Explain the unique aspects of the shadow banking business model. What type of institutions comprise this industry? What is the funding profile of these types of institutions?
Using the file attached:
- Explain the unique aspects of the shadow banking business model. What type of institutions comprise this industry? What is the funding profile of these types of institutions?
- Why does shadow banking exist? What gaps does it fill in the economy?
- What are the advantages of the shadow banking industry? What are the risks? How can they be mitigated?
- Should the shadow banking industry be more comprehensively regulated?
- GE Capital:
- a. In your view, is GE Capital a shadow bank? Should the market care about such a characterization?
- b. What does GE Capital's historical ROE suggest about the profit potential for nonbank financial institutions vis-a-vis traditional commercial banks?
- c. Why did GE initiate the GE Capital Exit Plan? Was it successful?
UV7199 Oct. 3, 2016
This public-sourced case was prepared by George (Yiorgos) Allayannis, Professor of Business Administration, and Jeffrey Allen (MBA ’16). It was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Names of characters and the company for which those characters work are fictional. Copyright 2016 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to [email protected]. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation.
GE and the Shadow Banking Landscape
Well, my plan is more comprehensive. And frankly, it’s tougher because of course we have to deal with the problem that the banks are still too big to fail…But we also have to worry about some of the other players— AIG, a big insurance company; Lehman Brothers, an investment bank. There’s this whole area called “shadow banking.” That’s where the experts tell me the next potential problem could come from. I want to make sure we’re going to cover everybody, not what caused the problem last time, but what could cause it next time.
—Hillary Clinton, Democratic presidential candidate1
Shadow banking, as usually defined, comprises a diverse set of institutions and markets that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions—but do so outside, or in ways only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions. Examples of important components of the shadow banking system include securitization vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, money market mutual funds, markets for repurchase agreements (repos), investment banks, and mortgage companies. Before the crisis, the shadow banking system had come to play a major role in global finance.
—Ben Bernanke, former chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve2
On May 13, 2016, Monica Reddy’s manager at Sifnos Capital Management (Sifnos), Tara Baker, approached her with a slightly bizarre request: “Starting Monday, we’d love to explore this shadow banking space. Think you could lead the charge?” Reddy was used to ambiguity at the small, upstart suburban DC investment fund. Baker admitted she got the bright idea from all the public debate between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton on financial regulatory structures throughout their presidential campaigns. Reddy had seen Hillary Clinton’s recent Wall Street Reform plan, which pledged to “tackle financial dangers of the ‘shadow banking’ system.”3
Reddy, who had started at Sifnos six months before, spent her first postcollege decade at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Although she loved the Treasury Department, she was ready to give the private sector a shot and wanted a reprieve from policy making. Most of her research at Sifnos thus far dealt with companies from the “real” side of the economy, a welcome change of pace from her financial markets focus in years prior. Despite that, it felt good to get an assignment she knew a little bit about. While Reddy had never
1 “CNN Democratic Debate—Full Transcript,” CNN.com, October 13, 2015, http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/10/13/cnn-democratic-
debate-full-transcript/ (accessed May 13, 2016). 2 Ben S. Bernanke, “Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response,” speech to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
April 13, 2012, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm (accessed May 13, 2016). 3 Hillary Clinton, “Wall Street Reform,” Hillaryclinton.com, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/wall-street/, (accessed May 13, 2016).
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worked directly on shadow banking issues, the topic had been ubiquitous in public policy circles since the global financial crisis (GFC), and she had plenty of resources on which to draw.
Notwithstanding the renewed public interest on the matter, Reddy was skeptical as to whether there were well-informed conceptions regarding the state of shadow banking. To be sure, she knew the sector had recently gained steam internationally. However, the classic conception of shadow banking in the United States that she heard described in so many postcrisis policy speeches had become less popular.4 Further, she was slightly troubled by the harsh dialogue surrounding shadow banking, as the industry was certainly capable of providing healthy competition with traditional banking and filling gaps in underserved markets. In fact, Reddy recalled that a contingency of policy makers insisted on referring to the industry as “market-based finance,” refusing the pejorative nature of the “shadow” adjective.5 On a similar note, it seemed that a single comprehensive shadow bank regulatory framework could not keep pace with the industry’s dynamism and innovation. One resource would be critical in getting to the bottom of all this—the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) 2015 Global Shadow Bank Monitoring Report.6 She had browsed a couple of the reports in years prior but never in excruciating detail.
Rather than simply describing the state of the industry, Reddy knew that Baker would want everything couched with a certain company in the background. She had been thinking about a headline that flashed across her Morning Money news feed on March 31, 2016, which read “MetLife Beats FSOC!”7 Immediately her focus shifted to another company, and she realized this assignment was going to be a fantastic blend of the real and financial sides of the economy. Reddy pulled up EDGAR and grabbed the 2015 10-K for one of the world’s oldest industrial companies—General Electric (GE)—the parent company of GE Capital, the institution she had in mind. In doing so, a few primary objectives came to Reddy’s mind. First, she was particularly interested in evaluating GE CEO Jeff Immelt’s 2015 decision to divest the vast majority of GE Capital. Second, she wanted to form an opinion regarding the divestiture’s impact on GE returns moving forward, a projection that was critical to her investment research. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, she was interested in evaluating whether GE Capital did indeed fit the characteristics of a shadow bank. Much of her analysis hinged on a better understanding of this so-called shadow banking industry itself. Thus she turned her attention to that task.
The Shadow Banking Industry
Reddy had seen the advent of the term “shadow banking” attributed to PIMCO economist Paul McCulley and traced back to 2007 in countless post-GFC analyses of the system.8 However, thorough explanations of the system’s function and makeup before the GFC were tough to discover. She recalled one speech delivered by then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Tim Geithner, in June 2008, before the onset of the U.S. financial meltdown, as one of the earlier public analyses of the industry. Without explicitly mentioning
4 Daniel K. Tarullo, “Thinking Critically about Nonbank Financial Intermediation,” speech at The Brookings Institution, November 17, 2015,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20151117a.htm (accessed May 17, 2016). 5 “Global Shadow Bank Monitoring Report 2015,” Financial Stability Board, November 12, 2015, http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/global-shadow-
banking-monitoring-report-2015/ (accessed May 14, 2016). 6 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) was the G-20 body responsible for monitoring global financial stability and coordinating the development of
international regulatory standards for addressing financial stability issues across member jurisdictions. Through the FSB, finance ministries and regulators from international jurisdictions come together to draft minimum standards, which are ideally implemented by participating members in their domestic legal and regulatory structures. In 2016, the FSB was chaired by Bank of England Governor Mark Carney.
7 Ben White, “Morning Money,” Politico, March 31, 2016, http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-money/2016/03/morning-money-213502, (accessed May 13, 2016).
8 See, for example, Bryan J. Noeth and Rajdeep Sengupta, “Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 2011, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is-shadow-banking-really-banking (accessed May 14, 2016).
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shadow banking, Geithner discussed “dramatic growth in the share of assets outside the traditional banking system,” in which “the scale of long-term risky and relatively illiquid assets financed by very short-term liabilities” made the system highly susceptible to banklike runs.9
Although pre-GFC discussions of shadow banking were lacking, there was certainly no shortage of public dialogue on the industry in the aftermath of the GFC. Reddy reexamined one of the original FSB background notes on shadow banking from 2011, which broadly identified shadow banking as “the system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system.”10 The FSB further determined that while regulators should certainly monitor the broad universe of nonbank financial intermediaries, a more concentrated conception of shadow banking was in order. Thus it formed the narrow definition of shadow banking as “a system of credit intermediation that involves entities and activities outside the regular banking system, and raises i) systemic risk concerns, in particular by maturity/liquidity transformation, leverage and flawed credit risk transfer, and/or ii) regulatory arbitrage concerns.”11 Reddy determined she would revisit some of these concepts shortly when she started thinking about risks in the system. For now, she was still concerned with zeroing in on what financial entities this system comprised.
Reddy always pictured the core of the shadow banking system, at least in the United States, to revolve substantially around the interaction of the “originate-to-distribute” model of credit intermediation and the securitization market. She recalled, for example, the practice of large, nonbank mortgage companies originating mortgage loans, then subsequently turning those loans over to the securitization process, which was facilitated by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), investment banks, and special-purpose and structured- investment vehicles (SPVs, SIVs). Reddy further recollected insurance companies being tied up in the process by issuing credit-risk guarantees. The system seemed also to involve money market mutual funds (MMMFs), hedge funds, and other financial institutions that got their hands on some of the by-products of the process, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and commercial paper. In this sense, shadow banking appeared to be more of a process involving numerous players rather than revolving around any one type of institution. Actually, she remembered attending a 2012 conference where then-chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, relayed a helpful example of the process she had in mind. Conveniently, the FSB included a visual depiction of this procedure in its 2011 report, which she reformulated and paired with Bernanke’s description (Exhibit 1).
Scope and Trends
Despite some emerging clarity surrounding the nature of shadow banking, Reddy still felt that she had not established a thorough understanding of the scope of the system. In reviewing her FSB materials, it seemed that a working proxy for the scope of shadow banking before 2015 was the group of institutions known as “other financial intermediaries” (OFIs).12 Data suggested that assets of OFIs had grown substantially since 2002 (Exhibit 2). Notably, however, there was a distinct dip in OFIs in 2008, owing most likely to the collapse of many nonbank financial structures in the United States around that time.
9 Timothy F. Geithner, “Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System,” speech at the Economic Club of New York, June 9, 2008,
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/tfg080609.html (accessed May 14, 2016). 10 “Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues,” Financial Stability Board, April 12, 2011, http://www.fsb.org/2011/04/shadow-banking-scoping-the-
issues/ (accessed May 14, 2016). 11 http://www.fsb.org/2011/04/shadow-banking-scoping-the-issues/. 12 The FSB defined OFIs as “all financial intermediaries that are not classified as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, public financial
institutions, central banks, or financial auxiliaries.” http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2015/.
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This concept of OFIs seemed consistent with the FSB’s broader definition of shadow banking. However, there had to be a separate quantification associated with the FSB’s narrower definition. And indeed, in its 2015 Global Shadow Bank Monitoring Report, the FSB published an “economic functions approach” to identifying shadow banking activities, which classified those types of financial activities that fulfilled the narrow definition.13 Reddy made note of these economic functions, their descriptions, and their typical entity types (Exhibit 3). Additionally, she reviewed data breaking down the share of shadow banking assets by economic function (Exhibit 4), along with the growth in shadow banking consistent with the narrower scope (Exhibit 5), and the distribution of worldwide financial assets among banks, OFIs, and shadow banks (Exhibit 6). Unfortunately, the FSB could only trace data for the narrow measure back to 2010. Nevertheless, the data seemed to run counter to some of the commonly held beliefs about shadow banking. Trends in the United States may have influenced the landscape because the United States maintained by far the largest share of global shadow banking assets (Exhibit 7). After the GFC, however, one of the most significant drivers of shadow banking growth—U.S. consumer credit—stalled significantly (Exhibit 8). Conversely, China’s share of worldwide shadow banking assets had grown markedly (Exhibit 7). In fact, Reddy had reason to believe the FSB’s data underrepresented shadow banking activity in China. Due to a definitional discrepancy, China’s FSB shadow banking data represented purely OFIs.14 Meanwhile, Reddy knew that Chinese shadow banking was linked primarily to banks engaging in off–balance sheet activities. Specifically, a large portion of shadow banking activity had been generated by banks or trust companies offering wealth-management products (WMPs) to yield-starved investors and lending directly to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or entrepreneurs, who might not otherwise fit state-mandated lending requirements.15 Chinese OFIs, therefore, did not capture the full shadow banking landscape.
The FSB’s data was a start in understanding the scope of and trends in the shadow banking sector, but Reddy was well aware that one of the big challenges in this arena revolved around data reliability. Many of the institutions that operated in this space did not have regulatory or public company reporting requirements. In fact, a Federal Reserve official had conceded that regulators’ “view of developments” in “the shadow banking sector—remains incomplete.”16 In any case, Reddy believed she had a decent grasp on the general nature of the shadow banking industry. Now, she wanted to more fully examine the typical business model the industry pursued.
The Business Model17
To understand the shadow banking business model, Reddy thought it wise to revisit the nature of traditional banking. At the most basic level, traditional banks intermediated between individual lenders and borrowers. Individuals typically could not lend directly to borrowers due to liquidity, timing, and informational constraints. The bank filled this gap by pooling deposits, of which they only needed to keep a fraction on hand, and seeking to find creditworthy borrowers who could put the funds to productive use. In this manner, banks engaged in
13 http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2015/. 14 The FSB noted in its monitoring report that China disagreed with the characterization of shadow banking activities, and, therefore, its shadow
banking data was purely a reflection of its OFI activity. http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2015/. 15 Wei Jiang, “The Future of Shadow Banking in China,” Columbia Business School: Jerome A. Chazen Institute of International Business, 2015,
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/chazen/globalinsights/sites/globalinsights/files/Shadow%20Banking%20in%20China_Chazen%20Institute.pdf (accessed May 15, 2016).
16 Stanley Fischer, “Financial Stability and Shadow Banks: What We Don’t Know Could Hurt Us,” speech at the 2015 Financial Stability Conference, December 3, 2015, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20151203a.htm (accessed May 16, 2016).
17 Unless otherwise noted, concepts in this section are derived from https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is- shadow-banking-really-banking.
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maturity and liquidity transformation.18 In the absence of backstops, market uncertainty could result in bank runs and fire sales. As an example, if a significant number of depositors withdrew their money at the same time, banks might need to liquidate assets to meet redemptions, which they may only be able to do at suppressed prices. This could ripple throughout the financial system, causing widespread asset price declines. To prevent such market panic, many countries established certain financial stability protections, such as deposit insurance, central bank liquidity backstops, and consolidated supervisory structures geared toward preserving the safety and soundness of banking entities.
Although the nature of shadow banking appeared similar to traditional banking, a few significant differences stuck out to Reddy. First, while both traditional and shadow banks were in the business of extending credit, it certainly seemed that the shadow banking industry was averse to holding loans to maturity, relying instead heavily on securitization and the originate-to-distribute model of lending. The second difference revolved around shadow banks’ exposure to government oversight and safety nets: they seemed to have little to no exposure in either of these areas. To be sure, some were regulated for various aspects of their business, particularly to the extent that they were dealing in securities. However, only commercial banks were subject to a comprehensive, prudential bank supervision regime. Critically, shadow banks also did not have access to deposit insurance that could help prevent runs and fire sales. The other major difference existed in shadow banks’ funding models. Nearly every resource Reddy consulted highlighted shadow banks’ reliance on short- term wholesale funding markets. Bernanke, for instance, posited that shadow banks relied on “various forms of short-term wholesale funding, including commercial paper, repos, securities lending transactions, and interbank loans.”19 Reddy knew that traditional banks used these funding sources as well, but it seemed that the shadow banking system was particularly reliant on them, given its inability to take on deposits. To think more clearly about these distinct funding arrangements, Reddy gathered her thoughts into a diagram illustrating an example of a repo transaction, which she viewed as a common example of these short-term wholesale funding streams (Exhibit 9). Clearly, there seemed to be risks involved in all of this, and Reddy would soon investigate those. However, she was still not convinced that she fully understood why these institutions existed in the first place—a matter that lay at the heart of her analysis.
Why Do Shadow Banks Exist?
The FSB suggested that “non-bank financing provides a valuable alternative to bank funding and helps support real economic activity.”20 To Reddy, it seemed that the shadow banking industry could indeed be a highly valuable source of financial innovation, competition, and diversification, with the ability to lower costs across the financial system.21 Perhaps most importantly, the industry appeared to fill significant gaps in the financial system with both sides of its balance sheet. Certainly she understood the enhanced access to credit the shadow banking system could provide, but the benefits of the industry’s funding model seemed less obvious. Thus she began her analysis there.
In many economies, cash-rich entities, such as corporations and pension funds, have relatively few safe and logical places to store their excess funds. Using the United States as an example, deposit insurance limits often
18 Maturity and liquidity transformation involve the use of shorter-term and more liquid funds, such as deposits, to finance longer-term and more
illiquid assets, such as loans. http://www.fsb.org/2011/04/shadow-banking-scoping-the-issues/. 19 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm. 20 “Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-Based Finance: An Overview of Progress,” Financial Stability Board, November 12, 2015,
http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/transforming-shadow-banking-into-resilient-market-based-finance-an-overview-of-progress/ (accessed May 17, 2016). 21 https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is-shadow-banking-really-banking.
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deterred such entities from simply placing their money in bank accounts.22 The FDIC insurance limit was $100,000 until October 2008, at which point the limit was temporarily raised to $250,000 and then permanently set to that level in 2010.23 As a further complication, until 2011, banks were prohibited from offering interest on checking accounts, which served as a further deterrent to large cash-holders placing money in the traditional banking system.24 Thus the shadow banking system emerged as a channel for cash-rich investors to store their money, particularly through investing in commercial paper, participating in repo transactions, or placing their funds with MMMFs, while earning some return and preserving demand-like features of deposits.25 Meanwhile, on the credit side, Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo described shadow banks’ role: “Nonbank intermediaries can also provide credit to borrowers that are underserved or unserved by traditional banks.”26 This property of shadow banking seemed especially important at present, given the lack of credit growth following the GFC and the anecdotes Reddy constantly heard related to the difficulty SMEs faced in obtaining financing for growth. In fact, she had read about some innovative attempts by hedge funds and private equity groups to create “specialized loan funds” geared toward midmarket businesses, one of which was created by the DC private equity powerhouse the Carlyle Group.27
Reddy believed that the innovative and dynamic properties of shadow banking were the key to unlocking the competition, credit access, diversification benefits, and cost reduction the industry could offer. It seemed that the shadow banking industry was simply more nimble, dealt with less bureaucracy, and was more open to taking advantage of technology than the traditional banking sector. A prime example of this was the ongoing revolution in financial technology and the rise of online marketplace lending. Reddy had heard of a few of these entities, such as Lending Club, SoFi, and OnDeck. Her former employer, the Treasury Department, recently released an interesting white paper investigating the benefits and risks of such developments. Its description of the industry was intriguing:
Advances in technology and data availability are changing the way consumers and small businesses secure financing. Leveraging these developments, online marketplace lenders offer faster credit to consumers and small businesses. Over the past ten years online marketplace lending companies have evolved from platforms connecting individual borrowers with individual lenders, to sophisticated networks featuring institutional investors, financial institution partnerships, direct lending, and securitization transactions.28
This was precisely the type of financial innovation Reddy had in mind when she considered the agility and dynamism of shadow banking. Of course, as with all opportunities in the financial arena, online marketplace
22 https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is-shadow-banking-really-banking. 23 “Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 per Depositor,” FDIC press release, July 21, 2010,
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html (accessed May 17, 2016). 24 Banks were prohibited from offering interest on demand deposits until Dodd-Frank (2011) repealed the standard set by Glass-Steagall in 1933. The
measure was designed to prevent banks from competing heavily on deposit accounts and putting the short-term funding to use in equity markets, which was believed to be a cause of the 1929 market crash. https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is-shadow-banking- really-banking; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Section 627, July 2010, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text (accessed May 17, 2016); “What is Regulation Q? Why Was it Repealed?,” FinRegHQ, July 5, 2016, http://www.finreghq.com/articles/regulation-q-repealed-reg-q-provides-exceptions/ (accessed July 9, 2016).
25 Demand-like features referred to the ability to easily withdraw money, with little to no restriction. https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/october-2011/is-shadow-banking-really-banking.
26 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20151117a.htm. 27 Carlyle GMS Finance defined mid-market companies as those with EBITDA between $10 and $100 million. Carlyle GMS Finance, Form 10-Q,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1544206/000119312516584027/d357694d10q.htm (accessed May 17, 2016); “Global Shadow Bank Monitoring Report 2013,” 41–42, Financial Stability Board, November 14, 2013, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_131114.pdf (accessed May 17, 2016).
28 Dan Cruz, “Opportunities and Challenges in Online Marketplace Lending,” United States Department of the Treasury, May 10, 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Opportunities-and-Challenges-in-Online-Marketplace-Lending.aspx (accessed May 17, 2016).
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lending carried risks. Treasury was apt to point out that beyond having minimal regulatory oversight, these lenders had grown up in an era of low interest rates, and their credit demand had yet to be tested in a downward cycle.29 It was uncertain how these business models would perform in downward credit cycles or higher- interest-rate environments; in the words of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., “If they have to borrow in the marketplace with individuals, hedge funds or securitized markets, they won’t be there in tough markets.”30 Nevertheless, these and other institutions that emerged in recent years demonstrated the role, benefits, and economic function of the shadow banking industry. Despite these benefits, so much of the literature Reddy examined focused on the substantial risks of shadow banking, which explicitly came to fruition during the GFC. As such, she could not formulate a complete picture of shadow banking without deepening her understanding of these risks.
Risks of the Shadow Banking Industry
Reddy felt that she had already developed some notion of shadow banking risks in exploring the business model. In a recent speech, Tarullo summarized the basic idea, explaining, “What we might refer to as the prototypical form of shadow banking presented the kind of risk associated with traditional banking prior to the creation of deposit insuranc
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