What unique contributions do the select readings make to their specific area/topic and to the sociology of race and ethnicity more broadly?

Below, write up a reflection (350-500 words) based on a selection of readings (at least 2 articles) from Week 6.

What unique contributions do the select readings make to their specific area/topic and to the sociology of race and ethnicity more broadly?

You may use the Object of Study Handout.pdF as an aid to assess your selection of readings before you write your reflection.

Requirements: 300-500

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2 Jane Lewis Qare Midgley, Women Against Slavery. The British Campaigns, 1780-1870 Mark Harrison Maryinez Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire Robert Ross Wim van Binsbergen, Tears of Rain: Ethnicity and History in Central Western Zambia Elliott R. Barkan Albert B. Robillard (ed.), Social Change in the Pacific Islands Sylvia Chant Sarah Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood (eds), ‘Viva’: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America Susan Halford Cindi Katz and Janice Monk (eds), Full Circles: Geographies of Women over the Lifecourse Jan Penrose Hans van Amersfoort and Hans Knippenberg (eds), States and Nations. The Rebirth of the ‘Nationalities Question’ in Europe Hans van Amersfoort Elizabeth D. Huttman, Wim Blauw and Juliet Saltman (eds), Urban Housing Segregation of Minorities in Western Europe and the United States David J. O’Brien Roger Daniels, Sandra C. Taylor and Harry H.L. Kitano (eds), Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress Won Moo Hurh David J. O’Brien and Stephen S. Fu~ta, The Japanese American Experience Steven J. Gold Paul James Rutledge, The Vietnamese Experience in America BOOKS RECEIVED 352 353 354 356 357 359 360 362 363 364 366 368 ‘·”‘ f. r· r ~ Rethinking ethnicity: identity, categorization and power Richard Jenkins Abstract This article argues that ethnic identity is to be understood and theorized as an example of social identity in general and that externally-located processes of social categorization are enormously influential in the production and reproduction of social identities. However, much research concerned with ethnicity, particularly social anthropological research, inspired, whether directly or indirectly, by Barth’s Ethnic Group.sand Boundaries, has concen­trated upon internal process of group identification, at the expense of categor­ization. To acknowledge the necessary role of categoriza1ion in the social construction of ethnic identity is also to recognize (a) the importance of power and authority relations (domination) in that process, and (b) a distinc­tion, which is developed in this article, between the nominal and 1he virtual dimensions of ethnic and other social identities. Finally, the artide offers an outline of a substantive research agenda concerned with contexts of social categorization. One of the most influential models of ethnicity and inter-ethnic social relations is that which was outlined by social anthropologist Fredrik Barth and his colleages in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Barth 1969a). The perspective put forv,,ard in that collection drew, on the one hand, upon the meta-theoretical model of social forms as generated by inter­personal transactions outlined in Barth’s earlier Models of Social Organ­isation (Barth 1966) and, on the other, upon a structural-functionalist tradition concerned with the study of ‘plural societies’ (R. Cohen 1978; Jenkins 1986a). However, the Barthian approach departed in a signifi­cant fashion from the then-dominant structural functionalism of social anthropology inasmuch as it emphasized the perceptions and purposive decision-making of social actors, rather than viewing individuals as more-or-less determined, general ‘bearers’ of the norms and values of their culture. Barth’s original view of ethnicity consists of a number of elements. Pride of place must be given to the insight that ethnicity is not an immutable bundle of cultural traits which it is sufficient to enumerate in order to identify a person as an ‘X’ or a ‘Y’ or locate the boundary Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 17 Number 2 April 1994 © Routledge 1994 0141-9870

198 Richard Jenkins “‘ between ethnic collectivities. Rather, ethnicity is situationally defined·~!i, produced in the course of social transactions that occur at or ~-;:;J~_ (and in the process help to constitute) the ethnic boundary in question F’ Ethnic boundaries are permeable, existing despite the flow of personnei · -~ or interaction across them; criteria of ethnic ascription and subscription are variable in their nature and salience. While remaining firmly grounded in his original 1966 Models project Barth has subsequently modified his vision of ethnicity somewhat. Hi; recent discussions of cultural pluralism in complex societies emphasize the importance of history, in addition to the transactional ebb-and-Dow of the here-and-now (Barth 1984; 1989). Barth invokes history in two distinct senses: as the ongoing progress of events which constitutes the context and content of the here-and-now, and as ‘streams’ of ‘tradition’ -the reference here to Redfield is explicit -within which people are to differing degrees located and of which they differentially partake. Emphasizing history produces a shift of emphasis away from the indi­vidualistic voluntarism of his earlier writings (which has always been one of the standard criticisms of Barth’s work: Paine 1976; Evens 1977) towards a Weberian acknowledgement of the unintended consequences of action. Further, recognizing the centrality of history entails a search for pattern, influence and effect within a wide social and geographic arena; attention must be given to factors both within and without the social setting, local community or region which is the object of analytical interest. In most respects, however, Barth has remained true to his original point of view in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, particularly with respect to the primacy accorded to the perceptions and definitions of actors. It is on this aspect of his work that I shall concentrate in this article, hoping to develop our understanding of ethnicity while capitalizing at the same time upon the strengths and insights of the Barthian paradigm and the tradition of work that it has inspired. Rather than offer an alternative which pretends to revolutionary novelty, I shall draw out some elements of Barth’s understanding of ethnicity, interpreting their implications in the context of a set of arguments about social identity in general. My primary objective is modest: to encourage the further broadening -substantively and theoretically -of the, par­ticularly social anthropological, discourse about ethnicity. In so doing I also hope to illustrate, incidentally, the value of the study of ethnicity to debates about social identity. Groups and categories Barth emphasizes the transactional nature of ethnicity; these trans­actions are of two basic kinds. First, there are processes of internal definition: actors signal to in-or out-group members a self-definition of i, { r I, ‘ , ‘ ‘ ~ Rethinking ethnicity 199 tbeir nature or identity. This can be an ego.centred, individual process Or ·a collective, group process, although it only makes sense to talk of ethnicity in an individual sense when the identity being defined and its expression refer to a recognizable socially-constructed identity and draw upon a repertoire of culturally~specified practices. Although conceptual­ized in the first instance as internal, these processes are necessarily transactional and social ( even in the individual case) because they presuppose both an audience, without whom they make no sense, and an externally derived framework of meaning. Second, there are processes of external definition. These are other­directed processes during which one person or set of persons defines the other(s) as ‘X’, ‘Y’ or whatever. This may, at its most consensual, be the validation of the others’ internal definition(s) of themselves. At the conflictual end of the spectrum of possibilities, however, there is the imposition, by one set of actors upon another, of a putative name and characterization which affects in significant ways the social experi­ence(s) of the categorized. This process of external definition may, in theory, be an individual act: person A defines person or persons Bas, say, ‘X’ or ‘Y’. For two reasons, however, it is difficult to imagine external definition as a primarily individual process. In the first place, more than an audience is involved: the others here are the object(s) of the process of definition, and implied within the situation is a meaningful intervention in their lives, an acting upon them. Thus, external definition is necessarily embedded within social relationships. Secondly, the capacity to act successfully upon other people’s lives implies either the power or the authority to do so. The exercise of power implies competitive access to and control over resources, while authority is, by definition, only effec­tive when it is legitimate. Power and authority are thus necessarily embedded within social relationships. The distinction between internal and external definition is primarily analytical. lo the complexity of day-to-day social life, each is chronically implicated in the other. The categorization of ‘them’ is too useful a foil in the identification of ‘us’ for this not to be the case, and the definition of ·us’ too much the product of a history of relationships with a range of significant others (Hagendoorn 1993). Which is, of course, one of Barth’s original claims: ethnicity, the production, reproduction and transformation of the social boundaries of ethnic groups, is a two-way process that takes place across the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’. At the individual level, in the creation of personal identities, much the same can be said: identity is located within a two-way social process, an interaction between ‘ego’ and ‘other’, inside and outside. It is in the meeting of internal and external definition that identity, whether social or personal, is created. It may be objected that the suggested equivalence of collective/social

20() Richard Jenkins identity and individual/personal identity is misleading: the boun, of the self are secure and unproblematic in a way that is not, example, true of social groups, particularly inasmuch as the notion _ the self is bounded by and within the body. There are a number J::· reasons for rejecting this argument. First, and regardless of whether, one chooses to follow Freud or Piaget, it seems clear that a relatively .. secure sense of the boundary of self is acquired as the infant separates: . itself psychologically from the significant other(s) in its life through an _ ,!; early interactive process of defining and being defined (Stem 1985), –· Secondly, there is a well-established understanding of adult personal ., -I• or self-identity which sees its content(s), boundaries and, most critically, .. security as variable over time in interaction with changing circumstances (e.g., Giddens 1991). Finally, even if the boundaries of the self are, “‘· most of the time, stable and taken for granted, this is only true as long as it is true. When it is not, when the boundary between the self and others weakens or dissolves, the result is a range of more-or-less severe, and not uncommon, disruptions of self that in Western culture arc conceptualized as psychiatric disorder (for one understanding of which, within a model that is analogous to the distinction between external and internal definition, see Laing 1971). To extend the logic of this last point, the boundaries of collective identity are also taken for granted until they are threatened. The contrasting processes of identity-production, internal and exter­nal, can be illuminated further by drawing upon concepts derived from the methodology of the social sciences. Basic to the sociological and anthropological enterprises is the classification of human collectivities. One of the most enduringly useful distinctions which we employ for this purpose is that which we draw between groups and categories: category. A class whose nature and composition is decided by the person who defines the category; for example, persons earning wages in a certain range may be counted as a category for income tax purposes. A category is therefore to be contrasted with a group, defined by the nature of the relations between the members (Mann 1983, p. 34). A group, therefore, is rooted in processes of internal definition, while a category is externally defined. This distinction is concerned, in the first instance, with the procedures that we employ to constitute the social world as a proper object for empirical inquiry and theoretical analysis. As such, it is relevant beyond the study of ethnicity and ethnic relations. Debates about social class, for example, are often characterized by disagreement about which principle of definition is most appropriate for the adequate constitution of classes as objects ofl for analysis. The distinction here may be vividly exemplified in this Rethinking ethnicity 201 ‘ :~d)iltext by Marx’s famous contrast between ‘a class in itself’ (a category) “”;pd •a class for itself’ (a group). This reference to Marx reminds us _Jf.tbat the distinction is, of course, something more than methodological. ;,. -‘:c Social groups and social categories are different kinds of collectivities “.’.r,$-~:<!;:existing in the social world. Marx’s understanding of the development X; :·_ of class consciousness involves a social category, defined with reference ,:;, .. to.alienation from the means of production, becoming a social group, the members of which identify with one another in their collective misfortune and have the potential for collective action on the basis of that identification. So, whereas social groups define themselves, their name(s), their nature(s) and their boundary(s), social categories are identified, defined and delineated by others. Most social collectivities can be characterized as, to some extent, defined in both ways. Each side of the dichotomy is implicated in the other and social identity is the outcome of the conjunction of processes of internal and external definition. Whether, in any specific instance, one chooses to talk about a group or a category will depend on the balance struck between internal and external pro­resses in that situation. It is a question of degree. Although it is undoubtedly true that historically social anthropology bas, inasmuch as it has considered individual identity at all, privileged social or external knowledge over self-or internal knowledge (A.P. Cohen 1992, p. 222), the emphasis of the post-Barthian anthropology of ethnicity and communal identity (e.g., Wallman 1978, 1986; A.P. Cohen 1982, 1985, 1986; Eriksen 1991) has tended to fall on the other side of the internal-external dialectic: upon processes of group identifi­cation rather than social categorization (Jenkins 1986a). There are at least three reasons why this should be so. First, anthropology, in its enthusiasm for ‘otherness’ and its (still) essentially non-conflictual model of the social world -regardless of internal theoretical debates between transactionalism or structuralism, for example, or the impact of various threads of post-modernism -tends to celebrate ethnicity as a social resource. This is at the expense of paying sufficient attention to ethnicity as a social liability or stigma. Secondly, this is reinforced by the fact that enthusiasm for a transactional model of social life -ethnicity as process -has typically been accompanied by a view of social relationships as rooted in reciprocation, exchange and relatively equitable negotiation. Thirdly, anthropology’s continued emphasis I upon participant observation as the discipline’s methodological sine qua non has led its practitioners to concentrate upon the collection of data ~ during face-to-face encounters or through direct observation. Processes i of collective internal definition may be easier to study using such an r approach than their external counterparts. • This anthropological bias is not, however, entailed by the Barthian model, as is well illustrated by Eidheim’s essay, ‘When ethnic identity

202 Richard Jenkins is a social stigma’, in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Eidheim 1 Ideally, the exploration of processes of ethnic and other forms of gorization should represent the extension, refinement and developm~t: ,, of the Barthian perspective. This is what the rest of this article sets ou(;:/c to do. Rethinking ethnicity 203 :i~uld be split off from or contrasted with ‘us’. Finally, there is the ‘.defence which pre-existing internal definitions may provide against the ::;-id).pasition of external definitions. The experience of categorization may 1,uengthen existing group identity through a process of resistance and telction. Thus, the experience of being categorized may contribute to Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to clarify one further ·: the formation of group identity ( although the ways in which it will do so point, which bas so far only been implied. In talking about the names _., .::.’l:’–<·are a matter for empirical research rather than theoretical prediction). natures and boundaries of groups and categories, I am suggesting t~ ~-_-.”. Similarly, group identification is likely to proceed, at least in part, identity is ‘made up’ of a number of distinct strands, even if they may ,> ·-.-through categorizing others (whether positively or negatively). Argu-only be analytically distinguishable. Two of these strands, in particular ments analogous to all the above could also be offered at the individual/ :i,re significa~t he.re. Social identity,_ whether it b~ ethnic or whatever: psychological level. 1s both nommal, 1.e., a name, and vutual, a meamng or an experience a contrast that is implicit in the distinction between boundaries and their contents, and approximately analogous to the well-worn distinc­tion between ‘status’ and ‘role’. This distinction is important becaUSe one can change without the other doing so; similarly one can be the product of internal processes of identification, the other of categoriz. ation. For example, although categorization may not necessarily change the name or boundary of an identity, it may have considerable potential to define what it means to bear it, the experience of ‘being an X’. The implications of this are explored later in the article. Social categorization Distinguishing between internal and external definitions, and between groups and categories, allows us to think about ethnic identity at a number of different levels within a unified analytical framework. One basis for doing so is presented schematically in Figure 1. Perhaps the first thing to explain about Figure 1, however, is that, as suggested in its caption, it is not specifically about ethnicity. If it has any application at all, it applies to all forms of social identity. Second, the vertical lines i indicate a continuum of graded differentiation, the horizontal ones __ a dialectical synthetic unity. In this sense, the iniemal:exter­nal distinction should not be read as implying an acceptance of intellec­tual dualisms such as thinking:doing or subjective:objective (and one could doubtless add a further long list). These are difficult to maintain and do not seem to contribute anything useful to the attempt to under­stand the social world (Jenkins 1981; see also Bourdieu 1990, pp. 23-141). So what does Figure 1 mean? The representation of the internal:ex­temal dichotomy by a line, rather than a sharp break, indicates a number of inter-relationships. First, there is the influence of external definition (by others) on internal definition(s). Next, it is important to recognize the role in internal definition of the categorization, or external definition, of others: the process of defining ‘us’ demands that ‘they’ .-., t • f t l ‘ l ! I } INTERNAL ! INDIVIDUAL COLLECTIVE j EXTERNAL ‘[” ___ ‘me· 1 self-image __ public image l group category Figure 1. Forms and processes of social identity The next step is to unpack further some of the social processes that are summarized in Figure 1. At the most individually-focused level, the distinction between’/’ and ‘me’, while it is inspired ultimately by Cooley (1902; 1965 ed., pp. 168–263), is derived in this formulation from Mead (1934, pp. 173-226), a theorist who has been ‘curiously unacknowl­edged’ by social anthropology (A.P. Cohen 1992, p. 226). To para­phrase Mead, the ‘I’ is that aspect of the self which responds to others, whereas the ‘me’ comprises the attitudes and responses of others as they are incorporated into the self. In this sense, it might be more appropriate to rename the latter the ‘What, me?’ This is a distinction that can also, of course, be interpreted as drawing upon the basic Freudian distinction between ‘ego’ and ‘superego’. In the course of earliest socialization each human being develops a unique personality, a sense of self which, although it may not always be avail­able to us consciously, is one of the bedrocks of our ‘ontological secur­ity’ (Giddens 1991, pp. 36-46). Much of this ‘sense of self’ is located in that hinterland of unreflexive habit -neither conscious nor uncon­scious -that is the generative site of practices which Bourdieu calls the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 53-97). This ‘sense of self’ is not simply a ‘mental’ phenomenon bu_t is intimately bound up with the physical integrity of the individual. Selves are located within bodies.

204 Richard Jenkins A sense of self is created in the course of the early verbal-‘. non-verbal dialogue -a complex interaction of separation front :: identification with -between the child and significant others. Typ’ parents in the first instance, the voice of these others becomes int, i.zed as the ‘me’. A voice that tells the child both who it is and wb~~-· shout~ do, each bein~ an aspe~t ~f t~e othe~. Th.is is the interactioqai_ ‘.–‘.·· learmng process of prunary soaaltzatton, which works at the conscioui _ and less-than-conscious levels, and which creates an internal relation,.’. · ship, whether harmoniously ‘adjusted’ or not, between the individuat­ized demands of the ‘I’ and the socialized demands of the ‘me’ (which may also be thought of in this context as representing culture). It is in the initial and continuing relationship between ‘I’ and ‘me’ that the basic sense of self is constituted. It is easy to imagine how primary socialization is likely to include an ethnic component: the child will learn not only that he/she is an ‘X’ but also what this means, in terms of self-esteem and worth or appropri: ate and inappropriate behaviour, and what it means not to be an ‘X’ a ‘Y’ or a ‘Z’ perhaps (Epstein 1978). This is emphatically the case, fo; example, in societies where ‘racial’ categorization is a powerful principle of social organization and stratification (Goodman 1964; Milner 1975; Troyna and Hatcher 1992). Moving on to self-image and public image, the distinction has some­thing in common with Mauss’s conceptualization (1938; 1985 ed., p. 12) of the difference between, on the one hand, ‘role’ (personnage) and, on the other, the combination of ‘person’ (personne) and ‘self’ (moi). Self-image, in my definition, is the way we see ourselves and, perhaps even more important, the way we would like to be seen by others. The essential starting point for any attempt to understand how this works in social interaction is, of course, Goffman (1969). In the context of this discussion, Goffman ‘s most important arguments about the ·pres­entation of self’ are: (1) that it is a matter of performance; (2) that there is no single, consistent self, but rather a range of aspects or revelations of self, depending on the social situation; (3) that manage­ment of the awkward relationship between the desired presentation of self and other, countervailing aspects of one’s biography and present situation is of great importance; and (4) that validation of the perform­ance by others, if not their complicit collaboration, is central to success­ful impression management. The homology between Goffman’s view of social selfhood as performative and processual and Barth’s model of ethnicity as transactional is obvious. The third and fourth points above direct our attention to the other side of the coin, public image, the vexed question of how others see us. It goes without saying that there is no necessary equivalence between self-image and public image. What is more, it is not always easy to know how others see us anyway. Apart from the obvious i, f i f t f l ‘ I l • ~ Rethinking ethnicity 205 -, ·sremological issue -the old philosophical problem of ‘other minds’ tltere are a number of reasons why this should be so. First, the ~;ence may attempt to conceal its opinion of both actor and perfonn­:::ance. second, the actor m_ay, for various st~at;gic ?r ta~tical reas~ns, :”‘-~ttempt to present somethrn~ ot_her than thelf true ~If-image. ~trd, < there may be poor commumcahon between the two sides, for vanous jnteractional, institutional or other external reasons. Fourth, the per­Sonal psychology that is integral to selfhood may, in the event of major disagreement between self-image and public image, block acknowledge­ment of the threatening public image. However, allowing for these qualifications, there will usually be at least some interaction between self-image(s) and public image(s), some process of conscious or uncon­scious adjustment in the ongoing process of the making and re-making of social identity. An example may clarify the point. Occupational identities are among the most important of social identities. For many people they provide the basis on which their livelihood is secured. They are also closely connected to social status. This was so in the pre-modern world and it remains so today. In modern industrial societies there is an element of election involved in the assumption of an occupational identity. Choice, however, only operates within strict limits and is generally bilateral: other people, gatekeepers of one sort or another within the education system and the labour market, play a crucial role in validating (or not) occupational aspiration. In order to pursue ambition, itself arguably a modem phenomenon, qualifications must be obtained, jobs must be applied for and the cooperation of more powerful others obtained. In the process there is for many young people, first in school and sub­sequently in the world of employment and unemployment, a conver­gence between aspiration and outcome, between self-image and public image, which is recognized culturally as ‘realism’ and is one source of stability in a visibly inequitable system (Willis 1977; Jenkins 1983). It is not just aspirations that are adjusted because of their public reception and evaluation; identity is also variable and vulnerable. For example, the labelling perspective in the sociology of deviance suggests that deviant identities can become internalized as a consequence of the individual concerned being publicly categorized as a law/rule breaker and treated accordingly (Becket 1963; Matza 1969; Lemert 1972). A point which is made less often is that a similar process is likely to operate with respect to positive or socially-valued categorization. The external social world is as much a source of self-esteem as a threatening environment of hostile labelling. Similarly, identities are imposed upon individuals in school (Cicourel and Kitsuse 1963; Rist 1977) and in the labour market, in a dialectical process of internal and external definition. The individual is identified in a particular way by significant others, who by virtue of their power

206 Richard Jenkins Rethinking ethnicity 207 or authority are in a position to make their definition of the person a~ the situation count, and thus to constitute that person’s subseq~t’;. career in terms of the identity in question. That individual’s expenenec·:,,._._” of the consequences of being categorized may, over time, lead to·ai;,·•R- adjustment in his or her self~image in the direction of the stigmatizinia:f1 public image. For example, an individual who is defined as ‘unreliable~ ·. and is not only distrusted but publicly distrusted and denied access ~ occasions where reliability is expected and could therefore be demon• strated, may, as a consequence, become as unreliable as he or she is purported to be. The notion of unreliability may then become an important dimension of his or her self-image. This model can, of course apply also to the incorporation of positive public images into the self: image. ~J~es of the ethnic bo~ndary: it_ is ~qually, if only !mpli~tly,. clear_th~t ~~Ianatory or analytical pnonty 1s accorded to 1dent1ficat1on w1thm ;-Jf:”-tbe ethnic boundary. There is a sense in which this is as it should be. A claim to ethnic identity must be validated by an audience of ‘out­’ siders’ or ‘others’, because without such an audience the issue would not arise, but it seems to make little sense to talk about an ethnicity . -which does not at some point recognize itself as such. The implication of these examples for ethnicity is apparent if we look at discrimination in the labour market and the depression or encouragement of aspiration, either effect being possible, among thase ethnic minorities who find themselves on its receiving end. The cumulat­ive outcome of this kind of situation, if left unchallenged by currents of resistance within the ethnic community or communities concerned, may at best be the development of ethnic occupational niches and a communally accepted ceiling on occupational mobility. At worst the self-image of a stigmatized and discriminated-against minority will inter­act with discrimination and exclusion in a vicious circle of disadvantage, as in many North American urban neighbourhoods (Liebow 1967; Han­nerz 1969; Anderson 1978). ‘Realism’ becomes, at least in part, consti­tutive of ‘reality’. Ethnic disadvantage in the labour market may seem far removed from the micro-interactional concerns of Goffman. A better example for our purposes might be perhaps the subtlety with which people in Northern Ireland purport to ‘tell’ the difference between Catholic and Protestant in social interaction (Burton 1978, pp. 37….fJ7; Jenkins 1982, pp. 30-31). However, the principles involved are essentially the same. The ‘labour-market’ is, after all, nothing more than an abstraction from a myriad of encounters in which the choices of job-seekers are subject to categorizing decisions about who should get which jobs (Jenkins 1986b). Although for the moment there is a question begged here -that of who is authorized to make the decisions and to make those decisions count -the example serves to connect the micro-interaction of self-image and personal image with the larger social register of groups and categories. Most discussions of ethnicity are pitched at the level of the social group, the emphasis being upon collective internal definitions of distinc­tiveness: ‘ethnic groups are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves’ (Barth 1969b, p. 10). While it is clear from Barth’s discussion that the ‘actors themselves’ can signify actors on both ;l.-” t ·!§l;’ J” ,, —~ ( la ‘ :l 1· I ‘( i • ‘ I • j I t ‘ } When the issue is expressed thus, the anthropological emphasis upon i~temal group identification becomes apparent. Leaving aside the mass­ive body of work on caste and hierarchy in India and elsewhere, because it is not concerned with ethnicity as such (which is not only a major exception but also, for many readers perhaps, an indefensible one), there are few examples in the anthropological ethnicity literature of an explicit concern with social categorization. Those examples which can be found, however, are ample illustration of the value of such an approach.1 For our purposes, one such will do (Stuchlik 1979). Looking at the history of European colonial expansion into Chile, the Spaniards came into contact relatively early -in the sixteenth century -with an indigenous people known today as the Mapuche . Stuchlik, using docmentary sources, identifies five distinct ways in which the Spanish, and subsequently the Chileans, categorized the Mapuche in the course of the centuries that followed: as ‘brave and fearless warriors’, ‘bloodthirsty bandits’, ‘lazy drunken Injuns’, ‘the white man·s burden’ and ‘gentle savages who lack education’, in historical sequence. The main thrust of this anlaysis -which, while it does not tell us about the impact of categorization on Mapuche group identity, does suggest some of its effects upon Mapuche life -is that these categorical models of the Mapuche are not a reflection of ‘factual’ knowledge about the Mapuche. Rather, they tell us about native policies, the goals of the Spanish and the Chileans with respect to the Mapuche. Hence they tell us about the categorizers -how they see themselves and their objectives -not the categorized. It is Chilean ethnicity that is under construction as much as anything else. A more general point can perhaps be made about the anthropological enterprise itself, particularly with respect to notions of ‘primitiveness’ as a means of categorizing other cultures (Boon 1982; Kuper 1988). Fortunately, unlike Spanish colonizers or Chilean administrators and politicians, the capacity of anthropologists to make their definitions count for those who they categorize has generally been modest, although their indirect influence should not be underestimated. Broaching the issue of ‘primitiveness’ brings me to the relationship between ethnicity and ‘race’, and in looking at ‘race’ and racism, we are dealing with some of the most powerful processes of social categoriz­ation. The relationship between ‘race’ and ethnicity is far from clear in the literature. Wallman, for example, argues that the two concepts are

208 Richard Jenkins essentially of the same order: phenotype, which is generally whi~’; mean by ‘race’, is no more than ‘one element in the repertotiii ~undary markers’ (Wallman 19~6, p .. 229). Elsewhere, she ha~~/ missed the debate about the relat10nsh1p between ‘race’ and etbnicityi. as a ‘quibble’ (Wallman 1978, p. 205). This is not, however, convinci’ ,. Ethnicity is historically and culturally more ubiquitous than thnse si~:, ations which we describe as ‘race relations’. Ethnic relations are not ·­necessarily hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual, as is arguably true for ‘race relations’ (Rex 1973, p. 184). Nor does ethnicity tend to appeal to a systematic body of justificatory, theoretical knowledge as the charter for its operation, as is frequently the case with ‘racial’ categorization and racism. The group:category distinction may clarify the situation. Banton, for example, has suggested that, ‘Membership in an ethnic group is usually voluntary; membership in a racial group is not’ (Banton 1983, p. 10). Ethnicity, in this view, is about inclusion (‘us’), while ‘race’ and racism are a matter of ‘exclusion’ (‘them’); group identification versus categori­zation. At first sight this seems to be a plausible and useful approach to the matter. There are, however, a number of important caveats to be acknowledged. In the first place, there is the routine implication, each in the other, of processes of group identification and categorization. The definition of ‘them’ in terms of ‘race’ is likely to be an important aspect of our definition of ‘us’ (which must, correspondingly, have a ‘racial’ dimension). Similarly, there are many processes of ethnic categorization which do not appear to involve the imputation of ‘racial’ difference ( although one is entitled to ask whether it is not more a case of ‘racial’ rhetoric having been in the quarantine of disreputability in the decades following World War II). Thirdly, groups may actively seek to identify themselves in positively evaluated ‘racial’ terms. The best-known example here, perhaps, is the ideology of the Herrenvolk, as in Nazi Germany and Nationalist South Africa. Something similar, however, can also be discerned in the formation of modern Israeli Jewish identity and in various forms of ‘black nationalism’ in the United States and elsewhere. These latter cases, in particular, represent the ‘turning round’ of a powerful process of negative ‘racial’ categorization into a positive group identity. Finally, we should remember that the criteria of ‘racial’ classification are no less socially-constructed and culturally­selected than those upon which ethnic identification depends. It is emphatically not the case that the difference between ethnicity and ‘race’ is a simple difference between the physical and the cultural, although it may be a difference between purported physical and cultural characteristics. Viewed from this perspective, ‘racial’ differentiation and racism should perhaps best be viewed as historically-specific forms of the gen-‘ ,, ,_ ‘ l ·t . r-‘ ; < ” t Rethinking ethnicity 209 _ perhaps even universaP -social phenomenon of ethnicity. As ich, they characterize situations in which one ethnic group dominates, r attempts to dominate, another and in the process categorizes them , . ~th reference to their supposed inherent and immutable difference ~ -and inferiority. The role of ‘racial’ ideologies in the legitimation of , ‘·eonquest and domination should not be overlooked in this respect. f{owever one might choose to recognize the distinction between them, the question of the relationship between ‘race’ and ethnicity remains -something more than a ‘quibble’ (cf Miles 1982, pp. 44-71). The other kind of ethnic legitimation which deserves a mention here is nationalism. Understood strictly as a political philosophy relating to the exclusive right of occupation of territory, on the one hand, and freedom from alien rule, on the other, this is an historical development with its roots in the bourgeois revolutions of nineteenth-century Europe (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). However, Smith is surely correct to insist (1986) that nationalism also has another set of roots, in the ethnic communality of the pre-modern world. The import­ant point to recognize here is that nationalism involves once again processes of both group identification and social categorization, inclusion and exclusion. Whatever else it may be, it is perhaps most usefully regarded, like ‘race’ and racism, as another historically specific facet of ethnicity. To conclude this section, the hierarchy of social (ethnic) identity, as represented in Figure 1, should be understood as a continuum which has only been stratified for the purposes of exposition. ‘I’ and ‘me’ unite in the creation of the sense of self which lies behind self-image. Self-images meld with public images in the complex negotiation of shared meanings and understandings that is the basis of group identity. Group identification and categorization combine in situationally-specific relations of resistance or reinforcement to produce the social reality in historical time and space of ethnicity. One could, of course, approach this hierarchy of interrelationship and effect from the other end, the relationship between groups and categories: the traffic on this particular street flows in both directions. Making this point, however, demands an acknowledgement of the simultaneity of the processes that are schematized out in Figure 1. They are all going on at the same time. None has precedence, conceptually, historically or developmentally. Nor can any of them be imagined in the absence of the others. Contexts of social categorization Identity is produced and reproduced in the course of social interaction. In order to move beyond the necessary abstraction of the discussion so far, I shall now examine specific processes of social categorization and 1 ‘ ;~ ‘ ‘

210 Richard Jenkins _ .. (.~ ‘ the contexts within which they can occur. Although the emphasis will'”$ be upon ethnic categorization, the overall picture should be generaliz-_­able to other kinds of social identity. This section will also begin to draw out the implications of the argu­ments of this article for a research agenda concerned with ethnicity and ethnic identity. I have argued that important aspects of the formation of ethnic identity, those that depend upon processes of categorization have been too often overlooked by researchers whose primary concern; have been defined in terms of ethnicity. There are, however, no prag­matic reasons why this situation should persist. All these topics arc readily available for research by ethnographers and others. The basic shape of this empirical agenda is presented schematically in Figure 2. It is not intended to be exhaustively inclusive; it is simply an attempt to indicate something of the flesh which can be hung on the bones of my argument. However, in order to render it useful within the limits set by a relatively short article, a number of simplifying assumptions are implicit in the discussion that follows. These are: (I) that ethnic categorization is most often pejorative, negative or stig­matizing in its content; (2) that there are no contemporary social set­tings in which the formaVinformal distinction does not have some rele­vance and (3) that all social settings are to some extent penetrated by market relationships. 1 INFORMAL I I FORMAL j Routine public interaction Sexual relationships Communal relationships Membership of informal groups Marriage and kinship Market relationships Employment Administrative allocation Organized politics Official classification Figure 2. Contexts of ethnic categorization With respect to the contrast between the formal and the informal, this is not a sharp distinction. Rather, it is a continuum of emphasis. In Figure 2 this means that ‘routine public interaction’, for example, while typically informal, can also, in specific circumstances, be formal­ized (as in the case of inter-‘racial’ public encounters in the South Africa of apartheid). Nor is informality conceptualized as merely a residual category, whatever is left in the absence of formality. Each is a specific kind of social relation that has developed, historically, side by side with 1he other: ‘The formal is simultaneously an absence and a presence within the informal, and vice versa’ (Harding and Jenkins 1989, p. 137). I ‘ I Rethinking ethnicity 211 Routine public interaction is the face-to-face interaction that occurs ” ()utside ongoing social relationships and within the gaze of others. Informal ethnic categorization organizes ‘relations in public’ in a -number of ways. First, there are the verbal and non-verbal cues that are used to allocate unknown others to an ethnic category. In some cruses, these cues are a dimension of group identity, explicit signals of ethnic identity: language, clothing, bodily adornment, etc. Others, however, such as many aspects of non-verbal behaviour, are likely to be involuntary or unconscious ( and here we see again the importance of habit and the body again, pace Bourdieu). Items of behaviour are appropriated by others as criteria of ethnic categorization, without those who ‘own’ them participating in this identification (or even, per­haps, being aware of it). Aspects of physical appearance, whether ‘real’ or imaginary and typically crystallized in ethnic stereotypes, are also a staple of anonymous public categorization. Other forms of routine public behaviour are instrumental in the construction and mobilization of ethnic categories. Particular mention should be made of humour, verbal abuse and violence (all of which are, of course, important in the context of enduring relationships and in the private sphere). With respect to humour, the case of the ·ethnic joke’ is well known. Anthropological analyses of joking suggest that ethnic joking is likely to characterize situations where social restraints inhibit the overt expression of inter-ethnic hostility (Douglas 1975, pp. 90-114). Jokes facilitate categorization where it may not be socially acceptable: there is no such thing as just a joke, and ethnic jokes are no exception. Inter-ethnic verbal abuse and violence do not, perhaps, require too much discussion here, except to suggest that humour, insult and violence shade into each other and are intimately connected. Verbal abuse and violence, in particular, are concerned with the beating of ethnic boundaries through the enforcement of definitions of what the ethnic ‘other’ is, or may or must do. Issues of power and control are at the heart of the matter. Power and control are also central to sexual relationships, which straddle the divide between the public and the private. The sensitivity of inter-ethnic sexual relationships has been documented in a wide variety of settings (e.g., Dollard 1957, pp. 134-87; Pryce 1979, pp. 80—94; Okely 1983, pp. 154-56). It may be expressed in notions of group ‘possession’ of women and must in part therefore be con­sidered as an aspect of patriarchy as well as ethnicity. In terms of ethnicity, what is typically at issue is the definition of which men may or may not have access to which women. The resolution of the issue is typically asymmetrical, in reflection of the power relationships between the groups in question. Access to another group’s women may loom large in the ethnic identity of a dominant group, with lack of control in this respec1 being a defining feature of subordinate categorization.

212 Richard Jenkins When racism enters the picture, men of a dominant group may, how. ever, be denied access to ethnically subordinate women by a genera} prohibition of ‘miscegenation’. Communal relationships, the more•or-less tightly knit networks that evolve over time in shared residential localities, provide many oppor. tunities for ethnic categorization. Most obviously, communities are often ethnically relatively homogeneous. Gossip may serve to mark the boundaries between one ethnic community and another and is one of the most effective ways of policing inter-ethnic sex and friendship relationships, Following Barth, all kinds of social interaction across communal boundaries are important in boundary maintenance (and also, hence the need for policing, in boundary change). Local peer groups are particularly efficient at socializing their members into group identity, and the articulation of ethnic categorization with respect to other ethnicities. Membership of informal groups may be a dimension of communal life. However, there are informal social groups which, while not specifically grounded in local communality, serve none the less as efficient contexts of ethnic exclusion and, through their tacit, or not so tacit, criteria of membership, categorization. Mundane examples are to be found in ethnic peer groups within schools and in work organizations. There is also a spectrum of more formally-constituted organizations -from the Ku Klux Klan to B’nai B’rith to immigrants’ mutual aid associations -whose membership is ethnically specified and which pursue ethnically-defined goals. The domain of kinship relations -marriage and the family -is subject to a degree of public regulation. In many societies this regulation is formally embodied in the law, There are few examples, however, of the formal categorization of permissible marriage partners in strictly ethnic terms, and where they can be found, as I have already observed, they typically involve racism in one form or another (laws prohibiting ‘miscegenation’ have been current in this century, inter alia, in some states of the American Union, Germany and, most recently, South Africa). The informal regulation of inter•ethnic sexual relations, dis­cussed above, remains the most potent force maintaining ethnic exclusi-‘ vity in marriage. In this context, the significant point about categoriz­ation is that it generates a situation in which the operation of the courtship and marriage market, structured by a set of ethnic categories which are expressed consciously as preference and unconsciously as encounters, will tend to reproduce the ethnic status quo without any recourse to explicit regulation. Another field of soda! life that is hierarchically structured in terms of power and formally regulated only to a limited extent is the domain of market relationships. Governed, on the face of things, by economic principles which emphasize the pursuit of either profit or relatively Rethinking ethnicity 213 . ,;,~·-:,;.t~uitable exchange (notions of equity and acceptable profit being con­,J~_; Cttrtnally defined), business and trading are nevertheless structured by · ·”· ethnic categorization. This is so with respect to (1) who can trade with ‘ ‘.; ! r l i ·’Wh,om, (2) who can trade in what, and (3) the price that different categories of people must pay for similar commodities or services. Examples can be found in contexts as diverse as the housing markets of Britain and the United States (Banton 1983, pp. 336-65), the trading networks of Northern Norway (Eidheim 1969) and the exchange relationships of ‘primitive’ New Guinea and northern Australia (Sahlins 19n, PP· 211-314) . Employment is a particular kind of market relationship that character­izes modern, industrialized societies. It may be informal or formal, but, for increasing swathes of the world’s population, entry into the labour Platket represents -apart, perhaps, from limited eligibility to member­ship of a welfare system -their only possible relation to the means of production and, hence, their only source of livelihood. In ethnically heterogeneous labour markets, ethnic categorization is a powerful cri­terion governing the allocation of job-seekers to jobs by those who are authorized to make recruitment decisions (e.g., Piore 1979; Jenkins 1986b). This is encouraged by the fact that recruitment to those posi­tions of supervision and management that involve hiring and firing others is, of course, also ethnically structured. In addition, the cumulat· ive effect of ethnic categorization in housing markets and education serves further to limit, systematically and disadvantageously, the labour-market options of particular groups. One of the key stages during employment recruitment is the inter­view, no matter how perfunctory it may be. Interviewing and committee decision-making are central to processes of administrative allocation (Batley 1981). These are the formal and informal practices that serve to allocate rewards and penalties within and from public and private­sector formal organizations. These rewards and penalties include, in addition to employment, public housing (Flett 1979), welfare benefits (Howe 1985) and social work intervention of one kind or another (Hillyard and Percy-Smith 1988, pp. 170-203; Liddiard and Hutson 1991). Many other examples could be cited. Interviewing and bureau­cratized collective decision-making are important sources, along with formal rules and certificated expertise or knowledge, of the rationality that legitimates the powers of delegated discretion exercised by officers in deciding individual cases. It is the discretionary nature of these gatekeeping encounters, within a permissive bureaucratic framework, that allows ethnic categorization its inevitable entry into the process, whether explicitly or implicitly (Erickson 1976; Karn 1983; Grillo 1985), along with other ascriptive and stigmatizing categorizations (Scott 1970; Prottas 1979; Lipsky 1980). Because of the increasing reach of administrative allocation processes

~–~ ‘ . t l 1 ‘ j. ·i· ; II I, ” I 1. F I: . ‘ • ,~ I . I’. I : I ‘ p I’ I ‘ I. I I I I I I I I ! 214 Richard Jenkins within modem states, their significance in the social construction ,_,-· patterns of disadvantage and the practical experience of membership>. of stigmatized categories of identity, whether ethnic or not, should not be underestimated. For the purposes of this analysis, the Particular significance of administrative allocation is that it is a privileged context for the transformation of the nominal into the virtual; ethnic categorjz. · ation in this context is likely to count in the lives of the categorized, Organized politics is the source of the statutes and regulations that underwrite the legitimacy of state bureaucracies. In states with histories of ethnic conflict, this conflict will be mirrored in the political system. In these situations, often -and somewhat misleadingly -referred to as ‘plural societies’, political parties and politicians may foster ethnic categorization through public rhetoric, legislative and administrative · acts and the distribution of resources via networks of clientage. Official categorization of this kind can also, however, involve the denial of the existence of historically-constituted ethnic groups, as in the Nazi state’s refusal to acknowledge Sorbian identity in Lusatia (Burleigh and Wip. pennann 1991, pp. 130–35). Even in societies without an explicitly ethnically structured polity, however, similar trends may be observed, as and when the calculus of politics favours them. Rhetoric is then more significant than legislation or administrative act. As moral entrepreneurs, politicians, in conjunc­tion with newspaper proprietors, journalists and commentators, public officials and spokespersons for interest groups, may participate in the development and promotion of moral panics about ethnically-labelled issues such as immigration or black street crime, for example (Hall et al. 1978). These are influential in the public constitution of a ‘problem’, its identification with particular ethnic categories (or, rather, their identification with it), and the framing of legislative and administrative responses. Less subtly, politics has historically provided the platform for the expression and mobilization of overt ethnic chauvinism; moral panics about ethnic ‘problems’ shade into the incitement of inter-ethnic conflict and violence. Welfare-oriented policy responses to perceived social problems may also contribute, however, to the politics of ethnic categorization. The attempt to target resources and intervention at a section of the popu­lation that is perceived to have particularly urgent or specialized ‘needs’, may serve either to call into existence a new social category or to strengthen an existing categorization. This classification may emphasize the worthiness to receive resources of the category in question, as, for example, in the case of ‘the elderly’. It may, however, identify members of the category in question as socially deficient or lacking in some fashion, and serve to label them further as ‘undeserving’ or ‘trouble­some’ (see, for example, the construction and mobilization of the cate· gory of ‘black youth’ in British political discourse: Solomos 1988). It , I l ‘ i r Rethinking ethnicity 215 .;;;:;;.,. ;,f:.jee(D.s particularly likely that equal opportunity m1t1at1ves and other ,}f’lr,edistributive policies will have these effects. · _ “fbis brings me finally to official classification. Increasingly elaborate _-and pervasive schemes for classifying populations mark a historical shift in ·state approaches to social control, from the public exercise of power over the body to the private disciplining of the mind (Foucault 1979; although, as in Nazi Germany, the classification of persons may also be a precursor to attacks on the body). Implicitly, this discussion has a}ready touched upon aspects of this process in the context of adminis­trative allocation and organized politics. There are many facets of the conjunction between power and knowledge which are embodied in legitimate social categorization. Suffice it to mention two here, one relatively benign, the other emphatically not. The first is that indispensable adjunct to the planning processes of modern government, the census of population. In order to gather mean­ingful data, population categories must first be defined. Among these are ethnic (or ‘racial’) categories (Lee 1993). Thus, they become estab­lished in official discourses, discourses that are powerfully constitutive of social reality. The nature of these ethnic categories -or, indeed, the collection of the information at all -may for a variety of reasons be contested by the sections of the population to whom they are applied, and the state may use them to justify policy in areas such as immigration control. Census statistics, however, are reasonably anonymous; they do not categorize individuals. Indeed, not many states categorize their indi­vidual citizens in this fashion. Minor examples of such an approach include the compulsory categorization and recording, for purposes of affirmative action monitoring, of the ethnic identity of employees in many US federal, state and private-sector organizations, or the identifi­cation of ‘nationality’ -denoting republic of origin -on the now-defunct USSR internal passport. Other states, however, most notably Nazi Germany and the Republic of South Africa, having defined citizenship in terms of ‘race’ (a crucial escalatory move in ethnic categorization), have gone on, necessarily, to develop far-reaching systems of ‘racial’ categorization, governing every aspect of life (and death). The role of ‘expert’ knowledge in the construction of these systems, and their bureacratized administration, are a grim reminder of the repressive possibilities which are inherent in administrative allocation (Mtiller-Hill 1988; Bauman 1989; Burleigh and Wippermann 1991). There are, of course, many more contexts of ethnic categorization to which research attention could be directed: child-rearing, friendship relations, education, religion and institutionalized social control, to name but a few. Some of those that I have discussed are themselves so broad -administrative allocation, for example -that they could usefully be disaggregated for the purposes of empirical research. Finally, a

~ ;1 ” ;! i ‘ii _,:-‘I’ –~ ‘ ,. -~ ‘ ~ •.,-. ,I’ , if’ ‘ i ‘. , , I; ,. , r , ‘ 1} ” ‘ , ! ,, ;.; ‘ ,, -~ ‘ I ‘ ‘ ,, ‘ ,, i ; i , 216 Richard Jenkins number of points should be remembered in any consideration of ~~-: issues raised in this section. ·c? First, although my own research background has encouraged me ,~,.~~’ draw upon illustrative material from complex, urbanized societies (and il disproportionately from Europe and North America at that), tlie”~–­scheme outlined in Figure 2 is intended to have the widest possible ?,i research applicability. ‘-} Secondly, the different social contexts of categorization should not be understood as separate or hierarchical ‘levels’. They overlap system. atically in complex and interesting ways: routine public interaction, for example, takes place within a number of the other social contexts . mentioned; they provide it with its necessary setting. A similar point could be made about informal social groups, which exist within (and contribute towards the organization of) many different contexts, and ‘.-_. so on. One of the first research tasks, therefore, must be to problernat-ize and examine this mutual reinforcement. The considerable potential for the mutual reinforcement of categorization in overlapping social contexts (what once we might have called over-determination) is of the greatest importance for our understanding of the power and resilience to intervention of, for example, racism. Thirdly, the implication in each other of internal and external defi­nition, group identification and categorization, should not be forgotten. Although the discussion in this section has largely been about categoriz­ation, the social contexts identified are also significant in processes of internal definition (and, given the inter-penetration of the two, how could it be otherwise?). Categorization and power Categorization contribmes to group identity in various ways. There is, for example, something that might be referred to as ‘internalization’: the categorized group is exposed to the terms in which another group defines it and assimilates that categorization, in whole or in part, into its own identity. Put this baldly, however, the suggestion seems to beg more questions than it answers: why should the external definition be internalized, for example, and how does it happen? There are at least five possible scenarios. ‘ ‘ I ·, First, the external categorization might be more or less the same as an aspect of existing group identity, in which case they will simply reinforce each other. One might suggest that, in fact, some degree of external reinforcement or validation is crucial for the successful maintenance of internal (group) definitions. Similarly, categorization may be less likely to ‘stick’ where it is markedly at odds with existing boundaries. Second, there is the incremental cultural change that is likely to be I [ i Rethinking ethnicity 217 t _ a—product of any !~mg-standing ~ut relat~vely hannon~ous _inter-ethnic :cb,;,-”81ltact. The ethmc boundary 1s osmotic, and not JUSt m terms of personnel: lan~uages and cultures may interact also, and in the process ideOtities are hkely to be affected. Third, the external category might be produced by people who, in the eyes of the original group, have the legitimate authority to categor­ite them, by virtue of their superior ritual status, knowledge, or what­ever. Such a situation implies greater social than cultural differentiation (if a distinction pos~d in terms ~s crude. as this is admis~i~le ), inasmuch as legitimate authonty necessarily reqmres at least a rrummal degree of gbared participation in values or cosmology. fourth, this might be a simpler case: external categorization is imposed by the use of physical force or its threat, i.e., the exercise of power. The categorized, without the capacity to resist the carrying of identity cards, the wearing of armbands, or whatever more subtle devices of identification and stigmatization might be deployed, may, in time, come to think of themselves in the language or categories of the oppressor. Finally, there arc the oppressed who do resist, who reject imposed boundaries and/or their content(s). However, the very act of defying categorization, of striving for an autonomy of self-identification, is, of course, an effect of being categorized in the first place. The rejected external definition is internalized, but paradoxically, as the focus of denial. In these five possibilities, the distinction between power and legit­imate authority can be seen in operation. However, the contribution of categorization to group identity depends upon more than ‘internaliz­ation’. In particular, we should not underestimate the capacity of one group of people to define effectively or to constitute the conditions of existence experienced by another ( something similar, at the individual level, has been discussed above, in the context of labelling). This is the distinction that I have proposed between the virtual and nominal dimensions of ethnicity. To return to an example mentioned earlier, the categorization in particular ways of the Mapuche by white Chileans must be expected to have influenced both groups. Specifically, it will have influenced the behaviour of the Chileans towards the Mapuche: ‘native policy’ as Stuchlik puts it. The Chileans, like the Spanish before them, because of their effective monopolization of violence within the local context and their consequent control of resources, were (and, indeed, still are) in a position to make their categorization of the Mapuche count disproportionately in the social construction of Mapuche life. The effective categorization of a group of people by a more powerful ‘other’ is not therefore ‘just’ a matter of classification (if, indeed, there is any such thing). It is necessarily an intervention in that group’s social

,, ,,; 5 ‘t ‘ ‘ ‘ 218 Richard Jenkins world which will, to an extent and in ways that are a function of th;:_ specifics of the situation, alter that world and the experience of liVin& in it. Just as the Chileans have the capacity to constitute, in part, the.·) experience of ‘being a Mapuche’, so do, for example, employment { recruiters in Britain, who are typically white, contribute to the SOci.a) ::i’t. constitution of the collective experience of growing up as a member of ,­a black ethnic minority. }.1 To return to Barth (and Weber), here one sees the unintended -,-­consequences of action at work, and it is partly in the cumulative mutual reinforcement of these unintended consequences that the pattern of history, both in the present and as a framework of constraint and­possiblity for future generations, is produced. If we accept that ‘culture’ is not independent of practical day+to-day life and its exigencies, theri “” the power of others to constitute the experience of daily living is a further important contribution of categorization to group identity. It is also powerful support for the view of ethnicity and identity as day-to­day practice and historical process that is central to Barth’s model and that I have developed in this article. Rethinking ethnicity 219 ~t:f1 ieft,,mon an_d exter~al definition. The_se operate in different ways a.1 ~he ‘7,-<·”-fndividual, 1nteract1onal and collective levels. Analyses of ethmc1ty, articutarly within social anthropology, have, however, emphasized -~…, tternal definition and group identification at the expense of external -definition and categorization. This is more than simply a problem of empirical neglect. If the arguments advanced in this paper are correct, identity is the practical product of the ongoing interaction of processes of internal and external definition. One cannot be understood in iso­lation from the other. Finally, a concern with external definition and categorization demands that we pay attention to power and authority, and the manner in which different modes of domination are implicated in the social construction of ethnic and other identities. This is not an original obser­vation. It is, perhaps, worth suggesting further that if we do not do so the result will be a model of ethnicity which is as trivial as it is one­sided. Unless we can construct an understanding of ethnicity that can address all of ethnicity’s facets and manifestations, from the celebratory communality of belonging to the final awful moment of genocide, we will have failed both ourselves and the people among whom we under-Summary :,f’ take our research. One of the starting points of my argument is that ethnicity should be conceptualized within a theoretical framework that allows for its integration into the topic of ‘social identity’ in general. In its tum, however, social identity must be constructed as a proper subject for theorization in such a way as to allow for the inclusion of individual and collective identities within a unified analytical framework. Even the most private of identities is not imaginable as anything other than the product of a socialized consciousness and a social situation. Even the most collective of identities must in some sense exist in the awareness of individual actors. Viewed in the abstract, identity, whether ethnic or otherwise, can be understood as two interacting but independent entailments: a name (the nominal) and an experience (the virtual). The latter is, in a sense, what the name means, and can change while the nominal identity remains the same (and vice versa). The nominal and the virtual unite in the ongoing production and reproduction of identity and its boundaries. The distinction between the nominal and the virtual is rooted in the recognition that ethnic identities (and, indeed, all social identities) are practical accomplishments rather than static forms. As such, they are immanently, although not necessarily, variable. As a social form -in the constitution of an historically enduring ethnic group, for example -ethnicity is no less potentially variable, both nominally and virtually. In the practical accomplishment of identity, two mutually interde­pendent but theoretically distinct social processes are at work; internal f l I : I ‘ I • ( Acknowledgements The original version of this article was given as a paper in March 1992 at a seminar at the University of Arhus, Denmark, while I was Visiting Professor in the Institut for etnografi og socialantropologi there. I cannot express too strongly my gratitude for the personal wannth and intellectual encouragement which were extended to me by everyone at Moesgard. Special thanks with respect to this article are due to all those who participated in the seminar on ‘Ethnicity and Cultural Identity’ for their comments, critical or otherwise, and to my fellow paper-givers that day, Poul Pedersen and Torben Vestergaard, for their important input while I was first putting it together. Subsequently, the paper has benefited from its discussion at the conference on ‘Social Order in Post Classical Sociology’, held to mark the retirement of Professor Michael Banton, at the University of Bristol, September 1992, and its stern treatment at the hands of this journal’s referees. In addition, the following have all been generous in their criticism: John Campbell, Len Mars, John Rex and Hilary Stan­worth. I am grateful to all concerned. The usual disclaimers apply, however, and I bear sole responsibility for weaknesses of argument or errors of substance.

‘ i ‘ -~ ‘ • 1 . ‘ 1 < ‘ • ‘, ‘ ‘ ‘ ; ; . ; l ‘(‘. ‘ 1 I 220 Richard Jenkins Notes I. In addition to Stuchlik’s paper, discussed in the main body of the teltt, see: 1953; Erickson 1976; Grillo 1985; Brody 1986; Jenkins 1986b. 2. To describe ethnicity as ‘possibly universal’ opens up the argument about ill supposedly ‘primordial’ character (Geertz 1973, pp. 255-310). The debate about whethei­or not ethnicity is ‘situational’ or ‘primordial’ seems futile; it confuses the ubiquity of a t social phenomenon such as ethnicity with ‘naturalness’, implying fixity, determinism and ” some kind of pre-social power of causation. -~: Refe[‘ences ANDERSON, B. 1983 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso ANDERSON, E. 1978 A Place on the Comer, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press BANTON, M. 1983 Racial and ethnic competition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press BARTH, F. 1966 ‘Models of social organisation·, Occasional Paper No. 23, London: Royal Anthropological Institute –(ed.) 1969a Ethnic Group!/ and Boundarie!/: The Sona( Organisation of Culturt Difference, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget –1969b ‘In1roduction’, in Barth 1969a op. cit. –1984 ‘Problems in conceptualizing cultural pluralism, with illustrations from Somar, Oman’, in D. Maybury-Lewis (ed.), The Prospects for Plural Societies, Proceedings, American Ethnological Society –1989 ‘The analysis of culture in complex societies’, Ethnos, vol. 54, pp. 120–42 BATLEY, R. 1981 ‘The politics of administrative allocation· in R. Forrest, J. Henderson and P. Williams (eds), Urban Political Ewnomy and Social Theory, Alders hot: Gower BAUMAN, Z. 1989 Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity BECKER, H.S. 1963 Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance, New York: Free Press BOON, J.A. 1982 Other Tribes, Other Scribes: Symbolic Anthropology in the Compara­tive Study of Cultures, Hi.stories, Religions and Texts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press BOURDIEU, P. 1990 The Logic of Pracn·ce, Cambridge: Polity BRODY, H. 1986 Maps and Dreams: Indians and the British Columbia Frontier, 2nd. ed., London: Faber and Faber BURLEIGH, M. and WIPPERMANN, W. 1991 The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, Cambridge· Cambridge University Press BURTON, F. 1978 The Politics of Legitimacy. Strugglr.1 in a Belfast Community, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul CICOUREL, A.V. and KITSUSE, J.I. 1963 The Educational Decision Makers, Indiana­polis: Bobbs·Merrill COHEN, A.P. 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i , i J • 1 ‘ ] .. ‘ ‘ , ” ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ , ‘ ‘ ~ . 222 Richard Jenkins KARN, V. 1983 ‘Race and how;ing in Britain: the role of the major ill!ititutions’, in N. Glazer and K. Young (eds), Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy: Achieving Equality in rhe Uniml Srates and Britaill, London: Heinemann KUPER, A. 1988 The Invention of Primitive Society: Trwisformations of an lllusion, London: Routledge LAING, R.O. 1971 Self and OtherY, HarmonWiwonh: Pelican LEE, S.M. 1993 ‘Racial cl~sifications in the US census: 1890-1990’, E1hnic lllld Racial Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 75-94 LEMERT, E.M. tm Human Devio.nce, Socio.I Problerm and Social Control, 2nd ed Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall ·, LIDDIARD, M. and HUTSON, S. 1991 ‘Homeless young people and runaways -agency definitions and processes’, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 20, pp. 365-88 LIEBOW, E. 1967 Tally’s Corner: A S11uly of Negro S1ree1corner Men, Boston: Li1t1e, Brown LIPSKY, M. 1980 Street.Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, New York: Russell Sage Foundation MANN, M. (ed.) 1983 The Macmillan Student Encyclop~dia of Sociology, London: Macmillan MATZA, D. 1969 Becoming Deviant, Englewood Cliffs; Pren1ice-HaU MAUSS, M, 1985 ‘A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self’, in M. Carri!hers, S, Collins and S, Lukes (eds), The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press MEAD, G.H, 1934 Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Oiicago, IL: University of Oticago Press MILES, R. 1982 Racism and Migrant Labour, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul MILNER, D. 1975 Children and Race, Harmondsworth: Penguin MOLLER-HILL, B. 1988 Murderous Science: Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies and Others, Gennany 1933-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press OK.ELY, J_ 1983 The Traveller-Gypsies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press PAINE, R 1976 Two modes of exchange and mediation’, in B. Kapferer (ed.), Trans­action and Meaning, Philadelphia, PA: ISHI PIORE, M, 1979 Birds of Passage: Migrant Labour and Indw;mal Socieries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press PROITAS, J.M. 1979 People Processing: The Street-Level Bureauc,a1 in Public Service Bureaucracies, Lexington: Lexington Books PRYCE, K, 1979 Endleu Preswre: A Study of West-Indian Life-styles in Bristol, Har­mond5worth: Penguin REX, J, 1973 Race, Colonialism and the City, London: Oxford University Press RIST, R.C. 1977 ‘On understanding the processes of schooling: the contributions of labelling theory’, in J, Karabel and A.H. Halsey (eds), Power and Ideology in Edu­cation, New York: Oxford University Press SAHLINS, M, 1972 Srone Age Economics, London: Tavistock SCOTT, R.A. 1970 ‘The construction of conceptions of stigma by professional experts’, in J,D, Douglas (ed.), Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings, New York: Basic Books SMITH, ANTHONY D. 1986 The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell SOLOMOS, J, 1988 BUJ.ck You1h, Racism and the State: The Po/mes of Ideology ond Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press STERN, D.N, 1985 The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, New York: Basic Books STUCHLIK, M. 1979 ‘Chilean native policies and the image of the Mapuche Indians’, in D, Riches (ed.), The Conceptualisation and Explanation of Processes of Social Change, Queen’s University Papers in Social Anthropology. voL 3, Belfast f I ! ” I ‘ [ I ‘ I Rethinking ethnicity 223 TROYNA, B. and HATCHER, R. 1992 Racism in Children’s Lives: A Study of Mainly While Primary Schools, London: Rouiledge WALLMAN, S. 1978 ‘The boundaries of race: processes of ethnicity in England’, Man, vol. 13, pp. 200-17 -1986 ‘Ethnicity and the boundary process in contexl’ in J, Rex and D, Mason (eds), Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press WJLl..lS, P. 1977 Leaming to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, faroborough: Saxon House RICHARD JENKINS is Reader in Sociology and Anthropology at the University College of Swansea. ADDRESS: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University College of Swansea, Singleton Park, Swansea SA2 8PP, UK.

Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 2015, Vol. 1(1) 52 –72© American Sociological Association 2014DOI: 10.1177/2332649214560440sre.sagepub.comCurrent (and Future) Theoretical Debates in Sociology of Race and EthnicityIn this article I argue for the necessity of a settler colonialism framework for an historically grounded and inclusive analysis of U.S. race and gender for-mation. A settler colonialism framework can encompass the specificities of racisms and sexisms affecting different racialized groups—especially Native Americans, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans—while also highlighting structural and cultural factors that undergird and link these rac-isms and sexisms. I offer here a first rough sketch of a settler colonialism–framed analysis of racial formation in certain critical periods and places in the United States. I engage with recent theoretical work that views settler colonialism as a distinct transnational formation whose political and eco-nomic projects have shaped and continue to shape race relations in first world nations that were estab-lished through settler colonialism. My aim is to avoid lumping all racisms together, even for the benign purpose of promoting cross-race alliances to fight racial injustice. Equally, I wish to avoid seeing racisms affecting various groups as com-pletely separate and unrelated. Rather, I endeavor to uncover some of the articulations among differ-ent racisms that would suggest more effective bases for cross-group alliances.In the latter regard, one implication of taking settler colonialism seriously is to advance decolo-nization as a necessary goal in the quest to achieve race and gender justice. Indeed, the elaboration of the settler colonialism framework has been closely paralleled by the development of decolonial cri-tiques of racial justice projects that aim to achieve liberal inclusion, rather than liberation, of 560440SREXXX10.1177/2332649214560440Sociology of Race and EthnicityGlennresearch-article20141University of California, Berkeley, CA, USACorresponding Author:Evelyn Nakano Glenn, University of California, 506 Barrows Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720.2570, USA. Email: [email protected] Colonialism as Structure: A Framework for Comparative Studies of U.S. Race and Gender FormationEvelyn Nakano Glenn1AbstractUnderstanding settler colonialism as an ongoing structure rather than a past historical event serves as the basis for an historically grounded and inclusive analysis of U.S. race and gender formation. The settler goal of seizing and establishing property rights over land and resources required the removal of indigenes, which was accomplished by various forms of direct and indirect violence, including militarized genocide. Settlers sought to control space, resources, and people not only by occupying land but also by establishing an exclusionary private property regime and coercive labor systems, including chattel slavery to work the land, extract resources, and build infrastructure. I examine the various ways in which the development of a white settler U.S. state and political economy shaped the race and gender formation of whites, Native Americans, African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Chinese Americans.Keywordssettler colonialism, decolonization, race, gender, genocide, white supremacy by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 53subordinated groups. Theorists of decolonialism, such as Walter Mignolo (2007) and Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2011), argue that the case for liberal inclusion can only be made by working within the narratives, logics, and epistemologies of modernism. Yet, these are the very narratives, log-ics, and epistemologies that undergird settler colo-nial projects. Thus, strategies and solutions that adhere to modernist concepts of progress, individu-ality, property, worth, and so on are fated to repro-duce the inequalities that colonialism has created. Mignolo and Maldonado-Torres argue for the necessity of challenging and rejecting modernist concepts. They propose that the border thinking and philosophy of women of color feminists offer counter-hegemonic narratives, logics, and episte-mologies that enable the imagining of liberation for men and women of color. What I draw on from decolonial theory is an intersectional perspective, one that recognizes gender, sexuality, and race as co-constituted by settler colonial projects.Before further elaborating the settler colonial framework, I will contextualize my project by briefly reviewing previous efforts to develop con-ceptual models to analyze and compare racisms affecting varied racialized groups in the United States.BEyOND THE BlACk-WHITE BINARy?American sociologists developed the concept of “ethnicity” to refer to relations among groups marked by cultural and language difference, while “race” referred to groups marked by supposed somatically visible difference. These scholars rec-ognized that racial groups were also characterized by cultural distinctions, but in practice, the study of ethnic relations generally focused on intraracial relations, especially among whites from different national origins, while the study of race focused in interracial group relations and inequality between and among groups marked as white and black. Indeed, the vast majority of sociological studies of racism and racial inequality have focused on white-black conflict and disparities. This attention was warranted given the long history of black subjuga-tion and the unique structural position blacks occu-pied as property under the regime of chattel slavery. Jared Sexton (2010:46) noted, “Because Blackness serves as the basis of enslavement in the logic of a transnational political and legal culture, it perma-nently destabilizes the position of any nominally free Black population.” Indeed, after Emancipation and the end of Reconstruction, white supremacy was reinstated in the former slave states by mea-sures that subjected nominally free blacks to legal, political, and economic conditions as close to slav-ery as possible. Blacks were systematically disfran-chised, super-exploited, confined, and terrorized in multiple ways. Denied any freedom wages in the form of land, freed people were ensnared in debt bondage under the sharecropping system, arbi-trarily imprisoned and put to forced labor under the convict labor system, and kept in check by legal and vigilante terrorism.Finally, a century after formal emancipation, with the gains won by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the growing ethnic, racial, and religious diversity of the U.S. population, espe-cially as non-Hispanic whites have approached becoming a numerical minority, race scholars have shifted more attention to racism affecting other groups, particularly Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans.One strategy has been to cluster racialized groups together under an umbrella term, such as “non-Whites,” “people of color,” or “third world minorities.” By identifying commonalities in their experiences of subordination, exploitation, and exclusion, theorists hoped to promote coalitional organizing to fight racism. The internal colonialism model, originally devised by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) to account for the condition of African Americans, was elaborated by Robert Blauner (1972) in his influential volume Racial Oppression in America to encompass African Americans, Native Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. According to Blauner (1972:53), these racialized minorities (Colonized Minorities) “share a common situation of oppression” that differed from the situation of European immigrants (Immigrant Minorities), namely, “forced entry into the larger society” (as opposed to voluntary entry by European immigrants), subjection to various forms of coerced labor (as opposed to participation in free labor), and colonizer cultural policy that “con-strains, transforms, or destroys original values, ori-entations, and ways of life.” Racial Oppression became a foundational text for students and schol-ars of Chicano-Latino, Native American, and Asian American Studies during the 1970s and 1980s.A second approach has been to focus on the common processes by which groups are formed (and reformed) as racial groups—that is, are identi-fied by social and political institutions and self-identify as distinct races. This approach bypasses the problem of mapping racialized groups in a by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

54 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) conceptual space or in a hierarchy of groups. Michael Omi and Howard Winant took this approach in their seminal work, Racial Formation in America, originally published in 1989 and reis-sued in revised versions in 1994 and 2014. Omi and Winant argued that in the United States, “Race is a fundamental axis of social organization.” At the same time, they recognized race not as fixed but as “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle” (Omi and Winant 1994:13). Indeed, the last decades of the twentieth century saw racially defined groups engaging in political struggle to challenge the structural and cultural violence of colonialism, apartheid, and racial-ethnic cleansing. One result of these struggles is that “we have now reached the point of fairly general agreement that race is not a biologically given but rather a socially constructed way of differentiating human beings” (Omi and Winant 1994:55). Omi and Winant (1994:63) caution, however, that “the transcen-dence of biological conceptions of race does not provide any reprieve from the dilemmas of racial injustice and conflict nor from the controversies over the significance of race in the present.”A third approach to the imperative for a more comprehensive understanding of race has been to retain the white-black poles as the anchors of a hierarchical U.S. racial system but to expand the hierarchy to include other racialized groups between the poles. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1997) developed what he called a “racialized social sys-tem” approach to analyzing how a society’s eco-nomic, political, social, and political stratification is structured by the placement of actors into racial categories. In other writings (e.g., Bonilla-Silva 2009) he argues that U.S. racial stratification is undergoing transformation into a tri-partite Latin American style system consisting of blacks, whites, and an intermediate category of honorary whites. Bonilla-Silva examines the ranking of various Asian and Latino groups on an array of measures, including income, schooling, educational attain-ment, occupational status, self-identity, attitudes toward blacks, rates of intermarriage, and residen-tial segregation. These rankings provide support for his hypothesis that some Asian groups (e.g., Chinese and Koreans) and some (generally lighter skinned) Latino groups (e.g., Chileans and Argentines) are being assimilated “upward” to become accepted as whites or else are being absorbed into an intermediate stratum of “honorary whites.” Concurrently, other Asian groups (e.g., Hmong and Cambodians) and darker skinned Latinos (e.g., many Puerto Ricans) are being assimilated “downward” to become part of an expanded category that he calls the “collective Black.”Still another approach has been taken by non-U.S. origin scholars who pioneered postcolonial studies (e.g., Bhabha 1994; Gilroy 1995; Hall 2003) and by U.S. Latino/a thinkers who pioneered border studies and feminist decolonial studies (e.g., Anzaldua 2012; Lugones 2010; Sandoval 2000). These scholars have stressed the indeterminacy of racial categories and the fluidity and hybridity of racial identities. Such conceptions make eminent sense of a world where large swathes of popula-tions emigrate and move across borders, where borders are constantly contested and changed, and where individuals and cultures mix and merge. Moreover, some ethnic groups in the United States have long embraced a hybrid identity, most promi-nently Mexican Americans, many of whom cele-brate their mixed Indigenous/Spanish heritage (mestizaje), and Filipinos. Regarding fluidity, recent empirical work by Aliya Saperstein and Andrew Penner (2010, 2012) analyzes national longitudinal data over two decades and finds that individuals’ racial self-identification and others’ classification of them shift over time. Generally, becoming successful and of high status leads to shifts in self-identification and social assignment toward “white,” while becoming unsuccessful and low status (including being incarcerated) leads to reassignment to “black.” A concurrent develop-ment has been the destabilization of sex and gender designations and identities by feminist thinkers such as Judith Butler (2006) and empirically stud-ied by researchers such as Lisa Diamond (2009), which unfortunately I do not have space to elabo-rate on here. Yet, despite the increased recognition of the instability and ambiguity of race and gender categorizations, they remain persistent and resilient principles for organizing hierarchical relations within and between societies. How are we to account for this seeming contradiction?AN AlTERNATIVE STARTING POINTI now turn to an exposition of settler colonialism as an alternative starting point for a framework that can generate a more historically and structurally grounded analysis of racial inequality in the United States, one that pays attention to variation across time and place while also being attentive to struc-tures that link these differing cases. It is by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 55a framework that is amenable to intersectional understanding because it is widely understood that colonial projects simultaneously structure race, gender, class, and sexual relations within and between colonists and the colonized. Moreover, since settler colonial projects are transnational in scope, a settler colonialism framework invites investigation of cross-national connections and comparisons.The concept of settler colonialism has been most clearly elaborated by scholars of indigenous studies, especially in Australia, Canada, and the United States. It is a framework that highlights commonalities in the history and contemporary situation of indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. However, although it may seem to be best suited to explain the racialization and treatment of indigenous peoples, I agree with Patrick Wolfe (1999) that settler colonialism should be seen not as an event but as an ongoing structure. The logic, tenets, and identities engendered by settler colo-nialism persist and continue to shape race, gender, class, and sexual formations into the present.Scholars of settler colonialism argue that it is a distinct form of colonialism that needs to be theo-rized separately from colonialism more generally. In contrast to classic colonialism whose aim is to take advantage of resources that will benefit the metropole, settler colonialism’s objective is to acquire land so that colonists can settle perma-nently and form new communities. Lorenzo Veracini (2011) compares the narrative arc of clas-sic colonialism and settler colonialism to the differ-ence between a circle and a line. In classic colonialism, the narrative, as in the Odyssey, takes a circular form, “consisting of an outward move-ment followed by interaction with exotic and colo-nized ‘others’ in foreign surroundings, and by a final return to an original location” (p. 205). In con-trast, “the narrative generally associated with set-tler colonial enterprises rather resembles the Aeneid, where the traveler moves forward along a story line that can’t be turned back” (p. 206). Settler colonists do not envision a return home. Rather, they seek to transform the new colony into “home.”The differing goals of classic colonialism and settler colonialism lead to a second major differ-ence: their confrontation with indigenes. In classic colonialism, the object is to exploit not only natural resources but also human resources. Native inhab-itants represent a cheap labor source that can be harnessed to produce goods and extract materials for export to the metropole. They also serve as con-sumers, expanding the market for goods produced by the metropole and its other colonies. Goods and raw materials, like colonists, follow a circular path in classic colonialism.In settler colonialism, the object is to acquire land and to gain control of resources. To realize these ambitions, the first thing that must be done is to eliminate the indigenous occupants of the land. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways: genocide, forced removal from territories desired by white settlers, and confinement to reservations outside the boundaries of white settlement. It can also be accomplished through assimilation. Assimilation can be biological (e.g., through inter-marriage to “dilute” indigenous blood) and/or cul-tural (e.g., by stripping indigenes of their culture and replacing it with settler culture).The second thing that must be done is to secure the land for settlers. This can be accomplished by imposing a modernist property regime that trans-forms land and resources (sometimes including people) into “things” that can be owned. This regime consists of such elements as mapping and marking boundaries to delimit an object that is to be owned, a system for recording ownership, and legal rules for ownership and sale of objects defined as property. Indigenous people generally understand the land and their relationship to it very differently, viewing themselves as being provided for by the land and in turn as living in harmony with the land and having a sense of responsibility for its welfare. Settler society does not recognize indigenous conceptions and from their own per-spective of land as property, views indigenes as failing to make productive use of it.THE lOGIC AND PRACTICES Of U.S. SETTlER COlONIAlISMI turn now to the specific case of U.S. settler colo-nialism. Walter Hixson (2013:29) argues that the British settler colonial project in North America was unique from those of its Spanish and French rivals: “Like the Spanish and the French, the English embraced patriarchy, private property, and Christianity, but the emphasis on the settlement of families and communities distinguished them.” Spanish male colonists were spread thinly across vast vistas of land. French traders and missionaries were surrounded by indigenous people with whom they had to coexist. The French also were over-whelmingly male and often took Indian mistresses and wives with whom they formed Metis (mixed) communities. “By contrast European women migrated with men and children to settle in the by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

56 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) English colonies.” This family-based colonization in combination with its rural character proved to be advantageous, enabling “a steady westward migra-tion towards the agricultural frontier as the threat of Indian attack diminished” (Elliott 2006:43–44).With regard to the elimination of the indigene, settlers adopted all of the aforementioned policies at one time or another. Hixson (2013) documents the almost continuous history of settler colonial ethnic cleansing. Regular outbreaks of warfare occurred throughout the seventeenth, second half of the eighteenth, and the nineteenth centuries as settlers pressed up against lands inhabited or used by Native Americans first in the East and then in the Midwest and finally the West. Some genocidal campaigns were carried out by official military forces of the metropole or the colonies, while oth-ers were unauthorized actions by settler vigilantes. Attacks launched by vigilantes were likely to be particularly brutal and to involve the slaughtering of women, children, infants, and the elderly. Hixson notes that in 1609 when hostilities broke out between the English settlers in Jamestown and Native Americans in the region, the leader of the colony, James Smith, “pioneered the tradition of irregular warfare in the ‘New World’ by burning and razing Indian homes and agricultural fields” (p. 31). Warfare escalated during and after the Civil War as American settlers pushed to occupy the remaining land in the West and Native tribes fought to preserve their ways of life. The Massacre at Wounded Knee (1890) that resulted in the death of 300 Sioux warriors was one of the last major bat-tles and mostly ended Indian armed resistance (Brown 2007:439–50).A little known aspect of genocidal raids and warfare was the enslavement of indigenous survi-vors, particularly women and children. In colonial New England, the selling of Indian slaves on the international market in the Caribbean and South America helped defray the costs of the Powhatan Wars. Settler men spoke of their desire for Native American women whom they could use as domes-tic servants and sex slaves. In the South, according to Alan Gallay (2009:57), “Only through warfare could Carolinians obtain the slaves they desired to exchange for supplies to build their plantations.” In California between 1850 and 1863, Walter Hixson (2013:125) writes, “Some 10,000 Indians were sold into servitude. American slave traders often killed the parents of Indian children so they might be seized and trafficked.”Conflicts over territory were also resolved by removal and relocation under treaties that were agreed to by Native Americans induced to sign by false promises and duress. During the presidency of Andrew Jackson, and at his urging, the U.S. Congress passed The Indian Removal Act of 1830 (IRA). The IRA targeted the “five civilized tribes” of the southeast (Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole), so called because they had gone furthest in adopting the culture and ways of life of white settlers (including the ownership of black slaves). Through treaty, these tribes were prevailed upon to cede their traditional lands in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida in exchange for land west of the Mississippi. The Choctaw, Creek, and Chickasaw were the first to be removed, and they suffered the loss of thousands of men, women, and children who died en route to the West. Cherokees waged a long legal battle that delayed removal until 1838. At that point, the U.S. government sent in 7,000 troops to force the Cherokee into stockades and then sent them on a forced march to the West with inadequate provisions. On the “Trail of Tears,” at least 4,000 Cherokees perished from hunger, cold, and disease. The Seminoles resisted militarily, wag-ing two wars, the second of which did not end until 1858, at which point most Seminoles had been relo-cated to Oklahoma. Even so, one hardy band of Seminoles managed to hold out in Florida, where their descendants still live (Foreman 1974; Perdue and Green 2008).Near the end of Indian armed resistance in the West in the 1880s, federal Indian policy turned decisively toward assimilation, or as it was often dubbed, “Americanization.” The aim was to phase out Indian treaty rights and other special statuses so as to absorb indigenous peoples into settler society. The twin prongs of Indian assimilation policy were land allotments and education. Under the Dawes Act of 1887, the federal government divided tribal land into individual allotments. Heads of house-holds were entitled to 160 acres, single individuals to 60 acres, and those under 18 to 40 acres (Debos 1973). By allotting larger holdings to heads of households, the program was designed to encour-age the formation of heteropatriarchal nuclear households. Proponents of allotment believed that owning and cultivating individual plots would transform Indian men into citizen farmers and Indian women into farm wives. Importantly, the large surplus left after allotments was made avail-able to white settlers and railroad companies for development. The net result of allotment policy was to dramatically reduce the amount of land owned by Indians collectively and individually. In 1887, before the start of allotment, Indians owned by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 57138 million acres; that amount was reduced to 54 million acres by 1934 when the allotment program was terminated (McDonald 1991).Special education for Indian children was meant to complement allotment by preparing Indians for new productive roles in American society. Starting in the 1880s, reformers’ designs for Indian children consisted of two components: child removal and placement in boarding schools. Education officials at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) favored com-pulsory removal so as to limit the influence of Indian mothers. Estelle Reed, a longtime Superintendent of Indian Schools, explained, “The Indian child must be placed in school before the habits of barbarous life become fixed and there he must be kept until contact with our life has taught him to abandon his savage ways and walk in the path of Christian civilization” (Superintendent of Indian Schools 1900:426). Over a 24-year period from 1879 to 1902, the federal government estab-lished over 150 boarding schools, of which 25 were off-reservation (Reyhner and Eder 2004). BIA recruiters were hired to convince parents to enroll their children, with the promise that their children would be fed, housed, and educated so that they could improve their lives.Once at school, Indian children were given hair-cuts and issued settler clothing. They were prohib-ited from speaking their native languages and from practicing native religions and rituals. The curricu-lum focused on gender-typed vocational training. Boys were trained in farming and trades and girls in domestic skills. Even though most federal offi-cials placed more emphasis on “civilizing” Indian men, they were persuaded to try to educate Indian girls under the tutelage of white female teachers. They blamed Indian women for the “backward-ness” of Indian men. In their view, the fact that Indian women did heavy physical labor and were ignorant of modern housekeeping methods accounted for Indian men’s laziness and disinterest in material progress. If Indian women could be educated to focus on the household and to desire better furnishings, Indian men would be impelled to work hard to acquire material goods (Stremlau 2005). Thus, assimilation was intended to instill a sense of gender-appropriate duties and obligations. Ultimately, the aim of Indian schooling was to impose “social death.” Col. Richard C. Pratt, founder and head of the Carlisle Indian School, proclaimed in a speech given in 1892:A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one, and that high sanction of his destruction has been an enormous factor in promoting Indian massacres. In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man. (Pratt 1973:260)The decades of the 1940s to the 1960s saw still another shift in settler policy toward Native Americans. The intent was to assimilate Native Americans as individuals into settler society and to break their communal orientation and tribal ties. In 1953 the U.S. Congress passed legislation termi-nating the tribal status of many Indian groups. Termination of tribal status meant the loss of legal standing as a sovereign dependent nation and the end of federal aid, protections, and services, such as health care, which had been provided by the Indian Health Service. Many reservations were also terminated and reservation land sold off, pri-marily to non-Indians. Tribal members were unilat-erally made U.S. citizens, subject to taxes and state laws from which they had been exempt. Over the next decade the government terminated 109 tribes and removed 2.5 million acres of trust land (Fixico 1986, 2000; Ramirez 2007).A linked policy was to disperse Indians away from reservations. The Indian Relocation Act of 1956 paid moving expenses and provided voca-tional training and job placement to Native Americans willing to leave their reservations for 9 government-designated urban centers (Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Dallas). Indian men were tracked into low-level, dead end jobs, and Indian women were directed into domestic ser-vice in white households. Many relocated Indians found that the promised jobs and stipends did not materialize and fell on hard times in the city; some returned to the reservation. The relocation policy resulted in the dispersal of the Indian population. An estimated 750,000 Native Americans migrated to cities between 1950 and 1980. Whereas in 1940 only 8 percent of Native Americans resided in cit-ies, by 2012, 70 percent did (T. Williams 2013).In the city, Native Americans often found com-munity with members of other tribes, leading to the development of a pan-Indian orientation; intermar-riage across tribes increased the proportion of Indians with multi-tribe identities. With the rise of the black civil rights movement, Native Americans began to organize for the cause of self-determina-tion for Indian people. This activism included legal challenges to termination and relocation policy that by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

58 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) eventually succeeded (LaGrand 2005; Smith and Warrior 1997).U.S. SETTlER COlONIAlISM AS A RACE-GENDER PROjECT: DEVElOPMENT Of NATIONAl IDENTITy AND NORMAlIzATION Of GENDERED WHITENESSIn this section, I describe U.S. settler colonialism as a race-gender project. By that I mean that it transplanted certain racialized and gendered con-ceptions and regimes from the metropole but also transformed them in the context of and experiences in the New World. What emerged out of the settler colonial project was a racialized and gendered national identity that normalized male whiteness. Since settlers initially were exogenous others seek-ing to claim rights to land and sovereignty over those who already occupied the land, they needed to develop conceptions of indigenous peoples as lesser beings, unworthy of consideration. They har-nessed race and gender to construct a hierarchy of humankind. Conceiving of indigenous peoples as less than fully human justified dispossessing them and rendered them expendable and/or invisible. Land occupied or used seasonally by indigenes was conceived of as terra nullius (empty land or land belonging to no one) and therefore available for taking by white settlers. Simultaneously, settlers conceived of themselves as more advanced and evolved, bringers of progress and enlightenment to the wilderness. Masculine whiteness thus became central to settler identity, a status closely tied to ownership of property and political sovereignty. The latter in turn articulated with heteropatriarchy, which rendered white manhood supreme with respect to control over property and self-rule. This entailed settler wives being denied an independent legal identity; instead, her identity was merged into that of her husband, and her property and labor were under his control. Further, it was presumed that “heteropatriarchal nuclear-domestic arrange-ments, in which the [white] father is both protector and leader should serve as the model for social arrangements of the state and its institutions” (Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013:13).Settlers may initially identify with the imperial power and submit to its rule, but over time their interactions with indigenes and experiences in the colony set them apart from the population in the metropole. American settlers attached their identity to the land itself, to the mythologized common experience of settlement, and often to the shared goal of self-government. Frontiersmen and women became symbols of what it meant to be American. This new identity helped to bridge differences of class, ethnicity, and nationality that might other-wise have divided them. Thus, there was greater equality among the settlers than existed at the time among inhabitants of the metropole. European immigrants to the United States who moved west to take advantage of inexpensive frontier lands were quickly granted American citizenship rights and considered equals among their peers in matters of local government.Some settlers also appropriated indigenous symbols, attributes, and skills, as in the case of American frontiersmen who wore buckskin and cowboys, range-riders, and backwoodsmen who adopted native trapping, hunting, and riding tech-niques. Turner’s ([1893] 1920:4) essay refers to frontiersmen discarding train travel for traveling by birch canoes, wearing hunting shirts and mocca-sins, planting Indian corn, and even shouting war cries and taking scalps in “orthodox Indian fash-ion.” Of course, the vast majority of white Americans did not actually ride canoes or wear buckskin. However, they identified with fictional or mythical characters (e.g., Leather Stockings, Paul Bunyan) or emblematic exemplars who did (e.g., Daniel Boone, Buffalo Bill).Walter Hixson (2013:3) characterizes the emu-lations of indigenes as expressions of settler ambivalence:The colonizer desired the colonized other, for example for his attunement with nature or sexual liberation, and yet was repulsed by his primitiveness and the dangers he posed. The slippages and uncertainty with the colonizer’s identity, including taking on some of the characteristics of the “savage,” produced anxiety and instability.Importantly, the adoption of indigenous symbols and attributes differentiates settlers from residents of the metropole, whom settlers may scorn as “over-civilized.” In the U.S. case, the appropriation of indigenous symbols and practices contributed to the forging of a new national identity separate from that of the metropole and supporting the case for self-government.Another element common to settler colonial-ism, one that certainly characterizes U.S. settler colonialism, is the “denial and disavowal of the by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 59history of violent dispossession of the indigenes” (Hixson 2013:12). Lorenzo Veracini (2010:14) opines,The settler hides behind his labour and hardship (the settler does not dispossess anyone; he “wrestles with the land” to sustain his family) . . . the settler enters a “new, empty land to start a new life;” indigenous people naturally and inevitably “vanish;” it is not settlers that displace them.In short, “settler colonialism obscures the condi-tions of its own production.” Veracini adds that set-tler colonialism’s need to disavow any foundational violence is such that “even when settler colonial narratives celebrate anti-indigenous violence, they do so by representing a defensive battle ensuring the continued survival of the settler community and never as a founding violence per se” (p. 78).The encounter with the indigene can be viewed as the founding moment for the formation of U.S. whiteness. The “savage” and eliminable indigene is racialized as “other” in contrast to the “civilized” sovereign settler, who becomes “white.” Whiteness also becomes synonymous with the nation. Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2008:85) explains, The USA as a White nation state cannot exist without land and clearly defined borders, it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides the context for national identification of Whiteness. In this way . . . Native American dispossession indelibly marks configurations of White national identity. Melissa Lovell (2007:3) observes, “Settler colo-nialism is an example of an institutionalised or nor-malised (and therefore mostly invisible) ideology of national identity.” She also points to the associated invisibility and normalization of whiteness. “White people are able to define Whiteness as normality and to position themselves as full citizens whilst pushing non-White people (including migrants and indigenous people) to the margins or even outside of the boundaries of citizenship.”Native American legal scholar Robert A. Williams, Jr. goes further, attributing the establish-ment of a U.S. white racial dictatorship to settler resolve to erase Indians from the land:An overtly racist, hostile, and violent language of Indian savagery can be found in the first official U.S. legal document promulgated by the Founding Fathers, the Declaration of Independence. . . . [This] racist, organizing iconography of the Indian as irreconcilable and inassimilable savage other continued after the Revolution as one of the core organizing beliefs inspiring the Founders’ vision of America’s growth and potentiality as a new form of expansionary White racial dictatorship in the world. (R. Williams 2005:39)While acknowledging the centrality of enslaved blacks to the formation of white racial identity, R. Williams argues that the Founders’ first Indian pol-icy “was the inaugural step in defining a White racial identity for the United States as a nation” (p. 48).THE lOGIC AND PRACTICE Of RACIAlIzED SlAVERy AND ExPlOITATIONAs stated in the earlier exposition on the defining characteristics of settler colonialism, U.S. settler colonialism has been driven by the impulse to gain sovereignty over land, bodies, and labor by turning them into private property that can be bought, exploited, and sold. In this section, I analyze exam-ples of how this impulse and the institutionalization of property regimes affected not only Native Americans but also other racialized groups in the past and present. Arvin et al. (2013:12) point out thatwithin settler colonialism, it is exploitation of land that yields supreme value. . . . Extracting value from the land also often requires systems of slavery and other forms of labor exploitation. These simultaneous processes of taking over the land (by killing and erasing the peoples with previous relationships to that land) and importing forced labor (to work the land as chattel slaves to yield high profit margins for the landowners) produced the wealth upon which the U.S. nation’s world power is founded.Initially, American colonists made use of enslaved Native Americans, immigrant white indentured servants and convicts, and enslaved Africans. However, Americans came to favor black chattel slaves, finding them more profitable, espe-cially for plantation labor in the South. What emerged was a triadic system that brought together the industry of the white settler, the land of dispos-sessed Native Americans, and the forced labor of by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

60 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) enslaved Africans to produce European and white American wealth. Patrick Wolfe (2011:273) notes, “Ubiquitously, colonizers have encoded and orchestrated this complexity by reference to some version, however inchoate, of the doctrine of race. In the sound-bite vocabulary of race, the three points of the Atlantic triangle . . . Africa, America and Europe became chromatized as Black, Red, and White respectively.”The establishment of black chattel slavery has been fundamental to U.S. conceptions of race in black-white terms. The distinction between the eliminability of indigenous peoples (for land) and usefulness of blacks (as property and for productive and reproductive labor) held as long as slavery remained in place. Thus, rules governing racial classification of Native Americans and blacks dif-fered. For Indians, miscegenation diluted indigene-ity such that mixed people were disqualified for tribal membership and therefore for coverage by treaty rights and entitlement to land allotments. Reducing the indigenous population entitled to treaty rights and land served the interests of white settlers and capitalists by opening up more land for them to own and exploit. In contrast, for blacks, miscegenation perpetuated blackness and increased the population of enslaveable people. The growth of the black slave population was consonant with the goals of increasing white property. The black-white binary came to be mapped onto other dichotomies that defined American identity: freedom-slavery, humanity-animality, owner of property–being prop-erty, and citizen-noncitizen. Given the transforma-tion of Native Americans into ghosts, it is not surprising that everyday conceptions of race came to be organized around a black-white binary rather than a red-white binary.These contrasting positions of eliminable Native Americans and enslavable and exploitable blacks were rooted in historical circumstances that have changed over time. With the dismantling of chattel slavery and emancipation, blacks in some places and in some situations became positioned more similarly to Native Americans as surplus population, therefore more eliminable. Patrick Wolfe (2006:404) notes that prior to emancipation, “as valuable commodities, slaves had only been destroyed in extremis.” Indeed, historian Walter Johnson (2013) has calculated that on the eve of the Civil War, in 1860, the value of slaves exceeded the value of all railroads and factories in the United States. However, once slavery was abolished and Reconstruction ended, the U.S. witnessed the rise of Jim Crow terrorism, lynching, legally mandated segregation, and criminalization-imprisonment tar-geting blacks. Still, their “dispensability was tempered” as long as blacks “continued to have value as a source of super-cheap labour.”In more recent times, particularly since the 1980s, blacks have lost their value as labor due to deindustrialization, globalized production, and immigration of workers from the global south to provide even cheaper labor. Racial zoning of American cities has hardened, and incarceration rates of blacks, particularly black men, have soared. Michelle Alexander (2012) has aptly dubbed the phenomenon of mass incarceration of blacks as the “New Jim Crow.” Even more starkly, Wolfe (2006) has proposed the term “structural genocide” to cover a range of eliminatory practices from mass killing to spatial removal to biological and cultural assimila-tion, all of which have been employed to deal with Native Americans and to some extent with blacks.Ruth Gilmore (2007) analyzes the massive growth of the California prison population dispro-portionately made up of African American men. She relates this growth to the diminishing demand for black labor by tracking the tandem rise in num-bers of unemployed and of prisoners between 1973 and 1996.Her analysis exposes the prison industrial com-plex as a key instrument of “structural genocide” directed against blacks. This notion is consistent with Gilmore’s (2007:28) definition of racism as “the state-sanctioned or legal production and exploi-tation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to pre-mature death.” Another prominent instrument of “structural genocide” is social and spatial contain-ment in impoverished inner city ghettos. Gilmore (2007:74) points out that the “concentration effect of sociospatial apartheid” includes “increased vulnera-bility to intentional and accidental violence, leading to premature death from a variety of causes.”SETTlER COlONIAlISM AND GENDERED AND RACIAlIzED OTHERSI next turn to settler colonial mobilization of race and gender to manage “exogenous others” beyond the indigenes and enslaved blacks. In contrast to virtuous or potentially virtuous exogenous others (typically European immigrants) who may be selected for gradual inclusion, undesirable exoge-nous others (typically racialized immigrants) were considered morally degraded, sometimes irredeem-ably so. Settler colonialism’s response to undesir-able exogenous others has often swung (and still does) between the poles of “elimination” and coer-cive “exploitation.” by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 61In making connections between settler colonial treatment of undesirable exogenous others and the treatment of Native Americans and African Americans, I am not assuming a commensurability between anti-black racism or anti-Indian racism and other racisms. The so-called Afro-pessimist school of thought argues for the singularity of anti-black racism, which is rooted in the unique condi-tions of chattel slavery (Patterson 1985; Sexton 2010, 2011; Wilderson 2010). In his exegesis of Afro-pessimism, Jared Sexton (2010) contends that despite the fact that some non-black groups have at times labored under conditions similar to blacks, they have not been subject to the rule of slave law. He goes on to argue “the ‘social death’ in which one is denied kinship entirely by the force of law, is reserved for the ‘natal alienation’ and ‘genealogical isolation’ characterizing slavery” (Sexton 2010:41). Thus, the analogizing of people of color suffering to black suffering “bear(s) a common refusal to admit to significant differences of structural posi-tion born of discrepant histories between Blacks and their political allies, actual or potential” (Sexton 2010:47–48).I agree that racisms targeting different groups are not identical and that different racisms cannot be made equivalent by drawing analogies between differing forms of subordination, for example between chattel slavery and labor exploitation. However, I do argue that the structure of U.S. set-tler colonialism rests on social, economic, and political underpinnings that link racisms. In mak-ing the argument, I eschew constructing or adjudi-cating a hierarchy of suffering but work at uncovering some of the underpinnings.Among the groups that can be considered under the rubric of “undesirable exogenous others” are Mexicans and Chinese. They are each single nationality groups that are often subsumed under broader designations, Hispanics/Latinos and Asian Americans, respectively. For purposes of this anal-ysis, I hone in on the specific groups—Mexicans and Chinese—rather than the broader heteroge-neous groupings because of their long history in the United States and their prominent representation in popular culture and political-legal discourse. Also relevant is that the period of these groups’ initial incorporation into the United States coincided with the westward expansion of U.S. settler colonialism and its project of final elimination of indigenes dur-ing the second half of the nineteenth century. While the category of exogenous other seems to fit the Chinese, who were viewed and treated as inalter-ably alien, it may seem incongruent to characterize Mexicans in that way. But, as Mae Ngai (2004:131–32) points out, “When Anglos confronted Mexicans, they perceived Mexicans as foreigners even though the majority of the Anglos themselves had also migrated to the Southwest at the same time.I now turn to examine settler colonialism’s con-frontation with Mexicans and Chinese, focusing on the specific racialization and control strategies aimed at these “undesirable exogenous others.”MANIfEST DESTINy: SETTlER COlONIAl ExPANSION INTO THE SOUTHWESTIn many ways the confrontation between Anglo settlers and Mexicans in the American Southwest was a continuation of U.S. settler colonialism’s restless expansion. As in the case of settler colonial takeover of Indian land, Anglo takeover of northern Mexico was a race-gender project. In the settler imagination, a feminized and backward Mexican race was giving way to a freedom-loving, demo-cratic progressive Anglo-Saxon or “American” race. Anglo settlers viewed Mexican men as weak, pusillanimous, and above all, lazy. Simultaneously, they depicted Mexican women as alluring and available, awaiting and welcoming Anglo-Saxon men. The sexual conquest of Mexican women as a metaphor for political conquest was often quite explicit (Almaguer 2008:60–62; de Leon 1983:9–10; Horsman 1981:233).Anglo settlers dispossessed Mexican landown-ers and agriculturalists through a combination of legal and extra-legal means: “taxation, boundary manipulation, theft, and juridical means such as delaying land grant claims” (Velez-Ibanez 1996:62). The closing off and privatizing of com-munal grazing lands and transformations in the economy constrained the ability of ordinary Mexicans to maintain their pastoral ways of life. Mexican men were increasingly forced into sea-sonal migratory wage work initially as sheepshear-ers, vaqueros, and later in railroad construction, mining, and agricultural field labor. Women and children remained in their home villages and engaged in domestic production and subsistence agriculture (Deutsch 1989).Up until the 1930s, the U.S.-Mexico border remained highly porous. The movement of Mexican nationals into the American Southwest (and back to Mexico) was not policed. Mexican immigrants entered freely and worked alongside Mexican Americans. After World War I, agriculture in California, Texas, and Arizona boomed. The by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

62 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) mode of farming “shifted from small and medium family-owned and run farms and sharecropping to large commercial farms owned by banks, lawyers, and merchant investors” (Ngai 2004:130). These agribusinesses required a large mobile labor force to move with the seasons for cotton, sugar beets, vegetables, and fruit. They welcomed migrants from Mexico to join the ranks of an exploitable migratory workforce.Racialization of Mexican Americans was com-plicated by the fact that under the terms of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States agreed to grant “the enjoyment of all the rights of citizenship of the United States to all of the varied people recognized as citizens by the Mexican gov-ernment.” The settler colonial formula that required whiteness as a condition of citizenship in some sense dictated the reverse logic that if Mexicans were American citizens they must be white. Thus, before the 1930s the U.S. government did not dis-tinguish Mexicans from whites for official pur-poses, including the U.S. census (Haney Lopez 1996; Reisler 1976).However, everyday practices of Anglo settlers and local governments were based on different understandings. In some times and places, Anglos differentiated between “Indian” and “Spanish” Mexicans, based on skin tone and class; in other times and places, they considered all Mexicans to be “mestizo” or “colored.” The Texas and New Mexico constitutions gave citizenship rights to “free Whites” and “citizens of Mexico,” while the California and Arizona constitutions limited suf-frage to “Whites” and “White” citizens of Mexico. On an everyday level, Anglo interpretations of Mexicans’ race varied, but by the 1910s it was con-verging toward lumping all Mexicans into the cat-egory of “non-White” or “colored” (Almaguer 2008; Weber 1992). Ngai (2004:131) notes that the concentration of Mexican immigrants in migratory agriculture “stoop labor” was central in their racial formation in the United States. They were branded by such epithets as “greasers” or “dirty Mexicans.”After World War II, particularly after the Civil Rights gains of the 1960s and 1970s, some U.S.-born Mexican Americans were able to move into white-collar and professional occupations and mid-dle-class neighborhoods. However, the ranks of Mexican Americans were swelled by new immi-grants, who were drawn by the demand for labor in agriculture, gardening and maintenance, food ser-vices, sweatshops, domestic service, and construc-tion. In 1965, the U.S. Congress passed a new immigration law that eliminated national quotas and replaced them with “need” criteria, including labor demand, family reunification, and political asylum. While opening up immigration from previ-ously barred areas, such as Asia, the 1965 Act severely reduced entry from Mexico and Central and South America. The restrictions did not deter economic migrants seeking to escape poverty, however, so the number of “illegal” immigrants from Mexico increased. Undocumented immi-grants readily found employment in low wage jobs, but lack of legal status constrained their employ-ment choices and left them unprotected and vulner-able to wage theft and many other forms of exploitation.For nearly a century after the U.S. takeover, much of the lower Southwest constituted a broad borderland where peoples and cultures mixed and merged to create distinct new styles of food, music, and arts. Residents continued to cross the interna-tional border more or less freely to work, shop, and visit friends and family, sometimes commuting back and forth on a daily basis to jobs on the U.S. side and returning to homes on the Mexican side. Towns and metropolitan areas also spanned national borders. The two largest binational metropolitan areas are the San Diego–Tijuana complex and the El Paso–Ciudad Juarez–Las Cruces complex. The lat-ter, with a population of 2.7 million, is the largest bilingual binational workforce in the Western hemi-sphere. However, with the imposition of stricter border control at the U.S.-Mexico line after 1965, Mexicanos could no longer move freely within their traditional lands. Those who crossed without papers became undesirable “illegal immigrants.”As undesirable exogenous others, Mexicans have been subjected to control by four main tech-nologies: (a) containment (separation and segrega-tion), (b) erasure (cultural assimilation), (c) terrorism (violence, lynching), and (d) removal (expulsion, deportation). I will give brief examples of how these technologies were deployed to control Mexican Americans.ContainmentMexican Americans in the Southwest were kept contained through segregation in almost all aspects of life. In many towns, they lived in designated areas that lacked enclosed sewers and paved streets. They worked in a segregated labor market that restricted them to the most menial jobs. Social spaces were organized to reinforce distance between Anglos and Mexicans. In public sites such as stores, theaters, and restaurants, Mexicans were by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 63allowed to be present only at certain restricted times or in segregated areas. For example, in some Texas towns, Mexicans were allowed only in the balcony sections of theaters, to sit only at counters or to use take-out at Anglo-run restaurants, to use the municipal swimming pool on the day before the pool was cleaned, and to shop on the Anglo side of town only on Saturday mornings (Foley 1999; Haas 1995; Montejano 1987).School segregation was mostly de facto, an out-growth of segregated housing patterns. However, many school districts established separate schools for Mexicans, even busing Mexican children to these schools. De jure segregation was technically illegal because the federal government and some state constitutions considered Mexicans to be “white.” Mexican parents mounted legal chal-lenges to separate schools for Mexicans. When Santa Paula, California, school officials were forced to admit Mexican students to two predomi-nantly white schools in the mid 1920s, they had special showers constructed in which Mexican stu-dents were required to bathe each day. Using the hygiene argument protected school boards in California districts from charges of illegal segrega-tion because the state school board allowed admin-istrators to bar children from attending school or to segregate them if they were “filthy” or “unhealthy” (Hernandez 1983; Menchaca 1995).ErasureRegarding cultural erasure through assimilation, Carlos Velez-Ibanez (1996:66) describes education of Mexican children in Arizona as conveying the message “that their considerable poverty stemmed from their backward Mexican culture and lan-guage.” Their education in Anglo-taught schools focused on eliminating obviously ‘foreign’ accents in Spanish, prohibiting the language from being spoken, and advising that Anglo Saxon models of work, morality, and government were to be imitated. . . . The school curriculum was designed to erase language, culture, social relations, food preferences and a sense of cultural lineage.Curricula were aimed not at preparing Mexican children for assimilation into the middle classes but at training them for a limited future as reliable and diligent workers. Curricula for Mexican children emphasized learning basic English and arithmetic skills, inculcation in the ideals and values of American society, development of good habits such as cleanliness and punctuality, and acquiring gender-appropriate vocational or domestic skills. Mexican girls studied sewing and mending, while Mexican boys were trained in carpentry, repairing shoes, basketry, haircutting, and blacksmithing (Haas 1995; P. Taylor 1930).TerrorismPerhaps the least known aspect of Mexican American history is the extent of racial terrorism and mob violence against Mexicans. Combing data from newspaper stories, photographs, letters, jour-nals, and diplomatic records, historians William Carrigan and Clive Webb (2013) were able to com-pile data on 547 Mexican victims murdered by Anglo mobs between 1848 and 1928. Reasoning that only a small percentage of instances could be documented in surviving sources, they argued,From the California Gold Rush to the last recorded instance of a Mexican lynched in public in 1928, vigilantes hanged, burned and shot thousands of persons of Mexican descent in the United States. The scale of mob violence against Mexicans is staggering, far exceeding the violence exacted on any other immigrant group and comparable, at least on a per capita basis to the mob violence suffered by African Americans. (Carrigan and Webb 2013:1)RemovalDuring times when there was a demand for labor, Mexicans were desirable as a source of super-exploitative labor doing the dirty work that Anglos considered beneath them. However, when work was scarce, they were considered expendable, a threat to community stability, and a drain on the economy. During the Great Depression, agriculture in the Southwest was especially hard hit, and hun-dreds of thousands of farmworkers were thrown out of work. In an effort to reduce welfare burdens, local officials organized mass “repatriation” drives. Welfare officials would grant temporary relief to impoverished Mexicans on the condition that they repatriate to Mexico at public expense. An esti-mated 350,000 to 600,000 Mexicans, many of them born in the United States and therefore American citizens, were put on trains and sent en masse to Mexico in the 1930s (Guttierez 1996; Reisler 1976). A second large-scale expulsion took place during 1954 under “Operation Wetback,” a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service sponsored by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

64 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) campaign to apprehend and deport undocumented agricultural workers. INS officials boasted that Operation Wetback had succeeded in apprehending and deporting some 1,300,000 “illegals” (Velez-Ibanez 1996:289).A third era of mass deportation was ushered in by a series of new immigration and deportation laws enacted between 1996 and 2003 that elevated militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and inten-sified surveillance in the interior of the United States. Different new laws increased deportations by expanding the categories of non-citizens eligi-ble for deportation, restricting the ability of migrants to appeal deportation, eliminating judicial reviews of deportation orders, and creating a new agency, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charged with “apprehending, detaining and deporting ‘criminal and fugitive’ non-citizens long after their arrival” (Hagan, Rodriguez, and Castro 2011:1375–76). In 2013, 369,000 undocumented immigrants were deported (“America’s Deportation Machine” 2014). In 2009, 72 percent of deportees were from Mexico, of which only 33 percent were for criminal violations. As in the case of the Depression era deportations, most of those deported in this recent wave have strong ties to the United States such as long resi-dence, a home, and/or family members. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) esti-mated that close to three-fifths of undocumented immigrants have lived in the United States for more than a decade (Ewing 2014).PERPETUAl AlIENS IN OUR MIDSTAround the same time that Mexicans in the Southwest were incorporated into the United States under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, gold was discovered near Sutter’s Mill in northern California in 1848. Thousands of mostly young males rushed in from the East and Midwest and from Latin America and Europe to prospect for gold or to sup-ply goods and services to the miners. Among the motley and polyglot gold rushers, the largest group of foreign workers was Chinese, comprising up to a quarter of miners in some counties (Kanizawa 2005). These comprised the first cohort of immi-grants who left Guangdong Province to work in California and other parts of the West. Thereafter, during a period of open immigration from 1850 to 1882, over 300,000 mostly young men were recruited to work on railroads and in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. They initially came over under contracts with labor brokers that bound them for a fixed term, usually seven years (Ling 1912). When federal legislation was passed in 1862 outlawing contract labor, labor brokers switched to a credit ticket system that bound workers until they could pay off their debts.Some men of the merchant class brought wives or concubines, but the vast majority of Chinese immigrants were laborers who came alone. Over half left wives behind in China. As “sojourners,” they worked to send remittances to relatives and to accumulate enough capital to acquire land in China. Many apparently succeeded in returning because according to the U.S. Census, the Chinese population never reached more than 107,000 dur-ing the nineteenth century. The Chinese population remained overwhelmingly gender-skewed, with the ratio of men to women ranging from 18.58:1 in 1860 to 26.79:1 in 1890 (Glenn 1983).Chinese labor filled demands in parts of the economy that in the American South would have been delegated to enslaved blacks. However, some white settlers (as well as federal policy) opposed the introduction of slavery into California and other western territories and states, and after Emancipation, white Californians opposed the entry of free blacks. Instead, they turned to imported labor from Asia. Chinese immigrants were tracked into work gangs laying railway tracks, clearing fields, and digging ditches for irrigation; they were also recruited into agricultural field labor, mining, and manufacturing. Finally, they filled the need for reproductive labor for the largely male Western population, as cooks, laundrymen, and domestic servants.Chinese laborers were sometimes “negroized” in popular culture due to their relegation to danger-ous and backbreaking work usually assigned to blacks and their roles vis-à-vis white workers (Aarim-Heriot 2003). However, they were more often depicted through orientalist tropes. Advertisements, editorial cartoons, and popular fiction portrayed “Chinamen” doing “women’s work” as laundrymen, houseboys, and cooks. Much excellent scholarship has documented, dis-sected, and analyzed more than a century of Sinophobia, including not only racist depictions of the Chinese in popular culture but also anti-Chi-nese pronouncements by representatives of white labor, white politicians, and white officials, as well as outbreaks of moral panics and health campaigns focused on Chinatowns (e.g., McClain 1994; Saxton 1975; Shah 2001).As undesirable exogenous others, Chinese were controlled via some of the same technologies as by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 65Mexicans, specifically: (a) containment (separa-tion/segregation), (b) terrorism (mob violence), and (c) removal (expulsion). For the most part, there was little focus on assimilation aside from Christian missionary efforts to convert Chinese and to rescue Chinese women from prostitution. White settler society viewed the Chinese as inassimilable, and it strongly opposed miscegenation, especially between white women and Chinese men. However, settler colonialism adopted two other powerful technologies to manage the Chinese: (d) restric-tion/disablement and (e) exclusion.ContainmentI will not elaborate on segregation because of the well-known phenomenon of the concentration of Chinese in Chinatowns that were viewed as simul-taneously unclean and vice-ridden and as exotic tourist attractions. There were also segregated schools for Chinese children in San Francisco and for “Oriental” students in the Sacramento Delta region through the 1930s.Terrorism and RemovalI combine terrorism and removal because much of the white mob violence against the Chinese was aimed not so much at killing or lynching individu-als but at destroying Chinese settlements and expelling all Chinese from a neighborhood, town, or city. Starting in 1850, with the driving out of Chinese miners from the gold fields and the seizing of their assets, white American settlers carried out more than 200 “roundups” and expulsions of Chinese over the next half-century. Jean Pfaelzer (2007:xix) asserts, “Surely the term expulsion doesn’t fully represent the rage and violence of those purges. What occurred along the Pacific coast, from the gold rush through the turn of the century, was ethnic cleansing.”The ethnic cleansing drives peaked in the 1880s, with Chinatowns in Los Angeles, San Jose, Seattle, and Tacoma being destroyed by white mobs. Pfaelzer (2007) was able to find documenta-tion for cases of mobs or vigilantes driving out Chinese residents from nearly 200 towns in the Pacific states. “Following expulsions, mobs or vig-ilantes seized Chinese fishing boats, nets, vegeta-ble gardens, laundries, stores, and homes then they burned down rural Chinatowns” (Pfaelzer 2007:253–54). David Courtwright (1996:158) wrote: “As with Indians to whom Whites often compared the Chinese, the way such killings were carried out revealed a deep, almost feral hatred. Chinese men were scalped, mutilated, burned, branded, decapitated, dismembered, and hanged from gutter spouts.”Restriction/DisablementPerhaps the most characteristic technology employed to manage the Chinese was the use of legal restric-tions designed to disable Chinese immigrants from making a living, putting down roots, procreating, and acquiring property, in short to become long-term and self-regenerating residents and citizens. The city of San Francisco, with the largest popula-tion of Chinese residents, passed several ordi-nances to hobble Chinese laundries. The State of California passed laws that imposed special taxes on Chinese miners and fishermen and that barred Chinese from testifying in criminal or civil cases and from employment on county irrigation projects (McClain 1994; Sandemeyer 1991).Most disabling were laws banning Chinese immigrants from owning land. As early as 1879, Oregon’s first constitution included a section grant-ing “White foreigners” the same rights in land as native citizens but added, “No Chinaman, not a resident of the state at the adoption of [this] consti-tution, shall ever hold any real estate or mining claim” (Lazarus 1987:217). Such forthright racial language was made unnecessary by the passage of the federal Naturalization Act of 1870. This law limited the right to become American citizens to “White persons and persons of African descent,” thus barring Asians from becoming naturalized citizens and creating a new category for them of “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” Thereafter, states and municipalities could pass restrictive legislation targeting Chinese (and later other Asians) without specific reference to race. Thus, California’s rewrit-ten constitution of 1879 extended land rights to for-eigners of the “White race or of African descent who were eligible to become United States citi-zens” (Lazarus 1987:216). Washington’s state con-stitution of 1889 prohibited “ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States” (Lazarus 1987:232). If property/land ownership was the defining entitlement of the white settler, then the Chinese immigrant was the quintessential alien “other.”While settler culture valorized the heteropatri-archal family as the moral foundation of its society, white settlers restricted Chinese immigrants’ abil-ity to form such families. The passage of the Page Act in 1875 prevented Chinese immigrant men who might otherwise have sent for wives from by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

66 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) doing so. Supposedly designed to prevent entry of Chinese, Japanese, and “Mongolian” prostitutes, contract laborers, and felons, the Page Act was mostly used to bar Chinese women under the fic-tion that they were all prostitutes (Abrams 2005:701). Alternatively, many Chinese sojourners might have formed relationships with local women, as Chinese male immigrants did in the Philippines and Peru (Hunt and Walker 1974; Wong 1978). This avenue was closed by the passage of state anti-miscegenation laws that banned marriage between Chinese and whites (Pascoe 2009). Together, the Page Act and state anti-miscegena-tion statutes served to worsen the gender imbalance of the Chinese community and reduce its ability to maintain itself or grow through procreation.ExclusionThe single most powerful technology employed to manage the Chinese was legal exclusion. The earli-est legislation to restrict Chinese immigration was the Page Act, which, as mentioned previously, cur-tailed the entry of Chinese women but did little to cut the flow of male Chinese laborers. This goal was finally accomplished with the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which barred Chinese laborers from immigrating for a period of 10 years and prohibited Chinese already in the United States from becoming citizens. The Chinese Exclusion Act ended a long era of open immigration and for the first time regulated entry based on national ori-gin. It foreshadowed later legislation that applied exclusion to other Asian groups and limited entry based on national origin. The Immigration Act of 1924 prohibited immigration from an area defined as the Asian Pacific Triangle and set limits on immigration from southern and Eastern Europe (Ngai 2004).Some Chinese men aspiring to immigrate man-aged to find a few loopholes in the law. For exam-ple, some were able to enter as “paper sons,” the supposed offspring of American-born Chinese (Hsu 2000). Without these subterfuges, the Chinese population in the United States might have disap-peared altogether. As it was, by 1930, the Chinese population in the United States had shrunk to 74,954, three-quarters of whom were male. With the paucity of females, the growth of an American-born generation entitled to citizenship was very slow. Thus, Chinese exclusion “made [Chinese] into permanent foreigners and guaranteed they would be but a small marginalized population in America for nearly 100 years” (Ngai 2004:18).This situation began to change during World War II. In 1943, in response to China’s position as a wartime ally, the U.S. government repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and created a token quota of 105 entrants per year. It also agreed to make perma-nent residents eligible for citizenship. Opening the gates wider were the Brides Act of 1946 that allowed entry of wives and children of citizens and permanent residents and the Immigration Act of 1953 that gave preference to relatives of citizens. For the first time in 60 years, sizable legal immi-gration flowed from China, and for the first time ever, the majority of newcomers were women. Finally, the passage of the previously mentioned 1965 immigration law that replaced national quotas with need criteria strongly favored Chinese immi-grants, who disproportionately qualified under the family reunification and labor needs criteria.These new immigrants entered at a time when racial exclusion in housing and employment was waning due to the implementation of anti-discrimi-nation laws passed in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. These reforms enabled col-lege-educated Chinese Americans and scholar pro-fessional immigrants to enter occupations and industries previously barred to them and to live in integrated neighborhoods and suburbs. However, the majority of Chinese immigrants were not middle class. Over half of the Chinese entering each year had been employed as service workers, operatives, crafts-men, or laborers prior to entry from Hong Kong or China. Moreover, a significant proportion of profes-sional, managerial, and white-collar entrants experi-enced downward mobility into blue-collar and service jobs due to language and licensing difficul-ties. Approximately two-thirds of immigrant Chinese in the United States are not fluent in English.Over the next five decades, the Chinese com-munity in the United States grew dramatically, bal-looning from 236,084 in 1960 to an unprecedented 4,010,114 by 2010. Many Chinese Americans have fared well in terms of education, family income, and occupational achievement; however, others have not. Chinese still confront discrimination or even Sinophobia in their dealings with white Americans. A consistent issue is that Chinese Americans are often seen and treated as foreign-ers—from somewhere else—by other Americans. A Pew Research survey conducted in 2012 found that 72 percent of Chinese American respondents felt that discrimination against their group was a problem (Pew 2013). Within white settler society, the relative success of some Chinese and other Asian Americans have been assigned various roles: by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 67as a middleman minority that can act as a buffer between whites and blacks, as a model minority to help hide the history of genocide/slavery, or as an exotic other to display the nation’s tolerant multiculturalism.SUMMARy AND CONClUSIONSThe most widely used sociological frameworks for theorizing race relations in the United States have focused on generating analyses that encompass not just anti-black racism but also anti-Latino and anti-Asian American racisms. What these frameworks share is an appreciation that racial hierarchy and inequality are not simply the products of individual beliefs and attitudes but are built into American social structure and that whites have historically benefited from racial inequality. I have found each of the major frameworks, internal colonialism, racial formation, and racialized social systems, use-ful in my own work in comparative race and gender studies. However, what these theories do not explic-itly consider is whether and in what ways U.S. national and regional racial systems may be unique and/or idiosyncratic because they have grown out of distinct material, social, and cultural circumstances, in this case, U.S. settler colonialism.I have offered the concept of “settler colonial-ism as structure,” as a framework that encourages and facilitates comparativity within and across regions and time. I believe that a settler colonial structural analysis reveals the underlying systems of beliefs, practices, and institutional systems that undergird and link the racialization and manage-ment of Native Americans, blacks, Mexicans and other Latinos, and Chinese and other Asian Americans that I have described herein.What are these underlying systems/structures? First, the defining characteristic of settler colonial-ism is its intention to acquire and occupy land on which to settle permanently, instead of merely to exploit resources. In order to realize this goal, the indigenous people who occupy the land have to be eliminated. Thus, one logic of settler colonial pol-icy has been the ultimate erasure of Native Americans. This goal was pursued through various forms of genocide, ranging from military violence to biological and cultural assimilation. British set-tler colonialism in what became the United States was particularly effective because it promoted fam-ily settlement right from the beginning. Thus, the growth of the settler population and its westward movement was continuous and relentless.Settler ideology justified elimination via the belief that the savage, heathen, uncivilized indi-genes were not making productive use of the land or its resources. Thus, they inevitably had to give way to enlightened and civilized Europeans. The difference between indigenes and settlers was simultaneously racialized and gendered. While racializing Native ways of life and Native Americans as “other,” settlers developed their self-identities as “white,” equating civilization and democracy with whiteness. Indian masculinity was viewed as primitive and violent, while Indian women were viewed as lacking feminine modesty and restraint. With independence from the metro-pole, the founders imagined the new nation as a white republic governed by and for white men.Second, in order to realize a profitable return from the land, settlers sought to intensively culti-vate it for agriculture, extract resources, and build the infrastructure for both cultivation and extrac-tion. For this purpose, especially on large-scale holdings that were available in the New World, extensive labor power was needed. As we have seen, settlers in all regions enslaved Native Americans, and the transnational trade in Native slaves helped to finance the building of Southern plantations. However, in the long run, settlers could not amass a large enough Indigenous slave work-force both because indigenes died in large numbers from European diseases and because they could sometimes escape and then survive in the wilder-ness. Settlers thus turned to African slave labor. Slave labor power could generate profit for the owner in a variety of ways: by performing field labor, processing raw materials, and producing goods for use or sale and by being leased out to others to earn money for the owner.What linked land taking from indigenes and black chattel slavery was a private property regime that converted people, ideas, and things into prop-erty that could be bought, owned, and sold. The purchase, ownership, and sale of property, whether inanimate or human, were regularized by property law or in the case of chattel slaves, by slave law. Generally, ownership entails the right to do what-ever one wants with one’s property—to sell, lend, or rent it and to seize the profits extracted from its use.The elimination of Native Americans and the enslavement of blacks form two nodes that have anchored U.S. racial formation. Redness has been made to disappear, such that contemporary Native Americans have become largely invisible in white consciousness. In contrast, blackness has been made by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

68 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) hypervisible, and blacks are constantly present as an imagined threat to whites and the settler colonial social order. As pointed out earlier, Indianness is thought to be diluted and then to disappear through miscegenation, while blackness is thought to be con-tinually reproduced even through generations of miscegenation. In this respect as well as others, the racialization of blacks—the irredeemability and dehumanization of blacks—has been incommensu-rable with the racialization of other groups.Nonetheless, the racialization of certain (in Lorenzo Veracini’s term) exogenous others has been a prominent feature of settler colonial societies. In the United States, some groups have been recruited and/or tracked into hard labor and super-exploited because they can be induced to work by need and kept in place by restricted mobility. For a nation that purports to stand for freedom, opportunity, and equality, the United States has had a long history of imposing coercive labor regimes, social segregation, and restricted mobility on many of its residents. Racializing certain groups as insufficiently human serves to justify subjecting them to oppression, sub-ordination, and super-exploitation. Thus, conditions of compelled labor short of chattel slavery—con-tract labor, sharecropping, payment in scrip, wages paid only after completion of a long period of work—were legally allowed and commonly imposed on racialized others even after the abolition of slavery. These practices were designed to immo-bilize and disable workers’ ability to survive by other means and thereby tie down theoretically free workers. These forms of coercion might be labeled de facto slavery because they do not involve owner-ship of the person and the enforcement of slave law.The experiences of national and local policies toward Mexicans and Chinese were examined herein to help illuminate the linked processes of racialization and super-exploitation in U.S. settler colonialism. Racialization has been integral to resolving the contradiction between settler ideolo-gies of freedom, equality, and progress and the unfreedom, inequality, and denial of mobility and citizenship rights to Mexican Americans in the Southwest and Chinese Americans in the Far West. The various technologies of control and manage-ment (segregation, cultural erasure, terrorism, expulsion, and legal exclusion) served the interests of capitalism by enabling landowners, plantation owners, and railroad companies to super-exploit these exogenous others. At the same time, racial-ization of “others” enabled white workers to reap a psychic reward, the so-called “wages of whiteness” to succor the wounds inflicted by class inferiority.The case studies of Mexican Americans and Chinese Americans further illustrate the impor-tance of paying attention to both the specificities and differences and the connections and common-alities among and between the experiences of vari-ous racialized others. Some of the major technologies for control and management of racial-ized groups were similar, most prominently the use of terrorism. It could be argued that the continuous history of genocide against Native Americans helped to normalize the use of extreme violence against non-white “others.” Extreme violence was rationalized as necessary to ensure settler security. As described, not only blacks, but also Mexicans and Chinese were subjected to extreme and dispro-portionate violence that might well be character-ized as ethnic cleansing. And, as in the case of the denial of the founding violence against Native Americans, white settler culture either denied or forgot its violence toward Mexicans and Chinese by magnifying the threat they posed not only to individual whites but also to the nation.The technology of erasure through cultural assimilation practiced on Native Americans was also employed on Mexican Americans. In both cases, schooling was intended to prepare girls and boys for gender-appropriate domestic and voca-tional skills. The speaking of children’s natal lan-guages was punished, and mainstream (white/Anglo) ways of living were valorized. Education was also intended to teach racialized children “their place” in American society, that is, to accept and be satisfied with a limited future. The technologies unique to Mexicans and Chinese were those of mass deportation and legal exclusion. Native Americans could be and were removed to remote reservations in the United States and in a few instances driven across the Southern border into Mexico, but they were not legally deported. Removal of freed blacks and resettling them in Africa was tried after the Civil War, but the number of those removed was only a small proportion of the population. Whites in the South were able to re-impose a white suprema-cist order that could control and super-exploit black labor. However, once the transcontinental railroad was completed, Chinese labor was not strictly nec-essary in the West, and moreover, as immigrants, the Chinese could more easily be subjected to expulsion and exclusion. In fact, the Chinese were the first immigrant group subject to exclusion, first through the Page Act of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and then through the Immigration Act of 1924 that extended exclusion to cover other Asian peoples. by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Glenn 69As described earlier, for nearly a century after the U.S. takeover of the Southwest, Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans were able to cross back and forth across the southern border more or less freely. However, this situation began to change during the 1920s with the establishment of the U.S. Border Patrol. Because of high unem-ployment during the Great Depression, Mexican Americans became the first group subject to mass deportation. A second large-scale deportation occurred during another period of unemployment in the 1950s under Operation Wetback. The first decades of the twenty-first century saw the creation and establishment of a vast federal machinery for “safeguarding” our borders, ostensibly to battle ter-rorism. This machinery has been wielded primarily against Mexicans, who are viewed as constituting a different kind of threat, a menace to “mainstream” American (white) culture. Thus, the majority of deportees continues to be immigrants from Mexico.Throughout my historical analyses of settler colonial structures and practices as they developed in relation to Indigenous peoples, blacks, Mexicans, and Chinese, I have tried to apply an intersectional lens that views race and gender as co-formations. The bulk of the discussion has perhaps focused greater attention on race and racialization; how-ever, gender has been present throughout the text. I pointed out that the settler project constructed vari-ous racialized gender and gendered racial dualisms. The white race was masculinized in relation to feminized black, red, or yellow races. Settler ideol-ogy also defined appropriate gender relations within the settler family and community, variously using Indian, black, and “others” as negative foils. White settler society understood extreme gender differentiation as a mark of civilization and thus attempted to shape white womanhood toward domesticity and dependency. Importantly, white women were viewed as needing to be protected by white men, particularly from the dangers posed by the primitive or perverse male sexuality of Natives, slaves, and exogenous others. Thus, for example, lurid tales of Indian capture of white women and their rescue by white soldiers circulated widely in settler culture. Meanwhile, Indian, black, and exogenous women were viewed variously as shameless, docile, alluring, or unfeminine because they did “men’s work.”Settler colonialism also had different effects on men and women from subjugated groups as shown in several instances discussed in the main text. For example, it was mentioned that Indian women were more likely to be enslaved, while adult Indian men were more likely to be killed. Relatedly, Indian women were also more likely to be brought into set-tler households to be sex slaves and domestic ser-vants. As for the Chinese, although male laborers were eventually subject to exclusion, women had been legally excluded earlier and more stringently on the assumption that all Chinese women attempt-ing to enter were prostitutes. In contrast, Mexican women were sometimes viewed more favorably than Mexican men and were thought to be appropri-ate wives for Anglo men. As for enslaved blacks, women were subjected to gender-specific violence such as rape but not exempted from the same kinds of physical punishment and heavy field labor to which slave men were subjected.I will now briefly consider the implications of the present analysis in relation to anti-racist poli-tics. Given that many different groups have been victimized by racial violence, exclusion, and dehu-manization, coalitions among racialized minorities are desirable and necessary. I suggest that coali-tions are best built by recognizing the specific his-tories of racialized minorities other than our own. Our understandings ideally should reckon with (a) commonalities, (b) relations and connections, and (c) differences. All of these are highlighted by this settler colonial analysis. Many commonalities have emerged from the case analyses, including experi-ences of genocide and terrorism that have been inflicted, justified, and “forgotten” or deempha-sized by settler society. Also having emerged are relations/connections in the experiences of differ-ent groups that complicate their positionality vis-à-vis one another. Thus, for example, the analysis might lead us to ask whether and in what ways racialized minorities might position themselves in relation to the territorial dispossession of Native Americans. Finally, some significant differences have emerged; for example, only blacks were sub-jected to chattel slavery, which is a condition of social death and subjection by slave law that even those who worked under conditions of extreme coercion did not share.A final thought: in this article I have suggested that a settler colonialism framework for analyzing and understanding race and gender in America will have certain advantages over other frameworks, most specifically in the strength of its historicity and in a fuller incorporation of the role of Native Americans in how racism and gender oppression have developed and continue to operate. A question with which I have not dealt is to what extent can a settler colonial framework relate to and interact with other frameworks such as internal colonialism, by guest on February 2, 2015sre.sagepub.comDownloaded from

70 Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1(1) racial formation, and racialized social systems. My belief is that there are significant insights and ana-lytical methods offered by each of the frameworks and that the addition of settler colonialism to the mix may help us to work toward a higher level theo-retical model that can be widely used by social sci-entists both in the United States and internationally. I suggest that a fruitful next task will be for us to explore and discuss the connections and relation-ships among the various frameworks, with a new awareness of the distinct historical, social, and cul-tural understandings brought to our table by the set-tler colonialism framework.ACkNOWlEDGMENTSI wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, on which I relied in revising the manuscript. I am, as always, grateful to Gary Glenn for his excellent editorial advice.REfERENCESAarm-Heriot, Najia. 2003. 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