Dubrofsky argues that women of color in The Bachelor are “positioned as neither legitimate nor illegitimate partners for the bachelor.” In your own words, what then does she argue is their role in the show?
Answer the four questions below according to the readings (see attachments); each answer should be 150-200 words.
1. Dubrofsky argues that women of color in The Bachelor are “positioned as neither legitimate nor illegitimate partners for the bachelor.” In your own words, what then does she argue is their role in the show?
2. In your own words, explain one of the three shifts that Davis argues are needed to bridge the gap between feminist theory of the body and feminist health activism.
3. In your own words, how does Jaggar define outlaw emotions, and what significance do they have?
4. Does Jaggar argue that emotions and evaluations are connected or not connected? Explain what she argues and how.
Requirements: 600-800 words
TheBachelor:WhitenessintheHaremRachelE.DubrofskyThisexaminationoftherepresentationofwhitenessandwomenofcolorinthereality-basedtelevisionseriesTheBachelorshowshowtheseriesis‘‘raced.’’Itisacontextinwhichonlywhitepeoplefindromanticpartners,aprocessthatwomenofcolorworktofacilitate.TheWesternizedtropeoftheEasternharemstructuresTheBachelor,duplicatingintheseriestheimperialist,Orientalist,andoppressiveracistpremisesoftheharemtrope.Keywords:Whiteness;Harem;Orientalism;Race;RealityTV;TheBachelorOverthecourseofthefirstseasonofAmericanIdolinthesummerof2002,morepeoplevotedbyphonetohelpselectawinnerthanvotedinthe2000U.S.presidentialelection(Albiniak,2002,p.22).Contemporaryreality-basedprogramminghascapturedtheattentionofTVviewersintheUnitedStates,andtelevisionscholarshaverespondedaccordingly.1However,littleworkonreality-basedshowsfeaturingtheactivitiesofeverydaypeoplefocusesonwomen,althoughwomenfigurecentrallyinthereality-basedromancegenre,orontheintersectionofwomenandrace,thoughpeopleofcolorfiguremoreprominentlyinreality-basedshowsthaninscriptedshows.2ThisarticleoutlineshowTheBacheloris‘‘raced’’:Theseriesisacontextinwhichonlywhitepeoplefindromanticpartners,whilewomenofcolorworktofacilitatethecouplingofwhitepeople.Iexamineracialstereotypes,racialreferences,andthewaysthatnarrativestructuresoppressivelyregulatethetelevisiontext.Ibasemynotingofraceonvisibleracialmarkersandcommentsbyparticipantsabouttheirracialbackground.Somewomenaremarkedbytheirdarkskinorphysicalfeaturesaswomenofcolorandaretreatedassuchontheseries.Otherwomenwhoarenotexplicitlymarkedphysicallyaswomenofcolorbutaredescribedwithaspecificethnicheritage*/forinstance,LatinAmericandescent*/aremarkedRachelE.Dubrofskyisapost-doctoralfellowinCommunicationattheUniversityofIllinois,Urbana-Champaign(UIUC)andaResearchAssociateattheSimonedeBeauvoirInstituteatConcordiaUniversity.Theworkisbasedonherdissertation,completedatUIUC.Correspondenceto:InstituteofCommunicationsResearch,UniversityofIllinoisatUrbana-Champaign,228GregoryHall,810SouthWrightStreet,Urbana,IL61801,USA.Email:[email protected],DebbyDubrofsky,LindaSteiner,andSusanJ.Harewoodfortheirinvaluablecontributionstothisarticle.ISSN0739-3180(print)/ISSN1479-5809(online)#2006NationalCommunicationAssociationDOI:10.1080/07393180600570733CriticalStudiesinMediaCommunicationVol.23,No.1,March2006,pp.39/56
bytheseriessometimesaswomenofcolor,andsometimesnot.Idonotputtheword‘‘white’’inquotationmarkshere,althoughquotationmarkswouldproperlyemphasizetheterm’sinstability.Iarguethatthestructure,mise-en-sce`ne,andsettingofTheBachelorevoketheWesternizedtropeoftheEasternharem(Ahmed,1982;Shohat&Stam,1994),enforcingtime-wornracistgenderdynamicsandduplicatingthetrope’simperialist,Orientalist,andoppressiveraciststructures(Said,1978).TheveryformofTheBachelornaturalizesthedesireofwhitemenforwomenofcolorasameansofpreparingforunionwiththeirultimatepartners,whitewomen.InTheBachelor,whitenessisanimplicitprerequisiteforfindingamate.Whilemanyofthewhitewomendonotfindlovewiththebachelor,theymaybethecenterofthestorylineforoneormoreepisodes.Infact,themorespectacularlythewhitewomenfailtobecomethebachelor’spartner,themorescreentimetheyget.Thisisnotthecaseforwomenofcolor,whoworkonlytoframethenarrativeaboutwhitepeopleformingaromanticunion.TheBachelor’sSuccessOriginallyairedinMarch2002,TheBachelorwasoneofthefirstreality-basedshowstofocusonromance.Ithasprovedthemostenduring,witheighteight-weekseasonsairedtodate3.InTheBachelor,aman(adifferentwhitemaneachseason)selectsonewomanfromamong25eligiblewomentobehispotentialbride.Basedoninformationgiveninthefirstepisodeofseasonsone,two,andsix,thebachelorsforthoseseasonswereselectedoverotherapplicantsbecausetheywerewell-rounded,wantedmarriage,hadanestablishedcareer,andboastedagreatpersonality.BachelorBobGuineywasselectedforseasonthreebecausehewasthemostpopular(amongaudiences)ofthemenrejectedonthefirstseasonofTheBachelorette.Otherbachelorswereapproachedbyproducerstostarontheseries:AndrewFirestonefromseasonfourisheirtotheFirestonefortune;JessePalmerfromseasonfiveisafootballplayerfortheNewYorkGiants;CharlieO’ConnellfromseasonsevenisaminorHollywoodactorandTravisStorkfromseasoneightisanemergencydoctor.Inseasontwo’sspecialTheBachelorRevealed(nospecialsofthiskindairedduringotherseasons),ChrisHarrison,thehost(whoiswhite),revealedthatwhenselectingfromfemaleapplicantswhoappliedfortheseries,producers‘‘scrutinize’’everyaspect:‘‘Shemustbesingleandbetweentheagesof21and35.Shemustbeadventurous,readyformarriage.Sheshouldbeintelligent.Sheshouldbeambitious.’’Ineachseason,thebachelorgoesonaseriesofdateswiththewomen(someone-on-onedateswith‘‘lucky’’contestantsandsomegroupdates,duringwhichindividualwomenvieforhisattention).Attheendofeachepisode,atleastoneparticipantiseliminatedduringa‘‘roseceremony,’’duringwhichthebachelorpresentsarosetoeachofthewomenhewantstokeepforthenextweek.Inthefirstfewroseceremonies,thebacheloreliminatesseveralwomenatonce;whenthegrouphasbeennarrowedtofour,heeliminatesthewomenoneatatime,untilheselectshisfinalchoice.Thusfarnoneofthebachelorshavemarriedthewomantheyselected;40R.E.Dubrofsky
onlytwoofthesevencouplesremaintogetheratthetimeofthiswriting(seasoneighthasnotendedyet).Eachseasonalsoincludestwospecials.IntheTheWomenTellAllspecial,thesecond-to-lastepisodeairedintheseason,beforethefinale,theeliminatedwomendiscusstheirexperiencesontheshow.Whenthisspecialairs,theaudiencedoesnotyetknowwhomthebachelorhaschosen.TheAftertheFinalRosespecialisthelastepisodeintheseason,airingafterthefinale(wherethebachelormakeshisfinalselection).Inthisspecial,thecoupleisreunited.ThefirstseasonofTheBachelorputABCbackontheratingsmap,knockingNBC’sTheWestWingoutoffirstplaceinthekey18/49demographic(Collins,2002,p.1).Overthefirstfiveseasons,TheBacheloraveraged11.3/16.7millionviewers(Oldenburg,2004).AccordingtoForbesonline,TheBachelorisamongthetopfivemostprofitableU.S.reality-basedshows,pullinginaprofitof$38.2millionforthefourthseason(withapricetagof$231,400per30-secondadvertisingspot)(Patsuris,2004).Becausetheseriesusestherhetoricofrealism(throughitsformandcontent,theactivitiesof‘‘real’’peopledoing‘‘real’’things),itnaturalizestheconstructionsofraceandromanceitpromotestoitsaudience.Thisarticlebreaksdownsomeofthis‘‘common-sense’’rhetorictoaskhowTVnaturalizestheprocessofawhitemanandwomanasthefinalpair.Howisitthatnoneofthewayswomenofcolorbehaveprovidesaccesstothecentralnarrative?Howdoestheharemstructuresituateraceandexperienceswithracial‘‘others’’asbothanecessarypartofawhiteperson’sjourneytofindingamateandachallengetobeovercome?Reality-BasedProgrammingTheterm‘‘reality-basedtelevision’’refersbroadlytoshowsthatareunscripted,thoughmosthaveaveryspecificstructure(withsettasksandeventsforeachepisode).Thetermpurposelyimpliesthattheshowsarebasedonrealitywithoutsuggestingthattheyarereality*/emphasizingtheconstructednessnotonlyofreality-basedprogrammingbutalsoofTVrepresentationsmoregenerally.Myanalysisassumesthatwhatoccursonreality-basedshowsisaconstructedfiction,liketheactiononscriptedshows,withthetwistthatrealpeoplecreatethefictionoftheseries.Inotherwords,reality-basedshowsusefootageof‘‘real’’peoplein‘‘real’’situationstocreateafictionaltext,whilescriptedshowsuseascripttocreatetheaction.Whathappensonreality-basedshowsisnot,ofcourse,arepresentationofwhat‘‘really’’happened.ThenarrativeisconstructedbyTVworkers,sometimesusingatinypercentageofthefootageactuallyshot.LikeStam(2000),Iapproachcharactersnotas‘‘real’’peoplebutratherasdiscursiveconstructions,andIlookat‘‘accents’’and‘‘intonations,’’touseBahktinianlanguage,discernibleinthetelevisualvoice,examiningwhichambientethnicvoicesare‘‘heard’’andwhichareelidedordistorted.Iassume,therefore,thatthestoryaboutraceinTheBachelorisassembledthroughtheeditingprocess.Theproductionprocessshapesthefinalproduct,the‘‘voices,’’‘‘accents,’’and‘‘intonations.’’WhitenessintheHarem41
WomenofColorin‘‘TheBachelor’’Whilewomenofcolorappearontheshow,theydonotthrive.Inthefirstseason,allfourwomenofcolorintheinitialpoolwereeliminatedbythethirdweek.Inthesecondseason,thelasttwoofthethreewomenofcolorvoluntarilyleftduringthesecondweek.Theonlywomanofcoloronthethirdseasonwaseliminatedinthefirstweek.Allthreewomanofcoloronthefourthseasonwereeliminatedbythesixthweek.Onthefifthseason,allfourwomenofcolorwereeliminatedbythesecondweek.Onthesixthseason,thelastofthethreewomenofcolorintheoriginalpoolwaseliminatedbythefourthweek.However,aCubanAmericanwoman,Mary,joinedtheseriesonthethirdepisodeofthesixthseason,andshewasthewomanbachelorByronVelvickfinallychoseashismate.Thiswasthefirstandonlytimetheseriesaddedwomeninthemiddleofaseason(awhitewomanwasaddedalongwithMary).Maryhadappearedinseasonfour,whentheseriesmarkedherexplicitlyasCubanAmerican.Inseasonsixherethnicitywasnotmentioneduntilthesecond-to-lastepisode.IarguethatwhileMarywasmarkedasawomanofcolorinseasonfour,shewaseffectively‘‘whitened’’inseasonsix.Becauseshewasnotmarkedphysicallyasawomanofcolor,theseriescouldrepresentherethnicityinamutablefashion.Theonlywomanofcolorontheseventhseasonwaseliminatedatthefirstroseceremony.Thethreewomenofcolorontheeighthseasonwereeliminatedinthefirstepisode.MakingTooMuchofTooLittle?FocusingonwomenofcolorinTheBacheloristricky:Becausetheyfiguresolittle,Iriskseemingtobemaking‘‘toomuch’’of‘‘toolittle.’’Indeed,nearlyallwomenareeventuallyeliminatedeachseason.Perhapsitisstatisticallyinsignificantthatonlyonewomanwhowasmarkedasawomanofcolor(andnotmarkedassuchintheseasonwhenthebachelorproposedtoher)endedupwithabachelor.Possiblymostofthewomenofcolornever‘‘clicked’’romanticallywiththebachelors.Theseriesinvitesustoconsiderracewithinthelogicofrelationalchoice,ratherthanwithinthelogicofrepresentationorofproduction.Whatiscrucialishowconsistentlytheseriesmarksthepresenceofthewomenofcolor.Appaduraisuggeststhatuniversitiesoftenencouragediversityon‘‘theprinciplethatmoredifferenceisbetter’’butfrequentlyfailtocreate‘‘ahabituswherediversityisattheheartoftheapparatusitself’’(1996,p.26).Thisisalsotrueoftelevision.TheBachelorhabitusissuchthatwomenofcolorexistbutaremostlyirrelevanttothedominantnarrative,excepttotheextentthattheiractionsworktoframethewhitewomen’saccesstothisnarrative,ortoframethewhitebachelor’sjourneytofindinghisidealmate.Inotherwords,theshow’sracismisnotovert.Attimesitisdifficulttopindown.ThisiswhatHallcalls‘‘inferentialracism’’:whenracistrepresentationsareunspokenandnaturalized,makingtheracistpremisesuponwhichtherepresentationsrelydifficulttobringtothesurface(2003,p.91).42R.E.Dubrofsky
FramingWhiteWomen’sIllegitimateBehaviorWomenofcoloronTheBachelorverifythebehaviorofwhitewomenandthusre-centerwhiteness.Womenofcolorgenerallyframethewhitewomen’sillegitimatebehavior*/theirexcessiveemotionalbehavior*/thushighlightingthattheseparti-cularwomenareunsuitablematchesforthebachelor.Forexample,Anindita,aSouthAsianAmericanwomanwhovoluntarilyleftatthesecondroseceremonyonthesecondseason,causedquiteastirduringagroupdatewithbachelorAaronBuergeandfourwhitewomenbyconfrontingChristiabouthernegativefeelingsaboutSuzanne.Thecentralfocusofthisscene,however,isonhowhurtChristiwasbytheday’sevents.Infact,duringtheconfrontation,Anindita’svoicewasheardbutsheappearedonlyinthecorneroftheframe.WhatwasapparentwasChristi’semotion,giventheclose-upsofhertearyface.WhileAninditaexposedthetensionbetweenthetwowomen*/evenincitingit*/shewasnevercentraltothisnarrative,muchlesstotheromancenarrativewiththebachelor.Anindita’srolewastohighlightChristi’sexcessiveemotionality.Karin,anAfricanAmericanwoman,actedtoframeandre-centerthepresenceofawhitewoman,Lee-Ann,inthefourthseason.AlthoughKarinmadeittothefourthroseceremony,shewasneverseeninteractingwiththebachelor.ThatsheremainedontheshowforsolongperhapsindicatessomeinteractionwithBob,yetthefocuswasonBob’sinteractionswiththeotherwomen,neverwithher.Infact,theseriesreferredtoherinonlythreeways:asbeautiful(byBobandtheotherwomen);ashigh-maintenance(bytheotherwomen);andasagreatfriend(byLee-Ann).Karinhadlittleornoscreentime.AlthoughtheotherwomenreferredtoKarinashigh-maintenanceandcommentedonherlackofenthusiasmfortheday’sgroupdateatawater-park,thisreceivedlittleattention.NordidherfriendshipwithLee-Ann,amuchdislikedfellow-participant,emergeasanissue.TheabsenceofanyfussoverKarin’smarkedlackofenthusiasmorherclosenesstoadetestedparticipantiscurious,consideringthatwheneveranyofthe(white)womensetthemselvesapartfromthemainactionoftheseries(bybeingdisdainfulofactivities,aloof,self-absorbed,andsoforth),thisbecameafocusofatleastoneepisodeandthereaftermarkedthewomannegatively.Inessence,althoughtheseriespresentedKarinbehavinglikesomeofthewhitewomen,shedidnotsignifyinthesameways.Karin’smostnotablemomentwaswhenshetriedtocomfortLee-Ann,whowasfuriouswiththeotherwomenandwiththebachelor.Atthispoint,weheardKarinspeakforlonger(andnotverylongatthat)thanshehadatanyothertime.Lee-Annhadbeenthedramaticcenterofmuchofthelastfourepisodes(becauseshesetherselfapartfromtheotherwomenandincurredtheirdisdain).Karin’sinteractionswithherforegroundedthisdrama.Tosomeextent,asWallace(1990)andProjansky(2001)noteaboutmediatreatmentofAfricanAmericans,Karinwasveryvisiblebuthadnovoice.CommentsaboutKarinrepeatedlyreferencedherbeauty,yetsheherselfrarelyspokeandlittleattentionwaspaidtoherbehavior.Frances,anAsianAmericanwomanonthesecondseason(wholeftvoluntarily),figuredonlynominallyontheshow,butsheframedtheover-emotionalbehaviorofaWhitenessintheHarem43
whitewoman,Heather.TheseriesdidnotshowFrancesinteractingwiththebacheloronheronlydatewithhim(agroupdate),althoughshedidnarratealotoftheactiononthedate.However,in‘‘TheWomenTellAll’’special,FrancesbecamethecatalystforanemotionaloutburstfromHeather.FrancesjokedabouthowHeathercookedlotsofgoodfoodforthewomeninanattempttofattenthemup.Whileallthewomenlaughed,thenextshotshowedHeatherburstingintotears.Whenthehostaskedwhatwaswrong,HeatherclaimedFrances’scommenthurther.Franceslookedconfusedbutapologized.Again,awomanofcolor’sfleetingpresenceservedtoframethecharacterizationofawhitewomanasexcessivelyemotional.Iftheexplicitaimoftheseriesistopromoteromance(ideallyleadingtomarriage,oratleasttoalong-termcommitment)andwinnersarethosewhosucceedinbecomingthestaroftheromancenarrative,thentheoverridingmessageisthatwomenofcolordonotcount.Theyarepositionedasneitherlegitimatenorillegitimateromanticpartnersforthebachelor.Yetthewomenofcolorareavitalpartofthestoryoftwowhitepeoplefindingapartner:Theyverifythebachelor’schoicesbyhighlightingtheunsuitabilityofcertainwhitewomen;theyserveaswindowdressingforthewhitewomen,givingthema‘‘specialflavor,anaddedspice’’(hooks,1992,p.157).ChoosingtoLeavetheShowDespitetheshow’savowedattempttoofferallthewomentheopportunityforlovewiththebachelorandthepowertomakechoices,theseareseriouslycircumscribedwhenitcomestowomenofcolor.Gray(1995)explainsthatwhathecallsassimilationistprograms‘‘celebrateracialinvisibilityandcolorblindness…[byintegrating]individualblackcharactersintohegemonicwhiteworldsvoidofanyhintofAfricanAmericantraditions,socialstruggle,racialconflicts,andculturaldifference’’(p.85).Inthesetexts,incontrasttothehegemonicstatusofwhiteness,Grayadds:‘‘Blacknesssimplyworkstoreaffirm,shoreup,andpolicetheculturalandmoralboundariesoftheexistingracialorder.Fromtheprivilegedangleoftheirnormativeraceandclasspositions,whitesareportrayedassympatheticadvocatesfortheeliminationofprejudice’’(1995,p.87).TheoverridingassimilationistparadigmofTheBachelorisapparentintheveryset-upoftheseries:Bypairingwhitemenwithwomenofcolorasopentothepossibilityofromance,theseriesconstructsthemasimplicitlywillingtoengageininterracialrelationships.Onthesurface,theseriesoperatesasifcolordoesnotmatter,asifpeopleintheseries(andimplicitlythemakersoftheshow)areneutralwhenitcomestoracialdifferences,orculturaldifferencesreadasracialones,andwilltreateveryoneasifthesedifferencesdonotexist.Everyone,ostensibly,cancompetetowintherewardsoftheshow*/findingaromanticpartner.Thesuggestionisthatwhitewomenandwomenofcolorhaveaccesstothesamechoices,willbenefitfromthesamerewards,andsufferthesameconsequencesforthechoicestheymake.However,thechoicesandopportunitiesaffordedwomenofcolordonotallowaccesstothecentralromancenarrative,astheydoforwhitewomen.Theactionsofwomenofcolordonotbringthemcloserto44R.E.Dubrofsky
winningthebachelor’sheart,thoughitisoftenthroughtheactionsofwomenofcolorthatwhitewomenloseaccesstothebachelor’sheart.Anexampleofhowthechoicesofwomenofcolorareframedontheseriesiswhen,inthesecondepisodeofseasontwo,thehostexplainedtothe15remainingwomenthatthebachelorhadtoeliminatefiveofthematthisroseceremony.Heremindedthem,ashehadbefore:‘‘Youallhaveasaythroughoutthisprocess.IfAaronoffersyouaroseandyouarenotinterested,youcan,andshould,rejecthisinvitation.’’Shortlythereafter,thehostre-enteredtheroomwithbachelorAaron.Aarontookhisplaceattheendoftheroom,nexttothepodiumwiththeroses.Ashewasabouttobeginselectingwomentoremainontheshow,Anindita,aSouthAsianAmericanwomaninhertwenties,interruptedhim,walkedtowardshimandtoldhimshefeltthat,tobefairtotheprocessoftheshow,sheshouldleave.Shereassuredhimthatshethoughthewasa‘‘greatguy,’’butsaidshedidnotwantarosefromhim.Theyhugged,andAninditawalkedoutoftheroom.ThenFrances,anAsianAmericanwomaninhertwenties,toldAaronthatshealsofeltitwastimeforhertogo(noreasongiven).SheandAaronhugged,andshewalkedoutoftheroomtomurmursandgaspsofsurprisefromtheotherwomen.Oneunidentifiablefemalevoicesaid,‘‘That’sjustnotright,’’emphasizingthatthiswasnotonlyanunusualturnofevents,butalsothatthewomen’sactionsrancountertotheexpectationsofhowthewomenweresupposedtobehave.ChristhenappearednexttoAaronandsaidthatwhileeveryonewasalittlesurprisedbythisturnofevents,‘‘werespecttheirchoice.’’Aaronbegantheroseceremony,saying,‘‘Well,thisonlygoestoshowthatImadetherightchoices.’’Whatisstrikingaboutthisincidentisthattheonlywomenwhovoluntarilyleftthisroseceremonywerealso,apparently,theonlytwowomenofcolor.Thoughwomendoleavevoluntarilyatroseceremoniesinotherseasons,itisnonethelessrare.4Thisistheonlytimetwowomenleaveatonce.ButtheassimilationistparadigmoftheseriesconstructedFrancesandAnindita’sdecisiontoleaveasbeingaboutchoice,achoiceaffordedallthewomenintheseries,eventhoughthehegemonyandpressureoftheshowadvocatedforthechoiceofstaying.TheseriesillustratesProbyn’s(1993)notionof‘‘choiceoisie,’’inwhichwomenmakingsociallyvalidatedchoicesarerepresentedasmakingchoicesindependentlybasedonindividualmotives(oftheirownvolition,withoutsocialoreconomicpressure).Inthiscase,thesociallyvalidatedchoiceisinfluencedbytheracistharemstructureoftheseries.ThisrepresentationofchoicefitswithwhatCloud(1996)calls‘‘therhetoricoftokenism’’:aliberalnotionofanautonomousindividual,anindividualfreeofoppressionwhoisabletosucceedshouldheorshehavethenecessarydrivetodoso(seealsoLubiano,1997,p.viii).Oppressionbecomespersonalsuffering,andsuccessistheresultofindividualaccomplishment(Cloud,1996,p.119).Inthiscontext,theseriesshowsAnindita’sandFrances’sdecisiontoleaveastheresultofpersonalchoiceandashavingnothingtodowithhowthestructureoftheseriespositionswomenofcolor:Theychoosetoleavetheseries,thereforetheychoosenottosucceedatromanceontheshow.Thewordsofthehostimmediatelybeforethewomenleft(tellingthemthattheycanalwaysexercisetheirrighttoleave)andaftertheyleft(‘‘werespecttheirchoice’’)WhitenessintheHarem45
reinforcedtheideathatthiswasachoicethewomendecidedtomake,notanactionresultingfromoverridingstructuraldeterminantsrelatedtotheshow.PerhapsAaron’sstatementafterFrances’sandAnindita’sdeparturewasthemosttelling:‘‘Well,thisonlygoestoshowthatImadetherightchoices.’’Inotherwords,Aaronwasnotromanticallyinterestedinthetwowomen.Theirpresence,departure,orfeelingsforhimwereirrelevantaswere,ultimately,theirchoices.Innoneoftheotherinstancesofwomendepartingfromtheseriesdidwehearthebachelormakethistypeofcomment;heeithermadenocommentorexpressedregretthatawomanleft.HaremStructureShohatsuggeststhatonewaytolookattextsistoexploretheir‘‘inferentialethnicpresences,thatis,thevariouswaysinwhichethnicculturespenetratethescreenwithoutalwaysliterallybeingrepresentedbyethnicandracialthemesorevencharacters’’(1991,p.223).Whilethepremiseoftheseries,tofindthebacheloralong-termromanticpartner,maynotimmediatelybringtomindtheconceptoftheharem,theveryset-upofTheBachelorimplicitlyreferencestheharem:onemanwith25beautifulwomenwholiveinthesamequartersandarealwaysatthebachelor’sdisposal.Infact,thewomenhavelittletodobutloungearoundandwaittosharetimewiththebachelor.TheharemtropeisaWesternversionoftheEast,Hollywood’sversionoftheEasternharem.ItexistsonlyintheWesternmind(Ahmed,1982;Said,1978).AsSaid’sinfluentialworkonOrientalism(1978)suggests,theWesternviewofthe‘‘Orient’’isprimarilyadiscoursethatreinscribesandbolsterstheWest’sviewofitself;itismuchlessaboutthe‘‘Orient’’thanabouttheWest.Thus,theharembecomesaplacewherewhite,WesternmencandominateEasternwomen.Thepowerful,masculineWestdominatestheweaker,feminizedEast.ShohatandStamsay:Thepopularimage-makingoftheorientinternalizedthecodesofmale-orientedtravelnarratives.StrongcontinuitieslinkHollywood’sethnographywithHolly-wood’spornography,whichoftenlatentlyinscribesharemsanddespotsevenintextsnotsetintheorient.Whatmightbecalled‘‘haremstructures’’infactpermeatedWesternmass-mediatedculture.BusbyBerkeley’sproductionnumbers,forexample,projectaharem-likestructurereminiscentofHollywood’smythicalorient;liketheorientalharem,theyhouseamultitudeofwomenserving,asLucyFischersuggests,assignifiersofmalepoweroverinfinitelysubstitutablefemales.Themise-en-sce`neofbothharemscenesandmusicalnumbersisstructuredaroundthescopicprivilegeofthemasterinanexclusionaryspaceinaccessibletoothermen.(1994,p.164)ThewomenonTheBachelorareoftensosimilarinappearance(e.g.,bodysizeandskincolor)that,atleastvisually,theymayattimesappeartobeinterchangeable.Thestructureoftheshowissuchthatthesupplyofwillingwomen*/willingtomakethemselvesaccessibletothisoneman,andnootherman,forthedurationoftheshow*/isendless.Theseriesaddstotheharemstructurethenotionofchoice:The46R.E.Dubrofsky
women’swillingnessisbolsteredbytheparadigmofchoicesincethewomenaretoldthattheycanchooseeithertoleaveortostayandacceptthewillofthebachelor(whowilldecideiftheystayorleave).Themise-en-sce`neintheseriesvisuallyreinforcestheharemstructure.Indescribingpostcardsofwomeninharemsattheturnofthecentury,Alloulamentionstheneedforacertainvisualsettingtosignifyeffectivelythequalitiesoftheharem:Thephotographercarefullyorchestrateshiseffects,sotospeak,andtheideaoftheharemasalabyrinthinespaceunderscorestheimportanceofthebackdrop,whichconsistsentirelyofasuccessionofsecretalcoves,hiddendoors,courtyardsleadingtomorecourtyardsandsoon.(1986,p.72)Thede´corofthebachelorpadmimicsthisconstructionoftheharemwithitssumptuous,boudoir-likefurniture;thearrayofsittingroomswithstuffedcouches,throwrugs,andoversizedpillows;andwallhangingsinrichdarkcolors.Ofcourse,therequisitehot-tubandswimmingpoolarenestledinalushgarden,withmanyverdantprivatesettingsformidnighttrysts.Theharemde´corpersiststhroughouttheshow.Almosteverydateislocatednearapoolandahottub(orthisisthefinaldestinationofthedate),andmanyprivaterooms(withcandles,carpets,pillows,andafireplace)areconducivetointimacy.Thebachelorsometimeshastheopportunitytoshareintimacieswithseveralwomeninasinglenight.Forexample,onagroupdatehemayspendsometimewithallthewomentogetherandthendividehistimebetweenkissingonewomaninasecludedgardenarea,‘‘making-out’’withanotherinanintimateboudoir-likeroom,andembracingyetathirdinahottub.Thesexuallychargedatmosphereisenhancedbythe‘‘far-Eastern,’’‘‘Orientalist’’themesoftheactivitiesaswellasthesetting,manyrequiringparticipantstostaylowtotheground,everreadyfora‘‘tumbleinthehay.’’Inseasonone,forexample,bachelorAlexMichaelandAmandaenjoyedsushiinaprivateroomwithvaguely‘‘Oriental’’redtapestriesonthewall;theysatatalowtablewithacarved-outfloorfortheirfeet(itlookedliketheyweresittingonthefloor).Afterdinner,theyrolledoverontothefloorand‘‘made-out.’’Thentheymovedintoanotherprivateroom,donnedkimonos,andgaveeachotherfull-bodymassages.Inseasonfour,bachelorBobandthreeofthewomenwenttoakaraokepajamaparty.Wearingneglige´e-likeattire,thewomensangtoBobandloungedtogetherondeepplushredcushions.Bob‘‘made-out’’withoneofthewomeninthemoreprivate,curtained-offroomsintheback,adornedwithabedandpillowsindeepshadesofredandan‘‘Oriental’’-lookingredtapestryononewall.Onanotherdate,Bobandseveralwomenwenttoaprivatecabaretclubwherethewomenwentonstageanddancedforhimineroticposes.Inthethirdseason,bachelorAndrewtookafewofthewomentoshareEthiopianfood,whichtheyatewiththeirhandsoffalowtable,sittingonthefloorinaroomdecoratedwith‘‘Middle-Eastern’’-lookingtapestries.Attheendofthemeal,theyloungedoncushionsonthefloorandwereentertainedbybellydancerswhoencouragedthewomentodanceforAndrew.Inthefifthseason,bachelorJessetookthreewomenonadatetoanopulenttentsetoutdoorswheretheyWhitenessintheHarem47
weregreetedbyaliveelephant.Thesetdesignersdeckedoutthetentin‘‘Middle-Eastern’’-lookingde´cor,withgildedredpillowsstrewnacrossthefloor,gildedredtapestrieshangingfromthewalls,alowtableatthecenteroftheroom,and‘‘Oriental’’rugslayeredontheground.‘‘Middle-Eastern’’-soundingmusicplayedinthebackground.Jessespentpartofthedatedoingwhatonemightexpectinthissetting:rollingaroundand‘‘making-out’’withoneofthewomen.Overthecourseofthedate,hekissedallthreewomen,eitherinthetentorinsecludedareasoutside.Theharemstructurewasevenmoreexplicitinthesixthseason,whenbachelorByronmovedintoaguesthouseinthegardenbehindthebachelorettepadwherethewomenlived,givinghimunlimitedaccesstothewomen.Inepisodefour,forexample,heorganizedapajamapartyatthewomen’shouse,providingthelingerieforthewomentowear.Whilethewomenhadaccesstothebachelor,Byrondecidedjusthowmuch:inthefifthepisode,forexample,ByroninsistedthatJayne,whocametovisithim,leavehisquartersbecause,ashetoldusinvoice-over,hedidnotwantto‘‘complicate’’thingsbyhavinganyofthewomenspendthenight.Whenthebachelorisnotpresent,theactivitiesofthewomenarestagedforthepleasureof‘‘thescopicprivilegeofthemasterinanexclusionaryspaceinaccessibletoothermen’’(Shohat&Stam,1994,p.164):Wewitnessthemnavigatingthedifficultiesoflivingtogetherwhiletheyfrolicaboutinbikinis,prancefromhottubtopool,playlawngames,drinklotsofalcohol,and,ofcourse,gossipandfightwithoneanother.Theharemde´coraccentuatesthesexualpossibilitiesatthebachelor’sdisposalandemphasizesthatthewomenaretobeever-readyandwillingtomakeuseofthecushyprivacy(camerasnotwithstanding)affordedbythissetting.ThespaceofTheBachelorisonewheresexualdilettantismistobecelebratedandexplored,partoftheWesternmythabouttheEasternharem,aplaceofsexualexcess,oflimitlesspleasureforWesternmen(Ahmed1982;Alloula,1986).ThebacheloristheSheikofthisrealm,thewhiteplayboywhohasarrivedinadarklandtofrolicbeforereturningtomoreseriousventuresandtohiswhiteleadinglady.Ontheroadtofindingamate,thebachelorhasnumerousopportunitiesforlustyforayswithmanywomenwhoawaitthepleasureofbeingconqueredbyhim.ExoticStopsEnRoutetoFindingaMateThepermeationofthe‘‘Eastern’’viatheimplicit(neverexplicitlyreferenced)tropeoftheharemisemblematicofthewayTheBachelorworksthroughbothimplicitandexplicitissueshavingtodowithrace:Racialdiversityframesthecentralnarrativeoftwowhitepeopleformingaromanticunion.Diversityultimatelyworkstomaintainpedagogiesofwhiteness,whilesituatingdiversityasessentialindefiningandhighlightingwhiteness(Gray,1991;Projansky&Ono,1999).AlthoughintheHollywoodharemnarrative,theEastisleftfarbehindoncethewhitecoupleaffirmstheirlove,theWesternnotionoftheEasternharemisnonethelessintegraltotheirhappyunion.AsShohatandStamcontend,‘‘eroticizingtheThirdWorldallowedtheimperialimaginarytoplayoutitsownfantasiesofsexualdomination’’(1994,p.158).Thus,‘‘anorientalsetting…providedHollywoodfilmmakerswithlicensetoexpose48R.E.Dubrofsky
fleshwithoutriskingcensorship’’(Shohat&Stam,1994,p.158)becausetheycouldclaimthattheyweresimplydepictingtheritualsofalesscivilizedculture.ThewhitecouplecanfullyenjoyandpartakeinthesensualritualsoftheEast(wheninRomedoastheRomansdo),whileintheenddistancingthemselvesfromtheverysameeroticizedculturethatenabledthemtofindeachother.PeopleofcolorinTheBachelorarepartofthebackdrop,thesetting,oftheotherwisewhitenarrative.Whilethebachelormayfrolicwithwomenofcolorduringhissojournintheharem,intheend,heleavestheharemwithhischosenwhitepartner.Whatofthewomenofcolorwhobecomeromanticallyinvolvedwiththebachelor?Lanease,anAfricanAmericanwomaninthefirstseason,wasoneoftwowomenofcolorshownromanticallyinvolvedwithabachelor.LaneasewasthefirstwomantokissbachelorAlex.However,Alexmadeclear,inaprivateconfessiontothecamera,thatshewasnothisfirstchoicefortheromanticboatride(wheretheykiss).Ofthetwowomencompetingfortheboatride(byplayingblack-jacks),hewantedtheotherwoman(awhitewoman)towin.Alexadmitted,however,thatheenjoyedthe‘‘boatride.’’Invoice-over,ashekissedLanease,hedescribedherasmore‘‘cosmopolitan,’’‘‘savvy,’’and‘‘intelligent’’thantheotherwomen.Butthesequalitieswereultimatelyirrelevantintermsofherlong-termappeal,qualitiesnevermentionedbyanyofthebachelorsasdesirableinaromanticpartner.LaneasewasthuscharacterizedbyAlexasafunpersonto‘‘foolaroundwith,’’butnotnecessarilyawomanwithwhomhewouldchoosetosettledown.Laneaseistheonlywomanofcolorinthesevenseasonsseenexplicitlybroachingthetopicofthepotentialdifficultyofaninterracialrelationship:Rightbeforethethirdroseceremony,sheaskedAlexifthefactthattheyarefromdifferentraceswasanissueforhim.Alexrespondedthatitwasnotanissueandreturnedthequestion.Sherepliedthatsurelytheywouldfacesomeproblems,butthatshewasreadyforwhatevermighthappen.Sincetheoverridingparadigmoftheshowisassimilationist,itmakessensethattheseriesshowedthebachelorgivingthequestionlittleconsideration.Onepisodethree,AlexeliminatedLanease,explainingtothecamera,inprivate,thathedidsobecauseshestillhadfeelingsforherex-boyfriend,informationhesolicitedfromacompetingparticipant.Laneasethereforeviolatedtheharemstructurewhichdictatesthatshemakeherselfavailableonlytothebachelor.Laneasehadnovoiceinwhattheshowconstructedasthemostimportantreasonforherdeparture,herfeelingsforherex;theseriesshowedeventheconfessionofthis‘‘sin’’comingfromanotherwoman.Justastheharemstructuresituatesthesexualdalliancesofthebachelor,Laneasebecameone(lustful)steponthewaytofindingaromanticpartner,butnotthefinalstep.AlthoughLaneaseappearedupsetwheneliminated,theseriesdidnotshowhercrying.ShetoldthecamerathatifAlexdidnotfeel‘‘one-hundred-per-cent,thenitwouldhaveneverworkedout.’’Hernonplussedbehaviorcontrastedwithhowtheseriesshowedwhitewomenwhohadaninvolvementwiththebachelorrespondingtobeingeliminated:tearsandemotion.Yetagain,theseriesshowedawomanofcolorbehavingdifferentlyfromwhatwehadcometoexpectfromthe(white)women.ThisWhitenessintheHarem49
wasmadeespeciallysalientinthisepisodewhenthefootagefocusedontheresponseofawhitewoman,Rhonda,tobeingeliminated.Intheepisodesleadinguptoherelimination,wesawRhondaspendingverylittletimewithAlex;unlikeLanease,shewasnotseenalonewithhimorkissinghim.However,wewatchedRhondaspeakwithemotionaboutherstrongfeelingsforAlex,whichweneversawLaneasedoing.Atthisroseceremony,Laneasewouldseeminglyhavehadthemosttobeupsetabout;ofallthewomeneliminated,theseriesshowedherhavinghadthestrongestconnectionwiththebachelor.Butherdepartureappearedanticlimactic.Instead,itwasRhonda’sresponse*/ananxietyattack*/thatprovidedtheclimacticmomentattheendoftheepisode:wewatchedasRhondastruggledforbreathandtheparamedicsarrivedtohelp.Mary,fromseasonfour(whoreturnsinseasonsix),istheotherwomanofcolortheseriesshowedromanticallyinvolvedwithabachelor.Maryhadmorescreentimethananyotherwomanofcolorintheseries.Inseasonfour,however,theseriesconstantlyportrayedMaryinawaythatmarkedherasan‘‘exoticOther’’andthereforeasanunsuitablematchforall-AmericanBob.InseasonsixshebecametheperfectmatchforbachelorByron.Akeyfactorinherportrayalineachseasonishowherethnicityismarked.InseasonfoursheisdistinguishedasLatina;inseasonsixsheisnot.Inseasonfour,Marywasseendancingseductivelyandwithabandon,usingsexualmovements,baringherbottomtoBobinthesecondepisode,andtellingthecamerathatthemusicjust‘‘tookmeover.’’Thatis,MarywascodedinseveralstereotypicalwaysforLatinas.Shewaspicturedasverysexual(Lo´pez,1991;Valdivia,2000)and‘‘tropicalized’’(abandonedherselftothemusic,excessiveinhermovements)(Aparicio&Cha´vez-Silverman,1997;Shohat,1991;Shohat&Stam,1994).Herbottombecameafocalpoint(Negro´n-Mutaner,1997).Indeed,seasonfourshowedrecurringimagesofMary’sbottom.Whensheworeabikinionepisodesix,wewereprivytoanextremeclose-upofherbottomasshepulledoffherrobe,andweheardBobsayonscreen‘‘AyCaramba.’’FollowingthisscenewasoneofBobandMaryinbathingsuitstakingashower.Againwesawaclose-upshotfrombehindwithMary’sbottomtakinguphalfthescreenandtheirclaspedhandstheotherhalf.5Mary’sage(thirty-five)alsobecameakeypartofhercharacterizationinseasonfour.Herbiologicalclocktickedloudlythroughouthertenureontheshow.HerconversationswithBobabouttheirpotentialfuturetogetheroftencenteredonherageandherdesireforfamily.ThesexualizingofMaryinthisseason,coupledwithherdesireforfamilyandchildren,fitswithstereotypesabout‘‘dark’’peoplefrom‘‘other’’countriesbeingfecundandsexual(Ono&Sloop,2002,p.40;Ruiz,2002,pp.4/5).BobultimatelyeliminatedMary,sayinghewasnotyetreadytostartafamilyandnotsurewhenorifheeverwouldbe.Interestingly,inseasonsix,whenonlyoneofthesequalitieswasplayedup*/desireforfamilyandchildren*/MaryappearedastheidealmateforbachelorByron.LanguageisoneimportantwaythatMarywasmarkedethnically.Inthefirstepisodeofseasonfour,MarygreetedBobwiththewords,‘‘Ola´,Sen˜or.’’WeoftensawherwhisperingsoftlytoBobinSpanish.Inepisodetwo,twooftheotherwomen50R.E.Dubrofsky
askedMarytotranslateaphraseintoSpanishforthem.BobusuallygreetedMarybypronouncinghernamewithamockSpanishaccent(Maaa-rrri-aa).6WhenMarybroughtBobhometomeetherparents,languagebecameanevenmoreexplicitmarker.ThissceneemphasizedBob’sconfusionintryingtoconversewithMary’sfather,whospokeonlySpanish.LanguagemarkedMarythroughoutasexoticanddifferentfromtheotherwomenandfromBob,butherfather’sinabilitytospeakEnglishturnedthisdifferenceintoasignofthedistancethis‘‘difference’’wouldcreatebetweenMary(andherfamily)andBob,theall-Americanguy.However,intheseasonfinaleofseasonsix,ByronproposedtoMaryinbothSpanishandEnglish.Heexplainedinthe‘‘AftertheFinalRose’’specialthathedidthistoletherfamilyknowhowserioushewasaboutMary.Thus,inthisseasonlanguagebecameaunifyingsign.ByronshowedhisdesiretobeapartofMary’sfamily,tobeunderstoodbythem,andtohaveherbeapartofhislife.Thistimeitwasthebachelorwhomadetheefforttospeaka‘‘foreign’’language,agoodwillgesturetoMary’sfamilyandasignofhisaffection(andperhaps,willingnesstoacceptthemandtheir‘‘foreignness’’).MaryherselfwasrarelyseenspeakingSpanishduringthisseason,suggestingperhapsthatshewasdistancedfromherCubanethnicity.Itwaspartofherfamilylife,partofherbackground,butnotintegraltoherdailylife.Incontrasttoseasonfour,whereher‘‘Latina-ness’’wasplayedupateveryturn,inseasonsixMary’sCubanethnicitywasonlymentionedtowardstheend.Likewise,Mary’s‘‘Americanness’’wasneveratissueinseasonsix,whileitwasthefocusofhercharacterizationinseasonfour.Forinstance,onepisodeone,seasonfour,Marysaidtheshowwas,forher,theultimaterealizationofthe‘‘Americandream’’intermsofromance.ShesaidherfamilycametotheUnitedStatestofindthe‘‘Americandream.’’SheconfessedtoBobthatshelovesfootballandwatchesiteverySaturday.Marywasshowntohavefullyembracedmuchofwhat‘‘America’’typicallystandsfor.However,inseasonfour,nomatterhowmuchsheprofessedherAmericanness,Marywasalways*/throughherlanguage,herbody,thewayshemoved,herdesireforchildrenandfamily,andtheobsessivefocusofthecameraonaparticularsegmentofherbody*/locatedasdifferent,‘‘Other,’’theoutsiderembracingthe‘‘Americandream,’’tryingtoohardtofitinbutneverquitesucceeding.Inseasonfour,whileMarywasexoticallyenticing,ultimatelyshewassimplytoodifferent(foreign)tobealifelongpartnerforBob.Intheend,thebachelordistancedhimselffromMarytoreaffirmwhite,Westernmonogamouslove.SeasonsixplayedoutafamiliarHollywoodharemtrope.TrackingimagesofArabsonthebigscreen,Shaheen(2001)notestheimpactoftheMotionPictureProducersandDirectorsofAmericaInc.ProductionCode(1930/1934),whichforbidmiscegenationinstorylineswithharemnarratives.Thecoderegulatedthe‘‘unthinkable,’’thatis,‘‘awhiteWesternwomanlovingadusky-skinned,swarthyArab’’(Shaheen,2001,p.423),andforcedfilmmakerstofindcreativewaystoexploretheEasternharemnarrativeandtheadventureswhiteWesternersmightenjoyintheEast.Thus‘‘thefairheroinecouldloveanArab,providedtherobedsheikhturnedouttobeaWesterner,disguisedasanArab’’(Shaheen,2001,p.423).InseasonsixofTheBachelor,thegendersinthistropewerereversed.ItwasMarywhowasultimatelyWhitenessintheHarem51
revealedtobe‘‘whiter’’thanpreviouslyshown(onseasonfour).AsignificantpartofMary’sjourneytoherunionwithByronwasovercomingherpastheartbreakwithBob.MaryandByronconsistentlytoldthecameraandeachotherthatMaryneededtoovercomeherexperienceswithBob.However,sinceMary’spresenceonseasonfourwasmarkedbyherCubanethnicity,partofwhatshehadtoovercomeinseasonsixwasthisethnicity.Afterpassingthroughthedark,mysterious,andsensualrealmoftheEastandovercomingMary’sheartbreakingexperiencesasanethnic‘‘Other’’inBob’sharem,onseasonsixthehappycouple’slovewasconfirmedandverifiedbythediscoveryoftheirmutualwhiteness.ThefluidityofMary’sethnicity*/ononeseasonshewasCubanAmerican,onanotherseasonshewasnotmarkedassuchandhencewhitened*/andthefailureandsuccesssheexperiencedinaccordancewithhowherethnicitywasmarked,reinforcetheimportanceofwhitenessinformingaromanticuniononTheBachelor.Thatis,racialandethnicsignifiersareusedpurposefullytomarktheviability(orlackthereof)ofparticipantsfortheromancenarrative.PotentialforaRadicalCritiqueOnewomanofcolorthreatenedtorupturetheraciststructureofTheBachelor.Anindita,theSouthAsianAmericanwomandiscussedearlier,providedapoignant,funny,andkeenlyinsightfulcritiqueoftheseries,butshewasneveraseriouscontenderforthebachelor’saffections.WemightwonderthenwhyAninditagotsomuchscreentimeintheseries.7AninditatoldAaronbeforethefirstroseceremonythattheshow’sprocessremindedherofsomethingshesawonafarm:abullinatrailersurroundedbycows,drawntohissmell.Shelikenedthewomenontheshowtothosecows;Aaronwasthebull.Aninditanotonlyequatedhumansandanimals.Shealsomadeexplicittheinherentmaleprivilegeoftheset-up:thedesperatesituationinwhichthewomenareplacedanditsabsurdityandcrassness.Furthermore,on‘‘TheWomenTellAll’’special,Aninditarespondedtothehost’saccusationthatshewasatrouble-makerbysayingthatwhileshewasbeingaccusedof‘‘stirringthepot,’’thebachelorhad‘‘histongueintwogirls’mouths’’ononedate.Here,Aninditaexplicitlycriticizedthesexualgallivantingandvulgarityaffordedbytheharemstructure.WhenAninditawasintroducedonthefirstepisodeoftheseries,sheexplainedthatthereasonshewantedtobetherewasthatinherculture(shedidnotspecifyfurther)awomanwhois27andunmarriedislikea‘‘going-out-of-businesssale’’*/apredicamentnotexclusivetoherculturesinceallwomenintheseries(manyintheirearlyandmid-twenties)appeardesperatetobemarried.Aninditaasserted,‘‘MyparentshadanarrangedmarriageandIthinkitlendsaperspectivetothisprocess,whichislikeamodernversionofanarrangedmarriage.’’Itisworthnotingthatarrangedmarriage,liketheharem,isareviledtraditionintheWestthatisusedtogoodeffectintheseries.WhileAninditaseemedpreparedtoaccepttheset-upoftheseriesasonesheisfamiliarwith,shecanalsobeconsideredasultimatelyrefusingtheracistpremisesoftheseries,openingupthepossibilityforaresistantreadingandprovidingpleasure52R.E.Dubrofsky
foraresistantreader.Despitetheattemptoftheseriestopositionwomenofcolorontheperiphery,Aninditaprovidedthepossibilityforruptureofthehegemonicimperativeofwhiteheterosexualromance,maleprivilegeandsuperiority,andtheartificeofreality-basedtelevision.Herpositioningasanillegitimatesuitorforthebachelorcanbereadasachallengetothedominantwhitemasculinepleasurescentraltotheshow.Inrefusingthisset-up(shedecidedtoleave)butremainingastrongpresence,Aninditacreatedanalternatespaceinwhichsheneednotsignifywithintheseoppressiveterms.Anindita’scharacterizationisrareforSouthAsiansinpopularU.S.media*/anintelligent,attractivewomancleverlypickingawayatatelevisionshow’sracistpremise.ConsideringAnindita’sbiting(thoughhumorous)critiqueoftheseriesandthethreatofhercommentsupendingtheideologicalpremisesoftheshow,wemightaskwhythemakersoftheseriesdecidedthatincludinghercommentswouldnotunderminetheshow’smodusoperandi.BecauseAninditawasneversituatedasalegitimateromanticpartnerforthebachelor(shesimplydoesnotsignifyasaromanticpartneratall),shefelloutsidethecentralparadigmsoftheshow.Hervoicewasnotsignificantintermsofrupturingthecentralnarrative.TheseriescouldthereforeincludeAnindita’scommentstooffercomicreliefandtoaddspice(hooks,1992,p.157).Nonetheless,theseriesdidnotcompletelyclosedownthemomentsofhegemonicruptureaffordedbyAnindita’scomments.Hence,Anindita’spresence(Sheisdark-skinned,sovisuallymarkedasawomanofcolor)suggeststhepotentialradicalresistancewomenofcolorcanrepresent,evenasitsimultaneouslyjustifiesthechoiceofawhitewomanastheonlyviablesuitor.TheWhiteHeroandHisMistressThesexualgallivantingofthebacheloris‘‘otherized’’withinthelargerromancenarrativeoftheseries;surelythebacheloristousethistimetosowhiswildoatswiththeexpresspurposeofsettlingdownwithonewomanattheend,presumablyinahomewithawhitepicketfenceandveryfewPersiancarpetsorredpillowsandcertainlynoelephantgrazingonthefrontlawn.MaleprotagonistsinTheBachelor,liketheprotagonistsinclassicHollywoodharemfilms,exploretheevilsoftheWesternizedversionoftheEasternharembeforeovercomingtheseexcessesintheinterestofsustainingamonogamousunion.ThebachelorstransgressWesternmonogamousnormsviathetropeoftheWesternversionoftheEasternhareminordertoreaffirmWesternnorms.Aromanticunionforawhitemancanonlybefoundwithonewhitewoman;beinginlovemeansnotlustingafterothers.Theharemexperienceandthewomenwhoarepartofthisprocessare,tosomeextent,thegrotesquebutnecessaryother(StallybrassandWhite,1986).JustastheharemnarrativeisembeddedintheWesternnarrativeofmonogamouslove,portrayalsofpeopleofcolorareembeddedinthedefiningofwhiteness.ThroughthetropeoftheEasternharem,TheBachelor’sracist,imperialiststructuretellsastoryabouttheromanticheterosexualunionoftwowhitepeople;itreliesonthemythofwhiteman’sabilitytoconquerthedarkOthertofindhiswaytowardstheWhitenessintheHarem53
idealwhitemate.WomenofcolorandwhitewomenservedifferentpurposesinthisOrientalistset-up.Whitewomencanriseabovetheharemstructuretobecomethebachelor’schosenwoman,forwhomhewillforsaketheharem’spleasures.Unlesstheycanbewhitened,however,womenofcolorcannot.BylocatingtheharemstructureintheUnitedStates(inHollywood,theharemremainsintheEastbutattheendthewhitecouplereturnstotheWest),theseriesreinscribesnotonlyimperialistdesires,butalsothehistoricalpowerdynamicofslaveryintheUnitedStates.GiventhehistoryofslaveryintheUnitedStates,andtherelationshipofwomenofcolortotheirwhitemasters*/assexualslaves,asmotherstotheirillegitimatechildren,butneveraslegitimateromanticpartners(wives)orasequalcitizens*/thepositioningofwomenofcolorinTheBachelorisparticularlydisturbing.Hereagainwomenofcolorfulfillthetime-wornrolesofsatisfyingthesexualdesiresofwhitemenandtakingcareofwhitemen(byhighlightingtheinappropriateandpotentiallydangerousbehaviorsofwhitewomenwhowanttomarrywhitemen).TheBachelortellsaveryspecificstoryaboutwhiteness,wherewhitenessisessentialtofindingaromanticpartner.Oncewomenofcolorhelpthewhiteheroesfindoneanother,theymustdisappearintothebackground*/justastheharemstructuredisappearstoletthewhitemasterandhischosenmistresstakecenterstage.Notes[1]SeeHillandPalmer(2002);RossandMoorti(2004a,2004b);Friedman’s(2002)editedcollectionRealitySquared;MurrayandOuellette’s(2004)editedcollectionRealityTV;andAndrejevic’swork(2002,2004).[2]Maher(2004)andStephens(2004)discusswomeninreality-basedshows.Kraszewski(2004),Nadel(2002),Derosia(2002),andOrbe,Warren,andCornwell(2001)discussraceandreality-basedprogramming.ArticlesinEntertainmentWeeklycriticizetheovertracismofTheApprenticeandreality-basedprogrammingproducerMarkBurnett’scavalierattitudeaboutrace(Harris,2004a,2004b).Twopointsarenoteworthy:First,scholarshiponpeopleofcoloronTVisprimarilyaboutrepresentationsofblackpeople.Second,scholarshiponmediaportrayalsofblackpeopleisusefulfordiscussionsofTVrepresentationsofpeopleofcolor.[3]TheBachelorgeneratedthreeseasonsofTheBachelorette,whereonewomanchoosesamong25men.AllthewomeninTheBachelorettewerewhite.[4]Participantscanleaveatanypoint:Onseasonthree,andagaininseasonsix,onewomanleftbeforethesecondroseceremony;inseasonfive,awomantoldthebachelorinprivatebeforethesecondroseceremonythatshewantedtoleave(thebachelordoesnotofferherarose).[5]Allthewomenappearinbikinisatsomepointandweseeclose-upsoftheirbodies,butMaryistheonlyoneforwhomthecorevisualmotifisherbottom.[6]OnonoteshowinBuffyTheVampireSlayertheuseofamockaccenttocommunicatetoapersonwhospeaksadifferentlanguageandwhoisfromadifferentculturebecomesanexerciseinxenophobia(2000,pp.172/177).[7]Whilemanywomenacrosstheseasonscomplainaboutbeingunfairlytreatedbythebachelororbythecompetingwomen,onlyoneotherwoman,Lee-Ann(awhitewomaninseasonfour),critiquestheunfairset-up.54R.E.Dubrofsky
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Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialisttrope or critical epistemology?1Kathy DavisAbstractIn a path-breaking essay,ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World Order (1999),ÕDonna Haraway links Our Bodies,Ourselves(the book and the slogan) to a critiqueofthe US womenÕs health movement,claiming that both draw implicitly upon colo-nialist metaphors ofdiscovery and acquisition ofterritory.HarawayÕs critique doesnot stand alone,but belongs to a broader discussion within poststructuralist feministtheory which has been concerned with denaturalizing the female body,with the rejec-tion ofÔexperienceÕas basis for feminist knowledge projects,and with deconstructingwomenÕs position as autonomous epistemic agents.Given the popularity ofthis much-cited and often reprinted essay,as well as HarawayÕs enormous inßuence on feminist(body) theory,feminist epistemology and technoscience politics,I will use her essayto consider the gap between contemporary poststructuralist feminist theory andwomenÕs health activism.On the basis ofalternative feminist theoretical (phenome-nological) perspectives on womenÕs bodies and embodiment,I conclude thatHarawayÕs critique,while provocative,has little to offer as an epistemological foun-dation for feminist health activism.Key words:Poststructuralist feminist body theory;phenomenology;womenÕs healthactivism;embodied epistemology;ÔnaturalÕbody,epistemic agency;Donna HarawayIntroductionIn a path-breaking essay,ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World OrderÕ(1999),Donna Haraway,one ofthe most important contemporary feministtheorists on womenÕs bodies and feminist politics ofknowledge,provides a dev-astating critique offeminist self-help,which was popular in US womenÕs healthmovement during the 1970s.2Armed with a gynaecological speculum,a mirror,a ßashlight,and Ð most ofall Ðeach other,in a consciousness-raising group,women ritually opened their bodies totheir own literal view.The speculum had become the symbol ofthe displacement of© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review.Published byBlackwell Publishing Ltd,9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK and 350 Main Street,Malden,MA02148,USA
51the female midwife by the specialist male physician and gynecologist.The mirror wasthe symbol forced on women as a signiÞer ofour own bodies as spectacle-for-anotherin the guise ofour own supposed narcissism.Vision itselfseemed to be the empow-ering act ofconquerors.More than a little amnesiac about how colonial travel narratives work,we peeredinside our vaginas toward the distant cervix and said something like,ÔLand ho!ÕWehave discovered ourselves and claim the new territory for women.ÕIn the context ofthe history ofWestern sexual politics Ð that is,in the context ofthe whole orthodoxhistory ofWestern philosophy and technology Ð visually self-possessed sexual andgenerative organs made potent tropes for the reclaimed feminist self.We thought wehad our eyes on the prize.I am caricaturing,ofcourse,but with a purpose.OurBodies,Ourselves was both a popular slogan and the title ofa landmark publicationin womenÕs health movements (Haraway,1999:67).Although the womenÕs health movement,and gynaecological self-help are not Ðand never were Ð identical,Haraway views them as expressions ofthe samefeminist politics ofknowledge.The image ofwomen recovering ownership oftheir own sexual and reproductive organs pervaded the US womenÕs healthmovement.While Haraway acknowledges that her critique is something ofacaricature,she,nevertheless,regards it as an important and,indeed,necessaryintervention in feminist health politics.Haraway argues that when feminist health activists draw upon metaphors ofÔdiscoveryÕand ÔrecoveryÕwhen they look at their bodies through a speculum,they unwittingly adopt the same objectifying medical ÔgazeÕwhich has histori-cally been central to the medical appropriation ofwomenÕs bodies.Tongue incheek,she compares feminist health activists to the well-known 1973 feministcartoon ofWonder Woman,complete with steel bracelets and stiletto high heels,seizing a speculum from a stethoscope-wearing doctor in white,while announc-ing Ôwith my speculum,I am strong! I can Þght!Õ(Haraway,1999:68).3Accord-ing to Haraway,the beliefthat women might have access to their bodies or mightcome to know their bodies in ways that stand outside the purview ofscienceand culture is mistaken.In actuality,these would-be feminist explorers are nodifferent than the male doctors they are attacking.And,indeed,they may evenbe considerably worse.Her Ôcolonial travel narrativeÕevokes troubling images ofwhite European male colonizers intent on conquering indigenous peoples in far-away places.She suggests that the ÔspeculumÕemployed by white,well-educated,feminist health activists in the seventies represented an epistemological practicewhich could never be empowering to ÔAfrican American women in povertyÕ(p.72).It does not begin to address the dramatic differences in morbidity,mor-tality and access in health care within the US.In her view,the Ôright speculumfor the jobÕwould allow feminist health activists to document these differences(Ôstatistics for freedom projectsÕ),thereby generating the painful,but necessarystructures ofaccountability between differently located women,both in the USand worldwide (p.72).In short,a new politics ofknowledge is required for aÔtruly comprehensiveÕfeminist politics ofhealth and oftechnoscience more gen-erally (Haraway,1999:84).Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
52HarawayÕs critique does not stand alone.It belongs to a broader discussionwithin poststructuralist feminist theory concerning the appropriate ingredientsofa feminist politics ofknowledge.Given the popularity ofHarawayÕs muchcited and often reprinted essay as well as her considerable inßuence on feminist(body) theory,feminist epistemology,and health politics,I will use it as a start-ing point to consider the gap between contemporary poststructuralist feministtheory on the body and womenÕs health activism.In order to explain this gap,I will now examine some ofthe points ofcontention in more detail:namely,the signiÞcance ofthe ÔnaturalÕbody (and the importance ofÔdenaturalizingÕwomenÕs bodies),the value ofexperiential knowledge (and the necessity ofÔdeconstructingÕexperience as authentic source ofknowledge),and the value ofwomenÕs epistemic agency (and the problem ofthe autonomous individual).Iwill then suggest some alternative (phenomenological) approaches to womenÕsbodies and health which can provide a more viable epistemological foundationfor a practical feminist politics ofembodiment.Feminist body theory/Feminist body politicsWomenÕs bodies and health have always been central to feminist politics.ThewomenÕs health movement was Ð and continues to be Ð one ofthe most vibrantÞelds offeminist activism.Beginning in the early 1970s with reproductive issueslike abortion rights,sterilization abuse,access to birth control and ÔmotherfriendlyÕbirthing arrangements,it has developed into a global movement whichencompasses a much broader range ofhealth issues ofconcern to women fromdifferent social,cultural,and geopolitical locations.Despite the wide range ofissues (everything from sexual violence to AIDSto the effects ofracism,poverty,and sustainable environment on health),theinternational womenÕs health movement rests upon the assumption that womenÕsmaterial bodies as well as their embodied experiences are central to the devel-opment ofa critical knowledge and health politics which is empowering towomen both individually and collectively.In contrast,feminist theory has been more ambivalent about womenÕs bodiesand embodied experience.Beginning with the Ôequality versus differencedebate,Õthe female body has posed a problem for feminists (Gatens,1999).Somefeminists have responded to the disadvantages encountered by women in thepublic sphere by citing their capacity to bear children.In this view,the biolog-ical body is held responsible for womenÕs subordinate position vis ‡ vis men insociety.Equality can only be achieved by overcoming Ð or transcending Ð the female body.For other feminists,the idea that the female body needed tobe ÔtranscendedÕfor the sake ofsexual equality was completely unaccept-able.It simply mirrored misogynist attitudes toward womenÕs bodies.It was,therefore,argued that a much better feminist strategy would be to afÞrm or even celebrate the female body and,particularly,womenÕs capacity formotherhood.Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
53Deciding between equality or difference,transcendence or celebration,proveda mission impossible,however,so attention shifted to the dilemma itself.Con-temporary feminist body theory began to focus on dismantling the dualisticthinking which linked women to their biological bodies in the Þrst place (Bordo,1987).Biology was regarded as a culprit,often used to justify womenÕs inferi-ority and social subordination.Thus,the Þrst intervention was to separate bio-logical sex from socially and culturally constructed gender.This theoretical intervention was important.,It had an unintended conse-quence however,namely,a ÔsomatophobiaÕamong feminist theorists (Spelman,1988).The fear that any mention ofthe female body would open the doors tobiological determinism meant that womenÕs biological bodies were left untheo-rized.It also meant that many feminist theorists looked at feminist healthactivism with its focus on womenÕs sexual organs,reproductive function,and thebeneÞts ofcervical self-help with grave suspicion.This activism seemed to benothing more than a reßection ofmasculinist medicineÕs obsession with womenas Ôwombs on legsÕ(Birke,1999:12).The female body was the starting point forfeminist health activism but,for feminist theory,it was a call to let the decon-struction begin.In addition to getting rid ofthe biological body,feminist theorists wereengaged in debunking claims ofobjectivity in science as little more than a mas-culinist Þction.Theorists like Evelyn Fox Keller (1985),Sandra Harding (1991),Patricia Hill Collins (2000),Dorothy Smith (1987;1990) and many others situ-ated sentient,embodied,experiential knowing as a resource for unmasking theuniversalist pretentions ofscience and for providing the basis for an alternative,critical epistemology,which would be grounded in the material realities ofwomenÕs lives.Asserting the primacy ofwomenÕs experience became the Ôsinequa nonofany feminist project ofliberation (Kruks,2001:132).ÕThe ascendancy ofpostmodernism and the Ôlinguistic turn,Õhowever,madethis project more complicated.Once regarded as the very bedrock ofsecond-wave feminism,ÔexperienceÕcame to be seen as an increasingly suspect concept(Scott,1992).Ifall knowledge was regarded as culturally shaped,then neitherwomen nor feminists had special access to the ÔtruthÕ(Haraway,1991).Whilethis critique was a needed corrective to simpliÞed claims about the authenticityofexperience and opened up space for reßexivity,it had the unintended conse-quence that the entire concept ofexperience was discarded.A seeminglyunbridgeable rift emerged between feminist theorists,who regarded experienceas nothing more than a discursive construction,and feminist health activists,who saw womenÕs embodied experience as an important corrective to the hege-mony ofmedical knowledge (Kuhlmann and Babitsch,2002).In the meantime,the ÔbodyÕhad returned to postmodern feminist theory witha vengeance as more and more feminist theorists embraced Foucault (McNay,1992;Bordo,1993;Davis,1997).The Foucauldian body,however,was not anexperiencing,sentient,lived body.It was a discursive body,a cultural text,asurface upon which culture could be inscribed.The body became a site for under-standing the workings ofmodern power or for ÔreadingÕculture.As cultural text,Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
54the female body was no longer linked to biology,nor was it treated as the seat ofauthentic experience,but rather it was viewed as a cultural construct in need ofdeconstruction.While postmodern feminist theory contributed to a more sophis-ticated understanding ofhow power works through the female body,it also stoodon somewhat uneasy footing with the question ofwomenÕs agency.Despite itsconcern for possibilities ofresistance and transformation in womenÕs bodily prac-tices,it proved to be more suited for delineating the collusions and compliancesofwomenÕs body practices with dominant cultural discourses than for theorizingcollective forms offeminist action in and through the body (Bordo,1993).It is clear that postmodern feminist body theory has raised many importanttheoretical issues.It is also clear,however,that it has left some issues under-theorized.And these are precisely the issues which are ofutmost concern for fem-inist health activism.It is,therefore,not surprising that feminist body theory hashad little to offer feminist health activism and,conversely,feminist healthactivism has had little effect on feminist body theory.It is my contention,however,that this state ofaffairs is not inevitable.Feminist theory could,in principle,havemuch to offer Ð and much to learn from Ð feminist health activism.Bridging thegap,however,would require at least three shifts in feminist body theory:a recon-ceptualization ofthe body,ofembodied experience,and ofepistemic agency.Fleshing out the bodyPostmodern feminist theories ofthe body have been successful in radicallypulling the rug out from under biological discourses that naturalize the femalebody.As Kuhlmann and Babitsch (2002) note,however,in their excellent reviewoffeminist body theory and its usefulness for womenÕs health issues,Ôwe mustface the question ofwhat price we are willing to pay in exchange for the delim-itation ofnaturalized categoriesÕ(p.436).They argue that the price ofmakingthe body central to theoretical projects (dismantling essentialism,deconstruct-ing dualisms,emphasizing ßuidity) may be a disembodied body.Even theoristswho claim that they are concerned with the materiality ofthe body (Butler,1989,1993),still lend little credence to the material reality ofwomenÕs ßesh-and-bloodbodies,bodies which are recognizable to ordinary women as their own.Thereseems to be an absence ofbodies in contemporary feminist body theory thatcan be touched,smelled,tasted,or perceived.There are no bodies with anÔinsideÕÐ reproductive organs,lungs and heart,glands and capillaries.Ulti-mately,the focus seems to be upon the surface ofthe body and on how culturebecomes imprinted upon it.While there can be no doubt that women in general and feminist healthactivists in particular need to be sensitive to the perils ofessentialism and dual-istic thinking,the silence offeminist theorists on the ßesh-and-blood body,aswell as on the possibilities that biology might have to offer for understandingwomenÕs bodies,is not without its costs.The vulnerabilities and limitations ofthe body,which invariably accompany illness,disease,disability or,quite simply,Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
55aging,are given short shrift in theories which concentrate on the body in endlessßux.The body as ongoing performance implies a transformability that beliesthe bodily constraints with which most people must live at different periods intheir lives.Postmodern feminist theory has little to offer in understanding whatit means to live with a disability or a chronic illness or even the temporary dis-comforts ofmenstrual cramps and labour pains.In her excellent study on disability,Susan Wendell suggests that postmodernfeminist theory erases much ofthe everyday reality ofliving in/with/through abody with limitations and vulnerabilities,which are particularly salient for mostwomenÕs embodied experience.Moreover,the one-sided insistence on the needto avoid dualisms underestimates the subjective appeal ofthe mind-bodydualism for women in their everyday interactions with their bodies (Wendell,1996:169).Living with chronic illness,for example,would be impossible withouta certain amount ofsplitting.The suffering that bodily vulnerability entailsmeans that a certain amount oftranscendence (ie,mind over matter) can bewelcome and,indeed,necessary for an individualÕs well-being.4Indeed,as somecritical disability scholars have argued,the most important task facing feministtheory on the body should be to think ofembodiment in terms ofits limita-tions rather than its unbridled capabilities (Breckenridge and Vogler,2001).Ina more just environment,everyone should be treated as Ôtemporarily able-bodiedÕ,resulting in a deÞnitive break with restrictive notions ofÔnormalcyÕanda reorganization ofthe lived environment with biological vulnerability in mind.Birke (1999) also takes issue with the ubiquitous feminist theoretical rebut-tal ofbiological determinism.While she also acknowledges the need to avoidessentialism and dualistic thinking,she suggests that this does not require reject-ing biology altogether.And,indeed,she warns,feminists avoid the biologicalbody at their own peril.As she puts it:…theories which deny the biological serve us ill,not least because it is through thebiological body that we live in and engage with this world at all.But also,and sig-niÞcantly,our failure to engage adequately with biology (except to criticize it for deter-minism) fails those people (and non-humans) who are most readily deÞned by it,andalso who may suffer because ofit (Birke,1999:175).Birke argues that the body is best viewed holistically,as a self-organizing andstructured materiality and organismic integrity,which both enables and con-strains an individualÕs engagement with the world around her.5Her aim is toretrieve the Ôbiological bodyÕÐ the body that is not just Ôskin deep,Õnor disem-bowelled,but has organs,an inside as well as an outside (p.2).She looks forways to understand Ôwhat goes onÕphysiologically in womenÕs bodies,whileavoiding the problems ofdeterminism which have been elaborated ad nauseamby contemporary feminist body theory.Like other feminist body theorists,Birkedoes not view the body as a static entity,hermeneutically sealed offfrom theworld.Bodies have their own developmental histories and capacities for trans-formation.Neither,however,is the body an assemblage ofpractices,a culturaltext,or an Ôimaginary.ÕIn her view,the ubiquitous emphasis on the ÔßuiditiesReclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
56and fracturingsÕofthe body may offer the promise ofendless transformation,thereby making it attractive to feminist theorists.This same transformability ofthe body,however,also opens the ßood-gates for a total manipulation ofhumanand non-human nature,resonating with the literal dismemberment ofbodies inmodern medicine.Organ transplantations,hysterectomies,and plastic surgeryall rest on a conceptualization ofthe body as Ôa set ofbits,Õwhich can beremoved or manipulated (Birke,1999:171).In contrast,Birke offers a theory ofthe biological body which includes change and organismic integrity,a bodywhich enables but which also provides constraints that defy even the mostadvanced technological interventions.In my view,Wendell and Birke provide a promising alternative to the disem-bodied body in feminist body theory.Both take up the project which feministactivists ofthe 1970s started Ð namely,a concern for womenÕs embodied vul-nerabilities and a desire to engage critically with medical knowledge.They showhow it is possible to learn from biology without falling into biological deter-minism,thereby justifying a feminist epistemology which engages with the femalebody as an anatomical and physiological entity,without ignoring the bodyÕscapacity for change.They also tackle the biological conditions which enable andconstrain an individualÕs interactions with the world around her without ignor-ing the role ofculture in giving meaning to these conditions.And,last but notleast,they assume that knowledge about womenÕs bodies and how they workshould not be left to biology,but should be an integral part offeminist inquiry.Retrieving experiencePostmodern feminist theory has provided an important cautionary warningagainst treating experience as self-explanatory and the reminder that experienceis always mediated by cultural discourses and institutional practices is welltaken.A strong case has been made for developing feminist methodologies thatcan critically analyse patriarchal or masculinist assumptions in alldomains ofknowledge,including feminist knowledge.The postmodern feminist commit-ment,however,to the theoretical project ofdeconstructing cultural discourseshas had the unintended consequence ofeclipsing the analysis ofexperience assituated knowledge.Many feminist scholars have reacted with uneasiness and even alarm atattempts to discredit womenÕs experience,arguing that feminist theory risksÔthrowing the baby out with the bathwaterÕ(Varikas,1995:99),has been leftstranded in disembodied Ôhigh altitude thinkingÕ(Kruks,2001:143),can nolonger engage meaningfully with the experience-oriented texts ofwomen whoare trying to take control oftheir own representation (Stone-Mediatore,1998:118),and,last but not least,has seriously undermined the critical potential ofexperience for disrupting dominant knowledge paradigms (Alcoff,2000:46).Alcoff(2000) argues against the necessity ofchoosing between an unreßectiveconception ofexperience as authentic source ofknowledge and the rejection ofKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
57experience as hopelessly contaminated and oflittle use to feminist theory.In herview,this is a Ôfalse dilemmaÕ,which simply replays the Ôtired modernist debatesbetween empiricism and idealismÕ(p.45).There is no reason that feminist schol-ars should not insist upon experience as Ôepistemologically indispensableÕwithout having to assume that experience is also Ôepistemologically self-sufÞcient.ÕKruks (2001) suggests that rather than rejecting experience as aÔsuspect concept,Õas Scott has advocated,feminist scholars should be devotingtheir energies to Þnding ways to theorizeit (p.131).WomenÕs experience pro-vides an essential starting point for understanding the embodied and materialeffects ofliving under speciÞc social and cultural conditions.The task at handis to link individual womenÕs subjective accounts oftheir experiences and howthese affect their everyday practices,with an analysis ofthe cultural discourses,institutional arrangements,and geopolitical contexts in which these accountsare embedded and which give meaning to them.For many feminist scholars,phenomenology provides a useful theoreticalhelpmeet for retrieving experience as a resource for feminist inquiry.Phenome-nological perspectives treat women as embodied subjects who think,act,andknow through their bodies.Their experiences are drawn upon as importantresources for understanding what it feels like to have a particular body (preg-nant,breasted),to experience a particular bodily sensation (menstrual cramps,labour pains),or to live through a speciÞc event (childbirth).Discourse alonecannot explain the affective realm ofembodiment,the Ôsentient knowingÕwhichis involved when individuals connect the physical,cognitive and cultural dimen-sions oftheir embodied lives at the site oftheir body.As Kruks (2001) puts it,the Ôfact that experiences are also discursively constructed does not diminish theimportance oftreating them…as a Ôpoint oforigin,Õor even a Ôfoundationfrom which to workÕ(p.139).There is a rich body ofstudies exploring the experience offeminine embod-iment from a phenomenological perspective,covering topics like being breastedor Ôthrowing like a girlÕ(Young,1990),pregnancy (Marshall,1996),sexualharassment or masochism (Bartky,1990),sexual trafÞcking or genital cutting(Kruks,2001;Bartky,2002).Experiences are articulated which have been mar-ginalized,distorted,or pathologized by dominant discourses.By subjectingthese experiences to phenomenological description,they are not so muchrevealed as made discursively available;ie,accessible for interpretation anddebate.In this way,many body issues which had previously been part oftacit,taken-for-granted,or ÔunnameableÕexperiences,can become part ofan explic-itly political or feminist agenda.Martin (2001) provides a three-pronged methodology which brings togethera phenomenological description ofwomenÕs accounts oftheir experiences witha discourse analysis ofcultural metaphors about womenÕs bodies and a socio-logical analysis ofhow social location (including poverty,class,and ÔraceÕ)shapes womenÕs reproductive lives.She shows how medical metaphors treat men-struation as Ôfailed productionÕin which the endometrial lining ÔdisintegratesÕorÔdecays.ÕMenopause is treated as a Ôbreakdown in the hierarchical communica-Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
58tion systemÕofthe body,whereby the ovaries regress,decline,atrophy,shrink,and become totally without Ôfunction.ÕWhile such pathologizing metaphorsshape how US women perceive their bodies and bodily functions,their storiesabout their embodied experiences also display signs ofresistance.One ofMartinÕs most interesting Þndings Ð and one which provides HarawayÕs notionofsituated knowledge with some empirical grounding Ð is that working classwomen are less inclined to adopt medical understandings about womenÕs bodies,preferring instead to emphasize how their own body feels,looks,or smells;theinconvenience and discomfort that bodily functions like menstruation or labourentail;or the signiÞcance such functions have in terms offemininity (menstru-ation as a rite ofpassage).She calls this everyday resistance a Ôphenomenolog-ical perspectiveÕin contrast to a Ômedical model,Õwhich is divorced from womenÕsexperience.MartinÕs approach illustrates how an understanding ofexperienceas discursively shaped does not preclude the detailed analysis ofhow womenexperience their bodies.Moya (1997) has criticized the poststructuralist rejection ofexperience fromthe perspective ofmarginalized women ofcolour.In an argument for a moreÔrealistÕfeminist theory,she takes up ScottÕs claim that experiences are alwaysdiscursively mediated and elaborates it to include the Ôcognitive componentÕofthis mediation through which women gain knowledge ofthe world.In her view,embodied experiences are not merely discursive constructions;they are alwaysembedded in the concrete physical realities ofan individualÕs particular sociallocation.As such,they are an invaluable source ofknowledge about the mate-rial effects ofliving in a speciÞc place at a particular moment in history.Shesuggests that feminist theorists should not turn away from but,rather,turntoward womenÕs bodies as a source ofknowledge and starting point for femi-nist analysis.The physical realities ofwomenÕs lives Ð including Ôour skin colour,the land we grew up in,our sexual longings Ð profoundly inform the contoursand contexts ofknowledge and should be part offeminist epistemology asÔtheory in the ßeshÕ(Moya,1997:135).Taken together,feminist scholars have productively drawn upon the insightsofphenomenology to retrieve experiential knowledge as a central element forfeminist epistemological projects.They have convincingly taken issue with post-structuralist critiques for providing impoverished understandings ofknowledge,which reduce womenÕs experience to discourse.The result is feminist theory thatis both disembodied and dislocated.They show how womenÕs embodied expe-riences are necessary for feminist critiques ofdominant forms ofknowledge ÐÔnot merely as endpoints or data that require theoretical illumination,but ascapable ofshedding light on theory itselfÕ(Alcoff,2000:56).Women as epistemic agentsPostmodern feminist theory has been instrumental in decentring theautonomous subject as a seat ofauthentic and undistorted knowledge about theKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
59world.It has underlined the pervasive power ofcultural discourses to shape howwomen experience their bodies as well as the body practices that they adopt.The ideologically loaded issues offreedom and choice have been problematized,whereby womenÕs agency is showed to be often more about compliance thanabout subversion (Bordo,1993).The price,however,for this emphasis on the power ofdiscourse to shapewomenÕs embodied experiences,is often a steep one.It can obstruct the possi-bility ofunderstanding how ordinary women might actively gain,evaluate,andcritically interpret knowledge about themselves,their lives,and the world aroundthem.It may become difÞcult to imagine how they mobilize knowledge for theirpersonal empowerment,let alone for collective feminist projects,as this knowl-edge is invariably embedded in oppressive cultural discourses and institutionalarrangements.In short,postmodern feminist theory does not leave much spacefor understanding how ordinary women exercise epistemic agency.Turning to Kruks (2001) once again,phenomenology can provide a correc-tive to some ofthe limitations ofpostmodern conceptions ofagency.It focuseson the embodied,sentient subject whose lived experience provides a startingpoint for a critical (feminist) epistemological project.It also provides a view ofa ÔpracticalÕsubject who acts with a certain degree ofintentionality,albeit neverfully articulated,a subject who embarks upon projects which Ôtransform some-thing into a further possibilityÕ(p.120).A phenomenological concept ofagencymakes it possible to see how womenÕs experiences are connected to practical pro-jects ofindividual empowerment.It also offers a starting point for thinkingbeyond the individualÕs experiences and enables us to imagine the suffering ofothers as well as the kinds ofintentional projects upon which they embark.InKruksÕ(2001) view,it is the recognition that others Ð however different theirprojects are Ð are also involved in intentional projects,which allows for reci-procity and the possibility ofcollective praxis (pp.124Ð125).Another approach to the problem ofwomenÕs epistemic agency is providedby Dorothy Smith (1990).While she claims an afÞnity to Foucauldian notionsofdiscourse,she employs a sociological perspective which takes speciÞc texts asa starting point for analysing how individuals actually interpret these texts andhow these texts organize their interpretive practices.For her,individuals are notsimply entangled in discourses;they have to engage with them actively,in wayswhich involve planning courses ofaction,drawing upon past knowledge,making on the spot calculations,and imagining what the results ofthe actionmight be.Without agency,discourses simply could not work.SmithÕs notion ofdiscursive agency opens up space for exploring how women knowledgeably,competently,and ßexibly draw upon,interpret,and re-articulate cultural dis-courses as they negotiate their life circumstances.Mohanty (2003),Lugones (2003),Stone-Mediatore (1998) and others havetaken issue with postmodern feminist theory,arguing that it leaves no way toengage with the myriad ways that women resist.The activity ofcriticizing hege-monic discourses and developing imaginative alternatives requires that thosewho have been marginalized in the production ofknowledge be situated as epis-Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
60temic agents,who generate critical and alternative forms ofknowledge as a basisfor empowerment.These theorists share and,indeed,have introduced some ofthe concerns ofpostmodern feminist theory Ð for example,the problem ofpriv-ileging the experiences ofwhite,middle class feminism as universal for allwomen.This does not lead,however,to the conclusion that epistemic agencyneeds to be abandoned altogether.Indeed,Mohanty (2003) has argued that aconcept ofagency is necessary for understanding the ways that US and ThirdWorld women are constantly engaged in interpreting,reßecting upon,and re-naming their experiences (pp.106Ð123).These interpretations are not only amatter ofrecycling existing metaphors and rhetorical strategies,as just Ôone dis-cursive production among othersÕ(Stone-Mediatore,1998:121).It is importantto understand how individuals come to favour certain discourses over others Ðdecisions which are shaped by situational,biographical or socio-political cir-cumstances.Lugones (2003) is also critical ofwhat she refers to as the Ôhighlyattenuated understandings ofagency in late modernityÕ(p.6).Resistance is notintentional in the sense ofa clear-cut choice among an array ofdesirable andless-than-desirable options.She argues that feminists need to become attentiveto the subtle and variegated ways women act,even when Ð at Þrst glance Ð itdoesnÕt seem to be about resistance in the narrow sense ofthe word.Resistancecan also be refusal or simply Ôtrying to survive.ÕOne ofthe goals offeminismshould be to discover the ways women might have for Ômoving together and con-nectingÕwith one another (pp.6Ð7).In conclusion,postmodern feminist theory has focused on the power ofdis-course to shape womenÕs practices.While agency is acknowledged in theabstract,little attention has been paid to women as producers ofcritical knowl-edge,as epistemic agents.This theory cannot account for why individual womenmight be motivated to employ oppositional discourses.Theorists like Kruks,Smith,Mohanty,Lugones,and others have shown,however,that it is possibleto recognize the power ofdiscourse,without discarding womenÕs epistemicagency.By exploring discourses as actively mobilized by individuals as epistemicagents,they show how women can deliberately and strategically reinterpret theirlives or actively pursue oppositional discourses.This involves an approach toagency that is not abstract but practical.Agency is always embedded in womenÕseveryday interpretive activities.This means that feminist theory needs to explorehow,why,and under what circumstances women actively use knowledge topursue oppositional ends.Embodied theoriesThis chapter opened with a fragment from an essay by the postmodern feministtheorist Donna Haraway,in which she makes a caricature ofthe politics ofknowledge which underlies feminist health activism.HarawayÕs strategy Ð whilegood for a laugh or two Ð does not seriously engage with the politics ofknowl-edge expressed in this activism and,more seriously,exacerbates rather thanKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
61bridges the gap between feminist theory and feminist activism concerningwomenÕs bodies and health.HarawayÕs intention is,ofcourse,less to discreditfeminist health activism than to address a more fundamental political concern.She is worried that feminist health activism has not sufÞciently addressed thehealth needs ofpoor women and women ofcolour in the US and,more gener-ally,has been inadequate for coming to terms with global disparities in healthand well-being.In her view,the dramatic global differences in health outcomesand the lack ofcare for even the most basic health needs require a very differ-ent feminist response than the politics ofÔselfhelp,Õwhich was so empoweringfor white,middle-class,US feminists in the 1970s.HarawayÕs concern for how differences in social location shape the politics ofknowledge is well-taken and she is right in pointing out that any comprehensivefeminist health politics would need to begin with an acknowledgment ofand aserious engagement with these differences and disparities.Although women ofcolour have always played an active role within the womenÕs health movement,Haraway does not draw upon their Ôsituated knowledgeÕor epistemic practicesin developing a feminist politics ofknowledge which reßects the speciÞcs oftheirlocation.6Paradoxically it is Haraway herself,armed with the knowledge prac-tices (statistics) ofmainstream social science,who speaks for them,dismissingtheir experiences as inconsequential for feminist theory.While I share HarawayÕs concern and believe that attention to social inequal-ities between women is ofgreat relevance to the future offeminist health politics,it is my contention that this concern deserves a more serious Ð and less ironic Ðtreatment than HarawayÕs essay provides.In other words,instead ofproducing acaricatural Ôstraw dogÕto be rhetorically knocked down,it would make more senseto develop a critique offeminist health activism which is grounded in the situ-ated knowledge practices offeminist activists Ôon the ground.ÕAs an antidote toHarawayÕs strategy,I have turned to other feminist scholars who,while engagedwith the same issues which have preoccupied poststructuralist feminist theoristslike Haraway,have come to very different conclusions.Feminist theory on thebody does not need to distance itselffrom feminist health activism in order todevelop a better feminist critique ofscience.It can instead take up and elaboratethe epistemological project which this activism has already begun.Bridging thegap would,however,require at least three shifts in feminist body theory:a recon-ceptualization ofthe body,ofembodied experience,and ofepistemic agency.The Þrst shift would be a reconceptualization ofthe body.The body is morethan a surface,a cultural ÔtextÕ,or a site for the endless deconstruction ofCarte-sian dualisms.Bodies are anatomical,physiological,experiential,and culturallyshaped entities.They age,suffer injury or illness,become disabled or inÞrm,andlimit our activities.Feminist theory must acknowledge the vulnerabilities ofwomenÕs bodies without having to resort to biological determinism or the notionofan Ôessential femaleÕbody.While most women have a body which is codedfemale,the details ofeach womanÕs embodiment vary according to her speciÞcsocial location.Bodies have their own idiosyncratic histories and are constantlyinteracting with their surroundings.And,Þnally,common bodily complaints orReclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
62problems Ð whether eating disorders or high blood pressure Ð may change overtime,becoming more or less relevant to understanding womenÕs embodiment ata particular historical moment or in a particular geographic location.WomenÕsbodies shape how they live in the world,just as how they live in the world isshaped through their bodies.The second shift would be a reconceptualization ofembodied experience.Feminist theory needs to Þnd ways to address how differently located womenperceive,feel about,and understand their bodily experiences.While it is impor-tant to acknowledge that experience is never a simple reßection ofreality,it can,nevertheless,still be used as a starting point for understanding what it means tolive in a particular body,at a speciÞc moment in time,or in a particular sociallocation.Their experiential accounts can be validated as an important source ofknowledge without treating them as authentic or absolute.WomenÕs experiencesdo not stand alone but can be juxtaposed with other forms ofknowledge:medical Þndings,cultural understandings about womenÕs bodies,or the experi-ential accounts ofother women with similar and/or different experiences.It isthe interaction between these forms ofknowledge,which allows experience tobecome a helpmeet for women to engage critically with dominant forms ofknowledge.The third shift would involve a reconceptualization ofwomenÕs epistemicagency.Agency is not simply a discursive effect,an artefact ofshifting culturaldiscourses.It involves the practical and Ð to some extent Ð intentional activitiesofsituated knowers,who interpret,reßect upon,and rework their experiences.Precisely because knowledge practices are always embedded in conditions whichare both enabling and constraining,it is important to develop sociologicallygrounded analyses ofhow women in the concrete circumstances oftheir every-day lives develop critical knowledge as well as individually or collectivelyempowering courses ofaction.Notes1This chapter draws upon my cross-cultural history on the global impact ofthe feminist classicon womenÕs health,Our Bodies,Ourselves(Davis forthcoming).2Self-help groups were formed by primarily white,middle-class women who shared informationand stories,educating themselves about their bodies,the medical establishment,and alternativetreatments.Self-help incorporates a range ofpractices including self-exams (breast,cervical,vaginal,vulvar),alternative therapies (home treatments for vaginal infections,nutritional changes,herbal remedies,menstrual extraction),as well as a wide range ofcommunity support groupsaround issues like cancer,menopause,weight management,AIDS,incest,or substance abuse.See,Kapsalis (1997);Morgen (2002);Murphy (2004).3The speculum was a particularly potent symbol for the early womenÕs health movement becauseofthe nefarious role it had played within US gynecology where it was initially employed by J.Marion Simms,the ÔFather ofAmerican Gynecology,Õin his surgical experiments on unanethesi-tized slave women.The appeal ofappropriating what had originally been an instrument ofoppres-sion to help women Ôtake back their bodiesÕwas obvious.See,Kapsalis (1997).4See,also,Davis-Floyd (1994) for a different context,but similar argument.She shows how pro-fessional women engage in a splitting offofthe body in their preference for C-sections,whichKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
63protect them from the troubling dissonance between their professional persona as career womenand their embodied pregnant persona.5See,also,Fausto-Sterling (2005) for a similar approach which treats the biological body as adynamic system that changes according to life circumstances and cultural conditions.6Women ofcolour,active in the womenÕs health movement,have often been just as concerned withrecovering womenÕs bodies and validating womenÕs experiences as the white activists have beenwho have born the brunt ofHarawayÕs critique.See,for example,White (1990),Smith (1995),Springer (1999).ReferencesAlcoff,L.M.(2000) ÔPhenomenology,Post-structuralism,and Feminist Theory on the Concept ofExperience.ÕIn L.Fisher and L.Embree (eds),Feminist Phenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Bartky,S.L.(1990).Femininity and Domination.Studies in the Phenomenology ofOppression.NewYork:Routledge.Bartky,S.L.(2002) ÔSympathy and SolidarityÕand Other Essays.Lanham,Rowman & LittleÞeld,2002).Birke,L.(1999) Feminism and the Biological Body.New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers University Press.Bordo,S.(1987) The Flight to Objectivity:Essays on Cartesianism and Culture.Albany:SUNY Press.Bordo,S.(1993) Unbearable Weight.Feminism,Western Culture,and the Body.Berkeley:CaliforniaUniversity Press.Breckenridge,C.A.and Vogler,C.(2001) ÔThe Critical Limits ofEmbodiment:DisabilityÕs Criti-cismÕ,Public Culture 13,3 (2001):349Ð357.Butler,J.(1989) Gender Trouble:Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity.New York:Routledge.Butler,J.(1993) Bodies That Matter:On the Discursive Limits ofÔSex.ÕNew York:Routledge.Collins,P.H.(2000) Black Feminist Thought.Knowledge,Consciousness,and the Politics ofEmpo-werment,2ndedition.New York:Routledge.Davis,K.(1997) ÔEmbody-ing Theory:Beyond Modernist and Postmodernist Readings ofthe Body.ÕIn Embodied Practices.Feminist Perspectives on the Body,ed.Kathy Davis,1Ð23.London:Sage.Davis,K.(forthcoming)The Making ofOur Bodies,Ourselves.How feminist knowledge travels acrossborders.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press.Davis-Floyd,R.E.(1994) ÔMind Over Body.The Pregnant Professional.ÕIn Many Mirrors:BodyImage and Social Relations,ed.Nicole Sault,204Ð234,New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers UniversityPress.Fausto-Sterling,A.(2005) ÔThe Bare Bones ofSex:Part 1- Sex and Gender.ÕSigns 30,2:1491Ð1527.Gatens,M.(1999) ÔPower,Bodies and Difference.ÕIn Feminist Theory and the Body,ed.Janet Priceand Margrit Shildrick,227Ð234.Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press.Haraway,D.(1991) ÔSituated Knowledges:The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege ofPartial PerspectiveÕ,In Simians,Cyborgs,and Womenby Donna Haraway,183Ð202.London:FreeAssociation Books.Haraway,D.(1999) ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World Order.ÕIn Revisioning Women,Health,and Healing,ed.Adele E.Clarke and Virginia L.Olesen,49Ð96.New York:Routledge.Harding,S.(1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge:Thinking from womenÕs lives.Milton Keynes:Open University Press.Kapsalis,T.(1997) Public Privates.Performing Gynecology From Both Ends ofthe Speculum.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press,1997.Keller,E.F.(1985) Reßections on Gender and Science.New Haven:Yale University Press.Kruks,S.(2001) Retrieving Experience.Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics.Ithaca andLondon:Cornell University Press.Kuhlmann,K.and Babitsch,B.(2002) ÔBodies,health,gender Ð bridging feminist theories andwomenÕs health.ÕWomenÕs Studies International Forum25,4:433Ð442.Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
64Lugones,M.(2003) Pilgimages/Peregrinajes.Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions.Lanham,MD.:Rowman & LittleÞeld.McNay,L.(1992) Foucault and Feminism.Cambridge:Polity.Marshall,H.(1996) ÔOur Bodies Ourselves.Why We Should Add Old Fashioned Empirical Phe-nomenology to the New Theories ofthe BodyÕ,WomenÕs Studies International Forum19,3:253Ð265.Martin,E.(2001) The Woman in the Body.Boston:Beacon Press.Mohanty,C.(2003) Feminism Without Borders.Decolonizing Theory,Practicing Solidarity.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press.Morgen,S.(2002) Into Our Own Hands.The WomenÕs Health Movement in the United States,1969Ð1990.New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers University Press.Moya,P.M.L.(1997) ÔPostmodernism,ÒRealism,Óand the Politics ofIdentity:Cherr’e Moraga andChicana Feminism.Õin J.Alexander and C.Mohanty (eds),Feminist Genealogies,Colonial Lega-cies,Democratic Futures125Ð150.New York:Routledge.Murphy,M.(2004) ÔImmodest witnessing:The epistemology ofvaginal self-examination in the U.S.Feminist self-help movement.ÕFeminist Studies30,1:115Ð147.Scott,J.W.(1992) ÔExperience.Õin Feminists Theorize the Political,ed.Judith Butler and Joan W.Scott,22Ð40.New York:Routledge.Smith,D.E.(1990) The Conceptual Practices ofPower.A Feminist Sociology ofKnowledge.Boston:Northeastern University Press.Smith,D.E (1987) The Everyday World as Problematic.A feminist sociology.Toronto:University ofToronto Press.Smith,S.L.(1995) Sick and tired ofbeing sick and tired;Black womenÕs health activism in America,1890Ð1950.Philadelphia:University ofPennsylvania Press.Spelman,E.(1988) Inessential Woman:Problems ofExclusion in Feminist Thought.Boston:BeaconPress.Springer,K.(1999) (ed.),Still Lifting,Still Climbing:African American WomenÕs ContemporaryActivism.New York:New York University Press.Stone-Mediatore,S.(1998) ÔChandra Mohanty and the Revaluing ofÒExperienceÓ.ÕHypatia13,2:116Ð133.Varikas,E.(1995) ÔGender,experience,and subjectivity:The Tilly-Scott disagreement.ÕNew LeftReview211:89Ð101.Wendell,S.(1996) The Rejected Body.Feminist Philosophical Reßections on Disability.New York:Routledge.White,E.C.(1990) (ed.),The Black WomenÕs Health Book.Speaking for Ourselves.Seattle,WA:TheSeal Press.Young,I.M.(1990) Throwing Like a Girl and other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory.Bloomington:Indiana University Press.Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=sinq20Download by: [70.183.184.48]Date: 11 March 2016, At: 13:20InquiryISSN: 0020-174X (Print) 1502-3923 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20Love and knowledge: Emotion in feministepistemologyAlison M. JaggarTo cite this article: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feministepistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185Published online: 29 Aug 2008.Submit your article to this journal Article views: 4562View related articles Citing articles: 45 View citing articles
Inquiry, 32,151-76Love and Knowledge: Emotion inFeminist EpistemologyAlison M. JaggarUniversity of CincinnatiThis paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, theWestern tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in theconstruction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion thatstresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates howemotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show howthe myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine theepistemic authority of women as well as other social groups associated culturallywith emotion. Finally, the paper sketches some ways in which the emotions ofunderclass groups, especially women, may contribute to the development of acritical social theory.I. Introduction: Emotion in Western EpistemologyWithin the Western philosophical tradition, emotions have usually beenconsidered potentially or actually subversive of knowledge.1 From Platountil the present, with a few notable exceptions, reason rather than emotionhas been regarded as the indispensable faculty for acquiring knowledge.2Typically, although again not invariably, the rational has been contrastedwith the emotional, and this contrasted pair then often linked with otherdichotomies. Not only has reason been contrasted with emotion, but it hasalso been associated with the mental, the cultural, the universal, the publicand the male, whereas emotion has been associated with the irrational, thephysical, the natural, the particular, the private and, of course, the female.Although Western epistemology has tended to give pride of place toreason rather than emotion, it has not always excluded emotion completelyfrom the realm of reason. In the Phaedrus, Plato portrayed emotions, suchas anger or curiosity, as irrational urges (horses) that must always becontrolled by reason (the charioteer). On this model, the emotions werenot seen as needing to be totally suppressed, but rather as needing directionby reason: for example, in a genuinely threatening situation, it was thoughtA similar version of this paper is to appear in Susan R. Bordo and Alison M. Jaggar (eds.),Gender. Body. Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing (New Brunswick,N.J.: Rutgers University Press).
152 Alison M. Jaggarnot only irrational but foolhardy not to be afraid.3 The split between reasonand emotion was not absolute, therefore, for the Greeks. Instead, theemotions were thought of as providing indispensable motive power thatneeded to be channelled appropriately. Without horses, after all, the skillof the charioteer would be worthless.The contrast between reason and emotion was sharpened in the seven-teenth century by redefining reason as a purely instrumental faculty. Forboth the Greeks, and the medieval philosophers, reason had been linkedwith value in so far as reason provided access to the objective structure ororder of reality, seen as simultaneously natural and morally justified. Withthe rise of modern science, however, the realms of nature and valuewere separated: nature was stripped of value and reconceptualized as aninanimate mechanism of no intrinsic worth. Values were relocated in humanbeings, rooted in their preferences and emotional responses. The separationof supposedly natural fact from human value meant that reason, if it wereto provide trustworthy insight into reality, had to be uncontaminated by orabstracted from value. Increasingly, therefore, though never universally,4reason was reconceptualized as the ability to make valid inferences frompremises established elsewhere, the ability to calculate means but not todetermine ends. The validity of logical inferences was thought independentof human attitudes and preferences; this was now the sense in which reasonwas taken to be objective and universal.5The modern redefinition of rationality required a corresponding recon-ceptualization of emotion. This was achieved by portraying emotions asnon-rational and often irrational urges that regularly swept the body, ratheras a storm sweeps over the land. The common way of referring to theemotions as the ‘passions’ emphasized that emotions happened to or wereimposed upon an individual, something she suffered rather than somethingshe did.The epistemology associated with this new ontology rehabilitated sensoryperception that, like emotion, typically had been suspected or evendiscounted by the Western tradition as a reliable source of knowledge.British empiricism, succeeded in the nineteenth century by positivism, tookits epistemological task to be the formulation of rules of inference thatwould guarantee the derivation of certain knowledge from the ‘raw data’supposedly given directly to the senses. Empirical testability becameaccepted as the hallmark of natural science; this, in turn, was viewed asthe paradigm of genuine knowledge. Often epistemology was equated withthe philosophy of science, and the dominant methodology of positivismprescribed that truly scientific knowledge must be capable of intersubjectiveverification. Because values and emotions had been defined as variable andidiosyncratic, positivism stipulated that trustworthy knowledge could beestablished only by methods that neutralized the values and emotions ofindividual scientists.
Love and Knowledge 153Recent approaches to epistemology have challenged some fundamentalassumptions of the positivist episfemological model. Contemporary the-orists of knowledge have undermined once rigid distinctions between ana-lytic and synthetic statements, between theories and observations and evenbetween facts and values. However, few challenges have been raised thusfar to the purported gap between emotion and knowledge. In this paper,I wish to begin bridging this gap through the suggestion that emotions maybe helpful and even necessary rather than inimical to the construction ofknowledge. My account is exploratory in nature and leaves many questionsunanswered. It is not supported by irrefutable arguments or conclusiveproofs; instead, it should be viewed as a preliminary sketch for an epis-temological model that will require much further development before itsworkability can be established.PART ONE: EMOTIONII. What are Emotions?The philosophical question, ‘What are emotions?’ requires both explicatingthe ways in which people ordinarily speak about emotion and evaluatingthe adequacy of those ways for expressing and illuminating experienceand activity. Several problems confront someone trying to answer thisdeceptively simple question. One set of difficulties results from the variety,complexity, and even inconsistency of the ways in which emotions areviewed, both in daily life and in scientific contexts. It is in part this varietythat makes emotions into a ‘question’ at the same time that it precludesanswering that question by simple appeal to ordinary usage. A seconddifficulty is the wide range of phenomena covered by the term ’emotion’:these extend from apparently instantaneous ‘knee-jerk’ responses of frightto lifelong dedication to an individual or a cause; from highly civilizedaesthetic responses to undifferentiated feelings of hunger and thirst;6 frombackground moods such as contentment or depression to intense andfocused involvement in an immediate situation. It may well be impossibleto construct a manageable account of emotion to cover such apparentlydiverse phenomena.A further problem concerns the criteria for preferring one account ofemotion to another. The more one learns about the ways in which othercultures conceptualize human faculties, the less plausible it becomes thatemotions constitute what philosophers call a ‘natural kind’. Not only dosome cultures identify emotions unrecognized in the West, but there isreason to believe that the concept of emotion itself is a historical invention,
154 Alison M. Jaggarlike the concept of intelligence (Lewontin [1982]) or even the concept ofmind (Rorty [1979]). For instance, anthropologist Catherine Lutz arguesthat the ‘dichotomous categories of “cognition” and “affect” are themselvesEuroamerican cultural constructions, master symbols that participate in thefundamental organization of our ways of looking at ourselves and others[1985,1986], both in and outside of social science’ (1987, p. 308). If this istrue, then we have even more reason to wonder about the adequacy ofordinary Western ways of talking about emotion. Yet we have no accesseither to our own emotions or to those of others independent of orunmediated by the discourse of our culture.In the face of these difficulties, I shall sketch an account of emotion withthe following limitations. First, it will operate within the context of Westerndiscussions of emotion: I shall not question, for instance, whether it wouldbe possible or desirable to dispense entirely with anything resembling ourconcept of emotion. Second, although this account attempts to be consistentwith as much as possible of Western understandings of emotion, it isintended to cover only a limited domain, not every phenomenon that maybe called an emotion. On the contrary, it excludes as genuine emotionsboth automatic physical responses and non-intentional sensations, such ashunger pangs. Third, I do not pretend to offer a complete theory ofemotion; instead, I focus on a few specific aspects of emotion that I taketo have been neglected or misrepresented, especially in positivist andneopositivist accounts. Finally, I would defend my approach not only onthe ground that it illuminates aspects of our experience and activity thatare obscured by positivist and neopositivist construals, but also on theground that it is less open than these to ideological abuse. In particular, Ibelieve that recognizing certain neglected aspects of emotion makes possiblea better and less ideologically biased account of how knowledge is, and soought to be, constructed.III. Emotions as IntentionalEarly positivist approaches to understanding emotions assumed that anadequate account required analytically separating emotion from otherhuman faculties. Just as positivist accounts of sense perception attemptedto distinguish the supposedly raw data of sensation from their cognitiveinterpretations, so positivist accounts of emotion tried to separate emotionconceptually from both reason and sense perception. As part of theirsharpening of these distinctions, positivist contruals of emotion tended toidentify emotions with the physical feelings or involuntary bodily move-ments that typically accompany them, such as pangs or qualms, flushes or
Love and Knowledge 155tremors; emotions were also assimilated to the subduing of physiologicalfunction or movement, as in the case of sadness, depression or boredom.The continuing influence of such supposedly scientific conceptions of emo-tion can be seen in the fact that ‘feeling’ is often used colloquially as asynonym for emotion, even though the more central meaning of ‘feeling’is physiological sensation. On such accounts, emotions were not seen asbeing about anything: instead, they were contrasted with and seen aspotential disruptions of other phenomena that are about some thing,phenomena such as rational judgments, thoughts, and observations. Thepositivist approach to understanding emotion has been called the DumbView (Spelman [1982]).The Dumb View of emotion is quite untenable. For one thing, the samefeeling or physiological response is likely to be interpreted as variousemotions, depending on the context of experience. This point often isillustrated by reference to a famous experiment; excited feelings wereinduced in research subjects by the injection of adrenalin, and the subjectsthen attributed to themselves appropriate emotions depending on theircontext (Schachter and Singer [1969]). Another problem with the DumbView is that identifying emotions with feelings would make it impossibleto postulate that a person might not be aware of her emotional state,because feelings by definition are a matter of conscious awareness. Finally,emotions differ from feelings, sensations or physiological responses in thatthey are dispositional rather than episodic. For instance, we may asserttruthfully that we are outraged by, proud of or saddened by certain events,even if at that moment we are neither agitated nor tearful.In recent years, contemporary philosophers have tended to reject theDumb View of emotion and have substituted more intentional or cognitivistunderstandings. These newer conceptions emphasize that intentional judg-ments as well as physiological disturbances are integral elements inemotion.7 They define or identify emotions not by the quality or characterof the physiological sensation that may be associated with them, but ratherby their intentional aspect, the associated judgment. Thus, it is the contentof my associated thought or judgment that determines whether my physicalagitation and restlessness are defined as ‘anxiety about my daughter’slateness’ rather than as ‘anticipation of tonight’s performance’.Cognitivist accounts of emotion have been criticized as overly rationalist,inapplicable to allegedly spontaneous, automatic or global emotions, suchas general feelings of nervousness, contentedness, Angst, ecstasy or terror.Certainly, these accounts entail that infants and animals experienceemotions, if at all, in only a primitive, rudimentary form. Far from beingunacceptable, however, this entailment is desirable because it suggests thathumans develop and mature in emotions as well as in other dimensions,increasing the range, variety and subtlety of their emotional responses inaccordance with their life experiences and their reflections on these.
156 Alison M. JaggarCognitivist accounts of emotion are not without their own problems. Aserious difficulty with many is that they end up replicating within thestructure of emotion the very problem they are trying to solve – namely,that of an artificial split between emotion and thought – because mostcognitivist accounts explain emotion as having two ‘components’: an affect-ive or feeling component and a cognition that supposedly interprets oridentifies the feelings. Such accounts, therefore, unwittingly perpetuatethe positivist distinction between the shared, public, objective world ofverifiable calculations, observations, and facts and the individual, private,subjective world of idiosyncratic feelings, and sensations. This sharp distinc-tion breaks any conceptual links between our feelings and the ‘external’world: if feelings are still conceived as blind or raw or undifferentiated,then we can give no sense to the notion of feelings fitting or failing to fitour perceptual judgments, that is, being appropriate or inappropriate.When intentionality is viewed as intellectual cognition and moved to thecenter of our picture of emotion, the affective elements are pushed to theperiphery and become shadowy conceptual danglers whose relevance toemotion is obscure or even negligible. An adequate cognitive account ofemotion must overcome this problem.Most cognitivist accounts of emotion thus remain problematic in so faras they fail to explain the relation between the cognitive and the affectiveaspects of emotion. Moreover, in so far as they prioritize the intellectualover the feeling aspects, they reinforce the traditional Western preferencefor mind over body.8 Nevertheless, they do identify a vital feature ofemotion overlooked by the Dumb View, namely, its intentionality.IV. Emotions as Social ConstructsWe tend to experience our emotions as involuntary individual responses tosituations, responses that are often (though, significantly, not always)private in the sense that they are not perceived as directly and immediatelyby other people as they are by the subject of the experience. The apparentlyindividual and involuntary character of our emotional experience is oftentaken as evidence that emotions are presocial, instinctive responses, deter-mined by our biological constitution. This inference, however, is quitemistaken. Although it is probably true that the physiological disturbancescharacterizing emotions (facial grimaces, changes in the metabolic rate,sweating, trembling, tears, and so on) are continuous with the instinctiveresponses of our prehuman ancestors and also that the ontogeny of emotionsto some extent recapitulates their phylogeny, mature human emotions can
Love and Knowledge 157be seen neither as instinctive nor as biologically determined. Instead, theyare socially constructed on several levels.The most obvious way in which emotions are socially constructed is thatchildren are taught deliberately what their culture defines as appropriateresponses to certain situations: to fear strangers, to enjoy spicy food or tolike swimming in cold water. On a less conscious level, children also learnwhat their culture defines as the appropriate ways to express the emotionsthat it recognizes. Although there may be crosscultural similarities in theexpression of some apparently universal emotions, there are also widedivergences in what are recognized as expressions of grief, respect, con-tempt or anger. On an even deeper level, cultures construct divergentunderstandings of what emotions are. For instance, English metaphors andmetonymies are said to reveal a ‘folk’ theory of anger as a hot fluidcontained in a private space within an individual and liable to dangerouspublic explosion (Lakoff and Kovecses [1987]). By contrast, the Ilongot, apeople of the Philippines, apparently do not understand the self in termsof a public/private distinction and consequently do not experience angeras an explosive internal force: for them, rather, it is an interpersonalphenomenon for which an individual may, for instance, be paid (Rosaldo[1984]).Further aspects of the social construction of emotion are revealed throughreflection on emotion’s intentional structure. If emotions necessarily involvejudgments, then obviously they require concepts, which may be seen associally constructed ways of organizing and making sense of the world. Forthis reason, emotions are simultaneously made possible and limited by theconceptual and linguistic resources of a society. This philosophical claim isborne out by empirical observation of the cultural variability of emotion.Although there is considerable overlap in the emotions identified by manycultures (Wierzbicka [1986]), at least some emotions are historically orculturally specific, including perhaps ennui, Angst, the Japanese amai (inwhich one clings to another, affiliative love), and the response of ‘being awild pig’, which occurs among the Gururumba, a horticultural people livingin the New Guinea Highlands (Averell [1980, p. 158]). Even apparentlyuniversal emotions, such as anger or love, may vary crossculturally. Wehave just seen that the Ilongot experience of anger is apparently quitedifferent from the contemporary Western experience. Romantic love wasinvented in the Middle Ages in Europe and since that time has beenmodified considerably; for instance, it is no longer confined to the nobility,and it no longer needs to be extramarital or unconsummated. In somecultures, romantic love does not exist at all.9Thus there are complex linguistic and other social preconditions for theexperience, that is, for the existence of human emotions. The emotionsthat we experience reflect prevailing forms of social life. For instance, one
158 Alison M. Jaggarcould not feel or even be betrayed in the absence of social norms aboutfidelity: it is inconceivable that betrayal or indeed any distinctively humanemotion could be experienced by a solitary individual in some hypotheticalpresocial state of nature. There is a sense in which any individual’s guilt oranger, joy or triumph, presupposes the existence of a social group capableof feeling guilt, anger, joy, or triumph. This is not to say that groupemotions historically precede or are logically prior to the emotions ofindividuals; it is to say that individual experience is simultaneously socialexperience.10 In later sections, I shall explore the epistemological andpolitical implications of this social rather than individual understanding ofemotion.V. Emotions as Active EngagementsWe often interpret our emotions as experiences that overwhelm us ratherthan as responses we consciously choose: that emotions are to some extentinvoluntary is part of the ordinary meaning of the term ’emotion’. Even indaily life, however, we recognize that emotions are not entirely involuntaryand we try to gain control over them in various ways ranging from mech-anistic behavior-modification techniques designed to sensitize or desensitizeour feeling responses to various situations to cognitive techniques designedto help us to think differently about situations. For instance, we might tryto change our response to an upsetting situation by thinking about it in away that will either divert our attention from its more painful aspects orpresent it as necessary for some larger good.Some psychological theories interpret emotions as chosen on an evendeeper level, interpreting them as actions for which the agent disclaimsresponsibility. For instance, the psychologist Averell likens the experienceof emotion to playing a culturally recognized role we ordinarily performso smoothly and automatically that we do not realize we are giving aperformance. He provides many examples demonstrating that even extremeand apparently totally involving displays of emotion in fact are functionalfor the individual and/or the society.11 For example, students requested torecord their experiences of anger or annoyance over a two-week periodcame to realize that their anger was not as uncontrollable and irrational asthey had assumed previously, and they noted the usefulness and effec-tiveness of anger in achieving various social goods. Averell notes, however,that emotions often are useful in attaining their goals only if they areinterpreted as passions rather than as actions and he cites the case of onesubject led to reflect on her anger who later wrote that it was less useful asa defense mechanism when she became conscious of its function.
Love and Knowledge 159The action/passion dichotomy is too simple for understanding emotion,as it is for other aspects of our lives. Perhaps it is more helpful to think ofemotions as habitual responses that we may have more or less difficulty inbreaking. We claim or disclaim responsibility for these responses dependingon our purposes in a particular context. We could never experience ouremotions entirely as deliberate actions, for then they would appear non-genuine and inauthentic, but neither should emotions be seen as non-intentional, primal or physical forces with which our rational selves areforever at war. As they have been socially constructed, so may they bereconstructed, although describing how this might happen would have tobe a long and complicated story.Emotions, then, are wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntaryresponses to the world. Rather, they are ways in which we engage activelyand even construct the world. They have both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’aspects, each of which conditions the other; in some respects they arechosen but in others they are involuntary; they presuppose language and asocial order. Thus, they can be attributed only to what are sometimes called’whole persons’, engaged in the on-going activity of social life.VI. Emotion, Evaluation, and ObservationEmotions and values are closely related. The relation is so close, indeed,that some philosophical accounts of what it is to hold or express certainvalues reduce these phenomena to nothing more than holding or expressingcertain emotional attitudes. When the relevant conception of emotion isthe Dumb View, then simple emotivism is certainly too crude an accountof what it is to hold a value; on this account, the intentionality of valuejudgments vanishes and value judgments become nothing more than soph-isticated grunts and groans. Nevertheless, the grain of important truth inemotivism is its recognition that values presuppose emotions to the extentthat emotions provide the experiential basis for values. If we had noemotional responses to the world, it is inconceivable that we should evercome to value one state of affairs more highly than another.Just as values presuppose emotions, so emotions presuppose values. Theobject of an emotion – that is, the object of fear, grief, pride, and so on -is a complex state of affairs that is appraised or evaluated by the individual.For instance, my pride in a friend’s achievement necessarily incorporates thevalue judgment that my friend has done something worthy of admiration.Emotions and evaluations, then, are logically or conceptually connected.Indeed, many evaluative terms derive directly from words for emotions:
160 Alison M. Jaggar’desirable’, ‘admirable’, ‘contemptible’, ‘despicable’, ‘respectable’, and soon. Certainly it is true (pace J. S. Mill) that the evaluation of a situationas desirable or dangerous does not entail that it is universally desired orfeared, but it does entail that desire or fear is viewed generally as anappropriate response to the situation. If someone is unafraid in a situationperceived generally as dangerous, her lack of fear requires further expla-nation; conversely, if someone is afraid without evident danger, then herfear demands explanation; and, if no danger can be identified, her fear isdenounced as irrational or pathological. Thus, every emotion presupposesan evaluation of some aspect of the environment while, conversely, everyevaluation or appraisal of the situation implies that those who share thatevaluation will share, ceteris paribus, a predictable emotional response tothe situation.The rejection of the Dumb View and the recognition of intentionalelements in emotion already incorporate a realization that observationinfluences and indeed partially constitutes emotion. We have seen alreadythat distinctively human emotions are not simple instinctive responses tosituations or events; instead, they depend essentially on the ways that weperceive those situations and events, as well on the ways that we havelearned or decided to respond to them. Without characteristically humanperceptions of and engagements in the world, there would be no charac-teristically human emotions.Just as observation directs, shapes, and partially defines emotion, so tooemotion directs, shapes, and even partially defines observation. Obser-vation is not simply a passive process of absorbing impressions or recordingstimuli; instead, it is an activity of selection and interpretation. What isselected and how it is interpreted are influenced by emotional attitudes.On the level of individual observation, this influence has always beenapparent to common sense, which notes that we remark very differentfeatures of the world when we are happy, depressed, fearful, or confident.This influence of emotion on perception is now being explored by socialscientists. One example is the so-called Honi phenomenon, named after asubject called Honi who, under identical experimental conditions, per-ceived strangers’ heads as changing in size but saw her husband’s head asremaining the same.12 xThe most obvious significance of this sort of example is in illustratinghow the individual experience of emotion focuses our attention selectively,directing, shaping, and even partially defining our observations, just as ourobservations direct, shape, and partially define our emotions. In addition,the example has been taken further in an argument for the social con-struction of what are taken in any situation to be undisputed facts, showinghow these rest on intersubjective agreements that consist partly in sharedassumptions about ‘normal’ or appropriate emotional responses to situa-
Love and Knowledge 161tions (McLaughlin [1985]). Thus these examples suggest that certainemotional attitudes are involved on a deep level in all observation, in theintersubjectively verified and so supposedly dispassionate observations ofscience as well as in the common perceptions of daily life. In the nextsection, I shall elaborate this claim.PART TWO: EPISTEMOLOGYVII. The Myth of Dispassionate InvestigationAs we have already seen, Western epistemology has tended to view emotionwith suspicion and even hostility.13 This derogatory Western attitudetoward emotion, like the earlier Western contempt for sensory observation,fails to recognize that emotion, like sensory perception, is necessary tohuman survival. Emotions prompt us to act appropriately, to approachsome people and situations and to avoid others, to caress or cuddle, fightor flee. Without emotion, human life would be unthinkable. Moreover,emotions have an intrinsic as well as an instrumental value. Although notall emotions are enjoyable or even justifiable, as we shall see, life withoutany emotion would be life without any meaning.Within the context of Western culture, however, people have often beenencouraged to control or even suppress their emotions. Consequently, it isnot unusual for people to be unaware of their emotional state or to denyit to themselves and others. This lack of awareness, especially combinedwith a neopositivist understanding of emotion that construes it as just afeeling of which one is aware, lends plausibility to the myth of dispassionateinvestigation. But lack of awareness of emotions certainly does not meanthat emotions are not present subconsciously or unconsciously, or thatsubterranean emotions do not exert a continuing influence on people’sarticulated values and observations, thoughts, and actions.14Within the positivist tradition, the influence of emotion is usually seenonly as distorting or impeding observation or knowledge. Certainly it is truethat contempt, disgust, shame, revulsion or fear may inhibit investigation ofcertain situations or phenomena. Furiously angry or extremely sad peopleoften seem quite unaware of their surroundings or even of their ownconditions; they may fail to hear or may systematically misinterpret whatother people say. People in love are notoriously oblivious to many aspectsof the situation around them., In spite of these examples, however, positivist epistemology recognizesthat the role of emotion in the construction of knowledge is not invariably
162 Alison M. Jaggardeleterious and that emotions may make a valuable contribution to knowl-edge. But the positivist tradition will allow emotion to play only the roleof suggesting hypotheses for investigation. Emotions are allowed thisbecause the so-called logic of discovery sets no limits on the idiosyncraticmethods that investigators may use for generating hypotheses.When hypotheses are to be tested, however, positivist epistemologyimposes the much stricter logic of justification. The core of this logic isreplicability, a criterion believed capable of eliminating or cancelling outwhat are conceptualized as emotional as well as evaluative biases on thepart of individual investigators. The conclusions of Western science thus arepresumed ‘objective’, precisely in the sense that they are uncontaminated bythe supposedly ‘subjective’ values and emotions that might bias individualinvestigators (Nagel [1968, pp. 33-34]).But if, as has been argued, the positivist distinction between discoveryand justification is not viable, then such a distinction is incapable of filteringout values in science. For example, although such a split, when built intothe Western scientific method, is generally successful in neutralizing theidiosyncratic or unconventional values of individual investigators, it hasbeen argued that it does not, indeed, cannot, eliminate generally acceptedsocial values. These values are implicit in the identification of the problemsthat are considered worthy of investigation, in the selection of the hypoth-eses that are considered worthy of testing and in the solutions to theproblems that are considered worthy of acceptance. The science of pastcenturies provides ample evidence of the influence of prevailing socialvalues, whether seventeenth-century atomistic physics (Merchant [1980]) ornineteenth-century competitive interpretations of natural selection (Young[1985]).Of course, only hindsight allows us to identify clearly the values thatshaped the science of the past and thus to reveal the formative influenceon science of pervasive emotional attitudes, attitudes that typically wentunremarked at the time because they were shared so generally. For instance,it is now glaringly evident that contempt for (and perhaps fear of) peopleof color is implicit in nineteenth-century anthropology’s interpretationsand even constructions of anthropological facts. Because we are closer tothem, however, it is harder for us to see how certain emotions, such assexual possessiveness or the need to dominate others, are currently acceptedas guiding principles in twentieth-century sociobiology or even defined aspart of reason within political theory and economics (Quinby [1986]).Values and emotions enter into the science of the past and the presentnot only at the level of scientific practice but also at the metascientificlevel, as answers to various questions: What is science? How should it bepracticed? And what is the status of scientific investigation versus non-scientific modes of inquiry? For instance, it is claimed with increasing
Love and Knowledge 163frequency that the modern Western conception of science, which identifiesknowledge with power and views it as a weapon for dominating nature,reflects the imperialism, racism, and misogyny of the societies that createdit. Several feminist theorists have argued that modern epistemology itselfmay be viewed as an expression of certain emotions alleged to be especiallycharacteristic of males in certain periods, such as separation anxiety andparanoia (Flax [1983], Bordo [1987]) or an obsession with control and fearof contamination (Scheman [1985], Schott [1988]).Positivism views values and emotions as alien invaders that must berepelled by a stricter application of the scientific method. If the foregoingclaims are correct, however, the scientific method and even its positivistconstruals themselves incorporate values and emotions. Moreover, such anincorporation seems a necessary feature of all knowledge and conceptionsof knowledge. Therefore, rather than repressing emotion in epistemologyit is necessary to rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion andconstruct conceptual models that demonstrate the mutually constitutiverather than oppositional relation between reason and emotion. Far fromprecluding the possibility of reliable knowledge, ’emotion as well as valuemust be shown as necessary to such knowledge. Despite its classical antece-dents and as in the ideal of disinterested inquiry, the ideal of dispassionateinquiry is an impossible dream, but a dream none the less or perhaps amyth that has exerted enormous influence on Western epistemology. Likeall myths, it is a form of ideology that fulfils certain social and politicalfunctions.VIII. The Ideological Function of the MythSo far, I have spoken very generally of people and their emotions, asthough everyone experienced similar emotions and dealt with them insimilar ways. It is an axiom of feminist theory, however, that all gen-eralizations about ‘people’ are suspect. The divisions in our society are sodeep, particularly the divisions of race, class, and gender, that manyfeminist theorists would claim that talk about people in general is ideo-logically dangerous because such talk obscures the fact that no one is simplya person but instead is constituted fundamentally by race, class, and gender.Race, class, and gender shape every aspect of our lives, and our emotionalconstitution is not excluded. Recognizing this helps us to see more clearlythe political functions of the myth of the dispassionate investigator.Feminist theorists have pointed out that the Western tradition has notseen everyone as equally emotional. Instead, reason has been associatedwith members of dominant political, social, and cultural groups and emotionwith members of subordinate groups. Prominent among those subordinate
164 Alison M. Jaggargroups in our society are people of color, except for supposedly ‘inscrutableorientals’, and women.15Although the emotionality of women is a familiar cultural stereotype, itsgrounding is quite shaky. Women appear to be more emotional than menbecause they, along with some groups of people of color, are permittedand even required to express emotion more openly. In contemporaryWestern culture, emotionally inexpressive women are suspect as not beingreal women,’6 whereas men who express their emotions freely are suspectedof being homosexual or in some other way deviant from the masculineideal. Modern Western men, in contrast with Shakespeare’s heroes, forinstance, are required to present a facade of coolness, lack of excitement,even boredom, to express emotion only rarely and then for relatively trivialevents, such as sporting occasions, where the emotions expressed areacknowledged to be dramatized and so are not taken entirely seriously.Thus, women in our society form the main group allowed or even expectedto express emotion. A woman may cry in the face of disaster, and a manof color may gesticulate, but a white man merely sets his jaw.17White men’s control of their emotional expression may go to the extremesof repressing their emotions, failing to develop emotionally or even losingthe capacity to experience many emotions. Not uncommonly, these menare unable to identify what they are feeling, and even they may be surprised,on occasion, by their own apparent lack of emotional response to a situation,such as a death, where emotional reaction is perceived to be appropriate.In some married couples, the wife is implicitly assigned the job of feelingemotion for both of them. White, college-educated men increasingly entertherapy in order to learn how to ‘get in touch with’ their emotions, a projectother men may ridicule as weakness. In therapeutic situations, men maylearn that they are just as emotional as women but less adept at identifyingtheir own or others’ emotions. In consequence, their emotional devel-opment may be relatively rudimentary; this may lead to moral rigidity orinsensitivity. Paradoxically, men’s lacking awareness of their own emotionalresponses frequently results in their being more influenced by emotionrather than less.Although there is no reason to suppose that the thoughts and actions ofwomen are any more influenced by emotion than the thoughts and actionsof men, the stereotypes of cool men and emotional women continue toflourish because they are confirmed by an uncritical daily experience. Inthese circumstances, where there is a differential assignment of reason andemotion, it is easy to see the ideological function of the myth of thedispassionate investigator. It functions, obviously, to bolster the epistemicauthority of the currently dominant groups, composed largely of whitemen, and to discredit the observations and claims of the currently sub-ordinate groups including, of course, the observations and claims of many
Love and Knowledge 165people of color and women. The more forcefully and vehemently the lattergroups express their observations and claims, the more emotional theyappear and so the more easily they are discredited. The alleged epistemicauthority of the dominant groups then justifies their political authority.The previous section of this paper argued that dispassionate inquiry wasa myth. This section has shown that the myth promotes a conception ofepistemological justification vindicating the silencing of those, especiallywomen, who are defined culturally as the bearers of emotion and so areperceived as more ‘subjective’, biased and irrational. In our present socialcontext, therefore, the ideal of the dispassionate investigator is a classist,racist, and especially masculinist myth.18IX. Emotional Hegemony and Emotional SubversionAs we have seen already, mature human emotions are neither instinctivenor biologically determined, although they may have developed out ofpresocial, instinctive responses. Like everything else that is human,emotions in part are socially constructed; like all social constructs, they arehistorical products, bearing the marks of the society that constructedthem. Within the very language of emotion, in our basic definitions andexplanations of what it is to feel pride or embarrassment, resentment orcontempt, cultural norms and expectations are embedded. Simply describ-ing ourselves as angry, for instance, presupposes that we view ourselves ashaving been wronged, victimized by the violation of some social norm.Thus, we absorb the standards and values of our society in the very processof learning the language of emotion, and those standards and values arebuilt into the foundation of our emotional constitution.Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominatetend to serve the interests of the dominant groups. Within a capitalist,white suprematist, and male-dominant society, the predominant values willtend to be those that serve the interests of rich white men. Consequently,we are all likely to develop an emotional constitution that is quite inap-propriate for feminism. Whatever our color, we are likely to feel what IrvingThalberg has called ‘visceral racism’; whatever our sexual orientation, weare likely to be homophobic; whatever our class, we are likely to be at leastsomewhat ambitious and competitive; whatever our sex, we are likely tofeel contempt for women. Such emotional responses may be rooted in usso deeply that they are relatively impervious to intellectual argumentand may recur even when we pay Up service to changed intellectualconvictions.19By forming our emotional constitution in particular ways, our societyhelps to ensure its own perpetuation. The dominant values are implicit in
166 Alison M. Jaggarresponses taken to be precultural or acultural, our so-called gut responses.Not only do these conservative responses hamper and disrupt our attemptsto live in or prefigure alternative social forms but also, and in so far as wetake them to be natural responses, they blinker us theoretically. Forinstance, they limit our capacity for outrage; they either prevent us fromdespising or encourage us to despise; they lend plausibility to the beliefthat greed and domination are inevitable human motivations; in sum, theyblind us to the possibility of alternative ways of living.This picture may seem at first to support the positivist claim that theintrusion of emotion only disrupts the process of seeking knowledge anddistorts the results of that process. The picture, however, is not complete;it ignores the fact that people do not always experience the conventionallyacceptable emotions. They may feel satisfaction rather than embarrassmentwhen their leaders make fools of themselves. They may feel resentmentrather than gratitude for welfare payments and hand-me-downs. They maybe attracted to forbidden modes of sexual expression. They may feelrevulsion for socially sanctioned ways of treating children or animals.In other words, the hegemony that our society exercises over people’semotional constitution is not total.People who experience conventionally unacceptable, or what I call’outlaw’ emotions often are subordinated individuals who pay a dispro-portionately high price for maintaining the status quo. The social situation ofsuch people makes them unable to experience the conventionally prescribedemotions: for instance, people of color are more likely to experience angerthan amusement when a racist joke is recounted, and women subjected tomale sexual banter are less likely to be flattered than uncomfortable oreven afraid.When unconventional emotional responses are experienced by isolatedindividuals, those concerned may be confused, unable to name their experi-ence; they may even doubt their own sanity. Women may come to believethat they are ’emotionally disturbed’ and that the embarrassment or feararoused in them by male sexual innuendo is prudery or paranoia. Whencertain emotions are shared or validated by others, however, the basisexists for forming a subculture defined by perceptions, norms, and valuesthat systematically oppose the prevailing perceptions, norms, and values.By constituting the basis for such a subculture, outlaw emotions may bepolitically because epistemologically subversive.Outlaw emotions are distinguished by their incompatibility with thedominant perceptions and values, and some, though certainly not all,of these outlaw emotions are potentially or actually feminist emotions.Emotions become feminist when they incorporate feminist perceptions andvalues, just as emotions are sexist or racist when they incorporate sexist orracist perceptions and values. For example, anger becomes feminist anger
Love and Knowledge 167when it involves the perception that the persistent importuning endured byone woman is a single instance of a widespread pattern of sexual harassment,and pride becomes feminist pride when it is evoked by realizing that acertain person’s achievement was possible only because that individualovercame specifically gendered obstacles to success.20Outlaw emotions stand in a dialectical relation to critical social theory:at least some are necessary for developing a critical perspective on theworld, but they also presuppose at least the beginnings of such a perspective.Feminists need to be aware of how we can draw on some of our outlawemotions in constructing feminist theory, and also of how the increasingsophistication of feminist theory can contribute to the re-education,refinement, and eventual reconstruction of our emotional constitution.X. Outlaw Emotions and Feminist TheoryThe most obvious way in which feminist and other outlaw emotions canhelp in developing alternatives to prevailing conceptions of reality is bymotivating new investigations. This is possible because, as we saw earlier,emotions may be long-term as well as momentary; it makes sense to saythat someone continues to be shocked or saddened by a situation, even ifshe is at the moment laughing heartily. As we have seen already, theoreticalinvestigation is always purposeful, and observation always selective. Fem-inist emotions provide a political motivation for investigation and so helpto determine the selection of problems as well as the method by which theyare investigated. Susan Griffin makes the same point when she characterizesfeminist theory as following ‘a direction determined by pain, and trauma,and compassion and outrage’ (Griffin [1979, p. 31]).As well as motivating critical research, outlaw emotions may also enableus to perceive the world differently from its portrayal in conventionaldescriptions. They may provide the first indications that something iswrong with the way alleged facts have been constructed, with acceptedunderstandings of how things are. Conventionally unexpected or inap-propriate emotions may precede our conscious recognition that accepteddescriptions and justifications often conceal as much as reveal the prevailingstate of affairs. Only when we reflect on our initially puzzling irritability,revulsion, anger or fear may we bring to consciousness our ‘gut-level’awareness that we are in a situation of coercion, cruelty, injustice or danger.Thus, conventionally inexplicable emotions, particularly though not exclus-ively those experienced by women, may lead us to make subversive obser-vations that challenge dominant conceptions of the status quo. They mayhelp us to realize that what are taken generally to be facts have been
168 Alison M. Jaggarconstructed in a way that obscures the reality of subordinated people,especially women’s reality.But why should we trust the emotional responses of women and othersubordinated groups? How can we determine which outlaw emotions areto be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can wesay that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? Whatreason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of theworld, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred toperceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate onlythe general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must awaitanother occasion.21I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of asociety in which all humans (and perhaps some non-human life too) thrive,or if they are conducive to establishing such a society. For instance, it isappropriate to feel joy when we are developing or exercising our creativepowers, and it is appropriate to feel anger and perhaps disgust in thosesituations where humans are denied their full creativity or freedom. Simi-larly, it is appropriate to feel fear if those capacities are threatened in us.This suggestion, obviously, is extremely vague and may even verge onthe tautologous. How can we apply it in situations where there is dis-agreement over what is or is not disgusting or exhilarating or unjust? HereI appeal to a claim for which I have argued elsewhere: the perspective onreality that is available from the standpoint of the subordinated, which inpart at least is the standpoint of women, is a perspective that offers a lesspartial and distorted and therefore more reliable view (Jaggar [1983, ch.11]). Subordinated people have a kind of epistemological privilege in sofar as they have easier access to this standpoint and therefore a betterchance of ascertaining the possible beginnings of a society in which all couldthrive. For this reason, I would claim that the emotional responses ofsubordinated people in general, and often of women in particular, are morelikely to be appropriate than the emotional responses of the dominant class.That is, they are more likely to incorporate reliable appraisals of situations.Even in contemporary science, where the ideology of dispassionateinquiry is almost overwhelming, it is possible to discover a few examplesthat seem to support the claim that certain emotions are more appropriatethan others in both a moral and epistemological sense. For instance, HilaryRose claims that women’s practice of caring, even though warped by itscontainment in the alienated context of a coercive sexual division of labor,has nevertheless generated more accurate and less oppressive under-standings of women’s bodily functions, such as menstruation (Rose [1983]).Certain emotions may be both morally appropriate and epistemologicallyadvantageous in approaching the non-human and even the inanimate world.Jane Goodall’s scientific contribution to our understanding of chimpanzee
Love and Knowledge 169behavior seems to have been made possible only by her amazing empathywith or even love for these animals (Goodall [1986]). In her study ofBarbara McClintock, Evelyn Fox Keller describes McClintock’s relation tothe objects of her research – grains of maize and their genetic properties -as a relation of affection, empathy and ‘the highest form of love: love thatallows for intimacy without the annihilation of difference’. She notesthat McClintock’s ‘vocabulary is consistently a vocabulary of affection, ofkinship, of empathy’ (Keller [1984, p. 164]). Examples like these promptHilary Rose to assert that a feminist science of nature needs to draw onheart as well as hand and brain.XI. Some Implications of Recognizing the Epistemic Potentialof EmotionAccepting that appropriate emotions are indispensable to reliable knowl-edge does not mean, of course, that uncritical feeling may be substitutedfor supposedly dispassionate investigation. Nor does it mean that theemotional responses of women and other members of the underclass are tobe trusted without question. Although our emotions are epistemologicallyindispensable, they are not epistemologically indisputable. Like all ourfaculties, they may be misleading, and their data, like all data, are alwayssubject to reinterpretation and revision. Because emotions are not pre-social, physiological responses to unequivocal situations, they are open tochallenge on various grounds. They may be dishonest or self-deceptive,they may incorporate inaccurate or partial perceptions, or they may beconstituted by oppressive values. Accepting the indispensability of appro-priate emotions to knowledge means no more (and no less) than thatdiscordant emotions should be attended to seriously and respectfully ratherthan condemned, ignored, discounted or suppressed.Just as appropriate emotions may contribute to the development ofknowledge, so the growth of knowledge may contribute to the developmentof appropriate emotions. For instance, the powerful insights of feministtheory often stimulate new emotional responses to past and present situa-tions. Inevitably, our emotions are affected by the knowledge that thewomen on our faculty are paid systematically less than the men, that onegirl in four is subjected to sexual abuse from heterosexual men in her ownfamily, and that few women reach orgasm in heterosexual intercourse. Weare likely to feel different emotions toward older women or people of coloras we re-evaluate our standards of sexual attractiveness or acknowledgethat black is beautiful. The new emotions evoked by feminist insights arelikely in turn to stimulate further feminist observations and insights, and
170 Alison M. Jaggarthese may generate new directions in both theory and political practice.There is a continuous feedback loop between our emotional constitutionand our theorizing such that each continually modifies the other and is inprinciple inseparable from it.The ease and speed with which we can re-educate our emotions isunfortunately not great. Emotions are only partially within our controlas individuals. Although affected by new information, they are habitualresponses not quickly unlearned. Even when we come to believe consciouslythat our fear or shame or revulsion is unwarranted, we may still continueto experience emotions inconsistent with our conscious politics. We maystill continue to be anxious for male approval, competitive with our com-rades and sisters and possessive with our lovers. These unwelcome, becauseapparently inappropriate emotions, should not be suppressed or denied;instead, they should be acknowledged and subjected to critical scrutiny.The persistence of such recalcitrant emotions probably demonstrates howfundamentally we have been constituted by the dominant world view, butit may also indicate superficiality or other inadequacy in our emergingtheory and politics.22 We can only start from where we are – beings whohave been created in a cruelly racist, capitalist and male-dominated societythat has shaped our bodies and our minds, our perceptions, our values andour emotions, our language, and our systems of knowledge.The alternative epistemological models that I suggest would display thecontinuous interaction between how we understand the world and who weare as people. They would show how our emotional responses to the worldchange as we conceptualize it differently and how our changing emotionalresponses then stimulate us to new insights. They would demonstrate theneed for theory to be self-reflexive, to focus not only on the outer worldbut also on ourselves and our relation to that world, to examine criticallyour social location, our actions, our values, our perceptions, and ouremotions. The models would also show how feminist and other criticalsocial theories are indispensable psychotherapeutic tools because theyprovide some insights necessary to a full understanding of our emotionalconstitution. Thus, the models would explain how the reconstruction ofknowledge is inseparable from the reconstruction of ourselves.A corollary of the reflexivity of feminist and other critical theory is thatit requires a much broader construal than positivism accepts of the processof theoretical investigation. In particular, it requires acknowledging that anecessary part of theoretical process is critical self-examination. Time spentin analyzing emotions and uncovering their sources should be viewed,therefore, neither as irrelevant to theoretical investigation nor even as aprerequisite for it; it is not a kind of clearing of the emotional decks,’dealing with’ our emotions so that they will not influence our thinking.Instead, we must recognize that our efforts to reinterpret and refine our
Love and Knowledge 171emotions are necessary to our theoretical investigation, just as our effortsto re-educate bur emotions are necessary to our political activity. Criticalreflection on emotion is not a self-indulgent substitute for political analysisand political action. It is itself a kind of political theory and political practice,indispensable for an adequate social theory and social transformation.Finally, the recognition that emotions play a vital part in developingknowledge enlarges our understanding of women’s claimed epistemicadvantage. We can now see that women’s subversive insights owe muchto women’s outlaw emotions, themselves appropriate responses to thesituations of women’s subordination. In addition to their propensity toexperience outlaw emotions, at least on some level, women are relativelyadept at identifying such emotions, in themselves and others, in partbecause of their social responsibility for caretaking, including emotionalnurturance. It is true that women, like all subordinated peoples, especiallythose who must live in close proximity with their masters, often engage inemotional deception and even self-deception as the price of their survival.Even so, women may be less likely than other subordinated groups toengage in denial or suppression of outlaw emotions. Women’s work ofemotional nurturance has required them to develop a special acuity inrecognizing hidden emotions and in understanding the genesis of thoseemotions. This emotional acumen can now be recognized as a skill inpolitical analysis and validated as giving women a special advantage bothin understanding the mechanisms of domination and in envisioning freerways to live.XII. ConclusionThe claim that emotion is vital to systematic knowledge is only the mostobvious contrast between the conception of theoretical investigation thatI have sketched here and the conception provided by positivism. Forinstance, the alternative approach emphasizes that what we identify asemotion is a conceptual abstraction from a complex process of humanactivity that also involves acting, sensing, and evaluating. This proposedaccount of theoretical construction demonstrates the simultaneous necessityfor and interdependence of faculties that our culture has abstracted andseparated from each other: emotion and reason, evaluation and perception,observation and action. The model of knowing suggested here is non-hierarchical and antifoundationalist; instead, it is appropriately symbolizedby the radical feminist metaphor of the upward spiral. Emotions are neithermore basic than observation, reason or action in building theory, norsecondary to them. Each of these human faculties reflects an aspect of
172 Alison M. Jaggarhuman knowing inseparable from the other aspects. Thus, to borrow afamous phrase from a Marxian context, the development of each of thesefaculties is a necessary condition for the development of all.In conclusion, it is interesting to note that acknowledging the importanceof emotion for knowledge is not an entirely novel suggestion within theWestern epistemological tradition. That archrationalist, Plato himself, cameto accept in the end that knowledge required a (very purified form of) love.It may be no accident that in the Symposium Socrates learns this lessonfrom Diotima, the wise woman!NOTESI wish to thank the following individuals who commented helpfully on earlier drafts of thispaper or made me aware of further resources: Lynne Arnault, Susan Bordo, Martha Bolton,Cheshire Calhoun, Randy Cornelius, Shelagh Crooks, Ronald De Sousa, Tim Diamond, DickFoley, Ann Garry, Judy Gerson, Mary Gibson, Sherry Gorelick, Marcia Lind, Helen Longino,Catherine Lutz, Andy McLaughlin, Uma Narayan, Linda Nicholson, Bob Richardson, SallyRuddick, Laurie Shrage, Alan Soble, Vicky Spelman, Karsten Struhl, Joan Tronto, DaisyQuarm, Naomi Quinn, and Alison Wylie. I am also grateful to my colleagues in the fall 1985Women’s Studies Chair Seminar at Douglass College, Rutgers University and to audiencesat Duke University, Georgia University Centre, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, North-eastern University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Princeton University,for their responses to earlier versions of this paper. In addition, I received many helpfulcomments from members of the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy and from studentsin Lisa Heldke’s classes in feminist epistemology at Carleton College and NorthwesternUniversity. Thanks, too, to Delia Cushway, who provided a comfortable environment inwhich I wrote the first draft.1 Philosophers who do not conform to this generalization and constitute part of what SusanRordo calls a ‘recessive’ tradition in Western philosophy include Hume and Nietzsche,Dewey and James (Bordo [1987, pp. 114-18]).2 The Western tradition as a whole has been profoundly rationalist, and much of its historymay be viewed as a continuous redrawing of the boundaries of the rational. For a surveyof this history from a feminist perspective, see Lloyd (1984).3 Thus, fear or other emotions were seen as rational in some circumstances. To illustratethis point, Vicky Spelman quotes Aristotle as saying (in the Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV,ch. 5): ‘[Anyone] who does not get angry when there is reason to be angry, or who doesnot get angry in the right way at the right time and with the right people, is a dolt’ (Spelman[1982, p. 1]).4 Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant are among the prominent philosophers who did not endorsea wholly stripped-down, instrumentalist conception of reason.5 The relocation of values in human attitudes and preferences in itself was not grounds fordenying their universality, because they could have been conceived as grounded in acommon’or universal human nature. In fact, however, the variability, rather than thecommonality, of human preferences and responses was emphasized; values gradually cameto be viewed as individual, particular and even idiosyncratic rather than as universal andobjective. The only exception to the variability of human desires was the supposedlyuniversal urge to egoism and the motive to maximize one’s own utility, whatever thatconsisted in. The value of autonomy and liberty, consequently, was seen as perhaps theonly value capable of being justified objectively because it was a precondition for satisfyingother desires.6 For instance, Julius Moravcsik has characterized as emotions what I would call ‘plain’hunger and thirst, appetites that are not desires for any particular food or drink (Moravcsik
Love and Knowledge 173[1982, pp. 207-24]). I myself think that such states, which Moravcsik also calls instincts orappetites, are understood better as sensations than emotions. In other words, I would viewso-called instinctive, non-intentional feelings as the biological raw material from whichfull-fledged human emotions develop.7 Even adherents of the Dumb View recognize, of course, that emotions are not entirelyrandom or unrelated to an individual’s judgments and beliefs; in other words, they notethat people are angry or excited about something, afraid or proud of something. On theDumb View, however, the judgments or beliefs associated with an emotion are seen as itscauses and thus as related to it only externally.8 Cheshire Calhoun pointed this out to me in private correspondence.9 Recognition of the many levels on which emotions are socially constructed raises thequestion whether it makes sense even to speak of the possibility of universal emotions.Although a full answer to this question is methodologically problematic, one mightspeculate that many of what we Westerners identify as emotions have functional analoguesin other cultures. In other words, it may be that people in every culture behave in waysthat fulfil at least some social functions of our angry or fearful behavior.10 The relationship between the emotional experience of an individual and the emotionalexperience of the group to which the individual belongs may perhaps be clarified by analogywith the relation between a word and the language of which it is a part. That a word hasmeaning presupposes that it is part of a linguistic system without which it has no meaning;yet the language itself has no meaning over and above the meaning of the words of whichit is composed together with their grammatical ordering. Words and language presupposeand mutually constitute each other. Similarly, both individual and group emotion pre-suppose and mutually constitute each other.11 Averell cites dissociative reactions by military personnel at Wright Paterson Air ForceBase and shows how these were effective in mustering help to deal with difficult situationswhile simultaneously relieving the individual of responsibility or blame (Averell [1980, p.157]).12 These and similar experiments are described in Kilpatrick (1961, ch. 10), cited by McLaugh-lin (1985, p. 296).13 The positivist attitude toward emotion, which requires that ideal investigators be bothdisinterested and dispassionate, may be a modern variant of older traditions in Westernphilosophy that recommended people seek to minimize their emotional responses to theworld and develop instead their powers of rationality and pure contemplation.14 It is now widely accepted that the suppression and repression of emotion has damaging ifnot explosive consequences. There is general acknowledgement that no one can avoid atsome time experiencing emotions she or he finds unpleasant, and there is also increasingrecognition that the denial of such emotions is likely to result in hysterical disorders ofthought and behavior, in projecting one’s own emotions on to others, in displacing themto inappropriate situations, or in psychosomatic ailments. Psychotherapy, which purportsto help individuals recognize and ‘deal with’ their emotions, has become an enormousindustry, especially in the USA. In much conventional psychotherapy, however, emotionsare still conceived as feelings or passions, ‘subjective’ disturbances that afflict individualsor interfere with their capacity for rational thought and action. Different therapies,therefore, have developed a wide variety of techniques for encouraging people to’discharge’ or ‘vent’ their emotions, just as they would drain an abscess. Once emotionshave been discharged or vented, they are supposed to be experienced less intensely, oreven to vanish entirely, and consequently to exert less influence on individuals’ thoughtsand actions. This approach to psychotherapy clearly demonstrates its kinship with the’folk’ theory of anger mentioned earlier, and it equally clearly retains the traditionalWestern assumption that emotion is inimical to rational thought and action. Thus, suchapproaches fail to challenge and indeed provide covert support for the view that ‘objective’knowers are not only disinterested but also dispassionate.15 E. V. Spelman (1982) illustrates this point with a quotation from the well known con-temporary philosopher, R. S. Peters, who wrote ‘we speak of emotional outbursts,reactions, upheavals and women’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol.62).
174 Alison M. Jaggar16 It seems likely that the conspicuous absence of emotion shown by Mrs Thatcher is adeliberate strategy-she finds necessary to counter the public perception of women as tooemotional for political leadership. The strategy results in her being perceived as a for-midable leader, but as an Iron Lady rather than a real woman. Ironically, Neil Kinnock,leader of the British Labour Party and Thatcher’s main opponent in the 1987 GeneralElection, was able to muster considerable public support, through television commercialsportraying him in the stereotypically feminine role of caring about the unfortunate victimsof Thatcher economics. Ultimately, however, this support was not sufficient to destroypublic confidence in Mrs Thatcher’s ‘masculine’ competence and gain Kinnock the election.17 On the rare occasions when a white man cries, he is embarrassed and feels constrained toapologize. The one exception to the rule that men should be emotionless is that they areallowed and often even expected to experience anger. Spelman (1982) points out thatmen’s cultural permission to be angry bolsters their claim to authority.18 Someone might argue that the viciousness of this myth was not a logical necessity. In anegalitarian society, where the concepts of reason and emotion were not gender-bound inthe way they still are today, it might be argued that the ideal of the dispassionate investigatorcould be epistemologically beneficial. Is it possible that, in such socially and conceptuallyegalitarian circumstances, the myth of the dispassionate investigator could serve as aheuristic device, an ideal never to be realized in practice but nevertheless helping tominimize ‘subjectivity’ and bias? My own view is that counterfactual myths rarely bringthe benefits advertised and that this one is no exception. This myth fosters an equallymythical conception of pure truth and objectivity, quite independent of human interestsor desires, and in this way it functions to disguise the inseparability of theory and practice,science and politics. Thus, it is part of an antidemocratic world-view that mystifies thepolitical dimension of knowledge and unwarrantedly circumscribes the arena of politicaldebate.19 Of course, the similarities in our emotional constitutions should not blind us to systematicdifferences. For instance, girls rather than boys are taught fear and disgust for spiders andsnakes, affection for fluffy animals and shame for their naked bodies. It is primarily,though not exclusively, men rather than women whose sexual responses are shaped byexposure to visual and sometimes violent pornography. Girls and women are taught tocultivate sympathy for others: boys and men are taught to separate themselves emotionallyfrom others. As I have noted already, more emotional expression is permitted for lower-class and some non-white men than for ruling-class men, perhaps because the expressionof emotion is thought to expose vulnerability. Men of the upper classes learn to cultivatean attitude of condescension, boredom, or detached amusement. As we shall see shortly,differences in the emotional constitution of various groups may be epistemologicallysignificant in so far as they both presuppose and facilitate different ways of perceiving theworld.20 A necessary condition for experiencing feminist emotions is that one already be a feministin some sense, even if one does not consciously wear that label. But many women andsome men, even those who would deny that they are feminist, still experience emotionscompatible with feminist values. For instance, they may be angered by the perception thatsomeone is being mistreated just because she is a woman, or they may take special pridein the achievement of a woman. If those who experience such emotions are unwilling torecognize them as feminist, their emotions’are probably described better as potentiallyfeminist or prefeminist emotions.21 I owe this suggestion to Marcia Lind.22 Within a feminist context, Berenice Fisher suggests that we focus particular attention onour emotions of guilt and shame as part of a critical re-evaluation of our political idealsand our political practice (Fisher [1984]).REFERENCESAverell, James R. 1980. ‘The Emotions’, in Ervin Staub (ed.), Personality: Basic Aspects andCurrent Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Love and Knowledge 175Bordo, S. R. 1987. The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture. Albany,N.Y.: SUNY Press.Fisher, Berenice 1984. ‘Guilt and Shame in the Women’s Movement: The Radical Ideal ofAction and its Meaning for Feminist Intellectuals’. Feminist Studies 10, 185-212.Flax, Jane 1983. ‘Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A PsychoanalyticPerspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics’, in Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka(eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Meth-odology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.Goodall, Jane 1986. The Chimpanzees of Bombe: Patterns of Behavior. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press.Griffin, Susan 1979. Rape: The Power of Consciousness. San Francisco: Harper & Row.Hinman, Lawrence 1986. ‘Emotion, Morality and Understanding.’ Paper presented at AnnualMeeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, St. Louis,Missouri, May 1986.Jaggar, Alison M. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman &Allanheld/Brighton, U.K.: Harvester Press.Keller, E. F. 1984. Gender and Science. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.Kilpatrick, Franklin P. (ed.) 1961. Explorations in Transactional Psychology. New York: NewYork University Press.Lakoff, George and Kovecses, Zoltan 1987. ‘The Cognitive Model of Anger Inherent inAmerican English’, in N. Quinn and D. Holland (eds.), Cultural Models in Language andThought. New York: Cambridge University Press.Lewontin, R. C. 1982. ‘Letter to the Editor’. New York Review of Books, 4 February, 40-41. This letter was drawn to my attention by Alan Soble.Lloyd, Geneyieve 1984. The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Lutz, Catherine 1985. ‘Depression and the Translation of Emotional Worlds’, in A. KleinmanandB. Good(eds.), Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-culturalPsychiatry of Affect and Disorder. Berkeley: University of California Press, 63-100.Lutz, Catherine 1986. ‘Emotion, Thought, and Estrangement: Emotion as a CulturalCategory’. Cultural Anthropology 1, 287-309.Lutz, Catherine 1987. ‘Goals, Events and Understanding in Ifaluck and Emotion Theory’, inN. Quinn and D. Holland (eds.). Cultural Models in Language and Thought. New York:Cambridge University Press.McLaughlin, Andrew 1985. ‘Images and Ethics of Nature’. Environmental Ethics 7, 293-319.Merchant, Carolyn M. 1980. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the ScientificRevolution. New York: Harper & Row.Moravcsik, J. M. E. 1982. ‘Understanding and the Emotions’, Dialectica 36, nos. 2-3, 207-24.Nagel, E. 1968. ‘The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter’; in May Brodbeck (ed.),Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.Quinby, Lee 1986. Discussion following talk at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, April,1986.Rorty, Richard 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press.Rosaldo, Michelle Z. 1984. ‘Towards an Anthropology of Self and Feeling’, in Richard A.Shweder and Robert A. LeVine (eds.), Culture Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Rose, Hilary 1983. ‘Hand, Brain, and Heart: A Feminist Epistemology for the NaturalSciences’. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 9, no. 1, 73-90.Schachter, Stanley and Singer, Jerome B. 1969. ‘Cognitive, Social and Psychological Deter-minants of Emotional State’. Psychological Review 69, 379-99.Scheman, Naomi 1985. ‘Women in the Philosophy Curriculum.’ Paper presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association.Chicago, April, 1985.Schott, Robin M. 1988. Cognition and Eros: A Critique of the Kantian Paradigm. Boston,Mass.: Beacon.
176 Alison M. JaggarSpelman, E. V. 1982. ‘Anger and Insubordination.’ Manuscript; early version read to mid-western chapter of the Society for Women in Philosophy, spring, 1982.Wierzbicka, Anna 1986. ‘Human Emotions:
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