This paper requires you to take an analytical approach to the issue, compare the differences in the US foreign policy to Guatem

CHAPTER 5

FRAMING AND THE POLIHEURISTIC THEORY OF DECISION: THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AND THE 1954 U.S.-LED COUP IN GUATEMALA

Michelle M.Taylor-Robinson and Steven B. Redd

Introduction

On June 27, 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala re-signed. His government was threatened with an invasion by a group of exiles led by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas who were part of a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–sponsored covert operation to overthrow Arbenz. Militarily, Castillo Armas’s small band of exiles had not been very successful; however, the intensive psychological battle being waged by the CIA was very intimidating to the people of Guatemala City, the Guatemalan military, and even to President Arbenz. Arbenz felt certain the Guatemalan military could defeat Castillo Armas, but his concern was that the United States would send its own military to invade if he did not back down (Gleijeses 1991, 317–322). Thus, the United States brought an end to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944 and the democratic government it established.The United Fruit Company also got rid of a government that seriously threatened its interests in Guatemala and throughout the region of Central America.This brief period of reform and progress in Guatemala was

A. Mintz (ed.), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making © Alex Mintz 2003

78

replaced by a succession of military-led authoritarian regimes and more than three decades of instability and guerrilla warfare.

This chapter uses the case of the 1954 U.S.-led coup in Guatemala to illustrate how a third party can attempt to frame a situation to bring about a desired foreign policy outcome. Specifically, we utilize the poliheuristic theory of decision and the concept of framing to more fully understand U.S. actions in Guatemala. This case has long been a subject of debate among scholars concerning the reasons for U.S. intervention, particularly whether the decision was based on Cold War security concerns or eco- nomic considerations.We argue that the United Fruit Company was mo- tivated by its own economic concerns but recognized that those concerns alone were not sufficient to induce the U.S. government to take action against the Arbenz regime. Hence, United Fruit framed events in Guatemala, through the U.S. press and contacts within the U.S. govern- ment, as a Cold War threat to the United States.We contend that framing and lobbying by a third party (the United Fruit Company) constrained President Eisenhower’s choice set and led him to the decision to authorize a covert operation to overthrow President Arbenz.

The stage began to be set for U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1944 when a popular revolutionary uprising overthrew the longtime dictator, General Jorge Ubico, who had ruled the country since 1931. Ubico came to power as a result of the world depression and its harsh impact on Guatemala’s economy. In response to growing working class unrest, the Guatemalan elite decided that they needed a strong leader, and General Ubico was their choice (Gleijeses 1991, 11). The “revolution” that over- threw Ubico was a spontaneous uprising by “frustrated and idealistic urban middle-class groups” (Ebel 1996, 458; see also Schneider 1958, 10–11). Al- though Ubico had succeeded in balancing the country’s budget, reducing graft, and building some infrastructure, his was a staid government that re- lied on repression to silence opposition and strikes and unpaid, forced labor to build public works projects. He was also an old-style dictator in his dealings with the United States and with United Fruit (UFCO). He cooperated with the company, gave it the policy concessions it wanted, and did not in any way threaten its lopsided, profitable arrangement in Guatemala (Gleijeses 1991, 11–22; Melville and Melville 1971, 21–22; Schneider 1958, 6–9).

In 1944, what started out as a teachers’ strike grew, ending with the ouster of Ubico and then the election of Dr. Juan José Arévalo to the pres- idency. Arévalo’s rhetoric of spiritual socialism and passage of a labor code threatened the Guatemalan elite and United Fruit, and began to concern the United States. However, Arévalo served out his six-year term, which

TAY L O R – RO B I N S O N A N D R E D D

Instructions:

Write 10-12 pages, double spaced (not counting your work cited) on a foreign policy issue facing the United States in the Clinton, Bush II, Obama, or Trump administration (1993-Present.)

*All papers will be checked for originality using NYU’s plagiarism detection software.

This paper requires you to take an analytical approach to the issue of your choice.

I want you to apply some of the theories and approaches that we have used in class such as: • The Realist, Liberalist, and Marxist approaches, or other schools of foreign policy • Domestic approaches to understanding foreign policy such as Pluralism, Elitism, The

“diversionary theory of war” or the “military industrial complex” • Changing structural realities in the global system • Psychological or personality based explanations of national leader’s behavior and

decisions • Bureaucratic or organizational approaches to foreign policy • The use of “soft power” (Nye) in US foreign policy • Differences between the “Clinton Doctrine”, “The Bush Doctrine”, the “Obama Doctrine”,

and the still forming “Trump Doctrine” • Rosenau’s 5 sources of foreign policy influence:

o External environment of the international system o The domestic societal environment of a nation state o The government structure that specifies the policy making process o The bureaucratic roles occupied by individual decision makers o Personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies of individual foreign policy officials

and government elites.

This paper should not be: o A persuasive policy brief or white paper arguing for a particular policy o An encyclopedic entry or statement of the facts without analysis o An opinion piece

Rather, I want you to develop as scholars and find the common themes, patterns, and examples of theories that we have discussed in this class in their application to recent and current foreign policy issues. _________________________________________________________________________

Choice TOPIC **:

compare the differences in the US foreign policy to Guatemala between the Bush II and Trump administrations.

Today foreign policy in Guatemala and US is that the US is using guatemala as a place to deport people to. however the relationship with guatemla has been different since Reagan financed the civil war in guatemala in 1954.

(The 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état, code-named Operation PBSUCCESS, was a covert operation carried out by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that deposed the democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz and ended the Guatemalan Revolution of 1944–1954. It installed the military dictatorship of Carlos Castillo Armas, the first in a series of U.S.-backed authoritarian rulers in Guatemala.

The Guatemalan Revolution began in 1944, after a popular uprising toppled the military dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. Juan José Arévalo was elected president in Guatemala's first democratic election. He introduced a minimum wage and near-universal suffrage, and turned Guatemala into a democracy. Arévalo was succeeded by Árbenz in 1951, who instituted land reforms which granted property to landless peasants.[1] The Guatemalan Revolution was disliked by the United States federal government, which was predisposed during the Cold War to see it as communist. This perception grew after Árbenz had been elected and formally legalized the communist Guatemalan Party of Labour. The United Fruit Company (UFC), whose highly profitable business had been affected by the end to exploitative labor practices in Guatemala, engaged in an influential lobbying campaign to persuade the U.S. to overthrow the Guatemalan government. U.S. President Harry Truman authorized Operation PBFORTUNE to topple Árbenz in 1952; although the operation was quickly aborted, it was a precursor to PBSUCCESS. Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected U.S. President in 1952, promising to take a harder line against communism; the links that his staff members John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had to the UFC also predisposed them to act against the Guatemalan government. Additionally, the U.S. federal government drew exaggerated conclusions about the extent of communist influence among Árbenz's advisers. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to carry out Operation PBSUCCESS in August 1953. The CIA armed, funded, and trained a force of 480 men led by Carlos Castillo Armas. The coup was preceded by U.S. efforts to criticize and isolate Guatemala internationally. Castillo Armas' force invaded Guatemala on 18 June 1954, backed by a heavy campaign of psychological warfare. This included a radio station which broadcast anti-government propaganda and a version of military events favorable to the rebellion, claiming to be genuine news, as well as air bombings of Guatemala City and a naval blockade. The invasion force fared poorly militarily, and most of its offensives were defeated. However, psychological warfare and the fear of a U.S. invasion intimidated the Guatemalan army, which eventually refused to fight. Árbenz briefly and unsuccessfully attempted to arm civilians to resist the invasion, before resigning on 27 June. Castillo Armas became president ten days later, following negotiations in San Salvador. Described as the definitive deathblow to democracy in Guatemala, the coup was widely criticized internationally, and strengthened the long-lasting anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America. Attempting to justify the coup, the CIA launched Operation PBHISTORY, which sought evidence of Soviet influence in Guatemala among documents from the Árbenz era: the effort was a failure. Castillo Armas quickly assumed dictatorial powers, banning opposition parties, imprisoning and torturing political opponents, and reversing the social reforms of the revolution. Nearly four decades of civil war followed, as leftist guerrillas fought the series of U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes whose brutalities include a genocide of the Maya peoples.)

Sources (5 pdf attachments ) ( 6 links to pdf and sites)

http://www.coha.org/latin-america-the-bush-administration’s-disappeared-foreign-policy-and-kerry’s- future-vision-for-the-region/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemala–United_States_relations ** Helps explain FP and US relation in guatemala

https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/30/guatemala-declares-war-on-history-dirty-war-archives-jimmy- morales/

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2003-09-01/bush-and-foreign-aid

https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ielr35&div=80&id=&page=

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/guatemala-asylum-deal-us-begins-deporting-asylum-seekers-to- guatemala-under-new-deal/

36

HollandPrivate Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy

Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy

William Pawley and the 1954 Coup d’État in Guatemala

✣ Max Holland

Introduction

In May 2003 the U.S. Department of State released a retrospective volume to supplement the publication twenty years earlier of a standard Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) compilation of documents on Latin America from 1952 to 1954.1 This supplemental volume was wholly devoted to the role of the U.S. government, especially the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954.2

The unprecedented step of publishing a supplement twenty years after an ostensibly deªnitive account had been released was taken only because of a loud hue and cry from historians. They rightly claimed that the earlier (1983) FRUS volume threatened to undermine the integrity of the series by not fully documenting Washington’s role in the ouster of Arbenz. Because the 1983 volume was incomplete, it conveyed a misleading history of U.S. relations with Guatemala. The U.S. Congress agreed with this argument and passed special legislation in 1991 requiring all federal agencies to provide State De- partment historians with the documents necessary for a “thorough, accurate,

1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, American Republics, Vol. IV (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers).

2. FRUS, 1952–1954, Guatemala (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce, 2003). On the day this supplement was published, the CIA made available 5,120 redacted documents, totaling 14,000 pages, pertaining to Operations PBFORTUNE, PBSUCCESS, and PBHISTORY, the agency cryptonyms denoting the primary covert activities relating to the 1954 coup d’état. (PBFORTUNE was a 1951–1952 contingency plan for ousting Arbenz; PBSUCCESS was the operation actually im- plemented in 1953–1954; PBHISTORY was the post-coup operation to collect and analyze docu- ments from the Arbenz government). These documents, only some of which were presented in FRUS, 1952–1954, Guatemala, were posted on the CIA’s Electronic Reading Room webpage, http:// www.foia.cia.gov/guatemala.asp (hereinafter referred to as CIA Guatemala ERR).

Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 7, No. 4, Fall 2005, pp. 36–73 © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

and reliable documentary record.”3 That law, greatly facilitated by the coinci- dental end of the Cold War, led to a general loosening of the CIA’s grip on heretofore sacrosanct documents from the Directorate of Plans (DD/P), the division responsible for carrying out covert actions approved by the president in the 1950s. The result is that the Guatemalan coup, a seminal event from every point of view, is one of the most thoroughly documented episodes of the Cold War, at least from the U.S. side.4

37

Private Sources of U.S. Foreign Policy

3. “Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, Guatemala,” Press Release, Ofªce of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 15 May 2003.

4. The Archivo General de Centro América in Guatemala City houses relevant documents, but its ªles are unorganized, according to one prominent scholar who has used them. See Piero Gleijeses, Shat- tered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and The United States, 1944–1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 396. Relevant and important documents surely exist in the archives of the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, especially regarding the Czechoslovak arms shipment of May 1954. Karel Sieber, a young Czech scholar with the Center for Cold War History at the Institute for Contemporary History (Prague), is researching this and related subjects. The U.S. literature on PBSUCCESS was one of the most extensive collections on a single Cold War event even before the publication of the supplemental FRUS volume. Covert interventions, climaxing in the overthrow of Chile’s Salvador Allende in September 1973, have also deªned historical writing on inter-American re- lations for a generation of scholars, as Max Paul Friedman observes in “Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin American Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States–Latin American Relations,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 5 (November 2003), pp. 541–552. Standard scholarly works include Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassiªed Eisenhower: A Divided Leg- acy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Gleijeses, Shattered Hope; and Nicholas Cullather, Secret History: The CIA’s Classiªed Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). For a recent work on the aftermath of the coup, see Stephen Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States and Guatemala, 1954–1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000). The most prominent works by journalists and radical leftist critics of American foreign policy are David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965); Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, eds., Guatemala (Berkeley: North American Congress on Latin Amer- ica [NACLA], 1974); Thomas McCann, An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit (New York: Crown Publishers, 1976); and Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982). General histories of the CIA and biographies of key ofªcials that treat PBSUCCESS in some detail include Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: William Morrow, 1962); David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisi- ble Government (New York: Random House, 1964); Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1979); John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II (New York, William Morrow, 1986); Burton Hersh, The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992); Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 1994); Chris- topher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Wash- ington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995); William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995); and Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared – The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). For useful memoirs of participants, see Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963); E. Howard Hunt, Undercover: Memoirs of

Despite the wealth of formerly top secret records now available, the role of William Pawley, a key actor in Operation PBSUCCESS, remains largely undocumented and therefore underappreciated. Known primarily as a fabu- lously wealthy businessman, Pawley was instrumental in sundry aspects of this covert operation, including the all-important provision of aircraft to the anti- Arbenz forces in June 1954. Yet Pawley’s name appears in only two of the for- merly sensitive documents released in 2003. That is not a quantitative im- provement over the 1983 FRUS volume, which contained just ªve documents referring to Pawley.5

Responsibility—if that is the right word—for this void lies neither with the State Department historians nor with their CIA colleagues but with the nature of the historical craft itself. The most that scholars can aspire to pro- duce, even under ideal circumstances, is a closely reasoned facsimile of what happened. A historical event can seldom, if ever, be recaptured in its full com- plexity. In this instance, moreover, considerable pains were taken to keep Pawley’s involvement entirely secret from the public, and certain aspects were shrouded from State Department ofªcials working on the overt complements to PBSUCCESS. If Pawley had not decided, late in life, to reminisce about his activities in an unpublished memoir, his part in the implementation of PBSUCCESS would probably have remained murky at best.6

38

Holland

an American Secret Agent (New York: Berkley Publishing, 1974); David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch: 25 Years of Peculiar Service (New York: Atheneum, 1977); Richard Bissell Jr. with Jonathan Lewis and Frances Pudlo, Reºections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003). Operation PBHISTORY, the fol- low-up to PBSUCCESS, is described in Max Holland, “Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2004), pp. 213–241.

5. Although Pawley is mentioned by name in only two of the newly declassiªed documents, dozens of them are indispensable in corroborating Pawley’s unpublished account of his role. In addition, the two documents that name him are signiªcant. The ªrst is a memorandum from Eisenhower’s new CIA di- rector, Allen Dulles, to DD/P chief Frank Wisner, suggesting one year before the coup that Pawley be appointed a special emissary to Guatemala in order to prepare a report to the president. The second document conªrms Pawley’s instrumental role in providing coup leaders with an air force. See “Mem- orandum re PBFORTUNE,” 8 March 1953, in FRUS, 1952–1954, Guatemala, p. 79; and “Memo- randum for the Record: Notes on Meeting with Messrs. Pawley and Hensel,” 8 June 1954, in CIA Guatemala ERR. The references from the earlier FRUS volume are “Memorandum of Conversation with the President, by the Secretary of State,” 19 May 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. IV, p. 1117; “The Second Secretary of Embassy in Guatemala (Hill), Temporarily in Washington, to the Ambassa- dor in Guatemala (Peurifoy),” 30 May 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. IV, p. 1154; “Notes of a Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, Held in the Department of State,” 9 June 1954, in FRUS, 1952– 1954, Vol. IV, p. 1160; “Notes of a Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, Held at the Department of State,” 16 June 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. IV, pp. 1170–1171; and “Notes of a Meeting of the Guatemalan Group, Held at the Department of State, 25 June 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, Vol. IV, p. 1186.

6. Pawley’s papers (hereinafter WDPP) are housed at the George C. Marshall Library (GCML) in Lexington, Virginia, and consist of two archival boxes. Most of the space is taken up by Pawley’s un- published 1974 manuscript, which he worked on intermittently for at least seven years. The often pro-

William Douglas Pawley, as his obituary in The New York Times noted in 1977, “led a life that could have been the substance of several old-time dime novels.”7 Despite having little formal education, Pawley was, as The Miami Herald put it, a “Florida legend of industry, diplomacy, politics and occasional international intrigue . . . a swashbuckler in a gray ºannel suit with a bit of a Midas touch.”8 Before Pawley committed suicide, he enjoyed a high-proªle career as an international salesman, businessman, aviation entrepreneur, U.S. ambassador, ªnancier, transit and sugar magnate, philanthropist, and special presidential envoy who dressed like an “‘upper bracket version’ of former New York mayor Jimmy Walker.”

Somewhat less well known were Pawley’s covert activities on behalf of (and sometimes despite) the U.S. government.9 Although Pawley was known for his expertise on Asia, his ªrst and most lasting international interest was Latin America. In 1900, four years after his birth in Florence, South Carolina, Pawley’s father moved the family to Caimanera, Cuba, to earn a living supply- ing the U.S. Navy at the Guantánamo naval base just wrested from Spain. Growing up among Cubans, William learned to speak Spanish with a sibilant Castilian lisp, and by the age of eleven he had developed a knack for salesman- ship when vending candies and fruit from a rowboat to sailors in Guantán- amo Bay.10 After graduating fr

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