Keeping labeling theory in mind, does sex registration (of convicted sex offenders) serve the public interests, and or does this labeling process do more harm than good?
1. Examine your personal life course. What turning points did you experience that led to where you are today. As part of this response please identify a criminological theory which best helps describe and or explain your unique experiences.
2. Keeping labeling theory in mind, does sex registration (of convicted sex offenders) serve the public interests, and or does this labeling process do more harm than good? Fully explain and defend your views.
Requirements: 500-600
48 | Regulation | Summer 2012During the 1990s and 2000s, sex offenders became subject to some of the most sweeping and novel crime legislation in the United States. Two early innovations inaugurating this trend were sex offender registration laws, which require that convicted sex offenders, once released, regularly provide valid contact information and other identifying data to law enforcement authorities, and sex offender notification laws, which complement registration laws by making an offender’s registration and criminal history infor-mation available to the public, most notably through the now-familiar searchable online databases known as “web registries.” Laws of both types, referred to generally as “SORN laws” and mandated by the federal government in some form since the mid-1990s, now exist in every state.State legislatures enacted SORN laws with the explicit and exclusive aim of reducing sex offender recidivism. Registration laws were designed solely to enable more effective law enforce-ment supervision (and apprehension, if necessary) of previously convicted sex offenders, who were assumed to be at serious risk for reoffending. Similarly, notification laws were passed with the singular goal of helping potential victims protect themselves from known and nearby sex offenders by facilitating the public monitoring and physical avoidance of these individuals. Propo-nents of registration and notification laws continue to defend J.J. Prescott is professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School.This article summarizes and expands on the paper “Do Sex Offender Reg-istration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?” by Prescott and J.E. Rockoff, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2011).CRiMe & laW enFoRCeMentDo Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?Laws purporting to protect the public may be increasing sex offender recidivism rates.By J.J. PResCottthem entirely on these grounds. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded, at least with respect to early versions of SORN laws, that state legislatures intended merely to “regulate” released offenders who may prove to be dangerous, not to punish them for previously committed crimes. The general idea that we ought to “regulate” released offend-ers—of any type—to reduce the likelihood of their returning to crime is an attractive one, at least in theory. Criminal recidivism generates significant social harm. As many as two-thirds of all released felony inmates are readmitted to prison within a few years, and the public generally views individuals convicted of sex offenses as among those most likely to reoffend upon release. It is not surprising, therefore, that the public’s impression of sex offender dangerousness, when catalyzed by a few gruesome and headline-grabbing crimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, pro-duced the first SORN laws, which in turn led to the federal acts that extended SORN laws nationwide.Nevertheless, despite their now-widespread use, SORN laws became the norm without any systematic study of their conse-quences. Admittedly, the logic underlying these laws seems at first difficult to gainsay: if a known sex offender poses even a small risk to a potential new victim, how can it hurt if the police are keeping better tabs on that offender or if the offender’s neighbors are made aware that he is a threat so they can take measures to reduce their own risk of victimization? But this question and its implied answer presume that SORN laws have no influence on whether released sex offenders opt to pursue new victims in the first place. If the enforcement of notification laws imposes IlluStratIon by Morgan ballard
IlluStratIon by Morgan ballard Summer 2012 | Regulation | 49
Crime & Law enforCementsignificant financial, social, and psychological costs on released sex offenders, as an avalanche of evidence suggests it does, then notification may in fact be criminogenic. The result may well be many more attempted attacks by convicted sex offenders and therefore higher recidivism rates on the whole, even if every indi-vidual attack attempted becomes somewhat less likely to succeed. Furthermore, the logic offered by most SORN advocates ignores the potentially significant, yet unintended, consequences that these laws may have on many other distinct facets of sex offender behavior. For one example, SORN laws may function as a deterrent to potential sex offenders, i.e., those with “clean” records who want to avoid the prospect of being publicly branded a sex offender if they are caught and convicted of committing a sex crime. For another, released offenders who are subject to noti-fication laws may react by attacking different (i.e., uninformed) rather than fewer victims, a phenomenon generally known as “crime displacement.”A comprehensive study of the consequences of SORN laws is necessary, therefore, to improve our understanding of not only whether but also how these particular “regulatory” post-release methods affect sex offender behavior. Such research is also indispensable to determining whether these laws are ulti-mately wise policy. Fortunately, analysis of the experiences of 15 states over almost 10 years provides needed insight into the effects that SORN laws may have on criminal behavior. Findings from these data indicate that registration alone may reduce sex offense recidivism against friends, acquaintances, and neighbors by improving local law enforcement supervision of sex offend-ers. But the evidence runs against the notion that notification reduces recidivism. Although notification laws do appear to deter nonregistered offenders, these tools may well increase recidivism among those the government publicly identifies as sex offenders by reducing their ability or desire to live without crime. Indeed, the idea that notification regimes may make registered offend-ers more dangerous is consistent with the fact that notification causes these individuals significant financial, social, and psycho-logical harm.Modeling the Behavioral Response of Criminals to SORN LawsAn empirical examination of the effects of registration and notification laws on criminal behavior requires the develop-ment of policy-relevant, empirically testable hypotheses. In order to catalog and organize the range of possible offender reactions to SORN laws, it pays to begin with the underlying determinants of criminal decisionmaking. Registration and notification differ in how they operate on these central inputs, 50 | Regulation | Summer 2012and SORN laws also apply differently to convicted (registered) sex offenders than they do to potential (nonregistered) sex offenders, making it essential to understand the distinct behav-ioral dynamics in each of these two cases.The likelihood that an individual commits a crime against a particular victim turns in significant part on four factors:■■The difficulty or cost (c) to the potential offender—unrelated to any punishment—of targeting and attacking the victim.■■The perceived probability (p) the potential offender will be caught and punished for any attack on the victim. ■■The severity of the punishment the potential offender believes will be imposed for any crime against the victim (f).■■The benefits to the potential offender of engaging in other (presumably lawful) activities relative to the benefits he would enjoy from committing the offense (u). By assumption, the likelihood that an offender commits a crime is increasing in the relative utility of crime commission (or decreasing in the relative attractiveness of choosing only legal behavior) and decreasing in the difficulty of targeting a victim, punishment probability, and punishment severity.Registration laws, by enhancing the efficacy of police supervi-sion, seem likely to reduce recidivism of registered offenders by increasing the probability of detection and punishment of any who commit new sex offenses. But registration alone appears unlikely to increase the actual difficulty of committing new crimes (assuming the identities of registered sex offenders are available only to local authorities and otherwise remain confiden-tial), to alter the level of punishment (given convicted offenders are already registered), or to affect the relative attractiveness of participating in only noncriminal activities, at least if the reg-istration procedures themselves are not too burdensome (and registration details remain secure). Notification laws may also reduce recidivism among known sex offenders by offering potential victims information they can use to protect themselves. But this publicity, by generating significant negative collateral consequences for released offenders such as the loss of employment, housing, and social ties, may also increase their proclivity for crime. Therefore, although disseminating the identities of convicted offenders may indeed make it more difficult for them to attack “informed” individuals (e.g., neighbors and acquaintances) and may increase the probability of detection and apprehension if they do, notification may also significantly reduce Findings from these data indicate that registration reduces sex offense recidivism by providing law enforcement with information on local sex offenders. But the evidence runs against the notion that notification reduces recidivism.
Summer 2012 | Regulation | 51tent of state SORN laws is critical to an accurate assessment of their consequences. But deciphering the meaning and history of these laws is no easy task. Every state’s laws evolved over time as a result of legislative amendments and judicial decisions, and SORN laws cannot be divided easily into one or even two types. Registration and notification laws are obviously designed to work in two different ways, but a canvassing of state laws imparts significant diversity even within these categories, especially in the form notification laws take. While early notification laws merely allowed public access to paper registries, later laws required that registration data be posted to publicly accessible web registries. Some states also enacted “active” notification laws under which officials must take affirmative steps to inform at-risk individuals (particularly neighbors) of relevant released offenders—typically by written notice or even a visit from a police officer. SORN laws thus fit into roughly four categories: registration, public access to a paper registry, web registry availability, and active community notification. Even so, states followed different legislative paths. For example, Iowa began registration and (lim-ited) public access notification simultaneously in 1995, but did not have any form of active notification until 1998 or an internet site until 2000. Texas, by contrast, began the registration of sex offenders in 1991, instituted public access and active notification in 1995, and launched an internet site in 1999. And, as jurisdic-tions moved from basic registration laws to more restrictive and varied forms of public access and from restrictive public access to the publication of sex offender information on the internet, states had to determine whether to apply such changes retroac-tively and, if appropriate, specify which former offenders were to be subject to the new laws.This cross-state variation in SORN laws—in exact timing of enactment and effective dates, in content and scope, and in retroactive application—can be used to identify the causal effects of registration and notification laws on the commission of sex crimes. Simply combining these legal data with the number of individual sex-offense incidents by state and time period as a measure of the outcome of interest (using, perhaps, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports) would make it possible to estimate at least the average effects of SORN laws on the overall frequency of sex offenses.Unfortunately, this approach is less useful than it might seem because it cannot separately identify the deterrence and recidi-vism effects of SORN laws. Furthermore, it fails to take advantage of the fact that registration and notification laws, by design or otherwise, may operate to produce specific predictable conse-quences. For instance, notification laws, if they work as intended, should not only cut the total frequency of sex crimes, but should also reduce the relative frequency of attacks by registered offend-ers on their neighbors (as opposed to strangers). An empirical strategy that tests for the existence of these additional patterns can provide a more complete view of the data and allows for more robust interpretation of any findings than would be feasible with simpler reduced-form approaches and any amorphous results they might produce. the relative attractiveness of staying on the straight and narrow, leaving the overall effect on recidivism ambiguous.Potential offenders—those who have never been convicted of a covered crime and so are not presently required to comply with SORN laws—may also be deterred by the prospect of becoming subjected to the demands of registration or notification in the future if they are caught and convicted of committing a sex offense. Otherwise, however, these individuals should be unaf-fected by SORN laws that by definition apply only to convicted sex offenders. As between the two types of SORN laws, potential offenders seem much more likely to be deterred by notifica-tion given the manifold and well-documented difficulties that released sex offenders are known to face.Capitalizing on the Geographic and Temporal Variation in SORN LawsA careful study of the effects of SORN laws on criminal behav-ior and crime frequency requires a reliable empirical strat-egy capable of differentiating between and evaluating these various hypotheses. The striking legal variation in SORN laws across states and over time (as well as the peculiar sources of this variation) offers a flexible approach to overcoming this hurdle. The implementation and evolution of state SORN laws during the 1990s and 2000s comprise, in effect, a whole series of natural experiments. By comparing the experiences of jurisdictions implementing or amending their SORN laws at particular points in time to the experiences of “control” juris-dictions under similar conditions, it is possible to disentangle and measure the behavioral consequences of registration and notification laws.Of course, attributing causal significance to the close corre-spondence between legislatively enacted laws and near-contem-poraneous changes in outcomes of interest is rightly viewed with suspicion. Correlation is not causation. Just as new criminal laws may influence criminal behavior, new prohibitions, more severe penalties, and higher police spending often follow from rising offense rates. SORN laws, however, do not fit this mold. Although the tim-ing and content of SORN laws vary considerably across the coun-try, they do so for reasons unrelated to offense trends. Enacted during a period of declining sex crime frequency, state registra-tion and notification laws were responses either to one or two highly atypical but well-publicized local incidents or to federal mandates (with significant grace periods), which were themselves inspired by a small number of conspicuous crimes. In addition to the random sparks of legislative activity generated by individual sex offenses, exogenously fixed state and federal constitutional constraints affected whether criminal laws like registration and notification were applied retroactively to individuals on the basis of crimes they committed in the past, and variation in preexist-ing legislative schedules partially dictated when SORN laws were enacted and became effective.Not surprisingly, precisely measuring the timing and con-
Crime & Law enforCement52 | Regulation | Summer 2012Contrasting Crime Frequency Effects from Shifts in the Types of Victims TargetedSORN laws may influence the number and nature of the sex offenses committed during any period of time in a variety of complementary and offsetting ways. Although registration and notification laws function differently, supplying information to diverse parties, both types of laws have the potential to influ-ence at least a few of the key determinants of criminal behavior (e.g., c, p, f, and u)—presumably discrete sets and by distinct mechanisms. Because some of these inputs are victim-type spe-cific, SORN laws seem likely to affect the relative frequency of particular offender-victim combinations (e.g., offenses against neighbors), not merely overall offense or recidivism rates. Thus, any comprehensive investigation into how SORN laws influ-ence criminal behavior ought to exploit the specific means by which these laws operate. Consider notification laws, which target recidivism by provid-ing individuals located “near” potential recidivists (like signifi-cant others, neighbors, acquaintances, etc.) with identifying infor-mation that can be used to monitor or avoid potential threats. Notification seeks in effect to make it more difficult for a released sex offender to attack “nearby” individuals, many of whom it is assumed were previously unaware of the offender’s criminal his-tory. If notification laws work as their proponents suggest, one would expect to observe relatively fewer attacks against the neigh-bors and acquaintances of released offenders. Likewise, under reg-istration laws, police supervision of released sex offenders should, in theory, lead to fewer crimes against victims who the police view as more probable targets—such as family members, significant others, neighbors, and acquaintances—as these crimes would be easier for authorities to detect and prosecute. These are testable hypotheses and they can be tested using federal National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, the only high-quality, multi-state crime data that include offender-victim relationship information. NIBRS is a relatively new data collection effort in which only a subset of states partici-pates. Registration and notification laws were enacted primarily in the 1990s and only 15 states were contributing to NIBRS as of 1998: Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachu-setts, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Fortunately, these states are broadly representative in important relevant respects and NIBRS contains sufficient crime data both pre- and post-SORN laws in each of these 15 states to conduct reliable analysis.The NIBRS offender-victim relationship variable has one geo-graphic element (the offender was a neighbor), but it is otherwise organized by the level of familiarity that the victim has with the offender (e.g., the offender was a friend or acquaintance) or by family ties (e.g., the offender was a spouse or sibling). Offenses that may respond in discernible ways to registration and notifica-tion laws fall into three categories: “close” (involving family mem-bers, significant others, and friends), “near” (involving neighbors, acquaintances, and offenders otherwise known), and “stranger” crimes. Potential victims who are neighbors or acquaintances seem more likely to learn from and respond to an offender’s information being made public than do family members or com-plete strangers. Accordingly, notification may reduce the relative frequency of “near” offenses. Similarly, registered offenders may be more easily monitored when they are around their families and in their neighborhoods, and more easily located when a nearby crime occurs. Hence, registration ought to reduce the relative number of “close” and “near” offenses.But even if registration and notification laws succeed at reduc-ing the relative incidence of crimes against particular classes of victims believed to be especially vulnerable, one cannot assume that the overall recidivism rate—much less the sex offense rate across the board—has also fallen. This counterintuitive claim is true for at least two reasons. First, sex offenders may respond to registration and notifica-tion by seeking out victims who are not protected by these laws. A registered offender who visits another jurisdiction or perhaps even another neighborhood will not be “known” there by either the public or the police. In theory, SORN laws may, as forensic psychologist Robert Prentky has observed, “accomplish nothing more than changing the neighborhood in which the offender looks for victims.” If the offenses that would have been com-mitted against the now-informed or newly supervised potential victims are simply displaced onto “strangers,” overall recidivism levels will not change. Second, notification may reduce the relative capacity or willingness of released sex offenders to live without crime by rendering them pariahs wherever they reside or work. As a con-sequence, even if committing crimes against neighbors becomes relatively less attractive, returning to crime may still become more attractive to released offenders on the whole, so much so that recidivism rates against all types of victims may actually increase.Distinguishing Changes in Recidivism Levels from Deterrence EffectsIf the only questions of interest were whether SORN laws reduce the total frequency of sex offenses and whether these laws influence the relative frequency of sex offenses committed against certain classes of victims, using interstate and intertem-poral variation in these laws to explain changes in sex offense patterns across jurisdictions and over time would be an entirely suitable empirical approach. But SORN laws are defended as a means of inhibiting or restraining released offenders from reoffending, not as a way of deterring potential first-time sex offenders (or non-registered offenders more generally) from committing sex crimes by threat-ening to enforce such laws against them if they do. This makes sense: reducing recidivism by providing potential victims with the identities and criminal histories of latent recidivists requires, by assumption and design, the collection and sharing of such information. By contrast, deterring offenders may be achieved in
Summer 2012 | Regulation | 53many other conceivable ways (such as by increasing prison sen-tences, perhaps), and one or more of these alternative strategies may prove to be more cost effective or superior on other grounds once all costs and benefits have been tallied. Therefore, separately measuring the deterrence and recidivism effects of SORN laws is essential to any discussion of the general desirability of these laws (particularly in the case of notification, it turns out). Unfortunately, isolating these effects is difficult to do persuasively when working with comprehensive multi-state crime data because these data simply do not indicate whether a crime was committed by a registered sex offender or by an offender with no prior sex crime record. This challenge has an intuitive solution, however. Although NIBRS data also lack information on whether crimes were committed by registered sex offenders or by “new” offenders, a simple fact bridges this gap: registration and notification laws cannot significantly affect the frequency of sex offenses by alter-ing recidivism levels (by, for example, informing potential victims of “known” threats) when nobody or only a few convicted sex offenders are subject to these laws—i.e., when registries are close to “empty.” But, in theory, both registration and notification laws can reduce the frequency of sex offenses even when private and public registries are “empty” by deterring potential sex offenders who fear becoming subject to these laws in the future.In application, this fact means that the significant differences across states and over time in the retroactive coverage of SORN laws can be used to distinguish their deterrence effects from their recidivism effects. This variation in coverage led to dramatic dis-parities in the numbers of affected offenders as these laws became effective: some states applied their laws only prospectively to individuals convicted or released after the relevant effective date; others made their laws retroactive, applying them to individuals convicted or released over a range of different pre-effective date time frames. As a result, as all states began to enforce their SORN laws, certain states had large catalogs of “registered” offenders while others had empty or nearly empty registries.A straight-forward means of implementing this approach involves collecting data on the actual number of offenders on each state’s registry (i.e., registry size) at many different points in time and combining this information with county-level registry size data at a single point in time (August 2007) to estimate the registry size in each county for every month in the sample under the assumption that registry sizes grew smoothly once established. Putting It All Together: The Many Consequences of SORN LawsUsing these ideas and a detailed coding of state SORN laws, NIBRS crime data, registry size information, and county-level economic and demographic data, the effects of SORN laws on overall and victim-specific sex offense frequencies—and whether these consequences, if any, resulted from changes in deterrence, recidivism, or both—can be estimated using stan-dard econometric methods.For all intents and purposes, these regression techniques use the timing and content of SORN laws and registry size informa-tion to explain changes in the number and type of sex offenses while at the same time accounting for alternative explanations that might generate spurious associations between these policies and fluctuating offense rates. The registry coverage data make it possible to estimate recidivism and deterrence effects separately, despite not knowing whether offenses were committed by reg-istered offenders. Estimating victim-specific offense frequency effects informs the interpretation of any aggregate frequency estimates and offers a means of testing whether notification simply displaces crime onto unknown victims.In these regressions, the outcomes of interest are the total number of sex offenses and the number of offenses against par-ticular victim types as recorded by NIBRS reporting agencies by month. The key explanatory variables are:■■whether a registration law has been implemented (capturing the deterrence effect of a registration law), ■■how many individuals are registered if a registration law is in place (registration’s effect on recidivism), ■■whether a notification law has been implemented (the deter-rence effect of notification), and ■■how many individuals are registered if a notification law is in place (notification’s effect on recidivism). All regressions include controls for when the crime occurred (to account for the potential influence of any secular crime trends) and for the agency that reported the offense (to account for any persistent heterogeneity in crime across reporting areas), as well as for annual per-capita income, unemployment levels, poverty rates, and the fraction of the population in five ethnic-ity categories and five-year age categories at the county level. Ordinary assaults and other non-sex crimes committed per 10,000 people are employed to correct for any broad changes in criminal justice policy or law and for related trends. As one would expect, sex offense rates are positively associated with both variables. Finally, regressions are weighted by an agency’s population coverage, meaning estimates reflect the average changes in risk faced by a typical person in the sample and are also adjusted for differences in crime variability that can result from large disparities in population levels.What does all of this work tell us? First, no evidence emerges that the threat of registration alone deters individuals from engaging in sex crime. In fact, the estimated impact of a new (empty) sex offender registry on the frequency of sex offenses is positive, although too small and imprecisely measured to be reliable. There is strong evidence, however, that requiring registration does reduce recidivism, presumably by increasing police monitoring and therefore increasing the likelihood of punishment that potential recidi-vists face. The data intimate that each additional sex offender registered per 10,000 people reduces the annual number of sex offenses reported per 10,000 people on average by 0.098 crimes (from a starting point of 9.17 crimes). This sizeable reduction
Crime & Law enforCement54 | Regulation | Summer 2012(1.07 percent) buttresses the idea that we may be able to use law enforcement supervision to combat sex offender recidivism.Second, with respect to notification, quite the opposite pat-tern unfolds. The threat of becoming subjected to a notifica-tion regime—and the shame and collateral consequences that accompany being publicly identified as a sex offender—appears to have a sizeable deterrent effect (i.e., it reduces nonregistrant offenses). The data suggest that notification laws deter on aver-age 1.17 crimes per 10,000 people per year (approximately 12.8 percent of all sex crimes). But these same data also warn that the greater the number of released offenders that states actually subject to notification, the higher the relative frequency of sex offenses. In other words, the punitive aspects of notification may have unintended perverse consequences. All else equal, publicly revealing the identity and criminal history of a released offender seems to increase the likelihood of his returning to crime. These results are highly statistically significant: it is unlikely that existing notification laws are reducing recidivism among registered offenders, and it is distinctly possible that these laws are making things worse.Sex offender notification policies may thus involve a difficult tradeoff: many potential offenders may be deterred by the threat of community notification and its associated costs, but the ex-post imposition of those sanctions on convicted offenders may make them more, rather than less, dangerous.Notification laws appear most attractive when they apply only to small numbers of offenders, presumably the worst of the worst. According to the analysis, notification precludes an additional 0.78 yearly sex offenses per 10,000 people (p = 0.02) when 4.7 offenders per 10,000 people (only the 10th percentile of registry size) are registered. By contrast, adding a notification law to an existing registration requirement with an average-size registry has an insignificant positive effect on sex offense frequency (0.14 yearly sex offenses per 10,000 people; p = 0.65), although the overall impact of both laws is still a reduction of 1.06 sex offenses per 10,000 people per year (p = 0.11). These numbers are at odds with the idea that expanding the coverage of notification laws will reduce crime. Given the substantial social and individual costs of maintaining a large public registry, one implication of these estimates is that states should employ relatively narrow notifica-tion regimes in which most or all sex offenders are required to register with police, but only a small and carefully selected subset is subjected to notification.Third, consistent with registration reducing recidivism, the data imply that large registries (without notification) make the commission of crimes against “close” and “near” victims—but not strangers—more difficult or otherwise less likely. The effect for victims of “near” offenders is highly statistically significant, whereas the estimate for victims of “close” offenders is slightly smaller in absolute value and is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimate for victims of “stranger” sex offenses is, in contrast, positive, though small and statistically inexact. These findings are at least compatible with the idea that registering sex offenders with law enforcement can preclude crimes against “nearby” victims while at the same time being of no consequence to strangers—i.e., neither protecting them nor making them more likely to be victimized through displacement.Fourth, the evidence suggests that notification’s deterrence effects are similar in percentage terms across all victim types. This parity result is reasonable given that the nature of the penalty that notification imposes on individuals convicted of sex offenses is largely invariant to the type of victim involved. Finally, notification is estimated to be recidivism-enhancing, and these effects are statistically significant and similar in size in percentage terms across all offender-victim groups. If notifica-tion laws were to make targeting local victims more difficult for a registered sex offender, then fewer “near” victim crimes should occur, along with little or no reduction in crimes against strang-ers (or even an increase in frequency in the case of displacement). Alternatively, if notification laws primarily make life outside of prison distressing for sex offenders and if notification laws fail to raise the relative cost of attacking certain victims, then crime rates should rise and be spread equally across all types of victims. The data support the latter scenario. Although notification may deter potential offenders from engaging in sex crime, prompt-ing victims to protect themselves against known offenders may backfire in the end.This discussion leaves out many details, robustness checks, and caveats that would accompany a full reporting of this empiri-cal work. Highlights from this work include: ■■An analysis of the effects of SORN laws on arrest rates rein-forces the interpretation and reliability of the offense results. ■■Placebo tests find no evidence of similar associations between SORN laws and crimes other than sex offenses, implicitly rejecting the possibility that unobserved variables or trends may drive these findings. ■■Alternative samples and specifications of the regressions, including the employment of state-specific linear trends as well as a series of corrections to the NIBRS data, do not affect the substantive conclusions of this work. ■■The possibility that shifts in victim reporting behavior may account for or explain these results can be shown to be inconsistent with other patterns in the data.ConclusionSex offender registration laws appear to reduce the frequency of reported sex offenses, particularly when the number of reg-istrants is large. Consequently, there may be significant social benefits to providing information about most or all convicted sex offenders to local authorities. An average-size registry decreases crime by approximately 1.21 sex offenses per year per 10,000 people, a 13 percent reduction from the sample mean. This drop in the sex crime rate benefits local victims (neighbors and acquaintances, as well as family members, friends, and significant others); there is no evidence that registration affects the frequency of sex offenses against strangers.Notification regimes also seem to influence sex offense fre-
Summer 2012 | Regulation | 55quency, although not as lawmakers had intended. Notification laws reduce the number of sex offenses when the size of the regis-try is small, but these benefits dissipate as more offenders become subject to notification requirements. This finding accords with the idea that notification can deter nonregistered individuals, but that it encourages recidivism among registered offenders, perhaps because of the psychological, social, and financial harms they suffer from the public release of their criminal history and personal information. Indeed, for a registry of average size, instituting a notification regime has the aggregate effect in these data of increasing the number of sex offenses by more than 1.57 percent, with all deterrence gains more than offset.The conclusion that notification appears to increase recidi-vism may seem counterintuitive. After all, the active identification of sex offenders through public registries is designed to alert potential victims to the threat a nearby released sex offender may pose to them or their households. But for community notifica-tion laws to succeed at reducing sex offender recidivism levels, two separate and nontrivial conditions must be met. The first condition, not surprisingly, is that the public identi-fication of sex offenders must make it more difficult, on average, for a released offender to commit a sex crime. This condition, in turn, requires that three underlying facts be true:■■At least some potential victims must be newly informed of the registered offender’s status by the operation of the notification law. ■■These newly informed victims must be capable of reducing their exposure (or the exposure of others) to victimization by the offender, at least on average. ■■It must be costly for the offender to identify any alternative victim who is either unaware of his status or who is unable to act on that information. But as ample research demonstrates, offenders are rarely strangers to their victims. Friends and family members will often already be aware of a sex offender’s criminal history. When an offender’s target is a stranger, it may be hard for the potential victim to determine the offender’s status in a timely way or to reduce her exposure if she does. Even if the victim is able to reduce her exposure, a released offender who becomes at risk for reoffending may find himself surrounded by other potential victims, many or some of whom are likely to be oblivious to the threat he poses. Neighbors seem most likely to benefit from notification so long as they receive the information and are able to behave in ways that reduce their risks. Unfortunately, neighbors as a class make up less than 5 percent of sex offense victims.The second condition is that notification must avoid aggra-vating those risk factors that can significantly increase an offender’s likelihood of reoffending. In fact, even if notifica-tion were to succeed at making it more difficult for released sex offenders to target and attack a victim, recidivism rates may still rise. The difficulty of committing a crime is only one factor, among many, that affects an offender’s likelihood of recidivating. Pub-licly identifying an individual as a sex offender (as well as impos-ing other significant constraints—residency restrictions, frequent reporting requirements, etc.), however, also influences many other drivers of criminal behavior by dramatically changing a sex offender’s daily life, future prospects, and psychological and financial burdens. While a law that restrains a released offender has the potential to reduce recidivism if that law makes the commission of crime more difficult or if it mitigates various risk factors, such a law also has the potential to increase recidivism if it worsens those circumstances (e.g., unemployment, unstable housing) known to contribute to reoffending. Notification regimes, with their attendant impositions, appear much more likely to increase the probability that released sex offenders return to crime, all else equal, than to reduce it. These laws and their implementation exacerbate a host of recidivism risk factors. Many compelling studies have established that publicly identifying sex offenders makes it more difficult for them to find employment and housing, resi-dency restrictions make everything more expensive and life less stable, and both make it harder for registered offenders to be with or build their own families. Life as a registered sex offender, by all accounts, is simply much more difficult than the life of the typical former felon—in large part because of SORN and other post-release laws. In an important sense, notification was and is intended to reproduce an upside of incarceration, essentially by “inca-pacitating” potential recidivists. Publicly identifying released sex offenders is an attempt to create a barrier between them and the public—i.e., their potential victims. Unfortunately, the analogy of notification laws to prison is too apt: publicly defining individu-als as “sex offenders” reproduces many of the deprivations and burdens of prison in addition to partially recreating the incapaci-tation effect. Plus, by making the world outside of prison more like being in prison, the threat of sending someone to prison should he commit another sex crime is rendered much less severe. Put another way, the more difficult, lonely, and unstable our laws make a registered sex offender’s life, the more likely he is to return to crime—and the less he has to lose by committing these new crimes.It is easy to see, therefore, that the effect on recidivism of noti-fication laws (and of most sex offender post-release laws gener-ally) is an empirical question: the effectiveness of these laws will depend on how they are structured and applied. If notification and its associated burdens make it more difficult for a registered sex offender to find victims, while at the same time not aggravat-ing the risk factors known to lead to recidivism and not reducing a registered offender’s desire to avoid prison, then recidivism rates should drop. But if these laws impose significant burdens on a large share of former offenders, and if only a limited number of potential victims benefit from knowing who and where sex offenders are, then we should not be surprised to observe more recidivism under notification, with recidivism rates rising as notification expands.
Copyright of Regulation is the property of Cato Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed tomultiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder’s express written permission. However, usersmay print, download, or email articles for individual use.
Social Class and Social Control: An Application of Deterrence Theory Author(s): Harold G. Grasmick, Darlene Jacobs and Carol B. Mc Collom Source: Social Forces, Dec., 1983, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Dec., 1983), pp. 359-374 Published by: Oxford University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2578312 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2578312?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/termsOxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social ForcesThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Social Control: An Application of Deterrence Theory* HAROLD G. GRASMICK, University of Oklahoma DARLENE JACOBS, University of Oklahoma CAROL B. MC COLLOM, University of Oklahoma Abstract In the recent controversy concerning the relationship between social class and criminality, the distinction between the more serious offenses included in the Uniform Crime Reports and the less serious offenses included in self-report research has emerged as a crucial issue. Only one previous study has been reported which uses the self-report method to examine the relationship between SES and involvement in less serious offenses among adults, and that study suggests that the relationship is positive. In the present research, we draw on deterrence theory to accountfor such a positive relationship. Ourfirst hypothesis predicts that high SES persons perceive a lower certainty of legal punishment for committing these offenses, a hypothesis consistent with radical criminology, which in turn explains their greater involvement. The second hypothesis, linked to the concept of marginal utility, proposes that high SES persons are less deterred by the threat of legal punishment for these offenses. Our survey of a random sample of 353 adults provides support for both hypotheses. In a paper titled “The Myth of Social Class and Criminality,” Tittle et al. (a) seriously challenged the conventional hypothesis that socioeconomic status and criminality are inversely related, a challenge which has generated new research as well as reevaluations of previous studies (Braithwaite; Clelland and Carter; Elliott and Agetone; Gould; Hindelang et al.; Hirschi et al.; Johnson; Kleck; Krohn et al.; Short; Stark; Thomberry and Farnworth; *This research was conducted as part of a graduate training program sponsored by the Na- tional Institute of Mental Health, Center for Work and Mental Health. We wish to thank Harold Vreeland and Louis Zurcher for their contributions to the program and to acknowl- edge the contributions of Julie Lam, Rita Givens, Deborah Glasser, Chiquita Owens, Cynthia Clegg, and Mary Hammond to the survey from which our data were obtained. Address correspondence to Harold G. Grasmick, Department of Sociology, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019. @ 1983 The University of North Carolina Press 359This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
360 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 Tittle et al., b). The conclusion emerging from the debate, stated most convincingly by Hindelang et al., appears to be that official crime statistics reveal at least a modest inverse relationship between SES and criminality, while self-report data from surveys, almost exclusively of adolescents, re- veal no relationship. Hindelang et al. explain the seemingly contradictory findings from the two data sources by arguing that official crime statistics and self-reports tap different “domains” of criminality. Both are reasonably valid indicators of illegal behavior, but official crime reports measure “serious” offenses, while self-reports in surveys measure involvement in “trivial” offenses, (998).1 Given the different domains, there is no a priori reason to expect that the correlates of crime in official data correspond to the correlates in self-report data. Although this argument is useful, the choice of the word “trivial” for offenses in self-report research is unfortunate if it is intended to imply that such offenses do not merit consideration in theory and re- search. These “less serious” offenses are employed in surveys precisely because they are the most frequently occurring offenses. While it is under- standable that official agents of social control would be concerned primarily with serious offenses recorded in the Uniform Crime Reports, it would seem that sociologists studying the “problem of order” should develop theories and research about the most prevalent forms of law violations as well as those considered to be the more serious. Our objective is to identify certain theoretically crucial differences between the serious offenses in the UCR and the less serious offenses used in survey research and then to draw on deterrence theory (see Gibbs) to predict and explain a positive relationship between SES and adult involve- ment in less serious offenses. Many self-report studies of the sEs-crime relationship have been conducted with samples of adolescents2, but the research by Tittle and Villemez (see also Tittle, b) is the only self-report study of the relationship between SES and adult involvement in less serious offenses.3 Their study reported evidence of a positive relationship, a find- ing replicated in our self-report data from a sample of adults. Our study moves beyond theirs by providing evidence concerning why the relation- ship occurs. Throughout the formulation and testing of our hypotheses, we will argue that the logic of deterrence theory, while predicting a positive relationship between adult SES and the offenses used in survey research, would predict an inverse relationship for the offenses in the Uniform Crime Reports. Deterrence, Socioeconomic Status, and Less Serious Offenses A growing volume of survey research on the deterrent effect of sanction threat suggests that perceived certainty of legal punishment is inverselyThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 361 related to self-reported involvement in less serious offenses (Anderson et al.; Grasmick and Bryjak; Jacob; Jensen et al.; Kraut; Scott and Grasmick; Silberman; Teevan; Tittle, a, b; Waldo and Chiricos). While the earlier stu- dies tended to focus entirely on the threat of State-imposed legal sanc- tions, more recent research incorporates two other forms of punishment threat: the threat of peer-imposed stigma if actors violate norms endorsed by peers, and the threat of self-imposed guilt feelings if actors violate norms they themselves have internalized. Grasmick and Green argue that these three types of punishment threat-legal sanctions, stigma and guilt feel- ings-correspond to the mechanisms of social control outlined in clas- sic essays by Wrong and by Blake and Davis and probably constitute an inclusive list of factors which inhibit or deter illegal behavior. Two patterns of multivariate relationships involving these variables from deterrence theory might be the source of a positive relationship be- tween SES and adult involvement in the offenses used in survey research. First, high SES persons might commit more of these offenses because they perceive a lower risk of punishment than low SES persons (Hypothesis I). Alternatively, high SES persons might commit more of the offenses be- cause, compared to low SES persons, they are less deterred by the threat of punishment they perceive. In other words, for these particular offenses, high SES persons might not be as strongly influenced by threats of punish- ment as low SES persons (Hypothesis II). These two processes, not being mutually exclusive, might operate simultaneously. Furthermore, both can be considered for each of the three types of punishment threat. LEGAL PUNISHMENT Radical criminology provides the beginning of a rationale for the hypothe- sis that, for less serious offenses, high SES persons perceive a lower certainty of legal punishment than low SES persons. A basic premise of radical crimi- nology is that lower class persons are “more likely to be scrutinized and therefore to be observed in violation of the law” by agents of social control (Chambliss, 86), a view supported in a recent study by Biggers. Biggers asked adults in a survey how often they saw agents of social control, both public police and private security guards, in a variety of settings encoun- tered in everyday life-neighborhoods, places of entertainment and rec- reation, stores, and workplaces. For all settings except the neighborhood, SES was inversely and significantly related to perceived frequency of en- countering formal agents of social control. (The relationship also was in- verse, though not significant, for the neighborhood setting.) Furthermore, low SES respondents were significantly more likely to agree with state- ments like the following: “Whenever I see a policeman around, I feel like he is just waiting for me to do something so he can bother me,” and “Police keep their eye on me.” So from Biggers’ study it appears that low SESThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
362 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 persons encounter more agents of social control, or at least think they do, and are more likely to believe they are closely scrutinized. Therefore, ceteris paribus, high SES persons should be less likely than low SES persons to think they would be caught if they committed an offense and, thus, according to deterrence theory, more likely to commit an offense. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the relationship be- tween SES and perceived certainty of legal punishment should be inverse for all types of offenses. In particular, for nearly all the offenses included in the Uniform Crime Reports, there are theoretical reasons to expect a positive relationship when it is recognized that crimes differ in the extent to which special skills or expertise are necessary to avoid detection. One unique feature of less serious offenses like those included in self-report survey re- search (e.g., drunken driving, small-scale theft, illegal gambling) is that no sophisticated skills are required to avoid detection and apprehension. Un- like these less serious offenses, however, most serious offenses probably do require special skills and knowledge to avoid apprehension, skills and knowledge which, as emphasized in differential association theory (Suth- erland and Cressey), must be learned. For the particular serious offenses in- cluded in the Uniform Crime Reports (e.g., robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft), the opportunity to learn the skills of detection avoidance probably is greater in the lower class (Cloward and Ohlin). Thus, for the specific seri- ous offenses included in the Uniform Crime Reports, higher SES persons who lack access to opportunities to acquire the skills and knowledge to avoid detection probably would perceive a greater risk of getting caught than low SES persons even though the higher SES individuals might, in general, be less closely scrutinized. In other words, the expected sign (+ or -) of the relationship between SES and perceived certainty of legal punishment is a function of characteristics of the offenses. For the less serious offenses included in self-report studies, the expected sign is negative; for the of- fenses in the Uniform Crime Reports, the expected sign is positive.4 The rationale underlying Hypothesis I, while predicting a positive relationship between SES and involvement in less serious offenses used in survey re- search, would predict an inverse relationship between SES and involve- ment in UCR offenses. Our self-report survey data will permit a test of the theory for less serious offenses but not for the UCR crimes. Utility theory (see Geerken and Gove; Stover and Brown) offers the rationale for Hypothesis 11-that the threat of legal punishment for less serious offenses is a weaker deterrent among high SES persons than among low SES persons. Again, however, the prediction would be different for the serious offenses in the Uniform Crime Reports. A second important differ- ence between serious and less serious offenses is the difference in the typical penalties-incarceration vs. a fine. When the legal penalty is a small fine of a fixed amount, as it is for most offenses used in self-report research, high SES persons should be less deterred than low SES persons byThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 363 the risk of being caught. But when the penalty is incarceration, as it is for most UCR offenses, lower SES persons, on the average, should be less deterred than high SES persons by threats of legal sanctions. The principles of marginal utility and marginal cost suggest that a fine of $100 for a less serious offense would be experienced as more costly by low SES persons than by high SES persons, implying that the latter would be less deterred by the threat of such a fine. For serious offenses punished by incarceration, on the other hand, the concept of “rewards forgone” suggests that a jail sentence would be more costly to a high SES person in terms of amenities relinquished. Consequently, while high SES persons are expected to be less deterred than low SES persons by threats of fines for less serious offenses, they would be more deterred by threats of incarceration for serious of- fenses. Again, our survey data will permit a test of the hypothesis for less serious offenses used in survey research but not for more serious offenses with incarceration as the typical penalty. STIGMA AND GUILT FEELINGS While we have drawn from existing theories to justify Hypotheses I and II for the threat of legal sanctions, theories in criminology and social control provide little reason to expect support for either general hypothesis for threats of stigma and guilt feelings. Tittle and Villemez do cite research from social psychology concerning SES differences in these threats (e.g., Kohn), but unlike our argument regarding legal sanctions, the existing theories and research concerning stigma and guilt feelings do not have the flexibility of predicting a positive relationship between SES and involve- ment in the less serious offenses in survey research and an inverse relation- ship for the offenses in the Uniform Crime Reports. Thus, although we have included measures of threats of stigma and guilt feelings in our research, we anticipate that perceptions of the threat of legal sanctions will be more useful in explaining the anticipated positive relationship between SES and involvement in less serious offenses. Research Procedures SAMPLE Data to test the hypotheses for less serious offenses were collected in a survey in a large metropolitan community in the Southwest during the Spring of 1981. A simple random sample of 360 adults was drawn from the Polk Directory, and contacts to schedule appointments for interviews were made on the phone or at the door after the potential respondent had re- ceived a letter about the survey. Refusals were replaced with re-samplingThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
364 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 from the Directory. This procedure resulted in a useable sample of 353 adults eighteen years of age and older.5 MEASUREMENT Information was gathered about respondents’ involvement in eight less serious offenses which have been used in previous deterrence research on adults (Grasmick and Green; Tittle, a, b). Self-reports were obtained for the following offenses: drunken driving, littering, simple assault, il- legal use of fireworks, theft valued at less than $20, tax cheating, illegal gambling, and theft valued at $20 or more. Tittle (a) has noted the problem of causal order in deterrence re- search which uses present perceptions of punishment threats as indepen- dent variables and self-reported past offenses as the dependent variable. On the surface at least, it appears that past behavior is presented as a function of present perceptions. To avoid this problem, Tittle recommends using as the measure of the dependent variable respondents’ estimates of whether they will commit the offense in the future, an idea closely linked to the concept of “behavioral intention” in social psychology (see Fishbein and Ajzen). Although Tittle’s suggestions are instructive, they do not solve the problem. At a conceptual level, deterrence theory proposes that pres- ent perceptions of sanctions influence future behavior. Since in cross-sec- tional survey research it is impossible to measure future behavior directly, the theory is operationalized with an indirect measure of the dependent variable. In fact, therefore, both self-reported past involvement and “in- tended” future involvement are indirect measures of future involvement in crime (see Jensen and Stitt). And it is not clear that what people say they will do in the future (intended future involvement) is a better predictor of what they actually will do in the future than is their self-reported past behavior. The literature on inconsistency between attitudes and behavior reveals a fairly low correspondence between what people say they will do and what they actually do, and much effort has been devoted to identifying factors which might intervene between what people intend to do and what they do (see Liska). In light of this body of research, it might be safer to consider self-reported past behavior, rather than intended future behavior, the more valid indicator of actual future behavior. Although we consider self-reported past behavior preferable (but not without flaws), we have incorporated Tittle’s suggestion into our re- search by obtaining both self-reported past offenses and intended future offenses. The interview was arranged so that the respondent recorded information about illegal behavior on a separate sheet of paper which was not shown to the interviewer. Both measures of the dependent variable will be used for testing the hypotheses. To facilitate the presentation of results, we have constructed a scale of self-reported past involvement inThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 365 the eight offenses and a scale of intended future involvement by summing standardized responses over the eight offenses. Creation of these scales was justified by factor analysis which indicated the presence of only one significant factor for each of the scales, with each offense having a loading of at least .30. Cronbach’s alpha, an estimate of reliability, is .68 for self- reported past involvement and .71 for intended future involvement. The correlation between the two scales is .66. To measure perceived threats of punishments, we modeled our questionnaire items after those used in previous research. For perceived threat of legal punishment, respondents were asked to indicate the proba- bility of their getting caught if they were to commit each of the offenses. A Likert format ranging from “definitely would not be” to “definitely would be” was used. This question was asked for each of the eight offenses, and again factor analysis justified the creation of a scale of perceived threat of legal punishment as the sum of standardized responses over the eight offenses. The value of alpha for the scale is .83. Threat of guilt feelings was measured by asking respondents if they thought committing each offense was “always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes wrong, seldom wrong, or never wrong.” It is assumed that people who believe the offense is always wrong would be more likely to experience guilt feelings if they were to commit the offense. Factor analysis indicated the presence of only one factor among the eight offenses, and the composite scale of threat of guilt feelings has a reliability coefficient of .67. To measure the threat of stigma from peers, the respondent was asked to think of the five persons he/she knows best and then to indicate how many of them would disapprove if the respondent were to commit the offense. This item was asked for each of the eight offenses. Again, a one-factor solution adequately reproduced the matrix of correlations for this item among the eight offenses, and the composite scale of threat of stigma which was constructed has an alpha of .87. Finally, socioeconomic status was measured as a linear composite of the z-score transformations of family income, respondent’s education, and the occupational prestige (Duncan’s SEI) of the head of household. Regres- sion procedures were used to estimate the family income from head of household occupation and education for those 26 respondents who did not answer the question concerning family income. Results As predicted, and consistent with the only previous survey research on the relationship between adult SES and involvement in less serious of- fenses (Tittle and Villemez), our data indicate a modest positive relationship between SES and less serious offenses. For self-reported past involve-This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
366 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 ment, the bivariate correlation with SES is +.20; for intended future in- volvement, +.14.6 Both of these bivariate relationships are significant at the .01 level.7 Furthermore, as in previous deterrence research (see Gras- mick and Green), all three perceived punishment threats are inversely correlated with both self-reported past and intended future involvement in less serious offenses. For legal sanctions, these correlations are -.37 and – .35; for stigma, -.37 and -.44; for guilt feelings, -.39 and -.56. All of these bivariate correlations are significant at the .001 level. HYPOTHESIS I Hypothesis I proposes that the observed positive correlation between SES and involvement in these less serious offenses occurs because high SES persons perceive a lower risk of punishment. The necessary inverse rela- tionship between SES and perceived punishment threat occurs only for legal sanctions (r = -.35; p = .001). The correlations between SES and perceptions of the threat of stigma (r = -.07) and of guilt feelings (r = -.04) are not significant at the .05 level.8 Table 1 presents the direct tests of Hypothesis I. For each of the three punishment threats, the two dependent variables were regressed on the threat and on SES simultaneously. Hypothesis I predicts that the overall effect of SES on involvement (i.e., the significant positive bivariate correla- tions between SES and the two measures of the dependent variable) will be reduced to an insignificant direct effect (i.e., B, or standardized regression coefficient, in Table 1) when the perceived threat of punishment is included in the equation. Results for this hypothesis are presented on the left side of Table 1 for self-reported past offenses and on the right side for intended future offenses. It is apparent in Table 1 that the hypothesis is supported for threat of legal punishment regardless of which measure of the dependent variable is analyzed. For both measures, the direct effect of SES on involvement in less serious offenses is not significant when perceived certainty of legal punish- ment is controlled (B = +.08 for self-reported past involvement; B = +.02 for intended future involvement). Table 1 also reveals, as expected from the bivariate correlations, that the positive relationship between SES and less serious offenses is not due to SES differences in perceived threats of stigma or guilt feelings since the B for SES is positive and significant in all these equations. Thus, of the three mechanisms of social control examined for Hypothesis I, the threat of legal sanctions appears to be the most useful in explaining the positive correlation between socioeconomic status and involvement in less serious offenses.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 367 Table 1. REGRESSION OF INVOLVEMENT IN OFFENSES ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND PERCEIVED PUNISHMENT THREAT (N=353) Self-Reported Past Intended Future I ndependent Involvement Involvement Variable b B p b B p Legal punishment -.28 -.34 .001 -.29 -.34 .001 SES +.16 +.08 HS +.06 +.02 NS Stigma -.27 -.36 .001 -.35 -.44 .001 SES +.35 +.18 .001 +.24 +.11 .05 Guilt feelings -.38 -.38 .001 -.58 -.55 .001 SES +.37 +.19 .001 +.26 +.12 .01 HYPOTHESIS II Hypothesis II suggests that high SES persons are less deterred by the threat of punishment for these offenses than are low SES persons. The hypothesis proposes a model of statistical interaction which can be tested by dummy coding SES and by creating product terms of SES and punishment threat (Kerlinger and Pedhazur). For this purpose, we have divided the sample into three groups of approximately equal size according to scores on SES. Then we translated this trichotomous variable into two dummy variables (SESI and SES2) as follows: low SES persons are coded 0 on both SESI and SES2; middle SES persons are coded 1 on SESI and 0 on SES2; high SES persons are coded 0 on SESI and 1 on SES2. Then we regressed involve- ment in the offenses (I) on punishment threat (P), SESI, SES2, SESI x P, and SES2 x P. This regression is depicted in the following equation: I = a + bjP + b2SES1 + b3SES2 + b4(SESI x P) + b5(SES2 x P) + e For low SES persons who are coded 0 on both dummy variables, all terms involving either SESI or SES2 are zero, and the equation is reduced to I = a + bjP + e. Thus, b, is the effect of perceived punishment threat on involvement in the offenses among low SES persons. For middle SES per- sons, SES1 = 1 and SES2 = 0, and the equation becomes I = (a + b2) + (b1 + b4)P + e. Therefore, among middle SES persons, the effect of perceived punishment threat on involvement is (b1 + b4), and a significance test for b4 is a test of the difference in the effect of P on I between low and middle SES respondents. Finally, among high SES persons who are coded 0 on SESI and 1 on SES2, the equation is I = (a + b3) + (b1 + b5)P + e. Since the effect of P on I among high SES persons is (b1 + b5), a significance test for b5 is aThis content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
368 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 test of the difference between low and high SES persons in the effect of perceived punishment threat on involvement in offenses. In Table 2 we report the coefficients in the equation for each of the three punishment threats and each of the two measures of the dependent variable (i.e., six separate equations). Results for self-reported past be- havior are reported on the left side of the table, while results for intended future behavior are reported on the right. For self-reported past involvement and threat of legal punishment, the b’s associated with the two product terms are positive, and the one for SES2 x L is significant at the .05 level, indicating a significant difference between the highest and lowest SES groups in the deterrent effect of per- ceived threat of legal punishment on self-reported past offenses. The effect (b) is -.41 in the third of the sample scoring lowest on SES but only -.19 (i.e., -.41 + .22) in the third of the sample scoring highest on SES. In the middle SES category, the inverse effect is -.29 (i.e., -.41 + .12), inter- mediate between the highest and lowest SES groups.9 In other words, the inverse effect of threat of legal sanctions on self-reported past involvement decreases as SES increases, suggesting that the threat of legal punishment for less serious offenses, usually in the form of a fine, is not as strong a deterrent among high SES persons as among low SES persons. 10 Table 2. REGRESSION OF INVOLVEMENT IN OFFENSES ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, PERCEIVED PUNISHMENT THREAT AND INTERACTION TERMS (N=353) Self-Reported Past Intended Future Independent Involvement Involvement Variable b p b p Legal punishment (L) -.41 .001 -.34 .001 SESI -2.03 NS -1.00 NS SES2 -2.81 .05 -1.66 NS SESI X L +.12 NS +.04 NS SES2 X L +.22 .05 +.08 NS Stigma (S) -.35 .001 -.42 .001 SESI -1.30 NS -1.79 NS SES2 +.26 NS +.19 NS SESI X S +.ll NS +.13 NS SES2 X S +.09 NS +.05 NS Guilt feelings (G) -.31 .001 -.44 .001 SES1 +3.00 NS +9.37 .05 SES2 +8.11 NS +10.72 .01 SES1 X G -.08 NS -.25 .05 SES2 X G -.19 NS -.28 .05This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 369 On the other hand, with self-reported past offenses none of the b’s for product terms in the equations for stigma or for guilt feelings are sig- nificant. With this measure of the dependent variable, therefore, the mag- nitude of the deterrent effects of these two punishment threats does not differ significantly by level of SES. Again, it appears that perceptions of legal sanctions are more useful than stigma and guilt feelings in under- standing the relationship between SES and involvement in less serious offenses for which a fine is the typical legal sanction. While the findings for Hypothesis I in Table 1 were consistent across both measures of the dependent variable, the results for Hypothesis II are different for intended future involvement than for self-reported past in- volvement for two of the types of punishment threat. Only for the threat of stigma are the conclusions from the right side of Table 2 (intended future involvement) the same as those from the left side (self-reported past in- volvement). For the threat of stigma, regardless of which indicator of the dependent variable is used, the b’s for the product terms are not signifi- cant, indicating that the magnitude of the effect of stigma on involvement is not a function of SES. With intended future involvement, the interaction of SES and threat of guilt feelings is significant in a direction which suggests that high SES persons are more deterred than low SES persons by the threat of guilt feel- ings. The effect is -.44 for low SES persons; [(-.44) + (-.25)] or -.69 for middle SES persons; and [(-.44) + (-.28)] or -.72 for high SES persons. The nature of this interaction is in direct contrast to the suggestion of Tittle and Villemez (485) that high SES persons might be more likely to have a “hardened conscience,” enabling them to behave contrary to their moral beliefs. Instead, with intended future offenses as the dependent variable, our data suggest that high SES persons are more strongly influenced than low SES persons by their moral sentiments. The significant interaction term for threat of legal sanctions using self-reported past involvement is not replicated with intended future in- volvement as the dependent variable. While the signs and magnitudes of the appropriate b’s reveal that the inverse effect of perceived threat of legal punishment on intended future involvement decreases as SES increases ( -.34, -.30, -.26), neither of the b’s for the product terms is significant at the .05 level. This inconsistency in support for Hypothesis II across the two measures of the dependent variable cannot be resolved with our data. In our analysis, whether the threat of legal sanctions has a weaker deterrent effect for these offenses among high SES persons than among low SES persons depends on whether self-reported past offenses or intended future offenses is the more valid indicator of actual future involvement. We sus- pect, as argued earlier, that self-reported past involvement is the better measure and, consequently, suspect from our analysis that high SES per- sons are less deterred by the threat of legal punishment for these offenses.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
370 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 However, in the absence of a more direct measure of “future behavior,” such as measures which could be incorporated into a panel design, the evidence for Hypothesis II is weaker than the evidence for Hypothesis 1. Discussion While most theorists (e.g., Merton) have concentrated on why there should be an inverse relationship between SES and crime, our research is an effort to explain why the reverse might be expected for some offenses. Our data, like those of Tittle and Villemez, suggest that SES is positively related to adult involvement in the kinds of offenses included in self-report survey research. We found evidence that this relationship exists because, com- pared to low SES persons, high SES persons perceive a lower certainty of legal sanctions for these offenses. Our data also provide evidence, although not as conclusive, that high SES persons are less deterred by the risk of legal sanctions they perceive for such offenses. We hope our research has contributed to the on-going discussion of the sEs-crime relationship. Our position is that the direction of the relation- ship most likely is a function of characteristics of the particular offenses. While Hindelang et al. have pointed to offense seriousness as an important dimension of variation, our hypotheses and rationales suggest that seri- ousness is relevant to the extent that it overlaps with the type of legal sanction (fine vs. incarceration) associated with the offense and to the extent that opportunities to learn the skills of detection avoidance are un- evenly distributed in the stratification system. While deterrence theory has directed us to these particular distinctions among offenses, other theories most likely can identify additional differences among offenses which are crucial for understanding the sEs-crime relationship. We also believe that our research illustrates the potential contribu- tions of deterrence theory. While stigma and guilt feelings are central con- cepts in many theories of social control (e.g., Hirschi), only deterrence researchers have been seriously considering the deterrent effect of threats of legal sanctions. Our findings suggest that perceptions of the threat of legal punishment, but not threats of stigma or guilt feelings, contribute to the positive relationship between SES and adult involvement in the offenses used in self-report survey research. Perhaps it is time for deterrence re- searchers to move beyond the question on whether the threat of legal punishment deters to the application of deterrence theory to other ques- tions in the study of crime and social control. Our research has been a step in that direction.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 371 Notes 1. As the authors note, the crimes included in the Uniforn Crime Reports tend to be rated high by the public on scales of “offense seriousness” (see Rossi et al.), while the offenses contained in self-report studies tend to be rated low. 2. For bibliographies, see Tittle et al. (a) and Braithwaite. 3. One recent study based on self-report data contains primarily serious offenses (Thornberry and Farnworth), and was based on the larger project by Wolfgang et al. With few exceptions, all 24 offenses included in the scales reported in that study are more serious than any of the offenses in the survey by Tittle and Villemez. Thus, the study by Thomberry and Farnworth should not be considered a self-report study of less serious offenses among adults. The re- search by Elliott and Ageton is a comparable study but of juveniles, containing self-reports of serious offenses as well as less serious offenses. 4. For other offenses, such as embezzlement and computer crimes, the skills of detection avoidance are likely to be more available at higher SES levels, creating an inverse relationship between SES and perceived risk of apprehension. 5. The gender, race and age distributions of the sample correspond closely to the distributions of the city’s population in the 1980 Census. In the sample, 54 percent of the cases are female, compared to 53 percent in the population. In the sample, 17 percent of the respondents are nonwhite, while 16 percent of the population is nonwhite. The mean age of the sample is 42.5, compared to 42.7 for adults in the population. These small differences are not statistically significant. 6. Individual offenses also were analyzed by dividing the sample into three groups of ap- proximately equal size according to scores on SES. For self-reported past behavior, greater in- volvement by the highest third compared to the lowest third of the SES distribution occurred for seven of the eight offenses. Only for illegal gambling did the lowest third appear slightly more involved than the highest third. For intended future behavior, the highest third showed greater involvement on five of the offenses, while no SES differences appear for two others (theft worth $20 or more and illegal gambling). Only for one offense (theft of less than $20) did the lowest third indicate a greater intended future involvement than the highest third. For several of these bivariate relationships, there was a slight departure from monotonicity. When this occurred, it usually was because the middle SES group revealed less involvement than the lowest SES group. This tendency was not strong in the data, however, and tests for nonlinear- ity in the relationships involving the composite scales were not significant. 7. The analysis also was performed with controls for age and gender, both of which are related to self-reported past and intended future involvement. But neither age nor gender are significantly related to the composite measure of SES (head of household occupation, family income, and education), so the controls did not alter the conclusions presented in the paper. Furthermore, we performed the entire analysis for each of the SES components separately. The general conclusions are the same for each component, but, as expected, the evidence is somewhat stronger for the three-item composite than for any one of the individual compo- nents. 8. Only one of the eight offense-level relationships between guilt feelings and SES was significant at the .05 level (littering), with high SES persons perceiving a lower threat. For threat of stigma, none of the offense-level relationships with SES were significant. On the other hand, the relationship between SES and perceived certainty of legal punishment was in- verse and significant beyond the .05 level for all offenses except assault. For the seven offenses having significant relationships, the values of gamma range from -.27 to – .49. The lack of a significant relationship between SES and perceived certainty of legal sanctions for simple as- sault, the only violent offense in the study, might be interpreted as tentative evidence for our argument that SES is not inversely related to perceived threat of legal sanctions for some kinds of more serious offenses. We would caution against such an interpretation. Our argument is not based on seriousness per se; rather, it is based on class differences in the opportunity to ac-This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
372 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 quire the skills of detection avoidance. In our opinion, all eight offenses in our study, includ- ing simple assault, require no special skills to avoid detection. Under this condition, based on the arguments of radical criminology, we expect an inverse relationship between SES and per- ceived certainty of legal sanction. The relationship is inverse for simple assault, but it is not significant. 9. We considered the possibility that the interaction effect was an artifact of SES differences in the variances of perceived threat of legal sanctions rather than a finding of substantive impor- tance. However, the three variances (26.17 for low SES, 29.42 for middle SES and 23.13 for high SES) did not differ significantly in a direction that would produce such an artifact (Winkler and Hays). In future research, a more direct test of Hypothesis II could involve responses to ques- tions concerning the extent to which respondents take into account the threat of legal sanc- tions in deciding whether to commit an offense. For less serious offenses punished by small fines, the expectation is that high SES persons are less likely than low SES persons to take the threat into account. 10. Since incarceration is not a probable penalty for any of the eight offenses, it is not possible with the present data to test the corollary hypothesis-that the threat of legal sanctions has a greater deterrent effect on high SES persons than on low SES persons when the anticipated penalty is incarceration. 11. For suggested innovations in survey research on deterrence, see Greenberg. References Anderson, L., T. Chiricos, and G. Waldo. 1977. “Formal and Informal Sanctions: A Compari- son of Deterrent Effects.” Social Problems 25:103-14. Biggers, S. 1980. “Police Presence, Police Work, and Social Justice: An Empirical Assessment of Some Propositions in Radical Criminology.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Oklahoma. Blake, J., and K. Davis. 1964. “Norms, Values and Sanctions.” In R. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology. Rand McNally. Braithwaite, J. 1981. “The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered.” American Sociological Review 46:36-57. Chambliss, W. J. 1969. Crime and the Legal Process. McGraw-Hill. Clelland, D., and T. Carter. 1980. “The New Myth of Class and Crime.” Criminology 18:319-36. Cloward, R., and L. Ohlin. 1960. Delinquency and Opportunity. Free Press. Elliott, D., and S. Ageton. 1980. “Reconciling Race and Class Differences in Self-Reported and Official Estimates of Delinquency.” American Sociological Review 45:95-110. Fishbein, M., and I. Ajzen. 1975. Belief, Attitudes, Intention and Behavior. Addison-Wesley. Geerken, M., and W Gove. 1975. “Deterrence: Some Theoretical Considerations.” Law and Society Review 9:497-513. Gibbs, J. 1977. “Social Control, Deterrence, and Perspectives on Social Order.” Social Forces 56:408-23. Gould, L. 1981. “Discrepancies Between Self-Reported and Official Measures of Delinquency: Comment on Hindelang, Hirschi, and Weis.” American Sociological Review 46:367-68. Grasmick, H., and G. Bryjak. 1980. “The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punish- ment.” Social Forces 59:471-91. Grasmick, H., and D. Green. 1980. “Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internaliza- tion as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 71:325-35. Greenberg, D. 1981. “Methodological Issues in Survey Research on the Inhibition of Crime: Comment on Grasmick and Green.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 72:1094-1101. Hindelang, M., T. Hirschi, and J. Weis. 1979. “Correlates of Delinquency: The Illusion of Dis- crepancy Between Self-Report and Official Measures.” American Sociological Review 44:995-1014.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Social Class and Deterrence / 373 Hirschi, T. 1969. Causes of Delinquency. University of California Press. Hirschi, T., M. Hindelang, and J. Weis. 1982. “Reply to ‘On the Use of Self-Report Data to De- termine the Class Distribution of Criminal and Delinquent Behavior.”‘ American Sociologi- cal Review 47:433-35. Jacob, H. 1980. “Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions.” Law and Policy Quarterly 2:61-80. Jensen, G., and B. Stitt. 1982. “Words and Misdeeds: Hypothetical Choices Versus Past Be- havior as Measures of Deviance.” In J. Hagan (ed.), Deterrence Reconsidered: Methodological Innovations. Sage. Jensen, G., J. Gibbs, and M. Erickson. 1978. “Perceived Risk of Punishment and Self- Reported Delinquency.” Social Forces 57:57-78. Johnson, R. 1980. “Social Class and Delinquent Behavior: A New Test.” Criminology 18:86-93. Kerlinger, F., and E. Pedhazur. 1973. Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Kleck, G. 1982. “On the Use of Self-Report Data to Determine the Class Distribution of Crimi- nal and Delinquent Behavior.” American Sociological Review 47:427-33. Kohn, M. 1969. Class and Conformity: A Study of Values. Dorsey. Kraut, R. 1976. “Deterrent and Definitional Influences on Shoplifting.” Social Problems 23:358-68. Krohn, M., R. Akers, M. Radosevich, and L. Lanza-Kaduce. 1980. “Social Status and De- viance.” Criminology 18:303-18. Liska, A. 1974. “Emergent Issues in the Attitude-Behavior Consistency Controversy.” Ameri- can Sociological Review 39:261-72. Merton, R. 1957. “Social Structure and Anomie.” In Social Theory and Social Structure. Free Press. Rossi, P., E. Waite, C. Bose, and R. Berk. 1974. “The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Struc- ture and Individual Differences.” American Sociological Review 39:224-37. Scott, W., and H. Grasmick. 1981. “Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theories.” Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 17:395-408. Short, J. 1979. “On the Etiology of Delinquent Behiavor.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delin- quency 16:28-33. Silberman, M. 1976. “Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence.” American Sociological Review 41:442-61. Stark, R. 1979. “Whose Status Counts? Comment on Tittle, Villemez and Smith.” American Sociological Review 44:668-69. Stover, R., and D. Brown. 1975. “Understanding Compliance and Noncompliance with the Law: The Contributions of Utility Theory.” Social Science Quarterly 56:361-75. Sutherland, E., and D. Cressey. 1978. Principles of Criminology. 10th ed. Lippincott. Teevan, J. 1976. “Deterrent Effects of Punishment for Breaking and Entering and Theft.” In Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fear of Punishment. Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services. Thornberry, T., and M. Farnworth. 1982. “Social Correlates of Criminal Involvement: Further Evidence on the Relationship between Social Status and Criminal Behavior.” American Sociological Review 47:505-17. Tittle, C. a:1977. “Sanction Fear and the Maintenance of Social Order.” Social Forces 55:579-96. . b:1980. Sanctions and Social Deviance: The Question of Deterrence. Praeger. Tittle, C., and W. Villemez. 1977. “Social Class and Criminality.” Social Forces 56:474-503. Tittle, C., W. Villemez, and D. Smith. a:1978: “The Myth of Social Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence.” American Sociological Review 46:634-56. . b:1982. “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: More on the Class/Criminality Con- troversy.” American Sociological Review 47:435-38. Waldo, G., and T. Chiricos. 1972. “Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deterrence Research.” Social Problems 19:522-40.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
374 / Social Forces Volume 62:2, December 1983 Winkler, R., and W. Hays. 1975. Statistics: Probability, Inference, and Decision. 2d ed. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Wolfgang, M., T. Thornberry, and R. Figlio. 1983. From Boy to Man-Delinquency to Crime. Uni- versity of Chicago Press. Wrong, D. 1961. “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modem Sociology.” American Sociological Review 26:183-93.This content downloaded from 63.236.101.18 on Thu, 31 Aug 2023 11:42:53 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
290Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 18:290–301, 2009Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1053-8712 print/1547-0679 onlineDOI: 10.1080/10538710902901663WCSA1053-87121547-0679Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, Vol. 18, No. 3, April 2009: pp. 1–20Journal of Child Sexual AbusePublic Attitudes Toward Sexual Offenders and Sex Offender RegistrationAttitudes Toward Sex Offender RegistrationP. D. Kernsmith et al.POCO D. KERNSMITHWayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, USASARAH W. CRAUNUniversity of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, USAJONATHAN FOSTERWayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, USAThis study explores the relationship between fear of various types ofsexual offenders and a belief that those sexual offenders should besubject to sex offender registration. We hypothesized that thosewho offend against children would elicit the most fear; conse-quently, the most feared offenders would be rated as most requir-ing registration. As part of a telephone survey, 733 participantsanswered questions about fear of sex offenders and agreementwith requirements about registration for offenders convicted ofincest, statutory rape, marital rape, pedophilia, date rape, and anoffense committed more than 10 years prior. Results indicated thatall types of sexual offenders elicited some fear from respondents,and fear was related to support of registration requirements.KEYWORDSsexual offenders, offender registration, publicattitudes, fear, community notification, offender reentryIn an attempt to minimize the likelihood of sexual offenders reoffendingafter a criminal conviction, a range of policies were implemented in the1990s to increase public knowledge about recidivistic sex offenders. Sexualoffender registration policies that allowed registries to become public, suchas the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law, were reinforced in 2006 with theReceived 15 May 2007; revised 1 October 2007; accepted 16 March 2009.Address correspondence to Poco D. Kernsmith, Wayne State University, School of SocialWork, 4756 Cass Avenue, Detroit, MI 48202. E-mail:[email protected]
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration291passage of the Adam Walsh Act. The Adam Walsh Act further strengthenedsex offender registry requirements by including more jurisdictions and cre-ating a tier system to classify registered sex offenders and require specifiedminimum lengths for registration (Center for Sex Offender Management[CSOM], 1999).The passage of sex offender registration policy has been facilitated bythe fact that these policies continue to be popular with the general public.For example, in one study, 95% of respondents agreed that the name andphotograph of registered sex offenders should be available to the public(Levenson, Brannon, Fortney, & Baker, 2007). In another study, over 80% ofWashington State residents believed community notification laws were veryimportant (Phillips, 1998). Finally, a study with a general population samplefrom Massachusetts found that on a scale from 1 (strongly disapprove) to10(strongly approve), participants’ score averaged over 8 in support of pub-lic sex offender registries (Proctor, Badzinski, & Johnson, 2002).However, the popularity of sex offender registries is not due to anoverwhelming amount of evidence supporting the effectiveness of the regis-tries in preventing sexual violence (Prescott & Rockoff, 2008). An under-standing of the implications of sex offender registries is just beginning toform through empirical research. Limited research with mixed findings hasbeen conducted to determine the effectiveness of such registries in prevent-ing sexual violence, their impact on sexual offenders, and their impact onthe community (Caputo & Brodsky, 2004; Welchans, 2005). Moreover, thevarious ways that states define what constitutes a sex crime adds an addi-tional level of complexity when trying to apply the research findings to real-world settings. Furthermore, attempts to understand the outcomes of thispolicy on preventing recidivistic sexual violence are confounded by the factthat the offenders on the registries have been convicted of a sexual crime,and convictions do not provide a true picture of sexual offending patterns(Craissati & Beech, 2004).Because the research supporting registration policy is only in its forma-tive stage, some researchers such as Edwards and Hensley (2001) haveexpressed concern about the broad implementation of sex offender regis-tries without an examination of the costs and benefits of the policy. Onepossible cost of having public sex offender registries is that the presence ofa registered sex offender in a neighborhood could increase the levels of fearin surrounding residents (Younglove & Vitello, 2003).To date, the research on sex offender registries and the possibility ofprovoking fear in residents is mixed. One study on community notificationand fear found that about one-third of residents who attended meetings tolearn more about a registered sex offender in the area were more fearfulafter the meeting, while another third reported less fear (Zevitz & Farkas,2000). Zevitz (2004) built on previous work by surveying residents wholived in a neighborhood with a registered sex offender, including not just
292P. D. Kernsmith et al.those who had attended meetings. Upon the initial contact, 35% of respon-dents reported fear for their children or themselves, although over a shorttime period, the percentage of respondents expressing fear dropped to one-quarter. Finally, Caputo and Brodsky (2004) found that residents who feltstrongly about the importance of Megan’s Law were more likely to reporthigher fears after being notified of an offender in their area. The authorsfound that the connection between notification and fear upon receiving anotification did produce coping behaviors in neighborhood residents.Alternatively, it has been proposed that individuals perceive the sexoffender registry system as a protective measure (Beck & Travis, 2004b;Trivits & Reppuci, 2002). If the registry is seen to increase one’s safety, fearmay not be impacted. Some studies have found that notification does notimpact fear of victimization overall (Beck, Clingermayer, Ramsey, & Travis,2004; Beck & Travis, 2004a). Levenson and colleagues (2007) completed asurvey in Florida with almost 200 subjects to examine perceptions about sexoffenders, sex offender registries, and fear. They found that parents andthose who had been victimized by childhood sexual abuse reported noadditional levels of fear as compared to those without children or a historyof abuse. Lack of fear surrounding victimization upon notification could beconsidered a consequence of a belief that notification minimizes the risk ofharm. However, given low reporting and arrest rates (Ringle, 1997; Snyder,2000), this may mean that notification leads to an unrealistic sense of secu-rity and also may reflect the incorrect assumption by the public that theyshould be more concerned about sexual abuse by a stranger than by some-one known to them. Thus, it may be that some amount of fear is necessaryto increase preventative behaviors, but fear alone will not result in thischange in behavior.This study expands on the research of Levenson and colleagues (2007).Specifically, we investigated the types of sexual offenders that elicit themost self-reported fear by respondents and the propensity for respondentsto agree that various types of sex offenders need to be registered. Previousresearch has characterized the registered sex offender as one generic crimi-nal, ignoring the differing types of sex offenses that require registration. Forexample, Levenson and colleagues asked participants which sex offendersshould be required to register, with the possible response options of “all sexoffenders,” “all sex offenders rated high risk,” “all sex offenders exceptthose rated as low risk with no history of violence,” and “no sex offenders”(p. 14). In this study we took a more nuanced approach to examining thecomposition of the registry by examining differing types of sex offensesrather than focusing on the registry as a whole. For example, does the pub-lic view an offender who commits spousal rape in the same way as some-one who sexually abuses a child? How strongly will the public agree thatboth types of sex offenders should be required to register? How will thediffering types of sexual offenses impact residents’ self-reported fear levels?
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration293HYPOTHESESWe hypothesized that respondents would report the greatest amount of fearfor sexual offenders who victimize children and that people would reportthe least amount of fear for offenders who commit spousal or statutory rape.Additionally, we hypothesized that the higher the level of self-reported fearfor a specific type of sexual offender, the higher the agreement would bethat the offender should be required to register his or her address withpolice.METHODParticipantsComputer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) was used to survey733individuals from across the state of Michigan. Random digit dialing wasused to sample participants, although sampling was conducted moreheavily in the Detroit metropolitan area. Surveys were conducted with resi-dences in which a person over the age of 18 was available to participate.The response rate for qualified phone numbers was 44%. The questionsused in this study represented a portion of a larger survey, which includedquestions on topics such as lead poisoning and relationships.Survey participants ranged from 18 to 95 years old, with an average ageof 50.5 years (SD = 16.83). Most of the participants (82.5%) identified theirprimary racial or ethnic origin as White/Caucasian, and 12% identified them-selves as Black/African American. Small percentages identified as Latino/Hispanic, American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Arab/Middle Eastern. These percentages approximate the racial composition ofthe state. Of the sample, 67.3% of participants were female, and 32.7% weremale. Only 5.1% of participants reported a level of education less than com-pletion of high school; 45% reported having a high school diploma; and theremaining 44.2% of participants reported having completed educationbeyond the high school level. Thirty-six percent of the sample had childrenunder the age of 18.InstrumentationThe survey used in the present study contained two scales on attitudesabout sex offenders. The fear scale included seven survey questions thatasked participants to rate how afraid (1 = very afraid to 4 = not at allafraid) they might be if a person who had committed a certain sexualoffense were living in their neighborhood. Participants were asked to ratetheir level of fear on a four-point Likert type scale for seven categories ofsexual offenders (α = .90). Seven additional questions asked participants to
294P. D. Kernsmith et al.rate how strongly they agreed (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)that each of the seven types of offenders should be required to register theiraddresses with police, rated on a five-point Likert type scale (α = .77; seeTable 1).The seven types of sex offenders included in the scales were the fol-lowing: (a) a person who sexually abused his or her own child (incest), (b)a 21-year-old who had consensual sex with a 15-year-old (statutory rape),(c) a person under the age of 18 who forced someone to have sex (juvenileoffender), (d) a person who forced his or her spouse to have sex (spousalTABLE 1Ratings of Fear and Agreement with Registration by Offender TypesOffenderSurvey questionFearAgreement with registrationMean (SD)*% Somewhat or very afraidMean (SD)**% Agree or strongly agreePedophileA person who sexually abused a child in the neighborhood1.68 (1.09)80.6%4.86 (0.62)97.0IncestA person who sexually abused his or her own child1.73 (1.12)78.44.84 (0.62)96.9Juvenile OffenderA person under the age of 18 who forced someone to have sex2.09 (1.10)70.24.34 (1.11)86.4Date RapeA person who forced someone to have sex while on a date2.15 (1.16)66.04.25 (1.13)84.9Old OffensesA person who committed a sex crime more than 10 years ago2.29 (1.05)62.94.26 (1.11)86.3Spousal RapeA person who forced his or her spouse to have sex2.34 (1.16)59.53.77 (1.37)71.3Statutory RapeA 21 year old had consensual sex with a 15 year old2.71 (1.20)45.03.55 (1.50)65.1*1 = very afraid, 4 = not at all afraid; **1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree.
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration295rape), (e) a person who sexually abused a child in the neighborhood(pedophile), (f) a teenager who forced someone to have sex while theywere on a date (date rape), and (g) a person who committed a sex crimemore than 10 years ago (old offense). For this study, incest and pedophiliawere identified as crimes against children. Statutory rape was defined usingthe Michigan law, which involves consensual sex with a victim between theages of 13 and 16 and the perpetrator being more than five years older.Data AnalysisDescriptive statistics were run to determine the average fear score and aver-age level of support for requiring an offender to register. Confirmatory fac-tor analysis was used to determine whether structure exists for fear of theseven offender types and to determine whether structure exists amongbeliefs that the seven offender types should be required to register withpolice. This was done to confirm our hypothesis that respondents wouldperceive crimes against children as distinct from other sex offenses.Although the data used in the factor analysis is ordinal rather than interval,Kim and Mueller (1978) noted that ordinal data may be used in detectingstructures, provided that the ranked categories do not significantly distortmetric scaling in a confirmatory factor analysis. Prior to analysis, data werevisually scanned for outliers; no cases were eliminated. Principal compo-nents analysis was conducted with varimax rotation, with two factors speci-fied. Post rotation, the first component accounted for 64.17% of the totaloriginal variance, and the second component accounted for 10.12%A Spearman’s Rho was used to analyze the relationship between partic-ipants’ rated fear of the different offender types and agreement that thoseoffenders should be required to register. Because the Likert scale for ques-tions pertaining to registration requirement was in the opposite directionfrom the scale related to fear, the fear scale was reverse-coded for this anal-ysis. Consequently, a positive score on a Spearman’s Rho would indicatethat the higher the fear, the higher the desire for the sex offender to berequired to register.RESULTSNearly all participants reported some fear of having a sex offender living intheir neighborhoods. As predicted, participants reported that they would bemost afraid of those who had offended against children. Mean ratings offear on the four-point Likert scale for the seven types of offenders are listedin Table 1. When taking the average of the fear scores for all sex offendertypes, females were found to be significantly more afraid of sex offendersthan males, t (715) = 6.29, p < .001. Females were also found to be more
296P. D. Kernsmith et al.afraid than males of each of the individual types of offenders (p < .001). Nosignificant racial differences were found for reported fear of offenders.Participants reported that they would be the most afraid of pedophiles,with 80% of the sample reporting that they would be somewhat afraid orvery afraid if they knew a pedophile had moved into their neighborhood(M= 1.68, SD = 1.09). Incest was the second most feared offense, with78.4% of the sample reporting that they would be somewhat afraid or veryafraid (M = 1.73, SD = 1.12). Paired-samples t-tests were conducted andrevealed that respondents were significantly more afraid of all other kindsof offenders for all analyses (p < .001). Participants reported the lowest fearfor a statutory rapist, with only 45% of participants indicating that theywould feel afraid. Analysis revealed that this pattern did not differ betweenracial or gender groups.Registration requirements were supported by a large majority ofrespondents. As predicted, participants were most likely to agree thatoffenders against children should be required to register their addresseswith police. Results are reported in Table 1. In examining the composite ofall offenders, females were found to be significantly more supportive of reg-istration requirements on average across types of offenders, t (719) = 2.40,p< .001. When examining the types of offenders individually, only a juve-nile offender, t (712) = 2.33, p < .001, incest, t (717) = 2.33, p < .001, and anold offense, t (707) = 2.25, p < .001, were found to be significantly different.No significant racial differences were found.Notably, 97% of participants reported that they somewhat or stronglyagreed that pedophiles should be required to register, and 96.9% of partici-pants somewhat or strongly agreed that a person who committed incestshould be required to register. Respondents were least likely to agree thatstatutory rapists should be required to register, with 65.1% reporting agree-ment with the registration requirement.In the factor analysis of the structure of fear, considering theeigenvalue, variance, scree plot, and residuals as standard acceptance crite-ria (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005), the results illustrated that only one compo-nent should be accepted (eigenvalue for component 1 was 4.49). Theeigenvalue for the second component was 0.708. This indicates that fear ofsex offenders is likely more complicated than merely the age of the victim.Two components emerged in the structure of which sex offendersshould be required to register with law enforcement (eigenvalue was 3.08for component 1 and 1.20 for component 2). Following varimax rotation,the first component accounted for 44.05% of the total original variance, andthe second component accounted for 17.17%. As expected, one componentcorresponded with offenders against children and the other included allothers. The variable old offenses, representing crimes that were more than10 years old, was below acceptance criteria in both factors (factor 1 loadingof .559, factor 2 loading of .317). It is possible that because no description
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration297of the age of the victim was given for this type, attitudes about this variablewere based on criteria other than age of the victim.Results of the bivariate analysis supported the hypothesis that level offear for a specific offender related to agreement that the offender should beregistered. Results demonstrated significant positive relationships betweenreported level of fear and reported agreement with required registration foreach of the seven types of offenders (see Table 2). A regression analysisrevealed that the relationship between fear and agreement with registrationremained significant when controlling for gender and race. Neither gender,ß = .006, t(715) = .156, p = .876, nor race, ß = .046, t(715) = 1.336, p = .182,were significant in the model.As expected, reported fear of incest shared a significant relationshipwith registration requirement, r(712) = .190, p < .001. Fear of pedophilesshowed a similar relationship, r(713) = .189, p < .001. Unexpectedly, thestrongest relationships between fear and registration requirement were foundfor statutory rape, r(705) = .508, p < .001, and spousal rape, r(689) = .415,p< .001. These relationships are likely due to the greater variance in thesevariables.DISCUSSIONThe purpose of this study was twofold. The first objective was to determinethe levels of fear and agreement with registration for several different typesof sexual offenders. Were perceptions and fear of registered sex offenderuniversal, regardless of the type of sexual crime committed? The secondobjective was to (a) determine if a relationship existed between agreementand registration and fear and to (b) attempt to determine an underlyingTABLE 2Spearman’s Rho Correlation Between Reported Fear and Requirement to RegisterReported agreement with registration requirementReported level of fear of sex offendersaIncestStatutory rapeJuvenile offenderMarital rapePedophileDate rapeOld offenseIncest.190**.055.161**.113**.176**.140**.100**Statutory Rape.131**.508**.208**.242**.113**.272**.222**Juvenile Offender.091*.218**.294**.257**.122**.280**.194**Marital Rape.107**.203**.231**.415**.129**.261**.227**Pedophile.172**.119**.151**.131**.189**.177**.148**Date Rape.121**.239**.282**.259**.122**.349**.197**Old Offense.146**.205**.225**.205**.177**.189**.345**aFear scores are reverse coded for bivariate analyses.*p < .05; **p < .001.
298P. D. Kernsmith et al.structure for both. The study found that respondents indicated the greatestamount of fear toward offenders against children. In addition, respondentsindicated the greatest amount of agreement with registration requirementsfor these types of offenders. Fear and agreement with registration corre-lated, with those feeling more fear indicating greater agreement with regis-tration requirements. Factor analysis indicated that respondents’ attitudesabout offender registration were largely a function of the age of the victim.However, fear of the offender appeared to involve more complex relation-ships, as the factor analysis did not delineate more than one componentbetween the seven types of sexual offenders.When a crime is committed against a child, it is more likely that anarrest will occur than when other types of victims are involved (Snyder,2000). Therefore, this may explain why sex offenders who commit crimesagainst children were seen by most respondents as needing to be requiredto register. Just as Redlich (2001) described Megan’s Law as being designedto protect children and Ringle (1997) described the underreporting ofoffenses against older victims, the perception that child offenders are preva-lent, dangerous, and require registration is congruent with the factor load-ings of the different types of offenders.Policy ImplicationsSex offender policy, specifically in relation to offender registration, isbased on the idea that offenders need to be punished and that the com-munity needs to be protected. The current study demonstrated that peo-ple do report high levels of fear of convicted sexual offenders. Certainlythis reaction can be viewed as logical; realistically, registered sexualoffenders are individuals who have been convicted for inflicting seriousharm on a victim. Thus, logically, every effort should be taken to preventsuch crimes and to prevent recidivism after individuals have been con-victed. However, Human Rights Watch (2007) has determined that currentpolicy may be overreaching and misapplied when registration and com-munity notification is applied without assessment of risk for recidivism.Policy based on misinformation and fear may lead to potentially danger-ous consequences, including increased rates of recidivism (Prescott &Rockoff, 2008).The current findings, as well as those from Caputo and Brodsky (2004),indicate that community members report fear and anxiety when thinkingabout registered sex offenders. Understanding cognitive and emotionalreactions to sex offenders provides valuable information for implementingregistration policy. Recognizing emotional and behavioral reactions to regis-tered sexual offenders can assist in creating programs and post-incarcerationconditions that ameliorate adverse reactions and foster positive communityreintegration as an alternative to community notification. For example,
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration299community education regarding the offending and recidivism patterns aswell as behaviors to reduce the risk of victimization may be more effectivein preventing future crimes. Given that most sexual offenses are perpetratedby family members or acquaintances (Snyder, 2000), the knowledge of peo-ple’s reactions and perceptions of safety in relation to strangers convicted ofsexual offending are important to understand in order to develop programsthat could provide individuals and families with effective strategies forreducing the risks from known offenders. Educational endeavors have beensuggested by others with the aim of increasing public awareness of typicalsex offenders (Levenson et al., 2007).LimitationsThe present study did have some limitations. The use of a telephone surveymay have resulted in some bias. For example, previous research has indi-cated that demographic factors such as income and employment are signifi-cantly related to participation (Johnson, Holbrook, Cho, & Bossarte, 2006).It is possible that these factors are also related to key variables in this study.In addition, this study was conducted in only one state and may not be gen-eralizable to other areas with differing definitions of sexual crimes such asstatutory rape. Regional issues or events may have impacted the attitudes ofparticipants, although the high levels of public support for sex offender reg-istration found in this study mirror findings by Levenson and colleagues(2007) and Phillips (1998).CONCLUSIONFuture research in this area should examine more closely the link betweenfear of various offender types, attitudes toward registration, and actualbehaviors in response to being notified that a sex offender is living in anindividual’s neighborhood. Future analyses should examine the role of par-ticipant gender and experiences with sexual violence in influencing thestrength and nature of correlations. Additionally, questions in this studyabout the types of registered sex offenders were gender neutral. As femaleregistered sex offenders comprise about 2% of the sex offender population(Craun & Kernsmith, 2006; Tewksbury, 2004), it is important to considerhow perspectives and fears may change depending on the gender of theoffender. Examining offender specific protective behaviors and researchaimed at elucidating the cognitive processes involved in assessing and react-ing to offenders is indicated as well.The issues involved in sex offender registration and policy encompassseveral tiers, ranging across micro and macro practice and involving policydevelopment, community work, and research. Because this is a multifaceted
300P. D. Kernsmith et al.problem, researchers and clinicians alike are suited to pursuing additionalknowledge for preventing recidivism among perpetrators of sexual vio-lence. Further empirical work can provide a better understanding of how toshape policy, prevent offender recidivism, and satisfy the public desire to beinformed of sex offenders in the area.REFERENCESBeck, V. S., Clingermayer, J., Ramsey, R. J., & Travis, L. F. (2004). Communityresponse to sex offenders. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 32(2), 141–168.Beck, V. S., & Travis, L. F. (2004a). Sex offender notification and fear of victimiza-tion. Journal of Criminal Justice, 32, 455–463.Beck, V. S., & Travis, L. F. (2004b). Sex offender notification and protective behav-ior. Violence and Victims, 19, 289–301.Caputo, A. A., & Brodsky, S. L. (2004). Citizen coping with community notificationof released sex offenders. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 22, 239–252.Center for Sex Offender Management. (1999). Sex offender registration: Policy over-view and comprehensive practices. Retrieved March 1, 2006, from http://www.csom.org/pubs/sexreg.html.Craissati, J., & Beech, A. (2004). The characteristics of a geographical sample ofconvicted rapists: Sexual victimization and compliance in comparison to childmolesters. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 19(4), 371–388.Craun, S. W., & Kernsmith, P. (2006). Juvenile offenders and sex offender registries:Examining the data behind the debate. Federal Probation, 70, 45–49.Edwards, W., & Hensley, C. (2001). Contextualizing sex offender management leg-islation and policy: Evaluating the problem of latent consequences in commu-nity notification laws. International Journal of Offender Therapy andComparative Criminology, 45(1), 83–101.Human Rights Watch. (2007). No easy answers: Sex offender laws in the UnitedStates. Human Rights Watch, 19(4), 1–146.Johnson, T. P., Holbrook, A. L., Cho, Y. I., & Bossarte, R. M. (2006). Nonresponseerror in injury risk surveys. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 31(5),427–436.Kim, J., & Mueller, C. W. (1978). Factor analysis: Statistical methods and practicalissues. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.Levenson, J. S., Brannon Y. N., Fortney, T., & Baker, J. (2007). Public perceptionsabout sex offenders and community protection policies. Analyses of SocialIssues and Public Policy, 7(1), 1–25.Mertler, C. A., & Vannatta, R. A. (2005). Advanced and multivariate statistical meth-ods (3rd ed.). Glendale, CA: Pyrczak Publishing.Phillips, D. M. (1998). Community notification as viewed by Washington’s citizens[Electronic version]. Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.Prescott, J., & Rockoff, J. (2008). Do sex offender registration and notification lawsaffect criminal behavior? Working Paper No. 08–006, John M. Olin Center forLaw & Economics, University of Michigan Law School. Retrieved April 15, 2009,
Attitudes Toward Sex Offender Registration301from http://kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/interdisciplinary/evidence/publications/wpg.html?m=printProctor, J. L., Badzinski, D. M., & Johnson, M. (2002). The impact of media onknowledge and perceptions of Megan’s Law. Criminal Justice Policy Review,13, 356–379.Redlich, A. D. (2001). Community notification practices: Perceptions of its effective-ness in preventing child sexual abuse. Journal of Child Sexual Abuse, 10(3),91–116.Ringle, C. (1997, November). Criminal victimization 1996: Changes 1995–1996 withtrends 1993–96. BJS Bulletin, NCJ 165812.Snyder, H. N. (2000). Sexual assault of young children as reported to law enforce-ment: Victim, incident, and other offender characteristics. National Center forJuvenile Justice, NCJ 182990.Tewksbury, R. (2004). Experiences and attitudes of registered female sex offenders.Federal Probation, 68(3), 30–33.Trivits, L. C., & Reppuci, N. D. (2002). Application of Megan’s Law to juveniles.American Psychologist, 57, 690–704.Welchans, S. (2005). Megan’s Law: Evaluations of sexual offender registries. Crimi-nal Justice Policy Review, 16, 123–140.Younglove, J. A., & Vitello, C. J. (2003). Community notification provisions of“Megan’s Law” from a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective: A case study.American Journal of Forensic Psychology, 21, 25–38.Zevitz, R. G. (2004). Sex offender placement and neighborhood social integra-tion: The making of a scarlet letter community. Criminal Justice Studies, 17,203–222.Zevitz, R. G., & Farkas, M. A. (2000). Sex offender community notification: Examin-ing the importance of neighborhood meetings. Behavioral Sciences and theLaw, 18, 393–408.AUTHOR NOTEPoco D. Kernsmith received her PhD in social welfare from the Universityof California, Los Angeles in 2002. She is an assistant professor at WayneState University. Her primary research interests include sexual assaultprevention, the impact of trauma on youth, and policy approaches to familyand intimate partner crime.Sarah W. Craun received her PhD in social welfare from the University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles in 2007. She is an assistant professor at the Universityof Tennessee at Knoxville. Her primary research interests include policy andintervention with sexual assault and sexual offenders.Jonathan Foster received his MSW from Wayne State University in 2006. Heis working as a mental health social worker with Windsor Regional Hospitalin Ontario, Canada.
Western Criminology Review 7(1), 1–8 (2006)Sex Offender Registries as a Tool for Public Safety: Views from Registered Offenders*Richard TewksburyUniversity of LouisvilleAbstract: Sex offender registries are tools for the public and law enforcement to know about and monitor the identities, locations, and behaviors of convicted sex offenders in the community. The ability of these tools to effectively and efficiently contribute to public safety, however, is dependent on their containing accurate and up-to-date information. This research draws on data from a sample of registered seoffenders to assess the frequency and intensity of monitoring perceived by registrants and registrants’ self-reported likelihood of maintaining their listed information as accurate. Results suggest that monitoring is not very close or frequent, and a significant minority of registered sex offenders may not be willing to comply with registration requirements nor to voluntarily update their registry information. Keywords: Sex offender registries; sex offenders; community corrections* This research was supported in part by a grant from the Foundation for the Scientific Study of Sexuality. Sex offender registries are one of our society’s latest and increasingly employed methods for monitoring convicted offenders and for providing communities with information about the identities and locations of potential predators. As a tool for monitoring offenders, registries are publicly accessible, regularly updated listings of convicted sex offenders designed to allow community members to know about, to recognize, and to protect themselves from dangerous others. The present research provides one of the first assessments of how registered sex offenders work with their status as registrants, maintain their information on the registry, and perceive their registration as impacting their public recognition as sex offenders.Sex Offender Registries Since their initial appearance in the mid 1990s, the use of registries has grown steadily. By February 2001 approximately 386,000 convicted sex offenders were listed on registries, with a median size of 4,100 registrants (Adams, 2002). Between April 1998 and February 2001 the number of registrants increased more than 39 percent. Assuming consistent growth since 2001, it is estimated that in mid-year 2004 more than 538,000 convicted offenders were listed on sex offender registries. At the start of 2005 a total of 40 states maintained a publicly accessible sex offender registry.1 Sex offender registries were a direct outgrowth of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994 and Megan’s Law in 1996 requiring public notification of the release from incarceration of convicted sex offenders. The Jacob Wetterling Act required states to establish programs for the registration of sex offenders by September 1997. Megan’s Law was named after 7-year-old Megan Kanka, a New Jersey girl kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in July 1994. This law required states to develop notification procedures that were publicly accessible, so community members could know of and monitor the presence of sex offenders. The idea behind a publicly accessible sex offender registry is that if community members (especially parents of young children) can know of sex offenders’ presence in their community they can take steps to prevent (the children’s) victimization. Additionally, some critics have contended that public access to listings of convicted sex offenders is an extension of punishment and, at best, marginally constitutional. However, the courts have generally upheld registration and public notification procedures. For a more complete discussion of criticisms and legal challenges see Hughes (2002). Inherent in registration and notification statutes also is a belief in deterrence. If offenders know that community members are aware of their identity and presence, offenders may be less likely to re-offend, considering that their likelihood of detection, apprehension, and conviction would be enhanced. Publicly accessible sex offender registries share many important commonalities but also have some
Sex Offender Registries as a Tool for Public Safety2distinct differences. Responsibility for maintaining the registry is held by different state agencies, including state police, departments of public safety, Attorneys General, and departments of corrections. Registries also vary with state statutes defining: different populations that must register, different lengths of registration for different offender categories, different information required for the posting, whether DNA samples are collected and linked to the registry listing, and who is provided access to the registry information.Research on Sex Offender Registries To date, research on sex offender registries, listed offenders, community reactions, and consequences of registries have not been frequent. Most common in the literature are social scientists and legal scholars (Avrahamian, 1998; Bolding, 1997; Bell, 1996; Petrosino and Petrosino, 1999) either questioning the efficacy of, or predicting failure for, sex offender registries. Others (Prentky, 1996; Zevitz and Farkas, 2000a, 2000b; Tewksbury, in press) have argued that sex offender registries may in fact have negative consequences on both communities and individual offenders. Zevitz and Farkas (2000a) have shown through data collected with attendees at community notification meetings that community residents attending such functions may suffer from increased anxiety. Also, when community members are notified of sex offenders’ presence in their communities, there are likely to be barriers erected to full and successful integration of such offenders into the community (Zevitz and Farkas, 2000b). The most common forms of barriers reported by sex offenders are: difficulties with housing, ostracization by other residents, harassment, emotional problems for others in the sex offenders’ families, and employment difficulties More specifically, Tewksbury (in press) collected data from registered sex offenders in Kentucky and reports that common collateral consequences of registration include social stigmatization; loss of relationships, employment, and housing and both verbal and physical assaults. More specifically, registered sex offenders in non-metropolitan counties experience a higher level of social stigmatization. Surprisingly, registrants with child victims report lower levels of stigmatization, harassment, and other losses. Few studies addressing recidivism of registered sex offenders is available. The Iowa Department of Human Rights (Adkins, Huff, and Stageberg, 2000) compared groups of over 200 convicted sex offenders released from supervision before the registration requirement and immediately following the implementation of the requirement. Results show “mixed effects,” with registered sex offenders having only slightly lower rates of recidivism for sexual offenses (3.0% vs. 3.5%), but a 26 percent lower rate of recidivism for all offenses. Other examinations of sex offender recidivism have looked at other forms of special sanctions. Berliner, Schram, Miller and Milloy (1995) report that among sex offenders in Washington sentenced under a special sex offender sentencing alternative, there is a statistically significant lower rate of re-arrest and reconviction for any misdemeanor offense or any felony. However, there is no statistically significant difference in either re-arrest or reconviction for sex offenses. Additionally, Lieb (1996) reports on recidivism among offenders subject to community notification in Washington. The results of this evaluation show that offenders subject to community notification had a slightly lower (but not statistically significant) sexual offense recidivism rate (19%) than a comparison group (22%). With a somewhat different focus and goal Tewksbury (2002) examined the information listed for a sample of registered sex offenders in Kentucky to determine whether complete and accurate information was available. While most registrants did have complete information provided, 43 percent of registrants did not have photographs with their information, and one in twelve (8.2%) of registrants had an address of “unknown” listed. Problems of missing and inaccurate data were most acute for registrants from a metropolitan county: 10.5 percent had “unknown” addresses, 10.5 percent listed addresses that turned out to be commercial locations, and 5.4 percent had addresses that did not exist. Simply stated, not very much is known about sex offender registries and how they may or may not contribute to public safety. Additionally, no previous research has examined differences in experiences, recidivism, or any other consequences based on a registrant’s risk level. These are clear and obvious gaps in the literature and knowledge, as sex offender registries have grown in size and influence.Present Study The present analysis examines information contained on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry (http://kspsor.state.ky.us) regarding whether and how registered offenders interact with and maintain their information on the registry. Drawing on a sample of sex offenders listed on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry, the present study assesses registrants’ perceptions of public recognition and law enforcement contact resulting from
R. Tewksbury / Western Criminology Review 7(1), 1–8 (2006)3their registration and registrants’ likelihood of assuring their listed information is complete and accurate. The Kentucky Sex Offender Registry is used for several reasons. First, the Kentucky registry is of a manageable size (2,400 registrants at time of data collection), and the information presented on each offender represents a mid-range of information compared with other registries (see Tewksbury and Higgins, in press). The Kentucky registry also provides a very good population for assessment of registrants based on two previously ignored variables in the literature: type/length of registration and urban/non-urban residence. The Kentucky registry includes only two categories of registrants, those required to register for 10 years and those required to register for lifetime. This difference in registration period is used here as a proxy for risk level; Kentucky does not designate a “risk level” on the registry and does not engage in community notification. Finally, the author is located at a university in the state of Kentucky, and this was believed to be of assistance in gaining compliance with survey completion from registered offenders. Methods Data for this study were collected by way of a mailed, anonymous questionnaire with offenders listed on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. Once identified (see below) sample members’ addresses were recorded from their registry page. All sample members were mailed a cover letter, informed consent explanation, survey, and postage-paid return envelope. The Human Studies Protection Program office at the author’s university reviewed all materials. Data collection was conducted in April, 2004. Kentucky’s Sex Offender Registry The Kentucky Sex Offender Registry is maintained by the Kentucky State Police. It is located on a publicly accessible internet website (http://kspsor.state.ky.us) and reports an average of over 15,000 hits per month (Adams, 2002). The site is searchable via offender name, city, county, and zip code. Information about individual registrants includes name, date of registration, date of birth, address, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, hair color, conviction offenses, length of registration, whether the offender is compliant with reporting requirements, date of last update of information, and a photograph. 2 Sample A 33 percent sample was drawn from the total 2,408 offenders listed on the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. Excluded from the sample were offenders with no known address included in their registration, those who were incarcerated, and those who had been registered for less than 6 months. The sample was selected using a systematic technique; the selection interval allowed for multiple iterations through the sampling frame. A total of 795 registered sex offenders were included in the sample. Sample size is largely driven by available funding. Very limited funding was provided for the study, allowing only a one-third sample to be surveyed. Additionally, funding limitations precluded follow-up contacts with sample members. A total of 121 completed and usable surveys were obtained,3 for a response rate of 15.4 percent. While this is not a very high response rate, this needs to be understood as a difficult to access population. Previous research looking at registrants has relied on small samples or has used only officially recorded data, 1217158.8%5041.260.9months10687.8%1512.243.8years10788.8%108.642.61412.1%7461.27764.11311.12419.7*A relative as victimVictims*MaleFemaleChildrenWhiteBlackOtherMultiple victimsMaleFemaleMean ageRace%NTable 1. Description of SamplePercentagestotalmorethan100%duetomultipleresponses permitted.Number of offenders — total sampleRegistration period10 yearsLifetimeMean length of time on registrySex
Sex Offender Registries as a Tool for Public Safety4avoiding collection of data directly from registrants (see Adkins, Huff, and Stageberg, 2000 and Tewksbury, 2002). Similarly, studies of sex offenders have almost always collected data either from offenders who are incarcerated or in treatment, or researchers have collected data from professionals working with sex offenders (treatment providers, probation officers, etc.). Only one study has been identified that gathered data directly from ex-offenders in the community (as opposed to those in treatment or monitoring programs) and, despite not reporting a response rate, relied on a sample size of 112 (Sack and Mason, 1980). Table 1 presents the demographic and registration information for the respondents.Instrument The data collection instrument was designed specifically for this study. The instrument is a four-page questionnaire containing 35 close-ended items. The items assess demographics; offense characteristics; questions about whether, by whom, and how often the offender is recognized as a registered sex offender; attitudes regarding registries in general; and the registration experience specifically. The dependent variables for this analysis are self-reports by registered sex offenders of their perceptions of the frequency of being recognized in their communities as registered sex offenders and frequency of being contacted by law enforcement officials regarding their status as registered sex offenders. Analysis also focuses on registrants’ self-reported likelihood (measured on a ten point scale, 1= not at all likely, 10= definitely would) of reporting inaccurate information (address, photo, and conviction offenses) on their registry listing and their likelihood of reporting a change of address.Findings As shown in Table 2, based on self-reports from registered sex offenders, approximately one in three believe they have never been recognized in public as a sex offender, and just more than one in three report never being contacted by law enforcement officers in their community as a result of their registration. A significant minority of registrants does report being recognized regularly. However, nearly two-thirds of registered sex offenders report contact with law enforcement only once a year or never. Considering that sex offender registries were developed in large part in response to high profile cases involving victimization of children, and as a tool for enhancing the protection of children, special attention is devoted to assessing child victimizers’ experiences of recognition in public and contact with law enforcement. As the data in Table 2 clearly show, there are no substantial differences in the experiences reported by child victimizers and the sample on the whole. Frequency of beingrecognized in publicDaily13.3%14.5%1-2 times per week10.67.21-2 times per month15.117.3Few times a year22.118.8Once a year7.15.8Never31.936.2Frequency of beingcontacted by policeDaily——1-2 times per week1.7%2.7%1-2 times per month11.713.5Few times a year25.023.0Once a year26.724.3Never35.036.5Table 2. Experiences of Public Recognition and Interactions with Law Enforcement Officers, Total Sample and Child VictimizersTotalsampleChildvictimizers(n=121)(n=77) In addition to assessing how registered sex offenders have experienced the degree to which their identities as sex offenders are known to community members and law enforcement officials, examination also focuses on whether registrants would be likely to correct or update misinformation that they might discover on their registration website. The Kentucky State Police, which maintains the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry, explains on the site, “The intent of this site is public safety and awareness. This database is made available to alert possible victims of potential danger, not to punish or embarrass offenders. . . . There is an overriding public interest and need to ensure the safety of the public by providing registered offender information.” In pursuit of this goal it is imperative that the registry include full and accurate information. As discussed above, a substantial degree of information on the registry may be absent or incorrect (see Tewksbury, 2002). Therefore, in order for the registry to serve as an effective and efficient tool in the promotion of community safety, it
R. Tewksbury / Western Criminology Review 7(1), 1–8 (2006)5would be necessary for registrants to provide corrections to misinformation on the registry. This, however, may be an especially large challenge, as only 38.7 percent of registrants report having ever looked at their online registry page. According to the data presented in Table 3, it appears likely though that were they to become aware of incorrect information most registrants would report corrections and would provide updated information about their residence, if they were to move.4for lifetime registrants, there is still a high likelihood that they would report such a change). Even more telling is the data reported in Table 5 regarding responses about whether registrants would correct/update misinformation, based on how long the registrant has already been on the registry. Here two variables show statistically significant differences. Registrants who have been on the registry for a shorter period of time are significantly more likely to correct incorrect addresses or offense listings on the registry.5 Would correct a wrong address listing8.32Would correct a wrong picture in listing8.33Would correct wrong offenses in listing9.02Would notify if move to a new address9.53Total sample(n=121)Table 3: Likelihood of Registrants to Correct/Update Misinformation on their Sex Offender Registry ListingMean score on a scale of 1 to 10.Examination of responses to these items for registrants convicted of sexual offenses against children and those with only adult victims shows no statistically significant differences. These same issues are also examined for registrants distinguishing between lower-risk offenders (as indicated by a registration requirement of ten years) and those deemed high risk (i.e. required to register for life). No statistically significant differences are reported for the three items regarding correcting an incorrect address, picture, or offense listing. Lifetime registrants, however, do report a statistically significant lower mean likelihood of reporting a change in their residence (although even Would correct a wrong address listing8.288.36Would correct a wrong picture in listing8.378.25Would correct wrong offenses in listing8.979.00Would notify if move to a new address9.839.09** P < .05Lifetimeregistrants(n=50)Table 4: Likelihood of Registrants to Correct/Update Misinformation on the Sex Offender Registry Listing, by Length of Required RegistrationMean score on a scale of 1 to 10.10-yearregistrants(n=71)Discussion These results suggest that registered sex offenders often do not experience very close monitoring, as measured by community members recognizing them and law enforcement officials having contact with them. Also, this analysis has shown that most registered sex offenders do report that they would correct or update misinformation they discovered on their individual registry listing. However, perhaps more important for the achievement of the registry’s stated goals, there are some important differences in the likelihood of registrants to correct/update their information. Lifetime registrants and those who have been listed on the registry for five or more years are significantly less likely to report a change of address and incorrect information on their registry listing. Interestingly, this both supports and contradicts earlier research. Bedarf (1995) reported that in Tennessee more than one-quarter of registrants move but do not change their registration address. The present findings also contrast with previous evidence which suggests that as registrants spend more time on a registry they are more likely to maintain compliance with registration requirements (Hebenton and Thomas, 1997). The reasons Would correct a wrong address listing8.967.76*Would correct a wrong picture in listing8.688.03Would correct wrong offenses in listing9.498.61*Would notify if move to a new address9.819.30Table 5: Likelihood of Registrants to Correct/Update Misinformation, Based on Lengthof Time on RegistryMean score on a scale of 1 to 10.Listed 5 years or less(n=55)* P < .05Listed morethan 5 years(n=44)
Sex Offender Registries as a Tool for Public Safety6for the present data suggesting a lower compliance are not clear at this time. However, one explanation may be that both lifetime registrants and those who have been listed for a longer period of time may have more animosity toward the process of registration and may have experienced a less stringent degree of enforcement than their counterparts. If these registrants have both a more negative view of registration, and they have personally experienced less frequent contacts and a lower intensity of supervision by officials; they may perceive that reporting misinformation or changes in their information is not in their best interests. This is an issue that points to some clear policy implications. Clearly, not all registered sex offenders will correct inaccurate information if and when they see it on their registry pages; this could subsequently detract from the value and utility of the registry for purposes of public safety. In order to effectively promote public safety and provide an efficient tool for the deterrence of convicted sex offenders, it is imperative that registries have full and accurate information listed and that the listed information is regularly verified and maintained. This, however, may not be occurring. Although Kentucky Revised Statutes (KSR 17.520[2]) require that registrants’ addresses (and no other information) be verified annually for those under ten year registration and every 90 days for lifetime registrants, previous research (Tewksbury 2002) has shown there to be numerous errors in the registration information; the present findings suggest that this may continue to be problematic. What stands as perhaps the most important implication of these findings is that the very basis of laws and structures, such as sex offender registries, may be jeopardized by registrants failing to monitor and maintain their registration information. As outlined by Pawson (2002) effective sex offender notification laws (including registries) are contingent on the creation and maintenance of valid and reliable registers. If registrants do not cooperate and participate with officials so as to ensure this foundation is in place, the entire justification and foundation for such efforts is put in serious jeopardy. Registrants need to perceive that there are significant negative consequences if they elect to not report misinformation or update their information with law enforcement officials. At present a registrant is guilty of a Class D felony (the lowest level felony) if they fail to report a change of address within five days. However, at present there is no specific agency or official statutorily charged with responsibility for verifying registrants’ information. As such, registrants may learn over time (as suggested by the above reported findings) that they can relocate without notifying law enforcement and consequences are unlikely to occur. Such a situation is only likely to exacerbate the difficulties and problems already present in the sex offender registry (e.g. missing and inaccurate information). There are limitations to this study, however. Most importantly, the sample size is small. Only 15.4 percent of surveyed registrants returned surveys. It is possible that registrants who were likely to respond in ways that correspond with legal requirements for registration were more likely to respond to the survey. This does suggest the possibility of bias; the picture presented here may be more positive than what would be present across the population. Those who responded to the survey may be those most likely to conform to registration requirements. Future research should address this issue more completely. Sex offender registries are present and publicly accessible in 40 states, and today have over one-half million convicted sexual offenders listed. These sites offer to enhance public safety and to provide communities with information that they can use for the protection of both themselves and their children. However, in order to achieve this goal it is imperative that the information listed on registries is up-to-date and accurate. Maintaining accurate information is contingent on the cooperation of registered offenders, and those responsible for registries need to work with registrants to ensure that this does occur. Future research needs to continue to address the accuracy of information on registries, the effects of registries and the registration process on offenders and the community, and to explore ways to balance the public safety function of registries with the civil liberties of offenders and community members.Endnotes 1. States that do not have a publicly accessible, online sex offender registry include California, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Additionally, New Hampshire provides a searchable registry of “offenders against children.” The New Hampshire registry is not included in the current analysis, as it is specialized for only a segment of the sex offender population. Hawaii has a website for a searchable registry, but at the time of data collection there does not appear to be any individuals listed in the registry. 2. The registration process does include collection of a DNA sample from all offenders, although at present this information is not directly linked to the registry.
R. Tewksbury / Western Criminology Review 7(1), 1–8 (2006)7 3. Ten surveys were returned as undeliverable, non-existent addresses, or deceased registrants; this yielded a final sample of 785 4. Interestingly, however, while the mean response to this item is quite high (9.53/10), it is notable that 10.3 percent of registrants indicate some degree of uncertainty about whether they would update their address, and 5.2 percent say they are more likely than not to not report a change in their address. However, according to Kentucky Revised Statute 17.510, it is a class D felony for a registered sex offender to provide false, misleading or incomplete information, or to fail to report a change of address within 5 five days of the change of address. 5. It should be noted, however, that the length of time a registrant has been on the registry is significantly correlated with the registrants age (.346, p=.001).ReferencesAdams, Devon B. 2002. Summary of State Sex Offender Registries, 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.Adkins, Geneva, David Huff and Paul Stageberg. 2000. The Iowa Sex Offender Registry and Recidivism. Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Department of Human Rights.Avrahamian, Koresh A. 1998. “A critical perspective: Do ‘Megan’s laws’ really shield children from sex-predators?” Journal of Juvenile Law, 19: 301-317.Bedarf, Abril R. 1995. “Examining sex offender community notification laws.” California Law Review, 83 (3): 885-940.Bell, Michael L..1996. “Pennsylvania’s sex offender community notification law: Will it protect communities from repeat sex offenders?” Duquesne Law Review, 34: 635-660.Berliner, Lucy, Donna Schram, Lisa L. Miller, and Cheryl Milloy. 1995. “A sentencing alternative for sex offenders: A study of decision making and recidivism.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 10(4): 487-502.Bolding, Mary. 1997. “California’s registration and community notification statute: Does it protect the public from convicted sex offenders?” Western State University Law Review, 25(1): 81-115.Hebenton, Bill and Terry Thomas. 1997. Keeping track? Observations on sex offender registers in the U.S. London: Home Office (available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fcdps83.pdf)Hughes, Thomas. 2002. “The crayon and considerations surrounding Megan’s Law: The D.A. can’t get no relief.” Pp. 135-142 in Ronald M. Holmes and Stephen T. Holmes, Current Perspectives on Sex Crimes. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Lieb, Roxanne. 1996. “Community notification laws: ‘A step toward more effective solutions’.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11 (2): 298-300.Pawson, Ray. 2002. Does Megan’s law work? A theory-driven systematic review. ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice: Working Paper 8. London: University of London. (Available at j=http://www.evidencenetwork.org/cgi-win/enet.exe/biblioview?780)Petrosino, Anthony and Carolyn Petrosino. 1999. The public safety potential of Megan’s law in Massachusetts: An assessment from a sample of criminal sexual psychopaths. Crime and Delinquency, 45(1): 140-158.Prentky, Robert A. 1996. “Community notification and constructive risk reduction.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 11(2): 295-298.Sack, W.illiam H. and Robert Mason R. 1980. “Child abuse and conviction of sexual crimes: A preliminary finding.” Law and Human Behavior, 4(3): 211-215.Tewksbury, Richard. 2005. “Collateral consequences of sex offender registration.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice. 21 (1): 82-90.Tewksbury, Richard. 2002. “Validity and utility of the Kentucky sex offender registry.” Federal Probation, 66 (1): 21-26.Tewksbury, Richard and George Higgins. 2005. “What can be learned from an online sex offender registry site?” Journal of Community Corrections, 14 (3): 9-11, 15-16.
Sex Offender Registries as a Tool for Public Safety8United States Census Bureau. 2000. Geographic comparison table, Kentucky — county. American Fact Finder. Abstract retrieved , 2004, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsTable?_lang=en&name=DEC_2000_PL_U_GCTPL_ST2&_geo_id=04000US21Zevitz, Richard G. and Mary Ann Farkas. 2000a. “Sex offender community notification: Examining the importance of neighborhood meetings.” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 18(2-3): 393-408.Zevitz, Richard G. and Mary Ann Farkas. 2000b. “Sex offender community notification: Managing high risk criminals or exacting further vengeance?” Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 18(2-3): 375-391.About the authorRichard Tewksbury is Professor of Justice Administration at the University of Louisville. His research focuses on sex offender registries, criminal victimization risks and correctional programming. He has previously served as Visiting Fellow with the Bureau of Justice Statistics working on the implementation of the Prison Rape Elimination Act.Contact Information: University of Louisville, Department of Justice Administration, Louisville, KY 40292, e-mail: [email protected].
Collepals.com Plagiarism Free Papers
Are you looking for custom essay writing service or even dissertation writing services? Just request for our write my paper service, and we'll match you with the best essay writer in your subject! With an exceptional team of professional academic experts in a wide range of subjects, we can guarantee you an unrivaled quality of custom-written papers.
Get ZERO PLAGIARISM, HUMAN WRITTEN ESSAYS
Why Hire Collepals.com writers to do your paper?
Quality- We are experienced and have access to ample research materials.
We write plagiarism Free Content
Confidential- We never share or sell your personal information to third parties.
Support-Chat with us today! We are always waiting to answer all your questions.
