As of 2016, how well had Axel Springer turned disruptive technological change into sustainable change within its core German market? What are the three most
Using the attached case study answer the following:
- As of 2016, how well had Axel Springer turned disruptive technological change into sustainable change within its core German market?
- What are the three most important things that Axel Springer did to crate sustainable digital change?
- How should Axel Springer ensure that it stays ahead of future disruptive developments within the global media sector, such as the increasing influence of social media?
- Can a major German publisher such as Axel Springer make a dent in English-speaking markets, such as Britain and America? If so, how?
- What are Axel Springer’s biggest threats from both a technology and company perspective? What specific action plan would you suggest to direct how management should address these threats?
- What is Axel Springer’s “Minimum Winning Game: to the next 24 months? Why?
CASE: E-610
DATE: 11/03/16
Ryan Kissick (MBA 2014); Robert A. Burgelman, Edmund W. Littlefield Professor of Management; and Robert
Siegel, Lecturer in Management, prepared this case as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either
effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.
Copyright © 2016 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Publicly available cases are
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Management Center, 655 Knight Way, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015.
AXEL SPRINGER IN 2016:
FROM TRANSFORMATION TO ACCELERATION?
Mathias Döpfner, chief executive officer (CEO) of Axel Springer SE, had successfully
transitioned the German publishing house through a major digital transformation in the world of
journalism. Given the massive disruption that had occurred over the previous two decades with
how people consumed news, this was no small feat. During this time, many newspapers,
magazines, and journals failed to keep up with the rapidly changing industry. Historically, print
advertising constituted the majority of revenue for large publishers. But the digital revolution in
journalism meant that print advertising revenues dropped precipitously. According to the
Newspaper Association of America, American print advertising revenues fell from $44.9 billion
in 2003 to $16.4 billion in 2014. 1 This downward trend in print advertising revenues happened
around the globe, with traditional publishers cutting thousands of jobs. And many publishers
were forced to declare bankruptcy during this period.
In spite of these industry headwinds, Axel Springer was thriving. As of the middle of 2016, the
company’s main newspaper, Bild, had a print circulation of close to 2 million and more than
340,000 digital subscribers, far more than competitor publications such as Süddeutsche Zeitung
and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Axel Springer’s annual revenue had grown from €2.1
billion in 2009 to €3.3 billion in 2015 (see Exhibit 1 for Axel Springer’s historical revenue and
Exhibit 2 for Axel Springer’s historical EBITDA). In 2009, digital media constituted 21.2
percent of the company’s total revenue 2 ; in 2015, digital media constituted 61.7 percent of the
company’s total revenue (see Exhibit 3 for Axel Springer’s digital revenue as a percentage of
1 Dan Kennedy, “Print Is Dying, Digital Is No Savior: The Long, Ugly Decline of The Newspaper Business
Continues Apace,” WGHB News, January 26, 2016, http://news.wgbh.org/2016/01/26/local-news/print-dying-
digital-no-savior-long-ugly-decline-newspaper-business-continues (July 16, 2016). 2 “Axel Springer 2010 Annual Report,” Axel Springer, http://www.axelspringer.de/dl/431754/Annual_report_2010
_Axel_Springer_AG.pdf (July 16, 2016).
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Axel Springer in 2016: From Transformation to Acceleration? E-610
p. 2
total revenue over time and Exhibit 4 for Axel Springer’s digital EBITDA as a percentage of
total EBITDA over time). 3
Döpfner had transformed Axel Springer through a two-stage digital transformation strategy
process. Starting in 2006, Axel Springer first focused on organic growth and late-stage digital
acquisitions, which infused digitization into Axel Springer’s corporate culture. 4 In 2013, the
second stage centered around Döpfner’s mission to become “The Leading Digital Publisher”;
Axel Springer would be defined not by its distribution channels, but by its (content) brands and
services. 5
Having successfully transformed Axel Springer from a print-only company to a thriving print
and digital media conglomerate, Döpfner wanted to accelerate Axel Springer’s growth even
further. He believed that Axel Springer was well positioned to succeed not only in their core
German market, but also more broadly on the world stage. Through a series of strategic
initiatives and acquisitions, Döpfner felt confident that Axel Springer could engage consumers
far beyond Germany’s borders with content that spanned many languages.
Yet he knew this path to becoming a global media powerhouse would not be straightforward,
especially given the rapid changes occurring within the media and publishing realm. In a world
in which people were consuming content from a variety of sources—traditional print media and
digital news sources, such as social media, e-mail, news alerts, or mobile applications—Axel
Springer would continuously need to assess how it provided content to consumers as well as who
it considered competition.
Against this backdrop, Döpfner wondered how Axel Springer could sustain its powerful brands
and monetize its digital content. Companies such as Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat, none of
which had been founded as traditional news companies, were on Döpfner’s radar. Döpfner
elaborated:
My number one priority [as of 2016] is to define the rules with social media
companies. Millions of people are consuming content on Facebook and other
social media platforms, and it’s important that we take a fair share of the business,
including data access and advertising revenues. It’s also critical that we maintain
sales of our own content and services, including subscription models. Social
media is the distribution of the future, and if we don’t figure out the right business
model—a way to monetize our digital content—we are in danger. 6
In addition to the threat posed by large technology and social media companies, Döpfner
wondered how Axel Springer could successfully enter foreign markets, including the United
3 “Axel Springer 2015 Annual Report,” Axel Springer, http://www.axelspringer.de/dl/22446733/Axel_Springer_
Annual_Report_2015.pdf (July 16, 2016). 4 For further information, see “Axel Springer in 2014: Strategic Leadership of the Digital Media Transformation,”
GSB No. E-522, p. 1. 5 Ibid.
6 Interview with Mathias Döpfner on September 22, 2016. All quotations are from this interview unless otherwise
noted.
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Axel Springer in 2016: From Transformation to Acceleration? E-610
p. 3
States. Axel Springer had established itself as a leader in the German media market, yet Döpfner
knew that success outside of Germany was an entirely different challenge with a new set of
competitors and consumer tastes.
Finally, in an increasingly complex and global media industry, Döpfner wondered how Axel
Springer could continue to provide value to its many business units and subsidiaries. He
explained:
Throughout Axel Springer’s digital transformation, it’s been important to make
sure that we are one company with one set of fundamental values and some
cultural common denominators that make people say, “I’m proud to be part of
Axel Springer.” Yet it’s also important to make sure that we’re structured in a
way that creates the most value for Axel Springer, whether that’s bringing worlds
together or instead creating clearly delineated power centers. For me, this is
always a tough question and top priority.
By the end of 2016, Döpfner was thrilled with Axel Springer’s progress over the past decade and
optimistic about the company’s prospects of becoming a global and digitally focused company,
yet he knew that navigating this complex environment would require overcoming many
challenges. Adding to Axel Springer’s urgency were vast declines in print advertising revenue;
global spending on newspaper print ads was expected to decrease by 8.7 percent in 2016, which
would be the largest drop since the global recession in 2008. 7 With these massive industry
headwinds, Döpfner needed to figure out how to monetize Axel Springer’s digital content on a
grand scale, and quickly.
TURNING DISRUPTIVE INTO SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The Evolution of Journalism in a Digital Era
Near the end of the 20th century, new technology began to change the landscape of media and
journalism across the world. The evolution occurred primarily due to the proliferation of
personal computers and increased access to the Internet, then continued in the 2000s with the
emergence of smartphones. 8 Prior to this digital revolution, most publishing houses operated
through a similar business model. They generated editorial content through employed
journalists, aggregated reach, and monetized the printed content through sales, advertising, and
classified revenues. 9 However, the raft of technological innovations drastically shifted this
traditional model, resulting in new media distribution strategies and vastly different consumer
preferences.
Using their smartphones, tablets, or personal computers, consumers could access news and
media content from anywhere they liked (see Exhibit 5 for a summary of where Americans
7 Suzanne Vranica and Jack Marshall, “Plummeting Newspaper Ad Revenue Sparks New Wave of Changes,” The
Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/plummeting-newspaper-ad-revenue-sparks-
new-wave-of-changes-1476955801 (October 21, 2016). 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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Axel Springer in 2016: From Transformation to Acceleration? E-610
p. 4
received their news content from 1991 to 2012). Consumers could browse media content on a
variety of channels, such as dedicated news websites, search engines, mobile applications, blogs,
and social media, many of which were free for consumers to access (see Exhibit 6 for data
relating to global trends in news consumption). Content was also available in a variety of
formats, including text, pictures, and videos, all of which could be accessed at the click of a
button. The ubiquity of news content allowed for a new type of news aggregator, such as the
Huffington Post, which collected content from across the Internet and then monetized the content
without having to generate the content themselves. Technology companies, including Apple and
Samsung, also began to include native news aggregator applications on their mobile devices.
In addition, many sites allowed non-journalists to contribute content, many of whom were not
paid by the corporation. For example, in the early 2010s, Forbes developed a platform whereby
thousands of individuals—business leaders, authors, academics, and other topic experts—could
contribute content on the Forbes.com website, without serving as full-time employees. 10
Using
the contributor model, companies could generate new content at a much lower cost, and they
could vastly increase the number of contributors publishing on their platform. 11
The rise of social media also played a dramatic role in the digital revolution of media and
journalism. Instead of simply absorbing media, consumers were actively involved in the creation
and distribution of content. Social media platforms allowed users to share stories publicly and
see what their friends were reading or watching. More and more companies incorporated social
media features into their media distribution, encouraging users to share and comment on news
stories. In this way, news shifted from a private read to a communal experience. Social media
also drove a shift towards the personalization of news content, in which consumers could access
media specifically targeted to their unique preferences. For example, Facebook’s proprietary
news feed algorithm ensured that users were shown only the content that mattered most to them
while filtering out the material that was of less importance. 12
Axel Springer’s History: The Early Years
Axel Springer was founded in Hamburg, Germany in 1946. Publisher Hinrich Springer and his
son Axel created the company as a means to bring popular content to the German people. 13
By
1959, Axel Springer had established itself as one of the major players in the German industry
with several popular publications including Nordwestdeutsche Hefte, Hörzu, Hamburger
Abendblatt, Bild, Die Welt, and Berliner Morgenpost. These offerings spanned a variety of
genres, including news, popular culture, and political commentary.
10
Lewis DVorkin, “Inside Forbes: In Journalism, What’s New Is Actually Old… and ‘That’s the Way It Is,’”
Forbes, May 29, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/lewisdvorkin/2012/05/29/inside-forbes-in-journalism-whats-
new-is-actually-old-and-thats-the-way-it-is/#2683f8ac359f (August 2, 2016). 11
Jeff Sonderman, “What the Forbes Model of Contributed Content Means for Journalism,” Poynter, May 29, 2012,
http://www.poynter.org/2012/what-the-forbes-model-of-contributed-content-means-for-journalism/173743/
(August 2, 2016). 12
Victor Luckerson, “Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually Works,” Time, July 9, 2015,
http://time.com/3950525/facebook-news-feed-algorithm/ (July 17, 2016). 13
For further information, see “Axel Springer in 2014: Strategic Leadership of the Digital Media Transformation,”
GSB No. E-522, p. 2.
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Axel Springer in 2016: From Transformation to Acceleration? E-610
p. 5
Throughout the next few decades, Axel Springer expanded its reach to attract an even broader
audience, developing a portfolio of magazines for sports, automobile, photography, and
international art enthusiasts. By the 1990s, Axel Springer’s publications had distribution in more
than 20 countries around the globe, and the company had established a presence in radio as well
as television. 14
Digital Evolution at Axel Springer
When Mathias Döpfner became CEO of Axel Springer in January 2002, he had a clear vision for
the company: Axel Springer would be the winner of digitalization in the European media
business. 15
In January 2006, however, Germany’s antitrust body blocked Axel Springer’s
attempt to acquire Germany’s biggest television broadcaster, ProSiebenSat.1, which prompted
Döpfner to reconsider Axel Springer’s digital strategy. 16
Turning his attention to online
channels, Döpfner challenged Axel Springer to generate half of its revenue and profit from
digital products within the next 10 years. This was a tall task given that less than 1 percent of the
company’s revenue came from digital products in 2006. 17
Yet, Axel Springer was able to achieve these goals by focusing on three success factors: not
fearing self-cannibalization from print to digital divisions; accepting diverse and entrepreneurial
personalities; and not allowing the creation of silos within Axel Springer. 18
Döpfner did not
want winners or losers to emerge within the organization; as such, he infused a digital culture
within each of Axel Springer’s three key business segments: classified advertisements,
marketing, and paid content. The classified advertisement segment generated revenue primarily
through job, car, and real estate advertisements. The marketing segment earned revenue from its
advertising clients, whereas the paid content segment generated revenue through paid readers
and viewers. As of 2015, the classified advertisement segment comprised 23 percent of Axel
Springer’s revenue, while marketing and paid content made up 27 percent and 48 percent,
respectively. 19
With employees singularly focused on what was best for the company as a whole, Axel Springer
was able to recognize unique opportunities for growth that blended the worlds of digital and
print. Ulf Poschardt, editor-in-chief of Axel Springer’s WeltN24, explained the company’s
unified approach: “A few years ago, I started a blog on Porsche. It started as a personal side
project, but it quickly became very popular with thousands of readers. So we decided to create
official digital and print products focused on Porsche, and advertisers came to us immediately.
This is just one small example, but it shows the integrated way that we looked at new
opportunities.” 20
14
Ibid, p. 3. 15
Ibid, p. 7. 16
Ibid, p. 7. 17
Ibid, p. 8. 18
Ibid, p. 8. 19
“Axel Springer 2015 Annual Report,” Axel Springer, http://www.axelspringer.de/dl/22446733/Axel_Springer_
Annual_Report_2015.pdf (July 16, 2016). 20
Interview with Ulf Poschardt on September 22, 2016. All quotations are from this interview unless otherwise
noted.
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Axel Springer in 2016: From Transformation to Acceleration? E-610
p. 6
Pioneers in Paid Digital Content
Döpfner knew that Axel Springer’s digital evolution would require much more than simply
moving content from print format to the Internet. The company had to experiment with new
distribution and monetization models, partnerships, and content solutions. Jan Bayer, president,
Paid Models, and member of the company’s Executive Board, explained Axel Springer’s
pioneering attitude in its digital endeavors:
When we introduced a paid component to our digital products in Germany, we
expected the other publishers to do the same. We were convinced that journalism
could only be a viable business if people paid for it. It’s not possible to finance a
newsroom and a worldwide network of correspondents with advertising only. At
least that’s the case in a comparably small market like Germany, where language
differences pose a natural barrier for reach. In the end, we were the only
publisher in Germany to introduce paid content. Obviously, there was a risk. If
you are the only one offering paid content, free content is your biggest
competitor. But we trusted that we had a premium product—something that
people would be willing to pay for. We were proved right. Eventually other
publishers followed the same path. 21
One of Axel Springer’s first digital solutions, iKiosk, was released on December 12, 2011. 22
Ulrich Schmitz, chief technical officer (CTO) of Axel Springer’s Electronic Media Division,
described the product: “iKiosk is a distribution platform for full newspaper and magazine
editions, but in PDF format. It started with our own publications, and step-by-step we added
almost the entire German market on iKiosk. Almost every major publication is now on iKiosk.
Essentially, people could pay to get the entire edition of the publication they wanted. It was a
natural transition from print.” 23
Less than three years later, Axel Springer, in conjunction with the New York Times, invested €3
million in the Dutch start-up Blendle, a company that described itself as the “iTunes for
journalism.” 24
Whereas iKiosk only allowed users to purchase the entire edition of a publication,
Blendle allowed users to pay on a per-article basis. Döpfner explained the investment, “As a </p
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