What unique contributions do the select readings make to their specific area/topic and to the sociology of race and ethnicity more broadly?

Below, write up a reflection (350-500 words) based on a selection of readings (at least 2 articles) from Week 6.

What unique contributions do the select readings make to their specific area/topic and to the sociology of race and ethnicity more broadly?

You may use the Object of Study Handout.pdF as an aid to assess your selection of readings before you write your reflection.

Requirements: 300-500

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2 Jane Lewis Qare Midgley, Women Against Slavery. The British Campaigns, 1780-1870 Mark Harrison Maryinez Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire Robert Ross Wim van Binsbergen, Tears of Rain: Ethnicity and History in Central Western Zambia Elliott R. Barkan Albert B. Robillard (ed.), Social Change in the Pacific Islands Sylvia Chant Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood (eds), ‘Viva’: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America Susan Halford Cindi Katz and Janice Monk (eds), Full Circles: Geographies of Women over the Lifecourse Jan Penrose Hans van Amersfoort and Hans Knippenberg (eds), States and Nations. The Rebirth of the ‘Nationalities Question’ in Europe Hans van Amersfoort Elizabeth D. Huttman, Wim Blauw and Juliet Saltman (eds), Urban Housing Segregation of Minorities in Western Europe and the United States David J. O’Brien Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor and Harry H.L. Kitano (eds), Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress Won Moo Hurh David J. O’Brien and Stephen S. Fu~ta, The Japanese American Experience Steven J. Gold Paul James Rutledge, The Vietnamese Experience in America BOOKS RECEIVED 352 353 354 356 357 359 360 362 363 364 366 368 ‘·”‘ f. r· r ~ Rethinking ethnicity: identity, categorization and power Richard Jenkins Abstract This article argues that ethnic identity is to be understood and theorized as an example of social identity in general and that externally-located processes of social categorization are enormously influential in the production and reproduction of social identities. However, much research concerned with ethnicity, particularly social anthropological research, inspired, whether directly or indirectly, by Barth’s Ethnic Group.sand Boundaries, has concen­trated upon internal process of group identification, at the expense of categor­ization. To acknowledge the necessary role of categoriza1ion in the social construction of ethnic identity is also to recognize (a) the importance of power and authority relations (domination) in that process, and (b) a distinc­tion, which is developed in this article, between the nominal and 1he virtual dimensions of ethnic and other social identities. Finally, the artide offers an outline of a substantive research agenda concerned with contexts of social categorization. One of the most influential models of ethnicity and inter-ethnic social relations is that which was outlined by social anthropologist Fredrik Barth and his colleages in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Barth 1969a). The perspective put forv,,ard in that collection drew, on the one hand, upon the meta-theoretical model of social forms as generated by inter­personal transactions outlined in Barth’s earlier Models of Social Organ­isation (Barth 1966) and, on the other, upon a structural-functionalist tradition concerned with the study of ‘plural societies’ (R. Cohen 1978; Jenkins 1986a). However, the Barthian approach departed in a signifi­cant fashion from the then-dominant structural functionalism of social anthropology inasmuch as it emphasized the perceptions and purposive decision-making of social actors, rather than viewing individuals as more-or-less determined, general ‘bearers’ of the norms and values of their culture. Barth’s original view of ethnicity consists of a number of elements. Pride of place must be given to the insight that ethnicity is not an immutable bundle of cultural traits which it is sufficient to enumerate in order to identify a person as an ‘X’ or a ‘Y’ or locate the boundary Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 17 Number 2 April 1994 © Routledge 1994 0141-9870

198 Richard Jenkins “‘ between ethnic collectivities. Rather, ethnicity is situationally defined·~!i, produced in the course of social transactions that occur at or ~-;:;J~_ (and in the process help to constitute) the ethnic boundary in question F’ Ethnic boundaries are permeable, existing despite the flow of personnei · -~ or interaction across them; criteria of ethnic ascription and subscription are variable in their nature and salience. While remaining firmly grounded in his original 1966 Models project Barth has subsequently modified his vision of ethnicity somewhat. Hi; recent discussions of cultural pluralism in complex societies emphasize the importance of history, in addition to the transactional ebb-and-Dow of the here-and-now (Barth 1984; 1989). Barth invokes history in two distinct senses: as the ongoing progress of events which constitutes the context and content of the here-and-now, and as ‘streams’ of ‘tradition’ -the reference here to Redfield is explicit -within which people are to differing degrees located and of which they differentially partake. Emphasizing history produces a shift of emphasis away from the indi­vidualistic voluntarism of his earlier writings (which has always been one of the standard criticisms of Barth’s work: Paine 1976; Evens 1977) towards a Weberian acknowledgement of the unintended consequences of action. Further, recognizing the centrality of history entails a search for pattern, influence and effect within a wide social and geographic arena; attention must be given to factors both within and without the social setting, local community or region which is the object of analytical interest. In most respects, however, Barth has remained true to his original point of view in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, particularly with respect to the primacy accorded to the perceptions and definitions of actors. It is on this aspect of his work that I shall concentrate in this article, hoping to develop our understanding of ethnicity while capitalizing at the same time upon the strengths and insights of the Barthian paradigm and the tradition of work that it has inspired. Rather than offer an alternative which pretends to revolutionary novelty, I shall draw out some elements of Barth’s understanding of ethnicity, interpreting their implications in the context of a set of arguments about social identity in general. My primary objective is modest: to encourage the further broadening -substantively and theoretically -of the, par­ticularly social anthropological, discourse about ethnicity. In so doing I also hope to illustrate, incidentally, the value of the study of ethnicity to debates about social identity. Groups and categories Barth emphasizes the transactional nature of ethnicity; these trans­actions are of two basic kinds. First, there are processes of internal definition: actors signal to in-or out-group members a self-definition of i, { r I, ‘ , ‘ ‘ ~ Rethinking ethnicity 199 tbeir nature or identity. This can be an ego.centred, individual process Or ·a collective, group process, although it only makes sense to talk of ethnicity in an individual sense when the identity being defined and its expression refer to a recognizable socially-constructed identity and draw upon a repertoire of culturally~specified practices. Although conceptual­ized in the first instance as internal, these processes are necessarily transactional and social ( even in the individual case) because they presuppose both an audience, without whom they make no sense, and an externally derived framework of meaning. Second, there are processes of external definition. These are other­directed processes during which one person or set of persons defines the other(s) as ‘X’, ‘Y’ or whatever. This may, at its most consensual, be the validation of the others’ internal definition(s) of themselves. At the conflictual end of the spectrum of possibilities, however, there is the imposition, by one set of actors upon another, of a putative name and characterization which affects in significant ways the social experi­ence(s) of the categorized. This process of external definition may, in theory, be an individual act: person A defines person or persons Bas, say, ‘X’ or ‘Y’. For two reasons, however, it is difficult to imagine external definition as a primarily individual process. In the first place, more than an audience is involved: the others here are the object(s) of the process of definition, and implied within the situation is a meaningful intervention in their lives, an acting upon them. Thus, external definition is necessarily embedded within social relationships. Secondly, the capacity to act successfully upon other people’s lives implies either the power or the authority to do so. The exercise of power implies competitive access to and control over resources, while authority is, by definition, only effec­tive when it is legitimate. Power and authority are thus necessarily embedded within social relationships. The distinction between internal and external definition is primarily analytical. lo the complexity of day-to-day social life, each is chronically implicated in the other. The categorization of ‘them’ is too useful a foil in the identification of ‘us’ for this not to be the case, and the definition of ·us’ too much the product of a history of relationships with a range of significant others (Hagendoorn 1993). Which is, of course, one of Barth’s original claims: ethnicity, the production, reproduction and transformation of the social boundaries of ethnic groups, is a two-way process that takes place across the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. At the individual level, in the creation of personal identities, much the same can be said: identity is located within a two-way social process, an interaction between ‘ego’ and ‘other’, inside and outside. It is in the meeting of internal and external definition that identity, whether social or personal, is created. It may be objected that the suggested equivalence of collective/social

20() Richard Jenkins identity and individual/personal identity is misleading: the boun, of the self are secure and unproblematic in a way that is not, example, true of social groups, particularly inasmuch as the notion _ the self is bounded by and within the body. There are a number J::· reasons for rejecting this argument. First, and regardless of whether, one chooses to follow Freud or Piaget, it seems clear that a relatively .. secure sense of the boundary of self is acquired as the infant separates: . itself psychologically from the significant other(s) in its life through an _ ,!; early interactive process of defining and being defined (Stem 1985), –· Secondly, there is a well-established understanding of adult personal ., -I• or self-identity which sees its content(s), boundaries and, most critically, .. security as variable over time in interaction with changing circumstances (e.g., Giddens 1991). Finally, even if the boundaries of the self are, “‘· most of the time, stable and taken for granted, this is only true as long as it is true. When it is not, when the boundary between the self and others weakens or dissolves, the result is a range of more-or-less severe, and not uncommon, disruptions of self that in Western culture arc conceptualized as psychiatric disorder (for one understanding of which, within a model that is analogous to the distinction between external and internal definition, see Laing 1971). To extend the logic of this last point, the boundaries of collective identity are also taken for granted until they are threatened. The contrasting processes of identity-production, internal and exter­nal, can be illuminated further by drawing upon concepts derived from the methodology of the social sciences. Basic to the sociological and anthropological enterprises is the classification of human collectivities. One of the most enduringly useful distinctions which we employ for this purpose is that which we draw between groups and categories: category. A class whose nature and composition is decided by the person who defines the category; for example, persons earning wages in a certain range may be counted as a category for income tax purposes. A category is therefore to be contrasted with a group, defined by the nature of the relations between the members (Mann 1983, p. 34). A group, therefore, is rooted in processes of internal definition, while a category is externally defined. This distinction is concerned, in the first instance, with the procedures that we employ to constitute the social world as a proper object for empirical inquiry and theoretical analysis. As such, it is relevant beyond the study of ethnicity and ethnic relations. Debates about social class, for example, are often characterized by disagreement about which principle of definition is most appropriate for the adequate constitution of classes as objects ofl for analysis. The distinction here may be vividly exemplified in this Rethinking ethnicity 201 ‘ :~d)iltext by Marx’s famous contrast between ‘a class in itself’ (a category) “”;pd •a class for itself’ (a group). This reference to Marx reminds us _Jf.tbat the distinction is, of course, something more than methodological. ;,. -‘:c Social groups and social categories are different kinds of collectivities “.’.r,$-~:<!;:existing in the social world. Marx’s understanding of the development X; :·_ of class consciousness involves a social category, defined with reference ,:;, .. to.alienation from the means of production, becoming a social group, the members of which identify with one another in their collective misfortune and have the potential for collective action on the basis of that identification. So, whereas social groups define themselves, their name(s), their nature(s) and their boundary(s), social categories are identified, defined and delineated by others. Most social collectivities can be characterized as, to some extent, defined in both ways. Each side of the dichotomy is implicated in the other and social identity is the outcome of the conjunction of processes of internal and external definition. Whether, in any specific instance, one chooses to talk about a group or a category will depend on the balance struck between internal and external pro­resses in that situation. It is a question of degree. Although it is undoubtedly true that historically social anthropology bas, inasmuch as it has considered individual identity at all, privileged social or external knowledge over self-or internal knowledge (A.P. Cohen 1992, p. 222), the emphasis of the post-Barthian anthropology of ethnicity and communal identity (e.g., Wallman 1978, 1986; A.P. Cohen 1982, 1985, 1986; Eriksen 1991) has tended to fall on the other side of the internal-external dialectic: upon processes of group identifi­cation rather than social categorization (Jenkins 1986a). There are at least three reasons why this should be so. First, anthropology, in its enthusiasm for ‘otherness’ and its (still) essentially non-conflictual model of the social world -regardless of internal theoretical debates between transactionalism or structuralism, for example, or the impact of various threads of post-modernism -tends to celebrate ethnicity as a social resource. This is at the expense of paying sufficient attention to ethnicity as a social liability or stigma. Secondly, this is reinforced by the fact that enthusiasm for a transactional model of social life -ethnicity as process -has typically been accompanied by a view of social relationships as rooted in reciprocation, exchange and relatively equitable negotiation. Thirdly, anthropology’s continued emphasis I upon participant observation as the discipline’s methodological sine qua non has led its practitioners to concentrate upon the collection of data ~ during face-to-face encounters or through direct observation. Processes i of collective internal definition may be easier to study using such an r approach than their external counterparts. • This anthropological bias is not, however, entailed by the Barthian model, as is well illustrated by Eidheim’s essay, ‘When ethnic identity

202 Richard Jenkins is a social stigma’, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Eidheim 1 Ideally, the exploration of processes of ethnic and other forms of gorization should represent the extension, refinement and developm~t: ,, of the Barthian perspective. This is what the rest of this article sets ou(;:/c to do. Rethinking ethnicity 203 :i~uld be split off from or contrasted with ‘us’. Finally, there is the ‘.defence which pre-existing internal definitions may provide against the ::;-id).pasition of external definitions. The experience of categorization may 1,uengthen existing group identity through a process of resistance and telction. Thus, the experience of being categorized may contribute to Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to clarify one further ·: the formation of group identity ( although the ways in which it will do so point, which bas so far only been implied. In talking about the names _., .::.’l:’–<·are a matter for empirical research rather than theoretical prediction). natures and boundaries of groups and categories, I am suggesting t~ ~-_-.”. Similarly, group identification is likely to proceed, at least in part, identity is ‘made up’ of a number of distinct strands, even if they may ,> ·-.-through categorizing others (whether positively or negatively). Argu-only be analytically distinguishable. Two of these strands, in particular ments analogous to all the above could also be offered at the individual/ :i,re significa~t he.re. Social identity,_ whether it b~ ethnic or whatever: psychological level. 1s both nommal, 1.e., a name, and vutual, a meamng or an experience a contrast that is implicit in the distinction between boundaries and their contents, and approximately analogous to the well-worn distinc­tion between ‘status’ and ‘role’. This distinction is important becaUSe one can change without the other doing so; similarly one can be the product of internal processes of identification, the other of categoriz. ation. For example, although categorization may not necessarily change the name or boundary of an identity, it may have considerable potential to define what it means to bear it, the experience of ‘being an X’. The implications of this are explored later in the article. Social categorization Distinguishing between internal and external definitions, and between groups and categories, allows us to think about ethnic identity at a number of different levels within a unified analytical framework. One basis for doing so is presented schematically in Figure 1. Perhaps the first thing to explain about Figure 1, however, is that, as suggested in its caption, it is not specifically about ethnicity. If it has any application at all, it applies to all forms of social identity. Second, the vertical lines i indicate a continuum of graded differentiation, the horizontal ones __ a dialectical synthetic unity. In this sense, the iniemal:exter­nal distinction should not be read as implying an acceptance of intellec­tual dualisms such as thinking:doing or subjective:objective (and one could doubtless add a further long list). These are difficult to maintain and do not seem to contribute anything useful to the attempt to under­stand the social world (Jenkins 1981; see also Bourdieu 1990, pp. 23-141). So what does Figure 1 mean? The representation of the internal:ex­temal dichotomy by a line, rather than a sharp break, indicates a number of inter-relationships. First, there is the influence of external definition (by others) on internal definition(s). Next, it is important to recognize the role in internal definition of the categorization, or external definition, of others: the process of defining ‘us’ demands that ‘they’ .-., t • f t l ‘ l ! I } INTERNAL ! INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE j EXTERNAL ‘[” ___ ‘me· 1 self-image __ public image l group category Figure 1. Forms and processes of social identity The next step is to unpack further some of the social processes that are summarized in Figure 1. At the most individually-focused level, the distinction between’/’ and ‘me’, while it is inspired ultimately by Cooley (1902; 1965 ed., pp. 168–263), is derived in this formulation from Mead (1934, pp. 173-226), a theorist who has been ‘curiously unacknowl­edged’ by social anthropology (A.P. Cohen 1992, p. 226). To para­phrase Mead, the ‘I’ is that aspect of the self which responds to others, whereas the ‘me’ comprises the attitudes and responses of others as they are incorporated into the self. In this sense, it might be more appropriate to rename the latter the ‘What, me?’ This is a distinction that can also, of course, be interpreted as drawing upon the basic Freudian distinction between ‘ego’ and ‘superego’. In the course of earliest socialization each human being develops a unique personality, a sense of self which, although it may not always be avail­able to us consciously, is one of the bedrocks of our ‘ontological secur­ity’ (Giddens 1991, pp. 36-46). Much of this ‘sense of self’ is located in that hinterland of unreflexive habit -neither conscious nor uncon­scious -that is the generative site of practices which Bourdieu calls the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 53-97). This ‘sense of self’ is not simply a ‘mental’ phenomenon bu_t is intimately bound up with the physical integrity of the individual. Selves are located within bodies.

204 Richard Jenkins A sense of self is created in the course of the early verbal-‘. non-verbal dialogue -a complex interaction of separation front :: identification with -between the child and significant others. Typ’ parents in the first instance, the voice of these others becomes int, i.zed as the ‘me’. A voice that tells the child both who it is and wb~~-· shout~ do, each bein~ an aspe~t ~f t~e othe~. Th.is is the interactioqai_ ‘.–‘.·· learmng process of prunary soaaltzatton, which works at the conscioui _ and less-than-conscious levels, and which creates an internal relation,.’. · ship, whether harmoniously ‘adjusted’ or not, between the individuat­ized demands of the ‘I’ and the socialized demands of the ‘me’ (which may also be thought of in this context as representing culture). It is in the initial and continuing relationship between ‘I’ and ‘me’ that the basic sense of self is constituted. It is easy to imagine how primary socialization is likely to include an ethnic component: the child will learn not only that he/she is an ‘X’ but also what this means, in terms of self-esteem and worth or appropri: ate and inappropriate behaviour, and what it means not to be an ‘X’ a ‘Y’ or a ‘Z’ perhaps (Epstein 1978). This is emphatically the case, fo; example, in societies where ‘racial’ categorization is a powerful principle of social organization and stratification (Goodman 1964; Milner 1975; Troyna and Hatcher 1992). Moving on to self-image and public image, the distinction has some­thing in common with Mauss’s conceptualization (1938; 1985 ed., p. 12) of the difference between, on the one hand, ‘role’ (personnage) and, on the other, the combination of ‘person’ (personne) and ‘self’ (moi). Self-image, in my definition, is the way we see ourselves and, perhaps even more important, the way we would like to be seen by others. The essential starting point for any attempt to understand how this works in social interaction is, of course, Goffman (1969). In the context of this discussion, Goffman ‘s most important arguments about the ·pres­entation of self’ are: (1) that it is a matter of performance; (2) that there is no single, consistent self, but rather a range of aspects or revelations of self, depending on the social situation; (3) that manage­ment of the awkward relationship between the desired presentation of self and other, countervailing aspects of one’s biography and present situation is of great importance; and (4) that validation of the perform­ance by others, if not their complicit collaboration, is central to success­ful impression management. The homology between Goffman’s view of social selfhood as performative and processual and Barth’s model of ethnicity as transactional is obvious. The third and fourth points above direct our attention to the other side of the coin, public image, the vexed question of how others see us. It goes without saying that there is no necessary equivalence between self-image and public image. What is more, it is not always easy to know how others see us anyway. Apart from the obvious i, f i f t f l ‘ I l • ~ Rethinking ethnicity 205 -, ·sremological issue -the old philosophical problem of ‘other minds’ tltere are a number of reasons why this should be so. First, the ~;ence may attempt to conceal its opinion of both actor and perfonn­:::ance. second, the actor m_ay, for various st~at;gic ?r ta~tical reas~ns, :”‘-~ttempt to present somethrn~ ot_her than thelf true ~If-image. ~trd, < there may be poor commumcahon between the two sides, for vanous jnteractional, institutional or other external reasons. Fourth, the per­Sonal psychology that is integral to selfhood may, in the event of major disagreement between self-image and public image, block acknowledge­ment of the threatening public image. However, allowing for these qualifications, there will usually be at least some interaction between self-image(s) and public image(s), some process of conscious or uncon­scious adjustment in the ongoing process of the making and re-making of social identity. An example may clarify the point. Occupational identities are among the most important of social identities. For many people they provide the basis on which their livelihood is secured. They are also closely connected to social status. This was so in the pre-modern world and it remains so today. In modern industrial societies there is an element of election involved in the assumption of an occupational identity. Choice, however, only operates within strict limits and is generally bilateral: other people, gatekeepers of one sort or another within the education system and the labour market, play a crucial role in validating (or not) occupational aspiration. In order to pursue ambition, itself arguably a modem phenomenon, qualifications must be obtained, jobs must be applied for and the cooperation of more powerful others obtained. In the process there is for many young people, first in school and sub­sequently in the world of employment and unemployment, a conver­gence between aspiration and outcome, between self-image and public image, which is recognized culturally as ‘realism’ and is one source of stability in a visibly inequitable system (Willis 1977; Jenkins 1983). It is not just aspirations that are adjusted because of their public reception and evaluation; identity is also variable and vulnerable. For example, the labelling perspective in the sociology of deviance suggests that deviant identities can become internalized as a consequence of the individual concerned being publicly categorized as a law/rule breaker and treated accordingly (Becket 1963; Matza 1969; Lemert 1972). A point which is made less often is that a similar process is likely to operate with respect to positive or socially-valued categorization. The external social world is as much a source of self-esteem as a threatening environment of hostile labelling. Similarly, identities are imposed upon individuals in school (Cicourel and Kitsuse 1963; Rist 1977) and in the labour market, in a dialectical process of internal and external definition. The individual is identified in a particular way by significant others, who by virtue of their power

206 Richard Jenkins Rethinking ethnicity 207 or authority are in a position to make their definition of the person a~ the situation count, and thus to constitute that person’s subseq~t’;. career in terms of the identity in question. That individual’s expenenec·:,,._._” of the consequences of being categorized may, over time, lead to·ai;,·•R- adjustment in his or her self~image in the direction of the stigmatizinia:f1 public image. For example, an individual who is defined as ‘unreliable~ ·. and is not only distrusted but publicly distrusted and denied access ~ occasions where reliability is expected and could therefore be demon• strated, may, as a consequence, become as unreliable as he or she is purported to be. The notion of unreliability may then become an important dimension of his or her self-image. This model can, of course apply also to the incorporation of positive public images into the self: image. ~J~es of the ethnic bo~ndary: it_ is ~qually, if only !mpli~t

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