Renee applied for a job with Prime Pave’s paving company. When the owner contacted her about her application he was surprised to find out that she was female.

Renee applied for a job with Prime Pave’s paving company. When the owner contacted her about her application he was surprised to find out that she was female. He said that hiring a woman would not work, as he could not afford to incur additional hotel room costs—possibly as much as $6,000, or almost 1 percent of total expenses—when they were on the road (she would be the only woman in a crew of four). Renee became angry and decided to file a human rights complaint, alleging discrimination based on sex. 

As the owner admitted that his refusal to hire Renee was based on her being a woman, the tribunal found that a prima facie case of discrimination was proven. (That is, a protected characteristic [sex] was a factor in the adverse impact [not being hired]). The burden then shifted to the respondent to prove that his refusal was based on a BFOR. 

Does the employer’s reason for refusing to hire Renee because of her gender constitute a BFOR defence?

Was it rationally connected to the job?  

Was the standard adopted in an honest and good faith belief it was necessary for a work-related purpose?

Was the standard reasonably necessary to fulfill the legitimate work-related purpose? Would accommodating the applicant cause the employer undue hardship?