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Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 26(1) 103 –120 © 2010 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1043986209350437 http://ccj.sagepub.com

Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China

Bin Liang1 and Hong Lu2

Abstract

Since its first Internet connection with the global computer network in 1994, China has witnessed explosive Internet development. By the end of 2008, China replaced the United States as the largest Internet user of the world. Although China enjoyed tremendous economic benefits from Internet development, the Chinese government has tried to maintain tight control over the telecommunications industry and the public Internet use, and fight increasing cyber crimes. In this article, we first review historical development of Internet use in China and then focus on China’s Internet censorship and its regulatory control. Next, we explore how the Internet is actively utilized by both the government and the public to serve political and civic functions. Finally, we discuss cyber crimes as an emergent form of crime in China and examine how the Chinese government reacts to these offenses. Lessons from Internet use and regulation in China are also discussed within the context of China’s economic, political, and legal conditions.

Keywords

Internet, Internet censorship, Internet regulation, cyber crime, China

Introduction Internet use and development is one of the most important inventions in the second half of the 20th century. It has transformed people’s lives and its impact is beyond one’s imagination and is still to come in many aspects.

1Oklahoma State University-Tulsa 2University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Corresponding Author: Bin Liang, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Oklahoma State University–Tulsa, 700 North Greenwood Avenue, Main Hall, 2223, Tulsa, OK 74106 Email: [email protected]

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China’s Internet use and development did not begin until a decade later after its economic reforms. Its growth has outpaced other countries, and China by 2008 has the largest number of Internet users in the world. What accompanied China’s Internet development is the government’s tight control and regulation over Internet infrastruc- ture, its commercial and social use, and its potential political ramifications. Despite being criticized by human rights groups and activists, China’s Internet censorship system seemingly functions well as the “Great Firewall of China.”

On the other hand, there is high hope that Internet use and development in China will eventually lead to democracy in the largest country, testing the hypothesized rela- tionship between Internet use, free flow of information, and democracy. Indeed, the Internet has profoundly transformed the Chinese society in the last decade, even in China’s political-legal reforms. However, democracy is still as far-reaching as it once was and the role of the Internet in this reform has been constrained by the wider socio- political and economic context of China.

Like many other nations, China’s Internet use and development also witnessed surging cyber crimes, many in traditional forms but others as new phenomena. Unfor- tunately, this appears to be the least studied subject. Key questions such as the status of cyber crimes in China, the features of such crimes, and the government’s response to these crimes are rarely answered.

In this article, we briefly review the historical development of Internet use in China and its regulation. We also explore the issues of China’s democracy on Internet use, the political and civic functions of the Internet, and emergent forms of cyber crimes and the Chinese government’s response to them. These issues are all discussed within China’s wider social, economic, political, and legal conditions.

Internet Development: Beyond the Great Wall, Joining the World China’s Internet development has come a long way in a very short time (Wu, 1996). Though China initiated the economic reform and “open-door” policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the use and development of Internet did not appear until almost a decade later. In the late 1980s, China’s academia, with the support of foreign partners, began to explore Internet use. In September 1987, a symbolic message “Beyond the Great Wall, Joining the World (yueguo changcheng, zouxiang shijie)” was sent from China via email (Qiu, 2003). In 1994, China connected its first international dedicated line to the Internet and became the 71st country to register onto the global computer network and received CN as the highest level domain name (Lu et al., 2002; Taubman, 1998).

Similar to other countries, China’s early efforts at creating Internet networks were focused on the scholarly exchange of information. Its first networks reflected these interests, including the China Academic Network (CANET), China Research Network (CRNET), and the Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP) Network (Harwit & Clark, 2001). Soon after, China began to realize the significance of computer information

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technology in its economic development and encouraged fast development of Internet in commercial use to embrace the new information era. As a result, China witnessed tremendous expansion of Internet use.

China’s total estimate of Internet users was only a few thousands by the mid-1990s but grew exponentially afterwards. Based on annual survey data by the Chinese Inter- net Network Information Center (CNNIC), Internet uses in China reached 2 million in 1998, surpassed 100 million in 2005, and rose to 298 million by the end of 2008. China also replaced the United States as the largest Internet user of the world. Despite its uneven distribution across geographical regions (e.g., rural areas carry fewer users than urban areas), China’s Internet coverage of its total population (23% by 2008) already passed the world average coverage (22%) (CNNIC survey reports at http:// www.cnnic.cn/en/index/0O/02/index.htm; Dowell, 2006; Srikantaiah & Dong, 1998; Tan, 1999; Tai, 2006; Wang, 2002).

Along with the growth of Internet users, other indexes of Internet development are impressive as well. Since the official establishment of the CNNIC in 1997, the number of registered domain names increased from a little more than 4,000 in 1997 to 1.8 mil- lion in 2004 and reached nearly 17 million by 2008; the number of registered Web sites increased from less than 4,000 in 1997 to almost 3 million by 2008.

China’s Internet development has been bound to its overall economic development in general and the growth of its telecommunication industry in particular over the years. For example, in 1997, the numbers of fixed-line telephones and mobile phones were about 70 million and 13 million, respectively (annual data reported by the National Bureau of Statistics of China). By 2001, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest mobile telecom market and its total number of mobile phone users reached nearly 373 million by 2005 while the number of fixed-line tele- phone reached 342 million (Tai, 2006, p. 119). CNNIC (2008) estimated that more than 117 million Internet users accessed Internet via their mobile phones by 2008 and more than 90% of Internet users (270 million) had broadband Internet access.

In comparison to other nations (e.g., Abbott, 2001; Fan, 2005; Srikantaiah & Dong, 1998; Xue, 2005), the intervention and domination by the Chinese government has been the major distinctive feature of China’s Internet development. The Internet boom was made possible largely because of a “state-centric strategy for comprehensive informationization” (Hartford, 2000). This state-precipitated development of the Internet also ensured the state ownership and control of main Internet infrastructure and the use of Internet.

Internet Censorship and Regulation: The Great Firewall, Self-Censorship, and Multidimensional Regulations Given China’s single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development, its Internet censorship and regulation has evolved into a comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains.

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The great firewall. The predominant method of control at the infrastructure level is restriction of access to Internet information (e.g., regulating access and content, moni- toring Internet use). At the national level, only government-approved agencies and businesses are permitted to establish an Internet Interconnecting Network (also called “backbone network” or gugan wangluo in Chinese) and to license the operation of Internet service providers at the next tier. These networks are required to go through international gateways located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou and are subject to governmental control and regulation (see, for example, Cheung, 2006; Fan, 2005; Perritt & Clarke, 1998; Tan, 1999). At the next tier, all private Internet service provid- ers are licensed through one of these Internet Interconnecting Networks and are required to install filters to block away undesirable content. The bottom tier involves Internet users who are required to register with Internet service providers to gain Inter- net access.

The Chinese government has also been constantly updating its surveillance and control system. Take the “Golden Shield” project for example. As one of the “Three Golden Projects,” it was first proposed in 1993 and approved in 1998. This project, still going on, is part of the Great Firewall of China. Its main function is to censor and control Internet information both domestically and globally (Dowell, 2006). In addi- tion, China has established a special Internet police force to assist its Internet surveillance. In August 2000, Anhui became the first province to set up Internet police force and 20 others followed suit later; more than 300,000 personnel were reportedly hired nationwide by the end of 2000 (Endeshaw, 2004; Harwit & Clark, 2001; Keith & Lin, 2006; Tai, 2006).

Prohibited activities/materials/information related with the Internet are placed in nine broad categories by the Chinese government. These include information that (a) is contrary to the basic principles that are laid down in the Constitution, laws, or administration regulations; (b) is seditious to the ruling regime of the state or the system of socialism; (c) subverts state power or sabotages the unity of the state; (d) incites ethnic hostility or racial discrimination, or disrupts racial unity; (e) spreads rumors or disrupts social order; (f) propagates feudal superstitions; disseminates obscenity, pornography, or gambling; incites violence, murder, or terror; instigates others to commit offences; (g) publicly insults or defames others; (h) harms the reputation or interests of the state; or (i) has content prohibited by laws or administra- tive regulations (pp. 13-14; Cheung, 2006; Dai, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 2006, pp. 18-19).

Despite its great effort, the effectiveness of China’s Internet censorship is unclear. Although some argued that it is very questionable (e.g., Deibert, 2002; Lacharite, 2002), others viewed it as effective (e.g., Kalathil & Boas, 2001) and even as “the most sophisticated effort of its kind in the world” (Open Net Initiative, 2005).

Though there are many ways to circumvent the government’s Internet filtering, such as use of proxy servers, private emails, and manipulating one’s search (Abbott, 2001; Dai, 2000; Deibert, 2002; Lacharite, 2002; Zittrain, 2004), there still lacks knowledge of how many Chinese Web surfers adopt such approaches (Human Rights

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Watch, 2006). One common finding is the inconsistent enforcement of China’s Inter- net filtering. Studies show that Internet blocks have come and gone, and the content of blocks also varies from time to time, most likely because of the fact that there is no coherent and consistent decision-making process (Hartford, 2000; Sohmen, 2001). Another finding is the extensive scope of China’s censoring, covering not only politi- cal issues but also issues such as crimes and economics (Hartford, 2000; Open Net Initiative, 2005). Empirical testing of the Chinese filtering system also found that the filtering system is rather dynamic and has been self-changing and refining over time (Open Net Initiative, 2005). In sum, China’s Internet control represents an “imperfect control,” aiming at keeping the vast majority from sensitive materials and preventing the nonconforming small minority from mounting a real challenge (Hartford, 2000).

Self-censorship. In addition to setting up technological restrictions to Internet infor- mation at the infrastructure level, the Chinese government also put high pressure on businesses and individuals to conform to its censorship in Internet commercial and social use. For instance, governmental regulations after 2000 set a priority instituting self-regulation and increasingly delegated policing power to nonstate sectors (Cheung, 2006; Endeshaw, 2004). Given their limited choices, high governmental pressure, and potential stiff penalties, adopting “self-regulation” and complying with state censor- ship seems to be the only viable option to business owners. In March 2002, for example, the Internet Society of China (ISC) issued a “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the China Internet Industry” (zhongguo hulianwang hangye zilü gongyue) in Beijing, establishing the foundation of domestic self-discipline mecha- nism (Endeshaw, 2004, CNNIC Web site). Given the broad and vague nature of government regulations, many businesses decided to play safe and end up with even more sweeping censor mechanisms (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2006; Sohmen, 2001).

China’s surveillance system also target foreign business investors in China. The Chinese government gained technical support from foreign companies (e.g., Cisco, Sun Microsystems) in building its Internet infrastructure (e.g., Qiu, 2003), yet required Internet corporations such as Google, Inc., Yahoo!, inc., Microsoft Corp., and Skype to comply with Chinese laws and regulations and to modify their Chinese version of search engines to filter sensitive information (Battelle, 2005; Fry, 2006; Hinman, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2006). In 2002, Yahoo! also voluntarily signed the “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the China Internet Industry” (Dowell, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006). Despite strong criticism from human rights activists, these corporations have justified their censoring as necessary compliance with local laws to run business (and the Chinese market is simply too large to ignore). Moreover, foreign investors are specifically prohibited from owning, operating, or managing telecommunications services in China. Even after its entry into the World Trade Orga- nization (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese government carefully controlled its telecommunication industry: foreign ownership is capped at 50% for value-added ser- vices and 49% for mobile telephone and domestic and international services (Pangestu & Mrongowius, 2002). Despite great hope by many (e.g., Dai, 2000; Deibert, 2002;

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Harwit & Clark, 2001), the impact of WTO on China’s democracy in general and Internet censorship and control in particular remains unclear.

Multidimensional regulations. China’s legislation over Internet use and development has definitely grown and become more comprehensive over time. The increasing leg- islation also accompanied a series of changes in regulating agencies. As Tan (1999) delineated, the pre-1994 era represented an experimental era characterized as a frag- mented structure without a single authority; from 1994 to 1998, China witnessed a transitional period, during which a single regulatory coordinator, the State Council’s Steering Committee of National Information Infrastructure, was established to negoti- ate and cooperate with other governmental agencies; in 1998, the Chinese government merged the existing Ministry of Post and Telecommunications with the Ministry of Electronics Industry to form one major single regulator, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). Since then, the MII has become the dominant regulator of China’s telecommunications industry.

Given the complex and comprehensive scope of China’s Internet regulations, how- ever, many other agencies (e.g., State Council, Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Culture, and State Secrets Bureau) still have regulatory authorities in Internet use and development and remain actively involved (Open Net Initiative, 2005; Zheng, 2008). While making comprehensive Internet control possible, the involvement of multiple agencies and players also creates inefficiency, redundancy, uncertainty, and confusion (Endeshaw, 2004; Qiu, 2003). In addition, the lack of sepa- ration between state-owned operation and regulation (e.g., the MII is closely involved with China Telecom which owns CHINANET) may enable agencies with regulatory power to directly obtain financial gains (Sohmen, 2001).

One direct result of such a multidimensional regulatory system is the comprehen- sive scope of agency regulations. Laws and regulations enacted over time cover a broad range of issues from infrastructure construction to Internet network security, Internet domain names registration, computer encryption, management of online busi- ness operation, Internet news reporting and publication, and copyright protection. For example, regulations in April 1996 stipulated that all domestic computer systems could only be connected to Internet Interconnecting Networks via the gateways estab- lished and managed by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (which was later merged into the MII). The Administration of the Maintenance of Secrets in the Inter- national Networking of Computer Information Systems Provisions in 2000 prohibited Internet users from sending state secrets via email or discussing state secrets in Inter- net chat rooms or on bulletin boards. The Administration of Engagement by Internet Sites in the Business of News Publication Tentative Provisions in 2000 and Interim Regulations for the Administration of the Internet Publications in 2002 tightened con- trol over Internet news reporting and publication. Based on both, the only bona fide news is official news from government sources such as the Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily (renmin ribao); Internet organizations cannot cite foreign news without official approval; all online publications must be inspected and approved as well. The Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of Internet Access

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Services in 2002 (replacing the old one in 2001) requires that Internet business owners (e.g., Internet cafés) keep records of users’ information for 60 days for government inspection purpose.

Besides its broad scope, there are a number of other features about China’s legisla- tion over time. First, China’s legislation is often vague and uncertain in nature. For example, the key term “state secret” was ill-defined in the 2000 regulation cited above (Tai, 2006). Some scholars (Cheung, 2006; Endeshaw, 2004; Keith & Lin, 2006; Weber, 2002) pointed out that the Chinese government did this on purpose to ensure ample room for its interpretation and manipulation. In addition, the uncertain and unspecified broadness holds Internet business owners and users in constant fear and therefore strengthens their self-censorship (Cheung, 2006). Second, many regulatory measures are often post hoc reactions to unpredictable conditions (Endeshaw, 2004; Qiu, 2003). As a result, many key regulations have been revised and refined over the years to “bring social and economic life in line with a priori principles and expecta- tions” (Endeshaw, 2004, p. 46). Third, many laws and regulations overlap and create redundancy and confusion sometimes (e.g., due to different expectations and require- ments between the Communist Party and the central administration), and such confusion is reflected in the lack of coherent and consistent decision-making pro- cesses and inconsistent enforcement (Endeshaw, 2004; Sohmen, 2001; Qiu, 1999/2000).

Internet Development and Democracy, E-Government, and Civic Engagement

Internet & democracy. Given China’s Internet censorship and authoritarian polity, a question, often asked, is the relationship between Internet development and democra- tization in China. There is a strong belief that Internet development, free flow of information, and formation of civil cyber groups pose potential threat to authoritarian regimes and China is no exception (Kluver, 2005; Tai, 2006; Taubman, 1998; Yang, 2003). However, Internet use and development in China has so far failed such an expectation (Kalathil & Boas, 2001) and some even argue that the Internet has become a new tool for governmental control (Tsui, 2003).

One possible answer could be found in the profile of Chinese Internet users. Besides demographic changes over the years (e.g., greater Internet penetration rate, lesser gender and geographic disparity), one consistent finding is the majority Chinese Inter- net users’ apathy for political communications (Hong & Huang, 2005). Instead, the majority of Chinese citizens use the Internet for gaming, entertainment, sports news, celebrities, and study and career opportunities (Kluver, 2005). Furthermore, China’s culture may have a role to play as well (Weber, 2002). Zhang, Chen, & Wen’s com- parative study (2002), for example, found that compared to Americans, Chinese Internet users are more supportive of a greater extent of government involvement in Internet regulation, consistent with Chinese citizens’ general attitude toward a greater role of the government in governing the society. It is not clear, however, why the

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majority of Chinese Internet users show little interest in political issues. More empiri- cal studies need to address how Chinese Internet users feel about Internet use and development, despite the heavy top-down approach adopted by the Chinese government.

E-government project. The Government Online Project (zhengfu shangwang gongcheng) was kicked off in 1999. As part of this project, all government departments are required to build their own Web sites and provide online management and service functions (Lu et al., 2002; Wang, 2002). Registered government domain names (gov. cn) increased from 323 in 1997 to 13,963 by July 2004 (3.7% of the total registered domain names), and the number of Chinese government Web sites also amounted to 12,332 by 2004 (2.0% of the total Web sites) (Lagerkvist, 2005; Zheng, 2008, p. 38).

Through its E-government project, the Chinese government aims at reaching a number of goals such as increasing government transparency and organizational effi- ciency, strengthening propaganda (e.g., the opening of Tibet human rights Web site recently, www.tibet328.cn), reestablishing legitimacy of the Communist Party, con- taining or eradicating more pressing political problems (e.g., corruption), and gaining better control over lower-level and/or local cadres (Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Kluver, 2005; Lagerkvist, 2005). In this process, governments at all levels are encouraged to take advantage of the new computer information technology, and the central govern- ment is eager to show its lead. On June 20, 2008, for example, President Hu Jintao hosted his very first online communication with Web surfers, and Premier Wen Jiabao followed suit on February 28, 2009. Such Internet communication between users and top national leaders was hailed as a significant step toward “Internet politics” in which Internet users’ political rights of information, participation, and supervision were honored.

These e-projects also have an impact on the legal system. Take judicial reforms for example. In 2009 the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) published its Outline of the 3rd Five-Year Reform of the People’s Courts (2009-2013). To improve adjudication and execution of judicial verdicts, the SPC proposes displaying judicial judgments online whenever feasible. Several courts such as courts in Beijing, Henan, and Hebei have already started such a practice as early as in 2003. By April 10, 2009, more than 160 basic courts and 50 intermediate level (appellate) courts have reportedly adopted such a practice, and a total of 59,744 judicial judgments have been posted online at various courts’ Web sites (News reported on April 10, 2009 at http://www.chinacourt.org/ html/article/200904/10/352466.shtml, last retrieved on April 29, 2009; the Legal Daily, December 17, 2008; the People’s Daily, March 17, 2009). Most recently on April 14, 2009, the official Web site of China’s courts (www.chinacourt.org) also announced establishment of free email boxes at all courts to facilitate communication between the courts and the public (News posted on April 14, 2009 at http://www .chinacourt.org/html/article/200904/14/352922.shtml, last retrieved on April 29, 2009). Such a practice echoed similar moves by many administrative organizations and leaders, which seemingly gained much support (Hartford, 2005). To go one step further, some courts even started televising live trials online.

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Civil engagement. It is not accurate that all Chinese Internet users shun away from political issues in China. Rather, their participation shows in a unique form (often event driven) at critical moments (sometimes unexpected). Given the growing mass of Internet users, their online response, reaction, and participation have already created an unexpected amplification of public engagement in some key events (Dowell, 2006; Zheng, 2008). Take the 2009 “hiding from the cat” event for example. In January, 2009, Li Qiaoming was arrested for cutting down and stealing trees and put into jail in Jinning county, Yunan province. On February 8th, Li was mysteriously injured and died in a local hospital on the 12th. After a perfunctory investigation, local police and procuratorate announced that Li got injured when he was playing a game called “hiding from the cat” (duo maomao) with his jail mates. What was unexpected after the official announcement this time was the strong criticism and questioning by Inter- net users, and suddenly “hiding from the cat” became a new online bomb.

Under the pressure to discover and disclose the “truth”, the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department in Yunan (CCPPDY) recruited five Internet users to form a special investigation committee (and two Internet users even chaired the com- mittee). On the 20th, the committee went to Jinning county and conducted its investigation. Due to lack of access to key evidence (e.g., the coroner report, surveil- lance tape of the jail, and interviewing jail mates), the committee could not reach a conclusion and simply posted its investigation process online on the 21st.

On the 27th, the Public Security and Procuratorate officials of the Yunan province announced the result of its official investigation. According to the report, Li was bul- lied numerous times by his jail mates in jail and suffered injuries. On the 8th, his jail mates blindfolded Li and beat him up. Li’s head was hit and bumped into the wall, which eventually caused his death. Li’s jail mates made up the story of playing a game to cover the truth. The report also disclosed various violations of prison management rules and regulations by both prison guards and bully inmates and called for further action. As a result, one director of the procuratorate in Jinning county was deposed, and three jailmates were charged with assaults and sentenced in August along with two prison guards who were found negligent (information summarized from various Internet sources).

The “hiding from the cat” event finally came to a conclusion but the term becomes a new symbol among Chinese Internet users. It is true that public engagement in major events such as the “hiding from the cat” is nonsystematic, spontaneous, and unpredict- able. These events, however, do carry a great potential to shake political-legal reforms in China to some extent.

Cyber Crimes: Control and Evolution In comparison to Internet censorship and regulation, studies on China’s cyber crimes (wangluo fanzui) are scarce. Similar to Western nations, cyber crimes are broadly defined in China to cover crimes that are committed with the involvement of computer information technology; cyber crimes are further classified into two large categories: one on crimes directly targeting computer systems and information networks, and the

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other on crimes committed through the use of computers and their related networks (Chen, 2004; Keith & Lin, 2006, p. 119).

Based on statistics from the MPS, Yu (2007) reported that the total number of investigated cyber crimes in China was a little more than 400 in 1999; it jumped to 2,700 in 2000, 4,500 in 2001, and reached 6,633 in 2006. These numbers are no doubt only the tip of the iceberg, as the Chinese official admitted that the authority could have only managed to investigate 20% of estimate cyber crimes (News reported by the Xinhua net.com in Tianjin on November 17, 2005, available at http://www.tj.xinhua. org/misc/2005-11/17/content_5613021.htm, last retrieved on April 30, 2009). A report from singtaonet.com in 2007 even listed China as the second largest cyber crime nation in the w

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