Compare and contrast two criminology theories (Rational theory and learning theory) and evaluate how these theories helped establish police patrol procedures and other strategies for crime prevention

For this paper you are to compare and contrast two criminology theories (Rational theory and learning theory) and evaluate how these theories helped establish police patrol procedures and other strategies for crime prevention. The purpose of this assignment is for each student to demonstrate original critical thinking on criminology theories, the published scholarly literature, and how you can apply criminological theories to help address a real-world problem.

Requirements: 10 pages

87International Interactions, 30:87–107, 2004Copyright © Taylor & Francis, Inc.ISSN: 0305-0629DOI: 10.1080/03050620490462595THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORYSTEPHEN L. QUACKENBUSHDepartment of Political Science,University of Missouri,Columbia, Missouri, USARational choice theory has long been criticized, with several recent critiques of ap-plications in political science in general and international relations in particular. Inthis paper, I seek to clarify discussion about rationality in several ways. I discuss therole of assumptions in theory and the assumption of rationality in rational choicetheory. I demonstrate that many critiques of rational choice theory have been mis-guided , since instrumental rationality—the rationality of rational choice theory—isapplicable to a wide variety of social situations, including situations where variouspsychological, informational, and structural factors claimed to interfere with ratio-nal decision-making are present. I also focus on three applications of rational choicetheory in international relations that demonstrate ways that rational choice theoristshave potentially added to confusion about the rationality assumption and createddisillusionment in others about the rational choice enterprise. Finally, I point outthat, since rational choice theory is not a single theory, critics’ claims about the non-falsifiability of rational choice are immaterial. An understanding of these issuesfacilitates movement by the international relations community away from argumentover the assumption of rationality and on to more productive and integrative theorybuilding.KEY WORDS: rational choice theory, assumptions, preferences, instrumental rationality,philosophy of scienceRational choice theory has long been criticized, with several recent critiques di-rected at both applications in political science in general (Green and Shapiro, 1994;also see Friedman, 1996) and international relations in particular (Walt, 1999a, b).1The debate over rational choice theory is by no means limited to political science.Received for publication 11 April 2001.A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Midwest PoliticalScience Association, Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank Frank Zagare, Paul Senese, and MichaelSimon for helpful comments and suggestions on various aspects of this paper.Address correspondence to Stephen L. Quackenbush, University of Missouri, 113 Professional Build-ing, Columbia, MO 65211. E-mail: [email protected]

Rational choice theory has been used throughout social science, and rationality hasbeen debated recently in other areas of social science as well (e.g., Coleman andFararo, 1992; Halpern and Stern, 1998).Green and Shapiro, in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (1994), assess ra-tional choice applications in American politics. They contend that rational choicetheory has been marred by a number of methodological pathologies. Among theseare post hoc theory development (where theory is modified to account for anomalousinstances), poorly formulated empirical tests, and bias in cases selected for testing.They review rational choice explanations of voter turnout, social dilemmas andfree-riding, legislative behavior, and electoral competition, and determine that “de-spite its enormous and growing prestige in the discipline, rational choice theory hasyet to deliver on its promise to advance the empirical study of politics” (Green andShapiro, 1994, p. 7).Walt (1999a) aims his critique at formal rational choice theory in security studies.He argues that theory should be judged by its logical consistency, originality, andempirical validity. Furthermore, he argues that although “all three are important, thelatter two criteria—originality and empirical validity—are especially prized” (Walt,1999a, p. 13). He then conducts a review of several formal rational choice works inan attempt to demonstrate that they have yielded trivial results, have not been em-pirically tested, and that empirical tests, when used, have been constructed poorly.Green and Shapiro’s essay renewed a continuing debate over the nature, success-fulness, and usefulness of rational choice theory in political science.2 Several re-sponses to Green and Shapiro are contained in the volume edited by Friedman, TheRational Choice Controversy (1996). Similarly, several responses to Walt’s critiquewere published in the Fall 1999 issue of International Security (Bueno de Mesquitaand Morrow, 1999; Martin, 1999; Niou and Ordeshook, 1999; Powell, 1999; Walt,1999b; Zagare, 1999). Several other contributions to this debate have also appearedin the last decade (Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, 1999; Cox, 1999; Jones, 1999;Kaufmann, 1994; Opp, 1999; Zagare, 1990).Despite the lengthy, and at times pointed, debate over rational choice theory, mis-conceptions of rational choice in the political science literature remain. This paperseeks to advance discussion regarding rationality in several ways. First, it clarifiesthe role of assumptions in theory by developing a theoretical model highlightingerror due to assumptions. It then discusses the nature of rational choice theory andexplores the question of whether actors are really rational.In this paper I argue that much of the criticism of rational choice theory has beenbased on a basic misunderstanding of the assumption of instrumental rationality—which is, after all, the rationality of rational choice theory. To alleviate this confu-sion, I explicate the assumption of instrumental rationality and demonstrate that it isconsistent with a broad range of motivations and behaviors that critics have claimedcontradict it. Next, I focus on three applications of rational choice theory in interna-tional relations and demonstrate ways that rational choice theorists themselves havepotentially added to confusion about the assumption of rationality and created disil-lusionment in others about the rational choice enterprise. Finally, I demonstrate that,since rational choice theory is not a single theory, critics’ claims about the universal-istic aspirations of rational choice and post hoc theory development are unmerited.88S. QUACKENBUSH

Although some of these points have been made by others, many have not. Fur-thermore, the fact that the conceptual confusion continues to pervade scholarly dis-course demonstrates the need to state them again. This is vitally important to thefield of international relations, for once the rationality postulate is more properlyunderstood, we can move beyond nonproductive debates about a simple assumptionand on to the more meaningful task of explaining international interactions.THE ROLE OF ASSUMPTIONS IN THEORYMuch of the debate about rational choice theory is fundamentally a debate aboutan assumption. Before turning to more specific discussion of the rationally assump-tion, it is useful to consider the role of assumptions in theory. The goal of science isto explain the world in which we live.3 In international relations, scholars seek toexplain why nations go to war, why they align with one another, or any number ofother questions dealing with the relations between actors on the international stage.Explanation is accomplished through theory. However, there is much disagreementamong political scientists about what theory is. Rapoport (1961) provides a list andexplication of various meanings of theory. Although certainly not the only defini-tion, Brodbeck (1959, p. 378) defines theory asa deductively connected set of laws. Some of these laws, the axioms or postulates ofthe theory, logically imply others, the theorems. The axioms are such only by virtueof their place in the theory.The foundation of a theory, and thus of its theorems, is assumptions. The useful-ness of a theory in explaining the world is determined through testing its theorems byobservation, whereas the truthfulness of an empirical generalization is only judgedlogically through theory (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, pp. 9–10).There are two types of assumptions (or axioms) in theory that are useful in simpli-fying the complex world the the theory seeks to explain. The first type of assumptionis about questions whose answers cannot be proven. Since the “true” answer cannotbe known, an assumption one way or another must be made. The second type ofassumption deals with questions whose answers can (at least in principle) be deter-mined empirically. However, these entities are assumed to take particular values inorder to simplify theory. Neither type of assumptions is statement of “fact.” As Mostand Starr state,axioms are simply dichotomous variables that analysts either choose or are forcedto leave unmeasured. . . . [A]xioms should not be viewed as assertions of universaltruth. . . . Once this is seen, one can move quickly beyond debates over the universaltruth or falsity of the assumptions themselves (1989, p. 112, emphasis in original).The assumptions are not, or at least not known to be, universally true (if some-thing is true, then it does not need to be assumed). How do assumptions aid theoryconstruction? Consider a theory of the form89THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

D = f (Ii)(1)where D is the dependent variable, Ii represents the independent variables, i variesfrom 1 to k, and k is the number of variables.4 Presumably, if the model is completelyand correctly specified and there is no measurement error, then there would be norandom error; the prediction would be deterministic.5 Since the complete absence ofmeasurement error is highly unlikely, if not impossible, models take the formD = f (Ii) + u(ej)(2)where the random error, u is a function of the measurement (and misspecification)error ej, j varies from 1 to n, and n is the number of observations. For the sake ofparsimony, assumptions (of the second type) are made. These may be explicitly stated,such as assuming the state is a unitary actor. However, these may also be unstated,and thus (intentionally or not) implicit.6 Inherent in the selection of some list ofvariables or explanatory factors is an assumption that nothing else matters (Hempel,1949). The theoretical model now takes the formD = f (Ii) + u(ej, aj)(3)where the error term is now a function of measurement error and error due to as-sumptions, aj.7 To the extent that any given assumption is not true for a particularcase error is introduced. For example, consider a particular variable that is assumedto equal 1 throughout. In reality, it only equals 1 in 900 of the 1000 cases examined.For each of those 100 cases that the variable does not in fact equal 1, error has beenintroduced by the assumption.Possibly recognizing the errors that can result from making assumptions, somescholars argue that assumptions need to be true in order to be useful. For example,Schrodt (1985) providesnot only a treatment of the discrepancies between the assumptions of rational choicemodels and the empirical evidence, but a rejection of the widely accepted notionthat our theoretical assumptions need not be empirically correct as long as they are‘useful’ in the sense that the models incorporating these assumptions turn out toprovide accurate predictions (Singer, 1989, p. 11).However, arguing that assumptions need to be “empirically correct” in order for thetheory to be useful demonstrates a misunderstanding of the role of assumptions inscientific theory.8 It is also logically incorrect. For example, Van Dyke (1960) arguedthat if a premise in a deductive argument is false, then the conclusion will be false.However, logic tells us that if “the conclusion of a deductive argument is false, thenat least one premise must be false. . . . From knowledge that a premise is false,however, we cannot say anything about the truth or falsity of the conclusion” (Hobbs,1993, p. 2). For example, consider the argument90S. QUACKENBUSH

My cat is a tableAll tables have four legsTherefore, my cat has four legs.Notice that each of the premises (which can be thought of as assumptions) is false.However, the conclusion is quite true. Considering the error due to assumptions dis-cussed above, notice that in this example the error introduced by the second premisecancels out the error introduced by the first.Although this example is clearly simplistic, there is no good reason that falseassumptions cannot lead to correct conclusions in more complex deductive argu-ments (theories). The usefulness of assumptions is determined by the empirical ac-curacy of the theory that results from them. The accuracy of a theory is determinedthrough empirical testing of its predictions. Standard levels of statistical significanceare generally used to determine whether or not a theory is supported by the data.Testing a theory’s assumptions does not provide a test of the theory’s predictions(Friedman, 1953), although an examination of assumptions can be useful in otherways (Morton, 1999).If the predictions of a theory are not supported, the culprit is the error term inEquation 3. If measurement (and misspecification) errors have been minimized, thenthe error resulting from assumptions is the cause.9 There are two solutions for thelatter problem. First, the applicability of the theory can be restricted to a subset of thepopulation where the error from assumptions is not too great. For example, this re-sults in what Most and Starr (1989) term “nice laws.” However, it is possible that nosuch subset exists. Second, one or more assumptions can be changed in order toreduce the error from assumptions.10 Of course, changing an assumption requiresthat the theory (if logically consistent) be altered as well.For example, the vast majority of aerodynamic theory (and fluid dynamics ingeneral) rests on the assumption that air is a continuum. This is, of course, false. Airis actually made up of a number of discrete molecules that bounce off one another.Air is therefore not a continuum. Everyone knows this, but engineers continue toassume that it is. Why? Because (except for at extremely high temperatures andaltitudes) it is very useful. The assumption simplifies the real world by eliminatingunnecessary complexity and detail. There are a number of other standard assump-tions used to study aerodynamics, such as the assumptions that air is frictionless orincompressible, none of which are empirically correct. Virtually all of science andengineering is rooted in assumptions that are untrue. The more that is assumed, thesimpler the theory. However, many assumptions also limit the range of applicabilityof the theory.To summarize: all theories rest on assumptions, regardless of whether these as-sumptions are made explicit. Assumptions should be judged not by whether or notthey are true, but by their usefulness. The usefulness of assumptions is determinedby the empirical validity of the theory that derives from them. If assumptions are tooheroic, and the resulting error is too large, the theory cannot be empirically verified.With this understanding of theory and assumptions in mind, it is useful to consider91THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

the nature of rational choice theory.WHAT IS RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY?Despite Green and Shapiro’s (1994) characterization of the universalistic claimsof rational choice theory, rational choice is not a ‘theory’ in the sense of the term asused above.11 Rather it is a descriptive phrase used to describe any of a number ofindividual theories that use the rationality assumption. In addition, rational choiceassumes that outcomes are the result of choices made by actors. There are threeseparate rational choice approaches: non-formal theory, expected-utility theory, andgame theory.It might seem surprising to some that I include nonformal theory as a type ofrational choice theory. For example, Walt (1999a) surveys and critiques many recentrational choice works in security studies, but it is immediately clear that he equates“rational choice” with “formal.”12 However, there is nothing inherent in the assump-tion of rationality (which is, after all, what rational choice theory is based on) thatrequires the use of formal models. While game theory and expected-utility theoryhave proven useful in deducing the logical implications of certain assumptions, ra-tional choice theory can exist without these formal methodologies.A common criticism of rational choice theory is that real decision-makers are notrational. They are constrained by institutions, cultural influences, or psychologicallimitations that make the assumption of rationality problematic at best, or foolhardyat worst. This criticism is based on a misunderstanding of both the assumption ofrationality in rational choice theory and the use of assumptions in theory in general.Next I illustrate this contention by discussing Abelson’s essay “The Secret Existenceof Expressive Behavior.”The Unsurprising Existence of Expressive BehaviorAbelson (1996) illustrates the misunderstanding of the assumption of rationality.Entering the debate about rational choice theory “with a certain sense of aggrava-tion,” Abelson (1996, p. 26) offers several examples to support his claim that “it isno surprise that rational choice models receive such poor empirical support … {since}the axiomatic requirements of rational choice are too demanding.” Throughout hiswork, Abelson provides numerous examples to demonstrate that real actors are notrational.Abelson begins by relating the story of the “doter’s paradox.” A hypothetical ra-tional choice theorist is supposedly at a loss to explain why John Doe dotes on hisgranddaughter every fall. Because the man does not expect that his doting will makeany difference in his granddaughter’s life, Abelson claims that his behavior is inex-plicable by rational choice theory. However, “John Doe traveled a long distance forsomething he claimed was important” (Abelson, 1996, p. 25). By doting, he wassimply doing that which he preferred to do; hence, he was acting entirely rationally.Despite using the term instrumental rationality, Abelson misconstrues the assump-tion of instrumental rationality. He claims that “political attitudes about many issues,including health care, abortion, welfare, and school busing depend surprisingly more92S. QUACKENBUSH

on symbolic factors than on self-interest” (Abelson, 1996, p. 28). A self-interestedactor (in the sense of rational choice theory) is one that acts according to his or herown preferences. Thus, if these symbolic factors determine actor’ preferences, thenthey determine the actor’ self-interest. Abelson has created a false dichotomy be-tween symbolic factors and self-interest.13Furthermore, Abelson incorrectly characterizes economic gains as being the onlyallowable influence on instrumentally rational actors’ preferences. An in-depth dis-cussion of his final example will illuminate these issues. Abelson describes an ex-perimental demonstration where subjects were givena choice between two proofreading tasks with different rates of pay per unit of text.One task was to proofread an address directory—pretty boring work. The other wasproofreading personal ads, a job with an appeal that people might be reluctant toadmit. When the unit pay rate was fixed at 24 cents for the directory and 17 cents forthe personal ads, subjects overwhelmingly preferred the stodgy but financially su-perior alternative. However, when the pay rate for the personals was made elastic bythe instruction “pay rate to be determined later; ranges from 4 cents to 30 cents,”there was a sizeable degree of erosion in the popularity of proofreading the direc-tory in favor of working on the personals (Abelson, 1996, p. 32).Abelson claims that this finding is particularly damaging to the requirement thatactors have transitive preferences. However, a closer inspection demonstrates thatthis is not so. The three options are: a, proofreading the directory, which pays 24cents; b, proofreading the personals, which pays 17 cents; and c, proofreading thepersonals where the pay is between 4 and 30 cents (and thus, the expected utility is17 cents).14 Given the distribution of choices when faced with the choice between aand b or a and c, it is clear that many had the preference ordering a cPaPb.15 Sinceu(a) = 24, u(b) = 17, and EU(c) = 17, but the evidence indicates that c is preferred toa and a is preferred to b, Abelson claims that the above ordering is intransitive.Abelson’s claim that this preference ordering is intransitive rests on two assump-tions: first, that the actors are solely interested in economic gain; and second, that theactors are risk-neutral. This can be easily demonstrated. The reflexive operator, R,indicates that for xRy, x is at least as good as y. Thus, xPy and xIy each indicate xRy.16Hence, for the above prefderence ordering, cRa, aRb, and cRb. The requirement for transitivity is that xRy and yRx implies that xRz for all x, y, and z. (Austin-Smith andBanks, 1999, pp. 2–4). Therefore, since aPb and bIc, this should imply aPc (ratherthan the observed cPa) in order for the preference ordering to be transitive.However, and this is the key point, this intransitivity results only if the two as-sumptions above are met. If the subjects’ risk attitudes are accounted for, the mysterydisappears. Risk neutral actors are indifferent between a certain outcome and a lot-tery with the same expected utility. Risk averse actors prefer the certain outcome,and risk acceptant actors prefer the lottery (Morrow, 1994). Risk acceptant actorswould prefer c to b (i.e., they would prefer the lottery with expected utility of 17 tothe certain outcome of 17), and the ordering cPaPb is transitive.Furthermore, the only reason that u(a) = 24, u(b) = 17, and EU(c) = 17 is that theplayers’ utilities were modeled solely as a function of economic gain. This is indica-tive of a recurring problem throughout Abelson’s essay. In each of his examples, he93THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

demonstrates that people are motivated by “fun” or other noneconomic benefits, andthus he claims that real people are not instrumentally rational. However, throughoutAbelson actually gives examples of people choosing according to their preferences—and thus acting rationally.What Preferences are Rational?It is quite clear that Abelson misconstrues instrumental rationality. He argues that“expressive” motivations are somehow different from “instrumental” ones. How-ever, nothing about instrumental rationality excludes “expressive” motivations. In-strumental rationality is only concerned when whether people act in accordance withtheir motivations, regardless of what those motivations may be. Unfortunately, Abelsonis not alone in his confusion about this issue. Similarly, Ingelehart (1990) equatesrational choice theory to a sole reliance on economic factors. These misconceptionsabout the nature of rational choice theory have likely resulted because it was firstused in economics, and many early rational choice applications in political sciencemodeled players’ utilities in economic terms.However, there is in no way a requirement that rational actors are only (or at all)motivated by economic benefit. Demonstrating that people do not choose accordingto economic preferences does not demonstrate that they do not choose rationally; itonly means that they are not solely motivated by economic gain. “So if we see aplayer choosing in a fashion that doesn’t maximize his payoffs as we have modeledthem, then we must have incorrectly modelled his payoffs” (Kreps, 1990, p. 26).Thus, recalling equation 3, it is possible that a given model of players’ payoffscreates an error due to assumption that is too large for the resulting theory to beempirically verified. Hence, the next logical step is to incorporate a better model ofthe players’ payoffs into the theory. Still misunderstanding, Green and Shapiro statethat “[I]t is possible, of course, to preserve a variant of RCT by bending and stretch-ing the conception of rational action to encompass such findings” (1994, p. 85).Changing the assumption about the players’ payoffs is not “bending and stretchingthe conception of rational action.” However, a more complete discussion of instru-mental rationality needs to be presented.ON INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITYAlthough the assumption of instrumental rationality has been clearly stated timeand again (e.g., Luce and Raiffa 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1973; Zagare, 1990), itis evident from the previous discussion that it is still misunderstood by many. Itappears as if this misunderstanding results from either confusion between proce-dural and instrumental rationality17 or an objection to the use of the term “rational-ity.” Each problem will be taken up in turn.Procedural rationality (Simon, 1976) is similar to the common, everyday concep-tion of rationality. Under procedural rationality, omniscient actors are said to make a“cool and clearheaded ends-means calculation” (Verba, 1961, p. 95) in the course ofconsidering all available options and choosing the best one. Thus, to the extent thatreal actors suffer from misperceptions and other psychological and cognitive limita-94S. QUACKENBUSH

tions, they are not procedurally rational. Although procedural rationality may haveits uses, it is manifestly not the rationality of rational choice theory.Rational choice theory is rooted in the assumption of instrumental rationality. Arational actor is one who, when confronted with “two alternatives which give rise tooutcomes, . . . . will choose the one which yields the more preferred outcome” (Luceand Raiffa, 1957, p. 50). Additionally, a rational actor must have connected and tran-sitive preferences.18 For preferences to be connected, for any two alternatives x and y,either xPy, yPx, or xIy. Transitivity, as discussed above, means that if xPy and yPz,then xPz.Instrumental rationality makes no normative judgements about preferences. Thatis, whether one’s preferences are “good” or “evil,” “instrumental” or “expressive,”or anything else has no impact on one’s instrumental rationality. Thus, a person suchas Adolf Hitler who prefers to launch an attempt to conquer entire continents andwipe out entire races, and acts accordingly, is just as rational as someone like WoodrowWilson who seeks to promote democracy and acts accordingly. Similarly, a job seekerwho prefers to minimize his income, and acts accordingly, is just as rational as an-other who acts according to her preference for maximizing income. Saying that some-one is instrumentally rational is not paying them a compliment; it is simply sayingthat they act according to their preferences, whatever they may be. Even so, manyhave argued that a variety of psychological, informational, or structural factors inter-fere with actors’—particularly states’—ability to act rationally.19 However, these fac-tors only interfere with procedural rationality, not instrumental rationality. Instru-mental rationality is compatible with a wide variety of supposedly limiting factors(Zagare, 1990).Instrumental rationality is an assumption. Testing a rational choice theory (as withany theory) consists of testing the propositions that flow from the theory, not theassumptions. Therefore, Green and Shapiro’s statement that “rational choice theo-rists seldom set forth a clear statement of what datum or data, if observed, wouldwarrant rejection … their conviction that politics flows from the maximizing behav-ior of rational actors” (1994, p. 36) is off the mark. Instrumental rationality is consis-tent with a wide variety of behaviors. Although certain types of behavior may contra-dict particular theories, that does not mean that they contradict the rationality postu-late.As Green and Shapiro (1994, p. 34) themselves state, “it is not obvious what sortsof behaviors, in principle, could fail to be explained by some variant of rationalchoice .” It is interesting to note how Green and Shapiro state the point so clearly yetstill not understand it. That “it is not obvious what sorts of behaviors, in principle,could fail to be explained by some variant of rational choice theory” is precisely thepoint, and this constitutes a great strength of rational choice theory. Rational choicetheory can, in principle, be applied to virtually any social situation. The suitability ofany given rational choice explanation of behavior is an empirical matter that cannotbe decided a priori. However, Green and Shapiro (along with many others) seem towant a world divided into behavior that is explainable by rational choice theory andbehavior that is not.Similarly, Kaufmann (1994) tests whether rational or psychological models foreignpolicy decision-making best explain German actions during the 1905–1906 Moroccan95THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Crisis. He examines the amount of time that it took each of 19 top-level German deci-sion-makers to reach “an assessment that the expected French concessions could notbe obtained” (Kaufmann, 1994, p. 569). He found very limited support for his predic-tions based on a psychological model.20 His only real finding is that increased personalinterest in the crisis led to a longer time until decision-makers revised their assessmentof the French position. Although this may be counter to what one would expect underprocedural rationality, it is entirely understandable in terms of instrumental rationality.While he claims to have findings contrary to rational choice theory, he actually foundthat each of the actors acted according to his own preferences.In a statement reminiscent of Green and Shapiro’s, Kaufamnn remarks that al-thougha rational process may be consistent with errors, it cannot explain why they shouldbe correlated with the types of errors predicted by psychological models. Indeed, ifby some reinterpretation of standards of rationality it could do so, there would ceaseto be any meaningful distinction between so-called “rational” and “psychological”models (Kaufmann, 1994, p. 578).It does not require any reinterpretation of the standards of rationality to accountfor the behavior identified by Kaufmann. While some rational choice theories mayassume away psychological factors that others do not, the definition of instrumentalrationality remains the same. It is important to note that changing one’s assumptionabout the relevant utility function (the factors which are important in deciding anactor’s preferences) is not at all the same as changing the standards of rationality. Itis simply, as Kreps stated, as attempt to model an actor’s preferences more correctly.Fundamentally, the issue comes down to the question of whether or not choicematters. From a strictly structural perspective, choice does not matter; for example,Luebbert (1991, p. 306) provides an emphatically structural argument and concludesthat “leadership and meaningful choice played no role in the outcomes.” Similarly,other theories such as process theories or dynamic models (e.g. Kadera, 2001) as-sume that choices have no impact on outcomes. If no role is given to choice within atheory, then clearly the issue of rationality is a moot point.But what of theories that acknowledge the role of choice?21 With the assumption ofrationality, one has a clear means of connecting actors’ preferences to their actions.But if we do not assume that actors are instrumentally rational, then what guides theirdecisions? Do they act randomly?22 Maybe they do, but such an assumption makesexplaining their behavior problematic at best, impossible at worst. However, if oneaccepts that choices matter, but rejects rationality, that is what we are left with.Although instrumental rationality may seem to be the clear way to explain actors’choices, a phobia about using the term rationality appears to keep many scholarsfrom recognizing their own implicit assumption of rationality. In studies of electoralbehavior, various socioeconomic factors, parental party identification, religious pref-erences, gender, etc. are examined in order to determine voters’ preferences. Simi-larly, in psychological theories of foreign policy, various misperceptions and cogni-tive limitations are explored to determine foreign policy decision makers’ prefer-ences.23 Why? Because, in each of these cases and many others, it is implicitly as-96S. QUACKENBUSH

sumed that actors will choose according to their preferences; i.e., that they are instru-mentally rational. Thus, it is a fallacy for those who offer purposive theories of inter-national politics to counter pose their arguments to rationalist explanations, sincetheir explanations are also rationalist (just less explicit in their treatment of assump-tions). Such critiques are, at best, undercutting the foundations of the theories thesetheorists themselves advocate.RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSThe discussion to this point has focused on explicating the assumption of instru-mental rationality and demonstrating its compatibility with a wide range of possiblemotivations and behaviors. That this point is still misunderstood by many could bedue to a lock of explicit explanation of the rationality postulate; hopefully the abovediscussion has served to fill that void. However, rational choice theorists have poten-tially added to confusion about the assumption of rationality, and create disillusion-ment in others about the rational choice enterprise in several ways. I now switch gearssomewhat to focus on three applications of rational choice theory in internationalrelations that demonstrate the problems associated with unfair tests of alternative theo-ries, insufficient attention given to preferences, and inconsistent use of rationality.Conclusions Come from AssumptionsRational choice theories assume more than that actors are rational. Depending onthe structure and function of the theory, assumptions are made about relevant actors,actors’ preference orderings, the choices available, and so on. It must be rememberedthat the conclusions of a theory depend on the assumptions of the theory. Formaltheory is useful in making these assumptions explicit; however, assumptions are thebasis of any theory, whether formal or not . Thus, when considering a theory’s em-pirical validity it is important to keep in mind that introducing additional assump-tions changes the original theory. If the assumptions made are overly heroic, theerror due to assumptions will be too large for the theory to be verified. However, ifthese heroic assumptions are not part of the original theory, it is not the originaltheory that is falsified but the modified one.Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman make this mistake in War and Reason (1992). Intheir Realpolotik Proposition 3.1 (1992, p. 60), they show that negotiation and thestatus quo are the only possible equilibrium outcomes of the readlpolitik variant ofthe international interaction game, under complete information. Further, the RealpolitikAcquiescence Impossibility Proposition 3.2 (1992, p. 67) shows that, with therealpolitik variant, acquiescence by either side is never an equilibrium outcome, re-gardless of information conditions. Given the numerous wars that have broken outand the 109 cases of acquiescence (out of 707 observations) in their data set, theyconclude that the realpolitik variant (and thus realism) does not adequately explaininternational relations.This seems reasonable, particularly given the wealth of evidence contradictingrealism (Vasquez, 1997, 1999). However, both of these results are (given their struc-ture of the game) rooted in one key assumption: “Assumption 4. All nations prefer to97THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

resolve their differences through negotiation rather than war” (Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman, 1992, p. 40). This assumption logically follows from the implied as-sumption that the expected benefits from negotiations are the same as the benefitsexpected from war. Since war involves higher costs than negotiation, negotiationshould be favored.24 However, this assumption seems problamatic, given the evi-dence that Japan preferred to attack Pearl Harbor rather than continuing to negotiate,that Germany preferred to attack Poland rather than negotiate,25 or other possiblehistorical examples. But more importantly, realism does not assume that negotiationis always preferred to war; thus, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman have incorporatedan additional assumption (not present in realism) into their realpolitik variant.The disconfirming cases that they cite are contradictory entirely because of thisone assumption. If the assumed preference ordering between negotiation and war isremoved, then both war and acquiescence can be equilibrium outcomes of the inter-national interaction game (as can easily be seen with backwards induction). Sincethere is nothing within realism that assumes that negotiation is always preferred towar, it seems that Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman have constructed an unfair test ofrealists theory and their conclusions are only correct about the readpolitik variant,not about realism.The Importance of PreferencesThe absolute versus relative gains debate provides several examples of miscon-ceptions, and questionable applications of, rational choice theory. Grieco (1988) seeksto defend neorealism against what he dubs neoliberal institutionalism. He contendsthat neoliberals’ views that states are often in Prisoner’s Dilemma situations is wrong(Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985).26 Grieco disputes theclaim that a state in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma responds (as a rational actormust) “solely out of a desire to maximize its individual long-term total payoffs”(1988, p. 496). He claims that such utility maximization is equivalent to maximizingone’s absolute gains, and therefore it is wrong because states are concerned withmaximizing their relative gains.Whether states are more interested in maximizing their absolute or relative gainsis irrelevant for the purposes of this paper. Rather, if states are in Prisoner’s Dilemmasituations then they must be maximizing their utility. To state it differently, one can-not argue that any particular game is an appropriate model of international relations(and thus use a rational choice perspective) and at the same time argue that the play-ers do not seek to maximize their utilities (and thus violate a fundamental tenant ofrational choice). However, utility maximization in no way presupposes that absolutegains are the only ones that matter. To the extent that relative gains matter, that con-cern needs to be incorporated into the utility functions. Thus, rational actors mustmaximize their utility regardless of weather that utility is independent of or partiallyinterdependent upon other actors, as Grieco (1988) proposes. Snidal (1991) makes asimilar argument and demonstrates that as relative gains become more important,several different types of games become Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Ultimately, if relativegains are the only important factor, then all games are zero-sum.Powell attempts a “reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains98S. QUACKENBUSH

. . . [that links] changes in the states’ behavior, the feasibility of cooperation, andespecially the states’ concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changesin the constraints facing the states” (1991, p. 1304). He then develops a simple 3 × 3“neoliberal institutional model [that] has been explicitly designed so that (F, F) [co-operation] is a first-period equilibrium outcome” (1991, p. 1308). In his conclusions,Powell (surprisingly enough) finds that cooperation is possible in an anarchic world.To conclude that a model demonstrates what it has been explicitly designed todemonstrate is to have not said much. Indeed, Powell’s results rest solely on hisassumptions about actors’ preferences.27 He makes rather arbitrary assumptions aboutstates’ preferences, arguing in favor of shifting “the focus of analysis away frompreferences to constraints” (Powell, 1991, p. 1304). Although the test of assumptionsis the empirical accuracy of the resulting theory, ignoring actors’ preferences by as-suming them away is counter to the very idea of rational choice theory. As Frieden(1999, p. 76) observes.the goal of improved analyses of international politics would be better served ifpreferences were defined more carefully, if they were derived more methodically,and if their implications for outcomes were stated and evaluated more systemati-cally. . . . [Furthermore,] no analysis of relations among actors … can be undertakenwithout a notion of the actors’ preferences. . . . Insufficient . . . attention to the roleof preferences in international politics has been responsible for many fruitless de-bates and much poorly designed research.However, Powell allows no variation in the preferences of states. Leaving prefer-ences open as variables (i.e., allowing for multiple types of players) is far more gen-eral and allows for application to a wide variety of situations. Then utility functionsfor the various actors can be specified and states’ preferences can be measured, ac-cording to a particular operationalization. For example, Bueno de Mesquita andLalman (1992) specify a utility function for the actors in the international interactiongame, but they allow states’ preferences to vary. Indeed, they explicitly operationalizeand measure states’ preferences.Rational Choice means Rational ChoiceOnce rationality is assumed, it must be used consistently. Classical deterrencetheorists such as Schelling have argued that deterrence relationships are best mod-eled by the game of Chicken (Figure 1). The two players, State A and State B, simul-taneously choose between cooperating and defecting. For each state, winning is thebest outcome (utility = 4) and conflict is the worst (u = 1). The status quo providesthe second best outcome, with losing being the second worst. The outcomes A Winsand B wins are Nash equilibria (represented by an asterisk).Obviously, each state would like to win, but how is this accomplished? Severalstrategies have been proposed, but only one will be examined here: the irrevocablecommitment.28 Schelling (1966, p. 43) explains the rationale of this strategy:If you are faced with an enemy who thinks you would turn and run if he kept ad-vancing, and if the bridge is there to run across, he may keep advancing. He may99THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

advance to the point where, if you do not run, a clash is automatic. Calculating whatis in your long-run interest, you may turn and cross the bridge. At least, he mayexpect you to. But if you burn the bridge so that you cannot retreat, and in sheerdesperation there is nothing you can do but defend yourself, he has a new calcula-tion to make. He cannot count on what you would prefer to do if he were advancingirresistibly; he must decide what he ought to do if you were incapable of anythingbut resisting him.Similarly, Kahn (1962) proposes making an irrevocable commitment by rippingthe steering wheel off, thereby forcing the opponent to concede. Given the assump-tions that the actors are rational and that the moves are simultaneous, this is impos-sible. If the moves are simultaneous, an irrevocable commitment can only truly bemade (or believed) by an irrational actor. However, Schelling’s description of burn-ing one’s bridges appears to be sequential moves (one player burns his bridges, andthen the other responds by not attacking). But sequential moves are not possible in asimultaneous move game (Rapoport, 1964).As Motyl (1999) points out, concepts must be both clearly defined and used con-sistently in order to be useful. Thus, if rationality is assumed, irrational choices areunacceptable. Similarly, if the theory uses a simultaneous move game, one playercannot move before the other. The assumption of rationality and formal modelingcan be very useful in theory construction; however, they must be used consistently inorder for the resulting theory to be logically consistent. In addition, inconsistent us-age of rationality creates confusion about the nature and utility of rational choicetheory. The presence of logical inconsistencies is a fundamental problem with anytheory; therefore, theories that use rationality inconsistently are fundamentally flawed.However, this is not a problem with the assumption of rationality, but with thosetheories that use rationality inconsistently.IS RATIONAL CHOICE ONE THEORY?Throughout their work, Green and Shapiro (1994) make much of their claim thatrational choice theory is indeed one theory. Although they state what seems to me the100S. QUACKENBUSHCooperateStatus Quo(3,3)B Wins*(2,4)A Wins*(4,2)Conflict(1,1)DefectCooperateDefectState BState AFigure 1. Game of Chicken.

appropriate response, “that we caricature rational choice theory by presenting it as asingle theory, that purports to explain everything, when in fact that is not the case”(1994, p. 192), they brush past it, continuing in their claims.It cannot possibly be the case that rational choice theory is indeed one theory. Fewwould dispute that balance of power theory and power transition theory are twoseparate theories. However, there have been rational choice approaches to both bal-ance of power theory (e.g., Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose, 1989; Wagner, 1986, 1994)and power transition theory (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1996; Danilovic, 1996; Zagare,1996b).29 Furthermore, other rational choice explanations of conflict (e.g., Bueno deMesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000)would not be labeled as either balance of power or power transition theory. Bothclassical deterrence theory (briefly reviewed above) and perfect deterrence theory(Zagare and Kilgour, 2000) are rational choice theories. However, they are unques-tionably different theories.Although other examples of competing rational choice theories are available, thepoint should be quite clear.30 Rational choice is not one theory. But what does itmatter? Many of Green and Shapiro’s examples of what they call post-hoc theoriz-ing were in fact examples of new theories being developed to improve on previousones. They characterize rational choice theory as bordering on nonfalsifiability be-cause when one rational choice theory is “falsified” another is created to explain thedisconfirming evidence. While there may be some merit to this charge, this wouldonly be a problem if rational choice were one theory. However, since rational choiceis an approach to theory and not one theory itself, nonfalsifiability of rational choiceis irrelevant. The falsifiability of any given theory (rational choice or otherwise) isthe important issue; falsifying the rational choice perspective is not only impossible,it is immaterial.CONCLUSIONSIn this paper, I have addressed broad issues concerning rational choice theory.First, I have attempted to clarify the role of assumptions in theory. There are twotypes of assumptions. Assumptions of the first type cannot be proven; they must beassumed. A second type of assumption is used to simplify reality in theory construc-tion. To the extent that the assumptions are not accurate for any given case, they addan error due to assumptions to the theoretical model. The ultimate test of the useful-ness of assumptions is the empirical validity of the theory that results from them.Rational choice theory is a descriptive phrase used to describe any of a number ofindividual theories that incorporate a rational choice approach. This approach isgrounded in the basic assumption that actors make rational choices in an attempt toreach their most preferred outcome. In addition, rational choice assumes that out-comes are the result of choices made by actors. There are three separate rationalchoice approaches: nonformal theory, expected utility theory, and game theory.Many critics of rational choice theory have questioned whether actors are reallyrational. However, I have demonstrated that these questions are based on misunder-standings of the assumption of instrumental rationality. Rational choice theory isconsistent with behavior that is constrained by institutions, cultural influences, or101THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

psychological limitations. Furthermore, many so-called nonrational choice theoriesimplicitly assume instrumental rationality. Once this, along with the role of assump-tions in theory, is properly recognized, we can move beyond debates about the as-sumptions of rationality and on to constructing useful theory and explaining interna-tional relations.An exploration of some applications of rational choice in international relationshas demonstrated several important points. First, when testing other theories, it mustbe ensured that new assumptions have not been added; otherwise, no conclusionscan be reached about the original theory. Secondly, the extent to which absolute orrelative gains matter to states needs to be incorporated into the states’ preferences . Ifassuming rationality, states must seek to maximize their utility; anything else wouldbe logically inconsistent. Additionally, preferences matter. Assuming particular pref-erences in order to construct a model to demonstrate a particular conclusion is tohave said nothing. Finally, concepts must be defined clearly and used consistently.Therefore, if rationality is assumed, irrational behavior is not allowed. Likewise, if agame is simultaneous, then sequential moves are not allowed.Finally, rational choice is not one theory. Rational choice is an approach to theorythat can result in competing and contradictory individual theories. Thus, Green andShapiro’s concerns about the nonfalsifiability of the rational choice approach areimmaterial. Rather, it is the falsifiability of individual theories that is of concern.With a proper understanding of the role of assumptions in theory and of the as-sumption of instrumental rationality, the field of international relations, and politicalscience in general, can move beyond debates about an assumption and on to moreproductive theory construction and research. The key, of course, is understandingthat a variety of motivations and behaviors are consistent with instrumental rational-ity, which is after all the rationality of rational choice theory.NOTES1.I address the question of what constitutes rational choice theory below.2.O’Neill (1992) provides a summary of game theory models of peace and war, and includes a discus-sion of the debate about rationality in international relations dating back to the 1960s.3.Other goals of science include descriptions of past events, prediction of future events, and prescriptionof solutions for the future. However, the key to these goals is the proper understanding (or explana-tion) of why things happen. With the foundation of understanding laid, one can give better descrip-tions of events, make better predictions of future events, and also make better prescriptions for thefuture.4.The basic format of this example is inspired by Przeworski and Teune (1982).5.Notice that it is an assumption that such a deterministic explanation is even possible.6.The danger of leaving assumptions implicit is that some analysts may not be aware of their assump-tions. Although one may claim to assume nothing and simply ‘see what the data say’, this is impos-sible. In order to examine the data, assumptions must be made concerning the nature of the relation-ships, the relevant variables, and so on. Indeed, for any given statistical method, a host of assumptionsare made.7.There has, of course, been an extensive discussion of the role of assumptions in economics literature(e.g., Blaug, 1992; Friedman, 1953). Although there has been some discussion of the issuein politicalscience (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, chap. 1; 1985), it is clear that the role of assumptions has notreceived the attention in political science that it has in economics. As well, the discussion of ‘error dueto assumptions’ is a novel approach that is useful in highlighting the role of assumptions in theory.102S. QUACKENBUSH

8.Notice, of course, that if statements are “empirically correct” then there is nothing to be assumed; theycan simply be stipulated.9.If theory is “incorrect,” then it will suffer from misspecification error and will not be confirmedregaurdless of the amount of measurement or assumption error.10.This is not to say that assumptions are irrelevant. Rather, it is to argue that the ultimate test of a theoryis the empirical accuracy of its predictions, and not the accuracy of its assumptions.11 For more on rational choice and universalism, see text following.12.Thus, in contrast to Morton’s (1999, p. 19) comment that “distaste for rational approaches … [is] abarrier to the acceptance of much formal modeling in political science,” it is evident that, for some,dislike for formal modeling is a barrier to acceptance of rational choice.13.For example, O’Neill (1999) considers various ways in which honor and symbols affect the likelihoodof war through a rational choice perspective. Thus, he explicitly considers how honor and symbolsaffect actors’ self-interest. Also, Schuessler (2000) examines the role of expressive choice in the con-text of electoral participation.14.The expected utility will only equal 17 if each of the possible outcomes (4, 5, 6, . . . 29, 30) has anequal probability of occurring.15.Where xPy indicates that x is preferred to y, and xIy indicates that the actor is indifferent between xand y.16.Notice also that xIy implies that yIx.17.Opp (1999) refers to procedural rationality as the narrow version and instrumental rationality as thewide version of the rationality assumption.18.The requirement for connectedness (or completeness) is from von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).Aumann (1962) provides an alternative specification of utility theory without the completeness axiom.19.Cashman (1993, pp. 79–81) provides a good summary of nine key criticisms of rationality along theselines.20.Although Kaufmann claims to have found limited support for his predictions, it is not clear that he has.His first model (and each of the variables in it) was statistically insignificant. The second model andthe two variables in it are significant. However, the results are quite confusing; although he states thatthe second model uses “only the motivated bias and salient bias variables” (Kaufmann, 1994, p. 576),the variables that appear in the model are for motivated bias and big-stick belief. Nonetheless, it seemsfrom his preceding discussion about the problems with the big-stick belief variable that it is indeed thesalience variable that appears in the second model. However, although he predicts that higher salienceleads to a reduced time until assessment revision (and thus a negative coefficient), the result is positiveand significant (<0.01) and Kaufmann claims that it supports his model!21.For examination of the role of choice in international relations, see Lake and Powell (1999).22.Yamamoto (1990) conducted a test of whether rationality or chance best explains war expansion.Unsurprisingly, the rational choice model performed much better than the model based on chance.23.As previously discussed, these psychological factors are entirely consistent with the assumption ofinstrumental rationality.24.Therefore, the following discussion deals with the implicit assumption about the expected benefits ofnegotiation and war, as well as assumption 4. Assumption 4 is highlighted it is the one that Bueno deMesquita and Lalman make explicit in their assumptions.25.Indeed, Hitler later regretted having negotiated over Czechoslovakia in Munich in 1938 rather thanattacking (Weinberg, 1995).26.Although it seems rather obvious, to me at least, that approaching a problem from a rational choiceperspective or arguing that states are in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation in no way implies agreementwith, much less subscription to, neoliberalism, this point is not particularly relevant to the currentdiscussion. Nonetheless, I fail to see where Axelrod and Keohane (1985) make a claim to neoliberalism.27.For example, the fighting cost to each state is 3.5 (later 7) and the payoff to victory is 6. These num-bers come from out of the blue. If the costs or payoffs were different, different results would beobtained.28.Zagare (1996a) and Zagare and Kilgour (2000, ch. 1) provide detailed critiques of classical deterrencetheory.29.Of course, as stated previously, theory does not have to be formal in order to be rational choice.Although nonformal rational choice works certainly exist in these areas, only formal pieces are used103THE RATIONALITY OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

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16-284CrimeandCriminalityChapter16.CRIMEANDCRIMINALITYItiscriminaltostealapurse,Itisdaringtostealafortune.Itisamarkofgreatnesstostealacrown.Theblamediminishesastheguiltincreases.JohannSchiller(1759-1805)Wesowanactandreapahabit:Wesowahabitandreapacharacter:Wesowacharacterandreapadestiny.WilliamBlack(1893)…therootcausesofcrime[are]poverty,unemploy-ment,underemployment,racism,poorhealthcare,badhous-ing,weakschools,mentalillness,alcoholism,single-parentfamilies,teenagepregnancy,andasocietyofselfishnessandgreed.PatrickV.Murphy(1985)formerNYPDCommissionerI.IntroductionA.TheIntractableProblemofCrimeWehavemadetheclaimthat,asidefrombeinganinterestingintellectualexercise,thereareimportantpracticalreasonsfortryingtounderstandhumanbehaviorinaninte-gratedfashion.Inthischapterwewilltesttheutilityofthehumanecologicalapproachononeofthemostintractableinternalsocialproblemsinculturallydiversesocieties—crime.Insubsequentchapters,wealsowilltestourapproachonmoregroup-levelproblemssuchastheconservationofpublicresourcesandwar.Crimeisaparticularlyinterestingproblembecauseitisinmanyrespectstheobverse(i.e.,the‘flipside’)ofaltruism.Thisisespeciallytrueifwedefinecrimebroadlyasbehav-iorinwhichindividualsobtainresourcesfromothersviaforce,fraud,orstealth.Thinkaboutthis.We’vediscussedtheapparentimportanceofaltruismforlarge-scalesocialin-teractionsbetweenunrelatedpeople.Inorderforpeopletoreapthefullbenefitsofgroupcooperationanddivisionoflabor,theysometimesmustsubordinatetheirpersonalintereststothoseofothers—occasionallyindramaticfashion.Altruisticactscostanindividualmorethanheorshegains.Criminalactsdojusttheopposite.Peoplewhocommittheseactsin-tentionallyharmothersfortheirowngain.Ofcourse,sometimesaltruismonthesmallscaleisnecessarytoexecutepredatory

CrimeandCriminality16-285strategiesagainstthelargersocieties.Criminalconspiraciesmayenjoinconsiderableself-sacrificeonthepartofgangmemberswhoarecaught.TheSicilianMafiawasapparentlysuccessfulinpartbecauseofitstraditionofomerta,silenceinthefaceofpolicequestioningandinducenmentstoratonthegang.OthercriminalconspiraciesoftentrytomimictheSi-ciliansinthisregard,buttheywerelongthemostsuccessful.Thefollowingdiscussionwilldefinekeytermsinabroadenoughsensesothatthelargerissuesassociatedwithcrimecanemerge.Wethenwilldiscussthewaysinwhichcrimeharmsindividualsandgroupsandwhywethinkthatitisnecessaryfromapracticalstandpointtotakealong-termintegratedapproachtounderstandingandcontrollingcrime.Inotherwords,we’lltrytoseewhatspecialinsightsthehumanecologicalapproachtounderstandingcriminalbehaviorcanbringtothisthornyproblemthataffectsusalleveryday.Attheendofthischapter,we’llarguethatourapproachsuggestspracticalpolicyal-ternativesthattraditionalacademicdisciplineshavetendedtooverlook.(Surprise!)Sothatyoucanmakeyourowndecisionsaboutthereasonablenessofourpositions,we’llfirstsummarizewellestablishedempiricalfindingsaboutthenatureanddistributionofcrimethentrytomakesenseofthemusingstandardecologicaltoolsandsomeoftheinsightsdevelopedthusfarinthiscourse.B.DefinitionofTermsLegally,crimesusuallyaredefinedasactsoromissionsforbiddenbylawthatcanbepunishedbyimprisonmentand/orfine.Murder,robbery,burglary,rape,drunkendriv-ing,childneglect,andfailuretopayyourtaxesallarecommonexamples.However,assev-eraleminentcriminologistsrecentlyhavenoted(e.g.SampsonandLaub1993;GottfredsonandHirschi1990),thekeytounderstandingcrimeistofocusonfundamentalattributesofallcriminalbehaviorsratherthanonspecificcriminalacts.Insteadoftryingtoseparatelyunderstandcrimessuchashomicide,robbery,rape,burglary,embezzlement,andheroinuse,weneedtoidentifywhatitistheyallhaveincommon.Muchpastresearchoncrimehasbeenconfoundedbyitsfocusonthesepolitico-legalratherthanbehavioraldefinitions.Thebehavioraldefinitionofcrimefocuseson,criminality,acertainpersonalitypro-filethatcausesthemostalarmingsortsofcrimes.Allcriminalbehaviorsinvolvetheuseofforce,fraud,orstealthtoobtainmaterialorsymbolicresources.AsGottfredsonandHirschi(1990)noted,criminalityisastyleofstrategicbehaviorcharacterizedbyself-centeredness,indifferencetothesufferingandneedsofothers,andlowself-control.Moreimpulsivein-dividualsaremorelikelytofindcriminalityanattractivestyleofbehaviorbecauseitcanprovideimmediategratificationthroughrelativelyeasyorsimplestrategies.Thesestrate-giesfrequentlyareriskyandthrilling,usuallyrequiringlittleskillorplanning.Theyoften

16-286CrimeandCriminalityresultinpainordiscomfortforvictimsandofferfewormeagerlong-termbenefitsbecausetheyinterferewithcareers,family,andfriendships.GottfredsonandHirschiassertthatthismeansthe“within-personcausesoftruancyarethesameasthewithin-personcausesofdruguse,aggravatedassault,andautoaccidents(1990,p.256).”Criminalityinthissensebrearsaproblematicrelationshipwithlegalcrimes.Somedrugdealers,taxcheats,prosti-tutesandotherlegalcriminalsmaysimplybebusiness-peoplewhosebusinessactivityhap-penstobeillegal.Psychologically,theymightnotdifferfromordinarycitizens.Almostallordinarycitizenscommitatleastsmalllegalcrimesduringthierlives.Nevertheless,Got-tfredson’sandHirschi’shypothesisisthatthevastmajorityoflegalcrimeiscommittedbyindividualsageneralstrategyofcriminalactivity.Thisconceptionofcrimeexplainsthewidevarietyofcriminalactivityandthefactthatindividualstendnottospecializeinonetypeofcrime.Italsoisconsistentwiththewell-establishedtendencyofpeopletobeconsistentoverlongperiodsoftimeinthefre-quencyandseverityofcrimestheycommit.Evenexecutiveswhocommitwhitecollarcrimesprobablyaremoreimpulsive,self-centered,andindifferenttothesufferingofothersthanthosewhodonottakeadvantageofsimilaropportunities.Focusingoncriminalityratherthanpolitical-legaldefinitionsalsoallowsustofi-nessetheperplexingproblemofwhysomeacts(e.g.,marijuanaconsumption)aredefinedascrimeswhilesimilararguablymoredamagingacts(e.g.,alcoholconsumption)arenot.Theseissues,centraltoconflicttheoriesandcriticaltheoriesofcrime,areimportant.How-ever,becausetheyfocusonsystematicallydeeperpowerrelationsbetweencompetingin-terestgroups,theyseldomprovidefeasiblepolicyalternativesandtendtoreinforceperceptionsofcrimeasaninsolvableproblem.Whatwewanttodohereisseeifthehumanecologicalapproachcanleadustosomepracticalstrategiesforcontrollingcrime.Humanresourcescanhavematerial,symbolic,orhedonisticvalue.Incrimessuchasthefts,individualstakematerialresourcessuchaspropertyfromanotherpersonwithouthisorherknowingcooperation.Thosewhocommitcrimessuchasnarcoticstraffickingandgamblingattempttoobtainmoneythatcanbeexchangedformaterialresources.Incrimessuchasassaultsnotassociatedwiththeft,sexualassaults,andillicitdruguse,peopleobtainhedonisticresourcesthatincreasepleasurablefeelingsordecreaseunpleasantfeelings.Po-liticalcrimessuchasterrorismorelectionfraudattempttoobtainsymbolicresourcessuchaspowerorprestige.C.HowBadistheProblemofCrime?TheUSistrulyinthemidstofacrimewave.SeriouscrimeratesintheUnitedStatesrose40percentfrom1970to1990.Ratesforreportedviolentcrimesrose85percent,rates

CrimeandCriminality16-287formorecommonpropertycrimes35percent.Asweattemptedtocontrolcrimethroughtraditionalapproaches,expendituresforfederal,state,andlocalcriminaljusticesystemac-tivitiesincreasedfrom$12.3billionin1971to$74.3billionin1990.Ourimprisonmentratessoaredfrom96to292per100,000,becominghigherthananyotherindustrializedna-tion.Crimehashighanddiversecosts.Thedirectphysical,material,mental,andemo-tionalinjurysufferedbyvictimsofcrimeisdeplorable.Perhapsevenmoretragic,however,istheindirectdamagetosociety.Attemptstocontrolcrimethroughthecriminaljusticesys-temincreasinglyintrudeinourprivatelives.Personalfreedomsarethreatenedaswerepeat-edlychoosebetweenpublicorderandindividualrights.Moreover,crimeamplifiesmistrust,feedsprejudice,andgenerallydegradessocialcohesion(Vila,1994).Peoplebe-comemorefearful,oftenimprisoningthemselvesintheirownhomes.Gunsarekeptwithinreach,aknockonthedoorevokesterror,astrangerinneedofassistanceisignored.II.ASystemsPerspectiveonCrimeCriminalbehavioristheproductofasystematicprocessthatinvolvescomplexinter-actionsbetweenindividual,societal,andecologicalfactorsoverthecourseofourlives.Inotherwords,fromconceptiononwardtheintellectual,emotional,andphysicalattributeswedeveloparestronglyinfluencedbyourpersonalbehaviorsandphysicalprocesses,interac-tionswiththephysicalenvironment,andinteractionswithotherpeople,groupsandinsti-tutions.Thesesystematicprocessesaffectthetransmissionfromgenerationtogenerationoftraitsassociatedwithincreasedinvolvementincrime.Aswillbediscussed,thisoftenignoredfacthasimportantpolicyimplications.Table17.1providesaroughideaofsomeofthekindsofinteractionsthatarepossible.Beforediscussingthesystematicprocessesthatcausecrime,wefirstmustoutlinekeyecological-,societal-,andindividual-levelcomponentsofthatsystem.Inotherwords,wemustlookatthepartsseparatelybeforewecanunderstandhowtheyworktogether.A.EcologicalFactorsEcologicalfactorsinvolveinteractionsbetweenpeopleandtheiractivitiesinaphys-icalenvironment.Thiscategoryincludesthingsassociatedwiththephysicalenvironmentsuchasgeographyandtopography,crowding,pollution,andrecreationalopportunities.Theseecologicalfactorscanaffecthowpeopledevelopphysicallyandemotionallyovertheirlivesaswellasthelevelofhostility,fear,orwell-beingtheyfeelfrommomenttomo-mentastheyexperience,forexample,acrowdedsubway,darklonelyparkinglot,orserenepark.

16-288CrimeandCriminalityEcologicalfactorsalsodeterminewhatopportunitiesforcrimeexistbecausetheyin-cludeinteractionsbetweenpeopleandthewaysphysicalenvironmentschannelthoseinter-actions.Theroutineactivitiesofpeopleinaphysicalsettingcanhaveimportanteffectsonwhenandwhereopportunitiesforcrimeoccur.Acrimeisnotpossibleunlessamotivatedandableoffenderconvergeswithavictim,property,orillicitsubstanceorbehaviorintheabsenceofcapableguardianship(peopleorphysicalbarrierstopreventthecrime).Table1:Examplesofimportantdirecteffectsthatcanproduceinteractionsamongecological,microlevel,andmacrolevelfactorsassociatedwithcrime.AFFECTSOFEcologicalFactorsONMicrolevelFactorsMacrolevelFactorsEcologicalFactorsX-Environmentreinforces(&perhapscounteracts)tem-peramentalpropensities.-Pollutionhazardsdegradelearning,causehyperactiv-ity,etc.-Exposuretodangerincreasesaggressivenessand/orfear.-Deviantmodelsprovideopportunitiestolearndevi-antbehaviors.-Criminalopportunitiesincreasetemptation.-Overcrowdingmayincreasehostility.-Physicalresourcesprovideeconomicopportunities.-Geographicbarriersrein-forceclass/ethnicbound-ariesandself-interestedness.-Ecologicalinteractionsdrivepopulation-levelevo-lutionofculture.MicrolevelFactors-Routineactivitiesofindi-vidualsaffectopportunitiesforcrime.-Individualscanmodifylocalenvironment.-Individualhistoricalandgeneticvariationassuressomevariationbetweentheabilities,motivation,andstrategiesofinteractingindividuals.X-Individualvariationpro-videsgristforevolutionaryprocesses.-Individualactionschangeaveragepayoffsforcriminalandnoncriminalbehaviors.-Individualsforminterestgroupstochangegovern-ment.

CrimeandCriminality16-289B.SocietalorMacrolevelFactorsSocietalormacrolevelfactorsdealwithsystematicinteractionsbetweensocialgroups.Societalfactorsdescribethewayssocietyisstructured.Theyincludesuchthingsastherelativedistributionofthepopulationamonggroupsandtheflowsofinformation,resources,andpeoplebetweengroups.Societalfactorsencompassthevarietyandhetero-geneityofracial/ethnic/cultural/productivegroups,theirbehaviorsandbeliefs,andeco-nomicrelations.C.MotivationandOpportunityIndividualsactuallycommitthecrimes.Althoughecologicalandsocietalfactorsmustbeincludedinanyfullexplanationofcrime,individualfactorsalwaysintervenebe-tweenthemandacriminalact.Forthisreasonindividualfactorsneedtobethecenterofanydescriptionofthecausesofcrime.Individualormicrolevelfactorsdescribehowapersonbecomesmotivatedtocommitacrime.Beforedescribingthosefactors,however,itisimportanttodefineanotherkeycomponentofthesystem—motivation.Isitjustthedrivingforcebehindouractions?Inthisdiscussion,motivationismorethanthe“Iwant.”portionoftheequation.Itincludes“Icould.”“WhatwillitcostmecomparedtowhatIthinkI’llget?”and“Isthisrightandprop-er?”Motivationistheoutcomeofaprocessinwhichagoalisformulated,costsandbene-fitsareassessed,andinternalconstraintsonbehaviorareapplied.Therelativeimportanceofthecomponentsofthisprocessmayvaryfromindividualtoindividual,timetotime,andsituationtosituation.Inotherwords,sometimesaperson’smotivationisinfluencedmoreMacrolevelFactors-Governmentmodificationsofbuiltenvironmentchan-nelpopulationmovementandchangelocationofcrim-inalopportunities.-Socioculturalheterogeneitycreatesmoreopportunitiesforcrime.-Weakregulationorguard-ianshipcreatesopportunitiesforcrime.-Culturalbeliefsinfluenceparentingstylesandparentalbehavior.-Economicinequalitycre-atespressuresforcrimeviapovertyandgreed.-Povertyincreaseschilddevelopmentalrisksbycre-atingstrainsonparents,&degradingeducationandhealthcare.-Unequalaccesstoinforma-tionandeducationcreatespowerinequities.XTable1:Examplesofimportantdirecteffectsthatcanproduceinteractionsamongecological,microlevel,andmacrolevelfactorsassociatedwithcrime.AFFECTSOFEcologicalFactorsONMicrolevelFactorsMacrolevelFactors

16-290CrimeandCriminalitybyrationaldecisionmaking,othertimesbyemotionssuchasanger,greed,orlust.Similar-ly,somepeopletendtobemoremotivatedbycost/benefitcalculationsmoreofthetimethanothers.Moreover,thevaluepeopleplaceondifferentobjectsoractivitiescanvaryascantheirabilitytoresisttemptation.Motivationalonecannotcauseacrimetooccur;opportunityalsoisrequired.And—althoughfewresearcherstodayaddressthisissue—opportunityitselfmayinfluencemotivation(Katz1988).Laypeoplecallthis“temptation”andprobablywouldconsideranydiscussionofmotivationthatexcludedtemptationsilly.Thusaperson’spropensitytocom-mitacriminalactataparticularpointintimeisafunctionofbothmotivationandoppor-tunity.Somemaybemotivatedtoseekoutandexploitcriminalopportunitiesthatofferextremelysmallrewards;otherswillcommitcrimesonlywhenpresentedwithrelativelyenormousopportunities;andaveryfewwillnotcommitcrimesregardlessofrewards.AsCohenandMachalek(1988)notedintheirinnovativeworkontheevolutionofcrimeandcriminalstrategies,disadvantagemaymotivatepeopletocommitcrimes,butsocanadvantage.Asthepastdecade’sstringofinstitutionalscandalshasgraphicallyillus-trated,theelevatedskillsandstatusthatprovideaccesstolucrativecriminalopportunitieswithlittleriskofbeingcaughtandpunishedalsocanmotivatepeopletocommitcrimes.Wemightimaginethatmostpoliticiansandbusiness-peoplewhotakeandofferbribesandthelikearelessimpulsiveandthrill-seekingthanstreetcriminal,butstillhavehighermo-tivationtocommitcrimesthantheirhonestcolleagues.However,inpoliticsandbusiness,theopportunitiesareenourmouslytempting.Contrariwise,scientificscandalsarerelativelyrare.However,itisnotlikelymotivationbutopportunitythatislacking.Themainrewardinscienceisprestige,anditisgainedbypublishingpapers.Plagarismanddatafakingoc-cur,butiftheideaisanimportantone,thevictimofplagarismwillcomplain,andotherwillattempttoreplicatethefakedexperiment.Thecriminalactofpublishingafakedpaperishighlypublic;yournameisattatchedandthechancesofgettingcaughtarehigh.Criminologistshypothesizethatanumberofindividualfactorsdetermineaperson’smotivationtocommitanact.Motivationataparticularpointintimeistheresultofinter-actionsoveraperson’slifecoursebetweenbiological,socio-cultural,anddevelopmentalfactors—aswellascontemporaneousopportunity.Psychologicalfactorsaretheresultofinteractionsbetweenbiologicalandsocio-culturalfactors.Criminologistsdonotimaginethatsomesimpleconsitutionalfactor(‘criminalnature”)isaverysatisfactoryexplanationformativationalfactors.Biologicalfactorsincludesuchthingsasphysicalsize,strength,orswiftness,andtheexcitability/reactivityofnervousandorgansystemsinthebody(see

CrimeandCriminality16-291Fishbein1990;WilsonandHerrnstein1985).Itiseasytoimaginethatbig,ath-letic,youngmalesarelikelytobestatisticallyover-representedamongstrong-armrobberscomparedtosmall,skinny,awkwardfellows.Althoughthesefac-torssetthephysicalboundariesofourbehaviorandinfluenceouraffectivestate,theydonotdeterminewhichofthemyriadpossiblebehaviorsweper-form.Socio-culturalfactorsinfluencethestrategiesofbehaviorandpersonalbeliefs,values,needs,anddesiresapersonacquiresoverhisorherlife.Thesehavebeenthefocusofmanywellknowntheoriesofcrimethatemphasizedsuchthingsassociallearning,rationalchoice,self-control,andsocialstrain.Theyincludetheknowledge,skills,attitudes,andotherculturalinformationwelearnthroughinteractionswithotherpeopleandgroups—aswellasfromcul-turalartifactssuchasbooksandmovies.Socio-culturallyacquiredtraitsaffectwhichbehavioralstrategies(waysofdo-ingthingstoachievedesiredends)oneknowshowtoapplyandtheyinfluencehowweperceivethecostsandbenefitsofacourseofaction.Forexample,thevalueweplaceonthegoodwillandopinionofothersisasocio-culturalfactor,asaremanyofthebeliefsthataffectthevalueweassigntomaterialorsym-bolicgoods.Socio-culturalfactorsinfluencethestrengthofself-controlthathelpsusresisttemptation.Theyalsocanproduce“strain”thatmagnifiestemp-tationwhentherearedisjunctionsbetweenwhatwehavelearnedtodesireandtheopportunitiesweperceive.Developmentistheprocessofphysical,intellectual,andemotionalgrowththatbeginswithconceptionandendswithdeath.Developmentcanbeadverselyin-fluencedbysuchfactorsasenvironmentalpollutants,disease,physicalinjury,andlackofnurturing.Interactionsthroughoutthelifecoursebetweenbiolog-ical,sociocultural,anddevelopmentalfactorsdeterminewhoweareandhowwerespondtoopportunitiesatanypointintime.Childdevelopment—thesourceofmanycorepersonalitytraits—isparticular-lyvulnerabletopoorfamilymanagementpracticesarisingfromsuchthingsaspoverty,lackofeducation,orlivinginahighcrimeneighborhood.Familystressorssuchasunemployment,maritalconflict,anddivorcealsocandisruptfamilylife.AccordingtoPattersonandhiscolleaguesattheOregonSocialLearningCenter,growingupinadisruptedfamilyisstronglyassociatedwithchildantisocialbehavior—ofwhichcrimeisonetype(e.g.Patterson,DeBary-she,andRamsey1989).D.SummaryofSystematicRelationshipsFigure17.1illustratestheinteractionsbetweenthethreetypesofindividualfactors,motivation,andopportunity.Overtime,interactionsbetweenbiological,socio-culturalanddevelopmentalfactorsaffecthowmotivatedapersonistouseforce,fraud,orstealthtoob-tainresourceswhenanopportunityispresented.Ifmotivationissufficientlyhighinthepresenceofanattractiveopportunity,acrimemayoccursolongasthepersonhastheabil-ityrequiredtocommitit.Aswewilldiscusslater,crimesprovokeresponsesfromvictimsandpotentialvictims.

16-292CrimeandCriminalityIII.TheNatureandDistributionofCrimeA.CorrelatesandCausesofCrimeAlargebodyofresearchindicatesthatcrimeishighlycorrelatedwithyouthfulnessandmalegender,andthatearlyinvolvementincrimeispredictiveofsubsequentinvolve-ment.Similarly,poverty,inequality,disruptedfamilies,inadequatesocialization,andthepresenceofcriminalopportunitiesallseemtobeimportantcorrelatesofcrime(e.g.,Samp-sonandLaub1993;ReissandRoth1993;Tonry,Ohlin,andFarrington1991;Land,Mc-Call,andCohen1990;GottfredsonandHirschi1990;BlauandSchwartz1984).Thesegeneralfindingsabouttheprimarycorrelatesofcrimeseemlikelytoendure—althoughthereremainssubstantialdebateamongcriminologistsinvariousacademicdisciplinesabouttherelativecausalimportanceof,andrelationshipsbetween,differentvariables.Thisdebatetendstoobscurelargerissuesregardingtheappropriatecausalscopeandscaleforunderstandingandcontrollingcrime;i.e.,whichvariablesinteractinginwhatwaysshouldbeconsidered,andatwhatlevelsofanalysis.Theproblemnoteasytosolvewithbettercor-relationalstudiesbecausesomanyvariablesareintercorrelated.Forexample,poverty,re-cialdiscrimination,andfamilydisruptionalldisproportionatelyaffectAfricanAmericans,whoalsodisproportionatelyengageincriminalbehavior.However,fromthecorrelationaldataaloneitisimpossibletosaywhichvariableisthemostimportantordirectcauseofcrime,oranythingabouthowthevariablesmightbecausallyinter-related.?Figure17.1.Importantsystematicinteractionsbetweenindividualandsocietalfactorsthatcausecrime.IndividuallevelSocietallevelBiologicalSocio-CulturalDevelopmentalMotivationforCrimeCriminalOpportunitiesCrimeCounter-StrategiesIF

CrimeandCriminality16-293Asaresult,nosatisfactoryunifiedtheoreticalframeworkyethasbeendeveloped.Thishasdiminishedthepolicyrelevanceofrecommendationsfromevensomeofthemostcomprehensiveinterdisciplinaryresearchoncrime.Thisisaprimeexampleofthekindofinterdisciplinaryproblemassociatedwiththesociologyofsciencethathumanecologytriestoaddress.B.Researchvs.Policy?Althoughresearchandpolicyformulationshouldbecomplementaryactivities,theyoftenhavedifferentimperatives.Whereasscientistsareengagedinanendlesspursuitofin-formationandunderstanding,policymakerseventuallymusttakeaction.Inthischapterwearenottryingtosettledebatesaboutwhichcausalvariablesexplainmorevarianceincrimeratesorcriminalbehavior.Ratherwewanttoshowhowthehumanecologicalapproachmightbeusedtosystematicallyandcompletelyorganizeinformationandempiricallysup-portedinsightsfromthemanydisciplinesthatstudycrime.Ifthisapproachmakesitpossi-bletodevelopatrulygeneraltheoryofcriminalbehavior,itfinallymightbepossibletoestablishaunifiedframeworktoguidebothresearchand,eventually,policy.Wedothinkthatthepolicyrelevanceofresearchisimportant.Fordecadestheoret-icalfragmentationincriminologyhascontributedtogenerallyineffective,fragmented,andshort-sightedpublicpolicies.Withoutaholisticunderstandingofthecausesofcrime,elect-edofficialswillcontinuetoshiftthefocusofcontroleffortsbackandforthfromindividualleveltomacrolevelcausesasthepoliticalpendulumswingsfromrighttoleft.Thiserraticapproachfeedsthedesperatebeliefthattheproblemofcrimeisintractable—abeliefthatresultsincallsforincreasinglydraconiancrimecontrolmeasuresthatthreatenconstitution-alguarantees,evencommonsense(e.g.,“Shootcasualmarijuanausers[Gates1992:286-287].”).C.PartialTheoriesofCrimeAnumberof‘general’and/orverybroadtheoriesofcrimehavebeenproposeddur-ingrecentyears.Yetnosingleperspectivehasbeenabletointegratecausalfactorsacrossimportantecological(environmentalandsituational),microlevel(intrinsictotheindividu-al),andmacrolevel(socialstructuralandeconomic)domainstoexplainthefullscopeofcriminalbehavior.Forexample,WilsonandHerrnstein(1985)provideanexhaustivere-viewofmicrolevelbiopsychologicalfactorsassociatedwiththedevelopmentofcriminalpropensitiesbyindividuals,butlargelyignoremacrolevelfactorssuchassocialstructure,culturalbeliefs,andtheroleofecologicalinteractions.GottfredsonandHirschi(1990)at-tendmoretoecologicalandmacrolevelfactorsassociatedwithdevelopmentofself-con-trol,butdenythatbiologicalfactorshaveanyimportance.Braithwaite(1989)linksmicro-

16-294CrimeandCriminalityandmacrolevelfactorsandprocesseswiththeecologicalorganizationofcommunities,butfailstoconsiderhowtheserelationsevolveovertimeorhowthepropensitiesofindividualsdevelopoverthelifecourse.PearsonandWeiner(1985)recommendadynamicprocesses-orientedapproachtounderstandinghowinteractionsbetweenecological,micro-andmac-rolevelfactorsaffectsociallearningandrationalbehaviorinindividuals.Buttheyneglectthereciprocalinfluenceoftheseindividualsontheevolutionofmacrolevelfactorsaswellasenvironmentalandbiologicalfactors.Others(e.g.,Agnew1992;Elliott,Ageton,andCanter1979)layafoundationforunderstandinghowthepropensitiesofindividualsdevel-opoverthelifecourseinresponsetomicro-andmacrolevelfactors,butignorebiologicalandecologicalfactorsthatinfluencecriminalbehavior.Thereisamoresynthetictrendinrecentresearch.Sampson,workingwithothers,recentlyhasdescribedmostofthesalientrelationships.Forexample,SampsonandLaub(1993)describedhowmacrolevelfactorsinfluenceindividualsoverthelifecourseviasys-tematiclinkstofamilyrelationsandtheinstitutionsofschoolandwork.AndSampsonandGroves(1989)identifiedhowthesefactorsareaffectedbytheecologicalorganizationofcommunities.However,thesescholarsavoiddiscussingtheroleofbiologicalfactorsanddonotaccountfortheevolutionofmacrolevelfactorsovertime.Similarly,Farrington(1986)explainscrimeastheproductofachainofprocessesthatinvolvebiological,mi-crolevel,andecologicalfactorsthatinfluencewhatisdesired,whichstrategiesareselectedtoobtaindesiderata,andsituationalandopportunityfactorsthataffectdecisionmaking.Buthedoesnotdealwiththeevolutionofmacrolevelandecologicalfactors.Developmentalpsychologistshavefocusedmorebroadlyontheetiologyofantiso-cialbehavior.Forexample,Moffitt(inpress)andPattersonetal.(1989)takeintoaccountgenerationalandlifespanissuesaswellasdemographic,micro-,andmacrolevelfactors.However,theyignoretherolesplayedbycriminalopportunitiesandfactorsassociatedwiththeevolutionofcriminalbehaviorsandsocialresponsestocrime.Allthesefactorsmustbeunderstoodtogetherbeforewecanexplain,predict,orcontrolcrimefully.Ahumanecologicalapproachisfundamentallydifferentfromtheseearliertheories(Vila1994).Eachoftheperspectivesmentionedthusfarattemptedtoshowhowanalysisofvariableswithinafavoreddomain,orassociatedwithaparticularconstructorsetofcon-structs,couldbeusedtoexplainallormostaspectsofcriminalbehavior.Eachoftheseper-spectivesunderstandablytendedtobelargelycongruentwiththeirauthors’academicdisciplines—disciplineswhoseboundariesexistinourmindsandinstitutions,butnotinre-ality.Humanecologysimilarlyhasitsrootsinthe‘interdiscipline’ofevolutionaryecology.Butitusesaproblem-oriented,ratherthandiscipline-oriented,approachtounderstanding

CrimeandCriminality16-295criminalbehavior.Forexample,itdoesnotask“Howcanonereconcile‘strain’,‘control’,‘labelling’,‘sociallearning’and…theories?”Insteaditasks“Whatrelationshipstendtobefundamentallyimportantforunderstandingchangesovertimeintheresourceacquisitionandretentionbehaviorsofanysocialorganism?”Thisdefinesnaturallytheboundariesoftheproblemandleadsustoviewsystematicinteractionsbetweenvariousdomainsinamorerealisticfashionasdynamicratherthanstatic.IV.KeyCausesofCrimeItisnecessarytoapplyagenerationaltimescaleinordertoholisticallyunderstandthecausesofindividualcriminalbehavior.Webeginthesamewayanecologistwouldap-proachthestudyofanyorganism:byexaminingthelifecycle.A.TheRoleofEarlyLifeExperiencesAswenotedpreviously,earlylifeexperiencesappearlikelytohaveanespeciallystronginfluenceonthedevelopmentofcriminalitybecauseindividualsacquiretheirtraitssequentially.Thetraitswepossessatanyjuncturearetheresultofthecumulativecognitive,affective,physical,andsocialeffectsofasequenceofeventsthatbeganatconception.Asaresultoftheseevents,individualsacquireastrategicstyleoverthecourseoftheirlives.Someindividualsdevelopastrategicstylethatemphasizestheuseofforce,fraud,orstealthtoobtainresourcesandischaracterizedbyself-centeredness,indifferencetothesufferingandneedsofothers,andlowself-control—criminality.Someofthemoreimportantdevelopmentalfactorsincludeparentingandfamilymanagementpractices,educationalsuccess,pre-,peri-,andpostnatalstress(e.g.,WilsonandHerrnstein1985),nutrition,andcomplexinteractionsbetweengenesandenvironment(Fishbein1990.Twoespeciallyimportantfactorsarewhetheranenvironmenthelpsorhin-dersachild’sattempttocopewithhis/hertemperamentalpropensitiesandtheabilityofparentstocopewithorredirectthebehaviorsofadifficultchild.AsWernerandSmith(1992)note,childrenareplacedatincreasingriskofbecominginvolvedincrimebysuchthingsaseconomichardships,livinginhighcrimeneighborhoods,seriouscaregivingdef-icits,andfamilydisruption.Buttheserisksappeartobebufferedbyfactorslikeaneasytemperament,scholasticcompetence,educatedmothers,andthepresenceofgrandparentsoroldersiblingswhoserveasalternatecaregivers.Therelativeimportanceofriskandpro-tectivefactorsvariesaccordingtolifestage,gender,andsocialenvironment.Demographicstressorssuchaspoverty,lackofeducation,highcrimeneighborhoodandfamilystressorssuchasunemployment,maritalconflict,anddivorcealltendtoinflu-encedevelopmentbydisruptingfamilymanagementpractices(SampsonandLaub

16-296CrimeandCriminality1993:83).Growingupinadisruptedfamilyisassociatedstronglywithchildantisocialbe-havior,ofwhichcrimeisonetype.Thegenerationaltimescaleisparticularlyimportantherebecausepoorfamilymanagement,antisocialbehaviors,andsusceptibilitytostressorsoftenaretransmittedintergenerationallyfromgrandparentstoparentstochildren(Patter-son,DeBaryshe,andRamsey1989).Aswillbediscussed,thismayhaveimportantpolicyimplications.B.AnExampleAsfigure17.2illustrates,parentsmaytransmitgenesthat—inconjunctionwithpre-,peri-,andpostnatalexperiences—causeoffspringtodevelopnervousandorgansystemsthatmakethemmuchmoredifficultandcranky.Thisaffectstheprobabilitytheywillbondproperlywithaparent,especiallyifthatparentisunderextremestressfromeconomic,so-cial,orpersonalfactors.Forexample,childrenofpoorparentsbesetbyeconomicdifficul-tiesandofwealthyparentswhoseextremefocusonsocialandcareerconcernsleadsthemtonurturetheirchildrenirregularlymaybevulnerabletothisdynamic1.Theparent/childbondaffectshowstronglyachildvaluesparentalapproval—weaklybondedchildrentendtobemuchmoreimpulsiveanddifficulttocontrol.Thiscaninitiateaviciouscycleinwhichachildreceiveslessaffectionandnurturancebecauseofmisbehaviorandthereforeseekslessandlesstoplease.Overtime,thechilddevelopsastrategicstyleinasettingwhererewardsoftenareunpredictableasparentsstrugglewithalternatingresentmentanddesiretonurture.Becauserewardsareperceivedasundependable,thechildlearnstoim-mediatelygraspopportunitiesforshort-termgratificationratherthanlearningtodeferthemforfuturerewards.Inthissettingachildalsoislesslikelytoacquireconventionalmoralbeliefs.Andtheriskofphysicalandemotionalchildabuse—whichfurthertendtofuelthisviciousspiraltowardcriminality(Widom1992)—alsomaybegreater.Moreimpulsivechildrentendtodolesswellinschool.Poorschoolperformancestronglyinfluencesfuturelifechancesandthushowmuchstaketheydevelopinconven-tionalsociety.Italsoincreasesthelikelihoodchildrenwillassociatewith,andlearncrimi-nalbehavioralstrategiesfrom,deviantassociates.Bothofthesefactorsincreasethelikelihoodofengaginginseriousandfrequentdelinquency(Hirschi1969).Engaginginde-linquencyfurthercandiminishconventionalopportunitiesandweakenbeliefsaboutthemoralvalidityofspecificlaws,thusreinforcingcriminality.Thistrajectorywilltendtocontinueintoadulthooduntil/unlessitisaltered.SampsonandLaubcitefundamentalshiftsinfamilyrelationsandworkasthemostimportantsourcesofpotentialchange(1993:248).1.SeeMoffitt(inpress:15-21)foramoredetaileddescriptionof“problemchild/problemparentinteractionsandtheemergenceofantisocialbehaviors”inadverserearingcontexts.

CrimeandCriminality16-297Examplesofimportantfactorsaffectingthedevelopmentofcriminalityatdifferentlifestages:PrenatalEarlychildhoodLatechildhoodAdolescenceEarlyadulthoodGrand-andparentaltraitsLackofemotional/socialsupport|GeneticinfluencesDisruptionoffamilyunit|Pre-,peri-,post-natalstressNumberofstressfullifeevents|Poverty|Nutrition|Lowscholasticcompetence|UnemploymentEnvironmentaleffects|OtherrolesSociallearningParents0GenetictransmissionZygoteChild0IndividuallearningAdolescent0OtherrolesSelectionParent1developmentdevelopmentdevelopmentCulturaltransmissionFigure17.2.Thehumanlifecycle.Peopleacquiretraitsthatinfluencetheirbehaviorsequentiallyoverthelifecourse.Whichtraitsareacquireddependsuponinteractionsbetweengenes,socialandindividuallearning,andenvironmentalfactorsduringdevelopment.Examplesoffactorsassociatedwithdevelopmentofcriminalityateachstagearelistedbelowthediagram.

16-298CrimeandCriminalityUnlessthetrajectoryisdeflected,thiscycleofcrimecausationwilltendtocontinuewhenpeoplewithhighcriminalitybecomeparentsorrolemodels.Forexample,menraisedinadisruptedhouseholdarelikelytobecomeimplusivedeliquentadults.Theirownchildrenarethusmorelikelytoliveindisruptedhouseholdsthatleadtomoreimpulsive,delinquentchildren.Atthepopulationlevel,thisprocessthuscanhaveanimportanteffectonhowthefrequency,distribution,andcharacterofcrimeevolves.Thelong,slowmultigenerationin-creaseincrimeexperiencedintheUSmaywellbeaproductoffactorssuchaspovertythathavesmalleffectsinanyonegeneration,butaccumulateoverthegenerationsduetocul-turaltransmission.V.TheEvolutionaryEcologyofCrimeBeforewecanidentifyeffectivecrimecontrolstrategies,wefirstmustunderstandwhatmakescrimeevolve.Inthediscussionthusfar,itwaspossibletoholisticallyunder-standindividualcriminalitybyconsideringtogetheropportunitiesforcrimeandinterac-tionsbetweenthebiological,socio-cultural,anddevelopmentalfactorsthatinfluencemotivation.IfwenowuseDarwin’strickofexpandingourfocustolookatpopulationlevelchangesastheresultofindividualinteractionsandbehaviorswecanunderstandhowtheamountandtypeofcrimeinsocietyevolvesovertime.Thisisthesameapproachtounder-standingcomplexsystemsthatecologistsapplytobiologicalcommunities,exceptthatitaccountsforuniquelyhumanattributessuchastheextensiveuseofcultureandsymbolicbehaviors2.Understandingwhatmakescrimeevolveaswellaswhatcausescriminalbe-haviormakesitpossibletoidentifyeffectivecrimecontrolstrategies.A.IndividualVariationTheindividualinteractionsthatdrivesocietal-levelchangesincrimeoccurbetweenpeoplewithdifferentcharacteristics.Overthecourseoftheirlives,peopleacquirecharac-teristicssuchasknowledge,skills,attitudes,beliefs,andstylesofstrategicbehavior.Whichcharacteristicstheyacquireisstronglyinfluencedbyrepeatedinteractionsbetweensocio-cultural,biological,anddevelopmentalfactors(figure17.1).Thesecharacteristicsaffectthevaluetheyplaceonmaterialandsymbolicresourcesataparticularpointintime.Theyalsoaffecttheirabilitytoobtainthoseresources.Inotherwords,thecharacteristicswepos-2.Aswe’vediscussedpreviouslyinthiscourse,culturaltraitsarethosebasedonlearnedinformationandbehaviors.Humansareuniqueintheirextensiveuseofculturaladaptations.Mostorganisms’adaptationsaredirectlydrivenandconstrainedbygeneticinformationthatonlycanbetransmittedfromparentstochildrenovergenerationaltime.Incontrast,humansreadilytransmitculturalinforma-tionwithinandbetweengenerations,betweenrelatedandunrelatedindividuals,andacrossvastdis-tances.Sincehumanculturaltraitsmaybeintentionallymodifiedtoadapttoenvironmentalopportunitiesandchallenges,wemayguidetheevolutionofculture.

CrimeandCriminality16-299sessatanytimestronglyinfluencewhichthingswewantandourabilitytogetthem.Wemaypossessthedesireandabilitytouseconventionalstrategiessuchaslegalemploymenttogetmoney,goods,orrespect.Wealsomightbeinclinedtousecriminalstrategiesentail-ingforce,fraud,orstealthtogetthesamethings.Alternatively,wecouldwanttousecon-ventionalstrategiesbutlacktheabilitytodoso.Aperson’smotivationtocommitacrimeisdeterminedbythesefactorsplustheeffectsoftemptationexertedbyanopportunityforcrime.Ifmotivationissufficientlyhighandanopportunityexists,acrimecanoccur.B.CoevolutionofCriminalStrategiesandCounterstrategiesCrimestendtoprovokecounterstrategies—defensiveresponses—fromvictimsandpotentialvictims.Theyinstallalarmsystems,avoidgoingoutatnight,orstayawayfromroughareas.Asinformationaboutcrimespreads,othersadoptsimilarcounterstrategies.Eventually,communitygroupsandgovernmentmayrespondwiththingssuchasneighbor-hoodwatchprograms,increasedpolicesurveillanceofproblemspots,ornewlegislation.Overtime,criminalstrategiesandcounterstrategiescancoevolveinresponsetooneanotherforseveralreasons.Asisdiscussedbelow,defensivecounterstrategiesencouragepeopleseekingcriminalopportunitiestoadaptbydevelopingnewstrategiesforcrimeorshiftingtoadifferenttypeofcrime(CohenandMachalek1988).Moregenerally,highercrimeratesoftenleadtomorerigorousprotectivemeasuresthatinitiallymaycausecrimeratestodecline.Similarly,lowercrimeratesmayleadtoarelaxationofbarrierstocrimeasindividualsandcommunitieschannellimitedresourcestomorepressingproblems.De-cliningcrimeratesthuseventuallymaymakecrimeaneasier,lessrisky,andmoreattrac-tive,waytogetresources.Thissuggeststhatcrimeprobablywillalwaysexistatsomelevelinsociety.Asfewerpeopleareattractedtocrime,potentialrewardswilltendtoincreaseuntiltheyareboundtoattractsomeone.Thesedynamics—andthetendencyofdefensivecounterstrategiestoinitiateaviciouscyclebyprovokingcounter-counterstrategiesfromof-fenders—suggestthatcrimeprobablyalwayswillexistatsomelevelinsociety.Under-standingthedifferentwaysthatcounterstrategiesaddressthecausesofcrimeisthekeytomakingcriminologicalresearchrelevanttopublicpolicy.C.CounterstrategicOptionsInthepast,mostcrimecontrolproposalsignoredthesimplefactthatcriminalityisstronglyinfluencedbyearlylifeexperiencesduetothecumulative,sequentialnatureofde-velopment.Asthedashedarrowsinfigure17.3illustrate,usuallywehaveemployedcoun-terstrategiesthatattemptedtoreduceopportunitiesforcrimeordeterit.Protectionoravoidancestrategiesattempttoreducecriminalopportunitiesbychangingpeople’sroutineactivitiesorbyincapacitatingconvictedoffendersthroughincarcerationorelectronicmon-

16-300CrimeandCriminalityitoringdevices(ReissandRoth1993:325).Theyalsomayincreaseguardianshipthroughsuchthingsastargethardening,neighborhoodwatchprograms,andincreasingthenumbersoreffectivenessofpolice.Deterrencestrategiesattempttodiminishmotivationforcrimebyincreasingtheperceivedcertainty,severity,orcelerityofpenalties.‘Non-punitive’de-terrenceapproachesalsoadvocateraisingthecostsofcrimebuttheyemphasizeincreasinganindividual’sstakeinconventionalactivitiesratherthanpunishingmisbehavior(seeWil-sonandHerrnstein1985).Nurturantstrategies(solidarrowinfigure17.3)seldomhavebeenincludedoncrimecontrolagendas.Theyattempttoforestalldevelopmentofcrimi-nalitybyimprovingearlylifeexperiencesandchannelingchildandadolescentdevelop-ment.Thelong-termeffectivenessofprotectionandavoidancestrategiesislimited.Theevolutionarydynamicsillustratedinfigure3meanthatprotectionstrategiestendtostimu-late“armsraces”reminiscentofpredator-preycoevolution.Forexample,criminalsadapttobetterlocksbylearningtoovercomethem,toanti-theftcaralarmsbyhijackingautosintrafficratherthanwhileparked,tochangesinpeople’sroutineactivitiesbymovingtoareaswithmorepotentialtargets.Whateverthelong-termlimitationsofprotectionstrategies,however,theyobviouslyalwayswillbenecessarybecauseoftheopportunisticnatureofmuchcrime.Duetothepotentiallyrapidnatureofculturalevolution,thesestrategiesBiologicalSocio-CulturalDevelopmentalMotivationforCrimeCriminalOpportunitiesCrimeCounter-StrategiesIFFigure17.3.Short-termcrimecontrolstrategies(dashedarrows)attempttodiminishopportunitiesforcrimeorreduceitsrewardsrelativetoconventionalbehavior.Long-termstrategies(boldarrow)addresstherootsofcriminalbehaviorearlyinthelifecourse.DeterrenceProtection/AvoidanceNurturance

CrimeandCriminality16-301shouldbeabletoevolvequicklyinresponsetochangesincriminalstrategies.Theeffectsofopportunity-reducingstrategieslikeincapacitationthroughincarcer-ationareunclearandmaybeconfoundedbythefactthatyoungeroffenders—whoareleastlikelytobeincarcerated—oftencommitthemostcrimes(seeReissandRoth1993:292-294).Moreover,incarcerationisexpensiveandperhapsoftencounterproductive.SampsonandLaub(1993:9)assertthatincarcerationindirectlycausescrimebydisruptingfamiliesandruiningemploymentprospects.Neweralternativeslikeincapacitationviaelectronicmonitoringofconvictedoffendersintheirhomesarecheaperthanincarcerationandmaybelesscounterproductive.Conventionaldeterrencestrategiesalsoareproblematic.Thereislittleevidencethat—inafreesociety—theycanbeeffectivebeyondsomeminimalthresholdforcontrol-lingmost3crimes(ReissandRoth1993:292;WilsonandHerrnstein1985:397-399).OnenoveldeterrenceapproachrecentlysuggestedbytheNationalResearchCouncil’sPanelontheUnderstandingandControlofViolentBehaviormightbemoreeffective.Itwouldat-tempttoimprovetheabilityofpeoplewhousealcoholandotherpsychoactivedrugstocal-culatecostsandbenefitsviatreatmentandpharmacologicalinterventions(ReissandRoth1993:332-334).Non-punitivedeterrencestrategiesthatattempttoincreasethestakeadolescentsandadultshaveinconventionallifeshowpromisefor‘correcting’lifetrajectories.SampsonandLaub’s(1993)rigorousreanalysisofdatafromtheGlueckArchiveindicatethatthebestwaytoencouragemostadultoffenderstodesistfromcrimeistoincreasetheir“socialcapital”byimprovingemploymentopportunitiesandfamilyties.Therealsoisevidencethatmilitaryserviceamongyoungmenmayhelpcompensateforthecriminogeniceffectsofearlierriskfactorsbecauseitprovidesanopportunitytorepaireducationalandvocation-aldeficits(WernerandSmith1992).4However,theparadigmproposedhereindicatesthatnon-punitivedeterrencestrategiesstillmayprovidelesspotentialcrimecontrol‘leverage’thannurturantstrategies.Sincecriminalityhasitsrootsintheearlylifecourse,changingthestrategicstylesofadultsgenerallyismoredifficultthaninfluencingthedevelopmentof3.Trafficoffensesandcrimeslikedrunkendrivingmaybeexceptions.4.Sinceimprovingemploymentopportunitiesappearstodiminishtheriskofoffending,itisironicthat,comparedwithmostotherindustrializednations,theUnitedStateshaslargelyignoredtheoccu-pationaltrainingneedsofnon-college-graduateswhocompriseover80percentofU.S.adultsoverage25.TheNationalCenteronEducationandtheEconomynotesthattheU.S.mayhavetheworstschool-to-worktransitionsystemofanyadvancedindustrialcountry.Inanapparentstepintherightdirection,theClintonAdministrationrecentlyapprovednon-militarynationalserviceprogramsthatmighthelpsmooththeschool-to-worktransitionforyoungadults.

16-302CrimeandCriminalitychildren.ToparaphraseAlexanderPope,itiseasiertobendatwigthanamatureoak.Improvingchildnurturancemaybethemosteffectivedefenseagainstcrime.Thisparadigmsuggeststhatitshouldbepossibletoreducetheconcentrationofcriminalityinapopulationbyimprovingearlylifeexperiences5andchannelingchildandadolescentde-velopment6.However,nurturantstrategiessuchaseducational,healthcare,andchildcareprogramsthataddresstherootsofcriminalityearlyinthelifecourseseldomhavebeenem-ployedforcrimecontrol.Andtheresultsofeducationalandpublichealthprogramsthatat-temptedtoimproveearlylifecoursefactorsoftenhavebeenequivocalordisappointing.Infact,substantialincreasesincrimehaveaccompaniedwhatsomewouldargueareenor-mousimprovementsduringthepastonehundredyearsinsuchthingsashealthcareaccess,publiceducationaboutfamilymanagement,andprovisionofcounselingforabusevictims.Howmightthisapparentinconsistencybeexplained?Althoughthereobviouslyhavebeensubstantialimprovementsintheseareasatthenationallevel,theirdistributionundeniablyhasbeenuneven.Andincreasesinreportedcrimerateshavebeenmostdramaticduringthelastfortyyears.Muchoftheincreaseincrimeduringthisperiodappearstohavebeenassociatedwithsuchfactorsasdemographicandbusinesscyclefluctuations(e.g.,Easterlin1987;HirschiandGottfredson1983),andchangesinpeople’sroutineactivities(CohenandFelson1979).Increasedurbanization,so-cialdisorganization,andconcentrationofthosewhoaremostdeprivedaswellaspopula-tiongrowthalsoappeartobeveryimportant(W.J.Wilson1987).Pastattemptstomeasuretheimpactofnurturantstrategiesoncrimeratesmayhavebeenconfoundedbytime-lageffects.Forexample,previousempiricaleffortstoidentifyre-5.Forexample,nurturantstrategiesmightattemptto1)assurethatallwomenandchildrenhaveaccesstogoodqualitypre-natal,post-natal,andchildhoodhealthcare;2)educateasmanypeopleaspossibleaboutthebasicsofparentingandfamilymanagement;3)helppeoplepreventunwantedpreg-nancies;4)makehelpavailableforchildrenwhohavebeensexually,physically,andemotionallyabused—andfortheirfamilies;and5)makeavailableextendedmaternityleavesandqualitychildcareforworkingparents.6.Crimecontrolstrategiesthatchanneltendenciessuchasimpulsivityassociatedwithincreasedriskofcriminalbehaviorarenecessarysincebiological,developmental,andenvironmentalvariationassurethatsomepeoplealwayswillbemoreimpulsive.Heretheemphasiswouldbeonimprovingthematchbetweenindividualsandtheirenvironment.Channelingimpulsivitymightinvolvebroad-basedchangesthatimprovethequalityofeducationforallstudents.Forexample,schoolscouldplacelessemphasisonforcingchildrentositallday,insteadallowingthemtoparticipateinmoreactivelearningortoreadinapreferredposition.Similarly,self-regulationtrainingthatimprovesself-controlanddiminishesimpulsivitywouldbenefitallchildren.Moreimpulsivestudentsalsomightbeencouragedtoprepareforconventionaloccupationsthatrewardpeoplewhopreferdoingtosittingandtalkingand/orprovideshorter-termgratification.Thismighthelpthemacquirealargerstakeinconventionalbehavioranddiminishrisksassociatedwithschoolfailure,makingthemlesslikelytodeveloporexpresscriminality(SampsonandLaub1993;WernerandSmith1992;Lemert1972).

CrimeandCriminality16-303lationshipsbetweencrimeandsocialstructural/economicvariables(e.g.,incomeinequali-ty,poverty,andunemployment)usingaggregatedataprimarilyfocusedoncontemporaneousratherthanlaggedeffects.Theproposedimportanceoflife-coursethink-ingandintergenerationaleffectsindicatethatresultsofeducational,healthcare,andchildcareprogramsimplementedtodayshouldbegintobeseeninabout15years—whentoday’snewbornsenterthe15-29year-oldagegroupmostatriskforcriminalbehavior.Eventhen,accordingtotheparadigm,changeprobablywouldbegradualwiththepopulation-levelconcentrationofcriminalitycontinuingtodeclineaseachgenerationofmorefullynurturedpeoplebecameparentsthemselves.Thismeansthatchangeassociatedwithnurturantstrat-egiesmightrequirethreeorfourgenerations.Attemptstomeasurepasteffectsofnurturantstrategiesalsomightbeconfoundedbyimmigrationbecause,forexample,nationalpro-gramsaffectingearlylifecoursefactorswouldnothavehadaneffectonthosewhosechild-hoodswerespentoutsidethecountry.LegalimmigrationasapercentageoftotalU.S.populationgrowthhasincreasedregularlyfrom-0.1percentduringthedepressionto29.2%from1980-1987.Itisunclearwhethertheapparentfailureofpastnurturantprogramsreflectstheirlackofutility,faultyprogramimplementation,orafailuretopersistentlypursuethemovergenerationaltimeframes.Italsoispossiblethattheeffectsoftheseprogramshaveyettobemeasured.Therecouldbesubstantialpayoffsifitispossibletosuccessfullyimplementprogramssuchastheseoverthelong-term.Thereisstrongevidencethatthemostpersistentfiveorsixpercentofoffendersareresponsibleforroughly50percentofreportedcrimes.Moffitt(inpress)suggeststhatantisocialbehaviorinthisgroupismostlikelytobethere-sultofearlylifecoursefactors.VI.ThoughtsfortheFutureWehavearguedthatitispossible—andprobablynecessary—touseahumaneco-logicalapproachtounderstandcrimeholisticallyifwearetoconductsoundresearchanddevelopsoundpublicpoliciesforcrimecontrol.Andwe’vetriedtoexplainhowthisap-proachcanbeusedtodescribehowecological,microlevelandmacrolevelfactorsassoci-atedwithcriminalbehaviorinteractandevolveovertimeandhowtheyinfluenceindividualdevelopmentoverthelifecourseandacrossgenerations.Iftheproposedrela-tionshipsandeffectsaresupportedbyresearch,asingletheoreticalframeworkcouldac-countforthewaysindividualsacquirebehavioralstrategiessuchascrimeandhowtheyaredifferentiallymotivatedtoemploythosestrategiesbyvariationinindividualresourcehold-ingpotential,resourcevaluation,strategicstyleandopportunity.

16-304CrimeandCriminalityApplyingthesamewellestablishedtechniquesandconceptsthathaveunifiedourunderstandingofcomplexorganicsystemsinthebiologicalsciences—whilegivingspecialconsiderationtotheuniquepropertiesofculture—providesauniqueholisticperspectiveonhumanbehavior.Itallowsustoviewcrimeasaculturaltraitwhosefrequencyandtypeevolveovertimeasaresultofdynamicinteractionsbetweenindividualandgroupbehaviorinaphysicalenvironment.Anappreciationofthenondeterministicnatureoftheseprocess-esencouragesustoconsiderwaystoguidetheevolutionofcultureindesirabledirections.Ouranalysisoftheproblemindicatesthatcrimecontrolstrategiesshouldtakeevo-lutionaryandecologicaldynamicsintoaccount.Thesedynamicssuggestthatprotection/avoidanceandconventionaldeterrencestrategiesforcrimecontrolalwayswillbeneces-sarybutwilltendtohavelimitedeffectivenessinafreesociety.Non-punitivedeterrencestrategiesthatattempttoimprovethe“socialcapital”ofadultsshowpromise—althoughtheyofferlimitedcrimecontrolleveragebecausethefundamentalbehavioralstylesindi-vidualsdevelopearlyinlifearedifficulttochange.Strategiesthataddressthechildhoodrootsofcrimeoverseveralgenerationsappearmostpromisingfromatheoreticalstand-pointbutpasteffortsinthisdirectiongenerallyhavebeendisappointing.Thisparadigmemphasizestheimportanceofdeterminingthereasonsfortheirapparentfailureandsug-gestsseveralpossiblenewavenuesofresearch.Howeverunattainabletheynowmayseem,nurturantcrimecontrolstrategiesarepracticallyandphilosophicallyappealingbecausetheyareproactiveandemphasizede-velopingrestraintsystemswithinindividualsratherthanincreasinggovernmentalcontrol.Theyalsohavebroaderimplications.Ifcrimecontrolstrategiesfocusedoncontrollingthedevelopmentandexpressionofcriminalityinsteadofcontrollingspecificcriminalacts,itmightbepossibletoaddresssimultaneouslythecommonsourceofanentiresetofdysfunc-tionalbehaviors:crime,drugabuse,accidents,andperhapsevensuicide.Andwemightdosoinamannerthatbuildshumancapitalandimprovessocialcohesiveness.Itisironicthatsomethinkitnaivetoconsideremployingnurturantstrategiesthat,accordingtothispara-digm,willtakegenerationstocontrolcrime.Weroutinelyplancities,highways,andmili-taryweaponssystems20yearsormoreintothefuture.TwentyyearsagoRichardNixonbecamethefirstoffivesuccessivepresidentstodeclare“war”oncrime(BillClintonbe-camethesixthinDecember1993).Ouranalysisindicatesthatitistimetoevolvethecultureofoursocietyandbecomelessimpulsive,lessdependentoncoercion,andmoresensitivetotheneedsandsufferingofothers.

CrimeandCriminality16-305VI.BibliographicNotes.ReferencesAgnew,Robert(1992)FoundationforaGeneralStrainTheoryofCrimeandDelinquency.Criminology30:47-88.Blau,PeterM.andJosephE.Schwartz(1984)CrosscuttingSocialCircles:TestingaMac-rostructuralTheoryofIntergroupRelations.Orlando,FL:AcademicPress.Braithwaite,John(1989)Crime,shame,andreintegration.NewYork.CambridgeUniver-sityPress.Cohen,LawrenceE.andMarcusFelson(1979)SocialChangeandCrimeRateTrends:ARoutineActivityApproach.AmericanSociologicalReview44:588-608.Easterlin,RichardA.(1987)BirthandFortune.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Elliott,DelbertS.,SuzanneS.Ageton,andR.J.Canter(1979)AnIntegratedTheoreticalPerspectiveonDelinquentBehavior.JournalofResearchinCrimeandDelinquency,16:3.Farrington,DavidP.(1986)Steppingstonestoadultcriminalcareers,inDanOlweus,JackBlock,andMarianRadke-Yarrow,eds.,Developmentofantisocialandprosocialbe-haviour:research,theories,andissues.NewYork:AcademicPress,pp.359-384.Fishbein,DianaH.(1990)BiologicalPerspectivesinCriminology.Criminology28:27-72.Gates,DarrylF.(1992)Chief:MylifeintheLAPD.NewYork:Bantam.Hirschi,Travis(1969)CausesofDelinquency.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.Hirschi,TravisandGottfredson,Michael(1983)AgeandtheExplanationofCrime.Amer-icanJournalofSociology89:552-584Katz,Jack(1988)SeductionsofCrime:MoralandSensualAttractionsinDoingEvil.NewYork:BasicBooksLand,KennethC.,PatriciaL.McCall,andLawrenceE.Cohen(1990)StructuralCovari-atesofHomicideRates:AreThereAnyInvariancesAcrosstimeandSocialSpace?AmericanJournalofSociology95:922-963.Lemert,EdwinM.(1972)HumanDeviance,SocialProblems,andSocialControl.Engle-woodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall.Pearson,FrankS.andNeilA.Weiner(1985)TowardanIntegrationofCriminologicalThe-ories.JournalofCriminalLawandCriminology76:116-150.Reiss,AlbertJ.Jr.andJeffreyA.Roth(1993)UnderstandingandPreventingViolence.Washington,DC:NationalAcademyPress.Sampson,RobertJ.andW.ByronGroves(1989)CommunityStructureandCrime:TestingSocial-DisorganizationTheory.AmericanJournalofSociology94:774-802.Tonry,MichaelL.,LloydE.Ohlin,andDavidP.Farrington(1991)HumanDevelopmentandCriminalBehavior.NewYork:Springer-Verlag.Widom,CathyS.(1992)TheCycleofViolence.NationalInstituteofJusticeResearchinBrief,NCJ136607.Wilson,JamesQ.andRichardJ.Herrnstein(1985)CrimeandHumanNature,NewYork:SimonandSchuster.Wilson,JamesQ.andRichardJ.Herrnstein(1985)CrimeandHumanNature,NewYork:SimonandSchuster.

16-306CrimeandCriminalityWilson,WilliamJ.(1987)TheTrulyDisadvantaged:TheInnerCity,theUnderclass,andPublicPolicy.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 5Understanding and Promoting Learning Theories Victor C. X. Wang Department of Educational Leadership & Research Methodologies EC207A, 5353 Parkside Dr. Jupiter, FL 33458, USA E-mail: [email protected] [Abstract] Learning theories deal with the ways people learn. There are a number of different learning theories in our society. For example, there are behaviorist, cognitivist, social and experiential learning theories. All learning theories strive to lead to change in basically three domains: cognitive, affective and psychomotor. Some theorists list more domains and others divide learning theories into different categories. According to this article, all learning theories may contain a general model that can be derived from existing learning theories if special attention is paid to observing these theories. Good learning theories determine the roles for learners and teachers and the relationships between learners and educators. Learning theory fundamentals help users of theories implement effective strategies. [Keywords] learning theory; behaviorist; cognitivist; social learning; experiential learning Introduction Humans have different interpretations of learning theories and different beliefs about how people learn. All these beliefs may come from personal experience, self-reflection, observation of others, research, and through the experience of trying to teach or persuade someone else to one’s own way of thinking. In a nutshell, everyone keeps learning every waking minute, using different learning theories. Theories guide one’s action in terms how one goes about learning new skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Without learning theories, one’s learning may lead to mindless activism. In other words, one’s time is spent trying to learn something, but the end result is ineffective. In democratic cultures, people may prefer critical thinking as an effective learning theory, whereas in authoritarian cultures, people may see rote learning or memorization as an effective learning theory. Many journal articles highlight the above-mentioned two schools of thought on learning theories. Some scholars may argue that critical thinking, as a theory, may lead to creativity and innovation, whereas rote learning may stifle creativity. The debate has been going on for decades, and no definitive conclusions have been reached. It is extremely difficult to determine which learning theories are better than others because people are engaged in informal or formal learning to change the way they see themselves, change the way they see other people, and change the way they see situations (Cramer & Wasiak, 2006). It is likely that there is no one best way of promoting learning. One strong piece of evidence is the result of the 2009 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) in which Asian students in authoritarian cultures did much better than students from democratic cultures. However, Western educators argue that the Western education system leads to more creative thinkers, problem solvers, and better scientists. This is true to a certain extent. All these learning theories are valuable in guiding one’s action in a particular culture, subculture, or even a particular setting. Although scholars have different interpretations of learning theories, the goal of any learning theory is the same. For example, Merriam (2004) explains a learning theory as leading to learners’ growth and development. Mezirow explains the theory of transformative learning as helping learners achieve perspective transformation. Abraham Maslow’s (1908-1970) primary contribution to psychology is his Hierarchy of Human Needs. Maslow contended that humans have a number of needs that are instinctive, that is, innate. These needs are classified as “cognitive needs” and “aesthetic needs.” “Neurotic needs” are included in Maslow’s theory but do not exist within the hierarchy. Maslow assumed needs are arranged in a hierarchy in terms of their potency. Although all needs are instinctive, some are more powerful than others. The lower the need is in the pyramid, the more powerful it is. The higher the need is in the pyramid, the weaker and more distinctly human it is. The lower, or basic, needs on the pyramid are

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 6similar to those possessed by non-human animals, but only humans possess the higher needs. Maslow considers the end goal of learning to be self-actualization: “the full use of talents, capacities, potentialities, etc.” (p. 150). Some learning theories, such as the theory of andragogy encourage learners to be self-directed in learning, whereas other theories emphasize the roles of teachers as information transmitters instead of learning facilitators, thus placing learners at the feet of master professors. Over the years, scholars have never stopped debating which learning theories are superior to other learning theories for a certain group of learners. Very often, these scholars are divided into two categories: some who emphasize releasing the energy of learners as a good learning theory from the Western hemisphere, and others who emphasize the passive role of following their teachers as learners from the Eastern hemisphere. Often, this line of division may be blurred as globalization brings different cultures together. The next section addresses how different learning theories came into being and what may be the essential elements in these theories to which both scholars and learners need to pay attention. Historical Developments of Learning Theories Experiments on how animals and humans learn went back as early as the late nineteenth century when John B. Watson (1878-1958) conducted a study of learning in animals. Behaviorism as a learning theory resulted directly from Watson’s experiments. Later in the 1960s, B. F. Skinner enhanced and advanced behaviorism. The Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) conducted experiments that resulted in the concept of conditioned reflexes (as cited in Knowles, Holton & Swanson, 1998, 2005, p. 25). Upon the basis of these experiments and others, scholars have tried to make comparisons between human and animal learning. The conclusion drawn is animals learn via reflexes and behavior modification, whereas humans learn through reflection (Wang & King, 2006, 2007). That is probably why humans are categorized as “social animals” who are capable of reflection. When animals are described as being social animals, it relies on their need to be with each other, primarily for protection and hunting; however, in terms of their learning, they are primarily reflexive, which may be associated with thinking orders that are much lower than “lower thinking” orders. Lower-order thinking skills are termed as knowledge, understanding, and application in Bloom’s taxonomy. Higher-order thinking skills are labeled as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation in Bloom’s taxonomy. In recent years, a higher level has been added to Bloom’s Taxonomy, that is, knowledge creation. The first American educational philosopher, John Dewey (1933), addressed the issue of why people learn by stating that learners are faced with learning problems, and these learning problems perplex and challenge the mind so that it makes belief uncertain. Dewey went on to say that it is this perplexity that leads to reflective thinking and, consequently, learning of the learners. In adult education, theorists advanced two principles of andragogy, similar to Dewey’s assertions. These two principles are adult learning is dictated by their developmental tasks and adult learning is contextual; in other words, adults have everyday problems to solve. This line of thought has been widely accepted in the academic world. Later, in the early 1980s, Jack Mezirow advanced the theory of transformative learning, in which he proposes that a disorienting dilemma has the potential to lead to critical reflection and from there to transformative learning. The premise of Mezirow’s theory does not deviate too far from Dewey’s reflective thinking theory. The early study of how animals and humans learn has sparked widespread study in generating more useful learning theories. The 1960s saw a proliferation of learning theories in the Western hemisphere. Indeed, the Western cultures have produced numerous social scientists in education. Carl Rogers, a therapist, was even nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize for his contributions to learning theories. He had only a master’s degree, yet his thinking/theories (client centered-therapy and student-centered education) are widely studied and applied even to this day. Rogers (1969, p. 5) explains how a learning theory can lead to effective learning by claiming: • Personal involvement: The whole person, including his or her feelings and cognitive aspects, are involved in the learning event.

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 7• Self-initiation: Even when the impetus or stimulus comes from the outside, the sense of discovery, of reaching out, of grasping and comprehending, comes from within. • Pervasiveness: Learning makes a difference in the behavior, attitudes, and, perhaps, even the personality of the learner. • Evaluation by the learner: The learner knows whether the learning meets personal need, whether it leads toward what the individual wants to know, whether it illuminates the dark area of ignorance the individual is experiencing. The locus of evaluation, we might say, resides definitely in the learner. • Its essence is meaning: When such learning takes place, the element of meaning to the learner is built into the whole experience. Without a doubt, the above theory has influenced generations of learners in both authoritarian cultures and democratic cultures. Those scholars, students, or practitioners who have silently applied this learning theory have surely become productive citizens of the world. The primary reason for Rogers coming up with his learning theory was that he did not believe that teachers can teach others directly. According to Rogers, teachers can only be facilitators. However, Rogers advocated that learners, young or old, had to engage the whole person first, and then take the initiative in learning, which may lead to ownership of learning. Finally, evaluation by the learner must be executed. In adult and higher education, the “learner self-evaluation” movement is derived from Rogers’ learning theory through Knowles (1980) development of andragogy. To Gagne (1972, pp. 3-41), an effective learning theory must lead to change in five domains of the learning process: 1. Motor skills, which are developed through practice. 2. Verbal information, the major requirement for learning being its presentation within an organized, meaningful context. 3. Intellectual skills, the learning of which appears to require prior learning of prerequisite skills. 4. Cognitive strategies, the learning of which requires repeated occasions in which challenges to thinking are presented. 5. Attitudes, which are learned most effectively through the use of human models and “vicarious reinforcement.” Gagne’s five domains are derived from the most popular three domains of educational objectives. Educators and scholars often address these three domains when writing course objectives. For example, when they ask the question, “By the end of this lesson, can my learners think differently?” they address the first domain of educational objectives, that is, the “cognitive domain.” When they ask the question, “By the end of this lesson, do my learners act differently?” they address the second domain of educational objectives, that is, the “psychomotor domain.” When they ask the question, “By the end of this lesson, do my learners feel differently?” they address the third domain, that is, the “affective domain.” When examining Gagne’s five domains, one cannot help but think of the widely accepted three domains of educational objectives. Whether detailed or addressed in general, these domains of educational objectives guide educators and learners to learn more explicitly in different fields. Later, Gardner (1983) developed the theory of multiple intelligences theory that is widely applied in the field of teaching and learning. According to Garner, humans possess at least eight different kinds of intelligence. The traditional Intelligent Quotient (IQ) test, which tests command of language and mathematical reasoning skills, does not account for the six other intelligences. When this theory is applied to the adult learning field, adult educators are cautioned that adult educators inform themselves of the various intelligences so that their teaching methods may reflect an absence of “bias” towards certain adult students who perform well under traditional methods. We now understand that learners are diverse in the way that intelligence is manifested.

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 8Easterners do not seem to have conducted as much research as Westerners regarding how humans learn. Their learning theories seem to have been derived from either Buddhism (Buddhism is a dharmic, non-theistic religion, a philosophy, and a system of psychology. Buddhism is also known in Sanskrit or Pali, the main ancient languages of Buddhists, as Buddha Dharma or Dhamma, which means the teachings of “the Awakened One.” Thus was called Siddhartha Gautama, hereinafter referred to as “the Buddha.” Early sources say that the Buddha was born in Lumbini (now in Nepal), and that he died, aged around 80, in Kushinagar (India). He lived in or around the fifth century BCE, according to recent scholarship. Buddhism spread throughout the Indian subcontinent in the five centuries following the Buddha’s passing, and thence into Central, Southeast and East Asia and Eastern Europe over the next two millennia.) Today, open any textbook in the field of teaching or learning written by either Westerners or Easterners, and there will be at least one or two prevalent learning theories expounded on with the intention to guide both educators and learners. With so many learning theories exiting, how can educators and learners make a smart choice as to which ones apply to them in practice? This remains a question to be addressed in the next section, which addresses some essential components of learning theories. Essential components of learning theories can be labeled as fundamental features of learning theories. Fundamental Features of Learning Theories Researchers have made great efforts in their attempts to categorize learning theories. To date, educators and learners are not unfamiliar with the 11 categories identified by Hilgard and Bower (1966): 1. Thorndike’s Connectionism 2. Pavlov’s Classical Conditioning 3. Guthrie’s Contiguous Conditioning 4. Skinner’s Operant Conditioning 5. Hull’s Systematic Behavior Theory 6. Tolman’s Purposive Behaviorism 7. Gestalt Theory 8. Freud’s Psychodynamics 9. Functionalism 10. Mathematical Learning Theory 11. Information Processing Models The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines connectionism as a movement in cognitive science which hopes to explain human intellectual abilities using artificial neural networks (also known as “neural networks’ or ‘neural nets”). Neural networks are simplified models of the brain composed of large numbers of units (the analogs of neurons) together with weights that measure the strength of connections between the units. These weights model the effects of the synapses that link one neuron to another. Experiments on models of this kind have demonstrated an ability to learn such skills as face recognition, reading, and the detection of simple grammatical structures. According to Tolman’s theory of sign learning (purposive behaviorism), an organism learns by pursuing signs to a goal, i.e., learning is acquired through meaningful behavior. Tolman (1948) emphasized the organized aspect of learning: The stimuli which are allowed in are not connected by just simple one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses. Rather the incoming impulses are usually worked over and elaborated in the central control room into a tentative cognitive-like map of the environment. And it is this tentative map, indicating routes and paths and environmental relationships, which finally determines what responses, if any, the animal will finally make. (p. 192) Gestalt Theory refers to a school of researchers who maintained that phenomena could only be understood if they were viewed as structural wholes; they had a great influence on early learning theory.

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 9The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines functionalism as the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle’s conception of the soul and has antecedents in Hobbes’s conception of the mind as a “calculating machine,” but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term “functionalism” is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states. Among the eleven learning theories, Dewey’s pragmatism stood out as an effective learning theory that was widely accepted by both educators and learners. It must be pointed out that not all learning theories fall into certain categories. The beauty of categorizing learning theories will help educators and learners understand and promote these theories. Otherwise, both educators and learners will get overwhelmed by the vast number of learning theories, wondering which ones to use to guide their action. To understand and promote learning theories should be the first step towards application of these theories. In Eastern cultures, there is a saying, which goes like this: “Educators and scholars should unite theories with practice.” It is evident that the implication of such a saying is that educators and scholars should walk on two legs: one leg represents theories and the other represents practice. Theories are advanced to guide one’s practice. An important feature of learning theories is that any theory presupposes a more general model according to which theoretical concepts are formulated (Reese & Overton, 1970). Unless a general model is successfully derived from a learning theory, educators and learners may find it hard to apply in practice. Such is the case with the theory of transformative learning. Many people have heard of the theory but do not understand how to apply it in practice. Wang and King (2006, 2007) developed a model that summarizes an in-depth comparison between transformative learning and Confucianism. As educators and learners ponder the model, they probably can relate to the theory and, consequently, may be able to apply it step by step. The model given below illustrates how a general model can be derived from any learning theories: Learner’s inner experience or external situation or experienceContentWhatProcessHowPremiseWhyReflectivityAffectivereflectivityDiscriminantreflectivityJudgmentalreflectivityConceptualreflectivityPsychicreflectivityTheoreticalreflectivityConfuciansilentreflectionMezirow’scritical reflectionGrowth and development of the learner Figure 1. Model of Learning through Critical Reflection by Wang and King (2006, 2007) Good learning theories always specify the role of the educators, the role of the learners and above all the relationship between the educator and the learner. This line of thought has become important simply because more and more people buy into the concept that it is in relationship with others that humans learn. Human beings are often referred to as “social animals.” The theory of andragogy, for example, has clearly defined the role for teachers and learners and the relationship between teachers and learners. In order for adult learners to maximize learning, teachers are required to serve as learning facilitators, resource

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 10 persons, and process managers instead of being information transmitters. This role of the teacher specifies that teachers must release the energy of learners by encouraging learners to be self-directed. The role of the learner specifies that learners cannot be submissive followers of their teachers. Learners must take the initiative to become self-directed learners. Wang and Cranton (2012) consider self-directed learning an effective adult education model. Cranton (2006) indicates that through the discussions of andragogy, one becomes mindful of the seminal model of transformative learning, creating the interconnection of the two models in adult education. The relationship between teachers and learners is specified as a “helping relationship” instead of a “directing relationship” (Wang, 2005). Upon the basis of this analysis, it is natural to conclude that the theory of pedagogy (the art and science of teaching children) specifies some different roles for teachers and learners and, therefore, the relationship between teachers and students may differ from the relationship between educators and adult learners. According to Knowles, Holton, and Swanson (2011), the pedagogical model assigns to the teacher responsibility for making decisions about what will be learned, how it will be learned, when it will be learned, and if it has been learned. Knowles (1980) saw pedagogy and andragogy on a continuum rather than a dualism; more recent work in K-12 education includes a fair amount of student self-direction and self-evaluation. Unfortunately, the trend toward increased standardized testing (especially in the US) has put some limits on what can be done in this respect. It may be the case that few people, other than theorists, get excited about theories (Torraco, 1997). This is because most people do not pay enough attention to learning theory fundamentals. If they do pay attention to the categories, the general models theories can generate and the roles and relationships learning theories can specify, people will find value in almost every existing learning theory. Besides, most theories, except those that are truly revolutionary, such as the contributions of Newton, Einstein, and Darwin, just do their jobs quietly behind the scenes (Torraco, 1997, p. 114). Once the learning theory fundamentals are applied, both educators and learners and even the general public can make the theories do their jobs out there in the open instead of behind the scenes. After all, theory is meant to be united with practice to guide one’s action (Elias & Merriam, 1995, 2005). Conclusion In the course of pursuing knowledge about learning theories, many learning theories have been generated and discarded. The ones that have endured are the ones that truly guide one’s action in learning. The theory of andragogy has endured because it has successfully explained how adults learn differently from children. The theory of transformative learning has endured because it can address how learners are engaged in deep shifts in their meaning perspectives. Gardner’s multiple intelligences theory has endured because one’s IQ score does not account for other intelligences that learners may have. The list can go on and on. However, the central point is no one can afford not to pay attention to learning theory fundamentals. Without these learning theory fundamentals, it is hard to learn to apply theories in practice. Theories are meant to be united with practice. But the learning theories fortified by learning fundamentals provide guiding principles from which people can successfully discern theories and, hopefully, apply them to practice. If learning is defined as a process that leads to a change in a learner’s disposition and capabilities that can be reflected in behavior (Gagne, 1985), then learning theories are meant to guide one’s learning. To understand how learning theories work, efforts must be exerted to understand learning theory fundamentals. References Cramer, K. D., & Wasiak, H. (2006). Change the way you see everything: Through asset-based thinking. Philadelphia, PA: Running Press Book Publishers. Cranton, P. (2006). Understanding and promoting transformative learning: A guide for educators of adults (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative

International Forum of Teaching and Studies Vol. 8 No. 2 2012 11 process. New York, NY: D. C. Health and Co. Elias, J. L., & Merriam, S. B. (1995). Philosophical foundations of adult education. Malabar. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company. Elias, J. L., & Merriam, S. B. (2005). Philosophical foundations of adult education (3rd ed.). Malabar. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company. Gagne, R. M. (1972). Domains of learning. Interchange, 1-8. Gagne, R. M. (1985). The conditions of learning (4th ed.). New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York, NY: Basic Books. Hilgard, E. R., & Bower, G. H. (1966). Theories of learning. New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Knowles, M. S. (1980). The modern practice of adult education: From pedagogy to andragogy. New York, NY: Associated Press. Knowles, M. S., Holton, E., & Swanson, A. (1998). The adult learner. Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing Company. Knowles, M. S., Holton, E., & Swanson, A. (2005). The adult learner (6th ed.). Boston, MA: ELSEVIER BUTTERWORTH HEINEMANN. Knowles, M. S., Holton, E., & Swanson, A. (2011). The adult learner: The definitive classic in adult education and human resource development (7th ed.). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. Merriam, S. B. (2004). The role of cognitive development in Mezirow’s transformational learning theory. Adult Education Quarterly, 55(1), 60-68. Reese, H. W., & Overton, W. E. (1970). Models of development and theories of development. In L. R. Gottlet & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), Life-span development psychology (pp. 115-145). New York, NY: Academic Press. Rogers, C. R. (1969). Freedom to learn. Columbus, OH: Merrill. Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55, 189-208. Torraco, R. J. (1997). Theory building research methods. In R. A. Swanson & E. F. Holton III (Eds.), Human resource development handbook (pp. 114-137). San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler. Wang, V. (2005). Perceptions of Teaching Preferences of Online Instructors. Journal on Excellence in College Teaching, 16(3), 33-54. Wang, V., & Cranton, P. (2012). Promoting and implementing self-directed learning (SLD): An effective adult education model. International Journal of adult Vocational Education and Technology, 3(3), 16-26. Wang, V., & King, K. P. (2006). Understanding Mezirow’s theory of reflectivity from Confucian perspectives: A model and perspective. Radical Pedagogy, 8(1), 1-17. Wang, V. C. X., & King, K. P. (2007). Confucius and Mezirow—Understanding Mezirow’s theory of reflectivity from Confucian perspectives: A model and perspective. In K. P. King & V. C. X. Wang (Eds.), Comparative adult education around the globe (pp. 253-275). Hangzhou, China, Zhejiang University Press.

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LegaltheoryandcaselawdeÞningtheinsanitydefenceinEnglishandWelshlawRAFIQMEMONReasideClinic,Birmingham,UKAbstractTheinsanitydefencehaslongbeenthefocusofcontroversyandacademicstudy.Itimpingesonanumberofsubjectsandareasofexpertiseincludingpsychiatry,law,ethics,andmorality.Theoriginsofthedefencegobackcenturiesbothinstatutelawandcaselaw.ThecrystallizationofthedefenceoccurredintheseminalM’Naghten’scase(1843).FromtheretheeponymousM’Naghtenruleswereexportedandmodifiedinvariousjurisdictionsaroundtheworld.However,thefocusofthisshortpaperisonthehistoryandmeaningofthedefenceasitcurrentlyappliesinEnglishandWelshlaw.Anaccountoflegaltheoryformingthefoundationtothedefenceisprovided.Historicalcaselawpre-M’Naghtenandpost-M’Naghtenisexplainedwithparticularemphasisonthemeaningsattachedtothefourelementsmakingupthedefence.ThebulkofthematerialrelatestothestatutoryinsanitydefenceavailablefortrialsonindictmentattheCrowncourt.However,thereisalsoapre-existingandancientcommonlawinsanitydefenceavailableforcasesinsummarytrialatthemagistratescourt.Thislatterdefenceisbrieflyreviewedtowardstheendofthepaper.Keywords:Insanitydefence,Englishlaw,Welshlaw,DanielM’Naghten,caselaw,legaltheory,criminalprocedureIntroductionOnbeingrationalandmoralandthusresponsibleThecriminallawpresumesthatindividualsaremoralagentswithfreewillwhoarethereforeresponsiblefortheiractsandomissions.Ifapersoncommitsacrimeandisresponsibleforitthenpunishmentlegitimatelyfollows.However,incivilizedcountriesthe‘insane’areregardedasnotCorrespondence:R.Memon,ReasideClinic,BristolRoadSouth,Rednal,BirminghamB459BE,UK.E-mail:rafi[email protected]&Psychology,June2006;17(2):230–252ISSN1478-9949print/ISSN1478-9957onlineª2006Taylor&FrancisDOI:10.1080/14789940600554609

havingcommittedcrime,sothereforepunishmentcannotlegitimatelyfollow.Rather,theinsaneareregardedashavingalegitimateexcuse.Moore(1984,p.244)statesthat‘oneisamoralagentonlyifoneisarationalagent.’Therefore,onlytherationalareresponsiblefortheiractions.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatseverelymentallyillpeoplethenhavea‘licencetocommitcrime’withoutfearofconviction.TheLawCommission(1989)wrote:Somepeopletaketheviewthatitwouldbewronginprinciplethatapersonshouldescapeconvictionif,althoughseverelymentallyill,hehascommittedarationalcrimewhichwasuninfluencedbyhisillnessandforwhichheoughttobeliabletobepunished.Theybelievethattheprosecutionoughttobeallowedtopersuadethejury(ifitcan)thattheoffencewasnotattributabletothedisorder.Weagree.(para278)TheRoyalCommissiononCapitalPunishment(1953)referredtothe:ancientandhumaneprinciplethathaslongformedpartofourcommonlaw…thatifapersonwasatthetimeofhisunlawfulactmentallysodisorderedthatitwouldbeunreasonabletoimputeguilttohim,heoughtnottobeheldliabletoconvictionandpunishment…underthecriminallaw.(para18.10)TheCommitteeonMentallyAbnormalOffenders(HomeOfficeandDepartmentofHealthandSocialSecurity,1975)saidofthis:‘Wesharetheviewthatthisisrightinprinciple.’ThequestionfortheCommissionwas,‘whethertheoffender,asaresultofinsanityormentalabnormality,issomuchlessresponsiblethananormalpersonthatitisjusttotreathimaswhollyirresponsible.’So,ifanoffenderhasresponsibility,hecommitsacrimeandpunishmentfollows.Butifanoffenderdoesnothaveresponsibility(theinsane)thenhedoesnotcommitacrimeandpunishmentdoesnotfollow.TheinabilitytoactrationallyIntheCanadiancaseofRvChaulk(1990),LamerCJCsaid:[W]hilethestateofinsanityandthestateofchildhoodcannotbeequated,theconnectionbetweenthesetwosituationsforthepurposeofthecriminallawisapparent.Whatthesetwosituationshaveincommonisthattheybothindicatethattheindividualinquestiondoesnotaccordwithoneofthebasicassumptionsofourcriminallawmodel:thattheaccusedisarationalautonomousbeingwhoiscapableofappreciatingthenatureandqualityofanactorofknowingrightfromwrong.WithrespectTheinsanitydefence231

tothestateofchildhood,thesebasicassumptionsarebroughtintoquestionbecauseoftheimmaturityoftheindividual–heorshehasnotyetdevelopedthebasiccapacitywhichjusticeandfairnessrequirebepresentinapersonwhoisbeingmeasuredagainstthestandardsofthecriminallaw.Withthestateofinsanity,thesebasicassumptionsarebroughtintoquestionbecausetheaccusedissufferingfromsomediseaseofthemind….Thismentalconditionmeansthattheaccusedislargelyincapableofcriminalintentandshouldnot,therefore,generallybesubjecttocriminalliabilityinthesamewaythatsanepeopleare.McAuley(1993,pp.3–4)describeslegalinsanityasanexcuseforwrongdoingbecausetheinsanelackthecapacitytoactrationally.Theinabilitytoactrationallyprecludescriminalresponsibility.Hedescribestheinsanitydefenceas:anethico-legalmatterthatmustbesettledbythecourtswhenframing(andre-framing)theinsanitydefence;andbyjuriesinthecontextofparticularcases.Butitisnotamatterinwhichpsychiatristshaveanyspecialcompetence,althoughtheirevidencemayquiteproperlyhaveadecisiveinfluenceonhowjudgesandjurorsactuallydetermineit.Further,‘[T]helegalcriterionofinsanityisessentiallyatestofmoralresponsibility.Thequestioniswhetherillnessexoneratesthedefendantfromblameforhisactions,notwhetherheissufferingfromarecognizedmentalillness.’Also,aconnectionorsenseofcausalityisrequiredbetweenthementaldisorderandthecriminalconduct.Hesays,‘[T]hemoralimpulsetoexcusetheinsanearisesifandonlyiftheirbehaviourcanbeseentobeconnectedwiththepsychologicalstates,andtheireffects.’Thereferenceshereto‘moralimpulse’and‘moralresponsibility’meanthatconsiderationsofmoralitylieattherootofthedefenceeventhoughcourtsoflawarecourtsoflawandnotcourtsofmorals.Theinsanitydefence:TheCriminalLunaticsAct1800RvHadfield[1800]On15May1800,KingGeorgeIIIattendedatheatrewhenJamesHadfieldwhowasintheaudiencestoodupandfiredapistolinhisdirection.Theshotmissedandtherewasnoinjury.OnbeingapprehendedhedeniedattemptingtokilltheKing.Heexplainedhewishedtodieandhadhopedthecrowdinthetheatrewouldkillhim.Hadfieldwaschargedwithhightreason.WitnessesreportedhimfiringhispistolattheKinganddroppingitafterwards.232R.Memon

Attrial,Hadfield’scounselarguedthathewasinsanefollowingablowtotheheadreceivedwhenfightingindefenceofKingandcountryduringhisformerlifeasasoldier.HethoughttheworldwouldendsoonandthatlikeJesusChristhewastosacrificehislifeforthesalvationofothers.Doctorsgaveevidenceindicatingthatthewoundstohisheadcausedtheinsanitywhichwaslikelytoremainpermanent.Thejurysaid,‘WefindtheprisonerisNotGuilty;hebeingundertheinfluenceofinsanityatthetimetheactwascommitted.’Hadfieldwasreturnedtoprison,ChiefJusticeLordKenyonbeingoftheopinionthatheonlyhadtheauthoritytoremandhimbacktoprison.WithindaysaBillwaspreparedandpassedthroughParliamenttobecometheCriminalLunaticsAct1800.ThefirstsectioncreatedthespecialverdictofinsanityandretrospectivelyappliedtoHadfield.Itstated,‘‘[T]hejuryshallberequiredtofindspeciallywhethersuchpersonwasinsaneatthetimeofthecommissionofsuchoffence.’Ifso,anacquittalof‘notguiltyonaccountofinsanity’wastobereturnedresultingincompleteexemptionfromcriminalresponsibility.Itallowedforpersonschargedwithtreasonwhowereacquittedonthegroundofinsanitytobekeptincustodyuntil‘HisMajesty’sPleasurebeKnown.’InpracticaltermsthismeantalifesentencewiththeauthorityforreleaserestingwiththeHomeSecretary.HadfieldspentalmosttherestofhislifedetainedatBethlemHospital.Moran(1985,p.487)concludedthatthespecialverdictthuscreatedwas:notinthecontextofhumanitarianreform,butinthecontextofasocialcontrolpolicydesignedtolimittherightsofdefendantschargedwithcriminaloffences…wasdesignedtodeterthementallyillthroughthefearordreadofpunishment.Thisputsamorepunitivecomplexiontothehistoricalpurposeofthedefenceincontrasttothemorehumaneandmoralapproachthatisadoptedtoday.RvOxford[1840]On10June1840asQueenVictoriawasridinginhercarriagethroughHydePark,an18-year-oldmanEdwardOxforddrewtwopistolsandfiredtheminherdirection.Hewastakenintopolicecustodyandlaterchargedwithhightreason.Paperswerefoundinhisresidencelistingthemembers’namesofasecretsocietycalled‘YoungEngland’and11rulesofthesociety.Nobulletsorballswerefoundatthecrimescene.WitnessestestifiedtheyhadseenOxfordfirepistolsattheQueen.Thedefencearguedontwofronts.First,thedefencearguesthatthepistolsfireddidnotcontainbullets,meaningthatOxfordwasguiltyofaTheinsanitydefence233

misdemeanourandnotacrime.Ifsuccessfulitwouldhaveledtohisrelease.Second,thedefenceargued,evenifthepistolsdidcontainbullets,hewasinsaneatthetimeandthereforecouldnotbeheldresponsible.Ifsuccessfulitwouldhaveresultedinindefinitedetentioninahospital.Fourmedicalexpertswerecalledtogiveevidenceandallsupportedadiagnosisofinsanity.Thejuryfoundhim‘notguilty,hebeingatthetimeinsane.’Oxfordwasorderedtobedetained‘atHerMajesty’sPleasure.’HewastransferredfromprisontoBethlemHospitalandremainedthere27yearsbeforebeingreleased.However,thedoctorsthereconsideredhimsane.Helearnedtospeakorreadsixlanguagesandtoplayseveralmusicalinstruments.Hesaidin1850,‘Ineverexpectedtobebroughtinmad.Iwasquitesurprisedatthat,forIknewIwasnotmad,andIwonderedhowtheyweregoingtoproveit.’Heexplainedthemotivationfortheshootingasbeingafoolishloveofnotoriety.Regardingthelistofconspiratorsandlettersfoundinhislodgingshesaid,‘Entirelynonsense!Itwasaveryabsurdjoke.Ididnotthinkitwouldcomesoserious.Ididnotappreciatetheconsequences,orIneverwouldhavedoneit.’ForMoran(1986),thecorrectverdictshouldhavebeen‘notguilty’ofhightreason.Hesays:EdwardOxfordwasthefirstpersonsinceJamesHadfieldtopleadinsanitytoachargeofhightreason,andtheautomaticconfinementstatutespassedinthewakeofHadfield’sacquittal(andappliedretroactivelytohim)servedtheirintendedpunitiveanddetentivepurposequitewell.(p.89)Theinsanitydefence:MÕNaghtenÕscaseIn1843DanielM’NaghtenwaschargedwiththemurderofEdwardDrummond,theprivatesecretarytoSirRobertPeelthePrimeMinister.Atthestartofthetrial,onbeingtoldtoenteraplea,hesaid,‘Iwasdriventodesperationbypersecution.’Onbeingtoldagaintosayeitherguiltyornotguiltyhesaid,‘Iamguiltyoffiring,’butdeniedintenttomurder.Apleaof‘notguilty’wasthereforerecorded.TheSolicitorGeneralinhisopeningspeechfortheCrownoutlinedthebackgroundtothecase.M’Naghtenwasawood-turnerfromGlasgow.InJuly1842hewenttoagunshopinGlasgowwhereheboughtthepistolsthatwereeventuallyusedinthehomicidethefollowingJanuary.Formanydayspriortotheoffence,M’NaghtenhadbeenobservedloiteringaroundthepublicofficesandhousesinWhitehall.Hewasnotedtoobservethepeoplegoinginandoutandhehadbeenspokentobysoldiersandbythepolice.On20January1843MrDrummondwaswalkingalongwhenM’Naghtenapproachedfrombehindandshothimwithapistol.Hewithdrewasecondpistolwhenapolicemanwhohadbeenwatching234R.Memon

fromacrossthestreetranovertoM’Naghtenandseizedhim.Astruggleensuedandasecondshotwasfiredwhichhitthepavementresultinginnoinjury.TheSolicitorGeneralstatedthefundamentalquestionthatthejuryshouldaddress.Hesaid:[I]tisaquestionforthejurytotakeintotheirconsiderationwhetherthepartywasaresponsibleagentwhenhecommittedthecrime,whetherhethenknewrightfromwrong,whetherhewasconsciousthathewasoffendingagainstthelawofhiscountryandnature,andwhetherhediditwilfully.Hecontinued,‘[F]ormanopinionwhetherornottheprisonerwasaresponsibleagentatthetimehecommittedtheoffence….Ifyouthinkhewasnot,heoughttobeacquitted.’Thekey,then,waswhetherthejuryfoundM’Naghtentobearesponsibleagentatthetimeofthehomicide.Iftheydid,thenthereshouldbeconvictionfollowedbypunishment.Iftheydidnot,thenthereshouldbeacquittalandnoconvictionorpunishment.SeveralwitnesseswerecalledasevidencefortheCrown.Oneofthem,apoliceinspector,recalledaconversationhehadhadwithM’Naghteninpolicecustodyfollowingtheshooting.Onbeingaskedifhewasawareofwhoitwasheshotat,M’Naghtenmistakenlyreplied,‘ItisSirRobertPeel,isitnot?’M’NaghtenhadbeentakentoBowStreetpolicecourtwherehemadeasignedstatement:TheToriesinmynativecityhavecompelledmetodothis.TheyfollowandpersecutemewhereverIgo,andhaveentirelydestroyedmypeaceofmind.TheyfollowedmetoFrance,intoScotland,andalloverEngland;infact,theyfollowmewhereverIgo.Icannotgetnorestforthemnightorday.Icannotsleepatnightinconsequenceofthecoursetheypursuetowardsme.Ibelievetheyhavedrivenmeintoaconsumption.IamsureIshallneverbethemanIformerlywas.Iusedtohavegoodhealthandstrength,butIhavenotnow.TheyhaveaccusedmeofcrimesofwhichIamnotguilty;theydoeverythingintheirpowertoharassandpersecuteme;infact,theywishtomurderme.Itcanbeprovedbyevidence.That’sallIhavetosay.ThisstatementisaclearaccountinM’Naghten’sownwordsofhisabnormalstateofmindintheperiodleadinguptotheoffence.Severalwitnesseswerecalledforthedefence,includingdoctors,andtheycorroboratedM’Naghten’sstoryofpersecutionwhichhefalselybelievedtobereal.HeoriginallythoughtCatholicpriestsandJesuitswereTheinsanitydefence235

thepersecutorsandthen‘theTories’andthepolicealso.Thegeographyofpersecutionextendedtowhereverhewent:Glasgow,Edinburgh,Liverpool,London,andBoulogne.Cockburn(leadcounsel)stated:ThedefenceuponwhichIrelywillturn,notuponthedenialoftheactwithwhichtheprisonerischarged,butuponthestateofhismindatthetimehecommittedtheact….[A]humanbeinginsuchastateisexemptfromlegalresponsibilityandlegalpunishment;toholdotherwisewouldbetoviolateeveryprincipleofjusticeandhumanity.Thequestionforhimwas:whetherunderthatdelusionofmindhedidanactwhichhewouldnothavedoneunderanyothercircumstance,saveundertheimpulseofthedelusionwhichhecouldnotcontrol,andoutofwhichdelusionalonetheactarose.Hewasawareofthesuspicionthatcanbearousedwhenadefenceofinsanityisputforward.Tocounterthishesaid:[T]herecanbenopretence…thatthiswasacaseoffeigningandsimulation,whenIshallhaveprovedtheexistenceofthedelusionforthespaceoftwolongyearsbefore,aswellasitscontinuancesince,theactwascommitted.Cockburnsaidtothejury:[Y]ouhave…thepowerofcausinghimtobeplacedinanasylumprovidedbythemercyofthelaw,wherehewillbeprotectedfromtheconsequencesofhisowndelusions,andsocietywillbesecuredfromthedangerofhisacts.Threedoctorsgaveevidence.TheprincipalmedicalevidencewasfromaDrMonro.Hesaid:IconsidertheactoftheprisonerinkillingMr.Drummondtohavebeencommittedwhilstunderadelusion;theactitselfIlookuponasthecrowningactofthewholematter—astheclimax—asacarryingoutofthepre-existingideawhichhadhauntedhimforyears.Second,DrMorisonsaidinregardtothedelusion,‘Itdeprivedtheprisonerofallrestraintoverhisactions.’Thelastdoctor,MrWinslow,said,‘[H]ecommittedtheoffenceinquestionwhilstafflictedwithadelusion,236R.Memon

underwhichheappearstohavebeenlabouringforaconsiderablelengthoftime.’Afterhearingtheevidenceofthethreedoctors,TindalCJsaid,‘Wefeeltheevidence…tobeverystrong,andsufficienttoinducemylearnedbrothersandmyselftostopthecase.’Addressingthejuryhesaid:Ifhewasnotsensibleatthetimehecommittedthatact…undoubtedlyhewasnotresponsibleforthatact,orliabletoanypunishmentwhateverflowingfromthatact….[T]hewholeofthemedicalevidenceisononeside,andthatthereisnopartofitwhichleavesanydoubtonthemind…butifonbalancingtheevidenceinyourmindsyouthinktheprisonercapableofdistinguishingbetweenrightandwrong,thenhewasaresponsibleagentandliabletoallthepenaltiesthelawimposes….[I]finyourjudgmentthesubjectshouldappearinvolvedinverygreatdifficulty,thenyouwillprobablynottakeuponyourselvestofindtheprisonerguilty.TheforemanofthejurysaidtheyfoundM’Naghtennotguiltyonthegroundofinsanity.Hewasreturnedfromcourtintoprisoncustody.On15March1843hewasadmittedtoBethlehemHospital.LessthantwomonthshadelapsedsincetheshootingofMrDrummond.M’Naghtenwasfoundnotguiltyonthegroundofinsanitybecausethejurydeemedhimnotresponsibleforhisactionsduetothedelusionshesufferedmakinghimincapableofdistinguishingrightfromwrong.Hewasthereforedeemednottobeliableforpunishment.Instead,hewassenttohospitalfortreatment.ThecaseandtheensuingcontroversyprovokeddebateintheHouseofLordsandquestionswereputtotheirLordshipsinabstractforminordertodeterminewhatthewordingoftheinsanitydefenceshouldbeandhowitshouldbearrivedat.TheiranswersbecameknownastheM’Naghtenrules.WordingoftheinsanitydefenceTindalLCJdeliveredthemajorityrulingofthejudgesintheHouseofLords.InwhatlaterbecameknownastheM’NaghtenRules,hestated:[T]hejuryoughttobetoldinallcasesthateverymanistobepresumedtobesane,andtopossessasufficientdegreeofreasontoberesponsibleforhiscrimes,untilthecontrarybeprovedtotheirsatisfaction;andthat,toestablishadefenceonthegroundofinsanity,itmustbeclearlyproved,that,atthetimeofthecommittingoftheact,thepartyaccusedwaslabouringundersuchadefectofreason,fromdiseaseofthemind,asnottoknowthenatureandqualityoftheacthewasdoing,or,ifhedidknowit,thathedidnotknowhewasdoingwhatwaswrong.Theinsanitydefence237

Bywayofexample,TindalLCJsaidfurther:[I]f,undertheinfluenceofhisdelusion,hesupposesanothermantobeintheactofattemptingtotakeawayhislife,andhekillsthatman,ashesupposes,inself-defence,hewouldbeexemptfrompunishment.Ifhisdelusionwasthatthedeceasedhadinflictedaseriousinjurytohischaracterandfortune,andhekilledhiminrevengeforsuchsupposedinjury,hewouldbeliabletopunishment.Therefore,ahomicidemotivatedbyself-defencewasacceptableasanexcusefrompunishment.Alternatively,ahomicidedrivenbyrevengewasnot.Howmanyandwhichjudgesconcurredwiththeaboverulingisnotknown.However,MauleJpresentedadissentingopinion.Hegavethreereasonsforthis.First,thequestionsdidnotariseoutoforwithreferencetoaparticularcase.Second,hehadheardnolegalargumentonthequestions.Finally,hefearedthattheanswersmayembarrasstheadministrationofjusticewhencitedincriminaltrials.Hesaid:Torenderapersonirresponsibleforacrimeonaccountofunsoundnessofmind,theunsoundnessshould,accordingtothelawasithaslongbeenunderstoodandheld,besuchastorenderhimincapableofknowingrightfromwrong.Therefore,inhisopinion,insanitywasofamuchnarrowercon-structionthanthatheldbyhisfellowjudges.However,tothisdaythemajorityrulingstandsasthelawandsubsequentcaselawhasdeterminedthemeaningsattachedtothefourelementsthatmakeuptheM’NaghtenRules.Theinsanitydefence:TheTrialoftheLunaticsAct1883Thesuccessortothe1800Act,theTrialoftheLunaticsAct1883,statedatsection2(1):Whereinanyindictmentorinformationanyactoromissionischargedagainstanypersonasanoffence,anditisgiveninevidenceonthetrialofsuchapersonforthatoffencethathewasinsane,soasnottoberesponsible,accordingtolaw,forhisactionatthetimewhentheactwasdoneoromissionmade,then,ifitappearstothejurybeforewhomsuchpersonistriedthathedidtheactormadetheomissioncharged,butwasinsaneasaforesaidatthetimewhenhedidormadethesame,thejuryshallreturnaspecialverdictthattheaccusedisnotguiltybyreasonofinsanity.238R.Memon

Kerrigan(2000,p.125)notedhowtheterm‘commissionofsuchoffence’fromthe1800Actwaschangedto‘didtheactormadetheomissioncharged’inthis1883Act.HequotedJudgeLJfromAttorneyGeneral’sReference(No3of1998)[1999]attheCourtofAppeal,whosaid:Thedifferenceismaterial.Theoriginalphrase,‘committedtheoffence’,appearstoencompasstherelevantact,togetherwiththenecessaryintent.Bycontrast,‘act’and‘omission’donotreadilyextendtointention.Thischangeoflanguage,apparentlyquitedeliberate,hasbeenleftunamendedforoveracenturyandforallpresentpurposesremainsinforce.Thecaseconcernedamanchargedwithaggravatedburglaryafterforcinghiswayintoastranger’shomearmedwithasnookercuewhichhesmashedintothewallandbroke.HewasfoundtobeinsaneandthetrialjudgeruledtheCrownhadtoprovealltheingredientsoftheoffencetoprovethathedidtheactoromissioncharged.Butpsychiatricevidenceshowedthathehadbeenunabletoformcriminalintent.ThereforetheCrowncouldnotproveitscaseandthejudgedirectedthejurytoacquitthedefendant,resultinginhisrelease.CurrentinterpretationoftheelementsoftheMÕNaghtenRulesDefectofreasonThecourtshavemadeanarrowinterpretationoftheterm‘defectofreason’.InRvKemp[1957],DevlinJstated:[A]defectofreasonisbyitselfnormallyenoughtomaketheactirrationalandthereforetodenyresponsibilityinlaw,butitwasnotintendedbytherulethatitshouldapplytodefectsofreasonwhichwerecausedsimplybybrutishstupiditywithoutrationalpower.Further,confusionorabsent-mindednessdoesnotamounttoa‘defectofreason’either,asdeterminedinRvClarke(1972)attheCourtofAppeal.Inthatcaseawomansufferedfromdepressionwhichresultedinherbecomingforgetfulonthemedicalevidenceofherowngeneralpractitionerandaconsultantpsychiatrist.Shewentshoppingtoasupermarketandbeforeproceedingtothecheck-outtransferredsomegoodsfromthebasketintoherownbag.Shewaschargedwiththeftandclaimedshewasabsentmindedasaresultofdepressionandhadnointentionofstealing.Thetrialjudgeruledthatthedefencewouldhavetobeputasoneofinsanitywhereuponshechangedherpleatoguilty.TheCourtofAppealheldthatthejudgemisstatedthelawandtheconvictionwasquashed.AcknerJstatedthatthiswasacaseof‘awomanwhoretainedherordinaryTheinsanitydefence239

powersofreasonbutwhowasmomentarilyabsent-mindedorconfusedandactedasshedidbyfailingtoconcentrateproperlyonwhatshewasdoingandbyfailingadequatelytousehermentalpowers.’ThiswasheldtobeoutwiththeM’NaghtenRulesandthereforenodefenceofinsanityarose.Healsostated:[T]heevidencefellveryfarshortofshowingeitherthatshesufferedfromadefectofreasonorthattheconsequencesofthatdefectofreason,ifany,werethatshewasunabletoknowthenatureandqualityoftheactshewasdoing.Also,uncontrollableurgesdonotcountasdefectsofreasonastheyaredefectsofwillandnotdefectsofreasonasexemplifiedbytheCourtofAppealinRvKopsch(1925).MrKopschhadoriginallybeenconvictedofthemurderofawomanandsentencedtodeath.Onarresthesaidhestrangledherwithhisnecktieatherrequest.Itwassuggestedattrialthathelosthisconsciousmindandactedinsteadunderthedirectionofthesubconsciouspartofhismind.AtappealtheLordChiefJusticesaid:[T]hefantastictheoryofuncontrollableimpulse…ifitweretobecomepartofourcriminallaw,wouldbemerelysubversive….Thejurymaywellhavethoughtthatthedefenceofinsanityinthiscase,asinsomanycases,wasthemerestnonsense.Theappealfailed.Whetherthedefectistemporaryorpermanentdoesnotmatter.InRvSullivan[1984]thedefectoccurredduringanepilepticfitwhichbynatureisatransientphenomenon.Thatcaseisdiscussedinmoredetailbelow.Therefore,ofallthedefendantswhomayhaveadiseaseofthemind,duetotherestrictionsdescribed,onlyasmallproportionwillbedeemedtohaveadefectofreasonasadirectconsequence.DiseaseofthemindIncontrasttothenarrowapproachtakento‘defectofreason’above,thelegalmeaningof‘diseaseofthemind’hasbeenwidelyinterpretedandisnotlimitedtopsychiatricdisorder.IntheHouseofLords,LordDenninginBrattyvAttorney-GeneralforNorthernIreland[1963]said:Themajormentaldiseaseswhichdoctorscallpsychoses,suchasschizophrenia,areclearlydiseasesofthemind.ButinCharlson,240R.Memon

BarryJ.seemstohaveassumedthatotherdiseasessuchasepilepsyorcerebraltumourarenotdiseasesofthemind,evenwhentheyaresuchastomanifestthemselvesinviolence.Idonotagreewiththis.Itseemstomethatanymentaldisorderthatmanifestsitselfinviolenceandispronetorecurisadiseaseofthemind.Atanyrateitisthesortofdiseaseforwhichapersonshouldbedetainedinhospitalratherthanbegivenanunqualifiedacquittal.InRvCharlson[1955],MrCharlsonwaschargedwiththreecountsofvaryingseverityofgrievousbodilyharmtohissonundertheOffencesagainstthePersonAct1861.Heaskedhissontolookoutofawindow,struckhisheadwithamalletandthenthrewhimoutofthewindowcausinggrievousbodilyharm.Therewasnoquestionovertheactusreusofthecrime.Hesaidinastatement,‘IrememberhittingPeterontheheadwiththemallet.IdonotknowwhyIhithim,butIdorememberhittinghim.’Nopleaofinsanitywasraised.Medicalevidencestatedtherewasnodiseaseofthemind;however,therewasapossibilityhesufferedfromacerebraltumourwhichcouldcauseimpulsiveviolencehewouldhavehadnocontrolover.Thequestionforthecourtwasoverthemensreaelementforthethreechargesandwhetherhesatisfiedanyofthem.Barry,Jsaid:[T]hequestioniswhethertheaccusedknewwhathewasdoingwhenhestrucktheblows….Ifhedidnotknowwhathewasdoing,ifhisactionswerepurelyautomaticandhismindhadnocontroloverthemovementofhislimbs,ifhewasinthesamepositionasapersoninanepilepticfitandnoresponsibilityrestsonhimatall,thentheproperverdictis‘notguilty’ofallthethreecharges.Notguiltyverdictswerereturnedonallthreecharges.Therewasnofindingofinsanity.Inthiscase,thepossiblecerebraltumourandtheanalogoussituationofepilepsywerenotseenasdiseasesofthemindintheM’Naghtensenseoftheterm.RvSullivan[1984],attheHouseofLords,concernedtheappellantMrSullivanwhohadanestablisheddiagnosisofepilepsy.Thedoctorsgivingevidencesaidthatepilepsywasnotadiseaseofthemind.However,thecourtruledthatepilepsywasadiseaseofthemind.Thedetailsofthecaseareasfollows.OnedayMrSullivanvisitedaneighbourandsufferedaseizureduringwhichhekickedtheheadandbodyofafriendresultingininjuries.MrSullivanhadnomemoryoftheassault.Attrialhepleadednotguiltytocausinggrievousbodilyharmwithintentandinflictinggrievousbodilyharm.Hisdefencewasofsaneautomatismbutthejudgeruleditwouldhavetobeadefenceofinsanity.MrSullivanthenchangedhispleatoguiltyofassaultandwasconvicted,resultinginaprobationorder.Theinsanitydefence241

Heappealedonthegroundsthatheshouldhavehadtheopportunitytobefoundnotguiltyviaadefenceof‘automatismsimpliciter.’LordDiplocksaid:‘[M]ind’intheM’NaghtenRulesisusedintheordinarysenseofmentalfacultiesofreason,memoryandunderstanding….[I]tmattersnotwhethertheaetiologyoftheimpairmentisorganic,asinepilepsy,orfunctional,orwhethertheimpairmentitselfispermanentoristransientandintermittent,providedthatitsubsistedatthetimeofthecommissionoftheact.Thepurposeofthelegislationrelatingtothedefenceofinsanity…hasbeentoprotectsocietyagainstrecurrenceofthedangerousconduct.Therefore,epilepsywasheldtobeadiseaseofthemind.RvKemp[1957]determinedthatarteriosclerosiswasa‘diseaseofthemind’.MrKempsufferedarteriosclerosiscausingatemporarylossofconsciousnessduringwhichhestruckhiswifewithahammer,causingagrievouswoundtoherandresultinginhimbeingchargedwithgrievousbodilyharm.Medicalopinionwasagreedthathesufferedarteriosclerosis,orhardeningofthearteries,butthedoctorsdifferedastowhetherthisamountedtoadiseaseofthemind.Onedoctorsaidthatthephysicaldiseasecausedamelancholiawhichwasadiseaseofthemind.Anotherdoctorsaidthatatemporarycuttingoffofthebloodsupplydidnotamounttoadiseaseofthemind,althoughhadthediseaseprocessprogressedtodegenerationofbraincellsthentherewouldhavebeenadiseaseofthemind.DevlinJsaid:Theobjectofthelimitationimposeduponthewords‘defectofreason’bythewords‘fromdiseaseofthemind’…wastopreventanaccusedfromescapingtheconsequencesofanotherwisecriminalactbyrelyinguponhisownnaturalorbrutishstupidity.Inhisjudgmentthewordswerenotputinfordistinguishingbetweendiseasesofmentaloriginanddiseaseswithaphysicalorigin.Further:Hardeningofthearteriesisadiseasewhichisshownontheevidencetobecapableofaffectingthemindinsuchawayastocauseadefect,temporarilyorpermanently,ofitsreasoning,understandingandsoon…andsoisadiseaseofthemind…withinthemeaningoftheRules.Anotherfactorthatdeterminesdiseaseofthemindisthedirectionofcausality.Internalcausesmaybediseasesofthemindbutnotexternalcauses.RvBurgess[1991]determinedthatsleep-walkingwascausedbyaninternalfactorandthatthiswasthereforeadiseaseofthemind.242R.Memon

UsingabottleandavideorecorderMrBurgessattackedawomanasshewasasleepandgraspedherroundthethroat.Shesufferedlacerationsrequiringsutures.Hewaschargedwithwoundingwithintenttodogrievousbodilyharm.Hisdefencewasthathelackedmensreaashewassleep-walkingatthetimeandsufferednon-insaneautomatism.Hehadnomemoryofhittinghereitherwiththebottleorthevideorecorder.However,thejudgeruledthattheevidenceamountedtoinsanityandthejuryreturnedthespecialverdict.Onappeal,hiscounselarguedthat,‘[A]lthoughthereplainlywasadisturbanceofthebrainfunction,itwasnotcausedbyadiseaseofthemind….[H]eshouldhavebeenallowedtorunthedefenceofnon-insaneautomatism.’IntheCourtofAppeal,LordLanesaid,‘[He]plainlysufferedfromadefectofreasonfromsomesortoffailure…ofthemindcausinghimtoactashedidwithoutconsciousmotivation….Whateverthecause…itwasan‘‘internal’’cause.’There-fore,theappealwasdismissedandtheapproachoftheoriginaltrialjudgewasheldtobecorrect.Thiswasnotacaseofnon-insaneautomatismwherethecauseisexternal.RvHennessy(1989)concernedadiabeticwhosebloodsugarbecameraisedduetolackofinsulin.Thiswasheldtobeadiseaseofthemind.However,anotherdiabeticinRvQuick[1973]sufferedfromlowbloodsugarduetoexternalinsulinandthiswasheldnottobeadiseaseofthemind.So,althoughtheunderlyingmedicaldiagnosisofdiabeteswasthesameinbothcases,theinterpretationastodiseaseofthemindvariedaccordingtothedirectionofcausality.InRvHennessy(1989),adiabeticwaschargedwithmotoringoffences.Duetolackofinsulinheenteredahyperglycaemicstate(abnormallyraisedbloodsugar)atthetimeoftheoffenceswhichhesaidwerecommittedinastateofautomatism.Hehadnottakenhisinsulinforsomedays.Medicalevidencewasthatanxietyordepressioncouldalsohaveincreasedthebloodsugarlevel.Hepleadednotguiltybutchangedittoaguiltypleaafterthetrialjudgeruledthatthecasewasoneofinsanity.Hewasconvictedandsentenced.IntheCourtofAppealtheLordChiefJusticesaid,#Thequestion…iswhetherthefunctionofthemindwasdisturbedontheonehandbydiseaseorontheotherhandbysomeexternalfactor.’HecitedthecaseofRvQuick[1973]whereinjectionsofinsulin,anexternalfactor,resultinginmalfunctionwasnotadisease.Conversely,highbloodsugarcausedbyaninherentdefectwasadisease.TheappealinRvHennessy(1989)wasdismissedasanxietyandde-pressionwerenotseentobeexternalfactorsofthekindcapableofcausingautomatism;rather,thecasewasoneofinternaldiabetescausingthehighbloodsugar.ThecaseofRvQuick[1973]concernedanurse,MrQuick,whotogetherwithanothernursewaschargedwiththeassaultofapatient.AttrialMrQuickwishedtouseadefenceofautomatismonthegroundsthatheTheinsanitydefence243

hadnomemoryoftheassaultduetohypoglycaemia(abnormallylowbloodsugar)causedbytakingprescribedinsulin,drinkingalcohol,andeatinglittle.Hepleadednotguilty.ThetrialjudgeruledtheappropriatedefencewasinsanityandsoMrQuickchangedhispleatoguilty,resultinginconviction.AttheCourtofAppeal,LawtonLJsaid:[T]hequestioniswhetherapersonwhocommitsacriminalactwhileundertheeffectsofhypoglycaemiacanraiseadefenceofautomatism,asthedefendantsubmittedwaspossible,orwhethersuchapersonmustrelyonadefenceofinsanityifhewishestorelievehimselfofresponsibilityforhisacts.Afterconsideringvariouscaseshecontinued:Judgesshouldfollowinacommonsensewaytheirsenseoffairness….Amalfunctioningofthemindoftransitoryeffectcausedbytheapplicationtothebodyofsomeexternalfactorsuchasviolence,drugs,includinganesthetics,alcoholandhypnoticinfluencescannotfairlybesaidtobeduetodisease.Quick’sconditionwasnotcausedbythediseaseofdiabetesinsidehimbutbytheadministrationofinsulinfromoutsidehisbodyandthereforethetrialjudgeshouldhaveallowedadefenceofautomatismtobeputtothejury.Thereforetheappealwasallowedandtheconvictionquashed.Giventhatdiseaseofthemindhasbroadmeaning,defectofreasonnarrowsdownthenumberofdefendantswhomaythenbeconsideredregardingeitheroftheremainingtwoelementsoftheinsanitydefence,describednext.NotknowingthenatureandqualityoftheactTheCourtofAppealinRvCodere(1916)clarifiedthatthenatureandqualityoftheactmeansitsphysicalnatureandquality:ithasnothingtodowiththemoralityoftheact.Anarrowcognitiveapproachhasbeenapplied.MrCodere,alieutenantintheCanadianInfantry,wasconvictedofthemurderofasergeant,alsoaCanadian.Attrialevidencewasgiventhathewasmentallyabnormalandnotresponsibleforhisactions;thathecouldnotcarryonasustainedconversation.Therewasastrongfamilyhistoryofinsanity.Medicalevidencefromonedoctorindicatedthathesuffereddelusionsandwasnotofsoundmind.However,anotherdoctorsaidthatheknewthedifferencebetweenrightandwrongandcouldnotbecertifiedinsane.AtappealhiscounselsaidinreferencetotheM’NaghtenRules:‘‘‘Nature’’oftheactreferstoitsphysicalaspect;‘‘quality’’refersto244R.Memon

itsmoralaspect.’Further,‘Ifthecriminalisincapableofreasonablyunderstandingtheheinousnessofhisact,hedoesnotknowthattheactiswrong.’InresponsetothistheLordChiefJusticesaid:TheCourtcannotagreewiththatviewofthemeaningofthewords‘natureandquality’….[I]nusingthelanguage‘natureandquality’thejudgeswereonlydealingwiththephysicalcharacteroftheact,andwerenotintendingtodistinguishbetweenthephysicalandmoralaspectsoftheact.Thecourtconcludedthereforethattheappellantwasnotinsaneandtheapplicationwasdismissed.NotknowinghewasdoingwhatwaswrongInRvWindle[1952]theCourtofAppealheldthattheword‘wrong’meanslegallywrong,notmorallywrong.Windlewasconvictedofmurderinghiswifebypoisoningherwithaspirinandsentencedtodeath.Doctorsonbothsidessaidheknewwhathedidwasagainstthelaw.Thetrialjudgeruledtherewasnoevidenceofinsanityandwithdrewtheissuefromthejury.OnappealLordGoddardreferredtoapreviousrulinginRexvRivett(1950)andsaidthattherealtestwasoneofresponsibility.Hesaid:Courtsoflawcanonlydistinguishbetweenthatwhichisinaccordancewithlawandthatwhichiscontrarytolaw….[I]twouldbeanunfortunatethingifitwerelefttojuriestoconsiderwhethersomeparticularactwasmorallyrightorwrong.Thetestmustbewhetheritiscontrarytolaw.Therefore,anarrowmeaningwasappliedandtheappealfailedbecauseWindleknewhewasdoingsomethinglegallywrong.TheCriminalProcedure(Insanity)Act1964Untilitsamendmentin1991,the1964Actmeantthatthosefoundlegallyinsanewereallcommittedtohospitalwithoutlimitoftime.Therewasnoflexibilityofdisposalatall,evenifthedefendanthadgotbettersincetheindictmentandwasnolongersufferingfrommentaldisorderatthetimeofthespecialverdict.Dell(1983)describedthisas:thepsychiatricequivalentofalifesentence:thedefendanthastobesenttoahospitalspecifiedbytheHomeSecretaryandmustthereafter,indefinitely,betreatedasthoughheweresubjecttoahospitalorderwithrestrictions…withoutanylimitoftime.(p.432)Theinsanitydefence245

Therefore,theinsanitydefencewasnotpopulareventhoughitmeantacquittal.TheLawSociety(1991)wassimilarlycriticaloftheinabilityofthecourtstotakeintoaccounttheparticularneedsofthedefendant.Itwrote:Thishasledinsomecasestounnecessarydetentioninpsychiatrichospitalforpeoplewhohavepreviouslybeenadequatelycaredforinthecommunity.Ratherthanriskthisprospect,inothercaseslawyers,psychiatristsandthecourtshave…advisedclientstopleadguiltyratherthanusetheinsanitydefence.Itconcludedthatthe1964Actfailed,asvulnerablepeoplewhoshouldhavebeenprotectedbyitavoideditbecauseofitsdraconianconsequences.TheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnÞtnesstoPlead)Act1991Section1(1)oftheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act1991states:Ajuryshallnotreturnaspecialverdictundersection2oftheTrialofLunaticsAct1883(acquittalongroundofinsanity)exceptonthewrittenororalevidenceoftwoormoreregisteredmedicalpractitionersatleastoneofwhomisdulyapproved.Therefore,thereisarequirementformedicalevidencetobesubmitted.Oneofthetwodoctorsmustbeapprovedunders.12(2)oftheMentalHealthAct1983,whichspecifies‘apractitionerapprovedforthepurposesofthissectionbytheSecretaryofStateashavingspecialexperienceinthediagnosisortreatmentofmentaldisorder.’Medicalevidencewasnotarequirementunderthepreviouslegislation.Moresignificantly,the1991Actamendedthe1964Actresultinginawiderangeofpossibledisposals,oraflexibilityofdisposalsfollowingthespecialverdict.Section5oftheamended1964Actnowreads:5(1)Thissectionapplieswhere–(a)aspecialverdictisreturnedthattheaccusedisnotguiltybyreasonofinsanity,or(b)findingsarerecordedthattheaccusedisunderadisabilityandthathedidtheactormadetheomissionchargedagainsthim.(2)Subjecttosubsection(3)below,thecourtshalleither–(a)makeanorderthattheaccusedbeadmitted,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSchedule1totheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act1991,tosuchahospitalasmaybespecifiedbytheSecretaryofState;or246R.Memon

(b)wheretheyhavethepowertodosobyvirtueofsection5ofthatAct,makeinrespectoftheaccusedsuchoneofthefollowingordersastheythinkmostsuitableinallthecircumstancesofthecase,namely–(i)guardianshiporderwithinthemeaningoftheMentalHealthAct1983;(ii)supervisionandtreatmentorderwithinthemeaningofSchedule2tothesaidActof1991;and(iii)anorderforhisabsolutedischarge(3)Paragraph(b)ofsubsection(2)aboveshallnotapplywheretheoffencetowhichthespecialverdictorfindingsrelateisanoffencethesentenceforwhichisfixedbylaw.(p.577)MackayandKearns(1994)describeswhatthefourdisposalsmeaninpractice.First,therecanbeahospitalorderwithorwithoutarestrictionorderattached.Ifarestrictionorderisattachedthenitcanbewithorwithoutlimitoftime.Ahospitalordermeansthedefendantisadmittedtohospitalwithinthemeaningofsection37oftheMentalHealthAct1983.Theeffectisthathemaybedetainedinhospitalforaperiodofuptosixmonthsunlesstheauthoritytodetainisrenewedbythe‘ResponsibleMedicalOfficer’(RMO).TheRMOhasthepowertograntleaveofabsencefromthehospitalsubjecttoapowerofrecallandalsotodischargehimfromthehospital.Thehospitalmanagersalsohavethepowertodischargehimfromhospitalasdoesthementalhealthreviewtribunal.Ahospitalorderisnotaformofpunishment.Arestrictionordermeansthedefendantistreatedasifanorderundersection41oftheMentalHealthAct1983wasmade.Section41(1)says,‘havingregardtothenatureoftheoffence,theantecedentsoftheoffenderandtheriskofhiscommittingfurtheroffencesifsetatlarge,thatitisnecessaryfortheprotectionofthepublicfromseriousharm.’TheeffectisthattheRMOcannotgrantleaveofabsencefromthehospital,cannottransferthedefendanttoanotherhospital,andcannotdischargehimfromhospital.OnlytheSecretaryofStatecangrantleaveortransferthepatient.Neithercanthehospitalmanagersdischargethepatient.TheauthoritytodischargerestsonlywiththeSecretaryofStateandthementalhealthreviewtribunalwhoarethereforegiventheresponsibilityofregardingtheinterestsofpublicsafetyintheirdecisionmaking.Restrictionscanbemadewithalimitoftimeorwithoutalimitoftimeatthediscretionofthecourt.However,thisdiscretiondoesnotapplytomurdercases.Wherethedefendantwaschargedwithmurder,putontrial,andthenfoundnotguiltybyreasonofinsanitysothereisnoconvictionformurderTheinsanitydefence247

assuch(henceforthreferredtoasmurdercases)thecourtmuststillimposewhatisineffectahospitalorderwithrestrictionswithoutlimitoftime.White(1992,p.14)commented,‘Thediscretiongiventothecourtsinthematterofdisposaliswhollytobewelcomed.Itisonlytoberegrettedthatitisnotextendedtotrialsformurder.’Second,aguardianshiporderallowstheoffendertoreceivecareandprotectioninthecommunitywiththeguardianusuallybeinganapprovedsocialworker.However,althoughthereispowertorequirehimtoattendformedicaltreatment,thereisnopowertoforceitonhimifherefuses.DolanandCampbell(1994)statethat‘theprimaryaimofsuchanorderistoensuretheoffenderreceivescareandprotection,ratherthanmedicaltreatment’(p.158).Third,asupervisionandtreatmentordercanbemadewhichissimilartoapsychiatricprobationorder(nowcalledacommunityrehabilitationorder).Amongtherequirementsarethatthesupervisingofficer(socialworkerorprobationofficer)iswillingtoprovidesupervisionandthataregisteredmedicalpractitionerhasmadearrangementstoprovidetreatment.Treatmentcanbegivenasanin-patientorasanout-patientandconditionsofresidencemaybeincluded.However,ifthereisnon-compliancethennolegalsanctionsorpunishmentcanfollow.Therefore,inpracticetheseordersaremadeonlywherethesubjectislikelytocomply.Finally,absolutedischargecouldbeappropriatewheretheoffencewastrivialandtheoffenderdoesnotrequiresupervisionandtreatmentinthecommunityoradmissiontohospital.ThecommonlawinsanitydefenceDPPvH[1997]developedthelawinrespectoftheinsanitydefenceatcommonlaw.MrHarperdrovehiscarwithabloodalcohollevelabovethelegallimitof88mgper100mlofblood.Onthedayoftheoffencehewassufferingfromhypomanicmooddisorder(aseverementalillnesscharacterizedbyabnormalelevationofmood).Itwasreportedthatpeoplewiththisdisorderlackedasenseoftimeandmoraljudgment.FromtimetotimehehadbeendetainedundertheMentalHealthAct1983.Hewaschargedwithanexcessalcoholoffenceunders.5(1)(a)oftheRoadTrafficAct1988.Hepleadedinsanityonthegroundsthathewassufferingfrommanicdepressivepsychosis(aseverementalillness).On12March1996themagistratesacquittedMrHarper.TheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsappealedagainstthedecisionofthemagistratestoacquit.TheDPPcontendedthattheinsanitydefenceonlyrelatedtoanoffencerequiringamentalelement.248R.Memon

Itwasdecidedthattheinsanitydefenceisnotavailableforstrictliabilityoffencestriedsummarily.However,thedefenceisstillavailabletochargesinvolvingmensrea.McCowanLJsaid:Thedefenceisbasedontheabsenceofmensrea,butnoneisrequiredfortheoffenceofdrivingwithanexcessofalcohol.Hencethedefenceofinsanityhasnorelevancetosuchachargeasitisanoffenceofstrictliability.Section37(3)oftheMentalHealthAct1983states:Whereapersonischargedbeforeamagistrates’courtwithanyactoromissionasanoffenceandthecourtwouldhavepower,onconvictinghimofthatoffence,tomakeanorderundersubsection(1)aboveinhiscaseasbeingapersonsufferingfrommentalillnessorseverementalimpairment,then,ifthecourtissatisfiedthattheaccuseddidtheactormadetheomissioncharged,thecourtmay,ifitthinksfit,makesuchanorderwithoutconvictinghim.Theresultofasuccessfulinsanitydefenceatthemagistratescourtisabsoluteacquittalwiththedefendantbeinggrantedbackallofhisliberty–thatis,unlessthemagistratesmakeahospitalorderundersection37(3)ofthe1983Act.Iftheydomakesuchanorderthentheycannotattachasection41restrictionorder.Thereisa‘legislativelacuna’here.ItisonlyifthereisaconvictionthatthemagistratescancommitthedefendanttotheCrowncourtinordertohaveitconsidertheimpositionofarestrictionorder.Themagistratesareunabletodothisifthedefendanthasbeenacquittedonthegroundofinsanity.ConclusionBeingrational,moral,responsible,andhavingfreewillarepresumptionsnecessaryfortheoperationofthecriminallaw.Theyarenecessaryinorderforthecourtslegitimatelytosecureconvictionsresultinginpunishment.Theinsanitydefencefunctionsasanexcuseforanoffencebyinterferingwiththelinksbetweenthesepresumptions.Thisisthefoundationuponwhichthesubstanceoftheinsanitydefenceisbuiltanduponwhichitnowstands.FromRvHadfield[1800]atthebeginningofthe19thcenturyinsanitywasseennotasanexcusefromcriminalresponsibility(asitisnow)butratherapunitivemeasuretodeterandpunishthementallyill,andforthestatetohavegreatercontroloverthem.ThesamewasdemonstratedinRvOxford[1840]40yearslater.Theinsanitydefence249

InanalysingtheapproachoftheEnglishjudiciarytowardstheM’NaghtenRules,Mackay(1995,p.100)says:[A]lthoughanexpansionaryapproachhasbeenadoptedtowardsthescopeof‘diseaseofthemind’,thishasbeencounterbalancedbythenarrowinterpretationgiventotheotherelementsoftheRules.Theeffectofthishasbeentoexcludethevastmajorityofmentallydisorderedpersonsfromtherealmsoftheinsanitydefence,asinevitablyinmostcasestheywillknowwhattheyaredoingandthattheoffencetheyarecommittingislegallywrong.So,inpracticetheinsanitydefenceisavailableonlytoasmallnumberofdefendants.Theconfiningoftheinsanitydefencewithinextremelynarrowlimitshasbeencriticizedasaweakness.McAuley(1993,p.39)says,‘[T]hereisacompellingcaseforreformulatingtheruleinawaythatdoesnotdependonthecontentiousconceptsofwhethertheaccused‘‘knew’’the‘‘natureandquality’’ofhisactorthatitwas‘‘wrong’’.’Ironically,hadtheM’NaghtenRulesastheyarenowinterpretedbeenappliedtoM’Naghtenduringhisowntrialthenhewouldnothavebeenfoundinsane.Thisisbecauseheknewboththenatureandqualityoftheact,andheknewhewasdoingwhatwaswrong.The‘flexibilityofdisposal’introducedbytheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act1991doesnotapplytomurdercases.Instead,wherethedefendantischargedwithmurderandsubsequentlyfoundinsanehemustbedealtwithbywayofanadmissionordertohospitalwithrestrictionsondischargewithoutlimitoftime.Thereisanelementofarbitrarinesshereandthereisnodiscretionavailabletothejudge.Also,inpracticeaconsiderableperiodoftimemaywellhaveelapsedsincetheoffence,thefindingofinsanity,andfinaldisposalofthecase.Duringthisperiodtheoffendermaywellhavereceivedtreatmentinhospital.Inanyevent,thereisnoseparateconsiderationofwhethertheoffenderstillactuallyrequireshospitaltreatment.Rather,itisthenatureofthechargeofmurderattheoutsetthateffectivelydeterminesdisposalattheend.StatutorychangebywayofafurtherActofParliamentisrequiredtoremedythisdifficultybyamendingagaintheCriminalProcedure(Insanity)Act1964.Section5(3)ofthe1964Actwouldineffectneedtobedeletedinordertoachievesuchchange.A‘legislativelacuna’wasidentifiedwithregardtothecommonlawinsanitydefenceatthemagistratescourtavailableforcrimesotherthanofstrictliability.Atsummarytrialiffoundnotguiltybyreasonofinsanitythenalthoughahospitalordercanbemadeunders.37oftheMentalHealthAct1983,thereisnoprovisionforthemagistratetocommitadefendanttotheCrownforittoconsiderarestrictionorder.Sucharestrictionordermaywellbeappropriategiventhecircumstancesofparticularcases.Toremedy250R.Memon

thisdifficultytherewouldneedtobelegislativechangestothissectionbyafurtherActofParliament.AcknowledgmentsThispaperwasbasedonmyLLMdissertationattheUniversityofNorthumbriasupervisedbyTinaBond.ReferencesDell,S.(1983).Wanted:Aninsanitydefencethatcanbeused.CriminalLawReview,431–437.Dolan,M.,&Campbell,A.(1994).TheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act1991:Acasereportandselectedreviewofthelegalreforms.MedicineScienceandLaw,34,155–160.HomeOfficeandDepartmentofHealthandSocialSecurity.(1975).ReportoftheCommitteeonMentallyAbnormalOffenders(Cmnd6244).London:HMSO.Kerrigan,K.(2000).Unfitnesstoplead,insanityandthementalelementincrime.JournalofMentalHealthLaw,125.LawCommission.(1989).Criminallaw:AcriminalcodeforEnglandandWales(LawCom.No.177Vol.4:Commentaryondraftcriminalcodebill).London:HMSO.LawSociety.(1991).CriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Bill:Briefingontheprivatemember’sbill.London:TheLawSociety.Mackay,R.D.,&Kearns,G.(1994).Thecontinuedunderuseofunfitnesstopleadandtheinsanitydefence.CriminalLawReview,576–579.Mackay,R.D.(1995).Mentalconditiondefencesinthecriminallaw.Oxford,UK:ClarendonPress.McAuley,F.(1993).Insanity,psychiatryandcriminalresponsibility.Dublin:RoundHallPress.Moore,M.S.(1984).Lawandpsychiatry:Rethinkingtherelationship.Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.Moran,R.(1985).Theoriginofinsanityasaspecialverdict:ThetrialfortreasonofJamesHadfield(1800).LawandSocietyReview,19,487–519.Moran,R.(1986).Thepunitiveusesoftheinsanitydefense:ThetrialfortreasonofEdwardOxford(1840).InternationalJournalofLawandPsychiatry,9,171–190.RoyalCommissiononCapitalPunishment.(1953)RoyalCommissiononCapitalPunishment1949–1954:Report(Cmd8932).London:HMSO.White,S.(1992).TheCriminalProcedure(InsanityandUnfitnesstoPlead)Act.CriminalLawReview,4–14.LawreportsAttorneyGeneral’sReference(No3of1998)[1999]3AllER40BrattyvAttorney-GeneralforNorthernIreland[1963]AC386DPPvH[1997]1WLR1406M’Naghten’sCase(1843)10Cl&F200RvBurgess[1991]2QB92RvCharlson[1955]1AllER859RvChaulk(1990)2CR(4th)1,16RvClarke(1972)56CrAppR225Theinsanitydefence251

RvCodere(1916)12CrAppR21RvHadfield[1800]27St.Tr.1281RvHennessy(1989)89CrAppR10RvKemp[1957]1QB399RvKopsch(1925)19CrAppRep50RvOxford[1840]4StTr(n.s.)497RvQuick[1973]QB910RvSullivan[1984]AC156RvWin

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