introduction
IN 2007, I asked a class of students in an urban sociology class at a fine Catholic university in the East to fantasize about their futures. Where and how would they be living, fifteen years hence? All but two imagined a life in suburbia, with a spouse, children, grass, and a good job. And that dream was of a white suburbia. To be sure, it was not all white. No one objected if, down on their imaginary block, the family of, say, a black health care professional lived. Nevertheless, a white vision. Sociologists have long known that people’s dreams are limited by their reality During World War 11, researchers asked the public, “What do you want in your postwar house?” and, according to Paul Goodman, “the responses were hopelessly banal.” As urban planner Catherine Bauer put it, “People can want only what they know” (Goodman 1962. 5). My students were not imagining a future from scratch. Mostly they were dreaming what they knew, plus about 25 percent. In so doing, these students were not unusual. On the contrary, I had begun class with that fantasy exercise precisely because I knew how it would likely turn out. What students know in the United States-at least what middle- and upper-class whites know throughout most of the country-is residential segregation, especially in the suburbs. And more Americans now live in suburbs than in cities and rural areas combined. The two exceptional students, both of whom imagined life in an urban row house, both came from New York City(46) “Hopelessly banal.” perhaps, but explicitly racist for certain were the vast subdivi sions erected by Levitt and Sons, the largest homebuilder in America after World War IL. When the William and Daisy Myers family moved in 1957 into Levittown, Pennsylvania, a “sundown town” that did not allow black residents, white suprema cists occupied a nearby house and made it the center of organized opposition. They raised a Confoderate flag, plaved “Desie owur a loudspeaker at high olume and all hours, and phoned the Myerses with threats. The [White] Citizens’ Council circu lated this cartoon showing their support for this Northern racism (Kushner 2009. 202, 205; Exhibit on Levittown 2002; Citizens’ Council 1957, 4). (Reprinted from The Citizen, the publication of the Citizens Council of Mississippi, 1957) Life before the Nadir It was not always this way. A little more than a century ago, Americans lived much more integrated lives, racially and economically. African Americans lived everywhere-in northeast Pennsylvania river valleys, in every Indiana county save one, deep in the north woods of Wiscon sin, in every county of Montana and California. Similarly, within cities, African Americans lived everywhere. Reynolds Farley and William Frey (1994, 24), premier researchers on residential segregation, point out that until about 1900, “in northern cities, some blacks shared neighborhoods with poor immigrants from Europe.” Even middle-class areas were (47) interracial: “Tiny cadres of highly educated blacks lived among whites in prosperous neighborhoods.” The Index of Dissimilarity (“D”) provides a useful measure of the degree of residential segregation in a city or metropolitan area. When D0, integration is perfect: Every part of the city has exactly the same racial composition. The number 100 represents complete apartheid: not one black in any white area nor one white in a black area. For val ues between 0 and 100, D tells the percentage of the smaller group usually African Americans-that would have to move to whiter areas to achieve a neutral distribution of both races. In 1890, a representative selection of twenty-two Northern cities had an average D of 38-not very segregated. Southern cities were even less segregated spatially, with a D of 22. Most city neighborhoods also contained poor people and rich people-the alley homes in Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., are an example-partly so the poor could maintain the houses of the rich The Nadir of Race Relations That was life in 1890. Rapid change was already underway. Between 1890 and 1940, racism rose to new heights, and race relations sank to new depths, prompting historians to call this era the “nadir of race rela tions.” Lynchings peaked. Owners expelled black baseball players from the major (and minor) leagues. Unions drove African Americans from such occupations as railroad fireman and meat cutter. During the nadir, race became embedded in our geography. Whites indulged in race riots that drove blacks out of towns from Oregon to Minnesota to Pennsylvania to Florida, creating sundown towns across the North. Many communities that had no African American residents joined in, passing ordinances that forbade blacks from remaining after dark. Still other towns decided informally not to allow African Ameri cans to settle. Suburbs used zoning and informal policing to keep out black would-be residents and eminent domain to take their property if they did manage to buy some. D is particularly useful, because it is not affected by the overall proportion of African Americans in the metropolitan area, and because it has intuitive clarity. D is calculated for twn ornns at a time here blacks RA ANH (48) In 1914, Villa Grove, near Cham paign, Illinois, put up this water tower. Sometime thereafter, the town mounted a whistle on it that sounded at 6 P.M. to warn African Americans to get beyond the city limits. It sounded until about 1998, when it was stopped owing to complaints by neighbors about the noise. Although ordinances are hard to find, this siren embodies one, because putting it up and sounding it required formal action by city hall. Since Villa Grove is on no main route and near no major black population center, its siren also exemplifies an irrational American nightmare. (Photograph by James W. Loewen.) The nadir took place for a comples of causes. Maybe the antiracis ideology of the Reconstruction era could not have lasted past 1890, hav ing derived in large part from the social events and intellectual develop ments of the Civil War. Certainly the ideology of imperialism, wafting into the United States on winds from England and Europe, played an important role. So did our continuing Indian wars, culminating in the 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee that sent Native Americans into a nadir of their own. Beginning around 1885, white workers in Wyoming California, and across the West drove Chinese American workers from whole counties and entire occupations. The rise of eugenics as a science was hardly coincidental. Perhaps most important was our nationa acquiescence, also beginning in 1890, as Mississippi passed its new state constitution removing African Americans from citizenship. Since the United States did nothing, all other Southern states and states as distant as Oklahoma followed suit by 1907. (49) Audiences cackle at the last line on this bust of Christopher Columbus. They “know” Italians are not a race. Italian Americans believed differ ently in 1920 when they erected this monument at the Indiana State Capitol. By the end of the nadir, however, Italians, Slavs, and other races had become one racewhite. Jews. Atmenians, and Turks took just a little longer. Without these additions, “whites” would have been outnumbered long ago. Perhaps for the same reason, now the white American Dream seems to be opening to Latinos and Asian Americans. (Photograph by James W. Loewen.) (50) During the nadir, Mena, the county seat of Polk County, Arkansas, competed for white residents and tourists by advertising what they had-cool summers, pretty homes, and so forthand the problems they did not have. The sentiment hardly died out in 1940, A 1980 article, “The Real Polk County, began, “It is not an uncommon experience in Polk County to hear a new comer remark that he chose to move here because of low taxes and no niggers” (The Real Polk County 1980). How were we to understand such acts? The easiest way would be to declare that African Americans had never deserved equal rights in the first place. After allwent this line of thought, slavery was over. Now a new generation of African Americans had come of age, never tainted by the “peculiar institution.” Why were they still at the bottom? African Americans themselves must be to blame. They must not work hard enough, think as well, or have as much drive compared to whites. And if they are the problem, why let that problem near us? 4″Cognitive dissonance” as developed by Festinger 1957 can help. The theme of African Americans as the problem does not stand up to scrutiny Whites forced African Americans from major league baseball not because they could not play well but because they could. Whites expelled black jockeys from the Kentucky Derby not because they were incompetent but because they won fifteen of the first twenty-eight der bies. They drove blacks out of the job of postal carrier so they could do it themselves, not (51) So, we did not In Illinots, the state where I did the most feldwork 1 identified 504 communities that were demographically likely to have been sundown towns. Of these, I got information about the racial policy formal or informal, of 220. Of those 220, I confirmed 219 as sundown towns. If the same ratio held among towns whose racial policies are unknown, then about 282 of them would be sundown towns, for a total of 501 (Loewen 2005). Statistically, at least 488 had to be sundown towns. (For details of the calculations, see the appendix.) This is about 70 per cent of all incorporated municipalities in the state. Similar ratios were found in Oregon, Indiana, and probably several other Northern states. Sundown suburbs were even more common: Across the United States, I estimate that 80 percent of all suburbs kept out black residents. Large cities did not go sundown, of course, although Tulsa tried, but most of their neighborhoods did. By 1920, the Index of Dissimilarity of the average Northern city had risen from 38 in 1890 to more than 80. By 1940, the South was catching up: Northern cities averaged 89.2, South ern cities 81.0. By 1960, the average Northern city held at 85.6, while D in the average Southern city had risen to an astonishing 91.9. Suburban Dreams and Nightmares Unfortunately, coinciding with this increising racism in American cul ture came a new ideological drive toward suburbia. The two grew fatally entwined. New technologystreetcars and, soon to come, autoswas sparking new dreams. No longer did maids and handymen have to live nearby, so the new residential dream could be quite different from the status quo. It resurrected elements of the English country home. watered down, as described in sometimes stinging phrases by social because blacks could not do it right, The foregong seems obvious, but when it comes to housing, even today, deep inside white culture a legacy from the nadir is the sneaking suspicion that African Americans are a problem, so it is best to keep them out In fact, segregation was even worse than that, especially in the North. At any given mo ment, Northern metropolitan areas looked more integrated than they really were, owing to the Great Migration, which continued at least to 1968. This influx of African Americans from the South led to blockbusting, in turn creating transitional neighborhoods that were temporarily desegregated and artificially reduced D. After factoring out changing neigh borhoods, Ds in both regions would rise, reflecting black movement to the cities, but es pecially in the North. Perhaps 94 would be a reasonable estimate for the average D in both regions, controlling for transitional neighborhoods. Cf. Tacuber 1965, Taeuber 1982, and Farley and Frey 1994. (52) These ads for a residential subdivision at the edge of Salt Lake City show the unfold ing of suburban ideology over time. At the left, in 1914, Highland Park advertises pure air; five years later, in 1919, the purity is racial. Possibly the developers were not anti black personally but merely believed that their new appeal would sell houses faster. commentators from Thorstein Veblen in 1899 (The Theory of the Lei sure Class) to Robert Fogelson in 2005 (Bourgeois Nightmares).? Fogelson stresses that the new dream community was defined more by what it was not-the city, with its noise and odors and, worst of all, all its people-than by what it was. Restrictive covenants abounded. Edina, the most prestigious suburb of Minneapolis/St. Paul, prohib ited “fuel storage tanks above ground” and forbade the planting of “shedding poplars box elders, or other objectionable trees or shrubs” Most importantly: No lot shall ever be sold, conveyed, leased, or rented to any per son other than one of the white or Caucasian race, nor shall any lot ever be used or occupied by any person other than one of the (53) So, we did not In Illinots, the state where I did the most feldwork 1 identified 504 communities that were demographically likely to have been sundown towns. Of these, I got information about the racial policy formal or informal, of 220. Of those 220, I confirmed 219 as sundown towns. If the same ratio held among towns whose racial policies are unknown, then about 282 of them would be sundown towns, for a total of 501 (Loewen 2005). Statistically, at least 488 had to be sundown towns. (For details of the calculations, see the appendix.) This is about 70 per cent of all incorporated municipalities in the state. Similar ratios were found in Oregon, Indiana, and probably several other Northern states. Sundown suburbs were even more common: Across the United States, I estimate that 80 percent of all suburbs kept out black residents. Large cities did not go sundown, of course, although Tulsa tried, but most of their neighborhoods did. By 1920, the Index of Dissimilarity of the average Northern city had risen from 38 in 1890 to more than 80. By 1940, the South was catching up: Northern cities averaged 89.2, South ern cities 81.0. By 1960, the average Northern city held at 85.6, while D in the average Southern city had risen to an astonishing 91.9. Suburban Dreams and Nightmares Unfortunately, coinciding with this increising racism in American cul ture came a new ideological drive toward suburbia. The two grew fatally entwined. New technologystreetcars and, soon to come, autoswas sparking new dreams. No longer did maids and handymen have to live nearby, so the new residential dream could be quite different from the status quo. It resurrected elements of the English country home. watered down, as described in sometimes stinging phrases by social because blacks could not do it right, The foregong seems obvious, but when it comes to housing, even today, deep inside white culture a legacy from the nadir is the sneaking suspicion that African Americans are a problem, so it is best to keep them out In fact, segregation was even worse than that, especially in the North. At any given mo ment, Northern metropolitan areas looked more integrated than they really were, owing to the Great Migration, which continued at least to 1968. This influx of African Americans from the South led to blockbusting, in turn creating transitional neighborhoods that were temporarily desegregated and artificially reduced D. After factoring out changing neigh borhoods, Ds in both regions would rise, reflecting black movement to the cities, but es pecially in the North. Perhaps 94 would be a reasonable estimate for the average D in both regions, controlling for transitional neighborhoods. Cf. Tacuber 1965, Taeuber 1982, and Farley and Frey 1994. (54) Children in Detroit live within sight of this playground in Grosse Pointe and know that its bars are aimed at them or were until recently. Only since about 1995 have African Americans been able to live without difficulty in most of the five communi ties known collectively as Grosse Pointe. (Photograph by James W. Loewen.) Residents knew it was their race that was the problem, so they could not work their way up and out of their predicament. As late as 2002, Leon ard Steinhorn could still observe, “An Hispanic or Asian with a third grade education is more likely to live among whites than a black with a Ph.D. (Steinorn 2002). In turn, residential segregation made it more likely that African Americans would receive inferior educations, health care, and other (55) public services. Worse yet, confining most African Americans to the opposite of the suburban dream-majority-black inner-city ghettoes restricted their access to cultural capital, “those learned patterns of mutual trust, insider knowledge about how things really work, encoun ter rituals, and social sensibilities that constitute the language of power and success” As a result, many young African Americans concluded that reaching the American Dream by the usual (white) methods excluded them. Instead, they turned to less realistic means of achieving it, such as crime or winning the lettery (Samuel 2002: Schultze 1995: Harper’s Index 1999). Our segregated landscape affects white dreams, too. Independent sundown towns, such as Pana, Illinois, or Medford, Oregon, limit the aspirations of children who come of age within them. It is an axiom of American small-town life that “youth goes elsewhere to become some body,” but young people in sundown towns typically hold ambivalent feelings toward the outside world. They are very aware that it differs from their circumscribed little world; indeed, like their parents, high school and college students from all-white towns and suburbs exagger ate the differences and routinely estimate that the population of the United States is 20 to 50 percent black. So they are wary of the outside world and not sure they want to venture out there. “Basically, they didn’t go anywhere,” a woman from Anna, a sundown town in southern Illi nois, said about her friends from Anna-Jonesboro High School. Some Anna residents refuse to go even to nearby Carbondale-it’s too black. (Carbondale is 23 percent black.) Adolescent dreams in elite suburbs display no such limits. These young people have grown up with a sense of entitlement. The world is their oyster, and they intend to harvest its pearls. Their parents mostly do not work in town but in corporate headquarters in the central city or suburban office parks. Their jobs take them across the country, and their frequent-flier miles take their families for vacations around the world. Parochial they are not. And yet, people in the white dream fear the black nightmare: “When we rode the subway said a former resident of Darien, Connecticut, about his high school friends, “they would ride wide-eyed, thinking they’d be mugged at any moment.” Paradoxically, while thus believing that race relations are unrealistically bad, segregated whites (56) also think they are unrealistically good. A 2001 poll showed that whites living in overwhelmingly white communities perceived the least dis crimination against blacks, while whites in majority black neighbor hoods perceived the most (Welch et al. 2001, 85-92). Where whites live not only affects how they think about blacks and vice versa-it also influences how they vote. At the beginning of the nadir, Republicans pulled back from their commitment to equal rights to all, regardless of race. Indeed, that retraction was a key reason for the nadir. From William McKinley to Richard Nison. African America could not tell which of the two main parties better served their interests. From time to time, they tried to make common cause with one party or the other, only to find their regard unrequited. Then in 1964 came a sea change. Campaigning for president, Barry Goldwater emphasized that he had opposed the Civil Rights Act of that year. His supporters urged, Let’s make the White House the white house again!” Goldwater carried only the Deep South and his home state of Arizona, but his ideological fellow travelers captured the Republican Party, and it has not been the same since. In 1968, Nixon devised his “Southern strategy”-coded ref erences to “states’ rights” to imply opposition to using the federal gov ernment to overturn the status quo in race relations-to head off George Wallace, a third-party candidate openly hostile to black rigts and aspi rations. The strategy was misnamed, however. Wallace’s popularity was hardly limited to Alabama and Mississippi; he won from a third of to more than half the white vote in such states as Wisconsin and Michigan. Nixon’s strategy worked so well, not only in the South but also in sun down towns and white suburbs everywhere, that it has since become bedrock Republican policy (Edsall and Edsall 1992). The Nightmare Persists Even in the Obama Age The situation grew still worse. In the words of economist Wilhelmina Leigh: “Between 1950 and 1990 the number of blacks living in all-black census tracts increased from 3 out of 10 to 5 out of 10. At the same time. the number of blacks living in mixed neighborhoods (25% black or less) declined from 25% to 16%” (Leigh 1992, 19). The power of the linethe border between central city and sundown suburb-astounds to this day. Driving west on Eight Mile, the road that forms the northern border of Detroit, houses on the left look like those on the right, but 75 percent of the residents on the left are African American, compared to (57) fewer than I percent on the right. Depending on one’s social class, the tidy homes and well-kempt lawns of suburban Warren or the McMan sions of Grosse Pointe embody many American Dreams. The tidy homes and well-kempt lawns of northern Detroit do not. Well, they do embody African American dreams, at least in the black working class. Having been excluded from the suburban home buying boom that marked the United States after World War II, African Americans have struggled to pursue the American Dream-home ownership in a nice neighborhood-more recently. Always, they have to know, and do know, that whites by definition give lower status to black neighborhoods, precisely because blacks live in them. The election of America’s first black president in 2008 was a giant step toward a more integrated nation, to be sure, and Americans saw it that way. Polled a year after Obama’s election, 60 percent of all Americans believed that race relations would improve as a result of his presidency, and more than 50 percent of African Americans thought this improvement had already happened just as a result of his election. As Fredrick Harris, who directs the Center on African American Politics and Society at Colum bia University, put it, “E very time Barack Obama or Michelle Obama and their children are in the press, in the news, this is still a source of pride and a daily reminder that there’s been some transformation” (One Year Later 2009). Unfortunately, the transformation is hardly complete. Obama won the presidency with just over 40 percent of the votes of white males and only 10 percent of the votes of white males in the Deep South. More over, despite Obama’s triumph, racism is not an aberration in our soci ety but a central part of it. It does not result from bigots but is part of how we do business and is built in-especially to where we live. As Afri can American families try to pursue the American Dream, they still face special obstacles. During the summer of 2009, it became clear why the subprime mortgage loan crisis hit African Americans especially hard. “We just went right after them,” said Beth Jacobson, self-described as the top-producing subprime loan officer at the huge Wells Fargo Bank. Wells Fargo “specifically targeted black churches, because it figured church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to take out subprime loans” Other banks participated. In Nw York City, for example, black households were “nearly five times as likely to hold high-interest subprime mortgages as whites of similar or even lower incomes,” according to the New York Times (Powell 2009), Thus, the (58) American Dreams of many families-especially black families-turned to nightmares. For a century, the American suburban dream has resulted from and exemplified the conflation of whiteness and prestige. Kenilworth, on Lake Michigan north of Evanston, is the most expensive suburb of Chi cago. It is also the whitest. Money does not drive the separation; in Chi cago live plenty of black families wealthy enough to afford Kenilworth. Rather, its developer, Joseph Sears, built into its founding ordinances “sales to Caucasians only” initially interpreted to bar Jews as well as Afri can Americans. In 1964, a black family finally moved into Kenilworth. Teenagers burned a cross on their lawn, but they stuck it out for twelve years, making some friends in the community. In 2002, however, not one black family lived in Kenilworth (Kilner 1990, 138, 143, emphasis original; U.S. Census of Population 2000 2002; Kenilworth realtor 2002). Of course, Kenilworth is a synecdoche for prestigious neighborhoods across America that remain pridefully exclusive, such as Tuxedo Park, probably the wealthiest suburb of New TYork City: Edina, Minnesota Chevy Chase, Maryland, adjoining Washington, D.C. The status of all these former sundown suburbs still derives in part from their overwhelmingly white populations. As they become ever more successful, white families in integrated working- or middle-class suburbs still move to Kenilworth. They move not because their previous neighborhoods grew too black for themindeed, not owing to any dis satisfaction with their previous neighborhoods-but because they are supposed to. Like water, money seeks its outlet. The Kenilworths of America are where the very elite are supposed to live, and people usually do what they are supposed to. Indeed, people usually dream what they are supposed to. A New American Dream? Let us close by recalling the college studen ith whom we began-who dreamt of the suburban good life. Like the residents of Kenilworth, they did not see themselves living in white suburbia out of racism but owing to their (hoped-for) success. Nevertheless, their vision is racialized, because it is based on what they know. Their choices, if based on that vision, will lead to continued segregation. Their dream furthers our seg regated nightmare. They need to dream outside the box. (59) We now live in two Americas at once. I do not mean a black Amer ica and a white America, although, to be sure, those still exist. 1 that we live in an integrated America (on the job, on most college cam puses, on American Idol, in the armed forces in the White House, ane in the Catholic Church), and we live in a segregated America (where we live and, too often, how we vote). About race, many of us are white supremacists yet at the same time yearn to transcend white supremacy. We have two dreams available to us at once. We have Kenilworth as dream, but also Kenilworth as nightmare. When acquaintances announce they are moving to the Kenilworths of America, we need to respond with concern: “Oh no! You’re not raising children there, are you?” To change our American Dream, we must stop conflating whiteness and prestige, and responding with dismay to what seems like innocent upward mobility is a good start We need a new dream. We are on the cusp of a new dream. In a way, in the 1990s, Michael Jordan represented that new dream-but despite his astonishing popularity across racial lines, white America did not take him home, except as a poster for the teenage son’s bedroom. Colin Powell might have represented the new dream-but he never ran for office and instead ran afoul of foul machinations in the George W. Bush administration. Obama does represent the new dream. Can Republicans offer the new dream? Only if they move beyond their Southern strategy and abandon being the party of white supremacy. Ultimately, to change our American Dream, we must change our racial geography. Toward this end, the recent history of sundown towns offers some hope. Since the middle of the 1990s, many sundown towns and suburbs have given up their policies and integrated peacefully-and not just with Jews, Asian Americans, and Latinos but also with African Americans. Is it too much to believe that we might unracialize our dream of the good life in America? Well, we can dream, can we not? After all, this is America. Appendix Inferential statistics allows us to calculate a range within which we can be confident the true number of sundown towns will fall. We use “the standard error of the difference of two percentages.” To find this (60) statistic, first we calculate the standard error of each percentage sepa rately. Beginning with the 218 towns on which we have information, the formula is: where n the number of towns for which we have data (220), p the proportion that were sundown (.995), and q= (1 – p) or .005. This stan dard error = .005, or 0.5 percent. (Actually, this proportion is known without error, or at least without error caused by sampling. Calculating its standard error would be appropriate if we were using a sample drawn from a larger population-say, all towns in the southern half of the state-but here 218 is the population. Some statisticians calculate the standard error anyway, just to be conservative or as a surrogate for other forms of error, such as having gathered incorrect evidence on a given town.) We also need the standard error of the percentage of sundown towns among the 284 towns for which we have no information. Since we do not know this percentage, we assume just 90 percent will be, lower than the most likely estimate of 99.5 percent. Such a conservative assumption provides a larger than likely standard error that results in a more con servative overall estimate. Using the same formula, we substitute: n 284, p 9, and q = .1. This standard error 018, or about 1.8 percent. We then combine these two standard errors using the formula Spl-p2) VSp+ Sp to find the standard error of the difference of two percentages, which 0182, or 1.82 percent. We wish to form a confidence interval around 282.6, our best esti mate for the number of sundown towns among the 284 unknowns. The more rigorous interval used by statisticians is the “99 percent limit, which means that 99 times out of 100, it will include the actual number of sundown towns. Statistical tables tell that a range that extends 2.58 standard errors above and below our best estimate will include that actual number 99 percent of the time. 2.58 x .0182 – .047, or 4.7 per cent; 4.7 percent of 284 13.3 towns. So at least 282.613.3 269 of the unknowns will be sundown. Symmetrically, our estimate for the maximum number of sundown towns likely among the unexamined (61) towns would be 282.6+13.3 or 296. Of course, numbers above 284 are impossible. To compensate, we might extend the lower limit downward to take in more of the distribution, since its upper limit is clipped, but this correction is not normally computed, is unlikely to be substantial since most of the distribution will be around 282-284, and is at least partly offset by the conservatively calculated standard error described above. Hence I think it is reasonable to conclude that we can be 99 per cent confident 269 to 284 of the 284 unknown towns were sundown towns. Adding the 219 confirmed sundown towns vicids an overall esti mate, with a 99 percent level of confidence, that the number of sundown towns among all 502 overwhelmingly white towns in Illinois lies between 488 and 503. Our best single estimate for the number of sundown towns in Illinois is 501. (62) It prompts reflection on the ways in which historical injustices continue to impact present-day society and the ongoing struggle for racial justice and equality. It also raises questions about the responsibility of individuals and institutions to confront and address systemic racism in housing and other spheres of life.
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