Explain how the political and social history of Myanmar affected the response after Cyclone Nargis. How did it affect their r

ANOTHER NARGIS STRIKES EVERY DAY

WWW.GFDRR.ORG

A N

O T

H E

R N

A R

G IS

S T

R IK

E S

E V

E R

Y D

A Y

Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring Five Years On

ABOUT GFDRR The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) helps

high-risk, low-income developing countries adapt to climate change and better understand

and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Working with over 400 community-

level, national, and international partners, GFDRR provides grant financing, on-the-ground

technical assistance helping mainstream disaster-mitigation policies into country-level

strategies, and thought leadership on disaster- and climate-resilience issues through a range

of knowledge-sharing activities. GFDRR is managed by the World Bank and funded by 25

donor partners.

The preparation of this report was supported by the Global Facility for Disaster

Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The report provides a practical example of the

importance of understanding and monitoring the social impacts of a natural disaster on

affected communities and highlights critical issues that may otherwise remain hidden.

Complementing the PDNA methodology, social-impacts analysis deepens post-disaster

recovery frameworks and programs. It also guides aid providers in allocating resources to

the evolving needs and priorities of affected communities and in choosing implementation

modalities that take into account local realities.

October 2008 June 2013

Photo Credits:

Photographs courtesy of Markus Kostner and Patrick Barron.

The photos on the inside covers were taken in a highly affected village in Bogale township, in October 2008 (left) and June 2013 (right). The

top photos depicts the footbridge connecting two sections of the village that makes crossing the creek still a precarious undertaking five

years after Nargis.

The bottom photos depict the primary school of the village which was destroyed by Nargis and newly constructed as a combined cyclone

shelter within two years of the cyclone.

A N

O TH

E R

N A

R G

IS S

TR IK

E S

E

V E

R Y

D A

Y

P O

S T-N

A R

G IS

S O

C IA

L IM P

A C

TS

M O

N ITO

R IN

G FIV

E Y

E A

R S

O N

10

11

Social Relations and Institutions ///Social relations remained strong …///

In about three-quarters of villages, social relations were considered good or fair, including in two- thirds of the highly affected villages. Where social relations were good, the community was organized and villagers undertook collective activities, mostly socio-religious tasks and regular community works such as road renovation and pond cleaning. Where social relations were poor, villagers were divided into different groups, and communal activities occurred only within these groups. In most cases, poor social relations were a remnant of the aid effort in one way or another.

///… but the bonds were getting weaker …///

At the same time, however, villagers felt that relations were worse than before Nargis in about half of the villages, including in two-thirds of the highly affected villages. Socioeconomic challenges had a negative impact on social cohesion. Better- off families that used to sponsor religious activities before Nargis were no longer able to afford them, depriving villagers of an important venue in which to strengthen social cohesion between community members. Increased migration among villagers of working age and the need to work longer hours also left villagers with less time to socialize with their neighbors.

///… especially in heterogeneous villages///

The passing away of religious leaders during Nargis contributed to strained social relations five years on, especially in villages with both Muslims and Buddhists. This was accentuated by the fact that aid had sometimes been provided along religious lines in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone. Villagers indicated that they were dealing with each other carefully and were no longer as comfortable in engaging with each other. On the whole, however,

villagers maintained social bonds across religious groups in spite of the deterioration of relationships elsewhere in the country. Leadership played a critical role in maintaining good relations.

///The role of women and youth continued

to evolve///

With aid having largely ceased, momentum toward women’s empowerment had evolved along new tracks. While after Nargis, women had been involved in aid committees, five years on, most former female committee members had once again assumed traditional gender roles, working for the family business or farm and/or undertaking household tasks. In some cases, however, women were making inroads in broader village affairs. In two villages women were elected as ten household leaders in 2013, the first time this had happened. At the same time, SIM 4 saw a resurgence of youth engagement. There were more youth-led activities in many villages, which may have been a reflection of the recent leadership changes, which brought younger leaders to power. In addition, many previous formal and informal leaders associated with the former regime withdrew from village affairs.

///Leadership dynamics had a positive effect on

social relations in many villages///

For the most part, people responded positively to changes in formal leadership that had taken place since Nargis. Political reforms and the shift to a new government in 2011 led to village tract administrator elections in early 2013. Villagers in 26 out of the 40 sample villages chose new formal leaders, while 13 reelected their former leaders. New leaders were noticeably younger, better educated and better off economically than the old leaders. In three-quarters of the villages, people were largely satisfied with the performance of the current formal leaders; the relations between villagers and their leaders were good and neutral in 21 and 9 villages, respectively. Villagers’ perceptions of their leaders did not depend on the latter’s age.

opportunities during the rest of the year. Secondary

income sources on which laborers relied to

supplement their earnings also declined, particularly

visible with small-scale fishing but also in weaving

nipa and collecting firewood. As a result, more

laborers were migrating than had been the case prior

to or in the immediate aftermath of Nargis.

///The debt burden intensified further …///

Indebtedness was directly related to the degree of

cyclone affectedness. Villagers in over one-third of

the villages were caught in a debt trap, unable to

repay even the debts that they had owed from before

Nargis. Of the 30 highly and moderately affected

villages in the sample, only 3 moderately affected

ones did not have repayment problems. Small

farmers experienced the sharpest increase in average

indebtedness, by a factor of three. Laborers had the

least capacity to repay debt; they needed to borrow

for consumption, and were, therefore, also affected

by increases in the prices of basic necessities.

Interest rates had remained largely unchanged,

ranging from 0.75 percent to 30 percent per month.

Villagers continued to rely on different credit

sources, but their relative importance had evolved.

Loans from the Myanmar Agricultural Development

Bank (MADB) brought much-needed capital into the

Delta; they were highly desirable because of their

low interest rates. MADB loans were insufficient to

meet demand, however, and private moneylenders

and traders remained important credit sources,

including for fishermen.

///… eventually affecting the distribution of land///

Within the first two years after Nargis, many

villagers depleted their assets to manage their debt.

Over the next three years, low yields and continuing

indebtedness led to an increasing number of land

transactions. All but one of the eleven villages

with a high level of land transactions were highly

or moderately affected by Nargis, implying the

transactions were related to economic distress. Even 8 of the 18 moderately affected villages saw high or moderate levels of land transactions. Many of these transactions occurred between 2010 and 2011. With many poorer farmers selling land and a few better-off farmers buying it, a highly unequal distribution of land developed in 15 percent of the sample villages. Villagers felt that the Farmland Law would enable them to use their land as collateral or sell it at a higher price. At the same time, the law intensified existing land conflicts in several villages.

///Oftentimes, outmigration was the only viable

coping mechanism, and it has increased///

Coping strategies had not changed over the previous three years but were being used more intensively. Migration continued to increase as a coping mechanism and as a way to escape job scarcity. In 40 percent of the villages, two-thirds or more of the households had at least one member who migrated. Many migrants were between the ages of 17 and 25. Many more of them had been migrating since 2010, with nearly half of village youth migrating in some instances. They ended up in big cities like Yangon and Pathein and worked mostly in factories.

Other forms of coping had potentially negative social and health consequences, such as working even longer hours to survive and thus having less time for social interaction, reducing social expenditures, and reducing the number of meals. A crucial strategy for small and medium farmers to reduce expenditure in over three-quarters of the villages was to reduce investment in fertilizer and other farming inputs, which in turn reduced yields and even led to crop failures.

12

13

///Tensions related to the aid effort still

lingered on///

Previously observed social tension between villagers resulting from real or perceived unequal aid distribution had largely been reversed. However, tensions were noted in 16 sample villages, half of which were highly affected villages. Since highly affected villages received more aid, they were also more prone to aid-related tension: two-thirds of all highly affected villages suffered from such tension, while less than 40 percent of moderately affected villages did. Over two-thirds of the villages with aid tension had newly elected leaders. However, the presence of tensions did not automatically translate into negative perceptions of village leaders. Villagers had negative perceptions of their leaders owing to aid in only five villages. At the same time, villagers recognized the positive effects the aid effort had had on capacity building and participation.

Recommendations and Reflections Much as was the post-Nargis aid effort, the

monitoring of social impacts in Myanmar was

undertaken at a unique time in the country’s history.

As such, SIM provided insights into village life at

a time when little was known about state-society

relations at the local level. To some degree, the

unique political circumstances determined its

particular usefulness. Then again, the social impacts

of natural disasters have rarely been studied as

thoroughly as after Nargis, and important lessons

can be drawn from such analysis.

Previous rounds of SIM assessed the post-Nargis aid

effort and the path to post-disaster recovery over

time through the eyes of affected villagers. These

SIM rounds found that, while tremendously helpful to beneficiaries, aid was not always targeted to the needs of the disaster-affected populations, often did not take a longer-term sector perspective into account, and did not focus adequately on critical actors in the value chain because they were not considered poor but were equally affected by the cyclone. SIM also pointed out that communities were not much involved in decision making about aid and that the emergency committees that aid providers set up tended to negatively affect relations between villagers and their leaders, even far beyond the period of aid delivery.

Beyond being a monitoring tool, SIM also helped enhance understanding of the dynamics that play out in disaster-affected villages over the longer term. SIM showed that major natural disasters can severely damage a community’s immune system and its ability to recover on its own, making it more prone to the negative effects of subsequent external events, whether natural, economic, or political. It found that the capacity of the survivors to recover from a major disaster depended more on how many assets they had lost to the disaster than the number of people who had died in their village. SIM pointed out that multiple factors determine recovery and that the importance of these may evolve over time and vary by location. While major disasters such as cyclones affect everyone in their path equally, they also create a new tapestry in the affected area as different communities and groups within a community recover differently. Furthermore, even when social capital is strong and contributes to recovery in the short-term, it is not immune to the effects of continuing economic deprivation. Above all, SIM underlined the fact that recovery takes a long time, and it is never linear.

As a result, SIM demonstrated that qualitative social analysis can help institutions involved in a post- disaster recovery effort understand cross-cutting issues, such as governance and social accountability;

community perceptions, including those on aid effectiveness, vulnerability, and social exclusion; and process tracing, such as on the social dynamics within communities or on how aid plays out at the village level. Social analysis, therefore, enables the aid effort to be more responsive to local realities and helps to ensure that it does not contribute to social fracture.

SECTION

01

Context

15

The success of any post-disaster aid effort depends

on how programs respond to and reflect such

changing needs and dynamics. After Cyclone Nargis,

therefore, the TCG developed a comprehensive

monitoring system that aimed to inform aid

responses. One component of this was Post-Nargis

Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM). SIM aimed to

understand the changing needs and priorities of

villagers, how social relations and socioeconomic

life were evolving, and the impacts of the aid

efforts. It focused on 40 villages spread across the

Delta. By focusing on a limited set of villages, it

provided in-depth information on how village life

was changing post-Nargis and insights into how aid

responses could best help Delta communities. It

complemented the ongoing quantitative Periodic

Review assessment, which measured progress

against recovery indicators in a wider set of

affected villages.

The TCG oversaw the implementation of three

rounds of post-Nargis social impacts monitoring.

The first SIM (SIM 1) was conducted in November

2008 and assessed how the disaster and aid

responses had affected Delta communities in the

first six months after Nargis. The second SIM (SIM

2) was undertaken from May to June 2009, i.e., one

year after the cyclone. The third SIM (SIM 3) was

carried out between March and April 2010. The TCG

came to an end in July 2010.

Myanmar has been undergoing a fundamental social,

political, and economic transformation since 2010.

The dissolution of the State Peace and Development

Council in March 2011 following parliamentary

elections in November 2010, parliamentary by-

elections in April 2012, and a range of economic

reforms have not only signaled a transition to

democratic governance and a market-oriented

economy but have also profoundly affected life in

rural Myanmar. In addition, while Nargis was the

most destructive natural disaster in the country’s

recorded history, the Delta and other parts of the

country have been suffering from other natural events with adverse impacts.

The longer-term effects of major natural disasters on the daily lives of those who survived them are often not well understood. How have villages affected by Nargis recovered economically in the longer run? Has village social life returned to what it had been before the cyclone? Have villages struck by the cyclone regained their capacity to withstand the compound effects of subsequent natural shocks? What other factors have shaped a village’s path to recovery? Finding answers to these questions became the purpose of the fourth round of SIM (SIM 4) that was conducted between April and May 2013, i.e., five years after Nargis. SIM 4 revisited the same 40 villages across the eight most affected Delta townships (Annex 1) and relied primarily on in-depth qualitative fieldwork.2 It focused on taking stock of the social and economic situation in the sample villages, allowing villagers to reflect on their experiences over the five years since Nargis within a rapidly changing environment. 3

a Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to coordinate this

aid effort.

After disasters, the needs of affected communities

evolve. As immediate survival priorities recede,

disaster survivors start focusing on how to rebuild

their lives and communities. Communities develop

coping mechanisms to help them deal with the

disaster and aid effort, which can have wide-ranging

impacts on local socioeconomic structures and

social relations. At the same time, new obstacles

to recovery can emerge as different individuals

and institutions adjust their behavior in the post-

disaster environment. Resource scarcity can increase

competition or promote cooperation.

Natural disasters have profound immediate impacts.

Lives are lost; shelters are destroyed; assets are

damaged or destroyed. Those who survive may

face acute health or sanitation problems and food

or water shortages. When Cyclone Nargis hit the

Ayeyarwady Delta and southern Yangon Division

in Myanmar on 2 May 2008, it brought devastation

in its wake. An estimated 140,000 people died,

and damages and losses were estimated at around

US$ 4 billion.1 In its aftermath, scores of domestic

and international actors launched a wide-ranging

humanitarian aid effort to address immediate

emergency needs. The Government of the Union of

Myanmar, ASEAN, and the United Nations formed

Section 01

Introduction

SECTION

01 Post-Nargis Recovery as Seen through Social Impacts Monitoring

16

17

struggling to recover. This affected those at every

point in the value chain. Moreover, Cyclone Nargis

drastically reduced the opportunities for paid work

for laborers, who faced reduced demand for their

labor from the bigger farmers and fishermen who

would normally employ them. Laborers received

food aid but less livelihood support compared to

other groups. As a result, many were facing immense

difficulties in getting by. The most recurrent theme

was an increasing debt burden. In every village

studied, villagers were worried about being able

to meet their loan repayments and having enough

money for consumption in the following year.

Cyclone Nargis had a major impact on

socioeconomic life in Delta villages. However,

despite its immense shock, social relations and

local capacity remained strong. Villagers worked

together to overcome immediate challenges,

which strengthened social relations. Communities

remained resilient and functioning. The report

concluded that if people’s livelihoods and village

economies did not begin to recover soon, there

would likely be profound longer-term impacts, such

as migration out of Delta villages and a tearing of

the social fabric. If people could not break out of

the Nargis debt trap, there was a risk of longer-term

redistribution of assets from many to a few.

///Still a mixed picture: SIM 2///

Cyclone survivors continued to prioritize aid for

livelihoods. However, a year after the cyclone, the

needs of affected communities had evolved, with

villagers also prioritizing health, education, and

small-scale community infrastructure. This reflected

a shift from emergency to longer-term recovery

priorities. As in SIM 1, aid in the form of cash or

affordable credit appeared to be more effective—and

was preferred by villagers—than in-kind assistance.

However, aid levels dropped sharply and were

too low to enable cyclone survivors to adequately

recover their livelihoods. Furthermore, aid providers

continued to make aid-related decisions, with

aid distribution more formalized through official

leaders and village emergency committees. Villagers

often lacked clear information about aid, which led

to cases of perceptions of misuse and conflict about

aid.

Socioeconomic conditions remained challenging

rand were exacerbated by the wider economic

environment. There was little overall progress with

livelihoods recovery. Farmers were unable to afford

adequate farming inputs and cultivated their land

less intensively. At the same time, there appeared

to be some progress with restarting fishing, though

less progress in the returns of fishing as a source of

livelihood. Most fishing aid provided was small-

scale fishing gear that enabled fishermen to earn a

subsistence income, rather than the kind of larger-

scale aid and capital necessary to revive the fishing

value chain. Casual laborers also continued to

struggle. The inability of big farmers to recover their

livelihood and cultivate their land as intensely as

before further reduced job opportunities for casual

labor. Furthermore, some farmers and fishermen

themselves became casual laborers, so competition

increased for the jobs that did exist. Debt levels were

still rising, and interest rates remained high. Farmers

began to lose land to moneylenders as they failed to

meet their debt payments.

Social capital was still strong overall. Young people

continued to play an active role in relief and

recovery activities, such as repairing and renovating

schools and pathways. Formal leaders played a

strong role in aid-related affairs, though the roles of

village elders in aid affairs had decreased somewhat

since SIM 1. Similarly, the role of religious leaders

had evolved, with only Christian and Muslim

religious leaders engaged in day-to-day recovery

activities. There was an increasing number of

instances where aid-related tensions weakened

social relations.

The path toward recovery has evolved over time and

differed not only by degree of cyclone affectedness,

but also by both location and type of livelihood. This

section summarizes salient findings from the initial

post-disaster social impacts analysis and the first

three rounds of SIM to provide an inter temporal

snapshot of the situation in the 40 sample villages.4

///Setting the stage: the Post-Nargis

Joint Assessment///

The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) was

the first post-disaster assessment that included

specific analysis of the social impacts of the disaster.

Undertaken within six weeks of the cyclone, the

analysis was necessarily preliminary and tentative.

It developed a set of hypotheses on forms of social

impact that might play out in the post-Nargis

period. SIM tracked these issues over time. Field

visits during the PONJA observed a high level of

unity and social cohesion among survivors, who had

no doubt been brought together by their common

efforts to survive and rebuild. It also identified

the risks of redistributing land awayy from small-

scale farmers to those with larger holdings and

of loan-based responses that further indebting

affected villagers. Furthermore, the analysis

underlined the importance of working with informal

local institutions and local leaders. Based on this

analysis, PONJA included in its guiding principles

the need to: involve communities at all stages

in the management of rel

Collepals.com Plagiarism Free Papers

Are you looking for custom essay writing service or even dissertation writing services? Just request for our write my paper service, and we'll match you with the best essay writer in your subject! With an exceptional team of professional academic experts in a wide range of subjects, we can guarantee you an unrivaled quality of custom-written papers.

Get ZERO PLAGIARISM, HUMAN WRITTEN ESSAYS

Why Hire Collepals.com writers to do your paper?

Quality- We are experienced and have access to ample research materials.

We write plagiarism Free Content

Confidential- We never share or sell your personal information to third parties.

Support-Chat with us today! We are always waiting to answer all your questions.