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Jourotl of Pcnorality ind Social Psychology 1984 Vol 47. No- 6. 1231-1243 Copyntht I9M by the Amcncan Psychological A^™TI«M» Inc. Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment Charles G. Lord Mark R. Le’pper Princeton University Stanford University Elizabeth Preston Princeton University It is proposed that several biases in social judgment result from a failure—first noted by Francis Bacon—to consider possibilities at odds with beliefs and perceptions of the moment. Individuals who are induced to consider the opposite. therefore, should display less bias in social judgment. In two separate but conceptually parallel experiments, this reasoning was applied to two domains— biased assimilation of new evidence on social issues and biased hypothesis testing of personality impressions. Subjects were induced to consider the opposite in two ways: through explicit instructions to do so and through stimulus materials that made opposite possibilities more salient. In both experiments the induction of a consider-the-opposite strategy had greater corrective effect than more demandladen alternative instructions to be as fair and unbiased as possible. The results are viewed as consistent with previous research on perseverance, hindsight, and logical problem solving, and are thought to suggest an effective method of retraining social judgment. ” ‘I beseech ye in the bowels of Christ, think that ye may be mistaken.’ I should like to have that written over the portals of every church, every school, and every courthouse, and, may I say, of every legislative body in the United States.” Thus spoke Judge Learned Hand in 1951, so taken was he with the wisdom of Oliver Cromwell’s 1650 plea to the Church of Scotland. The criticism that human decision makers do not adequately consider alternative possibilities, especially those directly at odds with their beliefs and perceptions of the moment, remains as viable today as it was in Cromwell’s time. In fact, modern psychology has provided substantial empirical evidence to buttress the argument that our beliefs pervasively color and bias our response to subsequent information, evidence, or argumentation (e.g., Allport, 1954; Asch, 1946; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; This research was supported in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH-36093 to Mark R. Lepper and Lee Ross. We thank Lee Ross for comments on earlier drafts and Mark Snyder for making available stimulus materials for Experiment 2. Requests for reprints should be sent to Charles Lord, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ross & Lepper, 1980; Snyder, 1981). Cromwell’s plea is, of course, a very general admonition that could be interpreted as an exhortation to try harder—a caution that would imply a motivational account of human fallibility and a largely motivational prescription for more rational judgment. Raise the stakes, as the United States did in Vietnam, and the other side will begin to view the issue more rationally (Tuchman, 1984). The success of such appeals in history and in current research, however, suggests that merely trying harder may be less than a foolproof debiasing strategy (cf. Kahneman et al., 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). We believe that there are also more specific and more cognitive elements involved in this characteristic failure to consider the opposite and that these processes may underlie many attributional and judgmental errors. In particular, we would argue, people typically seem oblivious to the fact that the way they process information may itself influence their judgments and that the questions they ask may determine the answers they receive. Thus any inducement for decision makers to consider that matters might be other than what they seem, especially an inducement to consider 1231 1232 C. LORD, M. LEPPER, AND E. PRESTON Experiment 1 possibilities diametrically opposed to one’s assumptions, would have an ameliorative effect on judgmental bias. Judge Hand’s sugBiased assimilation of new evidence serves gestion, in short, might be taken seriously by as a good example of what can happen when those interested in promoting more rational opposite possibilities are overlooked. Those social judgment. who hold strong beliefs about an issue are Such a strategy might be implemented in apt to examine relevant evidence in a biased several ways. One general approach might manner, by accepting confirming evidence at involve direct instructions to consider various face value and subjecting disconnrming evihypothetical and opposite possibilities; for dence to highly critical evaluation (Lord et example, when a professor asks a new grad- al., 1979). As a result, partisans on both sides uate student to consider what the data from of an issue may adopt more extreme attitudes a proposed experiment might mean if the following exposure to mixed evidence, some expected results were reversed. This approach of it supporting one side of an issue and is direct, in that the professor describes the some the other. tendency to overlook alternative data patterns Lord et al. (1979) asked subjects who and explicitly instructs the student to imagine either supported or opposed capital punishthese outcomes. A second general approach ment to read two purported studies, one might be to alter the task or eliciting stimulus seemingly confirming and one seemingly disconditions in such a way as to make opposite confirming the subject’s beliefs about the possibilities more salient; for example, when deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. Both the professor merely asks the student to read proponents and opponents of capital punisha paper whose conclusions suggest an exper- ment rated those procedures that produced imental outcome opposite to that expected confirming results as methodologically supeby the student who has read only one side of rior to those that produced disconfirming a theoretical dispute. This approach is indi- results, and both used this perceived disparity rect, in that the professor neither describes in the quality of evidence on the two sides of the tendency to ignore alternative data pat- the issue as justification for adopting more terns nor instructs the student to adopt any polarized attitudes. The researchers concluded particular cognitive strategy, but instead relies that attempts to furnish objective evidence on the recommended paper to render opposite on burning social issues “will frequently fuel possibilities more accessible. In the present rather than calm the fires of debate” (1979, studies, we sought to induce consideration of p. 2108). opposite possibilities in two ways: directly, For those who value social science evidence through explicit instructions, and indirectly, on complex and important social issues, the through stimulus salience and increased ac- way in which Lord et al.’s (1979) subjects cessibility. Both the direct and the indirect evaluated new evidence seems less than opapproaches were compared with an alternative timal. We ought, therefore, to be interested manipulation that reflected the different as- in ways to inhibit an uncritical biased assimsumption that biased judges are insufficiently ilation of new evidence to existing beliefs and motivated. attitudes. The appropriate method of correcIn order to test the generality of considering tion, however, depends on where one believes the opposite as a debiasing strategy, we applied the bias to lie. One possibility is that the it to two different domains of social judgment: subjects in Lord et al.’s (1979) study were biased assimilation of new evidence (Lord, not sufficiently motivated to be honest, acRoss, & Lepper, 1979) and biased hypothesis curate, and unbiased and were not prepared testing (Snyder & Swann, 1978). We chose to suspend judgment until they could give these two domains deliberately because they equal consideration to both sides, as jurors seemed more involving than many statistical in the legal setting and elected representatives or mathematical problems such as probability in the legislative setting are often reminded or covariation estimation (Jennings, Amabile, to do. The remedy suggested by this analysis & Ross, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; is to instruct and educate prospective deci1973) and thus presumably more resistant to sion makers in the exercise of impartiality. A second possibility is suggested by our earlier correction. CONSIDERING THE OPPOSITE analysis. Thus Lord et al.’s (1979) subjects may have responded to a study’s methodology on the basis of its stated result, without considering the possibility that the same methodology might have produced an opposite conclusion. The remedy suggested by this analysis is to promote an explicit consideration of alternative possibilities, especially those possible outcomes that are diametrically opposed to those expected or perceived. Experiment 1 tested both the “be unbiased” and the “consider-the-opposite” remedies in a replication of Lord et al.’s (1979) study on biased assimilation of new evidence. Method 1233 In a consider-the-opposite condition we described the process by which biased assimilation is thought to occur (e.g., that strengths and weaknesses may be differentially salient), and recommended the following: Ask yourself at each step whether you would have made the same high or low evaluations had exactly the same study produced results on the other side of the issue. One way of characterizing the difference between the be-unbiased and consider-the-opposite instructions is that subjects in the former condition were told, “Here’s what can happen. Don’t let it happen to you,” whereas subjects in the latter condition were told, “Here’s how it happens and what you can do about it.” Consider-the-opposite instructions were thus analogous to Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard’s (197S) successful technique of overcoming perseverance by describing how it happens and reminding subjects that a different experimental experience might have brought different supporting cognitions to mind. Merely describing a bias, at least in an involving domain, has no ameliorative effect (Fischhoff, 1977, 1982), so the operative component of consider-the-opposite instructions was assumed to be the recommended strategy. One hundred twenty Stanford University undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement Twenty proponents and twenty opponents of capital punishment received each of three types of instructions. In a replication condition we used the subject selection criteria, experimental materials, and procedure described in greater detail by Lord et al. (1979). We selected as subjects students who on an earlier questionnaire had either favored capital punishment and believed that it deterred potential murderers (proponents) or opposed capital punishment and believed that it did not deter potential murderers (opponents). In a 1-hr laboratory session, each student received four pieces of information: first, a one-sentence summary of a purported empirical result demonstrating the death penalty’s effectiveness or ineffectiveness in lowering murder rates; second, a twopage description of the methodology that produced this result; third, a one-sentence summary of an empirical result opposite to that found in the first study; fourth, a two-page description of the methodology that produced this second result. After reading each of the four pieces of information, subjects indicated how much and in what direction their attitudes toward capital punishment and their beliefs about its deterrent efficacy had changed, both as a result of that piece of information alone and cumulatively. In addition, after reading each of the twopage descriptions, subjects rated how well done (from – 8 = very poorly done to 8 = very well done) and how convincing (from —8 = completely unconvincing to 8 = completely convincing) the described study seemed as evidence on the issue. The overall design was counterbalanced with respect to subjects’ initial attitudes, order of confirming versus discontinuing information, and which methodology was said to have produced which result. In a be-unbiased condition we added to the replication instructions a warning that “the particular studies you select1 may provide evidence on the same side of this issue in both cases, or they may provide evidence on different sides of the issue,” and continued: Evaluations. Lord et al. (1979) found preferential evaluations of how well done and how convincing the confirming and disconfirming studies seemed and subsequent attitude polarization. We examined the same measures in order to test whether the three different types of instructions had different effects. More specifically, we conducted a 3 X 2 (Condition: Replication, Be-Unbiased, Consider-the-Opposite X Initial Attitude: Proponent, Opponent) analysis of variance (ANOVA) of differences between subjects’ evaluations of the antideterrence and prodeterrence studies. The results are presented in Table 1. As shown by the pattern of difference scores in Table 1, instructions interacted with initial attitude in determining evaluations of how well done the studies were, ^ 2 , 114) = 4.21, p< .05. Initial attitude made a difference for students who received the replication instructions, fl, 114) = 6.65, p < .05, proponents finding the prodeterrence study better done than the antideterrence study (M = 1.6) and opponentsfindingthe prodeterrence study worse done (M = —1.1). Initial attitude also made a difference for students who received We would like you to be as objective and unbiased as possible in evaluating the studies you read. You might consider yourself to be in the same role as a judge or juror asked to weigh all of the evidence in a fair and impartial manner.” 1 As described in Lord et al. (1979, p. 2100), subjects “chose” the two studies that they were to read from a set of 10 that were in reality identical. Results and Discussion 1234 C. LORD, M. LEPPER, AND E. PRESTON Table 1 Mean Evaluations of Prodeterrence and Aniideterrence Studies by Proponents and Opponents of Capital Punishment as a Function of Instructions in Experiment 1 How well done? Instructions How convincing? Study Proponents Opponents Proponents Opponents Replication Prodeterrencc Antideterrence Difference .8 -.8 1.6 -.6 .5 -1.1 1.5 -1.4 2.9 -.8 .2 -1.0 Be-unbiased Prodeterrence Antideterrence Difference 1.7 -.7 2.4 -1.6 .1 -1.7 1.6 -1.6 3.2 -2.5 1.0 -3.5 Consider-the-opposite Prodeterrence Antideterrence Difference -.3 -.6 .3 .4 -.1 .5 .8 -.2 1.0 .2 .4 -.2 Note. Positive difference scores indicate prodeterrence study better done/more convincing; negative difference scores indicate antideterrence study better done/more convincing. the be-unbiased instructions, f{, 114) = convincing (M = 3.2) and opponents finding 15.51, p < .01, proponents finding the pro- the prodeterrence study less convincing (M = deterrence study better done (M – 2.4) and —3.5). Initial attitude, however, did not affect opponents finding the prodeterrence study the evaluations of students who received conworse done (M = — 1.7). Initial attitude, how- sider-the-opposite instructions, F{1, 114) < 1. ever, did not affect the evaluations of students As with the well-done measure, we conducted who received consider-the-opposite instruc- the same 3 X 2 analysis for difference scores tions, F\, 114) < 1. To compare the effects that reflected a tendency to find attitudeof the three types of instructions directly, we congruent evidence more convincing than conducted the same 3 X 2 analysis for differ- attitude-incongruent evidence. According to ence scores that reflected preference for atti- a Newman-Keuls test following this analysis, tude-confirming evidence (pro- minus consider-the-opposite instructions produced anti- for proponents; anti- minus pro- for less attitude-congruent evaluations than beopponents). According to a Newman-Keuls unbiased instructions, with neither differing test following this analysis, consider-the-op- significantly from replication instructions, posite instructions produced significantly less (p < .05). attitude-congruent evaluations than either Attitude polarization. The striking consereplication or be-unbiased instructions, which quence of subjects’ differential evaluations of did not differ (p < .05). confirmatory versus disconfirmatory research, As also shown in Table 1, instructions Lord et al. (1979) demonstrated,1 was ininteracted with initial attitude in determining creased polarization of partisans attitudes evaluations of how convincing the studies toward capital punishment following exposure seemed as evidence on the issue of capital to both positive and negative results. Thus, punishnment, F[2, 114) = 3.95, p < .05. On we also examined reported attitude changes this measure as well, initial attitude made a from the experiment’s start to its finish in difference for students who received the rep- subjects’ beliefs about the death penalty’s lication instructions, F{, 114) = 8.13, p < deterrent efficacy and in their attitudes on .01, proponents finding the prodeterrence capital punishment. The primary question study more convincing than the antideterr- was whether instructions to consider the opence study (M = 2.9) and opponents finding posite would produce not only less biased the prodeterrence study less convincing (M = evaluations of the relevant evidence but also — 1.0). Initial attitude also made a difference less subsequent belief and attitude polarizafor students who received the be-unbiased tion. Figure 1 displays the results graphically instructions, J=X1, 114) = 23.76, p < .01, pro- as mean deviations from a central line that ponentsfindingthe prodeterrence study more represents no attitude change. The graph 1235 CONSIDERING THE OPPOSITE collapses across subjects who read a prodeterrence study first and an antideterrence study second and those who read the same studies in the other order, and depicts only attitude change following the second (and last) study, regardless of which it was. Positive changes indicate that the net result of reading both studies was a shift toward greater belief in the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy or a more positive attitude toward capital punishment; negative changes indicate that the net result of reading both studies was a shift toward less belief in the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy or a more negative attitude toward capital punishment. As may be seen in the top panel of the figure, after reading the summary and description of both’ studies, subjects in the Proponents Opponents REPLICATION BE UNBIASED CONSIDER THE OPPOSITE Figure 1. Mean changes in beliefs and attitudes in response to prodeterrence and antideterrence studies by proponents and/Opponents as a function of instructions in Experiment 1. Belief change ordinate reflects increased (positive numbers) or decreased (negative numbers) belief that the death penalty deters potential murderers. Atthude change ordinate similarly reflects more or less favorable attitude toward capital punishment. / 1236 C. LORD, M. LEPPER, AND E. PRESTON structions put pressure on them to claim lack of bias and attitude change, even though they actually viewed the evidence against them as weak compared to the evidence supporting their own initial attitudes. To test this possibility, we showed 20 different Stanford undergraduates photocopies of the three types of instructions and asked them to rate the three conditions of Experiment 1 on “how much each type of instructions made it seem that we, the experimenters, would like the subjects to report that the two studies, one supporting their initial attitude and the other contradicting their initial attitude, were equally well done,” on a scale from 0 = absolutely no pressure to 3 = a lot (p
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