What types of assumptions are made, and are they reasonable?
Analysis #4 Assignment:
Submit a 3-4 page, double-spaced critical analysis of the assigned reading, which is provided as an attachment. The analysis should include a brief summary of the material that is no more than one page (ideally just one paragraph) at the beginning of the paper. For the remainder of the critical analysis, thoroughly critique the author’s content by answering the following questions:
– What types of assumptions are made, and are they reasonable?
– Are there claims made that are logically inconsistent?
– How persuasive is the development of the case? Is it defensible, given the evidence? Is the argument plausible?
– Can you synthesize this material with other research to advance a theory or explanation for a current public affairs issue?
– What is the pragmatic meaning of the work? (For instance, if we believed what the author is saying, what difference would it make to our existing stock of ideas, working hypotheses, and the practice of public administration?)
***DO NOT PLAGIARIZE! Plagiarism software will be used to verify originality of the assignment. To avoid disputed charges for this assignment, DO NOT PLAGIARIZE!
Requirements:
TowardaConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanPublicAdministrationStephanieP.NewboldFrom:PublicAdministrationReview70(4)July/August,2010:538–546.MovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolforthefieldofpublicadminis-trationwouldimprovethequalityofscholarshipassociatedwithhowtomaintainandpreservecoredemocratic-republicanvaluesembeddedintheAmericanconstitutionaltradition.ThoseofuswhoarepartofestablishingthismovementdefinetheConstitutionalSchoolasagroupofpublicadministrationscholarsandpractitioners,joinedinalooseconfederation,characterizedbyaninterestintheprinciplesembodiedintheU.S.Con-stitutionasthebasisforourresearchandpractice.1WeseetheConstitutionasthenormativebaseforourscholarship,anditdemandsthatwereem-phasizeandreestablishagreatercommitmenttohowtheruleoflawper-vadespublicadministrativemanagementinitsentirety(Rosenbloom,2002,2003).ThoseassociatedwiththeConstitutionalSchoolwouldmostlikelystillagreewithRonaldMoeandRobertGilmour’sposition,onetheyestablished15yearsago:“Today,publicadministrationhaslargelyaban-donedorforgottenitsrootsinpubliclaw—andhasaccepted,tovaryingdegrees,thegenericbehavioralprinciplesofmanagementastaughtinschoolsofbusiness”(1995,p.135).Thepurposeofthisarticleistodemonstrateinclear,articulatetermswhyconstitutionaltraditionandruleoflawshouldserveasthefoundationsofpublicadministrationscholarshipintheUnitedStates.Withouttheacceptanceofthisnorm,Americanpublicadministrationwillfinditselfunabletoembracetheintellectualunderpinningsthatlegitimatethefieldinitsentirety(Cook,1996;P.Cooper,1997,2006;Lee&Rosenbloom,2005;MoeandGilmour,1995;Rohr,1986,1998,2002;Rosenbloom,1971,1983,1987,2003;Rosen-bloom,Carroll&Carroll,2000;Rosenbloom&Kravchuk,2005;Rosen-bloom&O’Leary,1996;Spicer&Terry,1993a,1993b;Terry,2003;Waldo,1948;Wamsleyetal.,1990).Thismovementprovidesthreedistinctwaystoimprovepublicadministrationscholarship:itemphasizestheintellectualandpracticalvalueoftheConstitutiontotheAmericanadministrativestate;itestablishesaconsistentlyusedtermthatworkstoencourageaspecifictypeofdialogue;andithelpsdemonstratehowtheAmericanConstitutionpervadesallareasofpublicadministrationscholarshipandpractice.
TheIntellectualOriginsofMovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolMichaelSpicerandLarryTerryfirstcoinedtheterm“ConstitutionalSchool”intheirprovocativeforumon“PublicAdministrationandtheConstitution”fora1993issueofPublicAdministrationReview(PAR).SeveralofusknewTerryquitewell,andyearsafterPARpublishedthismanuscript,JohnRohrandIaskedhimtoexpandonhisunderstandingofthisconcept.TerryelaboratedwithgreatintellectualenergyonthispointandinstructedusthatitwasAlexanderHamilton’spositioninFederalist27thathadinspiredhimtocreatethisterm.HewasparticularlyinfluencedbyHamilton’sideathat“[thepeople’s]confidenceinandobediencetoagov-ernmentwillcommonlybeproportionedtothegoodnessorbadnessofitsadministration”(Cooke,1961,p.172).CreatingaConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanpublicadministration,accordingtoTerry,wouldallowmorescholarsandpractitionersopportunitiestodeterminewhethertheadminis-trationofourgovernmentwasworkingtomeetthecitizenry’sneedsinresponsible,efficient,effective,ethical,legal,andconstitutionalways.ThosewhoarepartofmovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolalsowanttoencouragepublicadministrationscholars,practitioners,andstudentstopaymoreattentiontowhatacademicsinotherfieldsarepublishingwithregardtoissuesofconstitutionalsignificance.WhatwecanlearnfromthosewhoarewritingonissuesfocusingonAmericanconstitutionalismholdsthepotentialtolegitimatethevaluethatruleoflawbringstotheAmericanadministrativestateevenfurther.TerrymaintainedthatincorporatingHamilton’seighteenth-centuryargu-mentintotheintellectualframeworkandfoundationfortheConstitutionalSchoolwasessential,becauseitprovidedthenecessarytheoreticalbasistolegitimatethecontemporaryvalueofthisidea.Inorderforthepublictomaintainconfidenceintheintegrityofadministrativeagencies,publicser-vantsmustdemonstrateconstitutionalcompetence,respectfortheruleoflaw,andsounddiscretionaryjudgmentinallaspectsoftheirdecision-makingprocesses(Rohr,1998;Rosenbloom,Carroll&Carroll,2000;Terry,2003).ThiswayofthinkingcomplementsoneofTerry’skeyargumentsinsupportofadministrativeconservatorship:WhenpublicadministratorstakeanoathtoupholdtheConstitution,theyaremakingamoralcommitmenttothecontinuanceofconstitu-tionalprocessesthatencompassparticularvalues,beliefs,andinterests.Thiscommitmentisexpressedinpracticaltermsthroughtheirfidelitytodutyintheadministrationofgovernmentalinstitutions,includingthevaluesembodiedintheConstitution.(2003,p.28)TowardaConstitutionalSchool9
TheAmericanConstitutionnotonlyisvitaltothepreservationoftheadministrativestatebutalsoprovidesoneofthemostimportantsourcesoflegitimacyforthefieldasawhole(Rohr,1986).DavidRosenbloom(1971)haslongexaminedtheconnectionbetweenthefederalcivilserviceandtheAmericanConstitution,arelationship,heargues,thatisnotonlyimportantbutalsoundervaluedwithinpublicadministration.Rosenbloom’sworkhelpslegitimatetheneedforaCon-stitutionalSchool,becauseitdemonstrateshowconstitutionaltraditionandtheruleoflawcharacterizeAmericanpublicadministration,especiallywithregardtotherightsofcivilservantsandtheconceptionofthoserightsinboththeoryandpractice.IntheirreviewofRosenbloom’sworkFederalServiceandtheConstitution,CharlesLevineandLloydNigrodiscussanincreasinglyimportantaspectoffederalpublicmanagement:Rosenbloomdocumentsanacceleratingtrendtowardnarrowingthegapbetweenthepoliticalandlegalrightsofpublicemployeesandthoseofthegeneralcitizenry.Whilethistrendliberalizesthepublicemploymentrelationship,Rosenbloomworriesabouttheimplicationsofconstitutional-legalequalityforpublicemployeesanditspotentialimpactontheroleofpublicbureaucraciesinourpoliticalsystem.Heconcludesthatinthefuturethecapacityofpoliticalofficialstocontroltheselectionandbehaviorofemployeeswillbereducedandthat“thechangewillprob-ablyencourageanincreaseintherolethatcivilservantswillplayinthepoliticalarena.”(Levine&Nigro,1975,p.100)TwoimportantU.S.SupremeCourtcasesprovideclarificationofRosen-bloom’sexcellentpoint.Elrodv.Burns(1976)andBrantiv.Finkel(1980)dealtwiththeconceptofpatronagedismissals.Bothfocusedonthecon-stitutionalquestionofwhethernewlyelectedofficialscoulddischargepre-viousnon-civilserviceappointmentsmadebyoutgoingadministrationsbecausetheydidnotbelongtothesamepoliticalparty.Inbothcases,theSupremeCourtruledinfavoroftheremovedofficial.InreviewingtheElrodcase,Rohrmakesakeenobservation:“Thedecisionwasastunningillus-trationofthemarkedtendencyinAmericanconstitutionallawforindivi-dualrightstotrumptheclaimsofinstitutionalinterests—inthiscasetheinterestofpoliticalparties…hadtraditionallybeenregardedasvitalcomponentsofdemocraticgovernment”(2002,p.124).Rohr’sreflectiononBrantialsoilluminatesanotherkeyareaofconstitutionalconcernforAmericanpublicadministration:“Theultimateinquiryisnotwhetherthelabel‘policymaker’or‘confidential’fitsaparticularposition;rather,thequestioniswhetherthehiringauthoritycandemonstratethatpartyaffilia-tionisanappropriaterequirementfortheeffectiveperformanceofthepublicofficeinvolved”(2002,p.127).Takentogether,thesetwocasespro-videnoteworthyexamplesofhowpublicadministrationshouldincorporate10StephanieP.Newbold
issuesofconstitutionalsignificanceintoanorganizedschoolofthoughtinanefforttoinformscholarsandpractitionersabouthowtheConstitutionandtheruleoflawpermeatepublicadministration,publicmanagement,andthedemocraticgovernanceprocess,especiallyintimesofpoliticalandadministrativetransformationandchange.RosemaryO’LearyandCharlesWiseprovideanotherusefulexamplethatillustratesthevalueofmovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolintheirresearchonhowjudgesandcourtsare“becomingincreasinglyactiveintheirover-sightofadministrativeagencies”becauseofthe“newpartnershipthathasemergedbetweenjudgesandadministrators”inrecentyears(1991,pp.316,317).ThehopeofaConstitutionalSchoolisthatwhenscholarsandpracti-tionerswriteaboutanddiscussissuesofconstitutionalandlegalsig-nificance,theywillconsiderhowthisschoolofthoughtinformsthefield’sinstitutionalandintellectualheritage.SucheffortsarepreciselywhyPhillipCooperarguesthat“[p]ubliclawprovidesafoundationforadministrationandisessentialtotheinfrastructureonwhichadministrativeinstitutions,andmostotherinstitutionsofsocietyforthatmatter,operate”(1997,p.105).Thesetypesofunifiedperspectivescouldalsoserveasausefulattempttobridgethetheory–practicedividewithinthelargerpublicadministrationcommunity.WhileFederalistdoctrineprovidesthetheoreticalfoundationforestab-lishingaConstitutionalSchool,theapplicationofthisapproachhasimpor-tant,practicalramificationsfortheadministrativestate.Forexample,therecent,highlyregardedsupplementalissueofPublicAdministrationReview(Volume67,2007)analyzingthegovernment’sresponsetoHurricaneKatrinain2005wouldhaveprovidedanidealforumforasupporteroftheConstitutionalSchooltodiscusshowHamilton’sobservationinFed-eralistNo.27remainsasrelevanttodayasitwasin1787.InthisissueofPAR,scholarsandpractitionersexamineanumberofimportanttopicsrelatingtothefailedleveesystem,thegovernment’semergencyresponseplan,broadissuesaffectingpublicsectormanagementanddecisionmaking,theconsequencesofeconomicstatusandrace,andevenfederalism,espe-ciallyforthosemostnegativelyaffectedintheLowerNinthWard.Thiscollectiveanalysis,asinformativeasitcontinuestobe,overlookstheprac-ticalnotionofwhathappenstotheinstitutionalintegrityofarepublican,constitutionalregimethatunderminesthepositiverelationshipbetweentheadministrationofpubliclyfundeddisasterpreparednessprogramsaswellasemergencymanagementmechanismstorespondtocatastrophicnaturaldis-astersandthecitizenry’sconfidenceintheirgovernmenttomeettheneedsofthosemostdirectlyaffectedbyextraordinarycalamitiesoutsidetheircon-trol.Inaword,itsubstantiatesMoeandGilmour’sobservationthat“publiclawistheunder-appreciated‘cement’thatbindstheseparatedpowersoftheadministrativestate,ensurespoliticalandlegalaccountabilityofitsofficials,andrestrainsabusesofadministrativediscretionandconflictsofinterest”(1995,p.138).TowardaConstitutionalSchool11
ThosewhoarepartoftheConstitutionalSchool,aswellasthosewhoarguethatpublicadministrationshouldfocusmoreonhowupholdingtheruleoflawimprovesourcontinualefforts“toformamoreperfectunion,”wouldhaverelishedanopportunitytodemonstratethatagovernmentthatfailstomeettheneedsofthecitizenry,especiallyintimesofcrises,contra-dictssomeofthemostimportantthemesthatPubliusadvocatedinTheFederalist.Conservingdemocratic-republicanvaluesandtheconstitutionalintegrityofpublicadministrativeagenciesthatoperateinacomplex,separationofpowersgovernmentisnotaneasytask,butitisanecessaryone(Rainey,2003;Shapiro,1988).OnPresidentBarackObama’sfirstdayinoffice,hesignedanexecutiveorderfocusingonincreasedtransparencyandruleoflawwithintheexecu-tivebranch,particularlywithregardtotheFreedomofInformationAct.This,hemaintained,wouldbeahallmarkofhisadministration.AccordingtoPresidentObama,“Publicserviceisaprivilege.It’snotaboutadvantagingyourself.It’snotaboutadvancingyourfriendsoryourcorporateclients.It’snotaboutadvancinganideologicalagendaorthespecialinterestsofanyorganization.PublicserviceissimplyandabsolutelyaboutadvancingtheinterestsofAmericans”(TheCaucus,2009).ThePresident’sremarksinvokedJamesMadison’sgreatobservationinFederalist51:“Theinterestofthemanmustalwaysbeconnectedtotheconstitutionalrightsoftheplace”(Cooke,1961,p.349).LeadersoftheAmericanrepublicmustliveuptoahighernotionofpublicvirtue,and,inordertocarryoutMadison’sexpec-tation,publicservantsmustmaintainconstitutionalcompetenceandathoroughrecognitionofhowtheruleoflawanddiscretionaryjudgmentaffectthecitizenrytheyservesothatthepreservationofthenation’scon-stitutionalintegrityismaintained.AcarefulexaminationofthehistoricalevolutionofAmericanconstitutionaltraditiondemandsnoless.AGovernmentofthePeople,bythePeople,andforthePeople:HowEstablishingaConstitutionalSchoolAdvancesDemocraticGovernanceProponentsoftheConstitutionalSchoolwouldlikelychampionthefollow-ingobservationbyCharlesGoodsell:“ThequalityofpublicserviceintheUnitedStatesisvastlyunderrated.Ourgovernment’sadministrativeagenciesandthosewhoworkinthemarecommonlyportrayedasinefficient,incom-petent,andwasteful—andoftenuncivilanddeviousaswell.Thisissimplynottrue”(2004,p.xi).LiketheProgressiveErainthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies(Goodnow,1900;Wilson,1887),thePresident’sCommitteeonAdministrativeManagementduringtheFranklinD.Roose-veltadministration(1937),andtheNewPublicManagementmovementoftoday(Considine,2001;Loffler,1997;Osborne&Gaebler,1992;Peters1992),administrativescholarsandpractitionershavelongchampionedtheneedforgovernmenttoworkefficiently,effectively,andeconomically.Infact,HamiltonopensFederalist1withthestaunchassertionthatthe12StephanieP.Newbold
“unequivocalexperience”undertheArticlesofConfederationledtothe“inefficacyofthesubsistingFoederal[sic]Government,”andinordertosecurethe“existenceoftheUnion,”themajorityofthestateshadtoratifytheConstitution(Cooke,1961,p.3).Thefieldtraditionallyrecognizesthatthesereformeffortsattemptedtoapplyefficientpublicadministrativemanagementstrategiestothegoverningofthenation.Buttheyalsorepresentedimportanthistorical,political,intellectual,andinstitutionalopportunitiesto“reconciletraditionaldemo-craticinstitutionswiththerequirementsofnewadministrativetechnology”(Fry&Raadschelders,2008,309).Bymeansofcontrast,scholarssuchasTerryCooper(1991,1994;Cooper&Wright1992),RosemaryO’Leary(O’Leary&Wise,1991,2003),JohnRohr(1986,1998,2002),DavidRosenbloom(2002;Rosenbloom,Carroll&Carroll,2000),LarryTerry(2003),DwightWaldo(1948),GaryWamsleyetal.(1990),andCharlesWise(1998,2001)havechampionedthenotionthatitisoftenjustasimportant,andperhapsevenmoreso,forgovernmenttoimplementpublicpoliciesandrelyonmanagerialtechniquesthatdemonstratevaluesassociatedwithresponsibility,representativeness,responsiveness,ruleoflaw,andespeciallyconstitutionalcompetence.YongLeeandDavidRosenbloom(2005)presentausefuldistinctionbetweenutilitarianandinstrumentalvaluesversuscontractarianprinciplesforpublicsectordecisionmakingthatdemonstrateswheretheConstitutionalSchoolcouldandshouldfitwithinthebroaderpublicadministrationliterature.LeeandRosenbloommaintain:Utilitarianismleadspublicadministratorstojudgethedesirabilityofdecisionsandotheractionsintermsofcost-benefitratios.Instrument-alismfocusesoncost-effectiveness,thatis,makinggovernment“workbetterandcostless.”Allmodernadministrativeapproachestofundingthepublicsectorarebasedonsomemixofutilitarianandinstrumentalthinking.(2005,p.8)Bycontrast,LeeandRosenbloompointthefield’sattentiontothediffer-encesbetweeneconomicallyorientedpublicbudgetingdecisionmakingandtheneedforAmericancivilservantstoapplyconstitutionalcompetencesothattheyareabletoprotecttheindividualrightsofcitizenswhilesimultaneouslyupholdingtheruleoflawmoreefficientlyandeffectively:Thecontractarianjudgesdonothavetoconsiderhowelsepublicdol-larsheadedforthejailmaybeused;theutilitarian-instrumentalpublicbudgetersroutinelygiveshortshrifttotherightsoftheprisoners.Thereasonablycompetentpublicservanthastocombinebothperspectives:Withintheframeworkofthediscretionavailabletoadministrators,therightsofthedetaineesshouldbeprotectedinthemostcost-effectiveTowardaConstitutionalSchool13
fashion.Individuals’constitutionalrights,whetherenumeratedornonenumerated,cannoteasilybesacrificedforthegreatestgoodofthegreatestnumber.(2005,p.8)TheircomparisonoftheutilitarianandcontractarianperspectivesisquitehelpfulindetermininghowestablishingaConstitutionalSchoolcouldbroadenourunderstandingforhowtheruleoflawsubstantiatesourdemocratic-republicanregimeinboththeoryandpractice.JoelAberbachandBertRockman,intheir30-yearanalysisoftheexecutivebranchattheU.S.federallevel,observe:Agovernmentoflaws,asAmericansoftenliketothinktheirsis,isagovernmentthickwithsafeguardsagainstthearbitraryorcapricioususeofpower.Manyofthosesafeguardsalsopreventadministratorsfromrespondingincommonsensewaysthatmightberegardedasresponsiveoradaptive.(2000,p.14)Inthecontextofpublicadministrationreformmovementsandtheexam-inationofadministrativemanagementingeneral,theirempiricalobserva-tionsillustratesomeofthepracticaldifficultiesthatcanoccurwhengoverninginaseparationofpowersregime.Evenso,weshouldnotoverlookthefactthatwhengovernmentworksbothefficientlyandresponsively,theciti-zenry’sopinionofitusuallyincreases(Barnard,[1938]1968;Cooke,1961;T.Cooper,1991;Goodsell,2004;Rosenbloom&Kravchuk,2005;Selznick,1957;Terry,2003;Waldo,1948;Wamsleyetal.,1990).Bycontrast,whengovernmentleadersandadministrativeagenciesfailtomeettheneedsofthecitizenry,particularlyduringtimesofcrises,aswasthecaseintheearlystagesoftheGreatDepressionandinthemorerecentresponsetothevictimsofHurricaneKatrina,citizenconfidenceingovernmentnaturallydecreases.DwightWaldo,likeAlexanderHamilton,waskeenlyawareofthisdynamic,andheprovidedoneofthemostimportant,yetoverlooked,observationsabouttherelationshipbetweenefficiencyanddemocracywithintheAmericanadministrativestate:Agovernmentthatisreallydemocraticisalsoanefficientgovernment:itissensitivetopopulardemand,itrealizespopularwillwithintelli-gence,honesty,economy,anddispatch.Contrariwise,reallyefficientgovernmentisalsodemocratic:itministerstotherealneedsofthepeopleitrepresents.(1948,p.134)Waldo’sperspectivelargelycomesfromhiscomparisonoftheideologicaldifferencesbetweentheAmericanfoundersandtheearlytwentieth-century14StephanieP.Newbold
administrativereformerswhochampionedprinciplescommonlyassociatedwithscientificmanagement,onebestwaytoorganize,andeconomiceffi-ciency.2However,itwouldbeadvantageousfortwenty-firstcenturyAmer-icanscholarsandpractitionerstothinkaboutWaldo’spositionregardingtheneedtoconnectdemocraticvalueswitheconomiconesasawaytoadvanceandimprovethedemocraticgovernanceprocess.IntheirtimelyreflectiononWaldo’sseminalwork,DavidRosenbloomandHowardMcCurdydrawattentiontothisprecisepoint:“Truedemocracyrepresentsthewillofthepeople;trueefficiencyrepresentstheselectionofmethodsthatarecorrectwithrespecttoanunbiasedstandard,irrespectiveofwhatpeopledesire”(2007,p.204).Organizationtheorists,likesomepublicadministra-tionscholars,havealsoexaminedtheneedtoexpandthegeneralintellectualconceptualizationofefficiency.Inparticular,ChesterBarnard’sclassicwork,TheFunctionsoftheExecutive,providesalevelofinsightthatillustratesimportantdifficultiesthatoftenariseinanyorganizationalenvironmentwhenleadersfailtounderstandtheconceptofefficiencyinmultidimensionalterms:Tohaveanorganizationthatlendsprestigeandsecurestheloyaltyofdesirablepersonsisacomplexanddifficulttaskinefficiency—inall-roundefficiency,notone-sidedefficiency.Itisforthesereasonsthatgoodorganizations—commercial,governmental,military,academic,andothers—willbeobservedtodevotegreatattentionandsometimesgreatexpenseofmoneytothenon-economicinducements,becausetheyareindispensabletofundamentalefficiency,aswellastoeffectivenessinmanycases.([1938]1968,p.94)ThosewhochampiontheneedtomovetowardaConstitutionalSchooldonotarguethattheonlywaytostudyandpracticepublicadministrativescholarshipisthroughaconstitutionallens.Inaword,wewanttodrawattentiontothevaluethatstudyingAmericanconstitutionaltheoryandtheruleoflawbringtothestudyandpracticeofpublicadministration.Inordertoaccomplishthisobjective,severaldynamicsmustoccur.First,underscoringtheimportanceofAmericanconstitutionaltheorytopublicadministrationdemonstratesthatthelegitimacyoftheadministrativestateisfoundonlywithinthenation’sconstitutionalheritage(Rohr,1986).Second,developingaconsistentlyusedtermthatencouragesdiscussionanddebateonissuesofconstitutionalandlegalsignificanceisacriticalelementofthisintellectualendeavor.Third,wewanttoencouragescholarswithexpertiseinareassuchaspublicpolicy,organizationtheory,law,ethics,andpublicmanagementtodirectattentiontohowtheConstitutionpermeatesalmosteveryintellectualdimensionofpublicadministrationtheoryandpractice.Forexample,StephanieNewbold(2008)hasinitiatedadiscussionofhowtheconstitutionalprinciplesoffederalismandseparationofpowersTowardaConstitutionalSchool15
provideanexcellentwaytoteachandstudyorganizationtheoryasitrelatestomanagingpublicsectororganizationsintheUnitedStates.RosemaryO’LearyandCharlesWise(2003)havediscussedtheroleofthecourtsinshapingpublicmanagementaswellasthelegalresponsibilitiesofpublicinstitutionstotheadministrativestate.IntheirdiscussionoftheevolutionofU.S.SupremeCourtdecisionsfrom1900to2000,O’LearyandWisemakeastrikingobservation:Asfederalcourtsupervisionofpublicinstitutionshasstretchedoverdecades,theSupremeCourthasseenthenecessityofnudgingthedistrictcourtstowardendingtheirsupervisionofpublicinstitutions.Asaresult,theCourthasbeguntoplayamoredirectiveroleinindicatingwhichconsiderationsdistrictjudgesshouldusewhenterminatingjudicialdecreesininstitutioncases.(2003,p.180)ThehopeofaConstitutionalSchoolistocreateandprovidemoreoppor-tunitiesfortheemergenceofthistypeofdialogueinourliteratureandatourconferencesinordertodemonstratehowthisareaofscholarshipadvancesthefield’sunderstandingoftheAmericanConstitutionandtheruleoflawandtheirdirectandindirectrelationshipsontheadministrativestateanditsdemocraticinstitutions.GaryWamsleyhasoftenarguedthatpublicadministrativeagenciesdemonstratehowtheUnitedStatesrepresentsanever-democratizingcon-stitutionalrepublic.3AccordingtoWamsley,theAmericanstatehasnotalwaysliveduptothehighstandingmoralprinciplesespousedinitsDeclarationforIndependenceorinitsConstitution,butpublicadministra-tionistheoneentityofgovernmentwecanlooktothatisconstantlyworkingtoensurethatthenormativevaluesembeddedwithinourconstitu-tionalheritageareconserved.ManyexamplesexistthroughoutAmericanhistorythatsupportthisargument,butherewewillsimplyfocusonone.TheSupremeCourt’slandmark1954decisioninBrownv.BoardofEdu-cationofTopeka,Kansas,whichoverturnedPlesseyv.Fergusonandmadeitunconstitutionaltosegregatepublicschoolsaccordingtorace,infuriatedmuchoftheJimCrowSouth.Thesouthernstates’refusaltoabidebytheCourt’sdecisionforcedPresidentDwightD.Eisenhowerin1957tosendtheNationalGuardintoArkansastoensurethesafetyofAfricanAmericanschool-agedchildrenwhowereenteringall-whitepublicschoolsforthefirsttime.Thisexample,asunfortunateandembarrassingasitistoday,pointstoanimportantconstitutionalprinciplethatMadisondescribedinFederalist10.Itisalwayspossibleforamajoritytoinfringeontheindividualrightsandconstitutionalprotectionsofaminority.Indeed,astheAmericancon-stitutionalrepublichasgrownanddevelopedsinceitsinception,thecourts,especiallytheSupremeCourt,haveplayedanintegralroleinhelpingtopreservetheindividualrightsandconstitutionalprotectionsofminorities.16StephanieP.Newbold
Administrativeagencies,asaresult,havealsoworkedtoimplementmanyofthenecessarypolicychanges,insistedonbytheCourt,inanattempttocon-servethenation’sconstitutionaltraditionandmanyofthecoredemocraticprinciplesequatedwithAmericanrepublicanism.JusticeStephenBreyerhaspubliclycontendedthattheCourt’srulinginBrownandPresidentEisenhower’ssubsequentdecisiontoforcemuchoftheSouthtocomplywiththeCourt’sopinionisavaluableexamplethatillus-trateswhytheSupremeCourtshouldhavethelastwordinmattersofextraordinaryconstitutionalsignificance.BreyermaintainsthispositionnotbecausetheCourt’srulingsarealwaysright,butbecauseonebranchofgovernmentmustbeinsulatedfrompolitics4inordertocarryoutthewillofthefoundersandtodefendtheconstitutionalrightsofindividualsandgroupswhomightbediscriminatedagainstbyanoverbearing,oppressivemajority.5Rosenbloom(1987)hasalsofocusedthepublicadministrationcommu-nity’sattentiontotheideathata“newpartnership”hasemergedbetweencivilservantsandthejudiciary.Hemaintainsthatthreedistinctconditionsexist,largelyestablishedbythecourts,thatenablethispartnershiptomaterialize:Thedeclarationofnewconstitutionalrightsforindividualsastheycomeintocontactwithpublicadministration;effortstouseadjudica-tiontoobtainbroadreformsofpublicinstitutionssuchasschools,mentalhealthfacilities,andprisons;andtheCourt’sclarificationthatpublicadministratorshavequalified,butnotabsolute,immunitywithinthescopeoftheirofficialduties.(1987,pp.76–77)Rosenbloom’sanalysisdemonstratesthetypeofpartnershipthatthecourtsmaintainwithpublicservantsandtheagenciesinwhichtheyserve.Thistypeofrelationshipbuildsonthenation’sseparationofpowerssystemofgovernmentandprovidesinsightsintohowthecourts,likeCongress(seeRosenbloom,2002),playanactive,participatoryroleintheadministrativestate.ScholarsandpractitionersinterestedinthesetypesofinstitutionalandconstitutionalchangesarepreciselythetypeofaudiencetheConstitutionalSchoolhopestoattract.MovingTowardaConstitutionalSchool:ABold,Much-NeededAdditiontoPublicAdministrationDiscourseWhenPhilipSelznickdiscussedtheneedtocultivateapoliticalorientationfordevelopingamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofinstitutionalleader-ship,healsoarticulatedapositionthatresonateswitheffortstoestablishaConstitutionalSchool:“Thelinkbetween‘polity’and‘politics’mustcon-stantlybekeptinmind”(1957,p.61).TheparallelsbetweenSelznick’sTowardaConstitutionalSchool17
argumentandthecaseofthe“RevoltatJustice,”highlightedinAmyGut-mannandDennisThompson’seditedvolumeoncasesaffectingethicsandpolitics,pointstotheneedforpublicadministrationtopaygreaterattentiontoconstitutionaltraditionandtheruleoflaw.The“revolt”occurredwhenlawyersfortheU.S.JusticeDepartmentrefusedtocomplywiththeRichardM.Nixonadministration’sordersnottointegratepublicschools,astheHighCourthadorderedin1954.TheiractsofofficialdisobedienceillustrateanimportantexamplethathighlightsSelznick’sobservationregardingtheneedtodistinguishbetweenpolityandpolitics.GaryGreenberg’spersonaldescriptionofthiscaseisstriking.ThereasonswhyGreenbergandhiscol-leaguesdidnotmerelyresigntheirpositionswithintheJusticeDepartmentareconstitutionallyintriguingandparticularlyinsightfulfortheargumentaboutwhytheConstitutionshouldbeatthecenterofAmericanpublicadministrationtheoryandpractice.AsGreenbergrecalls:WhilepledgedbyouroathstosupportanddefendtheConstitutionandboundbydutytofollowourconsciencesandadheretothelaw,wefacedasituationinwhichtheAdministrationhadproposedtoactinviolationofthelaw.Weknewthatwecouldnotremainsilent,forsilence,particularlyinthisAdministration,isinterpretedassupportoracquiescence.OnlythroughsomeformofprotestcouldweliveuptoourobligationsaslawyersandasofficersoftheUnitedStates…Forthedutytoservethelaw,topromotetheadministrationofjustice,tosupportanddefendtheConstitutionismorethananegativecommand;itismorethana‘thoushaltnot.’Itisanaffirmativedutytoactinamannerthatwouldbestserveandpromotethoseinterests.(1997,p.146)Greenberg’sactionsreflecttheveryfoundationofwhytheAmericanCon-stitutionservesasthetheoreticalandpracticalunderpinningfortheadmin-istrativestate.Itprovidesagroundingandastandardthatcannotberejectedbythosewhofollowitsprinciples.WerecognizeandacknowledgemanyofthedemocraticdefectsassociatedwiththeConstitution(Levinson2006),butweacceptitnonetheless.For,asPubliusconcludedattheendofFederalist51,“Andhappilyfortherepublicancause,thepracticablespheremaybecarriedouttoaverygreatextent,byajudiciousmodificationandmixtureofthefederalprinciple”(Cooke,1961,p.353).Rosenbloom’s(1983)analysisofthelegalapproachtopublicadministra-tionalsoprovidesanimportantintellectualfoundationfortheConstitu-tionalSchool.Hisemphasisonproceduraldueprocess,individualsubstantiverights(astheSupremeCourthasdeterminedthattheFourteenthAmendmentalsoincorporatestheBillofRights),andhowtheAmericancourtsvalueequityandfairnesswhenconflictsemergebetweenprivatepar-tiesandthegovernment(Rosenbloom,1983,p.223)isquitehelpful.TheConstitutionalSchoolsupportsthistypeofargumentbecauseit18StephanieP.Newbold
demonstratesawayforthefieldtopaymoreactiveattentiontohowourgovernmentcanandshouldsecuretheconstitutionalandindividualrightsofcitizens.Itplaceslessemphasisoneconomiccost–benefitanalysesandmoreattentiononhowgovernmentcanworkinresponsible,representative,andresponsivewaysthatupholdconstitutionalprinciplesandtheruleoflawwithinthecontextofpublicsectordecisionmaking.Contributorstotheintellectualdevelopmentofdemocratictheory,datingfromtheancientGreekstocontemporarytheoristssuchasLeoStrauss,IsaiahBerlin,andSheldonWolin,haveconsistentlyarguedfortheneedtoconnectthestudyandpracticeofpoliticswithhighervaluesthatareessen-tialtothemaintenanceandpreservationofdemocracy,including,butnotlim-itedto,fairness,justice,equality,freedom,individualrights,property,moralreasoning,andtheuseandmisuseofdiscretionaryjudgment.ThoseinterestedintakingpartinamovementtowardaConstitutionalSchoolcouldmakescholarlycontributionstotheliteraturethatunderscorewhere,when,andhowabranchofgovernment,anadministrativeagency,oracivilservantupholdsdemocraticprinciples,asinthecaseofthe“RevoltatJustice,”andwhere,when,andhowtheymightneglectthem,asinthecaseofHurricaneKatrina.Whenmembersofthepublicadministrationcommunitydiscuss,write,andteachissuesthatrelatetoideasofconstitutionalsignificanceandruleoflaw,aConstitutionalSchoolofthoughtprovidesanintellectualplaceandaframeworkforbringingtheseideastolifeinmeaningful,lastingways.TheConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanpublicadministrationdoesnotpreferenceoneconstitutionalperspectiveorideaoveranother;rather,weencourageanddependondifferentapproaches,perspectives,andthoughtsabouthowtheAmericanConstitutionaffectsadministrativetheoryandpractice.Importantexamplesalreadyexistinourscholarlyliteraturethatsupportthepositionthatthisschoolofthoughtwouldimprovetheintel-lectualandinstitutionaldiscourseregardingtherelevanceofAmericancon-stitutionaltraditiontoissuesaffectingcontemporarypublicadministrativemanagement.First,HerbertStoring’s(1981)positionthattheAnti-FederalistswereleadingcontributorstotheratificationprocessoftheproposedConstitutionof1787isasignificantadditiontothehistoryofpublicadministration.Hisscholarshiphasimprovedthefield’sawarenessofhowtheConstitution’sopponentsworkedtoimprovetheratificationprocess,becausetheywereabletoinstructPubliusoncertainweaknessesinhisargument.6AlthoughStoringneverusestheterm“ConstitutionalSchool,”hisscholarlyworkcertainlymakeshimacontributortotheideabehindthisintellectualmove-mentbecausesomuchofhisresearchfocusesonthehistorical,political,institutional,andintellectualdevelopmentoftheAmericanConstitutionandthestateitcreated.ThefieldshouldtakenotethatbothJohnRohrandDavidRosenbloomwerehisstudentsattheUniversityofChicago.Second,O.C.McSwite’s(1997)argumentthattheFederalistsdeceivedtheAnti-FederalistsintoratifyinganewgoverningdocumentthatdidnotTowardaConstitutionalSchool19
representtheirinterestsinthesamewaytheArticlesofConfederationpro-tectedindividualandcommunityrightsisanotherhighlycontestedpointofviewthatiscurrentlybeingdebatedinAmericanadministrativetheory.Storing’sandMcSwite’sperspectivescouldnotbemoredifferentfromoneanotherintermsoftheirinterpretationoftheconstitutionalhistoryoftheUnitedStates.Thefactthatsuchdichotomouspositionscurrentlyexistper-tainingtotheratificationprocessshouldcontinuetoinvokemeaningful,purposefuldiscussionsandanalysesbyconstitutionalscholarsandadminis-trativehistoriansastothecontemporaryvaluethatthesepositionsbringtotheintellectualpracticeofdemocraticgovernanceandthestudyofpublicadministration.Morerecently,SanfordLevinson’s(2006)questioningofwhereandhowtheAmericanConstitutionwentwrong,andwhatthepeoplecandotocorrectthesedeficiencies,providesanotherimportantargumentthatwewouldliketodrawattentiontointermsofdemonstratinghowthisschoolcouldencouragethefieldtoevaluateanddebatethepervasivenessoftheConstitutionwithinourdemocraticrepublic.Inthisprovocativeandenga-gingwork,Levinsonmaintainsthatthelegislativeprocess,ArticleII’screa-tionofanall-too-powerfulexecutive,lifetimeappointmentsforSupremeCourtjustices,variousformsofvotingdiscrimination,andthedifficultiesthatArticleVimposesforamendingtheConstitutionareundemocraticgoverningelementsthatpermeatetheAmericanConstitution.Thesetypesofquestions,irrespectiveofhowoneinterpretsLevinson’sargument,arepre-ciselythesortofdiscussionthattheConstitutionalSchoolwouldliketoinitiateandpromoteinacademicjournals,atnationalconferences,andingraduateseminars.TheydemonstratethatperspectivesonAmericancon-stitutionaltheoryaremultidimensionalandthatwecanalllearnfromengagingwithideasthatmightbethecompleteoppositeofwhatwe,asindividualscholars,assertasfundamentallyessentialtothelegalandcon-stitutionalfoundationsoftheAmericanstatebutareintellectuallyrelevantallthesame.AnotherexampleisSupremeCourtJusticeAntoninScalia’slineofrea-soningastowhytheargumentsmadeatthefoundingoftheAmericanrepubliccontinuetoserveasaformativetoolforinterpretingtheConstitu-tiontextually.WhileScalia’sinterpretationoftheConstitutionisquitedif-ferentfromthatofBreyerandmanyothers,hisdistinctive,textualistapproachtoconstitutionalinterpretationandlegalreasoningprovidesanotherinformativeperspectivefortheConstitutionalSchoolofAmericanpublicadministrationtodiscussandlearnfrom,toagreeordisagreewith,theoreticallyandpractically.AccordingtoScalia:IwillconsultthewritingsofsomemenwhohappenedtobedelegatestotheConstitutionalConvention—Hamilton’sandMadison’swritingsinTheFederalist,forexample.Idoso,however,notbecausetheywereFramersandthereforetheirintentisauthoritativeandmustbethelaw;20StephanieP.Newbold
butratherbecausetheirwritings,likethoseofotherintelligentandinformedpeopleofthetime,displayhowthetextoftheConstitutionwaspracticallyunderstood.ThusIgiveequalweighttoJay’spiecesinTheFederalist,andtoJefferson’swritings,eventhoughneitherofthemwasaFramer.WhatIlookforintheConstitutionispreciselywhatIlookforinastatute:theoriginalmeaningofthetext,notwhattheoriginaldraftsmenintended.(1997,p.38)WhilemanywithinthelegalcommunitydisagreewithScalia’sformofconstitutionalinterpretation,thepurposeoftheConstitutionalSchoolisnottodefendorattackhislegalreasoning.Thepoint,rather,istorecognizethatscholars,practitioners,lawyers,judges,justices,andothersallhavetheirowninterpretivepreferencesoftheruleoflaw.TheConstitutionalSchoolhopestoembraceallinterpretiveperspectivesasaninclusivemeanstoencourageasmanyscholarsandpractitionersaspossibletoexaminehowtheAmericanConstitutionpermeateseachareaofpublicadministrationscholarshipandpractice.Inaword,wecouldnotagreemorewiththeapplicationofThomasJefferson’spositionwhenheestablishedtheUni-versityofVirginia:“[H]erewearenotafraidtofollowtruthwhereveritmaylead,nortolerateanyerrorsolongasreasonisleftfreetocombatit.”7IntheirdiscussionofhowtoconnectAmericanconstitutionaltraditionwiththetypesofdecisionmakingthatgoodandfaithfulcivilservantsmakeonaregularbasis,GaryWamsleyandhiscolleaguesargue:ThepublicadministratortakesanoathtoupholdtheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates—notthewhimsofthepowerful.ThisoathinitiatesadministratorsintoacommunitycreatedbythatConstitutionandobligesthemtoknowandsupportconstitutionalprinciplesthataffecttheirofficialspheresofpublicservice.(1990,p.47)ThosewhowereoriginallypartoftheBlacksburgSchoolandthosewhoareproductsofthiseducationalandphilosophicalperspectivecontinuetoemphasizetheideathatifAmericancivilservantsdonotworktodefend,protect,andpreservetheConstitution,therepublicanstructureofthenation’sconstitutionalorderanditsinstitutionalcompositionwillbeseverelyjeopardized(Rohr,1986;Terry,2003;Wamsleyetal.,1990).SucheffortshaveledJeffreyRosen(2006),aprofessoroflawatGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,toarguethatthecourtsarethemostdemocraticofthethreebranchesofAmericangovernment.Hepointstothevitalrolethatthejudiciary,especiallytheSupremeCourt,playsinmakingdecisionsthataffectrace,therighttoprivacy,politics,andcivilliberties.ThethemeheweavestogetherisparticularlyusefultotheConstitutionalSchool,becauseitprovidesanotheravenuetodebatehowthefederalcourtsinfluencetheTowardaConstitutionalSchool21
democraticprinciplesembeddedinourrepublic.ItalsogivesadditionallegitimacytoWamsley’sassertionthatthefieldshouldpaymoreattentiontothe“ever-democratizing”dimensionofAmericanpublicadministration.Additionally,RobertZinkepointstoanotherperspectiveontheroleoftheAmericanConstitutioninpublicadministration:TheConstitutionestablishesarhetoricalrepublic,whereprimarygov-ernmentalactivitiesconsistofspeaking,listening,andactingexpres-sivelyandwherenationalunitydependsuponthecommitmentofcitizenstolearnaboutmoralrealitiesandtoparticipateactivelyinconversations,debates,andexpressiveactionsthatmakethoserealitiesmanifest.Thisrepublicembracesadiversityofpoliticalandsocio-economicinterestsbutallowsnosinglevoicetodominatepublicdiscussion.(1992,p.145)ThepurposeofaConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanpublicadministrationistoencouragescholarsandpractitionerstocontinuetoengage,debate,andwriteonissuesthataresignificanttotheconstitutionalheritageoftheUnitedStates,itsdemocraticinstitutions,anditsadministrativeagencies,liketheonesespousedbyRosenandZinke.Thosewhoarepartofthismovementhopethatbydiscussingideasthatresonatewithconstitutionaltheoryandtheruleoflaw,thefieldwillbeencouragedtoaddmoredetailedexaminations,likethosealreadypublishedbyRohr,Rosenbloom,O’Leary,Wise,PhillipCooper,andTerryCooper,amongothers,ofhowthelawaffectstheadministrativestate.This,inturn,willprovideforamorecom-prehensiveunderstandingastohowtheConstitutionandthenation’slegalsystemaffectsthemaintenanceandpreservationoftheAmericanrepublicanditspublicorganizations(Newbold,2008).Inhislatestbook,ActiveLiberty,JusticeStephenBreyerexpresseshisviewsonthetypeofgovernmentthattheAmericanConstitutionestablishedandseemstoembraceRosenandZinke’sperspectives:Iseethedocumentascreatingacoherentframeworkforacertainkindofgovernment.Describedgenerally,thatgovernmentisdemocratic;itavoidsconcentrationoftoomuchpowerintoofewhands;itprotectspersonalliberty;itinsiststhatthelawrespecteachindividualequally;anditactsonlyuponthebasisoflawitself.(2005,p.8)WhereasTerrylookedbackintimetoTheFederalisttodemonstratetheneedtomovetowardaConstitutionalSchool,onecouldjustaseasilyarguethatBreyer’swell-craftedanalysislegitimatestheneedtoestablishthisschoolofthoughtinstrictlycontemporaryterms.UnlikeFrance,forexam-ple,theAmericanrepubliccannotexistwithoutitsConstitution,andifour22StephanieP.Newbold
state’sinstitutionallegitimacyisdependentonthisgoverningdocument,so,too,areitsadministrativeagencies(Rohr,1995).EventheauthorsoftheacclaimedPresident’sCommitteeonAdministrativeManagementreportwereperceptiveenoughtorecognizethat“badmanagementmayspoilgoodpurposes,andthatwithoutgoodmanagementdemocracyitselfcannotachieveitshighestgoals”(Brownlow,Merriam&Gulick,1937,p.4).Pre-servingtheconstitutionalintegrityoftheadministrativestatenotonlywasagoalofthefoundersoftherepublic,butalsohasbeenassociatedwitheverymajormovementforadministrativechangethroughoutthehistoryoftheUnitedStates,eventhosethatwereprimarilyconcernedwithimprovingtheeconomicdimensionsofefficiencyandeffectiveness.LegitimatingandmovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanpublicadministrationwillnotonlyaddtotheintellectualhistoryofthefield,butalsoenhanceourknowledgeandunderstandingofhowadminis-trativescholars,civilservants,andstateinstitutionsworktoconserveaparticulartypeofdemocratic-republicanorder.AsMoeandGilmourcorrectlyobserve,publicadministrationis:foundedonthebodyoftheConstitutionandtheBillofRightsandarticulatedbyatrulyenormousbodyofstatutory,regulatory,andcaselawtoensurecontinuanceofarepublicanformofgovernmentandtoprotecttherightsandfreedomsofcitizensatthehandsofanall-powerfulstate.(1995,p.135)MovingtowardaConstitutionalSchooldemonstratesthevalueofthisscholarlyperspectivewhilealsoaddinganotherimportantwaytolegitimatetheintellectualandconstitutionalfoundationoftheAmericanadministrativestate(Rohr,1986,2002;Rosenbloom,2003).OncetheConstitutionalConventionof1787concluded,acitizenapproachedBenjaminFranklinashewasexitingIndependenceHallandasked,“Well,Doctor,whathavewegot?”Franklinrespondedsuccinctly,“ARepublic,ifyoucankeepit.”MovingtowardaConstitutionalSchoolforAmericanpublicadministrationisonecriticallyimportantwayourfieldworks“tokeepit.”Notes1ThismovementwasestablishedbyRickGreen,KarenHult,DougMorgan,Ste-phanieNewbold,JohnRohr,andDavidRosenbloomattheAnnualMeetingoftheSouthernPoliticalScienceAssociation,heldinJanuary2007,NewOrleans,Louisiana.2WaldoarguedthattheAmericanfounderschampionedprinciplesassociatedwithlimited,divided,andbalancedgovernment,whereasearlynineteenth-centuryadministrativedemocratswanteditpulverized,dispersed,andvulgarized(seeChap.8ofTheAdministrativeState,especially,pp.130–40).TowardaConstitutionalSchool23
3GaryWamsley,cofounderoftheCenterforPublicAdministrationandPolicyatVirginiaTechandeditorofAdministration&Society,makesthispointineverycourseheteachesandeverylecturehegives.HededucesthisconceptlargelyfromGibsonBurrellandGarethMorgan’sSociologicalParadigmsandOrganizationalAnalysis(1979),inwhichthoseauthorsarguethattheincommensurabilityofparadigmsdoesnotallowforthe“incorporationofthelesswidelyacceptedapproacheswithinthedominantfunctionalistparadigm”(p.396).4ThisisareferencetothefactthatfederaljudgesarenominatedbythepresidentandconfirmedbytheSenateforalifetimeappointment.5SeeJusticeStephenBreyer’sinterviewwithCNNlegalcorrespondentJeffreyToobinintheOctober28,2006specialBrokenGovernment:JudgesonTrial.Foralessdetailedanalysis,seethechapter“ASeriousObjection”inActiveLiberty(2005).6StoringfocusedontheAnti-Federalists’concernsoverthelackofabillofrightsintheproposed1787ConstitutionandtheneedforPubliustoclarifyhisdefinitionofrepresentationandrepresentativegovernmentinafederalseparationofpowersregime.7ThomasJeffersontoWilliamRoscoe,fromMonticello,1820(LipscombandBergh,1904,p.303).ReferencesAberbach,JoelD.&BertA.Rockman.2000.IntheWebofPolitics:ThreeDecadesoftheU.S.FederalExecutive.Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitutionPress.Barnard,ChesterI.[1938]1968.TheFunctionsoftheExecutive.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress.Breyer,Stephen.2005.ActiveLiberty:InterpretingOurDemocraticConstitution.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf.Brownlow,Louis,CharlesMerriam&LutherGulick.1937.AdministrativeMan-agementintheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates.Washington,DC:President’sCommitteeonAdministrativeManagement.Burrell,Gibson&GarethMorgan.1979.SociologicalParadigmsandOrganizationalAnalysis:ElementsoftheSociologyofCorporateLife.NewYork:Routledge.TheCaucus.2009.PresidentObama’sFirstDay.January21.http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/reporting-for-duty/[accessedMarch23,2010].Considine,Mark.2001.EnterprisingStates:ThePublicManagementofWelfare-to-Work.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Cook,BrianJ.1996.BureaucracyandSelf-Government:ReconsideringtheRoleofPublicAdministrationinAmericanPolitics.Baltimore,MD:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.Cooke,JacobE.,ed.1961.TheFederalist.Middletown,CT:WesleyanUniversityPress.Cooper,PhillipJ.1997.PublicLawasaSetofToolsforManagement.InHandbookofPublicLawandAdministration,editedbyPhillipJ.Cooper&ChesterA.Newland.SanFrancisco,CA:Jossey-Bass,pp.104–119.Cooper,PhillipJ.2006.PublicLawandPublicAdministration.4thedn.Belmont,CA:Thomson/Wadsworth.Cooper,TerryL.1991.AnEthicofCitizenshipforPublicAdministrators.EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall.Cooper,TerryL.,ed.1994.HandbookofAdministrativeEthics.NewYork:MarcelDekker.24StephanieP.Newbold
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Rohr,JohnA.2002.CivilServantsandtheirConstitutions.Lawrence:UniversityPressofKansas.Rosen,Jeffrey.2006.TheMostDemocraticBranch:HowtheCourtsServeAmerica.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.Rosenbloom,DavidH.1971.FederalServiceandtheConstitution:TheDevelopmentofthePublicEmploymentRelationship.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.Rosenbloom,DavidH.1983.PublicAdministrativeTheoryandtheSeparationofPowers.PublicAdministrationReview43(3):219–227.Rosenbloom,DavidH.1987.PublicAdministratorsandtheJudiciary:The“NewPartnership.”PublicAdministrationReview47(1):75–83.Rosenbloom,DavidH.2002.BuildingaLegislative-CenteredPublicAdministration:CongressandtheAdministrativeState,1946–1999.Tuscaloosa:UniversityofAlabamaPress.Rosenbloom,DavidH.2003.AdministrativeLawforPublicManagers.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.Rosenbloom,DavidH.,JamesD.Carroll&JonathanD.Carroll.2000.Constitu-tionalCompetenceforPublicManagers:CasesandCommentary.Itasca,IL:F.E.Peacock.Rosenbloom,DavidH.&RobertS.Kravchuk.2005.PublicAdministration:Under-standingManagement,Politics,andLawinthePublicSector.6thedn.Boston,MA:McGraw-Hill.Rosenbloom,DavidH.&HowardE.McCurdy,eds.2007.RevisitingWaldo’sAdministrativeState:ConsistencyandChangeinPublicAdministration.Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress.Rosenbloom,DavidH.&RosemaryO’Leary.1996.PublicAdministrationandLaw.2ndedn.NewYork:MarcelDekker.Scalia,Antonin.1997.AMatterofInterpretation:FederalCourtsandtheLaw.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.Selznick,Philip.1957.LeadershipinAdministration:ASociologicalInterpretation.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Shapiro,Martin.1988.WhoGuardstheGuardians?JudicialControlofAdministration.Athens:UniversityofGeorgiaPress.Spicer,Michael&LarryD.Terry.1993a.AdvancingtheDialogue:Legitimacy,theFounders,andtheContractarianArgument.PublicAdministrationReview53(3):264–267.Spicer,Michael&LarryD.Terry.1993b.Legitimacy,History,andLogic:PublicAdministrationandtheConstitution.PublicAdministrationReview53(3):239–246.Storing,Herbert.1981.WhattheAnti-FederalistsWereFor.Chicago,IL:UniversityofChicagoPress.Terry,LarryD.2003.LeadershipofPublicBureaucracies:TheAdministratorasConservator.Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe.Waldo,Dwight.1948.TheAdministrativeState:AStudyofthePoliticalTheoryofAmericanPublicAdministration.NewYork:RonaldPress.Wamsley,Gary,etal.,eds.1990.RefoundingPublicAdministration.ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications.Wilson,Woodrow.1887.TheStudyofAdministration.PoliticalScienceQuarterly2(2):197–222.26StephanieP.Newbold
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