How should police agencies evaluate their intelligence led attempts at crime control? What types of evaluations work best at evaluating these initiatives? What are the obstacles to measur

THE CHALLENGES OF COVERT ACTIVITY

• This section reiterates the often misunderstood idea that covert activity is not intelligence‐led policing. Covert activity is simply a technique to gather information. Intelligence‐led policing is a business model for better resource allocation and decisions.

• Although the ACPO market research report found a general level of support for proactive policing, covert techniques of information gathering must be employed in such a manner as not to damage police legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

a. The risks of greater informant use in covert activities

• Norris and Dunnighan’s quote is probably a little too negative, but a considerable problem with the research literature is the lack of research generally into the area of informant use, positive or negative.

• The 5x5x5 scheme is similar to the Admiralty (or NATO) system, but with the addition of a handling code to indicate conditions for the dissemination of the information. The Admiralty system is a 6×6 scheme. The links section has a link to a relevant Wikipedia page.

b. Principle of proportionality

• ‘Surveillance creep’ is a term that Gary Marx applied to a range of surveillance‐type measures. For example, we could apply the concept to CCTV cameras, the tracking of credit card information, monitoring of web sites visited, automated e‐mail reading, social networking sites and so on.

c. Storing private information

• Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23,is often abbreviated to 28CFR23.

• The Policy clarification from the BJA is important because of the common misunderstanding of the constraints of 28CFR23. Often, too many US police departments do not use criminal information to the fullest extent because of an over‐cautious approach to this legislation.

d. Human rights and surveillance

The Don Weatherburn quote is probably the most salient comment; ‘If police are to create a credible threat of apprehension for carrying a prohibited weapon they are bound to conduct searches of a large number of people who, it will turn out, are not in possession of a weapon’. Dr. Don Weatherburn is the Director of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.

THE WIDENING SECURITY AGENDA

• This is an emerging academic research area that is being spearheaded by young and innovative researchers such as my colleague Jennifer Wood, and University of Montreal Professor Benoit Dupont.

a. Greater strategic application

• The GMAC PBM (see chapter 7) is a good example of the integration of strategic meetings into the normal tactical planning cycle.

• Jim Sheptycki has written extensively on the greater strategic application of criminal intelligence. See further reading section below.

• If you are interested in Reassurance Policing and Signal Crimes, then the work,of Martin Innes is appropriate and useful. See further reading section below.

• The greater strategic use of crime intelligence is an issue for authors of Threat and Risk Assessments.

b. Merging criminal intelligence and national security

• Observers in the UK will be familiar with the brief foray of the MI5 role into organized crime and drugs after the collapse of the Iron Curtain. 9/11 brought back a counter‐terrorism focus, but the boundaries between police and national security had already been blurred.

• The challenge in the US is a little more difficult. In many respects, the problem is not that national security agencies don’t want to work with local police, but rather that both sides do not understand the needs of the other.

AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

a. Conceptual training for analysts and executives

• The lack of executive training in intelligence‐led policing is a real problem. Too many think they know what intelligence‐led policing is, without actually engaging with the idea and learning what is actually involved.

• The few agencies I am aware of that address executive training include; the Australian Federal Police Intelligence Program, the New Jersey State Police Regional Intelligence Academy, and the National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA) in LA. The Manhattan Institute have been instrumental in getting the US locations up and running.

b. Disseminating success

• A link with the Center for Problem Oriented Policing is one possibility, though

there is also a funding proposal before Congress in the US for a Center for Intelligence‐Led Policing.

c. Looking beyond the tactical imperatives

• The development of SOCA in the UK has been, I understand, a rather uneven business.

• The training of law enforcement leaders in the use of crime intelligence for strategic planning rather than tactical operations is a theme running through the book. The issue is a tricky one in the US, where police chiefs only have a job tenure of a few years – little time to see valuable initiatives come to fruition.

d. Engage the next cohort of police leaders

• The increase in numbers of police officers entering the service with tertiary (University) degrees is encouraging.

• Some police forces, such as the Australian Federal Police, only employ graduates.

• In the future, it is to be hoped that a background in investigations is not a common prerequisite for senior ranks.

e. Ten yardsticks for intelligence‐led policing

• Where I say ‘5. Analytical and executive training is available’, this really should read ‘education’ rather than training. The whole issue of intelligenceled policing is a broader educational need rather than one of learning systems by rote as might be suggested by the word ‘training’. However, I didn’t want to lose my audience completely!

• There is no single one of these ten are more important than the others. However, without a doubt little will happen unless there is no. 1 – a supportive and informed command structure… than can demonstrate leadership, ownership and understanding.