Before taking on an assignment you will look over the content and only use the references and resources provided in the attachments. No plagiarism and origin
Before taking on an assignment you will look over the content and only use the references and resources provided in the attachments. No plagiarism and original work to be done. NO OUTSIDE SOURCES ALLOWED!!
Discussion: Health Care For All Is A Nice Idea – But How Would We Pay For It?
Extending health care services to all persons is a popular topic of discussion, but the overall cost of paying the bill for the services is what seems to stop it from becoming a reality. Take some time to research the facts regarding what it would cost to extend basic medical services to all persons in the United States, and some of the proposed ideas of how it would/could be paid for. What are the likely effects for all stakeholders involved? Do you believe it is fair to expect “the haves” to pay additional personal and/or corporate taxes to provide medical services for the “have nots”? Should workers have to give up their current employer-sponsored private-pay insurance to move to one single-payer system, or should there be a choice, and why? Use peer-reviewed sources (not opinions) to respond to these questions in approximately 200 words.
** Kaiser Family Foundation. (2019). Paying a visit to the doctor: Current financial protections for Medicare patients when receiving physician services. Available at https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/paying-a-visit-to-the-doctor-current-financial-protections-for-medicare-patients-when-receiving-physician-services/
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. (2016). Physician and other health professionals payment system. Available at https://www.medpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/medpac_payment_basics_21_physician_final_sec.pdf
Part I – Paying for Hospital Services – Overview
By contract, third-party payers reimburse hospital inpatient services based on a predetermined, fixed amount for a particular service. For example, Section 1886(d) of the Medicare Act established a classification system for inpatient charges (called diagnosis related groups or DRGs). The DRGs are assigned by a grouping program, which takes into account the patient’s diagnosis, procedures, age, gender, discharge status, and comordibities. Medicare uses this prospective payment system to pay for hospital services on a rate-per-discharge basis that varies according to the DRG which is assigned to a particular patient’s hospital stay.
The reimbursement formula that is used calculates the payment for each specific case, multiplied by the hospital’s payment rate by the weight of the DRG of the case. Adjustment factors such as geographical location and outliers are considered as well. Every DRG weight serves to represent the average amount of resources required to care for that particular DRG case, relative to the average amount of resources used to treat the cases in all DRGs. There are currently over 740 Medicare DRGs, with these classifications and relative weights reviewed a minimum of annually. Other third-party payers have developed similar systems by which payment is calculated for inpatient services. Here are some examples of DRGs:
DRG |
Description |
Case Weight |
Outlier |
001 |
Craniotomy Age>17 Years, Except for Trauma |
3.0932 |
32 |
037 |
Orbital Procedures |
0.8821 |
26 |
072 |
Nasal Trauma |
0.6419 |
26 |
115 |
Permanent Cardiac Pacemaker |
3.5513 |
33 |
191 |
Pancreas, Liver, Shunt Procedure |
3.6598 |
36 |
302 |
Kidney Transplant |
4.1370 |
35 |
418 |
Post-Operative Infections |
0.9777 |
29 |
441 |
Hand Procedure/Surgery |
0.8785 |
25 |
488 |
HIV Extensive O.R. Procedure |
4.2177 |
37 |
This system of prospective payment determines the pay rates for care, even before the care is provided to the patient. We now need to consider operating payments, capital payments, and outlier payments:
Operating payments are a central part of Medicare's prospective payment system. However, if a patient's serious condition requires additional services or a longer stay in the hospital, Medicare makes what are called "outlier" payments (discussed below). These payments may be more than the base operating and capital payments. The elements of the operating payment are calculated as follows: DRG relative weight x ((labor related large urban standardized amount x core based statistical area [CBSA] wage index) + (nonlabor related national large urban standardized amount x cost of living adjustment)) x (1+ indirect medical education + disproportionate share hospital).
In 1992, Medicare also began reimbursing hospitals for their capital costs associated with care and treatment of a patient, on a prospective basis. The elements of a capital payment are as follows: DRG relative rate x federal capital rate x large urban add-on x geographic cost adjustment factor x cost of living adjustment x (1+ indirect medical education + disproportionate share hospital).
Outlier payments are provided as occasional additional payments to encourage high-quality inpatient care for seriously ill patients who are identified as care outliers (these are the extremely costly cases producing losses that are often too large for hospitals to offset with other less costly cases in the same DRG). Because of the significant cost of such cases, a fixed loss amount is set each year to adjust for common pricing levels in the hospital’s local market area. The background reading links provide more information on the outlier payment formula as well as the process for calculation.
Part II – Paying for Physician Services – Overview
Until 1991, Medicare paid physicians based on the concept of reasonable charges. These charges were defined as the lowest of three factors: the actual cost of the service provided, the physician’s usual/customary charge, or the prevailing charge for the cost of the service in that particular community.
The physician payment system changed in 1992, moving to a resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) system. This new system took into account three new components of care resources: the physician’s work (skill level, time, stress, other work-related factors), overhead/practice expenses (nonphysician costs, excluding cost of malpractice insurance), and the actual cost of malpractice insurance.
In this module, we will explore how to calculate physician reimbursements based on this newer RBRVS model. Each of the over 8,000 procedure codes are given relative value units (RVUs) for each of the three care resource components. After additional adjustments for geographic cost differentials, the units are added to calculate the total number of RVUs for the care provided. That number is then multiplied by a conversion factor that equals the dollar value of one unit, to arrive at the dollar amount of the reimbursement.
The following table should help you better understand how rates are calculated:
Categories |
RVU |
Geographic Cost Index |
Product |
Conversion Factor |
Work |
27.36 |
1.089 |
29.80 |
– |
Practice Expense |
33.59 |
1.473 |
49.48 |
– |
Malpractice |
6.82 |
0.646 |
4.41 |
– |
Total |
– |
– |
83.69 |
69.87 |
The product values are added up and multiplied by the conversion factor. Using the above figures, the payment rate would be $5,847.42. Now that we know the Medicare approved rate, we can move on to:
How are Physicians Reimbursed?
The following should help you better understand the distinction made between participating physicians and non-participating physicians:
Participating physicians:
· Accept assignment on each and every patient case
· Bill Medicare and the patient 100% of the Medicare-approved fee for a procedure
· Receive payment from Medicare equal to 80% of the Medicare-approved fee, and patient pays 20% of the approved fee
Non-participating physicians who accept assignment on a case-by-case basis:
· Bill Medicare and the patient 95% of the Medicare-approved fee for a procedure
· Receive payment from Medicare equal to 80% of the Medicare-approved fee for non-participating physicians (95%), and patient pays 20% of the approved fee
Non-participating physicians who do not accept assignment:
· Bill the patient for 115% of the Medicare-approved fee for non-participating physicians (which is already at 95% of fee for participating physicians)
· Receive entire payment from the patient. Then Medicare reimburses the patient for 80% of the approved fee for non-participating physicians
The following examples should help you better understand billing by and payment to physicians:
Assume the Medicare-approved fee for a procedure is $1,000. This means that the Medicare-approved fee for non-participating physicians is $950.
The participating physician will bill Medicare and the patient. Medicare will pay the doctor $800 (80%), and the patient pays $200 (20%).
The non-participating physician who accepts assignment bills Medicare and the patient. Medicare pays $760 (80% of the $950) and the patient pays $190 (20% of the $950).
The non-participating physician who does not accept assignment bills the patient a maximum of $1,092.50 (115% of the $950). This is called limiting charge. The patient pays the physician the entire amount. Then Medicare reimburses the patient $760 (80% of the $950 approved fee). In this scenario, the physician gets paid more than the participating physician but can only look to the patient. In this scenario, the patient is on the hook for $332.50, because Medicare will not pay more than $760.
,
4 9
THEME SET-UP: Big sky’s revenue sourCes
C H A P T E R 3
PAYING FOR HEALTH SERVICES
Big Sky Dermatology Specialists is a small group practice in Jackson, Wyoming. The city is located in the scenic Jackson Hole Valley and is a major gateway to the Grand Teton and Yellowstone National Parks. In addition, it is home to the world’s largest ball of barbed wire. (It is amazing what you learn when studying healthcare finance!)
Jen Latimer, a recent graduate of Idaho State University’s healthcare administration program, was just hired to be Big Sky’s practice manager. One of her first tasks was to review the group’s payer mix. (Payer mix is a listing of the individuals and organizations that pay for a provider’s services, along with each payer’s percentage of revenues.) After all, revenues are the first step (of many) needed to ensure the financial success of any business.
To understand Big Sky’s revenues more thoroughly, Jen focused on two questions. First, who are the payers? In other words, where does Big Sky’s revenue come from? Second, what methods do the payers use to determine the payment amount? By gaining an appreciation of the group’s revenues, Jen believed she could accurately judge the financial riskiness of the practice. Furthermore, she would
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C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 8 . G a t e w a y t o H e a l t h c a r e M a n a g e m e n t .
A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .
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G a p e n s k i ’ s F u n d a m e n t a l s 0 f H e a l t h c a r e F i n a n c e5 0
be able to identify possible steps toward increasing the practice’s revenues and reduce the riskiness associated with those revenues.
By the end of the chapter, you will have a better understanding of healthcare-provider revenue sources and how the specific payment method influences provider behavior. Spe- cifically, you, like Jen, will know more about how these issues affect Big Sky.
After studying this chapter, you will be able to do the following:
➤ List the key features of insurance.
➤ Describe the major types of third-party payers.
➤ Discuss, in general terms, the reimbursement methods used by third-party
payers, and the associated incentives and risks for providers.
➤ Explain how clinical and procedural coding affects reimbursement.
➤ Define the specific reimbursement methods used by Medicare.
➤ Describe the key features of healthcare reform.
LEARNING OBjECTIvES
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C h a p t e r 3 : P a y i n g f o r H e a l t h S e r v i c e s 5 1
3.1 INTRODUCTION In most industries, the consumer of the product or service (1) has a choice among many suppliers, (2) can distinguish the quality of competing goods or services, (3) makes a (pre- sumably) rational decision regarding the purchase on the basis of quality and price, and (4) pays for the full cost of the purchase.
The provision of healthcare services does not follow this general model, as healthcare is delivered under unique circumstances. First, often only a few individuals or organizations provide a particular service. Second, judging the quality of competing providers is difficult, if not impossible. Third, the decision (or at least recommendation) on which provider to use for a particular service typically is not made by the consumer but rather by a physician or some other clinician. Fourth, the bulk of the payment to the provider is not normally made by the user (the patient) but by an insurer. Finally, for most individuals, the purchase of health insurance is paid for (or heavily subsidized) by employers or government agencies, so many patients are insulated from the true cost of healthcare services.
This highly unusual marketplace significantly influences the supply of and demand for healthcare services. To gain a better understanding of the unique payment mechanisms involved, we must examine the healthcare reimbursement system.
3.2 BASIC INSURANCE CONCEPTS Because insurance is the cornerstone of healthcare reimbursement, an appreciation of basic insurance concepts will help you better understand the marketplace for healthcare services.
A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATION
Assume that no health insurance exists and that you face only two medical outcomes in the coming year:
Outcome Probability Cost Stay healthy 0.99 $ 0 Get sick 0.01 50,000 1.00
What is your expected healthcare cost (in the statistical sense) for the coming year? To find the answer—$500—multiply the cost of each outcome by its probability of occur- rence and then sum the products:
Expected cost = (Probability of outcome 1 × Cost of outcome 1) + (Probability of outcome 2 × Cost of outcome 2)
= (0.99 × $0) + (0.01 × $50,000) = $0 + $500 = $500.
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Now, assume that everyone else faces the same medical outcomes and hence faces the same odds and costs associated with healthcare. Fur- thermore, assume that you, and everyone else, make $60,000 a year. With this salary, you can easily afford the $500 expected healthcare cost. The problem, however, is that no one’s actual cost will be $500. If you stay healthy, your cost will be zero; if you get sick, your cost will be $50,000, and this amount could force you, and most people who get sick, into personal bankruptcy, which is a ruin- ous event. (Do not forget that you have to pay all of your living expenses out of your $60,000 annual income in addition to any healthcare costs.)
Now, suppose an insurance policy that pays all of your healthcare costs for the coming year is available for $600.Would you take the policy, even though it costs $100 more than your “expected” healthcare costs?
Most people would, and do. Because individuals are risk averse (see “Critical Concept: Risk Aversion”), they are willing to pay $100 more than their expected benefit to eliminate the risk of financial ruin. In effect, policyholders are passing the costs associated with the risk of getting sick to the insurer who, as you will see, is spreading those costs over a large number of subscribers.
Would an insurer be willing to offer the policy for $600? If the insurer could sell enough policies, it would know its revenues and costs with some precision. For example, if the insurer sold a million policies, it would collect 1,000,000 × $600 = $600 million in health insurance premiums; pay out roughly 1,000,000 × $500 = $500 million in claims; and have about $100 million to cover administrative costs. It could provide a reserve in case claims are greater than predicted and make a profit. By writing a large number of policies, the financial risk inherent in medical costs can be spread over a large number of people, reducing the risk for the insurance company (and for each individual).
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURANCE
The simple example discussed earlier illustrates why individuals seek health insurance and why insurance companies are formed to provide such insurance. Next, we will dig a little deeper into insurance basics.
Insurance typically has four distinct characteristics:
1. Pooling of losses. The pooling (sharing) of losses is the heart of insurance. Pooling means that losses are spread over a large group of individuals so that
Pooling
The spreading of
losses over a large
group of individuals (or
organizations).
CRITICAL CONCEPT Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is the tendency of individuals and businesses to
dislike financial risk. Risk-averse individuals and businesses
are motivated to use insurance and other techniques to protect
against risk. For example, a favorite tool to control risk is di-
versification, which in the context of revenues means lowering
risk by having different sources of income. By not depending
on one source—say, Medicare patients—a provider can reduce
the uncertainty (riskiness) of its revenue stream. Insurance
is another way to limit risk. Individuals buy insurance on the
houses they own to limit the consequences of calamitous
events, such as fires or hurricanes.
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C h a p t e r 3 : P a y i n g f o r H e a l t h S e r v i c e s 5 3
each individual realizes the average loss of the pool rather than the actual loss incurred. In addition, pooling involves the grouping of a large number of homogeneous exposure units (people or things having the same risk characteristics). Thus, pooling implies (a) the sharing of losses by the entire group and (b) the prediction of future losses with some accuracy based on the law of large numbers. (The law of large numbers implies that predicting outcomes is easier when many identical trials are involved. For example, if a coin is flipped only once, you do not know whether the results will be heads or tails. However, if the coin is flipped 1,000 times, the result will be very close to 500 heads and 500 tails. In other words, you cannot predict the results of a single toss with any confidence, but you can predict the aggregate results if you have a large pool of tosses.)
2. Payment only for random losses. A random loss is unforeseen and occurs as a result of chance. Insurance is based on the premise that payments are made only for losses that are random. We discuss the moral hazard problem, in which losses are not random, in a later section.
3. Risk transfer. An insurance plan almost always involves risk transfer. The sole exception to the element of risk transfer is self-insurance, whereby an individual or a business does not buy insurance. (Self-insurance is discussed in a later section.) Risk transfer means that the risk is shifted from the insured to the insurer, which typically is in a better financial position to pay the loss than is the insured because of the premiums collected. In addition, because of the law of large numbers, the insurance company is better able to predict its losses.
4. Indemnification. Indemnification is the reimbursement of the insured if a loss occurs. In the context of health insurance, indemnification occurs when the insurer pays, in whole or in part, the insured or the provider for the expenses related to an insured’s illness or injury.
In summary, we applied these four characteristics to our insurance example: (1) The losses are pooled across a million individuals, (2) the losses on each individual are random (unpredictable), (3) the risk of loss is passed to the insurance company, and (4) the insur- ance company pays for any losses.
REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS
Insurance works fine when the four basic characteristics are present. However, if any of these characteristics is violated, problems arise. The two most common problems are adverse selection and moral hazard.
Random loss
An unpredictable
loss, such as one that
results from a fire or
hurricane.
Risk transfer
The passing of risk
from one individual or
business to another
(usually an insurer).
Indemnification
The agreement to pay
for losses incurred by
another party.
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Adverse Selection
Adverse selection occurs because those individu- als and businesses likely to incur losses are more inclined to purchase insurance than are those less likely to incur losses (see “Critical Concept: Adverse Selection”). For example, an otherwise healthy individual without insurance who needs a costly surgical procedure is more apt to get health insurance if she can afford it, whereas an identi- cal individual without the threat of surgery is less likely. Similarly, consider the health insurance
purchase likelihood of a 20-year-old versus that of a 65-year-old. All else the same, the older individual, with much greater health risk because of age, will probably obtain insur- ance. (Individuals aged 65 or older consume, on average, more than three times the dollar amount of healthcare services that younger individuals do.)
If the tendency toward adverse selection goes unchecked, a disproportionate num- ber of sick people, or those most likely to become sick, will seek health insurance, causing the insurer to experience higher-than-expected claims. This increase in claims will trigger a premium increase, which worsens the problem, because healthier members of the plan will either pursue cheaper rates from another company (if available) or forgo insurance.
One way health insurers attempt to control adverse selection is by instituting underwriting provisions. Thus, smokers may be charged a higher premium than nonsmokers. Another way is by including preexisting condition clauses in contracts, although this strategy was disallowed by the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010. (A preexisting condition is a physical or mental condition of the insured individual that existed before the issuance of the policy.) A typical clause might state that preexisting conditions are not covered until the policy has been in force for some period—say, one or two years. Preexisting conditions present a true problem for the health insurance field because an important characteristic of insurance is randomness. If an individual has a preexisting condition, the insurer no longer bears random risk but rather assumes the role of payer for the treatment of a known condition.
Because insurers tend to avoid paying large predictable claims, the US Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996. Among other actions, HIPAA set national standards, which could be modified within limits by the states, regarding what provisions could be included in health insurance policies. For example, under a group health policy—say, one that covers employees of a furniture manu- facturer—coverage to individuals cannot be denied or limited, and employees cannot be required to pay more in premiums if they suffer from poor health.
HIPAA also limited insurers’ ability to impose preexisting condition clauses and how long they could delay before beginning coverage. It allowed time credit for preexisting condi- tions under one plan to be counted tow
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