Perception Factors Please respond to the followin

Chapter 4

knowledge objectives After reading this chapter, you should be able to: 1. Describe the basic learning principles as described by operant conditioning theory and social cognitive theory, as well as the conditions which facilitate adult learning. 2. Understand the basic elements of training and how training can be accomplished through OB Mod, simulations, and learning from failure. 3. Discuss the three stages of perception. Understand the factors and biases influencing our perceptions of people and tasks. 4. Describe how we make causal attributions about behavior. exploring behavior in action The Strategic Importance of Learning and Perception VF Corporation, headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina, is the world’s largest apparel manufacturer, with revenues of $11 billion plus annually. Chances are that you have several items of their clothing in your closet. Their more than 30 brands include Wrangler, Lee, Vans, The North Face, Nautica, Timberland, 7 For All Mankind, and Jansport. The success of the VF Corporation is due in part to a growth plan launched in 2004. The goal of this plan was to transform the VF Corporation in a global lifestyle apparel company. VF credits its strong financial performance to six growth drivers, one of which is enabling our future. The company described this goal as: “Taking our company to new heights requires new capabilities and skills, and we’ve invested in areas that are specifically designed to support our growth. . . . [W]e know that providing our leaders and associates with new tools and training that stretches their capabilities is crucial to our continued success.” Thus, associ- ate learning, development, and knowledge sharing has become one of the crucial drivers of the VF Corporation’s strategy. Tom Nelson, currently VF Corporation’s managing director and vice-president of product procurement, stated, “Learn- ing and development makes a significant contribution to the company’s ongoing success.” VF Asia Ltd., a subsidiary of VF Corporation located in Hong Kong, took this directive very seriously. This subsidiary totally reorganized its learning unit, which had previously been somewhat piecemeal, with a program here, a learning opportunity there. Tommy Lo, who was the learning and development manager at the time, guided the two-person regional training team by first creating a strategy. The compa- ny’s 780 employees were grouped into one of four learning cat- egories, determined by their level in the organization and the content that needed to be learned and skills developed. These categories are personal competencies, functional leadership, managerial leadership, and strategic leadership. Furthermore, all functions associated with training, performance review and development, feedback, and reward were grouped together in the same program. Thus, training and development were tied to on-the-job performance. A further part of the firm’s learning and development strategy was to keep as many programs and initiatives as possible in-house rather than outsourcing them to vendors and contractors. Not only is this cost-effective, but it makes the most use out of in-house knowledge and talent. Finally, although VF Asia is across the world from its parent company, learning and development at the subsidiary was well integrated with that which takes place at headquarters. VF Corporation has a Global Learning Community, which shares new ideas and best practices through conference calls, and cer- tain employees attend corporate learning programs such as the VF Leadership Institute. Specific initiatives were put in place, all of which were tied to company core competencies. One concern was leader- ship development. To that end, Lo and his team developed a senior executive curriculum and middle-manager-level cur- riculum. Another concern was turnover. Thus, they developed a program to improve managers’ interviewing skills, so that they would be better at judging job candidates. Turnover decreased from 26.8 percent in 2007 to 19.3 percent in 2008. In order to improve associates’ ability to deal with customers from diverse cultures, the SELF (Self Enhancement Learning Fundamentals) program was initi- ated. This is an online training pro- gram covering topics such as eti- quette and negotiations. Associates can use this program at their own leisure. Overall, the 780 associates at VF Asia Ltd. underwent 14,200 hours of training in 2008. The vast majority of organiza- tions do not assess the effectiveness of their training programs beyond getting participants’ reactions to the programs. Things are different at 360b/Shutterstock VF Asia Ltd. Learning goals are tied into individual performance evaluations and to the strategic goals of the organization. Monthly learning and development summaries are sent to executives. VF Asia Ltd. makes sure its Sources: ASTD BEST Awards. At http://www.astd.org/ASTD/aboutus/Awardsand- BestPractices/bestAwards/; ASTD Learning Circuits, (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www .astd.org/LC/news.htm. J.J. Salopek, P. Harris, P. Ketter, M. Laff, & J. Llorens, “Success Is in the Details,” T & D (Oct. 6, 2009), 10; pp. 36–38. VF Corporation, “About VF: Growth Drivers,” accessed May 27, 2014, http://www.vfc.com/about/ training and development dollars are well spent. In 2009, this focus on learning was recognized with a BEST award by the American Society for Training and Develop- ment (ASTD). The criteria for this award are: • Investment is made in learning and performance initiatives. our-strategy/growth-drivers; W. Loeb, “VF Corp. has the Midas touch,” Forbes (April 2, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterloeb/2013/04/02/vf-corp-has- the-midas-touch/; VF Corporation, “About VF,” accessed May 27, 2014, at http:// www.vfc.com/about. The redevelopment of VF Asia Ltd.’s learning and development strategy illustrates the importance of learning to the overall strategic goals of the organization. The learning processes in this organization serve to develop current associates so that they have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to allow the organization to grow. Associates simply do not go through one-time training programs—what they learn in training is later assessed as part of their job performance and is thus tied to individual rewards. As we will soon discuss, rewards play an important role in the learning process. At a second level, learning processes help VF Asia tie individual training, development, performance evaluation, and rewards to the overall strategic vision of the organization. The corporate strategy and goals determine what is to be learned, and the success of training and development initiatives are evaluated at the executive level by the degree to which they achieve the firm’s strategic goals. Learning is fully integrated into the culture at VF Asia Ltd. and is therefore viewed as an important part of the organization’s success by associates and leaders at all levels in the firm. To be competitive in the dynamic twenty-first century, an organization must have associ- ates and managers who can effectively learn and grow. Continuous learning based on trying new things plays a critical role in an organization’s capability to gain and sustain a competitive advantage. Organizations can improve only when their human capital is enriched through learning. Their human capital must be better and produce more value for customers than their competitors to gain an advantage in the marketplace and to maintain that advantage.1 Fur- thermore, providing developmental opportunities to associates helps organizations attract and retain the people most interested in personal growth and becoming better at their work. Thus, managers need to develop the means for associates and all managers to continuously improve their knowledge and skills. To open this chapter, we explore the fundamentals of learning, including contingen- cies of reinforcement and various schedules of reinforcement. From there, we apply learn- ing principles to the training of newcomers and the purposeful modification of existing Learning and Perception learning A process through which individuals change their relatively permanent behavior based on positive or negative experiences in a situation. operant conditioning theory An explanation for consequence-based learning that assumes learning results from simple conditioning and that higher mental functioning is irrelevant. associates’ behavior. We focus on specific conditions helpful to learning, the use of behav- ior modification, simulations, and how people can learn from failure. Next, we move to a discussion of perception. Accurately perceiving characteristics of people, attributes of tasks, and the nature of cause-and-effect relationships is critical to properly assessing and learning from experiences. Several mental biases, however, can interfere with accurate perceptions. Fundamental Learning Principles When individuals first enter an organization, they bring with them their own unique experi- ences, perceptions, and ways of behaving. These patterns of behavior have developed because they have helped these individuals cope with the world around them. However, associates introduced to a new organization or to new tasks may need to learn new behaviors that will make them effective in the new situation. Associates and managers must therefore be acquainted with the principles and processes that govern learning. In the field of organizational behavior, learning refers to relatively permanent changes in human capabilities that occur as a result of experience rather than a natural growth pro- cess.2 These capabilities are related to specific learning outcomes, such as new behaviors, verbal information, intellectual skills, motor skills, attitudes, and cognitive strategies. Both parts of this definition are important. First, learning takes place only when changes in capabilities occur. Ultimately, these changes should result in changed behavior, since true learning represents adaptation to circumstances, and this must be reflected in behavior. Furthermore, this change should be relatively permanent until a new response is learned to the given situation. Second, learning is driven by experience with a particular situation. An associate may gain insights into a situation by thoughtfully trying different approaches to see what happens, by randomly trying different actions in a trial-and-error process, or by carefully observing others’ actions. In all cases, however, the associate has gained experi- ence in the situation—experience that affects behavior when the situation occurs again. Change in one’s capabilities due to a natural growth process (e.g., gaining muscle strength) is not learning. Operant Conditioning and Social Cognitive Theory Most behavior exhibited by associates and managers is intentional in the sense that a given behavior is designed to bring about a positive consequence or avoid a negative consequence. Some associates shake hands when they see each other in the morning because it feels good and expresses respect or affection. Other associates apply the brakes on a forklift to avoid an accident. Managers may not develop close social relationships with their organization’s associates in order to avoid the complications that can result. All of these behaviors have been learned. Operant conditioning theory and social learning theory both can be used to explain learning. Both are reinforcement theories based on the idea that behavior is a function of its consequences.3 Operant conditioning theory traces its roots at least back to a famous set of experiments involving cats, dogs, and other animals in the late 1800s.4 The goal of the experiments was to show that animals learn from the consequences of their behavior in a very straightforward way—that presentation of a reward, such as food, conditions an animal to repeat the rewarded behavior in the same or similar situations. In later years, research- ers such as B.F. Skinner emphasized this same conditioning in people.5 These researchers, known as behaviorists, adopted the position that higher mental processes typically ascribed to Punishment When behavior results in the introduction of a negative consequence, individuals are less likely to repeat the behavior. This is called punishment. Punishment differs from negative rein- forcement in that an undesirable consequence is introduced rather than removed. Punishment reduces the likelihood of a behavior, whereas negative reinforcement increases the likelihood. An associate who is reprimanded by peers for returning a few minutes late from lunch experi- ences punishment, as does an associate whose manager assigns him less preferred work hours in response to tardiness. Punishment must be used judiciously in organizations because it can create a backlash both among those punished and among those who witness the punishment.7 It is imperative when punishment is doled out that it be made contingent upon associates engaging in nega- tive behavior.8 Several examples illustrate this problem. At the Providence Journal, a newspaper organization in the northeastern United States, senior management reprimanded two indi- viduals and suspended a third for an editorial cartoon that seemed to poke fun at the publisher. Union officials and many union members believed the punishments were too harsh, resulting in ill will at a time when relations were already strained.9 At the IRS, some managers failed to discipline associates for tardiness, extended lunches, and so forth in a consistent manner, resulting in numerous problems.10 At Accent Signage Systems, a Minneapolis company that specializes in Americans-with-Disabilities-Act-compliant signs and other interior signage, the decision was made to terminate an employee for rude, abusive behavior after a series of failed efforts to address his actions. Although termination was probably a reasonable response, the result was far from reasonable; the terminated individual returned with a gun. He killed five people and injured three others before shooting himself, illustrating the complexity of manag- ing punishment.11 What constitutes an appropriate use of punishment in an organization? When associates exhibit minor counterproductive behaviors, such as rudeness to a peer or a lunch that lasts a few minutes too long, punishment involving a verbal reprimand can be delivered informally by peers or a manager. For more serious behaviors, such as intentional and repeated loafing or consistently leaving the workplace early, a more formal process should be used. Based on requirements set by the National Labor Relations Act, Union Carbide has successfully used the following formal process when dealing with problems as they unfold over time: (1) the problem is discussed informally, and the associate is reminded of expectations; (2) the associate receives one or more written reminders; (3) the associate is suspended for one day, with pay, and asked to consider his future with the organization; and (4) the associate is terminated.12 Whether they are imposing minor informal punishment or major formal punishment, associates and managers should follow several guidelines: • Deliver the punishment as quickly as possible following the undesirable behavior. • Direct the punishment at specific behaviors that have been made clear to the recipient. • Deliver the punishment in an objective, impersonal fashion. • Listen to the offending party’s explanation before taking action. The problems at Korean Air discussed in the Managerial Advice feature were caused at least in part by the overuse of punishment. Clearly, as the case illustrates, the use of punishment at this airline played a role in the crash. Being struck by a person above you in the organiza- tion is a particularly difficult situation, even for those in an authoritarian culture. Such an approach is inappropriate in a high-involvement organization. In complex situations, associ- ates and managers need the input of others to avoid making possibly serious errors such as those leading to the Korean Air crash. The changes implemented by the new president of the airline and the director of flight operations have helped to resolve the problem. Because Korean culture respects traditional authority, changing the culture at this airline was difficult.13 Yet the changes were important for the airline to compete in a global marketplace.

MANAGERIAL ADVICE Punishment Taken Too Far Sources: “Korean Air Is Restructuring Its Flight Operations Division,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 152, no. 21 (2000): 21; “Cargo Airline of the Year: Korean Air Cargo,” Air Transport World, 40, no. 2 (2000): 30–31; W.M. Carley and A. Pasztor, “Pilot Error: Korean Air Confronts Dismal Safety Record Rooted in Its Culture,” Wall Street Journal (July 7, 1999); Z. Coleman and M. Song, “Inquiry Blames Cockpit Crew for KAL Crash,” Wall Street Journal (June 6, 2001), P.M. Perry, “Cage the Rage,” Warehousing Management, 8, no. 2 (2001): 37–40; P. Starobin, “The Oilman as Teacher,” BusinessWeek (June 25, 2001), G. Thomas, “Korean Air CEO Vows ’No More Excuses,’” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 153, no. 1 (2000): 48; G. Thomas, “The Yin and Yang of Korean Air,” Air Transport World, 39, no. 10 (2002): 26–29. At 1:00 a.m. on August 6, 1997, most clearly evident during training. the pilots of a Korean Air 747 prepared to land at the Guam airport. Because the airport’s glide slope guidance system had been turned off for maintenance and because the airport’s radio beacon was located in a nonstandard posi- tion, the landing was more difficult than usual. A rainstorm further complicated the situation. Under these conditions, the captain needed frank and timely advice from a fully informed and empowered co-pilot and flight engineer. Sadly, no such advice was given by the intimidated subordinates. The resulting crash claimed 228 lives. The suboptimal cockpit climate on board the aircraft that morning seems to have been caused in part by Korean Air’s authoritarian culture, which included heavy- handed punishment delivered by captains for unwanted subordinate input and mistakes. Park Jae Hyun, a former captain with the air- line and then a flight inspector with the Minis- try of Transportation, believed that teamwork in the cockpit was nearly impossible in the existing “obey or else” environment, where co-pilots “couldn’t express themselves if they found something wrong with the captain’s piloting skills.” This environment was perhaps An American working as a pilot for the airline reported, “I’ve seen a captain punch a co-pilot … for a mistake and the co-pilot just said, ’Oh, sorry, sorry.’” Another Ameri- can reports being hit as well, but as an outsider he did not accept the abuse and said to the captain, “Do it again and I’ll break your arm.” Korean officials, American officials, and many others believed change was necessary to prevent additional accidents and to gen- erally improve the organization. Following another crash and the forced res- ignations of key leaders in the late 1990s, new leaders inside Korean Air took actions to change the authoritarian, punishment-ori- ented culture. Yi Taek Shim, the new presi- dent, vowed that cultural and technological problems would be addressed whatever the cost. Koh Myung Joon, who became the new director of flight operations, sought captains for training duty who had “the right tempera- ment,” meaning they would not use inappro- priate, heavy-handed punishment but rather would focus on positive reinforcement for desired behavior. These leaders clearly had Chris Parypa Photography/Shutterstock useful insights. Korean Air has had an excel- lent safety record in the twenty-first century, and crucial relationships with partner airlines have been strengthened. Consistent with actions and outcomes at Korean Air, Francis Friedman of Time & Place Strategies in New York has said that individuals in positions of authority should not “get into a kick-the-dog mentality.” Even Simon Kukes, a Russian who achieved noto- riety as CEO of Tyumen Oil, has suggested that managers should not “yell, scream, and try to find someone to punish.” This is interest- ing advice, given the general authoritarian culture in Russia. Sources: “Korean Air Is Restructuring Its Flight Operations Division,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 152, no. 21 (2000): 21; “Cargo Airline of the Year: Korean Air Cargo,” Air Transport World, 40, no. 2 (2000): 30–31; W.M. Carley and A. Pasztor, “Pilot Error: Korean Air Confronts Dismal Safety Record Rooted in Its Culture,” Wall Street Journal (July 7, 1999); Z. Coleman and M. Song, “Inquiry Blames Cockpit Crew for KAL Crash,” Wall Street Journal (June 6, 2001), P.M. Perry, “Cage the Rage,” Warehousing Management, 8, no. 2 (2001): 37–40; P. Starobin, “The Oilman as Teacher,” BusinessWeek (June 25, 2001), G. Thomas, “Korean Air CEO Vows ’No More Excuses,’” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 153, no. 1 (2000): 48; G. Thomas, “The Yin and Yang of Korean Air,” Air Transport World, 39, no. 10 (2002): 26–29. he reinforcing consequences of some dysfunctional work behaviors, however, may be completely removable. For example, an associate may have developed a habit of regularly visit- ing the manager’s office to complain about her co-workers. Most of the complaints are trivial, and the manager wishes to extinguish this practice. However, the fact that the manager has appeared to be attentive and understanding is a positive, reinforcing consequence. The man- ager may therefore extinguish the behavior by refusing to listen whenever this associate com- plains about her co-workers. (During a useful conversation with the associate, the manager would, of course, be attentive; only the dysfunctional behavior should be extinguished.) To use extinction, then, managers must recognize the reinforcing consequences of a behavior, and these consequences must be controllable. Extinction is supposedly used to eliminate dysfunctional behavior. However, this phe- nomenon can also result in unintended consequences by extinguishing desirable behavior. In a study of hospital employees, some researchers found that when managers failed to provide feedback for good performance (a reward), employees performed more poorly and became unsatisfied with their jobs.14 Schedules of Reinforcement Positive and negative reinforcement are powerful tools in many situations. To fully leverage these two tools, it is important to understand schedules of reinforcement.15 These schedules determine how often reinforcement is given for desired behavior. Reinforcement does not necessarily need to follow every instance of a positive behavior. The simplest schedule is continuous reinforcement, whereby reward occurs after each instance of a particular behavior or set of behaviors. This schedule tends to produce reasonably high rates of the rewarded behavior because it is relatively easy for an individual to understand the connection between a behavior and its positive consequences.16 Behavior in organizations, however, often is not reinforced on a continuous schedule, for several reasons. First, once ini- tial learning has occurred through training and/or coaching, continuous reinforcement is not required to maintain learned behavior. Second, in today’s organizations, both managers and associates are presumed to be self-managing, at least to some degree. Thus, they do not need continuous reinforcement of positive actions. Intermittent reinforcement, then, is often used to maintain learned behavior. Sched- ules can vary by rewarding responses only after a specified number of correct behaviors have occurred or after a specified amount of time has passed. The four most common intermittent schedules found in organizations are as follows: 1. Fixed interval. With this schedule, a reinforcement becomes available only after a fixed period of time has passed since the previous reinforcement. For example, an associate at an airport car rental counter might receive a dollar and praise for saying “May I help you?” rather than using the grammatically incorrect “Can I help you?” Because the manager delivering the reinforcement has a limited amount of money and time to devote to this bonus plan, he might listen from his back office for the proper greeting only after two hours have passed since his last delivery of reinforcement. Upon hearing the greeting after the two-hour interval, the manager would provide the next reinforcement. A fixed-interval schedule like this one can make the desired behavior more resistant to extinction than the continuous schedule because the associate is not accustomed to being reinforced for every instance of the desired behavior. However, it can also yield lower probabilities of the desired behavior immediately after reinforcement has occurred because the person may realize that no additional reinforcement is possible for a period of time. Moreover, it can yield generally low probabilities of the desired behavior if the fixed interval is too long for the situation.17 Overall, this schedule of reinforcement tends to be the least effective. 2. Variable interval. With this second schedule, a reinforcement becomes available after a variable period of time has passed since the previous reinforcement. In our car rental example, the manager might listen for and reward the desired greeting one hour after the previous reinforcement and then again after one half hour, and then again after three hours. This schedule can produce a consistently high rate of the desired behavior because the associate does not know when reinforcement might be given next. If, however, the average time between reinforcements becomes too great, the variable-interval schedule can lose its effectiveness.18 3. Fixed ratio. With this third reinforcement schedule, a reinforcer is introduced after the desired behavior has occurred a fixed number of times. In our car rental example, the manager might listen closely to all of the greetings used by a given associate and reward the desired greeting every third time it is used. In industrial settings, managers may create piece-rate incentive systems whereby individual production workers are paid, for example, $5.00 after producing every fifth piece. Although the fixed-ratio schedule can produce a reasonably high rate of desired behavior, it can also result in a short period immediately following reinforcement when the desired behavior does not occur.19 Such outcomes occur because associates and managers relax following reinforcement, knowing they are starting over. 4. Variable ratio. With our final schedule, a reinforcement is introduced after the desired behavior has occurred a variable number of times. The manager of our car rental counter may listen closely all day to the greetings but, because of money and time constraints, reward only the first desired greeting, the fifth, the eight, the fifteenth, the seventeenth, and so on. This schedule of reinforcement tends to produce consistently high rates of desired behavior and tends to make extinction less likely than under the other schedules.20 The variable-ratio schedule is very common in many areas of life, including sports: baseball and softball players are reinforced on this schedule in their hitting, basketball players in their shot making, anglers in their fishing, and gamblers in their slot machine activities. In business organizations, salespersons are perhaps more subject to this schedule than others, with a variable number of sales contacts occurring between actual sales. Exhibit 4-2 summarizes various schedules of reinforcement. Social Cognitive Theory Although the principles of operant conditioning explain a great deal of learning that takes place, people also learn in other ways. Social cognitive theory argues that in addition to learn- ing through direct reinforcement, people can also learn by anticipating consequences of their behavior and by modeling others.21 In other words, learning occurs through the mental processing of information.22 According to these approaches to learning, one way that associates can learn is through symbolization and forethought.23 People have the ability to symbolize events and to anticipate consequences. This means that rather than having to directly experience possible consequences of one’s behavior, a person can try out various scenarios in his or her mind to determine what potential consequences may result from a particular behavior. For example, if a manager has to make a decision about whether to open a new branch office, she can rely on past experience to

come up with symbolic representation of the problem and then anticipate what outcomes may occur if she decides to open the new office. According to social learning theory, people also learn by observing others. Rather than having to experience consequences first-hand, associates can observe the behavior of others and the results of that behavior.24 When results are positive, then associates will model the behavior demonstrated by the other person. For example, if an associate is trying to learn how to give presentations, rather than try out many different presentation styles, he may observe his supervisor, who is a wonderful presenter, and then model the supervisor’s presentation style. Associates are most likely to model the behavior of people they perceive to be competent, powerful, friendly, and of high status within the organization.25 Social learning theory also states that an individual’s belief that he will be able to perform a specific task in a given situation is important to learning. This belief is referred to as one’s self-efficacy. When associates have high self-efficacy toward a particular task, they believe poorly when they do not believe that they are able to accomplish the task at a satisfactory level. Athletes are often trained to visualize themselves performing extremely well in order to increase their self-efficacy, and consequently their performance. A great deal of research has shown that self-efficacy increases performance and learning, beyond ability.27 If there are two people with the same ability, the person with the higher self-efficacy will tend to perform better and learn more. Training and Enhancing the Performance of Associates 115 Other Conditions for Learning In addition to learning through consequences and observing others, more recent research has noted that the following conditions help facilitate adult learning:28 • Associates need to know why they are learning what they are learning. People become more motivated to learn when they understand why what they are learning is important.29 For example, in order for associates to successfully train to engage in safe behaviors, they must first understand what constitutes safe behavior and then understand the consequences of not engaging in these behaviors.30 In order for associates to know why they are learning what they are learning, they must be provided with specific learning objectives.31 Also, allowing associates to either directly or vicariously experience the negative effects of not learning may help them understand why learning the material is important.32 We discuss learning from failure in more detail later in this chapter. • Associates need to use their own experiences as the basis for learning. Many teaching and learning experts believe that people learn best when they can tie newly learned material to their past experiences, take an active role in their own learning, and are able to reflect on their learning experiences.33 According to the experiential learning perspective, it is imperative for learning to

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