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Course of Study: (5PIRS007W) Global Security

Title: Contemporary security studies (Chapter 28: After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies)

Name of Author: Waever, Ole and Buzan, Barry & Collins, Alan

Name of Publisher: Oxford University Press

28 After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies Ole Wrever and Barry Buzan

Chapter Contents • I n tro d u c tio n 4 1 8

• T h e o rig in s a n d in stitu tio n a l s t r u c t u r e o f s e c u r ity s t u d ie s 4 1 9

• T h e G o l d e n A g e o f s e c u r ity s tu d ie s 421

• I n s titu tio n a liz a tio n a n d sta g n a tio n 4 2 3

• D isc ip lin ary q u e s tio n in g a n d th e o r e tic a l re la u n c h 4 2 6

• C o n c lu s io n : t h e p o w e r s o f t h e o r y a n d t h e c h a lle n g e s o f t h e f u t u r e 431

Reader’s Guide T h is c h a p t e r p r e s e n t s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p a s t a n d p r e s e n t o f s e c u r ity s tu d ie s w ith an e m p h a s is

o n t h e ch a n g in g p e r i o d s o f t h e o r y p r o d u c tio n a n d p ra c tic a l p r o b le m so lving. T h e field s t a r t e d o u t a s a d is tin c t U S sp e c ia lty m u c h s h a p e d b y t h e n e w c o n d itio n s o f t h e 1 9 4 0 s s e t b y n u c le a r w e a p o n s

a n d a lo n g – te r m m o b iliz a tio n a g a in s t t h e S o v ie t U n io n , t w o f a c t o r s t h a t c r e a t e d a n e e d f o r a n e w

k in d o f civilian e x p e r t in d e f e n c e a n d s tr a te g y . F ro m an A m e r ic a n , th in k -ta n k b a s e d , in te rd is c ip lin a ry

field , s e c u rity s tu d ie s b e c a m e in s titu tio n a liz e d a s a p a r t o f o n e d isc ip lin e, I n te rn a tio n a l R e la tio n s (IR),

in c re a sin g ly in te r n a tio n a l a n d w ith t h e o r y a n c h o r e d in t h e u n iv e rs itie s . S in c e t h e 1 9 9 0 s, t h e field h a s

b e e n in a n e w p e r io d o f high t h e o r y p ro d u c tiv ity , b u t la rg e ly in t w o s e p a r a t e c l u s te r s w ith t h e U S A

a n d E u r o p e as c e n t r e s o f e a c h . T h is an aly sis is u s e d as a basis f o r raising s o m e c e n tr a l q u e s t io n s a n d

p r e d i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e f u t u r e o f t h e field .

Ole W aver and Barry Buzan

Introduction

T he fact that a book like the present one can be made, indeed had to be made, to present an existing field to people entering it testifies to major change in security studies. H ad a similar book been produced in previous decades, it w ould have looked very different. A 1950s version would have been very short. In the 1960s, it w ould have been structured with chapters on differ­ ent kinds o f policy questions—strategy, economy o f defence, decision making—and in some o f these (not­ ably the chapter on strategy) there would have been a lot o f theory (deterrence theory), but the theories w ould n ot have com peted for dealing w ith the same questions; a division o f labour would have kept them in different chapters, The 1970s edition would prob­ ably have been thinner on theory and more com pre­ hensive in the them atic chapters—and it w ould have com e w ith a com panion volum e (in German) de­ nouncing the whole field as part o f the repressive, mili­ tarized, Cold W ar system. The 1980s textbook would have been a reader o f texts arguing for and against the continued relevance o f the field, its possible widen­ ing o r even dissolution and m erger into wider fields. W ith developments in the 1990s, the field has come to take a shape as reflected in the structure o f this vol­ ume: the wideners have succeeded enough for chap­ ters on different sectors o f security to be necessary, and a num ber o f theories now com pete for tackling the whole field o f security In the first decades o f the twenty-first century, this reshaped discipline seems to gain increased attention, generate more undergradu­ ate courses and n o t least m ore—often theoretically inclined—PhD projects. This augm ented attraction is supported b o th by the prom inence o f "security" in the era o f the ‘global w ar on terror" and "climate security', and by the availability o f the family o f theories that sprang up during the 1990s.

O ur focus in this chapter is on security theory, which w e define as theory that aims at the understanding a n d /o r m anagem ent o f security issues. Such theory at different points in time resembles developments w ithin general 1R theory, while at other points there is less contact. For instance, some major developments in IR theory, such as 1970s interdependence and re­ gim e theory, had minimal im pact on security studies (at the time, at least), and some security theories were (originally) specific to security studies, such as deter­ rence theory or the C openhagen School, not gen­ eral theories o f IR* O ther cases o f security theory are

simultaneously IR and security th eo ry such as con­ structivism , feminism, or dem ocratic peace. While distinct from IR theory, security theory is also differ­ ent from security studies at large, because much work in security studies does not deal explicitly w ith theory Thus, security theory is a specific subset o f security studies and one whose development has gone through distinctive phases. (See Key Ideas 28. L)

One peculiarity o f this field is that it is divided more strongly than comparable fields into subsets w ith­ out m utual recognition, often w ithout even mutual awareness. Especially in European journals, confer­ ences, departments, and research centres, one finds a lively discussion o f a num ber o f relatively recent approaches: Critical Security Studies, feminism, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and the merits o f all these compared to "the traditional approach". Go to m ost departm ents in the USA or the leading jour­ nals, such as International Security and Security Studies, and m ost scholars there w ould say who?' and 'what?* about authors intensely discussed by a large n u m ­ ber o f scholars especially in Europe and parts o f the

KEY IDEAS 28J Terminology’ ’ ' ‘

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After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 419

developing world (Waever 2012a). In turn, the mostly American m ain scene has had theoretical debates cen­ tred on offensive versus defensive realism, the relative im portance o f ideational variables, and the role of pow er and institutions in orders (and empires). These debates did not structure the universe for m ost schol­ ars in the rest o f the world.

Therefore, w hen this concluding chapter attempts an assessment o f where we are, where we came from, and n ot least w here we might be going, it needs to fol­ low an asymmetrical structure, where the first part treats the field as hom ogeneous—a kind o f unified centre-periphery structure w ith the US definition of security studies unrivalled—while the later part splits into two parallel tracks. In the very last part of the chapter this evolves further into a global constellation, w here theory emerges from many parts o f the world, n o t least beyond the West. The chapter is structured chronologically. The first section looks at the origins and institutional structure of security studies—w hat and w here is it? The second covers the so-called Golden Age, the formative period o f strategic studies w hen m ost notably deterrence theory was developed and game theory applied to it (and in tu rn given m uch original impetus at the level of abstract theory), to as­ sist in the handling o f novel challenges from nuclear weapons. The third section is about the immediate post-Golden Age, when strategic studies was consoli­ dated as an integral part o f the security establishment, and theory often lost out to ‘hectic empiricism' (Buzan 1981, 2000), which m ight in tu rn have contributed to the decline o f strategic studies as a field. A fourth sec­ tion deals w ith the soul-searching debates on w iden­ ing and (sub)disciplinary identity during the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in various theoretical innovations. The final section looks from the current situation o f theoretical wealth into a future where these theories have begun to change their m utual relationships while also developing new ways to be involved w ith the m ain issues on the policy agenda.

T he first and second sections deal overwhelmingly w ith the USA, because this is w here m odern strategic studies em erged and found its characteristic shape. W h en m odern-style strategic studies grew else­ where, even w here independent traditions existed, this happened to such a large extent by attem pts to copy or im p o rt the American experience, that the formative period o f American strategic studies b e­ came the referent point for the field everywhere. A systematic com parison o f American and European

strategic studies is therefore presented towards the end o f the second section (referring to th e status in th e early 1970s), and only in the latest phases do distinct trajectories becom e self-reliant enough that a story o f two parallel tracks can explain th e pecu­ liarity o f debates unrecognizable to each other. The World beyond the West is for similar reasons only dealt w ith quite marginally, and mostly towards the end o f this chapter.

The origins and institutional structure of security studies

W ar and peace, threats and strategy, as well as dem o­ graphics and epidemics: issues like these have been on the agenda o f thinkers and w riters for centuries. However, anything resembling security studies as we now know it did n o t becom e a distinct field o f study until around the end o f the Second W orld War. As always, when a field is established, it is easy to see predecessors and preparatory w ork done in previous phases, and thus security studies can be projected back into the inter-w ar period w ith reference to w ork done on the causes and prevention o f wars (Baldwin 1995).

The novelty in the 1940s, however, was the emer­ gence o f a distinct category o f w ork at the intersec­ tion o f military expertise and university-based social science aimed at delivering policy-relevant knowledge supported by a broad, interdisciplinary academic knowledge base. In large part because o f the unprece­ dented implications o f nuclear weapons for w ar fight­ ing, b u t also because o f the broad-spectrum challenge to the USA posed by the Soviet Union (ideological and economic, as well as military) and the general prestige gained during the Second World War by both natural scientists (new weapons, code breaking) and social sci­ entists (for example, in advising on strategic bom bing priorities), civilian experts w ould now also specialize in military issues under the heading o f security. That the leading strategic thinkers should be mainly civil­ ians was w hat distinguished post-1945 security studies both from w hat had been done before, and from w hat continued to be done outside the West.

This institutional innovation happened at the same time as the concept o f security moved centre stage, becoming the guiding idea over previously supreme slogans such as defence and national interest (Yergin 1977; Waever 2012b).

420 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

General enabling conditions in the USA were: opti­ mism about the usefulness o f science; the possibility o f rational solutions to societal problems; novel secur­ ity issues that seemed n o t only urgent and prim ary but very much so (nuclear weapons and the Soviet, com m unist threat); generous funding for research; and exponential expansion o f higher education.

T he m ain key to the emergence o f strategic stud­ ies around the time o f the end of the Second World W ar and the beginning o f th e Cold War was the need for civilian experts to balance the military leadership, a need driven certainly by technological developments (nuclear weapons and the rapid rise o f war avoidance as the key strategic imperative), b u t also by broader political considerations about the potentially problem ­ atic political implications o f long-term mobilization.

The military driver is straightforward: gradually it becam e clear how radically nuclear weapons would transform the security equations, and the kind o f expertise needed differed from the classical military one. At some risk o f oversimplification (actual plan­ ning was quite a bit more mixed), the problem was that wars should no longer be fought b u t avoided, and ways should be found so that the possibility/ impossibility o f w ar generated by nuclear deployments could be manipulated for political gain. The centre of gravity shifted from the tactical and operational level to true long-term strategy (Brodie 1949), and from, the deployment o f a given technology to the targeted development o f fast-changing technologies for the fu­ ture. Although at first it seemed that even the games o f deterrence could be seen as controlled by the bot­ to m line o f w hat would happen in an actual fight, it gradually became necessary to treat nuclear strategy as a partly independent universe to be analysed in its own. right. This demanded a completely different form of knowledge from the one delivered by military experts. As succinctly p ut by Richard Betts (1997; 13); "Nuclear w ar spurred theorizing because it was inherently m ore theoretical than empirical: none had ever occurred/ Or, in the words of Richard Smoke (1976:275), the first pre­ condition for the emergence o f security studies was a "complexity dissectible by abstract analysis",

W hile this is probably a relatively uneontroversial interpretation o f the emergence o f security stud­ ies, it should also be noticed that the combination of nuclear w eapons and the Cold W ar m eant a need to coordinate m ore closely military and non-military considerations. Already w artim e experiences had shown, especially in. the USA, how challenging it was

to coordinate economic, political, and military plan­ ning (Etzold 1978: 1-2; Hogan 1998: 25). As it began to be clear that the Cold W ar could becom e a drawn- out, all-encompassing, and existential struggle, the idea took hold that one needed a form o f integrated understanding, where these different forms o f know­ ledge could become combined, and this was a major part o f the reasoning behind the N ational Security Act of 1947“ in addition to closer coordination o f the ser­ vices plus intelligence reform (Stuart 2008),

The specific challenge of th e USA, w ith its ''no- standing-armies '* tradition having to organize for long­ term mobilization, shaped the em erging civil-military interface in strategic studies. It was a deep-seated argum ent within American political thought that a perm anent military institution w ould be a threat to dem ocracy because it could be misused by fa tyrant an anti-democratic executive (Publius 1787-8: Bailyn 1992; Deudney 1995), Also, it was only during the Second World War that "the uniformed heads of the US arm ed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation s foreign policies1 (Stoler 2000: m). Therefore, when the USA moved to­ wards institutionalizing an unprecedented level of military mobilization, this could not be done purely in term s of ‘war* o r ‘defence". This is a central part o f the explanation for the rise o f the term "security" to cover the mobilization in. m ore inclusive and "civilian terms (Waever 2008, 2012b). And it conditioned a particular space for civilian expertise in a military-centred uni­ verse, The Cold War mobilization inevitably entailed a tension between American liberalism and military pro­ fessionalism, and the field o f strategic studies emerged as part o f the institutional responses to this tension (Lasswell 1950; H untington 1957).

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After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies

The Golden Age of security studies

The period o f the 1950s and 1960s is widely celebrated as one w here the field was simultaneously productive, influential, and relatively coherent. Although the field contained a wide variety o f other kinds o f w ork (to which we return shortly), the central and defining area was gam e theory and nuclear strategy. We pay particu­ lar attention to this period for two reasons. First, it was the formative period o f the new discipline, and therefore developments in the so-called Golden Age are n ot ju st episodes equal to m any others; they de­ fined how security studies was perceived: for good and bad these developments were the quintessential w ork o f security studies. Second, this m arked a (first) high point o f theorization, and we w ant to point to the pat­ tern o f ebb and flow o f theory m aking w ithin security studies.

The w ork on game theory and deterrence theory was a rare instance o f an intellectual development that scores high in term s o f theoretical creativity and sophistication, and simultaneously policy relevance. Very often this is seen as a trade-off—policy rele­ vance/utility versus theoretical abstraction /sophisti­ cation (cf. Hill 1994; Lepgold and Nincic 2001)—but w hen nuclear weapons created a novel challenge o f understanding a situation that was hypothetical and speculative through-and-through and open to swift and dramatic developments, a very sophisticated theoretical boom gained centrality politically. At the same time, this development became highly influen­ tial w ithin the academic world, because the nature o f the object allowed for a high degree o f abstraction and formalization that scored well on the criteria o f the day for a new, m ore 'scientific' form o f Inter­ national Relations. Under a Cold War situation w ith a boom ing US economy, a m ood o f technological optimism and a willingness to support social science as part o f the solution to social challenges (including n o t only the Cold War struggle b ut social problems o f all kinds), the reward was high for new approaches that seemed to move IR in the direction o f the use of scientific m ethods and tools, ranging from coding o f events data allowing for computerized data process­ ing, through cybernetic models and experimental psychology, to game theory. Deterrence theory be­ came a success story in this context for tw o reasons. On the one hand, it produced a seemingly productive (‘progressive’) research program m e where theoretical w ork produced ever new and m ore complex problems

that could in tu rn be dealt w ith by new theoretical moves. O n the other hand, all this seemed highly use­ ful because the theories actually produced their own reality o f abstractions, the w orld o f ‘secure second- strike capability’, ‘extended deterrence’, and ‘escala­ tion dom inance’.

This was reflected in the critique from peace re­ search and critical theory th a t the w hole 'Golden Age’ idea is a self-glorifying construction o f academ ­ ics whose real accom plishm ent was to make morally co rru p t governm ent policies (MAD, Vietnam) look respectable a n d /o r inevitable. Some critics said th at this w hole literature produced validating smoke­ screens for w hat the politicians and the military w anted to do anyway: build up a huge nuclear force and prom ote m ilitary Keynesianism (Green 1966, 1968; Senghaas 1969). A lthough it is undoubtedly true that these theories legitim ized deterrence and nuclear weapons as such, it is n o t fair to conclude that their ‘influence’ on policy was illusory. Theories of deterrence shaped the whole way o f m aking sense o f nuclear weapons, and thereby influenced th e shape, if n o t necessarily the size o f investments. The relative merits and roles o f bom bers, missiles, submarines, the uses and non-uses o f tactical nuclear weapons, and how to avoid vulnerability o f systems (the fa­ m ous basing study by W ohlstetter et al. in 1954)—for all such policies, there was a clear link from theorists to policy makers. But, in relation to targeting, there was a m ajor slippage w here Strategic Air Com m and largely continued w ith its ow n roughly ‘first-strike’- oriented policy (Rosenberg 1983). If one counter- factually im agined th a t the civilian experts had n o t existed at all, it seems m uch m ore probable th at the w hole nuclear build-up w ould have been shaped by an old-fashioned m ilitary logic o f maximizing ‘fire pow er’ w ithout m uch concern for overall stability and the political possibilities for signalling and m an­ oeuvring. Nuclear quantity was probably a product o f semi-independent dynamics having to do w ith the military industrial complex and the overall politics o f sizing the defence budget, b u t it should be beyond doubt th at Golden Age theorizing produced a dif­ ferent mix o f nuclear weapons w ith different quali­ ties and locations, and a different role in policy, from w hat w ould otherw ise have happened. For better or worse, this story o f the Golden Age and deterrence theory becam e the h e a rt o f th e discipline—its found­ ing m yth som ew hat similar to the way the first great debate operates in IR theory.

W h at is .most unique about this particular episode is, however, the degree to which policy-oriented w ork m ade significant contributions to general theory. This was n o t ju st application o f w ork done elsewhere to policy questions o r transfer o f knowledge to the political world, as we have come to expect o f th in k tanks, N either was it, as w ith the m ost recent think tanks* primarily about lobbying for specific policies, although the w ork o f RAND clearly served the gen­ eral interests o f the air force and had built-in biases towards a distrustful policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (Green 1968), This did not prevent lasting contribu­ tions to game theory. Even a m athem atician prefac­ ing the sixtieth anniversary edition o f von N eum ann and M orgenstem s foundational Theory o f Games and Economic Behavior (Kuhn 2004: x) posits that "many observers agree" that RAND was one o f tw o centres in which gam e theory flourished in the first post- war decade (see also D im and and Dimand 1996: 142-3), One need ju st m ention the 1950 invention at RAND o f the prisoner s dilemma (Poundstone 1992:103) and the late 1950s bargaining twist given to game theory by Thom as ScheUing (1960b). It is quite easy to see how these developments grew o ut o f specific chal­ lenges relating especially to the nuclear situation. Not­ iceably, these were also m ajor contributions to basic science at the same time (Dodge 2006),

The second biggest example from the Golden Age o f policy-relevant w ork that simultaneously consti­ tuted general theory was systems analysis, a m ethod for solving problems o f force structure and resource allocation th a t drew on economic theory as well as operations research developed by natural scientists, engineers, and economists during the Second World W ar (Stem 1967; Smoke 1976: 290-3). Several pion­ eering RAND studies were im plem ented into policy, notably the famous "air-bases" study by W ohlstetter et a i (1954). Several o f the leading representatives entered the Kennedy administration—McNamara's "whiz kids* (Brodie 1965; Kaplan 1983), From there, this m ethod and related RAND techniques like the * Plannmg~Programming-Budgetmg-SystemJ "spread through m ost o f the federal government" (Smoke 1976: 292). It is generally underestimated today how much, o f early strategic studies was n o t only inspired by the discipline o f economics (Hitch 1960; Schell- ing 1960a) b u t was actually about economics. A typi­ cal early course or 1960s-1970s textbook in strategic studies had strategy and deterrence as the biggest sub-field, but the second biggest w ould usually be 'the

422 Ole Wasver and Barry Buzan

economics o f defence"—n o t so puzzling given the size o f the American defence budget! (See Knorr and Trager 1977 for a broader treatm ent o f "economic is­ sues and national security'.) The image nowadays is often that Cold W ar strategic studies was obsessed w ith military questions, and this is partly tru e —it was mostly the economics o f defence planning—but strat­ egy was closely followed by economics as a key con­ cern. Most o f these textbooks had either no definition o f security studies or ju st a vacuous or circular defin­ ition o f security (something like securing th e state or essential values against threats; cf surveys in Buzan 1983; Buzan and H ansen 2009), W hat, de facto, .held the field together was a focus on defence as a pecu­ liar effort by society and an attention to all the related dimensions necessary for this; that is, selection, fund­ ing, m anagem ent, and politico-strategic utilisation o f military force, and the support thereof by various non-military instruments, Strikingly, clear definitions o f this kind o f security studies were only articulated m uch later, in the context o f the 198Cs-199Qs debate on widening. That is, their appearance testified to the opposite o f w hat they stated: that the field by then en­ capsulated a broader agenda w …

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