At the core of naval force design is a tension between buying existing technology now or using that money to research and build something new for the future

Jeffrey E. Kline

It is not in the interest of Britain—possessing as she does so large a navy—to adopt any important change in ships of war . . . until such a course is forced upon her. . . . [T]his time has arrived.

ADMIRAL BALDWIN WALKER, ROYAL NAVY, 1860

A retired naval officer with twenty-six years of service, Jeffrey E. Kline is currently a professor of practice in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and holds the OPNAV N9I Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis. He teaches joint campaign analysis and executive risk assessment and coordinates maritime security education programs offered at NPS. Jeff supports ap- plied analytical research in maritime operations and security, tactical analysis, and future force composi- tion studies.

Naval War College Review, Summer 2017, Vol. 70, No. 3

IMPACTS OF THE ROBOTICS AGE ON NAVAL FORCE DESIGN, EFFECTIVENESS, AND ACQUISITION

 The twenty-first century will see the emergence of maritime powers that have the capacity and capability to challenge the U.S. Navy for control of the seas.

Unfortunately, the Navy’s ability to react to emerging maritime powers’ rapid growth and technological advancement is constrained by its own planning, ac- quisition, and political processes. Introducing our own technology advances is hindered as well. The planning and acquisition system for our overly platform- focused naval force structure is burdened with so many inhibitors to change that we are ill prepared to capitalize on the missile and robotics age of warfare.

Yet by embracing the robotics age, recognizing the fundamental shift it rep- resents in how naval power is conveyed, and refocusing our efforts to emphasize the “right side” of our offensive kill chain—the side that delivers the packages producing kinetic and nonkinetic effects—we may hurdle acquisition challenges

and bring cutting-edge technology to contem- porary naval warfare.1 Incorporating robotics technology into the fleet as rapidly, effectively, and efficiently as possible would magnify the fleet’s capacity, lethality, and opportunity—all critical to strategic and tactical considerations. Doing so also would recognize the fiscal constraints under which our present force planning cannot be sus- tained. As Admiral Walker advised above, it is now time to change.2

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After addressing the traditional foundations of force structure planning and the inhibitors to change, this article will discuss how focusing on the packages delivered rather than the delivery platforms would allow us better to leverage new technologies in the 2030 time frame. What would a naval force architecture look like if this acquisition strategy were employed? This article will present a force-employment philosophy and a war-fighting strategy based on the tactical offensive that align with this acquisition approach. The article does not present an alternative force structure with actual numbers of ships and platforms, but suggests a force-acquisition strategy and force-design concept that provide a foundational underpinning by which a specific force architecture can be devel- oped. Three strategic force measures—reactivity, robustness, and resilience—will be used subjectively to assess this fleet design compared with our traditional programmed forces.

STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS OF NAVAL FORCE-STRUCTURE PLANNING AND THE GREAT INHIBITORS Ideally, a country’s naval force structure changes with national strategy, national treasure, technological advancement, and potential adversary capabilities. Na- tional strategy provides the rationale for, purpose of, and priority among choices to be made in creating a fleet. National treasure defines the resources and con- straints dictating strategic choices. New technologies provide opportunities for increasing fleet effectiveness, yet also may endanger fleet survival should poten- tial adversaries expose and exploit vulnerabilities in these technologies. This is a complex problem even when one takes into account only these four factors; however, U.S. naval acquisition also is challenged by other influences that inhibit capitalization of new technologies.

The most powerful of these inhibitions is inertia. The existing fleet repre- sents a capital-heavy investment by the country, one with long build times and lifetimes. Ships and aircraft cost billions to design, build, and maintain. They require a capital-intensive industry featuring heavy equipment, infrastructure, and a skilled workforce—all generations in the making. As a consequence, annual programming and budgeting decisions are marginal in nature. It is the nature of a large fleet to evolve slowly, as opposed to undergoing revolutionary changes to its composition. This is a reality the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) faces when considering changes to the naval forces. Each CNO’s relatively short tenure restricts the ability to formulate, market, and execute any maritime strategy that would have a comprehensive effect on ship and aircraft procurement.

Since the first six USN frigates were authorized in 1794, national internal political and economic factors have been another major influence on fleet composition. As Ian Toll illustrates well in his Six Frigates: The Epic History of

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the Founding of the U.S. Navy, the potential windfalls for local economies when selected to build warships generate powerful political pressures for stabilization once these selections are made.3 Now just as then, senators and congressmen rep- resenting districts that build ships (and aircraft) may be expected to defend exist- ing programs and seek new ones, to the economic benefit of their constituents.

Next, the compartmentalization of fleet planning, budgeting, building, and maintenance caused by large, resource-competing bureaucracies creates a lethar- gic environment inefficient for change. Multiple oversight agencies and bodies, including Congress, subject every decision that program managers make to often-paralyzing scrutiny. Our agility to implement rapid change is lost when the number of stakeholders exceeds the point at which responsibility and authority can be defined clearly. This is a structural issue common to all capital-heavy in- vestment programs—the space shuttle, large multimission warships, long-range bombers—that require bureaucracies to design and implement them.

Finally, the very nature of a fleet’s strategic value engenders conservatism in a senior naval leadership faced with the options for change. This is not necessarily an unhealthy view, as loss of the fleet could mean loss of sea lines of communica- tion (SLOCs), and therefore likely a war. Nonetheless, overvaluing what worked in the last major maritime war—which occurred in the 1940s—at the expense of recognizing that missile, robotics, and cyber technology has changed the pri- mary conveyance of naval power may result in a fleet unprepared to combat an enemy that is not so inhibited. A less formally “capable” adversary untethered by allegiance to past precedent may be more flexible and therefore much more dangerous.

Individually, none of these influences on force structure planning can be dismissed. The danger is that in aggregate they result in a harmful escalation of commitment toward obsolete platforms, permitting only marginal changes in force structure amid opportunities for major technological changes. The result today is a brittle U.S. fleet that is susceptible to tactical surprise and slow to react to adversaries’ technological initiatives.4

The United States is not unique in facing these challenges. Historically, major changes to naval force structure have resulted from war, great technological leaps, or both. Rowing, ramming, and boarding vessels gave way to the naval cannon and sail; sail to steam; armor and rifled guns to aircraft; and aircraft to missiles. Now comes the dawn of a robotics age. Missiles, robots, miniaturization, hyper- sonic technologies, and artificial intelligence give the advantage to many smaller, faster, and more lethal offense capabilities.5 Our challenge today is to not allow the restraints on current force structure planning to cede these advantages to potential adversaries.

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MISSILES, ROBOTS, AND AN OFFENSIVE TACTICS– ENABLING STRATEGY Meeting all the desired maritime strategic capabilities—all-domain access, deter- rence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security—while constrained by the budget and procurement process will require new thinking in platforms, weapons, and command and control (C2). Embracing the combined capacity of missiles and robotics in this new era creates options for achieving a desired tactical end state that enables our operational and strategic goals. Strategists will regard this as a reversal of the traditional hierarchy of the levels of war; yet it is historically accurate. Technology empowers a tactical edge in maritime warfare, providing new operational and strategic choices. For example, the advances in submarine technology during the first half of the twentieth century resulted in a new form of commerce raiding and sea-lane interdiction. The reach of carrier aircraft changed the nature of naval combat in World War II. Advances in nuclear propulsion and ballistic-missile technology in the second half of the twentieth century led to a third way of offering nuclear strategic deterrence: from the sea depths. Parallel examples can be made for missile-carrying aircraft and the guided torpedo.6

Today, investing in a very “smart” long-range autonomous offensive missile that can outrange those of our adversary may permit us to build less-expensive, less-well-defended ships from which to launch them, thereby making sea combat more affordable. Shifting emphasis to the weapon’s ability and the force’s target- ing capability, rather than concentrating on the platform itself, changes both the risk and cost calculus.

Take a specific example. Purchasing one fewer Burke-class guided-missile de- stroyer (DDG) would allow the acquisition and operation of thirty-five to forty large autonomous surface vessels (LASVs).7 If each of the latter were armed with eight antiship cruise missiles, from 280 to 320 offensive missiles could be dis- persed in a contested region, as opposed to the eight missiles (canister) or at most ninety (vertical launch systems) that the DDG could bring to one location. Our potential adversaries show an appreciation for this concept by building smaller, missile-capable combatants, establishing a clear missile gap between themselves and U.S. surface forces in contested regions.8

The proposal here is not to replace all DDGs with unmanned surface vessels, but to refocus our investments on less expensive “payloads” delivered, kinetic or cyber, not the more expensive delivery platforms.9 The goal is greater affordabil- ity paired with enhanced fleet capacity and employment options, thereby creating uncertainty in our potential adversaries’ strategic calculus. A stark example is a weapon that has huge maritime influence—changing our strategic risk calculus —yet has no maritime platform: the Chinese DF-21 antiship ballistic missile.

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As important as it is to focus on offensive payloads so as to provide rapid change capacity, doing so yields other benefits as well. It lessens many of the political, economic, and bureaucratic challenges associated with investing in capital-heavy platform programs. Since it is easier to modify weapons than plat- forms, technological upgrades to weapons systems can be accomplished quick- er.10 The forty-year-old Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo illustrates how an offensive weapon may evolve with new capabilities, even with no major modifications to its platform. There is also less political interest invested in weapon procurement, as these systems do not require the resources associated with a new submarine or aircraft carrier. Fewer stakeholders burden weapon design, procurement, as- sembly, and modification. These factors enable us to modify offensive capabili- ties quickly as new technology emerges, or to respond better when an adversary surprises us with a new capability. The ability to test, fail, and quickly change a portion of the fleet that is less capital heavy than our traditional forces is an ad- vantage from any perspective.

This philosophy is particularly exploitable in the electromagnetic (EM) and cyber realm. Inexpensive, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles employing radar reflectors or chirp jamming systems can be more cost-effective delivery platforms for EM packages than a single EF-18 Growler. The introduction of inexpensive, credible, and numerous decoys into the air, on the surface, and undersea also is enhanced by the robotics age’s ability to deliver confusing effects with little risk to manned systems. In defense, developing left-of-launch effects against an adversary’s surveillance systems—countertargeting—need not be expensive, and, if synchronized with the movement of actual forces, mitigates risk to sailors operating in contested areas.

In other words, when building a fleet for contested environments while op- erating under real financial constraints, our investments should concentrate on technologies that enhance the right side of our offensive kill chain and enable us to disrupt the left side of an adversary’s kill chain prior to his launch. Building kinetic weapons for offense and nonkinetic weapons for defense are more cost- effective options than building multimission, hardened, and therefore expensive platforms. Robotic vehicles for delivering these weapons put the focus of warfare close to the enemy and farther from us.

We are not there yet. If resource allocation is a mirror of strategic choices, in the president’s fiscal year 2017 Defense Department budget, of the $183 billion al- located for modernization (which includes procurement and research and devel- opment), about 40 percent is allocated for aircraft procurement and shipbuilding, less than 8 percent for munitions.11 Substantial change, involving Congress and the Navy Department, will be required to move past procuring a platform-centric force to procuring a sensor/weapon-centric force. However, we are beginning to

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explore the value of naval offense in employing our current fleet, and this, com- bined with opportunities presented in the robotics age, provides the opportunity to affect positively both fleet architecture and fleet design.

A TAILORED MARITIME OPERATIONAL AND ACQUISITION CONCEPT Faced with real challenges to sea control by emerging competitors, we are re- learning the basic tenet that offense is the most cost-effective form of naval warfare—in both acquisition and employment. Our surface navy is exploring distributed lethality, an offensive operational concept enabled by the missile age, and its principles are being adopted for a distributed fleet, with enhanced lethal- ity and targeting capabilities across the force and across multiple domains. We find that the range of an offensive missile matters, but only if its reconnaissance and targeting system holds the advantage over a potential adversary’s reconnais- sance and targeting system. As a result, we are reinvigorating EM warfare for surveillance, deception, and countering rival EM systems. Employing some old Cold War tricks enhanced with new technologies, we are considering seriously the use of and training in methods to find, target, and kill in an EM “night” (i.e., when advanced surveillance and targeting systems are available to neither side).12 These are necessary steps to provide an immediate credible threat, and therefore a deterrent, to potential adversaries’ adventurism in regions we hold to be critical to our national interest.

Yet we cannot abandon tactical and operational defense and still maintain use of the oceans. Only in an ideal Mahanian total battle fleet–on–battle fleet engagement, in which all an enemy’s sea-command capabilities are defeated in a single massive exchange, can offense achieve sea control. The twentieth century showed this idea to be limited to the age of sail, if it applied even then. Preserv- ing SLOCs and associated logistic-hub availability will require defense against ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, and torpedoes, mines, and guns. Our countersurveillance, countertargeting, and close-in soft-kill systems become as critical as our hard-kill systems. Dedicated multimission platforms still will be required to defeat an enemy’s attacks across our sea and air logistics lines.

For the past forty years, the cost-effective way to provide both offensive and defensive capabilities at sea has been to leverage economies of scale by placing as much multimission capability as possible in a ship hull. Our advanced Aegis Burke-class DDGs are the result. Once deployed to, say, the Central Command area of operations, this DDG can conduct counterpiracy activities in the morn- ing, then relocate on short notice to mount theater ballistic-missile defense in the afternoon. It can hunt other surface ships and defend an aircraft carrier from

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cruise-missile attack. It is versatile, fast, and multifunctional. Operationally, it is limited only by its draft.

But these ships also are limited by their expense. Plus, if a war starts and we begin to lose them, replacement time will be problematic. In a major war at sea, we may find that our cost-effective peacetime strategy of concentrating on econo- mies of scale has created a situation of “too many eggs in one basket.” The loss of a DDG while conducting an independent offensive surface action becomes a loss of missile and air defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and escort capacity to the fleet—as well as a highly skilled crew.

In the past we addressed economic constraints that prevented our entire fleet from consisting of advanced multimission ships by building a “high-low” mix, incorporating a few special-mission ships to conduct mine countermeasures and logistics. We envisioned the “low” ships in the mix filling the constabulary and escort duties farther from harm’s way during times of conflict. But if we consider distributed lethality and the advantage of the offense, combined with advances in unmanned systems, autonomy, and longer-range, smarter missiles, a new op- portunity for an economical fleet mix emerges. Its fleet design is the opposite of the traditional high-low mix: we would employ smaller, cheaper offensive plat- forms to operate forward, and larger sea-control ships to defend against our ad- versaries’ advanced sea-denial capabilities.13 A fleet employment of such a force results in finding and destroying the enemy with offensive systems that are more numerous, less expensive, and lower manned.14 They will be the sea-denial force. More-expensive defensive platforms will be deployed in areas of vital interest, or to protect high-value ships and convoys that are within the enemy’s reach.15 This “protection” force will be the sea-control force. The adversary cannot disregard our threat of offensive force to focus on attacking our interests while we have placed the best multimission ships to defend those interests. This is distributed lethality combined with smart defense.16

As the distributed lethality concept evolves into distributed maritime op- erations and multidomain concepts, the offsetting of constraining budgets with opportunities in new technologies will nudge us naturally toward this mixed approach. Offensive antiship missiles are becoming smarter and our adversaries have learned to employ them in various ways: from shore, shipping containers, bombers, and missile boats. Our own offensive fleet could be just as versatile, composed of missile corvettes paired with missile-equipped LASVs working in coordination with undersea systems and long-range bombers armed with hypersonic missiles. The objective of the components of this force is to close silently and deceptively; deliver their missiles, torpedoes, mines, or cyber pack- ages; then retire or, if unmanned, stay as a reconnaissance node, if desired.17 This

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concept leverages technological advances in missiles, unmanned systems, and countertargeting methods to provide a threat more credible, practical, useful, and economical. (In a calculus of value, a commander is more willing to risk what he or she values less; the more so when its capabilities nonetheless enjoy his or her confidence.) Our traditional fleet primarily will fill the role of the protective force, using strike when necessary to kill threats advancing toward our SLOCs.

This concept is an operational expression of tactics that Arleigh Burke devel- oped during the Solomons campaign. Commodore Burke championed sending the small, maneuverable destroyers ahead of the battle line to conduct coordi- nated torpedo attacks. Frederick Moosbrugger executed these tactics at Vella Gulf, and Burke did so at Cape Saint George. Burke’s fighting doctrine of simplic- ity, surprise, and delegation of authority also provides the tenets for employing today’s offensive force. And, like Burke’s skillful employment of radar to provide a tactical edge, the offensive force will be enabled with the latest targeting, coun- tertargeting, and killing technology as it becomes available.18 A characteristic of light, inexpensive delivery platforms is their ability to be upgraded quickly and cheaply through payload replacement or, if desired, whole-platform change-out.

As the sea-control force evolves through retirement of the top-end multimis- sion platforms, it too will become more tailored by employing the latest tech- nology to counter specific threats, although, by the nature of its purpose, it will remain multimission in character. For example, theater ASW ships still will be required to protect themselves from submarine-launched antiship cruise mis- siles, and escort duty will require some form of area defense from all threats.

During more-peaceful times, the offensive force can fill peacetime constabu- lary duties and engagement exercises in forward regions. But dividing a force into offense and protective defense elements is a war strategy, not a peacetime maritime security strategy.19 Building a portion of the force dedicated to offense, exercising and testing tactics using new technologies in robotics and automation in this force, and engaging allies in its employment signal serious intentions on our part to prepare for actual combat and the willingness to accept some losses. As a result, the new, offensively disposed force provides a stronger deterrence.

The evolution to a tailored fleet from our current force will be more effective and less expensive than simply adding offensive capability to each new ship built in a total multimission force. The tailored fleet will distribute offense to more- numerous platforms, while concentrating defense on areas of vital importance to maintain the true strategic end of our nation’s Navy: use of the seas. Such a fleet provides a way to distribute offensive lethality economically and to distribute de- fense efficiently. Making the offensive force both lethal and sufficiently resilient to ensure its deterrent credibility is addressed next.

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WEB FIRES, FOOTBALL, AND ACCELERATED CUMULATIVE WARFARE In a 2016 report to the CNO, Strategic Studies Group (SSG) 35 identified the next “capital ship” as the network of machines and humans.20 It recognized that emerging technology enables a multitudinous, disaggregated force of manned and unmanned systems to challenge adversary situational awareness and target- ing. It is the end vision of a sensor/weapon-centric force and describes a way to employ the offensive fleet. But, in this model, what now is a capital ship? Under the traditional definition, it is the most heavily armed and powerful warship, one of the first rank in size and armament.21 The capital ship is the main conveyance of naval power. The SSG implicitly selected the “main conveyance of combat power” definition to describe its network of systems and concept of employ- ment. However, if the main conveyance of naval power is defeated, so is the Navy. Capital ships can be viewed as a naval center of gravity. In a network of manned and unmanned systems, the network becomes the naval center of gravity—and therefore a target of interest to an adversary.

Like the SSG’s network, the maturing “web fires” or “netted fires” concept is a vision of netted sensors, shooters, and communications linked together to provide multiple options in executing detect-to-engage sequences across an area of operations. Information will be ubiquitous and accessible to all sensor and weapon operators via a web construct, linked through various methods of mesh networks, burst transmissions, and traditional communication channels resis- tant to enemy jamming and interference.22 The mesh network “capital ship” is designed to survive against interference and intrusion, just as the battleship was armored to survive against rifled rounds. It will enable distributed operations or massing of fires across all domains, including the human domain. It provides the surveillance and information advantage needed to employ long-range weapons before an adversary does. This web fires concept will be enriched by the use of unmanned systems, smart weaponry, and autonomy. It is the natural technologi- cal evolution of the Soviets’ reconnaissance-strike complex.23 It is the realization of the third offset, as envisioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work.24 It is the implementation of the SSG network of machines and humans.

Then the fighting starts. How battle resilient the web fires and distributed forces will be depends on the technology that enables them; on the C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and tactical philosophy envisioned when the elements are built; and on the sailors who operate them. The United States cannot be assured of technological superiority in the future, so our Navy must retain war-fighting methods that do not assume assurance of continuous information to all elements of the force. It must create a force

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design—defined as the way we fight—to leverage the greatest advantage of Amer- ican forces: individual command initiative and innovation in the face of adversity.

Web fires and a distributed force to be used as the offensive or sea-denial force should be built from the bottom up, not from the top down, meaning that, if necessary, every manned node in the web can act independently as a scout, commander, and shooter within its own area of responsibility. This decentralized execution is not a new concept for U.S. naval forces (every submariner will recog- nize the C2 concept), but unless the web is built with self-reliant, capable nodes from the start, we may not be able to implement fully a command philosophy of distributed decision making, particularly if we must fight in the electromagnetic night. “Offboard” information provided by the web, or subelements of the web, is then viewed as an enhancer, but not necessary to employ weapons. The offensive force will be network enabled, not network dependent.

Employing the offensive fleet as a distributed force comprising self-sufficient weapons-launch platforms, augmented by web fires’ off-platform information when available, achieves a highly resilient force structure. In a fight, the force net- work leverages a strategy of accelerated cumulative warfare, relying on individual engagements to create the desired emerging operational and strategic effects.25 It confounds an adversary by offering a multidomain, independent, dispersed, and offensively oriented challenge to defeat. This foundational philosophy turns the focus to tactical offense, reorients acquisition from platforms to weapons (kinetic and nonkinetic), and accelerates employment of technologies in missiles and ro- botics. It leads to a more numerous force composed of smaller platforms, as John Arquilla envisioned in his 2010 Foreign Policy article “The New Rules of War.”26

In execution, such an offensive force resembles an offensive football squad. Af- ter a play is called, each player proceeds to his assigned area, with full knowledge of his role in the called play. No communication is required after the ball is hiked. Although everyone has a role, each, if necessary, also can carry the football, run for a touchdown, or tackle. If the quarterback views new information after the play is called, a short audible at the line may change the play. Employment of the offensive fleet in a distributed force is similar. Pairs of delivery systems may move into position on the basis of commander’s intent and up-to-date intelligence; no communication is required. If an audible is called, it can be communicated through brief signals in code along short-burst, mesh-network paths.27 And each player, if necessary, can target and shoot independently within his or her area of responsibility.

The emergent effect of this cumulative strategy is sea denial close to the enemy’s objectives, with or without a continuous C2 network. This achieves the intent of both the web fires and manned-and-unmanned network concepts

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without dependency on an actual network, thereby eliminating a possible single- point vulnerability for the enemy’s attention. This enhances force resiliency and increases each unit’s survivability.

ASSESSING THE CONCEPT For a comprehensive quantitative assessment of a future naval force, we would need a complete force architecture with specific num

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