Menendez v. Terhune (2005): Should It Be Treated as a Battered Child Syndrome Case? Imminence and Imperfect Self-Defense

Assignment: Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2005)

Review the case of Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (2005). After reviewing all relevant materials, answer the following question in APA format: Do you think the Menendez case should be treated as a “battered child syndrome” case, easing the requirement of imminence and allowing jury instruction on imperfect self-defense? Why or why not?

Original example for study purposes (about 900 words). Either position can earn full credit if it is well supported; this model argues that the case should not ease the imminence requirement.

Should Menendez Be Treated as a Battered Child Syndrome Case?

Background

In August 1989, Lyle and Erik Menendez shot and killed their parents, José and Kitty Menendez, in the den of their Beverly Hills home. At trial, the brothers claimed that their father had sexually and physically abused them for years, that their mother had ignored or participated in the abuse and that they killed their parents because they feared their parents were about to kill them. Their first trials ended in hung juries after the court instructed the jurors on imperfect self-defense. In the second trial, the judge refused to give the instruction and limited expert testimony on the effects of abuse, and both brothers were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. In Menendez v. Terhune (2005), the Ninth Circuit denied their habeas petitions.

The Legal Standard

Under California law, imperfect self-defense applies when a defendant has an “actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury” (In re Christian S., 1994). The belief need not be reasonable, but the defendant must actually believe the danger is imminent. As the Ninth Circuit noted, quoting California precedent, “the fear, no matter how great, cannot be of prospective danger or even one that is in the near future” (Menendez v. Terhune, 2005). The trial court accepted Erik’s account as true but found no substantial evidence that he believed the danger was imminent at the time of the shooting. Looking at his own testimony, the Ninth Circuit characterized the killings as “in effect, preemptive strikes,” because the parents were sitting in the den watching television and Erik understood that they would not harm him until they left the room. The court held that the abuse evidence explained why the brothers feared their parents but not that they believed they faced imminent harm, and it ruled that excluding the instruction did not violate due process.

My Position: The Imminence Requirement Should Not Be Eased in This Case

I do not think the Menendez case should be treated as a battered child syndrome case that eases the imminence requirement. First, imminence serves an important purpose. Self-defense, even imperfect self-defense, is justified or mitigated because the defendant had no time to seek other options. When a person believes harm will come only in the future, the law expects them to escape or seek help. In 1989, Lyle and Erik were 21 and 18 years old, legal adults with financial resources, cars and the ability to leave home, call police or seek help from relatives. These circumstances distinguish them from young children who are truly trapped with an abusive caregiver.

Second, the evidence about the moments before the shooting does not show an actual belief in imminent attack. The brothers purchased shotguns two days earlier, and their parents were seated in the den when the brothers entered and fired multiple times, then reloaded. Their actions after the killings, including the elaborate story they told police, spending sprees and the lack of any immediate claim of self-defense, further weaken the claim that they acted in panic to stop an imminent attack. Even under the subjective standard of imperfect self-defense, the jury must have some evidence that the defendant believed the danger was present, and the trial court reasonably found that evidence lacking.

Third, easing imminence for older children and adults would expand imperfect self-defense into a defense based on general fear. Courts that have admitted battered person or battered child evidence, such as the California Supreme Court in People v. Humphrey (1996), have generally used it to help jurors understand whether the defendant actually and reasonably perceived imminent danger, not to eliminate the imminence requirement. In State v. Janes (1993), the Washington Supreme Court allowed battered child syndrome evidence, but still evaluated it within the requirement that the defendant reasonably perceive imminent danger. Following that approach, the Menendez brothers’ abuse evidence could be relevant to their state of mind, but it cannot replace the requirement of a belief in imminent peril.

The Strongest Counterargument

Supporters of the brothers argue that years of abuse can make a victim hypervigilant, so that small cues, such as a parent closing the den doors, are perceived as signs of an imminent attack that an outsider would not recognize. They argue that the jury, not the judge, should have decided whether Erik’s fear was genuine, as the first juries were allowed to do. This argument is powerful because imperfect self-defense depends on the defendant’s subjective belief, and abuse research shows that victims may perceive danger differently. Newer evidence about the alleged abuse has also renewed public sympathy; in May 2025, a Los Angeles judge resentenced the brothers to 50 years to life, making them eligible for parole, although the parole board denied release in August 2025, citing prison rule violations among other factors (Altman-Devilbiss, 2026). Still, these developments concern sentencing and rehabilitation, not whether the evidence at trial showed a belief in imminent danger.

Conclusion

Abuse may help explain the brothers’ fear and anger, and it is appropriately considered in sentencing and parole. However, the law of imperfect self-defense requires an actual belief in imminent danger, and the evidence showed that the killings were preemptive rather than responsive to an imminent threat. For these reasons, I agree with the trial court and the Ninth Circuit that the case should not be treated as a battered child syndrome case that eases the imminence requirement.

References

Altman-Devilbiss, A. (2026, September 8). Menendez brothers’ next shot at freedom moved up more than a year to March 2027. The National News Desk. https://kmph.com/news/nation-world/erik-lyle-menendez-brothers-next-shot-at-freedom-moved-up-more-than-a-year-to-march-2027-parole-suitability-hearing-beverly-hills-parents-murdered-1989-sexual-abuse-prison-violations

In re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768 (1994).

Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2005). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/422/1012/569492/

People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073 (1996).

State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220 (1993).

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