Summarize Displacement and Diffusion, Mass Media and Crime Prevention, General Deterrence
Reading Assignment #3
Chapters 6, 7, and 8
Deliverable Length: 4 pages plus references
Topic: Summarize Displacement and Diffusion, Mass Media and Crime Prevention, General Deterrence
Essay Questions
Evaluate the types of Crime Displacement
Discuss Offenders Choice and Mobility
Discuss if the Media causes Crime and Fear
Mass Media Crime prevention
Deterrence (General and Specific), name five effects and perceptions
Requirements: 4 pages
This is a clear and comprehensive approach to crime prevention. The focus of the book is applied and practical, which makes it ideal for theclassroom. The new edition provides an excellent in-depth coverage of what works in crime prevention, and how prevention programs areevaluated to assess their impact on crime and fear of victimization. It is an essential resource for both students and practitioners.Jonathan Kremser, Kutztown UniversityThis book, in comparison to others I have seen, offers the widest coverage regarding the different possible approaches to crime prevention—itaddresses strategies as diverse as environmental design, block-watch initiatives, media-driven public service announcements, community-oriented policing, correctional rehabilitation, and many, many more. As such, it provides students with the foundation for an impressivebreadth of knowledge regarding crime prevention.Pamela Wilcox, University of CincinnatiI have used Professor Lab’s text on crime prevention and found that his crime prevention typology is great for the classroom. Groupingtactics by primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention allows students to really think about some of the underlying factors driving thesecrimes and gives them some basis for critiquing the initial efficacy of a program. This text is great for students and professionals alike.Eric Martin, George Washington University2
Crime PreventionCrime Prevention: Approaches, Practices, and Evaluations, Ninth Edition, meets the needs of students andinstructors for engaging, evidence-based, impartial coverage of the origins of crime, as well as of public policythat can reduce or prevent deviance. The book examines a range of approaches to preventing crime andelucidates their respective goals. Strategies include primary prevention measures designed to preventconditions that foster deviance; secondary prevention measures directed toward persons or conditions with ahigh potential for deviance; and tertiary prevention measures to deal with persons who have alreadycommitted crimes.This edition provides research and information on all aspects of crime prevention, including the physicalenvironment and crime, neighborhood crime prevention programs, community policing, crime in schools, andelectronic monitoring and home confinement. Lab offers a thorough and well-rounded discussion of the manysides of the crime prevention debate, in clear and accessible language.Steven P. Lab is Professor of Criminal Justice and Chair of the Department of Human Services. He holds aPh.D. in Criminology from the Florida State University School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Dr. Lab isthe author or coauthor of five books, the editor/coeditor of two readers, and coeditor of one encyclopedia. He isthe author of more than 50 articles or book chapters and has presented more than 70 papers to academic orprofessional societies. He is a past editor of the Journal of Crime and Justice and has been an assistant editor oron the editorial boards of several additional journals. Dr. Lab has been a Visiting Professor at the Jill DandoInstitute of Crime Science of University College London and at Keele University in Staffordshire, England, aswell as a Visiting Fellow at Loughborough University (England) and a Research Consultant with the PerpetuityResearch Group at Leicester University (England). Dr. Lab has received grant funding for several large researchprojects from the National Institute of Justice, and has served as a consultant to the Ohio Attorney General’sOffice, the Arizona Governor’s Office, and various offices of the U.S. Department of Justice. Dr. Lab is also apast-president of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.A range of further resources for this book are available on the Companion Website:www.routledge.com/cw/lab3
Crime PreventionApproaches, Practices, and EvaluationsNINTH EDITIONSTEVEN P. LAB4
First published 2016by Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017and by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RNRoutledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business© 2016 Taylor & FrancisThe right of Steven P. Lab to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of theCopyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permissionin writing from the publishers.Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanationwithout intent to infringe.Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataLab, Steven P.Crime prevention : approaches, practices, and evaluations/Steven P. Lab. — Ninth Edition.pages cmRevised edition of the author’s Crime prevention, 2014.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-1-138-94693-4 (hardback : alk. paper) –ISBN 978-0-323-35772-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Crime prevention–United States. 2. Crime prevention–United States–Evaluation. I. Title.HV7431.L33 2016364.40973–dc232015030160ISBN: 978-1-138-94693-4 (hbk)ISBN: 978-0-323-35772-2 (pbk)ISBN: 978-1-315-71276-5 (ebk)Typeset in Adobe Garamond Proby Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire5
To Danielle6
ContentsPrefaceAcknowledgmentsCHAPTER 1—Crime and the Fear of CrimeThe Problem of Crime in SocietyThe Costs of Crime/VictimizationThe Fear of CrimeSummaryCHAPTER 2—Crime PreventionCrime Prevention Through the AgesDefining Crime PreventionCrime Prevention ClassificationsCHAPTER 3—Evaluation and Crime PreventionTypes of EvaluationTheory and Measurement in EvaluationThe Method for EvaluationAn Overview of the BookPART I Primary PreventionCHAPTER 4—The Physical Environment and Crime PreventionCrime Prevention Through Environmental DesignImplementation of Environmental DesignImpact of Physical DesignIncivility, Disorder, and CrimeSummaryCHAPTER 5—Neighborhood Crime PreventionTypes of Neighborhood Crime Prevention ApproachesBuilding GuardianshipEvaluation of Neighborhood Crime PreventionCitizen Participation and SupportChapter SummaryCHAPTER 6—Displacement and DiffusionCrime Displacement7
DiffusionOffender Choice and MobilityEvidence of Displacement and DiffusionImplications of Displacement and DiffusionCHAPTER 7—The Mass Media and Crime PreventionThe Media and CrimeMass Media Crime Prevention ActivitiesThe Media’s Responsibility for Crime PreventionSummaryCHAPTER 8—Developmental Crime PreventionBackgroundRisk Factors and Developmental PreventionProgramsDevelopmental ConcernsSummaryCHAPTER 9—General DeterrenceDeterrenceThe Deterrent Effect of Legal SanctionsPerceptions and DeterrenceSummaryPART II Secondary PreventionCHAPTER 10—Prediction for Secondary PreventionPredicting Future OffendingRisk Factors and PredictionPredicting Places and EventsRepeat VictimizationImplications for Crime PreventionCHAPTER 11—Situational Crime PreventionThe Growth of Situational PreventionThe Theoretical BasisSituational TypologiesIssues and Concerns with Situational PreventionImplementing Situational PreventionSituational Prevention StudiesSummaryCHAPTER 12—Partnerships for Crime Prevention8
Community PolicingProblem IdentificationPartnership Efforts and AssessmentSuccessful PartnershipsSummaryCHAPTER 13—Drugs, Crime, and Crime PreventionThe Scope of Drug UseThe Drugs–Crime ConnectionInterventions and PreventionDrugs and Crime PreventionCHAPTER 14—The School and Crime PreventionTheoretical ViewsEducational Factors and DelinquencySchool Programs for Delinquency PreventionThe Future of School/Educational Programs in Crime PreventionPART III Tertiary PreventionCHAPTER 15—Specific Deterrence and IncapacitationThe Specific Deterrent Effect of Criminal SanctionsIncapacitationFuture ImplicationsCHAPTER 16—RehabilitationThe “What Works?” ArgumentEvaluations of Rehabilitation ProgramsAssessing Rehabilitation and Crime PreventionCHAPTER 17—Some Closing Thoughts on Crime Prevention and the FutureThe State of the EvidenceImproving Our KnowledgeRecognizing the Diversity in Crime PreventionSummaryGlossaryReferencesName indexSubject index9
Preface to the Ninth EditionThis ninth edition of Crime Prevention: Approaches, Practices, and Evaluations carries forth the successfulformat developed over the previous eight editions. While there are many different ways to approach the fieldof crime prevention, the feedback I have received over the years from a wide range of individuals hasconsistently pointed out that the format of the text lays a nice pedagogical outline for the academic study ofcrime prevention. Consequently, I have endeavored to stay true to the approach in the book whilesimultaneously adding emerging new ideas and prevention initiatives to the discussion. The generalorganization of the book remains the same following the public health prevention model of primary,secondary, and tertiary prevention. Adding more recent materials does not always result in a clean, cleardivision of prevention into the basic public health model. Many of the topics bridge across the threecomponents. Two easy examples are in discussion of physical design and prevention aimed at high-riskindividuals/situations. Physical design is a cornerstone of primary prevention, particularly Crime PreventionThrough Environmental Design, and also appears in many situational prevention activities, most notablyproduct design for high-emerging items. Prevention that seeks to target high-risk individuals/situations fitsboth in secondary prevention activities (that by definition target risk) and tertiary prevention wheredeterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation may target high-risk offenders. These facts do not detract fromthe presentation in the book; rather they point out the growing interest in and focus on emerging preventiontechniques.The field of academic crime prevention continues to see major advances. These changes cover the entiregamut of prevention, from physical design to developmental prevention to identifying high-risk individuals tosituational initiatives to partnerships and beyond. Across almost all topics it has become necessary over theyears to expand the discussions to cover the many emerging programs and approaches in crime prevention,while preserving the more classic bases of crime prevention. This current edition has been modified in thefollowing ways:Data on crime and crime prevention have been updated throughout the book.Chapter 1 has updated crime/victimization data and expanded discussion of identity theft and forms ofvictimization not found in official measures.Chapter 4 offers a new discussion of CPTED that places territoriality at the apex of initiatives forprevention activities, with surveillance, activity support, image, and other elements as components inthe building of territoriality; expanded discussions of the use of CCTV; a new Third-GenerationCPTED for consideration; and shifts the topic of product design to another point in the book.Chapter 5 offers a new logic model for neighborhood crime prevention, adds a more in-depthdiscussion on guardianship, and enhances the material on leveraging guardianship.In Chapter 6 the presentation on crime pattern theory has been reworked for clarity, and moreresearch on displacement has been added.The material on mass media and prevention (Chapter 7) now includes a discussion of the use of socialmedia both in terms of crime and crime prevention.Chapter 8 has added more examples of effective developmental prevention programs, including a newsection on Mentoring Programs.The discussion on risk factors (Chapter 10) now includes materials on risk assessment instrumentsused at various points in criminal justice system processing.The Situational Prevention chapter (11) has added material on how to make prevention techniquesmore useful for practitioners (the 11Ds), has added a revised discussion of product design, andeliminated sections on Organized Crime and Crowd Violence (these topics can be found on the bookweb site).10
Chapter 12 has a new section on Hot Spot Policing, has added Civil Injunctions to the discussion ofabatement, eliminated sections on Weed and Seed and Business Improvement Districts, and expandedon the discussions of PSN and gang suppression.Chapter 13 has a reworked discussion on drug use by offenders, including a new section on ADAM II,and presents information on the most recent incarnation of D.A.R.E.The schools chapter (14) has updated information on the G.R.E.A.T. program and police in schools.The final chapters on specific deterrence/incapacitation and rehabilitation have been updated but arelargely unchanged.11
AcknowledgmentsOver the various iterations of this book, there are many people who deserve mention and thanks for helpingme along the way. First and foremost I need to thank my friends and colleagues who have supported me innumerous ways and prompted me to look at things in different ways. This group includes Bob Langworthy andJohn Whitehead, who have remained good friends and colleagues. Since entering the crime prevention arena, Ihave had the great pleasure and honor to get to know many people who have provided insight, material, andfriendship—Paul and Pat Brantingham, Ron Clarke, Ralph Taylor, George Rengert, Paul Cromwell, Tim Hope,Graham Farrell, Shane Johnson, Kate Bowers, Marcus Felson, Gloria Laycock, Martin Gil, Nick Tilley, JimLeBeau, David Farrington, Brandon Welsh, Dennis Rosenbaum, and Wes Skogan. Finally, I have to thank myeditor, Ellen Boyne, who has endured the changes in publisher and continues to watch my back and make sureI don’t look foolish in print. I am certain that I have missed some people who deserve to be mentioned. The factthat they know me means that they are probably aware of my penchant for forgetting names and will forgiveme for the oversight. I thank you all for helping make this book a success. The errors and omissions, of course,are mine alone.Hopefully you will find this edition helpful in your individual pursuits. Please do not hesitate to let me knowwhat you think. It has been the feedback of many people over the years that has helped make this book asuccess.S.P.L.12
Chapter 1Crime and the Fear of CrimeChapter OutlineThe Problem of Crime in SocietyOfficial Measures of CrimeMeasuring VictimizationSummaryThe Costs of Crime/VictimizationThe Fear of CrimeDefining FearMeasuring FearThe Level of FearFear and CrimeFear and DemographicsExplaining the Divergent FindingsFear SummarySummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Identify and discuss two different measures of crime and victimization.Discuss the changing crime rates in the United States.Identify shortcomings with the UCR.Explain how a panel survey works.Discuss the NCVS and what it shows about victimization.Provide information on the costs of crime/victimization.Give a definition of fear and discuss how it manifests itself.Explain the differences between fear, worry, and assessments of crime.Discuss the levels of fear in society and how fear relates to crime and victimization.Define vicarious victimization.Provide reasons for the reported levels of fear.Define incivility and show how it relates to fear.Crime remains an indisputable fact of life for many, if not most, members of modern society. This is truedespite the frequent declarations that crime continues to fall and is reaching levels not seen in years. While theoverall level of crime has fallen in recent years, large numbers of citizens are still victimized every year and theimpact of crime on everyone in society is substantial. Beyond those who are actually victimized, manyindividuals are fearful of crime and victimization. That fear has consequences of its own for both individuals13
and our communities. Crime and fear lead most individuals to turn to the criminal justice system for help. Theability of the criminal justice system to single-handedly alleviate crime and fear in society has been seriouslyquestioned by both proponents and opponents. Despite the claims by some that the reductions in crime sincethe early 1990s are due to concerted police actions, there is little reason to believe that actions of the criminaljustice system are the primary (or sole) cause of the reductions. At the same time, crime and fear still impactthe lives of many individuals. Society clearly needs to continue to pursue means of preventing crime and fear.This first chapter attempts to show how crime and fear have changed over time and remain problems thatneed to be addressed. It is this information that forms the basis for continued calls for crime prevention actions.After examining the level and change in actual crime in society, this chapter will examine the impact of crimeon victims and society. It will also examine the companion issue of fear of crime. Indeed, the “fear of crime”poses a greater, more far reaching problem for society and its members. Demonstrating a need for crimeprevention is not difficult to accomplish when you consider the levels of crime and fear in society.14
The Problem of Crime in SocietyThe magnitude of the crime problem can be evaluated using both official and victimization measures ofcrime. The use of official crime statistics, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports,provides a view of crime from the standpoint of what the formal criminal justice system must handle. Manycritics argue that this provides an inaccurate and incomplete analysis of the true levels of crime in society.These individuals point to the results of victimization surveys as a basis for their argument. While eachpresents a different absolute level of crime, both tend to reveal similar patterns in criminal activity over time.Official Measures of CrimeThe FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) are the most widely used and cited official measures of crime in theUnited States. The UCR represents the number of criminal offenses known to the police. The reported crimerate reflects only those offenses known as Part I crimes (violent crimes: murder, rape, robbery, and assault;property crimes: burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson). A host of other offenses (i.e., fraud, kidnapping, anddrug offenses), known as Part II crimes, are not included in the computations and reported crime rates. Theresulting crime rates, therefore, reflect only a portion of the offenses with which the formal criminal justicesystem comes into contact.According to the UCR, there were more than 9.75 million index crimes committed in 2013. Of that number,almost 1.2 million were personal crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and 8.6 million wereproperty offenses (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014). This translates into 3,099 index crimes for every100,000 people in the United States (also known as the “crime rate”). The corresponding crime rates forpersonal and property crime are 367.9 and 2,730.7, respectively. Conklin (2003) notes that many individualscompare these figures to those from the mid-1980s and early 1990s and trumpet the great decreases in crime.Even further, these figures are used by various groups to take credit for the decreases: police leaders claim thataggressive police tactics caused the decline, mayors have pointed to wider ranging community policies as thecause, and politicians claim that mandatory sentencing laws caused the changes (Conklin, 2003). Whiledetermining the cause of the reductions is important, it is beyond the scope of this book to attempt that task.What is more important is to place the “great reductions” in crime into context.On the Web Detailed information on official crime numbers and rates from the UCR can be found at the FBIUCR site at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013The trend in violent and property crime since 1962 is shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 1.1 illustrates thatthe 2013 violent crime rate has fallen almost to the levels in 1970. Thus, it is a true claim that violent crime islower today than any time in almost 45 years. Similar claims can be made about property crime, although thereference point would be roughly 1968 (see Figure 1.2). Interestingly, all of the levels in these two figures aresignificantly higher than they were in the 1960s when the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement andthe Administration of Justice lamented the great growth in crime and the need to do something about it.The crime rates today are significantly higher than throughout the 1960s. This is especially problematic ifyou consider the data for violent crimes, which are those crimes that most concern people. Figure 1.1 showsthat the violent crime rate in 1962 was 162 offenses for every 100,000 persons. This was less than one-third ofthe rate in 1977 and roughly one-third of the rate in 1992. Similarly, the property crime rate in 1962 (1,858) wasless than half of the 1971 rate and only about one-third of the 1980 property crime rate (Figure 1.2). In bothcases, the recent figures are still significantly higher than those of 40 years ago when society was lamenting the15
high crime it was facing. The property crime rate in 2013 is 126 percent higher than the rate in 1962, while thepersonal crime rate is roughly 46 percent higher. This suggests that those who point to the great strides madecombating crime should be careful not to congratulate themselves too much.Figure 1.1 Change in Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000 population) Source: Constructed by author from UCR data.Figure 1.2 Change in Property Crime Rate (per 100,000 population) Source: Constructed by author from UCR data.While the UCR shows a large number of crimes are committed in the United States, it still comes under firefrom a variety of sources for underreporting the actual level of crime in the country. O’Brien (1985) points outthat concerns over the way the data is collected and how the police learn about crime lead many to questionthe validity of the results. Foremost among the concerns is the question of whether the police records andreports provide an unbiased, complete view of crime in society. Popular wisdom would answer this questionwith a resounding “No!” Examination of the UCR reveals three major points at which the UCR can beinaccurately adjusted.First, the UCR is a voluntary system of data collection. It is possible for police departments to adjust theirfigures in order to enhance the image of their operation and/or their jurisdiction. Police funding is based onservice delivery and productivity is often measured by the crime figures they report (O’Brien, 1985). As aresult, it may be in the best interests of the department to alter its collection and reporting practices in order tomake itself look better. Interestingly, this may be accomplished through both increasing and decreasing thelevel of crime. For example, an increase in the reported crime rate may be touted as an indication of better16
police work and improved police effectiveness. This would be especially true if the police had previouslyannounced a “crackdown” on a selected crime and then wished to demonstrate their success. Similarly, adecrease in the level of crime may be pointed to as deterrence brought on by improved police performance.A second major problem with the UCR involves the ability of individual police officers to adjust the crimerate. Any officer can refrain from making an arrest or a formal report on an incident. Such activity may allowthe officer to deflect minor or unimportant events away from an already overburdened criminal justice system.More importantly, however, such discretion factors into a distorted and underrepresented crime rate.Departmental policies may also contribute to this shift in reported crimes. Administrative proceduresconcerning the handling of crimes may alter the level of reported offenses. McCleary et al. (1982) found that,by requiring all reported cases of burglary to be investigated by detectives, the number of officially recordedburglaries showed an immediate drop. This was attributable to the detectives reclassifying offenses that werenot burglaries (i.e., thefts) to their correct UCR categories. Less experienced officers who used to handle theseoffenses elevated many instances to the burglary category. It is clear that the UCR crime rates are subject tounintentional, as well as intentional, manipulation.The third criticism of the UCR revolves around the claim that many offenses are not brought to the attentionof the police. The police are a reactive force. This means that they primarily respond to calls for service.Despite their patrol function, little crime is encountered directly by the police. They must rely on victims andwitnesses to call them for help. The absence of such calls when offenses do occur translates into crimes that arenot known to the police and that do not become part of official crime figures. The fact that there is muchunreported crime, along with the potential problems of data collection, has prompted many individuals to relyon victimization surveys in order to assess the extent of the crime problem.A fourth concern is that most UCR data is restricted to Part I offenses and ignores the Part II crimes. Whilethe UCR does collect some information on Part II offenses, it is related almost exclusively to data on thenumber of persons arrested for various categories of crimes. Included here are other assaults (besidesaggravated assault), forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, vandalism, sex offenses (besides forcible rape andprostitution), drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. Assuming that greater attention is paid to the Part Ioffenses and the clearance (arrest rate) for those crimes is roughly 20 percent, it can be assumed that the arrestdata for Part II offenses are serious underreports of the number of such offenses. Nevertheless, the arrest ratefor other assaults is 360.5 (per 100,000 population), fraud is 46.2, vandalism is 66.0, drunkenness is 145.7, anddisorderly conduct is 152.7 (FBI, 2014). Looking solely at the known Part I offenses, therefore, presents a limitedpicture of crime, even given limitations with UCR figures.Limitations of the UCR suggest that other means of measuring crime are needed. Perhaps the mainalternative source of data involves surveys of the public.Measuring VictimizationVictimization surveys are surveys of the population carried out to measure the level of criminalvictimization in society. This form of crime measurement was prompted by the 1967 President’s Commissionon Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, which commissioned surveys to assess the accuracy (orlack thereof) of the UCR. The results of those early surveys suggested that the police data reflected only half ofthe crime in society (see, for example, Ennis, 1967). Based on those early investigations, victim surveys becamea common method for measuring crime by the late 1970s, with the federal government institutionalizing theNational Crime Victimization Survey (originally the National Crime Survey) in 1972. These surveys typicallyinquire about the victimization experiences of a subject and/or his household over a specified period of time(usually the preceding six months or year). Such surveys have been lauded as a more accurate reading of crimein society because they circumvent the problems of official records and they uncover crimes that are notreported to the police.On the Web 17
In-depth discussion of the NCVS can be found at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 and http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2173The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is the best known of the victimization surveys. It is apanel survey of households drawn from across the United States, in which a panel of subjects (in this caseaddresses) are surveyed repeatedly over a specified period. The NCVS contacts the same households every sixmonths for a period of three years, with one sixth of the sample dropping out and being replaced every sixmonths. Interviewers attempt to talk with every household member aged 12 and older. While the NCVS hasundergone considerable change in data collection methods in recent years, including the use of computer-aidedinterviewing and changes in preliminary screen questions, the findings relative to official statistics haveremained fairly stable. The success of the NCVS has prompted similar victim surveys in other countries, mostnotably the British Crime Survey (BCS).According to the 2013 NCVS, there were almost 23 million victimizations in the United States againstpersons aged 12 or older (Truman and Langton, 2014). Of that number, 6.1 million were violent crimes andalmost 17 million were property crimes. These raw figures translate into victimization rates of 2,380 violentcrimes (per 100,000 population) and 13,140 property crimes (per 100,000 households). These figures, both theraw numbers and the crime rates, are significantly higher than the UCR data. Indeed, the NCVS violent crimerate is almost 6.5 times as high as the UCR violent crime rate. While the NCVS property crime rate isconsidered for households instead of individuals as in the UCR, the fact that the rate is almost five times ashigh as the UCR rate is indicative of the fact that property crime is larger than reported in police data. Theclaim that the UCR underreports crime, therefore, is supported in these figures.On the Web Detailed information on the 2010 NCVS can be viewed in Truman and Langton’s (2014) reportthat can be found on the textbook’s web site.Consistent with UCR figures, the NCVS reveals decreasing victimization levels, with great reductions inviolent crime over the past decade. The NCVS estimates that there were 35,646,755 offenses in 1973. Thisnumber rose to 41,267,496 in 1981. Since 1981 there has been a relatively steady decline in propertyvictimizations (Rand et al., 1997; Rand, 2009). Conversely, the violent crime rate held fairly steady throughoutthe 1970s, decreased in the early 1980s, increased from about 1986 until 1994, and has steadily declined sincethat time (Rand, 2009; Rennison and Rand, 2003). This trend varies somewhat for individual crimes (motorvehicle theft, for example, increased steadily between 1985 and 1991) but the overall trend is consistent withthe findings from the UCR. See Table 1.1.Victimization surveys have the ability to uncover crime and victimization not typically seen in officialmeasures or the traditional NCVS data. Identity theft is one growing area of concern, particularly due to thegrowth of the Internet and electronic records. As society has moved toward paperless records and the storageof information on computers, offenders no longer have to have physical access to the records. Instead, they canaccess the information over the Internet by either having lawful access to the files, or illegally gaining entry tothe records by hacking into a computer system. Electronic methods can be used for theft from next door orfrom around the world. Based on findings from a national survey of almost 5,000 adults conducted in 2006,most victims did not even know they were victimized or how it was done (56 percent) (Synovate, 2007).Identity theft can take a variety of forms. The NCVS has included questions on identity theft since 2004(Baum, 2007). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has surveyed the public on identity theft since 2003(Synovate, 2007). According to the NCVS, roughly 7.9 million households were the victims of identity theft in2012 (see Table 1.2). Theft involving existing credit cards or other existing accounts is the most common formof identity theft. The establishment of new accounts and the theft of personal information are also prevalentforms of theft.18
Table 1.1 Criminal Victimization, 2013 (number and rates per 100,000)Type of VictimizationNumberRateTotal violent crimes6,126,4202,320 Rape/sexual assault300,170110 Robbery645,650240 Aggravated assault994,220380 Simple assault4,186,3901,580Total property crimes16,774,09013,140 Household burglary3,286,2102,570 Motor vehicle theft661,250520 Theft12,826,62010,050Source: Adapted by author from J.L. Truman and L. Langton (2014). Criminal Victimization, 2013. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics.Table 1.2 Types and Extent of Identity TheftTypeNumberExisting Credit Cards7,698,500Existing Bank Accounts7,470,700Other Accounts1,696,400New Account1,125,100Personal Information883,600Total7,928,500Source: Constructed by author from E. Harrell and L. Langton (2013). Victims of Identity Theft, 2012. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics.Information on identity theft offers a wealth of additional information. The NCVS data show that mostvictims of identity theft are from households with incomes of $75,000 and more (Harrell and Langton, 2013).Information from the NCVS suggests that this form of crime has been on the increase since the first survey wascompleted in 2003. Many victims fail to realize that a theft has occurred until long after the event. The mostcommon means by which victims discovered the theft was being contacted by a financial institution aboutaccount activity (Harrell and Langton, 2013).Another form of theft not typically found in data involves mass-marketing fraud. This can occur throughschemes that seek to obtain relatively small amounts of money from a large number of victims or throughmaximizing the return on a smaller number of wealthier victims. Again, this type of fraud can target victimsvirtually anywhere in the world. The use of mail, telephones, the Internet, and the mass media makes borders,whether physical or symbolic, almost meaningless. While there are a number of different mass-marketingfraud schemes, there are several commonalities in the approaches. First is the use of some form of mass19
communication to reach a wide range of potential victims spread over a large geographic area (ofteninternationally). A second common feature is the attempt to convince victims to provide funds or access tofunds in return for a promised service or benefit. Some of these schemes can appear very similar to those seenearlier under identity theft.On the Web Read more about mass-marketing fraud and responses for victims and society athttp://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/internet/Gauging the extent of mass-market fraud schemes is not an easy task. Three main reasons can be offered forthe lack of definitive data on these offenses. First, many of these offenses are relatively new crime forms, andboth the public and the criminal justice system are playing catch-up in identifying and addressing them.Second, there is no systematic method for collecting and disseminating information on mass-market crimes.While the FBI and other agencies are working to gather such data, the work is still in its infancy. Third, manyindividuals either do not know they have been victimized or do not report the event to the authorities due toembarrassment and shame. Despite these facts, we can glean some information on the extent and impact ofmass-marketing fraud.Most of the information that is available is from victim surveys or complaints filed by victims. The U.K.Office of Fair Trading (2006) reports that almost half of its survey respondents had been approached by ascammer in some way over their lifetimes. Of those individuals, 8 percent had been the victim of some form ofscam, with most of the events taking place in the past year. The survey report estimates that more than 3.2million people (6.5 percent of the U.K. adult population) are victimized every year. In the United States, aFederal Trade Commission survey on consumer fraud claims that 10.8 percent of the U.S. adult population wasvictimized in 2011, with a total of almost 38 million fraud incidents (Anderson, 2013). An alternative source ofdata comes from the Internet Crime Complaint Center. In 2012, the Center received 289,874 complaints(Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2013). It is important to note that these data reflect only those incidentsreported to that office and not victimizations reported to any other agency.Victimization studies are not without their critics and shortcomings. Among the many problems inherent inthe surveys are the lack of knowledge of what constitutes various crimes on the part of respondents, problemsof respondent recall, and issues of question wording. These issues are well documented elsewhere (see O’Brien,1985) and will not be considered here. The magnitude of the difference between official and victimizationfigures, however, is too large to be offset solely by the problems of victim surveys. There is little question thatvictim surveys uncover more crime than official measures.SummaryClearly, no single measure of crime/victimization is perfect. Each measure taps something different. Theexact nature and level of crime in society is unknown. Official UCR figures reveal a staggering amount ofcrime. More than doubling those numbers to account for unreported offenses, as victimization figures wouldsuggest, compounds the problem. Measures of new and emerging forms of crime further exacerbate the crimeproblem. Even with the recent reductions in crime, the number of offenses is staggering.The level of crime, whether at its peak or more moderate numbers, exceeds the limits of what the criminaljustice system can hope to handle. The system is already overburdened and often simply processes peoplethrough the maze of legal requirements while having a questionable impact on the level of crime (Conklin,2003). Even if the criminal justice system could claim credit for the recent reductions, there is still a lot of workto do. Compounding the situation is the fact that the bulk of criminal justice system activity (e.g., arrests,convictions, incarceration, and corrections) reflects an after-the-fact approach to crime. The system dealsprimarily with crimes which have already been committed. There is little, if any, evidence to show that the20
criminal justice system actually stops crime before it occurs.21
The Costs of Crime/VictimizationThe problem of crime and victimization goes beyond simple counts of the number of offenses. Crime has anumber of different impacts on both the victims and society, and in many ways these impacts surpass the sizeand scope of the UCR and NVCS figures. Economic loss, injuries, the need for medical care, and lost time fromwork are additional measures of crime’s impact.Information on the impact of crime is routinely collected each year by both the UCR and victimizationsurveys. Data on direct economic loss from various crimes according to both the UCR and NCVS appear inTable 1.3. According to the UCR figures, victims experienced more than $17 billion in direct loss from crimes.This ranges from $7.5 billion for theft, with an average loss of $1,259 per incident, to $20 million for bankrobbery, at an average loss of $3,542. NCVS data report similar losses at just under a total of $18 billion. Theft isagain the most costly overall ($6.4 billion) but has the lowest per crime costs ($524), while robbery experiencesthe lowest total loss ($885 million). The differences are largely due to variation between the two data sources.What is important to note beyond these dollar figures is that, despite the reductions in the number and rates ofcrime in recent years, the economic loss per event has steadily increased at a rate greater than inflation.Table 1.3 Economic Loss for Specific CrimesAvg. LossTotal LossOffenseUCRNCVSUCRNCVSBurglary$2,322$1,539$4.5B$4.9BTheft1,2595247.5B6.4BMotor Vehicle Theft5,8726,0774.1 B4.8BRobbery1,1701,482404M885 MBank Robbery3,54220MAssault2361BArson14,390645MSource: Constructed by author from FBI (2014). Crime in the United States, 2013.https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013; Bureau of Justice Statistics (2010). Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2007, Statistical Tables.Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Beyond measures of monetary loss, the NCVS provides information on the impact of physical injuries andlost time due to victimization. In 2008, 36 percent of robbery victims and 23 percent of assault victims sustaineda physical injury, with 17 percent of the robbery victims and 10 percent of the assault victims requiringmedical care (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010). Roughly 10 percent of the robbery, assault, and burglaryvictims reported losing time from work, with the related loss of income. Of those who lost time from work,almost 26 percent of assault victims and 12 percent of robbery victims lost more than 10 days.On the Web NCVS and UCR cost figures and the Miller et al. (1996) report can be found on the textbook web22
site.While the above information paints a serious picture of the impact of crime, the actual impact extendsbeyond the direct financial loss due to the crime or the time lost by victims as reflected in the UCR or theNCVS. Indeed, crime exacts a wide range of additional costs on the individual and society. Among these arethe criminal justice system costs of investigating, arresting, prosecuting, adjudicating, andincarcerating/punishing the offender. Besides the direct crime losses suffered by the victims, there are themedical costs related to injuries and lost income, as well as intangible costs which include pain and suffering,psychological impacts, and reduced quality of life.In a recent analysis, McCollister et al. (2010) provide a detailed discussion of the data and computations onthe costs of crime to society. The authors draw data from the UCR, National Incident-based Reporting System(NIBRS), the NCVS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Fire Administration (for arsons), theBureau of Justice Assistance (for jail and prison data, criminal justice system employment data, andexpenditures), and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (income and earnings). They also rely on data and input fromother analyses, including the work of Miller et al. (1996) and Aos (2003b). Table 1.4 presents the tangible andintangible costs for 13 crime types in 2008 dollars. The total costs range from a high of almost $9 million foreach murder to a low of $3,532 for each larceny/theft. While these per-crime figures are themselves staggering,multiplying the costs of homicides by the number of homicides in 2010 reveals a total cost of more than $132billion just for this one offense category. Carrying out this same computation for all 13 crime categories revealsa total costs of more than $295 trillion in 2010!Table 1.4 Tangible and Intangible Costs of CrimeThe economic impact of crime on the individual and society is huge. Simply looking at the immediate lossdue to the victimization itself is short-sighted. To these losses you need to add the costs of the criminal justicesystem, other costs to the victim and his family, pain and suffering, and lost productivity by the offender.23
While the actual level of crime has fallen in recent years, the staggering economic costs to the individualvictims and to society cannot be ignored.24
The Fear of CrimeTo further compound the problem of the levels of “actual crime” and the economic and physical impact ofcrime in society, one needs only to examine the perceived levels of crime and the resultant fear held by manymembers of society. The “fear of crime” presents a view of criminal victimization that, although not necessarilyreal, forms the basis for daily “inactivity” and anxiety. Because fear reduction is an important component ofmany crime prevention programs, it is important to understand the extent of fear and issues related tomeasuring and understanding fear.Fear of crime emerged as a social issue in the mid-1960s and soon became a permanent part ofcriminological research. Lee (2007) argues that fear was “invented” in the 1960s through a convergence ofvarious factors. Among these were the development of victimization surveys as a part of the 1967 President’sCommission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (and subsequently in other countries), thegrowth of professional/academic interest in crime and its causes, the use of crime and fear as political capital,and the feminist movement (Lee, 2007). The newly discovered “fear of crime” became an integral part ofnational and local government policymaking.Defining FearWhat exactly is fear? Despite the growth of interest in “fear of crime,” there remains a lack of consensus onexactly what the term means. Perhaps the most recognized work on this issue is that of Kenneth Ferraro andhis associates. Ferraro defines fear as:an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime. This definition of fear implies that somerecognition of potential danger, what we may call perceived risk, is necessary to evoke fear.(1995, p. 8)While this definition requires an emotional response, the fear may manifest itself in various ways dependingon the person involved and the basis for his anxiety. Some individuals fear walking on the streets in theirneighborhood while others fear physical attack within their own home. As a result, there may be a shift inphysical functioning such as high blood pressure and rapid heartbeat. Alternatively, the individual maysimilarly alter his attitudes about walking alone in certain places or avoiding various activities. To a greatextent, the source of the fear for the individual will determine the response to the fear. Regardless of the sourceof this fear, it is real for the individual.Measuring FearFerraro (1995) points out that researchers have attempted to measure fear in a variety of ways. Some surveysquestion respondents about how much they worry about being a victim. Others ask about perceptions of thecrime problem in their community. Still other surveys have respondents rate their chances of becoming avictim. These various approaches do not provide the same information.25
Figure 1.3 Classification and Examples of Crime Perceptions Source: K.F. Ferraro and R.L. LaGrange (1988). “Are older people afraid of crime?” Journal of Aging Studies 2:277–287. Reprinted with permissionfrom Elsevier Science.In an attempt to show the differences between various fear measures, Ferraro and LaGrange (1988) provide aclassification scheme that considers the perceptions of the respondent being tapped and the degree to whichthe method addresses the individual or others (see Figure 1.3). This classification taps judgments of risk—howsafe the respondent or others are, values—how concerned the person is about crime or victimization, andemotions—how much the individual is afraid or worried about becoming a victim. Personal fear of crimeappears in the lower right hand cell (F). This measure would ask respondents directly about how afraid theyare of being the victim of specific crimes, often without reference to any specific place or time. These questionsdirectly tap the “emotions of dread or anxiety” of the individual. At the other extreme (cell A), respondentsassess the general safety of other people, quite possibly without even mentioning crime.Table 1.5 Common “Fear” QuestionsNational Crime Victimization Survey:How safe do you feel or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night?General Social Survey:Is there any area right around here-that is, within a mile-where you would be afraid to walk alone atnight?Taking a Bite out of Crime Campaign Evaluation:How likely do you think it is that your home will be broken into or burglarized during the next year?Is having your home burglarized or broken into something that you worry about?National Opinion Survey on Criminal Justice:Do you worry very frequently, somewhat frequently, seldom or never about:– Yourself or someone in your family getting sexually assaulted– Being attacked while driving your car– Getting mugged– Getting beaten up, knifed or shot– Getting murdered– Your home being burglarized while someone is at home– Your home being burglarized while no one is at homeGallup Poll:– Is there more crime in your area than there was a year ago, or less?– Is there more crime in the U.S. than there was a year ago, or less?– Overall, how would you describe the problem of crime in the U.S.? Is it extremely serious, very26
serious, moderately serious, not too serious, or not serious at all?Fear of Crime in America Survey:Rate your fear of: (1 = not afraid at all; 10 = very afraid)– being approached on the street by a beggar or panhandler– being raped or sexually assaulted– being murdered– being attacked by someone with a weapon– having your car stolen– having your property damaged by vandalsInterestingly, while discussions of “fear of crime” are common, many researchers utilize measures thatreflect risk or assessments of crime levels, rather than the emotional response of the individual (Ferraro, 1995).This diversity is seen in many of the common and large-scale surveys. Table 1.5 presents a sample of “fear”questions used in past surveys and research. Note that the questions vary from asking about perceptions onchanges in crime (Gallup Poll), to feeling safe outside at night with no mention of crime (NCVS), to rating fearof specific criminal actions (Fear of Crime in America Survey). These differing measures all tap some aspect ofthe fear definition presented earlier.The Level of FearTrying to delineate the actual level of fear is like trying to hit a moving target. No two studies provide thesame results. This may be due largely to the use of varying measures of fear. Despite this fact, it is possible tooffer some insight and “ballpark” figures for fear.Many researchers report that 40 to 50 percent of the population express a fear of crime (Hindelang, 1975;Maguire and Pastore, 1995; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Toseland, 1982). In 2011, 38 percent of respondentsreport that there are areas near their home where they would be afraid to walk alone at night (Maguire, 2011).Questions asking about perceived changes in crime in the United States or a respondent’s area often result ingreater fear levels with 66 percent or more reporting that there is “more” crime than in the past (Jones, 2010).Table 1.6 Percentage of Respondents who Frequently or Occasionally Worry About Different Forms of VictimizationTable 1.6 presents data on the level of “worry” about being a victim of specific crimes. Maguire (2011)reports that one out of five respondents worries frequently or occasionally about being murdered, almost halfworry about having their home burglarized when they are not home, 30 percent worry about a burglary whenthey are home, 44 percent worry about having their car stolen or broken into, and one out of three worries27
about being mugged. Interestingly, few respondents report ever being a victim of any of these crimes.Fear and CrimeOne very important fact to keep in mind is that the level of fear exceeds the actual levels of crime. Skoganand Maxfield (1981) illustrate the lack of a connection between crime and fear by showing that, in terms ofrobbery, approximately 48 percent of the non-victims report feeling somewhat or very unsafe, while 54 percentof the victims report the same fear. The expectation was that victims should express significantly more fearthan non-victims. Similarly, both official and victimization measures show that less than 10 percent of thepopulation is victimized, despite fear of 40 percent or more. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that, despitethe reductions in crime found in both official and victimization figures, 66 percent of the respondents to aGallup Poll in 2002 believe there was more crime in the United States than in the previous year (Jones, 2010).Another way of looking at fear and crime is to examine the link between fear and past victimization ofrespondents. Some studies offer empirical support of a positive relationship between victimization and fear ofcrime (Bachman et al., 2011; Ferguson and Mindel, 2007; Keane, 1995; Lumb et al., 1993; McCoy et al., 1996;Roundtree, 1998; Skogan, 1987; Will and McGrath, 1995; Zhao et al., 2015). Other studies, however, fail to findany relationship between victimization and fear (Ferraro, 1995; Garofalo, 1979; Gates and Rohe, 1987; Liska etal., 1982; McGarrell et al., 1997; Perkins and Taylor, 1996; Rifai, 1982). Yet another group of researchers arguethat the relationship depends on the definitions and measures of fear and/or victimization (Baumer, 1985;Bennett and Flavin, 1994; Ferraro and LaGrange, 1987; Garofalo, 1981; Gomme, 1988).Fear and DemographicsBesides the diversity in the fear–victimization relationship, the level of fear is not consistent across alldemographic groups in the population. It is principally an urban problem and affects the elderly and women toa greater extent than other groups. Greater than 60 percent of those persons living in urban areas express fearof crime. Conversely, only 30 percent of rural residents voice the same fears. A wide range of studies revealthat the elderly and women are the most fearful groups in society (Baumer, 1985; Bennett and Flavin, 1994;Ferraro, 1995; Hindelang et al., 1978; McGarrell et al., 1997; Perkins and Taylor, 1996; Riger et al., 1978; Skoganand Maxfield, 1981; Will and McGrath, 1995). This persists despite the fact that the elderly and women are theleast victimized groups. Some researchers argue these fear results are an artifact of how fear is measured andthat the young are actually the most fearful (Chiricos et al., 1997; Ferraro, 1995; Lumb et al., 1993).Fear also varies along other demographic lines. Numerous studies report that fearful people tend to be black(Biderman et al., 1967; Chiricos et al., 1997; Lab, 1990; Smith and Lab, 1991; Parker, 1988; Parker and Ray, 1990;Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), lower socioeconomic status (Bennett and Flavin, 1994; Biderman et al., 1967;Gomme, 1986; Greenberg et al., 1985; Riger et al., 1978; Will and McGrath, 1995), and live in large communities(Baumer, 1985; Biderman et al., 1967; Boggs, 1971; Kennedy and Silverman, 1985; Liska et al., 1982; Will andMcGrath, 1995). Other studies, however, note the lack of a relationship or a reverse relationship between someof these demographic factors and fear (Gomme, 1986; Gomme, 1988; Kennedy and Krahn, 1984; Kennedy andSilverman, 1985; Lab, 1990; Smith and Lab, 1991; Menard and Covey, 1987; Ortega and Myles, 1987; Toseland,1982).Explaining the Divergent FindingsTwo basic questions arise from an inspection of past research on fear of crime. First, how do you justify thelevels of fear in light of the actual levels and chances of victimization? Second, why do different studies finddivergent sets of characteristics among fearful individuals? There is no clear answer to these questions. Instead,there may be many contributing factors.Vicarious Victimization28
Hough (1995) argues that fear is related to measures of vicarious victimization. Vicarious victimizationrefers to knowing someone or hearing about others who have been the victim of a crime. This information mayelicit a sympathetic reaction and empathetic fear of crime. Grohe et al. (2012), using a phone survey ofresidents in one southeastern U.S. city, report that fear of burglary is significantly related to actual burglary inthe city. Analyzing fear among Houston residents, Zhao et al. (2015) note that local crime is related to fear ofviolent, property, and disorder offenses independent of actual victimization. Vicarious fear can also come fromreal or dramatic depictions of crime in the media, particularly television. Both fictional police dramas and thereporting of crime and violence in the news inundate the populace with a view that crime is a constant threatto every individual. It is also noteworthy that most depictions are not of everyday “street crimes.” Instead, theyfocus on more heinous and frightening offenses such as murder, rape, and home burglary. Several studies(Chiricos et al., 1996; Lane and Meeker, 2003a; Weitzer and Kubrin, 2004) report that exposure to crime in themedia is related to higher reported fear.Perceived Risk and HarmA second possible explanation for inordinate levels of fear centers on the potential harm one encounterswhen victimized (Riger et al., 1978; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Warr, 1984). That is, victimization has a greaterimpact on some individuals than others. The elderly, for example, are largely on fixed incomes and any lossdue to theft, property damage, or medical expenses cannot always be accommodated within their budgets. Aminor dollar loss can translate into a major hardship. Similarly, physical injuries to elderly victims can result inlengthy, painful recuperation beyond that needed by younger individuals. The elderly and females also have agreat physical disadvantage when faced with young male offenders who hold an edge in strength and physicalprowess. The perceived potential for physical harm is greatly enhanced when the victim and offender representopposite positions in physical and social power. McCoy et al. (1996) and Smith and Torstensson (1997) find thatperceived vulnerability is a strong predictor of fear among women and the elderly.Vulnerability also appears in the form of social isolation (Akers et al., 1987; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993;Kennedy and Silverman, 1985; Riger et al., 1978). Many elderly live alone and have few family members orclose friends living nearby. These individuals may feel they have no one to call on for assistance in theaftermath of a crime. They are socially isolated from support networks that are more common among youngermembers of the population.IncivilityA third possible explanation for the lack of a direct victimization–fear connection involves area incivility.Incivility refers to physical and social factors involved in disorder and community decline. Physical signs ofincivility include the deterioration of buildings, litter, graffiti, vandalism, and abandoned buildings and cars.Among the social signs of incivility are public drunkenness, vagrancy, loitering youths, harassment (such asbegging or panhandling), and visible drug sales and use. Both residents and potential offenders may see signsof incivility as indicative of a lack of social cohesion, high transiency, a lack of resources, and/or an uncaringattitude (Lewis and Salem, 1986; Skogan, 1990). Residents may feel a lack of control in the neighborhood that inturn may generate a greater fear of crime. Conversely, areas that display collective efficacy and strong socialintegration should have lower levels of fear (Doran and Burgess, 2012; Jackson and Gray, 2010; Zhao et al.,2015).Several studies have analyzed the contribution of incivilities to the level of fear. McGarrell et al. (1997)report that neighborhood disorder/incivility contributes significantly to variation in respondents’ fear of crime.Roundtree (1998) finds similar results when analyzing survey data from 5,302 Seattle residents. Residents’perceptions of disorder significantly increased fear of both violent and burglary victimizations. Lane andcolleagues (Lane, 2002; Lane and Fox, 2012; Lane and Meeker, 2000, 2005, 2011) have demonstrated thatneighborhood conditions and signs of disorder are related to levels of fear. Finally, McCoy et al. (1996) notethat dissatisfaction with one’s neighborhood (a possible indicator of incivilities) is a key to residents’ fear.29
Methodological FactorsDiffering methodologies in the studies may also influence the results. As noted earlier, varying “fear”measures can contribute to divergent findings. It is not improbable that the same respondents could providetwo different views of fear when asked different questions. For example, survey respondents may give “fearful”responses when asked about walking alone after dark anywhere “within a mile,” but few “fear” responses tothe likelihood of being raped. Similarly, respondents may feel that crime is a greater problem today than a yearago, but still not worry much about being mugged. The extent of fear also may vary depending on who isanswering which questions. Females, for example, worry more about sexual assault than do males. Ferraro(1995) notes that general fear among women is better understood as an extension of the fear of rape.Operationalizing fear in different ways, therefore, produces greatly different results. Variation in fear also mayreflect the locale of the study. For example, Chiricos et al. (1997) point out that their results on fear differ fromthose of Covington and Taylor (1991), despite the similar concerns addressed in the two studies. They speculatethat the variation is due to differences between Tallahassee, Florida and Baltimore, Maryland. The setting ofthe analysis, therefore, can influence the results.Crime and FearYet another factor influencing the levels of fear involves the actual level of crime. While the fear of crimevaries independently from actual victimization and crime, it would be naive to claim that changes in the crimerate have no influence on reported fear. Media reports of increasing crime and spectacular offensesundoubtedly hold some sway over perceptions of safety in the community. Unfortunately, lower crime ratesprobably do not bring about lower fear as easily. The media does not promote good news to the same extent asbad news. Feelings of fear and worry, once formed, would be difficult to reverse.Benefits of FearThroughout this discussion, fear has been presented primarily as a negative concept. That is, fear is a badthing that has negative consequences for the individual. Among these negatives are changes in behavior,retreating behind closed doors, not trusting other people, anxiety, and/or depression, to name a few. Thelogical conclusion to draw is that we need to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, fear. It is possible, however, toview fear as a positive thing.Jackson and Gray (2009) note that there is such a thing as functional fear. In essence, fear can be a goodthing, provided the individual uses it as motivation to take precautions. These precautions may range fromavoiding certain risky places or times, to utilizing safety devices at home, to pairing up with others for safetywhen outdoors. A similar proposition is offered by Lee (2007) when he discusses the fearing subject. Thisperson is someone who becomes responsible for the safety of himself and his property. Jackson and Gray(2010), using the Safer Neighborhoods Survey in London, report that fear actually promotes precautions, whichreduce subsequent fear for a significant number of respondents.Based on these arguments, it would be ill-advised to try to completely eliminate fear. Rather, fear can behealthy for people. The key would be to determine what that “healthy level” is and how to limit a person’s fearat that optimal level. Under this approach, eliminating fear would result in people taking unnecessary chancesand ignoring risky situations.Fear SummaryDespite the issues and concerns inherent in measuring fear of crime, one fact remains unchanged. That is,people report being fearful to a much greater extent than they report (either officially or unofficially) being avictim of crime. Because of fear, people respond in a variety of ways. Some individuals will avoid certainplaces at certain times, or stop going somewhere altogether. Others may install locks and security devices and30
stay inside their fortress. The public may demand greater police presence. Funds may be expended on self-defense classes, dogs, guns, or other items in an attempt to protect one’s self and reduce the feelings of fear.Whatever the response, it is indicative of fear’s impact on the individual and society.31
SummaryThe extent of the crime problem is hard to accurately gauge and is multifaceted. Attempts to measure thelevel of crime present a variety of findings and anomalies. While these various counting procedures may notagree on the numerical magnitude of crime and victimization, there is consensus that crime remains a majorsocial problem. Crime may be on the decrease, but it remains far higher today than in the 1960s when thePresident’s Commission proclaimed that major changes were needed to stem the problem of crime andvictimization. Beyond the enumeration of criminal acts, the economic, impact of crime on the individual andsociety is substantial. Psychological and time losses due to crime are also significant. Also problematic are theinordinate levels of fear of crime. Fear far exceeds the actual amount of crime and affects many individualswho never have been, and may never be, crime victims. Crime prevention must be cognizant of both the realand perceived levels of crime and must be prepared to attack crime in all its aspects.Key Termsfearfearing subjectfunctional fearincivilityNational Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)panel surveyPart I crimesPart II crimesUniform Crime Reports (UCR)vicarious victimizationvictimization surveys32
Chapter 2Crime PreventionChapter OutlineCrime Prevention Through the AgesModern Crime PreventionSummaryDefining Crime PreventionCrime Prevention ClassificationsCrime Prevention/Public Health ModelAlternate Classifications of Crime PreventionModel of ChoiceLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Discuss the historic methods used by individuals and communities to respond to and preventcrime.Provide a definition of crime prevention.Contrast crime prevention and crime control.Outline the crime prevention model based on the public health model.Define primary, secondary, and tertiary crime prevention.Provide examples of prevention activities for each part of the crime prevention model.Offer examples of other crime prevention models.Identify the difference between micro-, meso-, and macro-level prevention.Define and discuss crime science.Crime prevention is not a new idea. Indeed, for as long as people have been victimized there have beenattempts to protect oneself and one’s family. The term “crime prevention,” however, has only recently come tosignify a set of ideas for combating crime. Many people suggest that crime prevention today is new andunique, particularly in terms of citizen participation. In reality, many recent activities classified as crimeprevention can be seen throughout history. “New” crime prevention ideas and techniques are often little morethan reincarnations of past practices or extensions of basic approaches in the (distant) past. It is only in therelatively recent past that the general citizenry has not been the primary line of defense against crime andvictimization. This chapter will accomplish several things. First, it presents a brief discussion of crimeprevention throughout history. Second, a definition for crime prevention will be presented. Third, the chapterpresents the general crime prevention model that serves to organize the remainder of the text.33
34
Crime Prevention Through the AgesIn any discussion it is important to set forth the context from which our ideas and thoughts emerge. Perhapsthe best place to start is with an understanding of what has happened in the past. The study of crimeprevention is no exception.The earliest responses to crime were left to the individual and his family. Retribution, revenge, andvengeance were the driving forces throughout early history. While such actions would serve to make thevictim whole again, it also would eliminate the benefit gained by the offender. It was assumed that potentialoffenders would see little gain in an offense, thereby deterring the individual from taking action. The Code ofHammurabi (approximately 1900 B.C.) outlined retribution by the victim and/or his family as the acceptedresponse to injurious behavior. Lex talionis, the principle of “an eye for an eye,” was specifically set forth as adriving principle in the Hammurabic law. Such laws and practices provided legitimacy to individual citizenaction.The existence of formal systems of social control is relatively new. Early “policing,” such as in the RomanEmpire and in France, was concentrated in the cities, conducted by the military, and dealt with issues of thecentral state and the nobility (i.e., king) (Holden, 1992; Langworthy and Travis, 1994). The general public wasleft to continue self-help methods.The Norman conquest of England in 1066 gave rise to a form of citizen policing referred to as obligatorypolicing (Klockars, 1985). Male citizens were required to band together into groups for the purpose of policingeach other. If one individual in the group caused harm (to a group or non-group member), the other memberswere responsible for apprehending and sanctioning the offender. Beyond this obligatory action, a variety ofcooperative practices emerged that relied on citizen participation to protect the community and one another.Watch and ward rotated the responsibility for keeping watch over the town or area, particularly at night,among the male citizens. Identified threats would cause the watcher to raise the alarm and call for help (hueand cry). It was then up to the general citizenry to apprehend and (possibly) punish the offender. Thoseresponding to the call for help were not employees of the state. Rather, they were other common citizens. The“watch and ward” and “hue and cry” ideas were codified in 1285 in the Statutes of Winchester (Klockars, 1985),which also required men to have weapons available for use when called (assize of arms), and outlined the roleof a constable, which was an unpaid position responsible for coordinating the watch and ward system, andoverseeing other aspects of the law. It is apparent throughout these actions that crime prevention was a majorresponsibility of the citizenry.Similar citizen responsibility was commonplace in the new world colonies and the early United States. Thevigilante movement, which mirrored early ideas of “hue and cry,” was a major component of enforcing lawand order in the growing frontier of the young country (Klockars, 1985). Posses of citizens were formed whenan offender needed to be apprehended and punished.The individual, often voluntary, responsibility for crime prevention in England generally persisted until the1800s. The exceptions to this trend can be seen in the development of paid, private security police forspecialized industries or groups (Klockars, 1985; Langworthy and Travis, 1994). The Merchant Police ofEngland, which was established in the sixteenth century to protect the wool industry, is a prime example of anearly private police force. The parochial police, hired by the wealthy to protect their homes and businesses, isanother example.Entrepreneurial policing appeared with the passage of the Highwayman Act in England in 1692. This lawoutlined the payment of bounty for the capture of thieves and the recovery of property. The voluntary bountyhunters came to be known as thief takers (Klockars, 1985; LaGrange, 1993) who, by the mid-1700s, wereorganized under the leadership of English magistrates. The thief takers, who were often reformed criminalsthemselves, were “paid” to protect the public by being able to keep a portion of all recovered property. Theevolution of the thief takers from a wholly voluntary activity to a legitimized, organized group undergovernment control was the beginning of a process that ended with the establishment of the MetropolitanPolice in London in 1829.A key to the Metropolitan Police organization was the idea of crime prevention. Sir Robert Peel, who was35
the driving force behind the Metropolitan Police Act, and Charles Roman, the commissioner of the neworganization, both saw crime prevention as the basic principle underlying police work (LaGrange, 1993). Evenearlier attempts at formal policing, such as that in seventeenth century Paris, emphasized crime preventionthrough methods such as preventive patrol, increased lighting, and street cleaning (Stead, 1983). Formal policeforces in the United States, mirroring the movement in England, emerged in the mid-1800s and were restrictedprimarily to the largest cities in the northeast, leaving citizens to continue their efforts at self-protection.While much of this discussion has emphasized individual action and self-help, it should not be construed asindicative that protective actions were solely a matter of retribution and revenge. There are numerousexamples of alternative approaches that would be considered preventive in nature. Easy examples were the useof walls, moats, drawbridges and other physical design features around cities that protected the communityfrom external invasion. Surveillance, as provided by “watch and ward,” allowed the identification of problemsbefore they got out of hand. Yet another early prevention approach was the restriction of weapon ownership asa means of eliminating violent behavior (Holden, 1992).The advent of the twentieth century witnessed a great deal of change in societal response to deviantbehavior. Not only was a formal police force becoming the norm, but other forces were emerging to addresscrime and deviance. The growth of the scientific study of crime and criminal behavior offered new responsesto deviant behavior. The emerging fields of psychology and sociology in the late 1800s and early 1900s werebeginning to question the causes of deviant behavior. Rather than carry on the dominant tradition ofattributing deviance to the battle between good and evil (God and the devil), researchers were starting to notepatterns in where and when offenses occurred and who was involved in the offenses, and to relate these factsto changing social structure and personal relationships. The logical result of this growing study was amovement away from simple responses involving repression, vengeance, retribution, and the like to actionsthat would attack the assumed causes of deviant behavior. The emerging criminal and juvenile justice systems,therefore, responded by incorporating more prevention-oriented functions into their activity.One prime example of an early “crime prevention” approach was the development of the juvenile court andits efforts to combat the problems of poverty, lack of education, and poor parenting among the lower classes.The preventive nature of the juvenile system can be seen in the parens patriae philosophy, which argued thatyouths needed help and that processing in adult court was geared toward punishment rather than prevention.The expansion of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to cover status offenses reflected the belief that curfewviolation, smoking, playing in the street, incorrigibility, and other such actions (none of which were proscribedby the criminal code) were indicative of later criminal behavior. Thus, intervening in these status offenses wasa means of preventing later crime. The juvenile system, therefore, was clearly an attempt at crime prevention.Yet another example of early crime preventive action was the Chicago Area Project. Shaw and McKay (1931,1942) found crime and delinquency concentrating in the central areas of Chicago, where residential transienceand an apparent lack of social ties predominated. Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that this constant turnover ofresidents resulted in an inability of the people to exert any informal social control over the individuals in thearea. People were more interested in improving themselves and moving out of these neighborhoods than inimproving the area and staying there. Consequently, offenders could act with some degree of impunity in theseneighborhoods. The Chicago Area Project, founded in 1931, sought to work with the residents to build a senseof pride and community, thereby prompting people to stay and exert control over the actions of people in thearea. Recreation for youths, vigilance and community self-renewal, and mediation were the major componentsof the project (Schlossman and Sedlak, 1983). In essence, the project sought to build ongoing, thrivingcommunities that could control the behavior of both its residents and those who visited the area.Modern Crime PreventionThe modern era of crime prevention can be traced to the changes in crime in the 1960s. That decade saw theadvent of major increases in crime and delinquency, accompanied by large-scale social unrest in the UnitedStates over the Vietnam War and perceived social inequality. The public demanded that something be done toaddress crime and social unrest. The work of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and theAdministration of Justice (hereafter the Commission) highlighted the plight of crime victims and the failure ofexisting criminal justice system actions to curtail problems. The Commission called for new approaches,36
including educational programs, local crime initiatives, better funding of criminal justice initiatives, andresearch on the causes of and solution for crime.Academic interest in the burgeoning crime problem led the way to modern crime prevention activities. Oneof the first focal areas was on the contribution of the physical design of communities to crime. Jacobs’ (1961)The Death and Life of Great American Cities focused on urban decay and the natural and social environments,and their impact on crime and deviance. The modern urban environment, as well as many programs to changeurban life, were anathema to a vibrant community that protects itself and residents who look out for oneanother. Jacobs suggested that the physical environment needs to enhance natural surveillance by those in theneighborhood as a means of making streets safe for legitimate users. Similarly, Wood’s (1961) evaluation ofpublic housing in Chicago noted that safety is enhanced through resident surveillance and activity in the area.The 1971 publication of Jeffery’s Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design took the ideas of Jacobsand Wood further and argued that crime prevention requires environmental engineering. His emphasis was onfuture offending rather than past behavior (the target of existing systems of social control). Jeffery (1971)argued that criminal behavior, particularly potential future activity, is strongly influenced by the potentialfuture consequences of the individual’s actions. It is possible to curtail offending by removing environmentalcues that reinforce the offending behavior. The physical and social environments have great potential todetermine the levels of pleasure and pain faced by the individual. Jeffery argued that it is possible to makealterations to the environment that will enhance conforming behavior and mitigate offending. Those changesare not limited to physical changes. Rather, Jeffery claimed that increasing citizen involvement in communityactivities and surveillance, and increased proactive programs by the police and other agents of social control,can hold great potential for the prevention of crime.While Jacobs, Jeffery, and others were laying out an academic basis for an emerging crime prevention,architects and community planners, along with federal agencies and private corporations, were implementingand testing new initiatives. Newman (1972), in his book Defensible Space: People and Design in the ViolentCity, called on architects to change the physical environment in such a way as to maximize territoriality andnatural surveillance by residents and create an image of an area as cared for and protected. He demonstratedthe impact of appropriate construction on reduced crime and disorder. Newman’s work prompted the U.S.Department of Justice, other government agencies, and private corporations (such as Westinghouse Electric) tofund demonstration projects. The results of these projects led to the development of many different crimeprevention efforts, including neighborhood watch, “Take a Bite Out of Crime,” citizen patrols, lighting projects,and others.A final major development in modern crime prevention was the introduction of situational crimeprevention in 1983. Developed by the British Home Office, situational crime prevention refocused attentionfrom broad social/community change to target-, time- and place-specific efforts that would remove theopportunities for crime. This move took crime prevention from the macro to the micro level of interest.SummaryThis short presentation demonstrates that crime prevention is an idea that has been around for as long asthere has been crime. While the form has changed and the term “crime prevention” is relatively new, theconcern over safety is age old. Throughout most of history, it was the individual’s responsibility, eithervoluntarily or through obligation, to deal with crime and offenders. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,society moved to a system of police, courts, and corrections, which assumed the primary responsibility forcrime.Since the 1960s there has been a growing movement toward bringing the citizenry back as activeparticipants in crime prevention. While many see this type of community action as “new,” in reality it is morea movement back to age-old traditions of individual responsibility than it is a revolutionary step forward incrime control. Crime prevention must utilize the wide range of ideas and abilities found throughout society.Community planning, architecture, neighborhood action, juvenile advocacy, security planning, education, andtechnical training, among many other system and non-system activities, all have a potential impact on thelevels of crime and fear of crime. The realm of crime prevention is vast and open for expansion.37
38
Defining Crime PreventionThe definition of crime prevention varies from study to study and program to program. Ekblom (2005, p. 28)states “Crime prevention is intervention in the causes of criminal and disorderly events to reduce the risks oftheir occurrence and/or the potential seriousness of their consequences.” This definition addresses both crimeand its impact on individuals and society. As outlined in the last chapter, the consequences of crime are notinconsequential. While most definitions of crime prevention incorporate the ideas of lessening the actual levelsof crime or limiting further increases in crime, few deal with the problem of fear of crime and perceived crimeand victimization. This book uses a very simple yet encompassing definition:crime prevention entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime.These actions are not restricted to the efforts of the criminal justice system and include activities byindividuals and groups, both public and private. Just as there are many causes of crime, there are manypotentially valuable approaches to crime prevention.This definition differs from Ekblom’s in that it does not directly address the consequences of crime. Thereason for this is twofold. First, if crime and fear are successfully addressed, the consequences are also affected.Second, it is possible to address the consequences of victimization without ever attacking the underlying crime.This can occur in many ways, including payments to victims through victim compensation, the provision ofmental health counselors, actions taken to reduce the time lost from participating with the criminal justiceprocess, and any number of other interventions. While these actions are laudable, they do nothing to addressthe cause of the problems. Therefore, throughout the discussion in this book, the emphasis is on crime and thefear of crime, with the consequences receiving little direct attention.Crime prevention and crime control are not synonymous. Crime prevention clearly denotes an attempt toeliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before further activity. On the other hand, crimecontrol alludes to maintenance of a given or existing level and the management of that amount of behavior.Control also fails to adequately address the problem of fear of crime. Critics of this distinction will fault theauthor’s implicit assumption that society and criminal justice can do something about crime and the fear ofcrime beyond simple management of an inevitable, inescapable minimal amount of crime. These functionalistswould view crime as a social necessity that, regardless of the effort, will always exist. While functionalists maybe correct, taking the stance that crime is necessary and all we can do is “control” it leads to a mind-setdoomed not to achieve crime “prevention.”39
Crime Prevention ClassificationsCrime prevention can be classified in a number of different ways. Perhaps the earliest attempt to groupcrime prevention efforts simply borrowed the well-established public health model of disease preventioninitiatives (see Brantingham and Faust, 1976; Caplan, 1964; Leavell and Clark, 1965; Shah and Roth, 1974).Crime Prevention/Public Health ModelThe tripartite public health model classifies prevention as either primary, secondary or tertiary. Each areaattacks the problem at different stages of development. From the public health viewpoint, primary preventionrefers to actions taken to avoid the initial development of the disease or problem. This would includevaccinations and sanitary cleanups by public health officials. Secondary prevention moves beyond the point ofgeneral societal concerns and focuses on individuals and situations that exhibit early signs of disease. Includedat this stage are screening tests such as those for tuberculosis or systematically providing examinations toworkers who handle toxic materials. Tertiary prevention rests at the point where the disease or problem hasalready manifested itself. Activities at this stage involve the elimination of the immediate problem and takingsteps designed to inhibit a recurrence in the future. Crime prevention activities are directly analogous to thispublic health model.Primary Crime PreventionPrimary prevention within the realm of criminal justice “identifies conditions of the physical and socialenvironment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts” (Brantingham and Faust, 1976). Thetypes of prevention approaches subsumed here take a variety of forms and are located within a wide range ofsocial organizations (see Table 2.1). Included here are environmental design, neighborhood watch, generaldeterrence, private security, developmental prevention approaches, and education about crime and crimeprevention. Environmental design includes a wide range of crime prevention techniques aimed at makingcrime more difficult for the offender, surveillance easier for residents, and feelings of safety more widespread.The use of building plans conducive to visibility, the addition of lights and locks, and the marking of propertyfor ease of identification fall within the realm of environmental design. Neighborhood watches and citizenpatrols increase the ability of residents to exert control over their neighborhood and add risk of observation forpotential offenders.Activities of varied groups/organizations can also play a major role within the realm of primary prevention.The presence of the police may affect the attractiveness of an area for crime as well as lower the fear of crime.The courts and corrections may influence primary prevention by increasing perceived risk of crime foroffenders. Actions of the criminal justice system may also bring about general deterrence. Public educationconcerning the actual levels of crime and the interaction of the criminal justice system and the public may alsoaffect perceptions of crime and individual choices to violate the law.Table 2.1 Crime Prevention ApproachesPrimary prevention:Secondary prevention:Environmental designIdentification and prediction Architectural design Early ID of problem individuals Lighting Crime area analysis40
Access controlSituational crime prevention Property identification Problem identificationNeighborhood watch Situation-specific intervention SurveillanceCommunity policing Citizen patrolsSubstance abuseGeneral deterrence Prevention and treatment Arrest and convictionSchools and crime prevention Sentencing methodsTertiary prevention:Public educationSpecific deterrence Levels of crimeIncapacitation Fear Self-helpRehabilitation and treatmentDevelopmental crime preventionEarly intervention programsSocial crime prevention Unemployment Poverty Employment/Job trainingDevelopmental crime prevention approaches focus on risk factors that may lead individuals to deviantbehavior. Programs working with parents and children to build parental and social skills, preparation forschool, cognitive abilities and more are prime examples of developmental approaches. Social preventionactivities are those typically aimed at alleviating unemployment, poor education, poverty, and similar social illsthat may reduce crime and fear by attending to the root causes underlying deviant behavior. These and manyother primary prevention behaviors are implemented with the intent of avoiding initial, as well as continued,crime and victimization and may be instrumental at lowering the fear of crime.Secondary Crime PreventionSecondary prevention “engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene”(Brantingham and Faust, 1976) prior to commission of illegal activity. Implicit in secondary prevention is theability to correctly identify and predict problem people and situations. Perhaps the most recognizable form ofsecondary prevention is the idea of situational crime prevention. Situational crime prevention seeks to identifyexisting problems at the micro level and institute interventions that are developed specifically for the givenproblem. These solutions may involve physical design changes, altering social behaviors, improvingsurveillance, or any number of other activities. Closely allied to situational prevention is the emergence ofcommunity policing. The community policing approach relies heavily on citizen involvement in a problem-solving approach to neighborhood concerns.Many secondary prevention efforts resemble activities listed under primary prevention. The distinction restson whether the programs are aimed more at keeping problems that lead to criminal activity from arising(primary prevention) or if the efforts are focused on factors that already exist and are fostering deviantbehavior (secondary prevention). Secondary prevention may deal with predelinquents or deviant behaviorwhich leads to injurious criminal activity. For example, alcohol and other drug use are highly related to otherforms of deviance. Targeting drug use as an indicator of criminal propensity is a secondary preventionapproach. Schools can play an important role in secondary prevention both in terms of identifying problemyouths and in providing a forum for interventions. Clearly, much secondary prevention may rest in the handsof parents, educators, and neighborhood leaders who have daily contact with the individuals and conditionsleading to deviance and fear.41
Tertiary Crime PreventionAccording to Brantingham and Faust (1976), tertiary prevention “deals with actual offenders and involvesintervention … in such a fashion that they will not commit further offenses.” The majority of tertiaryprevention rests within the workings of the criminal justice system. The activities of arrest, prosecution,incarceration, treatment, and rehabilitation all fall within the realm of tertiary prevention. Non-justice systeminput to this process includes private enterprise correctional programs, diversionary justice within thecommunity, and some community corrections. Tertiary prevention is often ignored in discussions of crimeprevention due to its traditional place in other texts and the great volume of writing on these topics thatalready exists.The types of approaches and interventions within each level of crime prevention are certainly not limited tothose mentioned. Within each of the three types of prevention there are many variations and novel ways toapproach a given crime problem. Indeed, crime prevention techniques are only limited by the imagination ofindividuals interested in decreasing the levels of crime and fear of crime.Alternate Classifications of Crime PreventionAs noted earlier, crime prevention can be classified in other ways than that of a public health model. One isa variation on the tripartite public health model offered by van Dijk and de Waard (1991). Their model adds asecond dimension resulting in a 3 × 3 configuration with primary/secondary/tertiary on one axis and victim-oriented/community-neighborhood-oriented/offender-oriented on the other axis. For example, primaryprevention techniques can be divided into actions that target victims, the community, or potential offenders.This simply refines the public health-based classification system. Crawford (1998) offers another two-dimensional typology that again uses the primary/secondary/tertiary view as a starting point, and adds adistinction between social and situational approaches within each category. Both of these models offeralternative views of crime prevention and ways of conceptualizing crime prevention interventions.Hunter (2010) sees crime prevention divided into micro, meso, and macro levels, while maintaining theprimary, secondary, and tertiary distinctions. Micro-level crime prevention targets individuals, small groups,small areas, or small businesses for intervention. These interventions may be very site-specific and targetindividual vulnerabilities. Meso-level crime prevention looks at larger communities or neighborhoods, orlarger groups of individuals or businesses. Examples of this could be entire villages or towns, or possibly achain of specialty stores. The interventions here will involve larger groups and seek to engender cooperativeresponses to crime. Finally, macro-level crime prevention looks at large communities, society as a whole, orother very large collectives. At this level, responses would involve large-scale social changes, major shifts ineducational practices, major new employment opportunities, or legislative changes to address crime anddisorder (Hunter, 2010).Tonry and Farrington (1995) divide crime prevention into four categories: (1) developmental, (2) community,(3) situational, and (4) criminal justice. Each of these categories simply parcels out some aspect of the publichealth model. The criminal justice category, for example, is substantially tertiary prevention, while communityis largely primary prevention. Bjørgo (2013) offers a general crime prevention model with nine categories: (1)establishing and monitoring normative barriers, (2) reducing recruitment to criminal activity, (3) deterrence, (4)disrupting acts before they occur, (5) protecting targets, (6) reducing the level of harm from crime, (7) reducingthe rewards of crime, (8) incapacitation, and (9) desistence and rehabilitation. Each of these fall somewherewithin the public health model.An emerging area within the realm of crime prevention is that of crime science. Laycock (2005) suggeststhat crime science is a new discipline, or at the very least a new paradigm, for addressing crime by couplingefforts to prevent crime with the detection of and intervention with offenders. This is in contrast to the existingparadigm within criminal justice where “Crime is seen as fundamentally about offenders rather thansituations” (Laycock, 2005, p. 21). The emphasis on offenders involves the criminal justice system in theapprehension, adjudication and punishment/treatment of offenders. Little or no concern is paid to preventionof crime. Conversely, “[c]rime science is the application of the methods of science to crime and disorder”(Laycock, 2005, p. 4).42
In essence, crime science attacks crime from a wide range of disciplines using a broad array of tools. Amongthe disciplines included are those traditionally found in discussions of crime and criminality—sociology,psychology, criminology, and criminal justice. Also included, however, are the fields of engineering, biology,physics, architecture, genetics, communications, computer science, education, and many others. Each of thesedisciplines offers insight to the behavior of individuals, how to control or manipulate the physical and socialenvironment, the development of safety and security devices, or a myriad of other factors that play a role incrime and crime control. A primary goal of crime science is to bring these divergent disciplines together into afunctional, coordinated response to crime (Laycock, 2005).In many ways, crime science fits nicely in the public health prevention model. An examination of theapproaches listed in Table 2.1 shows a wide array of actions and interventions that require the knowledge andexpertise from disciplines beyond those typically involved in the criminal justice system. At the same time, thecriminal justice system is intimately involved in the detection, apprehension and intervention with offenders,as well as the implementation of new prevention initiatives. Many of the prevention approaches andinterventions outlined in this book rely on methods and information drawn from disciplines not traditionallyinvolved in crime or its prevention.Model of ChoiceWhile all of the classifications presented here have merit, this book utilizes the public health framework.Virtually all of the other classifications fit within this model. Primary, secondary, and tertiary crime preventionencompass diverse prevention methods ranging from physical design of homes and communities, toneighborhood watch, to educating the public, to developmental approaches, to situationally uniqueinterventions, to drug prevention, to deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Crime prevention is notlimited to the work of the criminal justice system. Instead, it relies on the knowledge and abilities of a verydiverse set of individuals and groups who work to apply scientific principles to the understanding andprevention of crime. Beyond just presenting a discussion of different prevention approaches, this book attemptsto provide insight to the effectiveness of each approach. Evaluating prevention initiatives, however, is notwithout its problems. It is to the topic of evaluating crime prevention that we now turn.Key Termsassize of armsChicago Area Projectconstablecrime controlcrime preventioncrime sciencedevelopmental preventionhue and crylex talionismicro-, meso-, and macro-level crime preventionobligatory policingparens patriaeparochial policeprimary preventionpublic health modelsecondary preventionsituational crime preventionsocial preventionstatus offensestertiary prevention43
thief takersvigilante movementwatch and ward44
Chapter 3Evaluation and Crime PreventionChapter OutlineTypes of EvaluationImpact EvaluationProcess EvaluationCost–Benefit EvaluationsTheory and Measurement in EvaluationTheoretical ConcernsMeasurement IssuesFollow-Up PeriodsSummaryThe Method for EvaluationExperimental DesignRealistic EvaluationSummaryAn Overview of the BookLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Distinguish between impact and process evaluation.Discuss obstacles to undertaking impact evaluations.Provide an argument for the value of process evaluations.Define cost–benefit evaluation and discuss problems with doing it in crime prevention.Give reasons for why programs and evaluation should be based on sound theory.Identify measurement problems in evaluating crime prevention programs.Explain why the appropriate follow-up period is important.Explain what is meant by the “gold standard” in evaluation.Discuss the concerns with relying on a single methodological standard for evaluations.Discuss both threats to internal and external validity, particularly as they impact crimeprevention evaluations.Outline the Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods.Explain realistic evaluation.The goal of this book is not just to provide information on crime prevention programs and initiatives. Instead,the intent is to offer insight into what works in crime prevention. To accomplish that task, it is necessary toevaluate prevention programs and efforts. Because this text is a survey of the prevention field, it relies onevaluations conducted by other researchers. At first glance it may seem that reporting on evaluations that have45
already been conducted would be easy and straightforward. Unfortunately, a good deal of debate has occurredover what constitutes “good” evaluation (see Holcomb and Lab, 2003).The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the topic of evaluation and lay the groundwork for the evaluation ofprevention that appears throughout the chapters. A number of topics will be addressed. First, the differenttypes of evaluations, or as some would argue the different parts of an effective evaluation, are discussed. Thesecond issue to be discussed involves theoretical and measurement problems. The debate about the appropriatemethodology for evaluations forms a core topic in the chapter and helps tie together the different threadsraised in the earlier sections. The ultimate goal is to lay a foundation for understanding the importance ofevaluation in crime prevention.46
Types of EvaluationIn general, evaluation refers to investigating the usefulness of some exercise or phenomenon. Evaluation ofcrime prevention, therefore, refers to investigating the impact of a prevention technique or intervention on thelevel of subsequent crime, fear, or other intended outcome. Making such a determination may require the useof various methodologies. Ekblom and Pease (1995) argue that evaluation research is often viewed asaddressing two research goals using diverse methodologies. These goals are generally understanding theimplementation of the intervention and the impact of the initiative and are evaluated using two forms ofevaluation—process and impact evaluation—respectively. A third form of evaluation—cost–benefit evaluation—is becoming more common.Impact EvaluationImpact (outcome) evaluations focus on what changes (e.g., to the crime rate) occur after the introductionof the policy, intervention, or program. There are many examples of impact evaluations in criminal justice. Forexample, treatment programs used in correctional settings are evaluated on their effectiveness to reducerecidivism or drug use among offenders. Changes in police patrol practices aimed at reducing the level of drugsales in an area are evaluated in terms of subsequent numbers of sales. In-school interventions that teachstudents how to respond to problems in a non-aggressive fashion are assessed in terms of the type or amountof future physical confrontations in school. Neighborhood watch programs have been evaluated in terms oftheir impact on crime levels in the neighborhood and the fear of crime reported by residents. Changes in trafficpatterns, walkways, building designs, and the layout of residential complexes have been assessed in terms ofchanges in crime. Evaluations of newsletters and media efforts to promote preventive activity have looked atthe ability of such efforts to change not only citizen behavior but also their victimization levels. These are afew of the many evaluations that can be found throughout the crime prevention literature and discussed inlater chapters.Undertaking impact evaluations in crime prevention poses some interesting problems. One major obstacle isthe fact that crime prevention initiatives rarely rely on a single intervention or approach. Rather, crimeprevention programs often incorporate a menu of different activities at the same time. For example,neighborhood crime prevention typically includes a watch scheme, property identification, neighborhoodcleanup, periodic meetings, and some form of prevention newsletter. The problem for evaluators is identifyingwhich of the many prevention activities is responsible for the observed changes (if any). It is possible that theentire package is necessary to bring about the change, it is possible that only one of the elements is responsiblefor the change, or it is equally plausible that the mix of interventions mitigates any positive impact on crimeand fear. It is rare to find that a single prevention activity is undertaken in total isolation from other anti-crimeinitiatives.A second set of obstacles for evaluating crime prevention revolves around the fact that the target of theinitiatives (and thus the unit of analysis for the evaluation) is a neighborhood or other geographic area. This isnot to suggest that implementing a crime prevention program across a neighborhood or community is ill-conceived. Rather, the issue is solely a methodological one, and it is multifaceted. First, neighborhoods cannotbe isolated. This means that there are a multitude of other influences on the neighborhood—many of themfrom the surrounding community or adjacent neighborhoods—that may have an influence on the levels ofcrime. Second, many interventions are not uniformly applied across an area or adopted by all residents. As aresult, it is possible that an intervention appears to have no impact across the area, when in fact those whoparticipate experience a reduction in crime and/or fear. Impact evaluations need to pay special attention to theeffectiveness of prevention techniques in cases in which there is not total cooperation or adoption of theintervention.A third concern with impact evaluations of crime prevention programs involves the competing issues ofcrime displacement and diffusion of benefits. While both of these will be discussed at length later in the book,47
they refer to the issue of whether the prevention activity influences the level of crime and fear in areas notinvolved in the initiative. These obstacles to impact evaluations will receive further consideration later in thischapter.Process EvaluationProcess evaluations consider the implementation of a program or initiative and involve determining theprocedures used to implement a specific program. These evaluations also examine the social context withinwhich the program or initiative operates (Ekblom and Pease, 1995). In general, process evaluations offer adetailed descriptive account of the program and its implementation. Process evaluations look at a wide range ofvariables and topics starting with the initial goals of the initiative and continuing all the way through thecurrent operations (or closing) of the program. Typical factors considered are the mission/goals of the program,the level and quality of program staff, the funding and other resources of the program, obstacles faced inimplementing and sustaining the initiative, the degree to which the project was carried out as planned, thelevel of support for the program, the degree to which the clients complied with the intervention, the quality ofthe data gathered, and any changes made in the program over time. All of this information is used in assessingthe degree to which the intervention was successfully implemented as planned. Advocates of processevaluations point out that the resulting information is pivotal in answering questions about the context of anintervention and what actually took place in the initiative.Unfortunately, many evaluations only look only at the process. There is often no attempt to undertake animpact evaluation. Thus, it is possible to know what was attempted and how well it was done, but it isimpossible to know whether it had any impact on crime and/or fear of crime. Among the more extensiveprocess evaluations in the United States and the United Kingdom are those examining partnership initiatives,including the Comprehensive Communities Programs, the Strategic Approaches to Community SafetyInitiative, the Burglary Reduction Initiative, and the Crime and Disorder Act projects. Almost withoutexception, the U.S. evaluations have been exclusively process oriented (e.g., Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997;Kelling, 1998; Rosenbaum and Kaminska-Costello, 1998). Even where impact evaluations were planned, theywere often abandoned before they were funded or completed.Process evaluations of prevention programs or other initiatives often view success in terms other thanreaching the outcome goals of the program. Instead, success is often measured in terms of the number ofmeetings held, participation by different agencies at the meetings, how long the program has been operating,the number of clients handled, the amount of funds expended, or the development of operational plans. Whatis missing is the assessment of the program’s impact on crime, fear, quality of life, or other intended outcome.From the standpoint of having an impact on crime, process evaluations alone offer no insight.Given the fact that process evaluations do not answer the key question for many programs (i.e., does itreduce crime), why are they so prevalent? Several reasons are apparent. First, doing a process evaluation canset the stage for an outcome study by indicating whether the intervention or initiative has been implementedcorrectly and whether the target receives the amount of intervention necessary to bring about the intendedchange. Second, process evaluations can provide insight into the context within which the interventionoperates. Knowing the background of the problem, the operations of the program, what took place, problemsthat arose, and other factors can provide information on whether the intervention can be used in another placeat another time. That is, process evaluations provide insight into the potential generalizability of theintervention. In this sense, therefore, a process evaluation becomes an important part of the overall assessmentof the program. Finally, process evaluations have the distinct advantage that they cannot fail. Every processevaluation can tell about what happened, how much took place, how many participated, and other factors.Such information can form the basis of a formidable report showing that an initiative is busy doing a lot ofthings. Thus, a program can point to numerous accomplishments.In conjunction with an impact evaluation, process evaluations provide information on the different settings,the implementation of the intervention, and other factors that may have an impact on the results (Tilley, 2002).Process evaluations should accompany an impact evaluation. Process evaluations look at how well theintervention was implemented, whether it was maintained at the level needed for success, if the experimentalgroup accepted the intervention, whether there were factors that may have kept the program from succeeding,48
and similar issues. Clearly, there are unique social, physical, and situational factors that will affect the abilityof a prevention program to have an impact (Ekblom, 2002; Tilley, 2002).Cost–Benefit EvaluationsThe third type of evaluation that deserves mentioning here is that of a cost–benefit evaluation. A cost–benefit evaluation (or cost–benefit analysis) seeks to assess whether the costs of an intervention are justifiedby the benefits or outcomes that accrue from it. Aos (2003a) demonstrates that assessing the costs and benefitsof a prevention program is an important component of a full evaluation of any program. With limitedresources available to it, the criminal justice system (as well as any government or private enterprise) needs toimplement programs that can bring about the desired changes for the least cost. Cost–benefit analysis is a formof process evaluation that requires an impact evaluation be completed at the same time. The reason for this isrelatively simple: you cannot determine if the costs are justified if you do not measure the ability of theprogram to bring about the expected change. Thus, a cost–benefit analysis requires both a process and impactevaluation.Undertaking a cost–benefit analysis in crime prevention and criminal justice poses some problems notalways found in other disciplines. The largest problem involves setting monetary values on factors that are noteasily enumerated (Tilley, 2009). For example, placing a value on burglaries that do not occur may beaccomplished by taking the average dollar lost from past burglaries and assuming that each prevented burglaryis a savings at that dollar figure. How do you place a monetary value, however, on things like reduced fear ofcrime, trauma from victimization, or psychological/emotional loss due to an assault or homicide? How do youaccount for time loss that may not be related to days off work? The problem of setting values for many factorsis pervasive in social science evaluations. A second problem is making certain that all of the costs involved inthe program (and related to the program operations) are counted. While counting the number of copies madeand office hours spent can be completed, it is harder to enumerate the value of lost time spent on otheractivities, the level of effort expended, and other factors. These problems do not make it impossible to conducta cost–benefit analysis, although they do make it more challenging.49
Theory and Measurement in EvaluationThe value of any evaluation, as well as the ability to conduct an evaluation, is largely determined by basicfactors related to the underlying theory and the measurement of key concepts. It is not uncommon forevaluations to pay little attention to theory and to uncritically use variables that are not appropriate foranswering relevant questions. An additional common evaluation shortfall involves the failure to follow up onthe project. Each of these issues is addressed in turn.Theoretical ConcernsCrime prevention programs are often implemented, and evaluations are often undertaken, in a theoreticalvacuum (Holcomb and Lab, 2003). This means that those implementing and evaluating the intervention pay noattention to the theoretical assumptions underlying the prevention program. Basic questions, such as whyshould the redesign of the parking deck have an impact on theft from autos, why should a partnership reducedrug use in the community, and why would an educational program reduce aggressive behavior, are oftenignored. This is surprising given their centrality to the evaluation of initiatives. It is not necessary to identify aformal theory for every intervention, but it is necessary to be able to adequately explain why and how theintervention will bring about the desired change.Despite the argument that evaluations should be guided by the theory underlying the intervention, a greatnumber of successful evaluations are undertaken in a theoretical vacuum. These evaluations may still provideanswers to whether or not the program had the intended impact. Why then is the lack of theory a concern forevaluation? One reason is that while these evaluations can tell us if prevention initiatives are successful, theyfail to tell us why a program is or is not successful. They also can provide only limited insight to whether theprogram can be implemented in other places or at other times (Holcomb and Lab, 2003). A second reason forhaving a solid theoretical basis for the evaluation is that many investigations might not be necessary if theunderlying theory for the intervention was examined. There are numerous examples where examination of theunderlying theory would have raised questions about the efficacy of the intervention at the outset (Holcomband Lab, 2003). For example, studies of curfews often fail to recognize that, as they are typically conceived,there is no reason to expect them to have any impact. This is because the underlying argument is that gettingyouths off the street would make it hard for them to commit offenses. Unfortunately, curfews imposed fromlate night to early morning (as is typical) will have no impact on the number of crimes during the after schoolhours when most youths commit their offenses. Clearly, the knowledge of the theory underlying curfewswould not only eliminate the need for the evaluation, but also suggest termination of the curfew (Holcomb andLab, 2003). Basically, evaluations of programs without a theoretical base can be considered as “research in avacuum.” There is no context within which to understand the program, frame the evaluation questions, designthe methodological approach, or carry out the evaluation.If evaluations undertaken with an eye toward theory are preferred, why are so many atheoreticalevaluations undertaken? Several reasons are apparent (see Holcomb and Lab, 2003). First, there is an “outcomemyopia” that permeates many evaluations. This means that the programs and the evaluators are onlyinterested in whether the program works and not how or why it works. The resulting evaluation simplyassumes that a positive outcome is enough to prove the intervention works. While this is a plausibleconclusion, it is also possible that other factors are at work and it does not tell anything about why a programdoes not work when the findings are negative. A second reason for the lack of theory in evaluation is the factthat many program administrators simply “know” that it works. For them, “it is only common sense that itworks!” Thus, they are not interested in spending the time, money, and/or effort to prove what they alreadyknow. There is no reason to explain exactly how a program works or to undertake an evaluation—it simplydoes. This blind belief in programs is evident in many initiatives that have the ear of politicians who canprovide legislative and funding support. A final explanation for the appearance of atheoretical evaluations ofcrime prevention initiatives is the fact that many programs are the result of grassroots efforts by small groups.50
These groups are not always interested in evaluations or how the program works, as long as they are happywith it. Evaluations of these programs, therefore, are undertaken by outside researchers who come to theprogram long after it was initiated. They have few resources to devote to an evaluation and probably have notbeen collecting data on the project. The result is evaluations that look only at the outcome and ignore thequestion of why the program should or does work. The evaluator gets in, completes the evaluation, and getsout in relatively short order.Truly effective evaluations need to be informed by the underlying theoretical rationale for the programunder inspection. Just knowing that a program does or does not work is not enough. It is important tounderstand why an intervention works or does not work. Of equal value is gaining insight to whether aprogram can be implemented in another place at another time. The underlying theory provides a great deal ofinformation that is lost in evaluations where theory is missing.Measurement IssuesMeasurement of key concepts is a concern in all forms of research, but nowhere is it more evident than inevaluation research. The types of interventions found in crime prevention present some interestingmeasurement problems. One problem involves measuring the key outcome variables when the intervention isgeographically based. While some studies looking at city-wide crime levels can use police data, many crimeprevention programs are based on neighborhoods or other small geographic areas that do not coincide withspecific police reporting areas. Thus, a great deal of data manipulation is needed if official crime records are tobe used. The advent of geographic information systems that allow for the mapping of crime locations hashelped to minimize this problem, but only in those locations where this technology is in use.One possible solution to the problems with using official data is to rely on victim survey data. Indeed, manyprevention evaluations incorporate victim surveys along with official crime data. Victim survey data offer anumber of advantages, including the ability to collect data for the exact area under consideration, the ability tocapture crimes not reported to the police, and the fact that the survey can collect information on fear andpersonal perceptions that is not found in official records. Unfortunately, victim data are not always availableand the collection of that data can be both time consuming and costly. This lack of data is compounded whenan evaluation also needs data from a comparison group or area.The ability of victim surveys to gather data on key concepts such as fear is not without its own problems. Aswas seen in Chapter 1, operationalizing fear is not straightforward. Fear has been measured in a number ofdifferent ways, making it difficult to compare results across studies. It is also problematic if the measure of fearis inappropriate for the type of intervention. For example, asking questions about perceptions of changingcrime may not be germane if the intervention involves lighting the neighborhood so residents go out at night.Instead, asking about whether respondents would walk outside at night on their street would fit the preventiontechnique. The choice of operationalization is greatly contingent on the prevention initiative and theunderlying theory. Thus, the need to use theory to inform the prevention program extends naturally to thechoice of variables and how they are measured.Yet another measurement issue involves finding ways to uncover the competing influences in the projectthat mask the outcomes. An interesting conundrum in crime prevention initiatives is the fact that the programsoften try to simultaneously reduce the level of crime while increasing the reporting of crime to the police.Neighborhood watch programs are a prime example. These programs typically include a number of initiativessuch as property identification, surveillance of neighbors’ property, and encouraging the reporting of crime tothe police. While the intent is to reduce the level of crime in the neighborhood, it is easy to see how aneffective program can appear to have no impact. This would occur if, while the program reduces the actuallevel of offending in the area, the residents report a larger percentage of the crimes that do occur. The officialdata, therefore, would appear unchanged even though crime is down. Prevention evaluations need to considerthis type of problem and utilize methods (such as pre- and post-project victim surveys) that would uncover thiscomplication.Follow-Up Periods51
An issue closely related to how something is measured is the issue of the appropriate length of time tofollow up the project. The question of the follow-up period is actually two-sided. First, how long after theimplementation of the program or intervention will changes in crime (or other outcome) appear? Second, isthere a possibility that over time any initial changes will diminish or disappear? The most common situation isone in which the evaluation considers a relatively short follow-up period, often six months. This occursbecause of the immediate desire to know whether the program works and the fact that the costs of anevaluation increase with the follow-up time. A relatively short follow-up time means that any program thatrequires a lengthy time to have an impact will be seen as ineffective. Alternatively, an initiative with animmediate impact will be declared a success, despite the (unknown) fact that the impact may diminish overtime. While there is no rule on the appropriate follow-up time, the evaluation should look to the underlyingtheory for guidance. The ideal situation would be one where follow-up data are gathered at different intervals,such as three months, six months, 12 months, and 18 months. The use of multiple points in time will illuminateboth the speed of an intervention’s impact (if any) and any evidence that the impact diminishes over time.SummaryEvaluations that ignore theory (or evaluations of atheoretical programs) and problems with measurementand follow-up are common in studies of crime prevention programs. Much of this is due to the fact thatevaluations are often undertaken late in the life of programs when data is more difficult to gather and theprogram has undergone several changes since its inception. The evaluation also may be undertaken byindividuals or groups connected with the intervention and who “know it works,” thus adding a potentialsource of bias. While solutions to these issues are not always easy or cheap, evaluations need to take whateversteps are possible to avoid these problems.52
The Method for EvaluationAn inspection of the crime prevention literature reveals great diversity in the methodologies applied in thesearch for what works in prevention. A great deal of debate about the appropriate methods to use has ensuedover the past 10 years. Where one view argues that true experimental design is the preferred approach, theopposite view suggests that the method should be dictated by the questions being asked and the situationwithin which the intervention exists.Experimental DesignA great deal of discussion has centered on the claim that only evaluations using (or approximating) a trueexperimental design are worthy of consideration. Also known as a randomized control trial (Tilley, 2009),experimental design has become the gold standard in evaluation. Why is experimental design the preferredapproach by many evaluators? From a purely methodological perspective it offers a number of strengths. First,a randomized control trial, which relies on the random assignment of cases into experimental and controlgroups, increases the likelihood that the two groups being compared are equivalent. Second, there is enoughcontrol over the evaluation to make certain that the experimental group receives the treatment or interventionwhile the control group does not. There is also the expectation that all other possible factors that couldinfluence the outcome are controlled to the extent that they cannot affect either of the two groups. In essence,the experimental design addresses the various threats to internal validity—that is, factors that could cause theresults to occur besides the measures that were implemented (see Table 3.1). If the project is able to accomplishthese things, any changes observed in the experimental group that do not appear in the control group should beattributable to the intervention. The researcher thus feels confident that he “knows” the cause of any observedchange.This “gold standard” has a long history in the hard sciences (e.g. biology and chemistry) and is acceptedpractice. A great deal of attention has been focused on relying on this approach in criminal justice and crimeprevention due to the work of Sherman et al. (1997) which was prepared for the U.S. Congress. In that report,the authors opted to rate the existing literature on prevention initiatives according to how closely a studyadhered to the standards of a true experimental design (see Berk and Rossi, 1999; Cook and Campbell, 1979).Using the resulting Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods (see Table 3.2), Sherman et al. (1997) conclude thatthe bulk of the evidence on prevention activities shows there are relatively few effectiveprograms/interventions. Subsequent work using this approach has gone so far as to suggest that policy makersshould only consider research that meets the gold standard and that research funds should only be expendedwhen an experimental design (or close to it) is possible (Sherman et al., 2002). Unfortunately, applying thisstandard in crime prevention research (and, more generally, social sciences) is difficult and often not possible.Table 3.1 Selected Threats to Internal ValidityHistorySomething taking place independently of the experiment causes the change to takeplaceMaturationThe aging of the study subjects brings about a change independent of the program orstimulusTestingThe taking of measurements in the study (such as through surveys, observations, ordata collection) causes change to occur in place of or beyond the impact of the stimulus53
InstrumentationChanges in the study measures or study procedure that take place during the projectbring about changesStatisticalRegressionImplementing a project that focuses on subjects that are at an extreme end of ameasurement (such as low or high crime rate) will naturally regress to a statisticalaverage score over timeSelectionExperimental subjects who are not truly representative of the population of interest willinfluence the resultsMortalityThe incidence of study subjects dropping out during the course of the experiment canbias the results if they are different from those who remain in the projectSource: Adapted by author from W. Shadish et al. (2002). Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference.Boston: Houghton Mifflin.There are various problems with relying exclusively on experimental designs in crime prevention. Foremostamong these is the question of whether the results would be applicable in other places, settings, and times—that is, the generalizability of the results. This problem involves what are called threats to external validity.Table 3.3 lists a variety of threats to external validity. An inspection of this list reveals the wide range ofpotential problems inherent in trying to replicate the findings of any program evaluation. One major problemis that many interventions target communities and larger collectives, rather than individuals. It is very difficult,if not impossible, to randomly assign communities to experimental and control groups (Ekblom, 2002; Ekblomand Pease, 1995; Laycock, 2002). In the absence of randomization, the best that can be done is to try andidentify neighborhoods or communities for the control group which are matched to the experimental areas onas many characteristics as possible. Matching, however, cannot guarantee that the areas are comparable. Evenif random assignment is possible or good matching is accomplished, there is no way to isolate the experimentaland control communities from all other influences. Most importantly, interventions and initiativesimplemented in a community cannot be hidden from sight. People in both the experimental community andthe control areas will be able to see what is taking place. This can lead individuals and groups in the controlareas to adopt the intervention, or to act in such a way as to impede the intervention in the experimental area.There is simply no way to isolate the experimental community from all outside influences as can be done in alaboratory.Table 3.2 Maryland Scale of Scientific MethodsLevel1:Correlation between a crime prevention program and a measure of crime or crime risk factors at asingle point in time.Level2:Temporal sequence between the program and the crime or risk outcome clearly observed, or thepresence of a comparison group without demonstrated comparability to the treatment group.Level3:A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without theprogram.LevelComparison between multiple units with and without the program, controlling for other factors,54
4:or using comparison units that evidence only minor differences.Level5:Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to program and comparison groups.Source: Sherman et al. (1998). “Preventing crime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising.” Research in Brief. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.On the Web The Campbell Collaboration is a leading advocate and supporter of evaluations that rely on theexperimental design and the promotion of evidence-based practice in criminal justice. You canlearn more about their approach and publications at their web site:http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/A number of threats to external validity involve issues related to the implementation of an intervention(Tilley, 2009). The individuals/groups involved in an intervention can vary greatly from place to place. This canaffect the quality of the intervention or the degree to which a program is fully implemented/delivered asplanned (i.e., the dosage).The locations, crime, victims, and offenders are rarely (if ever) exactly the same in different places or times,which may affect the outcome of the intervention. The bottom line is, even if an evaluation shows that a crimeprevention intervention is effective in one place, there is no guarantee that it will be just as effective in otherplaces.Table 3.3 Threats to External ValidityThreat to ExternalValidityExplanationPlace attributesPlaces are never exactly the same, and the details may be important to the effectsbrought aboutVictim attributesPatterns of victim attributes will vary from one site to another, and the details maybe important to the effects brought aboutOffender/likelyoffender attributesPatterns of offender/likely offender attributes will vary from one site to another,and the details may be important to the effects brought aboutIntervenorattributesWho is involved in delivering the intervention, in terms of leader, frontline worker,or agency will vary from site to site, and the details may be important to the effectsbrought aboutCommunity/family/peer groupThe patterns of social relationships in which offenders and victims are embeddedwill vary from site to site, and the details may be important to the effects brought55
attributesaboutInterventionattributesWhat is done can never be duplicated exactly, and the details may be important tothe effects brought aboutNon-crime optionsOther non-crime behaviors available to those who would otherwise commit anoffense will vary from site to site, and the details may be important to the effectsbrought aboutCrime optionsDifferent crime possibilities available to those who would otherwise commit someparticular type of offense will vary from site to site, and the details may beimportant to the effects brought aboutDosageIntensity of intervention in relation to target people, places of crime problemsvaries from site to site, and the level may be important to the effects brought aboutSource: N. Tilley (2009). Crime Prevention. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan. Reprinted with permission.The underlying problem for external validity is that, too often, experimental designs fail to consider thecontext within which a program or intervention operates. What this means is that the program may besuccessful in one location at one time while it is a dismal failure at another location or time. There may besomething different about the neighborhoods that is not readily apparent from simple demographic, crime, orsocial information available about the areas. Simple random assignment or matching cannot eliminate thesefactors. Instead, there is a need for a thorough process evaluation to accompany the impact analysis.Another flaw in relying too heavily on experimental design is the fact that it is all too easy to jump to aconclusion that something does or does not work. This may occur when no impact emerges in an analysis—theresearcher claims it was a failure and suggests abandoning further use of the intervention. The negativefindings, however, may be the result of factors such as poor program implementation, misspecification of theappropriate target or causal mechanism underlying the problem, or resistance by the target (Eck, 2002). In thesecases, a well constructed experimental design may find no programmatic impact and declare the intervention afailure, when in fact the intervention can and would work in other settings or if it was properly implemented.Unfortunately, in many evaluations using rigorous experimental designs, the methodology ends up drivingthe project rather than allowing the underlying theory to dictate the development of the project or its analysis.You can have a good experimental design and find no impact of a project due to the fact that there was notheoretical reason to expect the intervention to work in the first place. One good example of this appears inevaluations of juvenile curfew laws (discussed earlier in this chapter) where the evaluation design meets thelevel of scientific rigor outlined by Sherman et al. (1997) but ignores the theoretical flaw underlying theapproach. There was really no reason to undertake evaluations just because it met some methodologicalstandard when attention to the theory would have suggested that the intervention would not work.Realistic EvaluationOveremphasis on the “correct” methodology (i.e., the gold standard) marginalizes the value of otherapproaches to building knowledge of crime prevention. Basic knowledge essential to crime prevention hascome out of a variety of research endeavors, such as ethnographic and qualitative methodologies. A primeexample of this is the knowledge we have on burglars and their choice of targets. Extensive ethnographicresearch has been completed with different groups of burglars, in different settings, across different countries,and using different approaches, such as riding around with them in cars to identify prime targets or having56
them rate pictures of homes on suitability for burglary. These studies (e.g., Bennett, 1986; Bennett and Wright,1984; Cromwell et al., 1991; Reppetto, 1974; Wright and Decker, 1994) have provided a great deal of insight onthe behaviors of burglars that is consistent across the studies (see Chapter 6 for more information). Thisinformation is very helpful for understanding what works to prevent residential burglary. Similar research hasbeen completed targeting robbery and other property crimes and offenders (e.g., Feeney, 1986; Gill andMatthews, 1994; Shover, 1991; Tunnell, 1992). While these projects do not even approximate the experimentaldesign standards, should we simply ignore the information and abandon this line of inquiry? The answer tothis question is “No.” Indeed, it is important to recognize that the “gold standard” is not appropriate for allinvestigations.Pawson and Tilley (1997) call for a more “realistic” approach to evaluation research. In realistic evaluation,rather than relying exclusively on experimental approaches, evaluation needs to observe the phenomenon in itsentirety. Two key ideas are central to realistic evaluation—mechanism and context. Mechanism refers tounderstanding “what it is about a program which makes it work” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66). In otherwords, by what process does an intervention impact an outcome measure such as crime or fear of crime? Whilethe most rigorous experimental design can indicate whether a program is responsible for any observedchanges, it does not tell why the program had an impact on the dependent variable. It is vital to understand themechanism bringing about the change in order to build basic knowledge and to increase the potential successat transplanting a program from one setting to another (Ekblom 2002).Beyond just examining the mechanism by which something works, Pawson and Tilley (1997, p. 69) note that“the relationship between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, but contingent.” By this, they arguethat the context in which any intervention is implemented has an impact on its effectiveness. Consequently,the impact of a prevention effort is contingent on the context in which it operates, and subsequently will affectwhether the program has a similar impact in different settings (Tilley, 2002). Ekblom and Pease (1995) note thatefforts to find a single, best methodological approach to evaluation are short-sighted when they ignore thecontext of the program being studied. Circumstances unique to one setting and context may directly affect theability of an intervention to achieve its goals. This requires more than a superficial impact evaluation whichmeets the “gold standard.” It is important to combine knowledge of the mechanism by which change is thoughtto occur with an understanding of the wider context in which specific crime prevention efforts areimplemented.What is needed is recognition that the problem, the theory, and the context should determine theappropriate methodology for understanding what works. A single standard is not appropriate for all problemsor questions. As Laycock (2002, p. 234) has so aptly pointed out, “‘the gold standard’ should not be anyparticular methodology, but a process of informed decision-making through which the appropriatemethodology is chosen.”SummaryBased on the above, this book considers the evidence on crime prevention regardless of the methodologyused. What is more important is whether the methodology is sound for the problem and the situation in whichit is used. While experimental design informed by good theory and attention to the context of the project ispreferred, it is not often available. In those cases, the best knowledge available is discussed and used to informabout what appears to work and not work. Even while recognizing that context is important, there is a clearbias in this book toward emphasizing outcome or impact evaluations. Underlying process evaluation materialsand information have been considered throughout the chapters but receive little direct presentation due tospace concerns.57
An Overview of the BookThe balance of this text attempts to expose the reader to some of the predominant crime prevention issuesand techniques of the past 40 years. The discussion is, by necessity, limited and does not deal with all of theprevention programs that have been attempted or evaluated. The goal of the book is to present a sampling ofprevention approaches, outline the selected programs and issues, present the research and (primary impact)evaluations which have been carried out on the programs (if any have been done), and critically examine theprevention effort and the potential of the approach to affect crime and the fear of crime.Throughout the text, the key criterion for assessing the effectiveness of various crime prevention methods islower subsequent offending and/or fear of crime. Subsequent offending could be either initial criminal activity(primary prevention) or recidivism (tertiary prevention). Lowered fear of crime could come from anyintervention mechanism, especially primary preventive techniques. Although a variety of other outcomemeasures have been used in assessing crime prevention programs (e.g., program operation, costs, number ofclients served), reductions in crime and fear are the ultimate goals. These other outcomes will receive littleattention in the following chapters. This does not mean that they are unimportant considerations. Indeed, froma fiscal standpoint it is important to know the costs of programs. However, this does not indicate the ability ofthe intervention to alter crime or fear of crime.Key Termscontextcost–benefit evaluationevaluationgeneralizabilitygold standardimpact (outcome) evaluationsMaryland Scale of Scientific Methodsmechanismprocess evaluationsrealistic evaluationthreats to external validitythreats to internal validity58
Part IPrimary PreventionThe words “crime prevention” typically bring to mind programs that are divorced from the formal criminaljustice system and are greatly reliant upon the efforts of the citizenry. Such crime prevention efforts typicallyfall under the rubric of primary prevention. Primary prevention deals with eliminating influences in thephysical and social environment that engender deviant behavior. Such programs do not target individuals whoare already criminal or prone to criminal behavior, except in a most indirect sense. Instead, primary preventionprograms work with general physical and societal factors that provide the opportunity for deviance to occur.The following chapters reflect varying methods aimed at removing or mitigating the criminogenic aspects ofsociety.Chapter 4 focuses directly on physical design components of crime prevention. Crime Prevention ThroughEnvironmental Design (CPTED) has been one of the most widely discussed crime prevention approaches of thepast 40 years. The idea behind CPTED is making crime harder to commit and making residents feel moresecure in their surroundings. This is accomplished by altering the physical environment. Increased lighting,improved locks, stronger doors, use of surveillance equipment, and other physical changes are intended tobring about greater social cohesion, citizen concern and involvement and, ultimately, reduced crime and fear ofcrime. Chapter 5 moves to a direct analysis of neighborhood crime prevention. The basic focus is on themechanisms involved in building neighborhood cohesion and concern through crime prevention activities.Block watch and citizen patrols are key elements of many neighborhood efforts. Chapter 6 investigatescompeting ideas of displacement and diffusion as a result of crime prevention programming. Typically,reduced levels of crime in crime prevention areas serve as an indicator that crime has been eliminated. There isthe potential, however, that the crime is simply displaced along some dimension. In displacement, the overallcrime rate remains the same while modifications in the type, timing, or placement of crime occur.One key element in the discussion of crime prevention is the impact of programs on the fear of crime. Massmedia crime prevention techniques, outlined in Chapter 7, represent an attempt to deal directly with the fear ofcrime, as well as actual crime, across a wide range of societal members. Developmental prevention forms thebasis of Chapter 8. This chapter discusses the issue of identifying at-risk individuals and situations that can beaddressed through early social intervention. Finally, Chapter 9 focuses on the formal criminal justice system.Deterrence is a cornerstone of formal system processing. General deterrence (as opposed to specific deterrence,which is discussed in Chapter 15) seeks to provide disincentives to persons not yet involved in deviantbehavior. This is clearly in the realm of primary prevention. While the earlier chapters examine the impact ofcrime prevention activities on both crime and fear of crime, the chapter on general deterrence looks only at itseffect on actual deviant behavior.59
Chapter 4The Physical Environment and Crime PreventionChapter OutlineCrime Prevention Through Environmental DesignTerritorialitySurveillanceImage and MilieuAccess Control and Target HardeningActivity Support and Motivation ReinforcementConflicts in CPTED ElementsSummaryImplementation of Environmental DesignThe Impact of Physical DesignEffects of Individual FactorsPhysical Design of NeighborhoodsA Challenge to Defensible SpaceSecond-Generation CPTEDA Third-Generation CPTEDIncivility, Disorder, and CrimeSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Define CPTED.Define defensible space.List and define Newman’s elements of defensible space.Explain OTREP and its relation to crime.Discuss four intermediate goals of physical design changes.List and discuss the core principles of Secure By Design.Provide insight on the effectiveness of lighting to prevent crime.Define and discuss the ideas of prospect, refuge, and escape as they relate to prevention.Discuss the evidence on the effectiveness of CCTV.Explain Operation Identification and its impact.Demonstrate your knowledge about the impact of street layout on crime prevention.Discuss neighborhood-wide environmental design programs and their impact on crime and fear.Discuss Merry’s analysis of and conclusions on defensible space.Explain incivility and its relation to crime and crime prevention.Discuss the idea of product design and provide examples for crime prevention.60
The advent of modern crime prevention has its roots in architectural design in the 1950s–1970s. At that time,architects and urban designers questioned the impact of the physical layout of cities and urban housing onbehavior, particularly criminal actions. Changing the physical design of a community, home, or business couldaffect crime in a variety of ways.Physical changes may make it more difficult to carry out a crime. This difficulty can result in lower payoffin relationship to the effort. Another potential impact is that the risk of being seen and caught whilecommitting an offense may be enhanced. Finally, the physical design changes may prompt residents to altertheir behavior in ways that make crime more difficult to commit. This chapter introduces and explains variousphysical design approaches for combating and preventing crime, examines the impact these actions have oncrime, and assesses the potential of these approaches.61
Crime Prevention Through Environmental DesignEfforts to alter the physical design of an area or location to impact crime are generally referred to as CrimePrevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Included in this approach are architectural designsthat enhance territoriality and surveillance, target hardening, and the recognition of legitimate users of an area.The basic ideas of CPTED grew out of Newman’s (1972) concept of “defensible space.”On the Web Kushmuk and Whittemore (1981) argue that the effect of physical design changes on crime isindirect and operates through four intermediate goals. The intermediate goals they outline areaccess control, surveillance, activity support, and motivation reinforcement. Whether they areintermediate goals or parts of CPTED could be debated. The authors illustrate the possiblecausal sequence in a diagram that can be found on the textbook’s web site.Defensible space proposes “a model which inhibits crime by creating a physical expression of a social fabricwhich defends itself” (Newman, 1972). The idea is that the physical characteristics of an area can influence thebehavior of both residents and potential offenders. For residents, the appearance and design of the area canengender a more caring attitude, draw the residents into contact with one another, lead to furtherimprovements and use of the area, and build a stake in the control and elimination of crime. For potentialoffenders, an area’s appearance can suggest that residents use and care for their surroundings, pay attention towhat occurs, and intervene if an offense is seen.Table 4.1 CPTED ElementsNewman’s defensible space elements:TerritorialityA sense of ownership over an area which prompts people to take action when somethingseems amissNaturalThe ability to observe activity, whether inside or outside, without the aid ofsurveillancespecial devices (such as closed-circuit television)ImageA neighborhood having the appearance that it is not isolated and is cared for, and thatresidents will take actionMilieuThe placement of a home, building, or community in a larger area characterized by lowcrimeOtherelements:AccesscontrolThe ability to regulate who comes and goes from an area or building, with the intent oflimiting access to legitimate usersActivitysupportFunctions that assist and enhance interaction between citizens and other legitimate usersin the communityTargethardeningActions that increase the effort by offenders in committing a crimeSource: Compiled by author from 0. Newman (1972). Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City. New York: Macmillan; J.62
Kushmuk and S.L. Whittemore (1981). A Reevaluation of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Program in Portland,Oregon. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; Cozens et al. (2005). “Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED): Areview and modern bibliography.” Property Management 23:328-356.Newman (1972) identifies four elements of defensible space—territoriality, natural surveillance, image, andmilieu (see Table 4.1). To these, proponents of CPTED have added several elements—access control, targethardening, and activity support. In some respects there is a great deal of commonality between these elements.At the same time, the elements may conflict with one another. Each of the CPTED factors influences thecriminogenic nature of the area.TerritorialityTerritoriality refers to the ability and desire of legitimate users of an area to lay claim to the area. Arealcontrol is based on the establishment of real or perceived boundaries, the recognition of strangers andlegitimate users of the area, and a general communal atmosphere among the inhabitants. Territoriality meansthat an area, building, or property is owned by someone and others have no claim to it. Most important is thatthe residents/owners/legitimate users (non-offenders), as well as the potential offenders, recognize the“ownership” of the territory and make decisions about actions with that knowledge. Cozens et al. (2005) pointout that territoriality takes two distinct forms. These are symbolic and real. Symbolic territoriality refers tothings such as signs, landscaping, or other items that signal a change in ownership or area. Real territorialityis engendered by walls, fences, gates, or other items that place a physical barrier in front of people.SurveillanceSurveillance involves any action that increases the chance that offenders will be observed. Newman (1972)specifically addresses the idea of natural surveillance where residents and legitimate users have the ability tosee and observe what is taking place around them without taking special measures (this is what Cozens et al.(2005) would also call informal surveillance). Newman suggests placing windows in such a fashion to allowresidents to see activity on all sides of their homes. Doors should face the street to allow passersby to viewactivity taking place inside the entranceways and few families should use the same common entrance so thatlegitimate users can identify one another. Additionally, pathways in and around the community should leaveclear, unobstructed views for residents to see what is awaiting them as they enter and exit their homes(Newman, 1972). Outdoor activity and pedestrian traffic increase the number of “eyes on the street.”Surveillance can be enhanced in a variety of other ways. Formal or organized surveillance refers to the useof guards or employees specifically tasked with watching for offending (Cozens et al., 2005). Such formalsurveillance may also be done by normal citizens involving themselves in citizen patrols or other organizedsurveillance activities. Yet another type—mechanical surveillance—utilizes cameras or other devices toobserve activities, or lights to simply increase the ability of people to see what is taking place (Cozens et al.,2005).On the Web Diagrams illustrating the surveillance rationale (natural, formal, and mechanical) can be foundon the textbook web site.Any increase of surveillance activity should have a direct effect on opportunities for crime. The chances ofcommitting a crime and getting away unobserved are diminished as the number of people who are able to see63
what is taking place increases. Underlying these suggestions is the assumption that, if a crime or suspiciousindividual is seen, the observer will inform the police or take some other action designed to eliminate crime.Image and MilieuNewman’s (1972) concept of image is in some ways an extension of territoriality. Image is basically theoutward appearance of an area or property as cared for by those who belong in the area. This communicates topotential offenders that there are concerned citizens watching over the area who will take actions to protect it.If the residents claim ownership (territoriality) and show that to others, the chances that offenders will takeaction will be minimized. Milieu extends these ideas further by arguing that prevention is enhanced if thesurrounding area is also well cared for and maintained, and that there is little crime in those neighboring areas.Thus, building homes, businesses, or new communities within an already low-crime area will protect the newlocation. Maintaining the image of the area is essential to sending the right message out to both legitimateusers and potential offenders (Cozens et al., 2005).On the Web A holistic model illustrating the impact of most CPTED elements on building a community forcrime prevention can be seen on the textbook web site.Access Control and Target HardeningAccess control seeks to allow only those persons who have legitimate business in an area to enter. Thisreduces the opportunity for crime by increasing the effort needed to enter and exit a building or area for thepurpose of committing crime. Access control is also considered on a larger scale in terms of access to aneighborhood or community. This can be accomplished through gating communities, closing roads, or othermeans. Neighborhood designs that could make offending more difficult include limiting the flow of trafficthrough an area by strangers, changes that limit the number of through-streets, establishing cul-de-sacs anddead-end streets, and enhancing the ability of residents to recognize legitimate users. In essence, controllingaccess and egress to an area limits its permeability to those who wish to commit crime.Target hardening is a closely related element to access control. Target hardening efforts are those that makepotential criminal targets more difficult to victimize. The use and/or installation of locks, bars on windows,unbreakable glass, intruder alarms, fences, safes, and other devices makes crime more difficult to carry out.Target hardening can also take an indirect approach to crime control through the placement of identifyingmarks on personal property that makes stolen goods more difficult to fence and easier to identify and return tovictims.Beyond the design of buildings and places, it is possible to design products in ways that make them moredifficult targets. While not considered in the early discussions of CPTED, product design to prevent crime hasbecome a major movement. A prime example of this approach in target hardening is the incorporation ofsteering column locks in automobiles. This has been done for the sole purpose of reducing the incidence ofmotor vehicle theft. Product design will be discussed again later in this chapter.It is important to note that access control/target-hardening measures will not eliminate crime. Any form ofaccess control or target hardening can be overcome by a clever and persistent criminal. The hope is that themeasures will reduce the absolute level of crime in the community. The actual impact of these approaches oncrime is discussed later in this chapter.Activity Support and Motivation Reinforcement64
The ideas of activity support and motivation reinforcement offered by Kushmuk and Whittemore (1981)relate to the building of a community atmosphere. They are roughly the same thing and involve encouraginglaw-abiding use of the community and area (Cozens et al., 2005). The ability to recognize neighbors andidentify needs of the community should enhance social cohesion among residents and contribute to acommunal atmosphere that works to eliminate crime and other common problems. Activity support andmotivation reinforcement may occur indirectly through activities such as street fairs, community days, andother social events. It can also be generated by directly recruiting residents for anti-crime activities or othersocietal/community issues.The community atmosphere and caring attitude can be built, in part, through the physical appearance anddesign of an area (Newman, 1972). In a complementary fashion, the impact of access control/target hardeningand surveillance relies on the behavior of legitimate users. Windows, better lighting, and clear viewing areimportant only if someone opts to use these features. In addition, residents need the ability to distinguishlegitimate users from strangers in order to assess whether action is needed. This recognition comes frominteraction between legitimate users.Conflicts in CPTED ElementsWhile the elements of CPTED appear straightforward and have been used and promoted for roughly 40years, there are potential contradictions between some elements. Cozens et al. (2005), Reynald (2011), andothers have pointed out that territoriality, access control, and surveillance have the potential of cancelling outone another. For example, erecting walls, fences, or other structures may demarcate an area but can impedenatural surveillance (Reynald, 2011). In a similar fashion, access control and target hardening efforts can lead tothe building of fortresses around individuals and areas. These fortresses can keep people from participating incommunity and neighborhood activities, thus reducing activity support (Cozens et al., 2005). It is important,therefore, to seek a balance between the elements when instituting CPTED.An important problem for CPTED may be the fact that the key concepts are poorly defined (Ekblom, 2011b).Territoriality has a wide variety of definitions, which makes it hard to apply and evaluate. Surveillance runsthe gamut from active measures, such as the use of police and security guards, to passive actions thatencourage or enhance citizen action. Implementing activity support through environmental design with a goalof increasing citizen usage of an area is equally difficult to achieve when the terms are not clear (Ekblom,2011b). Consequently, the implementation and effectiveness of CPTED is compromised.Johnson et al. (2014) propose a framework for CPTED that places potential interventions/activities in ameaningful configuration for implementation and prevention. Analyzing existing CPTED programs andprojects, the authors argue that territoriality should be considered the key concept/mechanism. They base thisclaim on the fact that all of the other CPTED elements are “preparatory tasks” for enhancing territoriality, aswell as “operational tasks” when territoriality is being exercised by residents. Basically, physical designprompts, prepares for, and precedes behavior. Table 4.2 illustrates the relationships in CPTED, withterritoriality at the head and other CPTED elements as component parts of territoriality. The frameworkprovides researchers and practitioners guidance for implementing changes. Each of the major concepts(components) have subconcepts. In addition, the implementation of the actions involves both preparatory tasksand operational tasks.Table 4.2 Deconstructed TerritorialityConceptComponentsExample of Tasks (Both Preparatory andOperational)SurveillanceFormal surveillanceCCTVLightingGuards65
Monitoring/ObservingPatrolsChallenging offendersInformal surveillanceClear sightlinesOpen streetsUse of spaceChallenging offenders/strangersPhysical designPositivereinforcementImage management/maintenanceMaintaining spaceSigns of ownershipTackling incivilitiesAvoiding social stigmaCare of public spaceActivity supportUse of public spaceDesign for useSafe areas for activitiesLegitimate use of spaceDiscouraging offendingAccess controlTarget hardeningLocksGatesStrong windowsBuilding standardsOrganized securityEntry guardsBoundary definitionVaried land useSpace delineationPhysical barriersUsers assert area controlIdentify intrudersSource: Compiled by author from D. Johnson et al. (2014). “Designing in crime prevention, designing out ambiguity: Practice issues withthe CPTED knowledge framework available to professionals in the field and its potentially ambiguous nature.” Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety 16:147-168.SummaryThe basis for CPTED rests on the assumption that the physical design influences the behavior of bothresidents/legitimate users of an areas, as well as potential offenders. For the residents, the expectation is thatthey will be observant of what is taking place around them and take action if they observe criminal activity.66
On the other hand, potential offenders should be influenced by the costs and benefits inherent in an action.Kaplan et al. (1978) illustrate the potential impact on offenders through an idea they refer to as OTREP. Thatis, crime Opportunity is the result of Target, Risk, Effort, and Payoff. The assumption is that offenses can beavoided when there is a high risk of apprehension with little potential payoff. Crime should be reduced as thepotential costs (effort) outweigh the potential benefits (payoff). Manipulating physical design features(reducing the number of targets while increasing the risks of getting caught) may be one way to bring abouthigher costs relative to benefits.67
Implementation of Environmental DesignThe implementation of environmental design strategies has not always gone smoothly or followed a clearplan. Much of the reason for this is the fact that most efforts have taken place with little or no long-rangeplanning and only intermittent government organization and support. Many of the initial projects, such as inHartford, Connecticut, and Portland, Oregon, were demonstration projects backed by the government or aprivate foundation (such as Westinghouse Electric). This does not mean that environmental design has beenignored or has no organizational support.It is only since the mid-1990s that we have seen major organized movement toward incorporatingenvironmental design into communities in an ongoing fashion, and most of that movement has taken placeoutside the United States. In 1989, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in England established theSecured By Design (SBD) program. This ongoing initiative emphasizes and promotes the inclusion of safetyand security measures in new and existing buildings (ACPO, 2009). The SBD project provides architectural andsecurity assistance to any agency requesting its input. At the present time, there are 18 Design Guides availableto assist in building safe and secure homes, facilities, and locations (ACPO, 2015). Among these guides arethose for new homes, commercial sites, hospitals, and schools. The SBD program includes six Core Principles,which closely align with the ideas of defensible space. These include: (1) an integrated approach, (2)environmental quality and a sense of ownership, (3) natural surveillance, (4) access and footpaths, (5) openspace and management, and (6) lighting.Table 4.3 provides seven attributes of sustainable communities set forth by the British Home Office in 2004that correspond to the basic SBD principles. These attributes are particularly well suited for crime prevention.Included here are access control, surveillance, ownership (territoriality), and activity (support), all key CPTEDconcepts.On the Web The Secured By Design web site offers a great deal of additional information on theimplementation and evaluation of physical design for preventive purposes. You can explore thesite at: http://www.securedbydesign.com/index.aspxThe passage of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) in the United Kingdom is another good example ofgovernmental adoption of environmental design. The CDA mandated the cooperation of many agencies inaddressing crime problems. Included in that mandate were plans to rely on architects and planners in efforts todesign out crime (Everson and Woodhouse, 2007).Table 4.3 Attributes of Sustainable Communities• Access and movement: places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide forconvenient movement without compromising security• Structure: places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict• Surveillance: places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked• Ownership: places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community• Physical protection: places that include necessary, well-designed security features• Activity: places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reducedrisk of crime and a sense of safety at all times• Management and maintenance: places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind,to discourage crime in the present and the future68
Source: Home Office (2004) Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention. London: Home Office.New Zealand has implemented national guidelines for construction and design that inhibits crime. Table 4.4lists the elements of the guidelines. The intent of the guidelines is to promote the incorporation of CPTEDprinciples in new developments. Similar guidelines have been adopted throughout Australia. In some instances,such as in Victoria (see Table 4.5) and New South Wales (see Table 4.6), the guidelines have some force of lawin as much as the authorities can halt the construction of developments that do not meet the guidelines. Anexamination of both the Victoria and New South Wales guidelines shows that the elements are direct fromCPTED and correspond to the SBD principles in Britain.On the Web Download the guidelines and rules for the Victoria(www.dtpli.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/231619/Safer_Design_Guidelines.pdf), NewSouth Wales (http://www.planning.nsw.gov.au/rdaguidelines/documents/duapguide_s79c.pdf),and the State of Virginia (www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/documents/cpted.pdf) governments.Note the adherence to CPTED principles. What new ideas do you see in these that may extendthe basic CPTED ideas?In the U.S. the drive for CPTED is primarily a function of private or professional organizations. Bothnational and international groups promote environmental design. Among these are the International CPTEDAssociation, CPTED Security, the National Crime Prevention Council, the National Institute of CrimePrevention’s CPTED Training web site, the Designing Out Crime Association (U.K.), and many others. At thestate level, Virginia’s Department of Criminal Justice Services has promulgated Safer By Design principles foruse in designing communities, housing, and businesses. There has also been a wide range of projects andevaluations that have been attempted to assess the effectiveness of environmental design changes.Table 4.4 New Zealand National CPTED Guidelines1. AccessSafe movement and connections2. Surveillance and sightlinesSee and be seen3. LayoutClear and logical orientation4. Activity mixEyes on the street5. Sense of ownershipShowing a space is cared for6. Quality environmentsWell-designed, managed and maintained environments7. Physical protectionUsing active security measuresSource: Adapted by author from Ministry of Justice (2005). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Principles. New ZealandMinistry of Justice, http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/crime-prevention/environmental-designTable 4.5 Victoria Principles for Safer DesignSurveillanceMaximize visibility and surveillance of the public environmentAccess, movement, and sightlinesProvide safe movement, good connections and access69
ActivityMaximize activity in public placesOwnershipClearly define private and public space responsibilitiesManagement and maintenanceManage public space to ensure that it is attractive and well usedSource: Adapted by author from State of Victoria Department of Sustainability and Environment (2005). Safe Design Guidelines forVictoria. East Melbourne: Department of Sustainability and Environment.70
The Impact of Physical DesignThe impact of CPTED and physical design features on crime and fear has long been a topic for research andevaluation. When Newman (1972) introduced the idea of defensible space, he illustrated the impact of CPTEDfeatures by comparing two public housing projects. The first, a high-rise, high-crime project, allowed strangerseasy access through unmonitored, multi-user entrances. In addition, the buildings lacked windows andopportunities to observe indoor common areas and outdoor pathways. The size of the project mitigatedattempts to recognize legitimate users from strangers due to the great numbers of people in the project.Conversely, the second public housing area consisted of low-rise buildings that experienced lower crime levels.The project limited the number of families using the same entrances. This enhanced the ability of residents toidentify strangers. Surveillance was enhanced by entrances that faced public thoroughfares. Additionally, thelow-lying structures made casual observation of outdoor activities through windows more feasible andeffective.Table 4.6 Safer By Design Elements: New South WalesTerritorial re-enforcementActual and symbolic boundary markers to encourage communal responsibility for public areas andfacilities and to communicate to people where they should/not be and what activities are appropriate.SurveillanceNatural surveillance is achieved when normal space users can see and be seen by others.Technical/mechanical surveillance is achieved through mechanical/electronic measures such as CCTV,help points and mirrored building panels.Formal (or organised) surveillance is achieved through the tactical positioning of guardians.Access controlAccess control treatments restrict, channel and encourage people and vehicles into, out of and aroundthe development.Natural access control includes the tactical use of landforms and waterways features, design measuresincluding building configuration, formal and informal pathways, landscaping, fencing and gardens.Technical/Mechanical access control includes the employment of security hardware.Formal (or organised) access control includes on-site guardians such as employed security officers.Space/Activity managementFormal supervision, control and care of the development.Source: Adapted by author from New South Wales (2015). Safer By Design.http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/community_issues/crime_prevention/safer_by_designNewman (1972) argued that defensible space can be accomplished through a variety of physical designactions, including the placement of windows conducive to easy visibility of surrounding areas, the location ofentrances that are observable by others, the installation of lights to enhance visibility, and the establishment ofcommon areas that are controllable by residents. All of these features are evident in low-rise housing projectsand are either absent or limited in high-rise, high-density projects. Most importantly, these features impact the71
behavior of both legitimate users and potential offenders (Newman, 1972).In assessing the impact of physical design, it is important to consider that the impact can be either direct orindirect. Rubenstein et al. (1980) outline three types of changes or effects that appear in analyses of crimeprevention (see Figure 4.1). Type 1 effects are those that measure the direct impact of physical design features(such as locks, lights, or fences) on crime. Type 2 effects consider the impact of the physical design on a varietyof intervening factors. Possible intervening factors include the attitudes of legitimate users about theircommunity, feelings of territoriality, efforts of community members to combat crime, and an improvedcommunity atmosphere. (While territoriality, activity support and motivation reinforcement are consideredelements of CPTED by some, the models found on the textbook web site and many discussions view them asintervening or mediating factors.)The physical design features bring about changes in these intervening factorsprior to effecting crime. Finally, Type 3 measures deal with the direct effect of the intervening factors on crimeand the indirect influence of physical design on crime through the intervening factors.On the Web The U.S. Office of Justice Programs has initiated a valuable source of information oninterventions to attack crime, including prevention activities. You can explore the CrimeSolutions site at http://crimesolutions.gov/default.aspxFigure 4.1 Model of Crime Prevention Effects The following discussion of physical design and its influence on crime is divided into several sections. First,the effect of access control/target hardening and surveillance techniques are considered as individual factors.Second, the evaluation moves to studies that examine broad-based uses of defensible space concepts inresidential and commercial areas. Finally, altering the physical environment by designing products withprevention in mind is considered.The Effects of Individual FactorsThe ideas of access control/target hardening and surveillance include a wide range of potential interventionsfor combating crime. Increased street lighting, reduced concealment, installation of locks, use of unbreakableglass, alarms and cameras, marking of property for identification, and security guards are only a few of theavailable means of prevention. Despite this proliferation of methods, few of these have been subjected toindividual evaluation. Most crime prevention programs rely on a range of activities and not just a singleapproach. Almost without exception, most evaluations look at the direct impact of physical design on crimeand/or fear of crime.Lighting72
Efforts to prevent crime by improving the lighting in areas was a major undertaking in the 1970s andremains a common approach in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Pease (1999) suggests thatlighting may impact crime through various mechanisms. For example, lighting may lead to increased outdooractivity and, in turn, greater surveillance. Lighting may also enhance the ability to detect a crime in progress oridentify an offender. Advocates often point to the deterrent potential of lights, which may make potentialoffenders choose less well-lit areas for their crimes. Lighting should allow potential victims to see theirsurroundings and may lead them to avoid less well-lit locations.Typical research on the impact of lights contrasts criminal activity in an area that has received new lightswith areas that do not receive new or improved lighting. In general, studies find a positive impact of lighting.The strongest support for lighting has been offered by Painter and Farrington (1997, 1999a, 1999b) based on aseries of analyses conducted in England. Painter and Farrington (1997) report positive effects of lighting in ananalysis of experimental and control areas of Dudley (West Midlands). Using victimization survey data, theauthors report a 41 percent reduction in crime incidents in the experimental area and only a 15 percentreduction in the control area. In addition, respondents report being more satisfied in the relit areas. A similaranalysis of relighting in Stoke-on-Trent (Staffordshire), also revealed significant reductions in crime in theexperimental area as compared to the control area (Painter and Farrington, 1999b). They also report someevidence of reduced fear of crime. The crime and fear results, however, are not as dramatic as those found inDudley. In both studies, the authors report reduced crime in non-relit areas adjacent to the target experimentalneighborhoods. They claim that the impact of lighting is diffused into these other areas.Welsh and Farrington (2009) reviewed the state of the evidence on a number of crime prevention efforts,including lighting. A total of 13 studies from both the United States and the United Kingdom were included inthe review. Overall, the studies show a positive impact of lighting, particularly on property crime, with a 21percent reduction in crime in experimental areas. Studies conducted in the United Kingdom showed thestrongest results, possibly due to the fact that they have been completed in more recent years with morerigorous evaluations (Welsh and Farrington, 2009). Overall, lighting has a positive impact on area crime.On the Web The work of Welsh and Farrington is an example of the systematic reviews championed by theCampbell Collaboration. You can find many more reviews of prevention actions at theCollaboration web site: http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/Improved lighting schemes remain popular. The reason for this involves the issue of fear. Even if relightingdoes not always reduce crime, the ability to see better makes people feel safer. Various studies show reductionsin fear following improved lighting. In perhaps the earliest review of lighting studies, Tien et al. (1977) foundoverwhelming reductions in fear of crime. Atkins et al. (1991) report that women and elderly respondents whorecognize changes in lighting worry less about crime and feel safer. Finally, Painter and Farrington (1997,1999b) reveal similar findings on improved area satisfaction and reduced fear of crime. Research on lightingreveals positive impacts on crime, victimization, and fear of crime among citizens.CCTVSurveillance is also accomplished by means of mechanical devices, particularly closed-circuit television(CCTV). Research on CCTV has grown tremendously in recent years. While there are no estimates of thenumber of public CCTV cameras in use in the United States, Norris and McCahill (2006) estimate there are 4.2million public CCTV cameras in the United Kingdom. The large investment in CCTV has prompted numerousevaluations of its impact on crime and fear.Brown (1995) and Ditton and Short (1999) report on evaluations of CCTV in five U.K. cities. Each evaluationincluded experimental and control areas as well as outcome measures both pre- and post-installation of CCTV73
equipment. Brown (1995) notes that the experimental areas experienced reduced levels of burglary, but thefts,vandalism, and other offenses only declined in some locations. Results in Airdrie, Scotland, show reductions inoverall recorded crime, although there are some increases in recorded drug and motor vehicle offenses (Dittonand Short, 1999). The authors note that the increases may be due to increased detection of offenses through theuse of CCTV. Results in Glasgow also show that CCTV impacts crime in the target area (Ditton and Short,1999). Fear also was reduced in areas covered by CCTV (Brown, 1995). Unfortunately, there was also evidenceof displacement of crime from areas with CCTV to nearby/surrounding areas (Brown, 1995).An evaluation of CCTV use in Philadelphia considered its impact on different street crimes. Ratcliffe et al.(2009) examined the effectiveness of two types of cameras (those that could tilt, zoom, and pan and those thatwere more static but could be relocated) in eight locations. Based on 32 months of police data for the target andsurrounding areas, the authors report crime reduction in only four of the eight locations, with greater impacton disorder crimes than serious offenses (Ratcliffe et al., 2009). There was an overall 13 percent reduction incrime. The results also show some evidence of both diffusion and displacement of crime, although this was notuniform and they largely cancelled each other out (Ratcliffe et al., 2009).CCTV has also been used in businesses and car parks. Tilley (1993) reports that motor vehicle theft, theftfrom autos, and vandalism were all reduced in areas monitored with CCTV equipment. Reid and Andresen(2012) examined the impact of CCTV at a commuter car park in Surrey, British Columbia. Using victimizationsurvey data, the authors report a significant drop in victimization and improvement in feelings of safety. Theftof motor vehicles fell by 80 percent, and theft from motor vehicles dropped more than 50 percent (Reid andAndresen, 2012). Beck and Willis (1999), examining CCTV in fashion clothing stores, report that stores withextensive CCTV systems experience significant reductions in loss after the installation, compared to otherstores. They note that the results, however, diminish over time (Beck and Willis, 1999). Hayes and Downs(2011) compared three different CCTV configurations in retail stores, finding reduced loss after CCTVinstallation. Winge and Knutsson (2003), studying the use of CCTV in the Oslo (Norway) central railroadstation, report increased detection of crime, increased recorded violent crime, reduced theft from autos, and nochange in perceptions about crime in the area.Not all evaluations show positive results. Farrington et al. (2007), looking at both police and victimizationdata, fail to find any significant positive change in crime in the area covered by CCTV. Waples and Gill (2006)consider the impact of redeployable CCTV, which allows the cameras to be moved from one fixed location toanother. Evaluation results show no change in crime or fear for one area, and increased crime in another afterdeployment of the CCTV initiative (Waples and Gill, 2006). The authors argue that these negative results couldbe due to various technological problems with the redeployable cameras. McLean et al. (2013), studying CCTVin Schenectady, New York, report reduced crime in the immediate vicinity of the cameras, but the impactvaries from location to location in town. Finally, LaVigne et al. (2011) report that CCTV is effective at reducingcrime in Baltimore, has varied impact in Chicago, and no impact in Washington, DC. A key finding in thestudy is that active monitoring of CCTV is essential to bring about an impact (LaVigne et al., 2011).CCTV has been the subject of several major reviews of evaluation research. Welsh and Farrington (2009)examined 44 CCTV evaluations from 1978 to 2007. Studies fell into categories of city centers, public housing,public transportation, and car parks. The examination of studies in city centers revealed small but insignificantreductions in crime, although the results were better in the U.K. studies (Welsh and Farrington, 2009). Publichousing evaluations revealed small, non-significant reductions in crime. Studies of CCTV in publictransportation settings found sizable reductions in crime, although they were still statistically insignificant.Finally, CCTV in car parks had the only significant reductions in crime (Welsh and Farrington, 2009). Thegreatest impact was found in studies from the U.K., prompting the authors to speculate that this is due to theuse of longer follow-up times and greater public support for CCTV in the U.K.Another major review (Gill and Spriggs, 2005) found that crime was reduced in six target areas while itincreased in seven areas. However, in the four locations where there was a statistically significant change incrime in the experimental areas relative to the control areas, two changes favored the experimental area andtwo favored the control areas. At the same time, fear of crime was reducing in CCTV areas. There was alsosome evidence of displacement of crime from CCTV areas to other locations (Gill and Spriggs, 2005).The evidence from the studies clearly shows that CCTV can impact crime, although it is not universal andthe conditions when it succeeds are not clear. CCTV holds some promise as evidenced by the success of the74
technique with some crimes in some locations. It is not a universal cure all for crime problems. Futureevaluations need to use appropriate methodologies, including control areas and significant follow-up periods. Itis also important to try to disentangle the impact of CCTV from other crime prevention techniques that are insimultaneous use (Farrington and Painter, 2003; Welsh and Farrington, 2009).SurveillabilityLighting is only one factor that can influence the ability to observe an area. Surveillability also is determinedby a wide range of other factors. Fisher and Nasar (1992; Nasar and Fisher, 1993) note the physical designimpact on prospect, refuge, and escape. Prospect refers to the ability of individuals to see an area. Locationsthat offer greater prospect should engender less fear and victimization than those locations that limit sightlines. Refuge deals with the presence or absence of concealment, in which offenders could hide from potentialvictims. Refuge provides both hiding places and protection for potential offenders. Finally, escape addressesthe ability of both offenders and victims to escape from an area before and/or after an offense. In essence,physical design features which impact on surveillability should alter both fear and victimization levels.Fisher and Nasar (1992; Nasar and Fisher, 1993) tested these assumptions using a university site whichoffered greatly varying degrees of prospect, refuge, and escape. Using both surveys and observations, theauthors report strong support for their argument. Areas of increased concealment (refuge), blocked prospect,and limited escape elicit greater fear. Crime figures also show greater victimization accompanying blockedprospect and greater concealment (Nasar and Fisher, 1993). The findings are site specific and suggest thatanalysis needs to focus on the micro-level. That is, while macro-level analyses may suggest that individuals arefearful in a certain area, that fear is actually more targeted at specific places in the area, not the entire area.Interestingly, lighting has no impact on reported fear once the issues of prospect, refuge and escape areconsidered (Fisher and Nasar, 1992). While limited to a single site on a university campus, these results suggestthat a more general view of surveillability is needed than just an analysis of lighting. The research on prospect,refuge, and escape provides support for the assumption that people make assessments of their surroundingsand respond to the potential danger and fear they interpret in different situations.Surveillance also can be provided through the use of guards or other individuals hired specifically for thatfunction. Hesseling (1995) demonstrates various forms of “functional surveillance” used in The Netherlands. Inone instance surveillance was provided by hiring individuals to ride public transportation in order to reduceviolence and fare dodging. Similarly, the employment of caretakers in public housing contributed to reductionsin vandalism, graffiti, and theft. The use of security guards on city streets to assist the police impacted feelingsof safety (Hesseling, 1995). Sorenson (1998) provides similar positive results in an assessment of public housingin three U.S. cities. An evaluation of security guards in car parks finds significant declines in auto thefts(Barclay et al., 1996). In general, assigning surveillance responsibilities and providing the means to contact theauthorities impacts the level of calls for police service and the level of arrests. Clearly, surveillability has animpact on both crime and fear of crime.Property Identification ProgramsProperty identification programs have a long history in crime prevention, often under the title OperationIdentification. The basic idea behind property identification is to increase the difficulty for offenders todispose of marked items. Despite the great proliferation of property identification programs, there is littleempirical research on most projects. One early review of 99 projects from across the United States reportedthat, despite public awareness of the programs, few programs are able to entice more than 10 percent of thepopulation to participate (Heller et al., 1975). Likewise, few programs report significant changes in reportedburglary and none find an impact on arrests or convictions for burglary (Heller et al., 1975).One exemplary evaluation of property marking was undertaken in South Wales (Laycock, 1985; 1990). Threephysically proximate villages were targeted for the property marking campaign due to their relative isolationfrom other residential areas. The choice of isolated villages was made in order to reduce the chance that theprogram would simply displace crime. The program relied on a high degree of publicity, door-to-door contact,75
the provision of free equipment to mark property, and window stickers. Project efforts were successful atengendering participation by 72 percent of the homes. More importantly, the evaluation showed a 40 percentdrop in burglary for participating homes with little or no displacement to non-participating residences(Laycock, 1985). A follow-up evaluation (Laycock, 1990) revealed greater reductions in burglary in the secondyear after program implementation. Importantly, both the initial and year two reductions in crime followedheavy publicity of the program. Increases in burglary occurred during times of low publicity (Laycock, 1990).This suggests that the results are more related to the media attention and not the property marking.A recent trend in property identification has been to tag vehicles with ID numbers to combat motor vehicletheft. Rhodes et al. (1997) report that the marking of vehicle parts has a small impact on theft of cars byprofessional thieves. Various programs seek to make vehicles that are typically not driven at certain times ofthe day (particularly early mornings) or in certain areas (such as near borders) more recognizable to lawenforcement officers through the use of decals and special license plates (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1998).These identifying marks alert police that the vehicle is out of place and should be stopped. While the programshave not yet been adequately evaluated, these programs are an interesting extension of property marking athome.AlarmsAlarms represent another possible deterrent to offending. Silent alarms in various Cedar Rapids, Iowa,schools and businesses increased both the numbers of arrests and the clearance rate in buildings with alarms(Cedar Rapids Police Department, 1975). Break-ins at buildings with alarms revealed entry through places nothooked up to the alarms (Cedar Rapids Police Department, 1975). Buck et al. (1993) examined the impact ofalarms and other factors on burglary in three Philadelphia suburbs. Alarms proved to be a strong deterrent tohousehold burglary.Interviews with offenders also reveal the impact of alarms. Reppetto (1974) found that one-third of theoffenders checked on the presence or absence of alarms during the planning stages of the offense. Bennett andWright (1984) asked burglars to evaluate videotape and photos of potential targets. They found that thepresence or absence of alarms was a prime consideration in the choice of their targets. Similarly, Hearnden andMagill (2004) find that 84 percent of active and incarcerated burglars claim that outside alarms are key factorsin their decision-making process. Blevins et al. (2012) report that 60 percent of 422 burglars were deterred byalarms. Interviews with burglars in New Zealand reveals that the main deterrent to offending is alarms andsecurity systems (Baker and Gray, 2005).Locks, Doors, and Related Access FactorsAccess control can be improved through the installation of various devices that make entry more difficult.These will not eliminate crime. Rather, a motivated offender will need to work harder and find more effectiveways of gaining entrance. The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office (1975) evaluated the effect of solid casedoors, dead bolt locks, pins in sliding glass doors, and construction of short walls aimed at making entrythrough windows more difficult at four public housing projects. The evaluation found a significant decline inthe level of burglary in three of the four target areas. The mode of entry after the improvements were madeshifted to the use of open and unlocked windows and doors. This shift was expected due to the increaseddifficulty posed by the changes (Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, 1975).A recent evaluation in Glasgow, Scotland, examined the impact of Secured By Design doors and windows inpublic housing. Dwellings fitted with both doors and windows in four areas comprised the experimental groupand matched control areas were identified for comparison (Teedon et al., 2009). A pre-post-analysis revealedsignificant drops in housebreaking, attempted housebreaking and theft in experimental dwellings. At the sametime, offending increased in the comparison areas (Teedon et al., 2009). The introduction of access controldevices, therefore, had a significant positive impact.Bennett and Wright’s (1984) study of burglars also shows support for the use of target-hardening devices.Their subjects list the type of windows and locks as one influence on their decision making. Offenders tend to76
prefer smaller windows because they are easier to force open. Similarly, the presence of a lock becomes moreeffective as the difficulty in picking or breaking the lock increases (Bennett and Wright, 1984).Area PermeabilityEfforts to limit access to neighborhoods include the establishment of dead-end streets, cul-de-sacs, one-waystreets, alley gating, and closing streets. Such action can project a private atmosphere, cut down on the level ofuse by strangers, and increase the presence of legitimate users. Often this approach is coupled with broadercommunity planning activities.In an early study, Newman and Wayne (1974) compared public and private streets in adjacent areas of St.Louis. A private street is one that is owned and maintained by the residents living on the street, is often a cul-de-sac, and is set apart from the connecting streets by means of landscaping, gates, entranceways, or othersimilar features. The authors found less crime on private streets and the fear of crime was lower amongsubjects living on those streets (Newman and Wayne, 1974). They also found more interaction between theresidents living on these private streets, which should lead to reduced crime. Unfortunately, the lack ofcomparability between the experimental and control groups, however, suggests that these results should beviewed with some caution.Different street layouts have been compared for their effect on crime. Bevis and Nutter (1977) look at therelative effect of dead-end, cul-de-sac, “L” type, “T” type, and through-traffic streets. These are arranged inorder of accessibility with the dead-end street being the least accessible. The authors find a clear relationshipexisting between the type of street layout and burglary. More accessible streets experience higher rates ofburglary (Bevis and Nutter, 1977). Johnson and Bowers (2010) note that burglary increases where there is agreater number of roads that intersect with one another.Newman (1996) reported on the effects of creating mini neighborhoods in Dayton, Ohio, by limiting accessto neighborhoods. Each mini-neighborhood was accessible by means of a single entrance. All other streets andalleys were closed to both access and egress. The results of the project were significant reductions in traffic,traffic accidents, overall crime, and violent crime in the mini neighborhoods. Residents also reported fewervictimizations and less fear of crime (Newman, 1996). Operation Cul-de-Sac in Los Angeles set out to curbgang homicides and assaults in a 10-block area by blocking road access in the area. Relying on Part I offensedata, Lasley (1998) reports that both homicides and assaults fell significantly during the period of the programand increased after the roadblocks were removed. Donnelly and Kimble (1997) investigate street closures in a10-square-block area of Dayton characterized by street crime, drugs, and prostitution. After a one-year follow-up, overall crime dropped 25 percent and violent crime fell 40 percent, while there is no evidence ofdisplacement to other areas (Donnelly and Kimble, 1997). These projects clearly show the impact of alteringtraffic flow in high crime areas. Similar results appear in studies in both the U.S. and U.K. (Armitage et al.,2010, 2011; Johnson and Bowers, 2010; Nubani and Wineman, 2009).In the United Kingdom, a relatively common attempt to control access is to erect alley gates. Alley gatingrefers to erecting gates on alleys that run behind home and businesses, thereby restricting access to residents orother legitimate users. A key target of this approach is burglary, particularly in areas where the criminals gainaccess through the rear of the buildings. An evaluation of alley gating in Liverpool reports that roughly 4,000alley gates had been erected (Home Office, 2001), with a subsequent reduction of 875 burglaries (Bowers et al.,2003). The gates had an impact independent of other crime prevention activities taking place in the target areas.Similarly, an analysis of alley gating in Cadoxton, South Wales, reveals clear decreases in burglary after theinstallation of the gates (Rogers, 2013). Residents in the gated areas also report reduced perceptions of bothcrime and disorder in the area. Haywood et al. (2009), examining the impact of alley gating in Oldham(northwest England), find significant reductions in burglary.The available evidence illustrates the potential of traffic control as a means of combating crime. Streets andareas that are easily accessible to pedestrian and auto traffic tend to experience higher levels of actual crimeand fear of crime. The construction of cul-de-sacs, dead-end streets, alley gates, and streets that promote afeeling of ownership will have positive effects for crime prevention.77
SummaryAs noted earlier, the amount of research aimed at single crime prevention approaches is minimal. Few crimeprevention programs are unidimensional in approach. Rather, most plans introduce a variety of techniques tobe implemented as parts of a larger prevention package. This makes evaluation of the individual factorsproblematic and necessitates research focused on entire programs. We now turn to an evaluation of crimeprevention efforts that include a range of ideas, including some of those already discussed.Physical Design of NeighborhoodsStudies of public housing are among the early examinations of area-wide physical design on crime. As notedearlier, Newman (1972) reports that crime varies among public housing with different design features. Variousdesign problems negate attempts to build a sense of community, lay claim to an area (territoriality), present asense of safety (image), or allow surveillance. Newman and Franck (1980), studying public housing in Newark,St. Louis, and San Francisco, find that accessibility and building size have direct effects on burglary and fear ofcrime. Building size also affects the use of space and feelings of control over space and indirectly, throughcontrol and use of space, on crime and fear. Poyner (1994), reporting on physical design in an English publichousing estate, demonstrates that limiting access reduces robbery, but not burglary. The removal of enclosedwalkways between buildings effectively limits access, escape and concealment for potential offenders (Poyner,1994).On the Web You can access and read about the North Asylum Hill project and many others at:https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/79544-79593NCJRS.pdfEnvironmental design received one of its biggest tests in the North Asylum Hill area of Hartford,Connecticut. This area implemented a number of crime prevention activities including changes in streetpatterns, landscaping, neighborhood police patrols, and increased citizen organization. The design elementswere primarily the creation of cul-de-sacs, the elimination of through streets, creating one-way streets, and thenarrowing of street openings—all geared to making the area appear more private and controlled by residents ofthe area. An initial evaluation revealed great decreases in both burglary and robbery as compared toneighboring South Asylum Hill and the remainder of Hartford (Fowler et al., 1979). Fear of burglary andpotential victimization also declined in the area. In addition, there was a corresponding increase in the use ofthe streets and parks by residents. A follow-up evaluation three years later (Fowler and Mangione, 1982)supported the findings of reduced vehicular traffic, increased pedestrian usage, and lower levels of fear, butboth burglary and robbery had returned to city-wide levels (Fowler and Mangione, 1982). The effect on crime,therefore, was short-lived.General characteristics of urban neighborhoods provide further insight into the physical design–crimerelationship. Greenberg et al. (1982) compare contiguous low and high crime neighborhoods in Atlanta. Lowcrime areas are characterized by single-family dwellings, few major through streets, and few vacant lots; arepredominantly residential; are bounded by other residential areas; and have characteristics that prohibit easyaccess. Uniform building setbacks and private parking, which diminish concealment for offenders, are also partof low crime neighborhoods (Greenberg et al., 1982). These results tend to support the argument that physicalfeatures can affect criminal behavior.The use of physical design changes to combat crime in a commercial area was undertaken in the UnionAvenue Corridor (UAC) of Portland, Oregon. The UAC was a commercial strip approximately 3.5 miles longand four blocks wide accommodating businesses ranging from light industry to banks to grocery stores and cardealerships. The surrounding area was middle to low income and predominately black, with a crime rate78
roughly three times that of the remainder of Portland (Kushmuk and Whittemore, 1981). The crime preventionprogram included improving street lighting, improving street appearance, changing traffic patterns, providingoff-street parking, establishing business and neighborhood groups, and using various promotional events, allwith the intent of reducing crime and fear and increasing social cohesion and improving the quality of life.Kushmuk and Whittemore (1981) note that official measures of crime (specifically robbery and commercialburglary) declined as a result of the prevention activities. Victimization surveys, however, revealed no changesin either the number of offenses or perceptions of victimization. In addition, while the overall fear of crime didnot change over the study period, customers were more fearful at night and the elderly were more fearful, ingeneral, after the crime prevention program. Changes in other outcomes also failed to appear. Neitherbusinessmen nor residents reported any increases in social cohesion or cooperation with the police (Kushmukand Whittemore, 1981). Residents also did not display any changes in communal activity or support ofneighbors. While businessmen reported that their sales had increased since the program’s implementation, theyfelt that the UAC was not in as good a condition as before the program (Kushmuk and Whittemore, 1981). Ingeneral, the evaluation showed some changes in crime and other social factors but these movements were notmuch different from those found in the remainder of Portland.In 1999, the British government began the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) by funding 63 projects acrossthe United Kingdom (Kodz and Pease, 2003). The RBI relies on local communities to identify the causes of theburglary problems in their area and to develop appropriate interventions, many of which are physical designchanges, such as target hardening, the installation of alley gates, lighting improvements, fencing, and propertymarking (Kodz and Pease, 2003). Interventions also include neighborhood watch, intensive police crackdowns,and other methods (discussed in later chapters). In 40 out of 55 RBI evaluations, the burglary rates fell relativeto the control areas (evaluations using comparison areas were not conducted in eight locations). An evaluationof the Fordbridge (West Midlands) RBI project, which implemented target hardening, alley gates, electronicentry controls for buildings, and improved street lighting, reports a reduction in burglary of 43 percent for theexperimental area (Home Office, 2003a). Similarly, the RBI project in Stirchley (West Midlands), relying onalley gates, fences and property marking (along with a crime prevention newsletter), claims a 53 percent dropin burglary, which is twice the reduction seen in the control area (Home Office, 2003b). These results on theeffectiveness of the RBI suggest that physical design elements are effective at reducing the burglary problem.On the Web More detail and information on the RBI project is available at:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors287.pdfSecure By Design has also received attention for its impact on crime. As noted earlier, SBD seeks toinfluence the building of new structures or the redesign of existing sites in ways that will mitigate crime anddisorder. In one evaluation of SBD in West Yorkshire, Armitage (2000) notes a significant reduction in crime atthe sites that were refurbished following the SBD principles. There was a 26 percent drop in the number ofdwelling crimes and roughly half as many residents reported being fearful around their homes. An assessmentof environmental design features comparing 25 SBD estates with 25 non-SBD estates also shows theeffectiveness of physical design for reducing burglary and general crime (Armitage, 2007). Estates conformingto proper design guidelines are at lower risk for crime than estates not using the design features.In a study of SBD in West Yorkshire, Armitage and Monchuk (2011) report similar positive results. Bothburglary and overall crime is significantly lower in SBD developments compared to non-SBD developmentsand the entire city. They further note that as the concentration of SBD homes increases, the level of overallcrime decreases (Armitage and Monchuk, 2011). These results have been maintained over a 10-year period oftime. Teedon et al. (2009, 2010) report similar positive results from an analysis of SBD in Glasgow. Comparedto non-SBD properties, roughly 60 percent fewer SBD homes experienced burglaries and theft from burglary,and 80 percent fewer attempted burglaries. There was also a drop in crime in a comparison of pre-SBD andpost-SBD data (Teedon et al., 2010).79
A Challenge to Defensible SpaceWhile it appears that physical design features can impact crime and fear, there is no guarantee that properdesign will produce the desired results. Merry (1981) conducted an 18-month participant observation study of asingle public housing project that seemed to conform to good defensible space design. The project wascomposed of low buildings, separate courtyards, few families per entranceway, wide pathways, public space infront of the buildings, and private (fenced) space at the rear of the buildings. Additionally, many of theresidents had installed target-hardening devices such as locks and window bars. Using a combination ofinterviews, observation, and official crime figures, Merry (1981) found that the physical design features failedto have any effect on crime or the residents’ feelings of safety. Despite the seeming defensibility of the project,Merry (1981) questioned the design features. First, the stairwells and hallways near doors were not easilyobservable by residents or passersby. Second, many of the outdoor features, such as fences and enclosed trashcollectors, actually provided cover for potential offenders. Finally, the layout of the buildings and outdoorareas, although seemingly conducive to territoriality, confused residents and visitors and produced discomfortand disorientation. Clearly, the physical design did not increase interaction between residents and residentsrarely intervened in questionable behavior (Merry, 1981). Residents were unable to distinguish strangers fromlegitimate users, feared future retaliation, and held an uncaring attitude toward those not identified as friendsor relatives. Merry attributed these problems to a lack of social cohesion and community identity among theproject’s residents.The general failure of the defensible space concept to bring about clear reductions in crime was placedsquarely on the inability of the physical environment to effectively create feelings of territoriality and a senseof community concern and action. Merry (1981) noted that “good defensible space design neither guaranteesthat a space will appear safe nor that it will become a part of a territory which residents defend effectively.” Anarea may be defensible but undefended.Second-Generation CPTEDThese various discussions should not be interpreted as indicating that there is no positive effect of defensiblespace features on crime and fear of crime. An array of studies have found various design features and crimeprevention techniques that affect crime and fear. There are, however, a substantial number of studies thatproduce negative or equivocal results.These contradictory findings may stem from the inability to bring about, or lack of attention paid to,changes in intervening factors (see Figure 4.1), such as social cohesion and feelings of territoriality. The basicpremise of Newman’s argument is that the physical environment engenders feelings of territoriality and citizencontrol, which then affect crime. Any failure of physical design, therefore, may be due to an inability of theindividual implementation program to bring about these intervening factors.Discussions of CPTED over the past decade have increasingly pointed to the development of a second-generation CPTED. Saville and Cleveland (2003), Cozens et al. (2005), and Reynald (2011) all argue thatCPTED needs to explicitly look beyond simple physical design and overtly incorporate social factors andactivities in prevention. Cozens et al. (2005) note that CPTED needs to consider the social makeup ofareas/neighborhoods. Reynald (2011) argues for formal/organized surveillance which is enhanced by focusingon social capital and social cohesion. Saville and Cleveland (2003) outline four components to second-generation CPTED:1. Social cohesion between residents, businesses, and others.2. Connectivity of the local area to government agencies, businesses, and others that can contribute toarea improvement.3. Community cultural initiatives that can bring people together.4. Threshold capacity that builds cohesion among residents and serves to enhance the community andsupport the needs and efforts of the residents.In essence, second-generation CPTED seeks to directly enhance the intervening factors needed to prevent80
crime.A Third-Generation CPTEDIn 2011, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) published“Improving Urban Security through Green Environmental Design.” This document proposes a third-generation CPTED that uses green sustainable design to improve communities and reduce crime (and othersocial) problems. The key to this is making residents, visitors, and anyone else feel safe in the community(UNICRI, 2011). This is essentially territoriality. Third-generation CPTED “insists on practical measures,physically or cybernetically enhanced, that foster the perception of urban space as safe” (UNICRI, 2011, p. 11).This is done using technologies that transform public space to interactive communal space, which fosters asense of belonging, ownership, and surveillability.Third-generation CPTED included four major components: (1) places, (2) people, (3) technology, and (4)networks. This version of CPTED seeks to reprogram urban space to achieve a safer community. Each of thecore components promotes efforts that build interaction between users and a sense of ownership that shouldlead to increased safety (see Table 4.7). A cornerstone to all this is the use of technology and green design for asustainable community. While the presentation of this approach often reads as very futuristic and utopian(especially when talking about embedded sensors and actuators in buildings throughout the city), it is a veryforward-looking, “outside the box” approach that may impact behavior in the future.Table 4.7 Third-Generation CPTED: Core ConceptsPlaceSafe homes; secure employment; activity centers; green space; new developments; healthyenvironment; natural surveillance; public transportation; public educationPeopleAbility for people to be heard; communication; sense of belonging; community gatheringsTechnologyEnergy efficiency; transparency; green energy; surveillance networks; informatics; real timeinformation; interaction; cyberneticsNetworksPhysical networks for community; energy; communication; etc.; wireless networks forinformation transfer; social networkingSource: Adapted by author from UNICRI (2011). Improving Urban Security Through Green Environmental Design. Retrieved fromhttp://www.unicri.it/news/files/2011-04-01_110414_CRA_Urban_Security_sm.pdf81
Incivility, Disorder, and CrimeA final topic to address is the issue of disorder and incivility. While “crime and disorder” have beenaddressed throughout this chapter, it is always in terms of action to eliminate these problems. Much of thediscussion about physical features deals with the correct design to allow surveillance and feelings of goodwillamong legitimate users. It is also important to question the degree to which signs of disorder may activelypromote criminal activity. This may occur when both signs of physical and social disorder signal that an areaor location is not protected and is open to criminal behavior.Various authors (Hunter, 1978; Skogan, 1990; Taylor and Gottfredson, 1986; Wilson and Kelling, 1982) havepresented indicators of physical disorder, including broken windows, abandoned buildings, vacant lots,deteriorating buildings, litter, vandalism, and graffiti. Similarly, they offer social indicators, such as loiteringjuveniles, public drunkenness, gangs, drug sales and use, harassment (such as begging and panhandling),prostitution, and a lack of interaction among people on the street. Perkins and Taylor (1996), Taylor et al.(1995), and Spelman (1993) suggest that physical disorder can contribute to the growth of social disorder.Examples of such instances would be non-residential property or abandoned structures interrupting a housingblock (Taylor, 1988). The physical layout may inhibit social interaction among residents and allow for socialincivilities to arise.These physical and social indicators are typically referred to as signs of disorder or incivility. Incivility in aneighborhood has been proposed as evidence that the residents are not concerned, or at least are lessconcerned, about what is happening around them than people in areas not characterized by incivility (Lewisand Salem, 1986). Signs of disorder may lead residents to withdraw into their homes and abandon cooperativeefforts at improving the neighborhood (Skogan, 1990; Taylor, 1988). This would leave the neighborhood open topotential offenders. The idea of incivilities can be viewed as another part of Newman’s “image.” For theoffender, signs of incivility are indicative of lower risk (Taylor and Gottfredson, 1986). Efforts to minimizedisorder and incivility through improvement of the physical and social environment, therefore, should increaseperceived risk and decrease crime and fear of crime.Interestingly, incivility has been accepted almost without question as a cause of crime and fear in society,despite the relative lack of research on the subject. This is somewhat easy to understand when one considersthe location of crime and fear in communities. Areas exhibiting physical and social signs of incivility are oftenthe same ones experiencing higher levels of crime and fear. Indeed, a number of studies find that crime andfear are higher in areas displaying signs of disorder (Lynch and Cantor, 1992; Perkins and Taylor, 1996; Skogan,1990; Spelman, 1993).The logical assumption to draw from the research on incivility is that efforts to reduce physical and socialdisorder will effectively reduce crime and fear. Taylor (1997), however, questions the extent to whicheliminating signs of disorder, particularly physical signs, will have an impact. He points out that therelationship between disorder and fear is highly contingent on how disorder is measured. Specifically, areadisorder measured objectively by independent raters is only marginally related to fear and resident behavior. Astrong relationship between disorder and fear (and possibly behavior) appears only when perceived incivilitiesare considered, as subjectively reflected in surveys of residents. Consequently, efforts to reduce physicaldisorder would have only minimal impact on fear (Taylor, 1997). The challenge is to identify methods ofaltering the perceptions of disorder.While there may be some disagreement about the actual influence of disorder and incivilities on crime, fear,and citizen behavior, many reasons remain for working to reduce signs of incivility. Perhaps the best reason isthat no one should have to live in areas with such problems. Additionally, even minimal effects on crime andfear should be considered a success. Unless research finds that efforts to remove disorder increase crime andfear, there is only an upside to their elimination.82
83
SummaryExamination of the existing evidence on physical design shows some promising results along with a numberof instances in which the impact of the techniques is inconsistent. Table 4.8 attempts to provide a generalsummary of the impact of different physical design techniques across different target areas. A great deal of thesupport for the results in Table 4.8 does not appear in the earlier discussion. Instead, the table rests on evidencepresented here and in other analyses.Table 4.8 Summary of the Evidence on Physical Design Impact on CrimesTechniquePositive ImpactUnclear ImpactNo ImpactLightingBurglaryBurglary (business)TheftTheft (business)FearRobbery (business)ViolenceCCTVFearBurglaryAuto theftTheftRobberyViolenceTraffic patterns/ street layoutBurglaryTheftFearRobberyViolenceAlarmsBurglaryProperty IDBurglaryTheftInformal surveillanceBurglaryTheftRobberyFearBuilding designBurglaryRobberyTheftFear84
Area improvementFearBurglaryRobberyTheftThe left-hand column of the table lists the crime prevention action or technique. The second column liststhose instances where the technique has a positive impact, that is, where the crime or fear has gone down as aresult of the crime prevention action. The next column lists those crimes where there is no clear impact of thetechnique. In these cases, there is conflicting evidence on the technique’s impact and a great deal of divergenceacross studies/contexts. The final column lists those instances where evaluations show the crime preventiontechniques have no impact.An inspection of the table reveals that there are a number of instances in which physical design techniqueshave been found to be effective. Interestingly, there are also many examples in which the evidence is stilluncertain and there are several examples in which the techniques have been found to have no impact (e.g.,permeability has no apparent impact on theft or robbery). With so many cases of uncertainty in the findings,how is it possible to have such discrepancies and where does this leave CPTED?Part of the reason for the discrepancies stems from the nature of social research. First, many of the studiesare attempting to investigate the effect of one set of factors on crime. In so doing, the evaluators often fail toconsider the vast array of alternative variables that may be contributing to the levels of crime and fear. Second,many studies fail to specify an adequate control group or have no control group. The results of the evaluations,therefore, have no baseline upon which to judge any change or lack of change. The simple use of measurestaken prior to and after a change within a single locale or group cannot solve the problem of possiblecompeting influences and factors occurring simultaneously with the intervention of interest. Third, the vastarray of study sites makes comparison across studies difficult. It is difficult to compare the various studyresults in the absence of detailed information on each experimental and control group from each study. Thecontext within which each study is being conducted may greatly influence the results. Evaluations that exhibitpositive effects may be taking place in locations that are fundamentally different from those showing negativeor no effects. This possibility cannot be assessed from many reports.The lack of consistent positive results also may be due to the fact that many physical design featurescontribute to the building of fortresses for protection. Physical design changes, target hardening, and accesscontrol serve to isolate people from one another rather than build territoriality. While these efforts may reducethe level of fear of crime, there is a concomitant loss of community. Counter to Newman’s assumption thatphysical design will engender a sense of community, social support, and territoriality, there is little or noevidence that this happens. Crime can be expected to increase where traditional, fortress mentality techniquesare employed. As the individual withdraws from the rest of the neighborhood in an attempt to protect himself,the community enters an upward spiral of increased crime, fear, and loss of community.An alternative is to emphasize second-generation CPTED. Such crime prevention techniques overtly promptthe retention, retrieval, and/or enhancement of the community. Neighborhood/block watch, citizen patrols,community-oriented policing, and similar reactions reflect community-oriented responses to crime and fear.These efforts should reduce crime and fear over time as the community reasserts itself and takes control of thebehavior and actions of persons within the community. Rather than assume that alterations in a sense ofcommunity, neighborhood cohesion, and similar factors follow physical design changes, a community-orientedmodel suggests that interventions specifically directed at increasing social interaction, social cohesion, feelingsof ownership, territoriality, and reducing fear will be more effective at combating crime and victimization. Thenext chapter looks at community-oriented crime prevention programs which actively seek to involve thecitizens in actions that should engender community/neighborhood cohesion, a sense of control, territoriality,and other factors that will affect both fear and crime. The next chapter focuses on attempts to increase citizeninvolvement in crime prevention and fill the gap left by simple environmental design approaches.Key Terms85
access controlactivity supportalley gatingclosed-circuit television (CCTV)Crime and Disorder Act (CDA)Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)defensible spaceescapeformal or organized surveillanceimageincivilitymechanical surveillancemilieumotivation reinforcementnatural surveillanceOperation IdentificationOTREPpermeabilityprospectreal territorialityReducing Burglary Initiative (RBI)refugesecond-generation CPTEDSecured By Design (SBD)symbolic territorialitytarget hardeningterritorialitythird-generation CPTED86
Chapter 5Neighborhood Crime PreventionChapter OutlineTypes of Neighborhood Crime Prevention ApproachesNeighborhood/Block WatchCommunity Anti-Drug ProgramsCitizen PatrolsBuilding GuardianshipEvaluation of Neighborhood Crime PreventionEffects on Community CohesionEffects on CrimeTwo Examples—Kirkholt and Safer CitiesCommunity Anti-Drug ProgramsCitizen PatrolsNeighborhood Crime Prevention and Fear of CrimeEvaluation IssuesCitizen Participation and SupportWho Participates?Problematic Assumptions in Organizing for Crime PreventionLeveraging Participation/GuardianshipChapter SummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Demonstrate your knowledge of neighborhood watch and the types of activities found inneighborhood watch programs.Define community anti-drug programs and discuss their impact.Discuss citizen patrols and their crime prevention capabilities.Outline routine activities theory.Discuss Eck’s triplets of guardianship.Talk about the impact of neighborhood crime prevention on community cohesion.Provide an overview of the impact of neighborhood crime prevention on crime and fear.Discuss the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project and its impact.Explain the Safer Cities program and its impact.List problems and issues that hamper the evaluation of neighborhood crime prevention programs.Talk about who participates in neighborhood crime prevention.Provide reasons for the divergent findings on who participates in crime prevention.Discuss research findings on domains of crime prevention.Outline the five problematic assumptions underlying neighborhood watch.87
The failure of physical, environmental design changes to always impact crime and fear may be directlyattributable to the ability of such activities to live up to the assumptions of the basic theory. Few authors claimthat changes in physical design alone will have a major impact on crime. By themselves, locks, lights,windows, and the other physical characteristics can only make offending more difficult and lead to alternativemeans of committing the crimes. The key element that will reduce and prevent crime is the ability of thephysical features to enhance active surveillance, engender community cohesion, and promote citizen actionagainst crime.Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design has faltered because of the inability to motivate residentsand legitimate users to become active guardians against crime. As seen in Chapter 4, the evidence in support ofa link between physical design features and intervening factors such as increased social cohesion and use of anarea is rarely found in the evaluations. This may be due to the lack of attention paid to these factors. Studiesthat include intervening elements find little support for the connection between physical design and changes insocial cohesion, support, and other intervening constructs. In addition, the conflicting evidence concerning theinfluence of physical features on crime may be due to conflicting levels of social cohesion, communityatmosphere, surveillance, and other intervening variables that are unaccounted for in the studies.Second-generation CPTED seeks to directly build social cohesion, citizen participation, and resident action.The most recognized manifestation of the second-generation goals is neighborhood crime prevention. Whilepredating second-generation CPTED, neighborhood crime prevention seeks to directly influence interveningconstructs in the CPTED model and, in turn, build active guardianship and impact levels of crime and fear.Neighborhood crime prevention can take a variety of forms that are broader in scope than just those discussedin connection with physical design. Possible techniques include neighborhood watch, neighborhood advocacy,citizen patrols, physical design, and any actions to engender guardianship. Figure 5.1 illustrates the conceptualframework of neighborhood crime prevention.The wide array of activities demonstrates the fact that crime prevention relies on a number of approachesand cannot be left to one basic set of ideas, such as physical design. The model in Figure 5.1 proposes thatintervening changes must occur before the long-term problems are affected. The model shows that some of theCPTED design characteristics introduced in the last chapter as initial points of interventionFigure 5.1 Neighborhood-Based Crime Prevention Conceptual Framework Source: R.F. Cook and J.A. Roehl (1983). Preventing Crime and Arson: A Review of Community-based Strategies. Reston, VA: Institute for SocialAnalysis.(i.e., property marking and home security) are viewed here as intermediate outcomes of the more generalstrategies. The most important of these general strategies is citizen involvement. Citizen activity and interest,88
as we will see, often precede the other factors, including physical design.89
Types of Neighborhood Crime Prevention ApproachesA wide variety of neighborhood crime prevention strategies have been proposed and implemented over theyears. Since the 1970s, there has been a great proliferation of programs in the United States, United Kingdom,and other countries. While many programs have been instigated and aided by various government agencies orpolicies, other programs have emerged from the simple realization by citizens that the formal criminal justicesystem is incapable of solving the crime problem on its own. Regardless of the source of stimulation,neighborhood crime prevention has become a major aspect of crime prevention.Neighborhood/Block WatchNeighborhood watch directly seeks to bring neighbors and residents of an area together as a means ofenhancing knowledge of one another and their ability to recognize who belongs and who does not in the area.Key activities of neighborhood watch groups include discussions of mutual problems in the neighborhood,actions to increase feelings of community, and the promotion of interventions to address common problems.Neighborhood watch, ideally, is proactive in design. That is, it sets out to identify problems before they occuror, at the very least, as they occur. This requires interaction between citizens and law enforcement, educationabout crime and prevention efforts, and the implementation of various preventive actions. Figure 5.2 is a logicmodel by the Bureau of Justice Assistance that outlines activities and expectations for a typical neighborhoodwatch group. Neighborhood involvement is meant to recognize and circumvent the problems that lead to anarea’s decline and accompanying increased crime.In its most effective form, neighborhood watch should provide informal (and possibly formal) social controlin the community. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) note that many neighborhoods are socially disorganized and,consequently, are unable to exert any control over residents or visitors to the area. Building on the early workof Shaw and McKay (1931, 1942), the authors argue that neighborhoods need to draw on resources from avariety of sources in an effort to build social control. Friendships, families, local businesses, churches, schools,and interpersonal networks are examples of local resources upon which neighborhoods can draw and build(Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Neighborhood watch is one incarnation of social control in a neighborhood.90
Figure 5.2 BJA Center for Program Evaluation and Performance Measurement: Neighborhood Watch Logic Model Source: Bureau of Justice Assistance (2015). Neighborhood Watch Logic Model. https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-crime-prevention/cbcp6.htmOne way that neighborhood watch contributes to social control is through the heavy use of surveillance.Successful surveillance requires the ability to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate users of an area. Theabsence of such recognition leaves residents unable to identify someone or something that is out of place.Members of neighborhood organizations become eyes and ears for the police. It is impossible for the legalauthorities to be everywhere at the same time. It is the responsibility of ordinary citizens, therefore, to assist inthe surveillance function of law enforcement.On the Web The National Sheriff’s Association, supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, maintains aweb site for neighborhood watch that contains a great deal of information. This can be accessedat http://www.nnw.org/ The textbook web site also has a “Neighborhood Watch Manual” fromthe Bureau of Justice Assistance that you may find helpful.Table 5.1 Cooperative Neighborhood Crime Prevention ParticipationAreaNeighborhood WatchInformal SurveillanceNew World36%67%91
Asia2377Western Europe1859Africa1048Latin America1260Countries in transition849Source: del Frate (1998). Preventing Crime: Citizens’ Experiences Across the World. UNICRI Issues and Reports No. 9. New York: UnitedNations.The exact number of neighborhood or block watches is not known. Many neighborhood watch groups aretrue grassroots organizations and do not belong to any larger national organization that keeps records on suchgroups. In the United States, the National Sheriffs’ Association sponsors the National Neighborhood Watch(NNW) organization. According to NNW (2015), there were more than 25,000 neighborhood watch groups inthe United States in 2012, with more than one million volunteers. It is unknown how many other non-affiliatedneighborhood watch groups or participants exist. The National Association of Town Watch (2015) claims morethan 16,000 communities with 38 million neighbors involved. O’Keefe et al. (1996) note that 31 percent ofnational survey respondents claimed membership in a neighborhood crime prevention organization. InEngland and Wales, the Neighborhood and Home Watch Network (2015) claims there are 170,000neighborhood watch schemes with 3.8 million participating households. According to the 2009–2010 BritishCrime Survey, roughly 13 percent of the households in England and Wales participate in neighborhood watchschemes. Internationally, neighborhood watch is more common in New World countries (the United States, theUnited Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and Asian countries than other areas (see Table 5.1).Beyond a formal neighborhood watch group, greater numbers of people simply call on neighbors to keep aneye on their home when they are gone (del Frate, 1998). It is important to remember that any numbers onneighborhood watch participation are only approximations. There is no centralized measure of participation inneighborhood watch, so determining involvement is difficult.The surveillance goal of neighborhood watch is greatly enhanced by instituting various activities. Garofaloand McLeod (1988), based on a national survey of neighborhood watch programs, reported that the mostcommon activities among groups are Operation Identification (appearing in 81 percent of the programs),followed by security surveys (68 percent), crime hotlines (38 percent), and block parenting (27 percent).Improving street lighting (35 percent) and physical environmental concerns (38 percent) are also commonactivities adopted by neighborhood watch groups. Among the other activities reported by the neighborhoodwatch groups are escort services, Whistle Stop, phone chains, court watch, hiring guards, organizedsurveillance, and victim/witness assistance (Garofalo and McLeod, 1988). One institutionalized neighborhoodproject is the National Night Out program. Started in 1981 and sponsored by the National Association ofTown Watch, the program occurs every August and consists of educational programs, neighborhoodorganizing, social events, and anti-drug and anti-crime activities (natw.org). National Night Out receives agreat deal of support from law enforcement and encourages citizens to leave their lights on, come out of theirhomes, and join together to combat crime and community problems.Community Anti-Drug ProgramsOne notable movement in the area of neighborhood anti-crime programs in the 1990s involved theproliferation of community anti-drug (CAD) programs. In response to the surge in drug use, particularlycocaine and crack in inner cities during the early 1990s, residents banded together with each other, the police,and various agencies and organizations to attack drug use, drug sales, and related problems (Davis et al., 1993).Many of the neighborhood efforts mirrored neighborhood watch programs in their use of surveillance tactics,reporting to the police, working with agencies to clean up the area, providing information to residents,instituting anti-drug programs, and participating in citizen patrols.92
On the Web More information on the Drug Free Communities Support Program is available athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/Drug-Free-Communities-Support-ProgramWhile no count of CAD programs is available, it is reasonable to assume that they are prevalent, particularlyin larger cities and areas with serious, visible drug problems. The Center for Substance Abuse Prevention’sCommunity Partnership Demonstration Program targeted 252 communities for anti-drug activity (Davis andLurigio, 1996). The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy oversees the Drug Free CommunitiesSupport Program. This program offers funding in support of some 2,000 community coalitions with 9,000volunteers in their efforts to combat drug problems on a variety of levels (White House Office of National DrugControl Policy, 2015). Included in the community activities is encouraging citizen participation in preventionactivity.Citizen PatrolsCitizen patrols are often a key element of neighborhood watch and represent an active role in surveillanceefforts. The sole purpose of patrols is to put more eyes on the street in order to increase the chances ofdetecting strangers in the area and discovering crimes in progress. Residents are discouraged from physicallyintervening in any suspicious activity they may find. While most citizen patrols are on foot, mobile patrols canbe found in some communities. Participants can be either volunteers or paid individuals.As with block watches, no clear number of citizen patrols is available. The Guardian Angels is perhaps themost well-known citizen patrol group. Started in 1971, the group is made up primarily of teenagers and youngadults, and boasts having over 130 chapters in the United States and 17 other countries. It also provideseducational materials on safety, an online, Internet safety component, and works with at-risk youths(www.guardianangels.org). In the United Kingdom, local churches are active in promoting citizen patrols. Onegroup, Street Pastors, operates in 250 locations and claims more than 9,000 volunteers. A second group, StreetAngels, boasts 120 patrols (Bullock, 2014).Variations on the citizen patrol theme include Whistle Stop, Radio Watch, and similar projects. Thesesurveillance methods use the simple presence of people on the street. Participants in these programs generallydo not serve in any formal capacity or follow any set schedules. Instead, they watch for suspicious persons andactivity while partaking in normal daily activity. For example, people in Whistle Stop blow a whistle if theysee something happening out of the ordinary as they are shopping, working, or simply walking out of doors.Radio Watch relies on individuals with two-way radios (such as cab drivers and truckers) or cell phones toreport questionable behavior when they see it occurring. Once again, the key is to observe, call the authorities,and not take any further action.On the Web The Guardian Angels support a number of chapters and initiatives. You can explore what theyoffer at http://www.guardianangels.org/93
94
Building GuardianshipThroughout all of the different forms of neighborhood crime prevention, the key component is buildingguardianship. The primary guardians are typically meant to be residents and legitimate users of the areas.Indeed, as discussed in the last chapter, physical design is expected to engender citizen action (guardianship) tostop crime. The failure of CPTED to bring this about led to overt efforts to engender citizen action (as insecond-generation CPTED) and neighborhood crime prevention.The importance of guardianship is demonstrated most effectively in routine activities theory. Cohen andFelson (1979) argue that three things must coincide for crime to occur. These are (1) a suitable target, (2) amotivated offender, and (3) an absence of guardians. When these three factors converge in time and place, theopportunity for crime is enhanced. It is important to note that routine activities theory does not posit thatcrime will occur. That is, it is not a cause of criminal activity. Rather, it presents the opportunity for crime andgreatly enhances the chances that crime will take place. Addressing crime, therefore, is accomplished byreducing the opportunity.Neighborhood watch, in particular, and community crime prevention, in general, primarily address theguardianship component of routine activities. Guardianship can take a variety of forms. Eck (1994) proposestriplets of guardianship—guardians of targets, handlers of offenders, and managers of places—whichcorrespond to the elements of routine activities theory. The inner triangle of Figure 5.3 represents the basiccomponents of routine activities—the point at which targets, offenders, and places coincide. The outer triangleindicates the potential guardians or protectors for each of the dimensions. Each type of guardian may beinstrumental in determining the level and type of crime that occurs. Guardians, handlers, and managers havethe ability to reduce the opportunity for crime by limiting at least one dimension necessary for the commissionof an offense. The guardians are typically the owner of the property, a family member or friend, the police orsecurity, or others who provide surveillance and protection to the target.Figure 5.3 Routine Activities Triangle Source: R.V. Clarke and J.E. Eck (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Washington, DC: Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services.Guardianship requires more than just the existence of a possible guardian. Hollis-Peel et al. (2011) note thatguardianship can be either a physical presence to address crime or it can be a symbolic presence that signalshigher risk to potential offenders. The guardians themselves do not have to be those tasked with guarding aperson or place. Instead, the guardians can be individuals who just happen to be present when a motivatedoffender is contemplating action. There is also the assumption that the guardian has the physical ability to95
intervene and the willingness to do so. Reynald (2011) argues that there are three dimensions to actualguardianship. These are (1) the simple availability to observe what is happening around one’s self, (2) actuallyundertaking the task of watching, and (3) acting on what the individual sees. Hollis-Peel et al. (2011) add to thisdiscussion by proposing a hierarchy of guardianship:4. Intervening guardians who are visible, monitoring the area, and take action when something occurs.3. Capable guardians who are visible and actively observing/monitoring.2. Available guardians who are present but are not actively paying attention to what is happening in thearea.1. Invisible guardians who are not evident or visible in the area.This hierarchy suggests that the simple presence of an individual does not guarantee observation or action.Reynald (2011) suggests that, in many instances, guardianship is interrupted at different points, which inhibitssuccessful surveillance and action. These may be an inability to recognize strangers in an area, the absence ofpersonal attachment to the area, a high level of resident turnover that prompts alienation between theresidents, or more targets than potential guardians (Reynald, 2011). As a result, Reynald argues thatguardianship needs to be conceptualized as Guardianship in Action, which refers to taking steps to ensure thatresidents and individuals carry out active guardianship. That is, they have the ability to observe, they watchwhat is happening, and they take action when they see something taking place (Reynald, 2011).96
Evaluation of Neighborhood Crime PreventionEvaluation of neighborhood crime prevention efforts typically involves two distinct measures ofeffectiveness. The most logical measure is the impact these activities have on crime and the fear of crime. Asecond measure of effectiveness is the impact of neighborhood organizing on intervening factors such as socialcohesion, a sense of territoriality, and neighborliness. Crime rates and fear of crime change to the extent thatthese intervening factors are enhanced. The following evaluation of neighborhood crime prevention looks atchanges in both the intermediate factors as well as crime and fear of crime.On the Web CrimeSolutions.gov provides access to a great deal of information on community crimeprevention interventions and their effectiveness at http://crimesolutions.gov/ The textbook website also has a document from the Office of Community-Oriented Policing on “Does NW ReduceCrime?”Effects on Community CohesionStudies of neighborhood crime prevention often include an evaluation of the effectiveness of theorganization effort. The outcome measures range from simple documentation of existing groups and numbersof participants to some statements about the quality of individual involvement. A few studies rely exclusivelyupon these process evaluation measures and fail to consider the actual impact on crime and fear. Theassumption in these later studies is that changes in intermediary factors inevitably lead to crime prevention.Several analyses of community crime prevention note the extent of citizen participation in terms of numberof neighborhood groups and the number of participants in those groups. Garofalo and McLeod (1988) andO’Keefe et al. (1996) demonstrate widespread participation in various crime prevention activities. Bennett(1990) reports that 64 percent of the residents in one London neighborhood and 44 percent in another claim toparticipate in neighborhood watch. Crawford (1998) notes that more than six million people participate inneighborhood watch organizations in England and Wales.While these levels of activity may appear to be admirable, it is unknown how many people regularly attendcrime prevention meetings, heed the advice they are given, or do more than simply show up at the meetings.How many people show up at more than the initial organizational meeting? How much impact do a fewhundred people have when they are spread out among thousands of groups around the country and how muchsupport do they have in the community at large? These key questions are not clearly answered in mostanalyses.Crime prevention programs typically report positive results, such as neighborhood improvements, andassume that these are signs of increased community cohesion and territoriality. One of the problems with thisevidence is that many times the improvements are funded and undertaken by outside agencies and notresidents. While the improvements may be significant, there is little or no evidence that these changesimpacted social cohesion or interaction. As noted in the last chapter, crime preventive initiatives may conflictwith each other and negate the intended actions. Cozens and Davies (2013), for example, note that theinstallation of security shutters on homes, a physical design component of neighborhood watch, led to reducedsocial interaction.Evaluations of neighborhood watch routinely show that watch participants hold very positive attitudes ofthe police (Brown and Wycoff, 1987; Laycock and Tilley, 1995b; Shernock, 1986; Skogan and Wycoff, 1986;Williams and Pate, 1987; Wolfer, 2001). Community watch programs bring citizens and officers together in97
symbiotic, mutual, problem-solving activity. The police serve neighborhood groups as sources of informationon crime and crime prevention techniques. The public, in turn, provides information on suspicious persons,crimes in progress, and relevant crime-solving information. This information is routinely used to argue thatneighborhood watch leads to improved community cohesion.Various studies of neighborhood crime prevention efforts attempt to more directly assess changes incommunity cohesion and communal support. The results, however, are often mixed. Bennett (1987, 1990),studying neighborhood watch in two areas of London, reports that social cohesion increased in one anddecreased in the other. Similarly, an analysis of four organized neighborhoods in Chicago (Rosenbaum et al.,1985) reveals no change in community cohesion for three areas and decreased cohesion in the fourthneighborhood. Lewis et al. (1988) analyzed interviews with residents in five neighborhood watch areas ofChicago both before and after the implementation of increased efforts at organization. Unfortunately, theauthors find no change in the frequency of informal discussion between residents or in the number ofneighbors known by name, both of which indicate that community cohesion appears to be unaffected by theneighborhood watch programs.Effects on CrimeThe primary interest in neighborhood crime prevention is reduced levels of crime and fear of crime.Community crime prevention techniques are aimed primarily at the property offenses of burglary, larceny, androbbery. Little, if any, impact should be found on crimes of interpersonal violence. The reason for this is thatmany personal crimes occur between individuals who know one another and within the home. Increasedsurveillance will not alleviate crimes when the offender and victim are co-residents or legitimate users of thearea. Neither would appear out of place nor draw attention to themselves. Only crimes that occur betweenstrangers should experience any great reduction from neighborhood watch activities. The following discussionof effects on crime is divided into three primary areas—studies using official data, analysis of victim surveydata, and a discussion of two specific prevention initiatives from Great Britain.Official RecordsOfficial crime records reveal a positive impact of neighborhood watch programs on crime. Most studiesreport a lower level of crime (particularly property offenses) in the target communities than control areasand/or decreases compared to pre-program levels. An early comparison of Detroit neighborhoods shows a 58percent reduction in burglary and 61 percent fewer purse snatchings in the crime prevention community(Figgie International, 1983). Perry (1984), investigating citizen crime prevention in 15 Denver neighborhoods,finds that 11 of the 15 neighborhoods had lower crime rates the year following implementation compared tothe year prior to the project. Similarly, Latessa and Travis (1987) note significant drops in burglary, larceny,auto theft, and total crime in an organized area of Cincinnati compared to the rest of the city. The efficacy ofthe neighborhood efforts is supported by the fact that comparable decreases did not appear for personal crimes(aggravated assault and robbery), which are not the typical target of neighborhood actions.Many of the projects that are a part of the Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI) in the United Kingdom includeneighborhood watch, targeted policing, youth programs, and other interventions, along with physical designchanges in their programs (Kodz and Pease, 2003). In early evaluations in Rochdale (Greater Manchester) andYew Tree, Sandwell (West Midlands), the programs significantly reduced the burglary levels in theexperimental areas relative to the control neighborhoods (Home Office, 2003c, 2003d). Millie and Hough (2004)report an average decrease of 21 percent in burglaries in RBI areas, with decreases in 14 of 16 projects. Similarpositive results have been reported elsewhere in the United States and the United Kingdom (Anderton, 1985;Jenkins and Latimer, 1987; Kohfeld et al., 1981; Laycock and Tilley, 1995a).A systematic review of neighborhood watch evaluations reports positive results. Holloway et al. (2008)report on a meta-analysis of existing research on neighborhood watch. The authors were able to locate 18evaluations primarily from the U.S. and U.K., which provided data for reanalysis. The results of the analysesreveal that neighborhood watch is effective at significantly reducing crime (Holloway et al., 2008).98
Interestingly, studies from the U.S. and Canada were more likely to uncover positive results than those fromthe U.K.These results do not mean that all studies using official records find lower levels of crime in crimeprevention communities. An evaluation of neighborhood watch programs in London finds no change in crimefor organized areas while there were decreases in control neighborhoods (Bennett, 1990). One possibleexplanation for mixed results would be pre-program differences in the areas or in offending. Neighborhoodwatch areas with great reductions in crime are often those with high pre-program offense levels (Henig, 1984).The reductions, therefore, could be due to a regression to the more natural crime levels for these areas.An important confounding factor in the evaluation of neighborhood watch may be changes in the level ofreporting to the police. Successful programs should increase the number of calls to the police. At the same time,there may be a reduction in crime. This is possible if citizens call the police more often but fewer calls reflectcriminal activities. For example, Bolkcom (1981) reports a doubling in calls to police accompanied by a decreasein crime. Similarly, a public housing project in Charlotte, North Carolina, reveals increased reports of crimeaccompanied by a reduced crime rate (Hayes, 1982). The fact that reporting of crime to the police increases isone indication that the neighborhood watch program is successful.Victimization MeasuresThe use of victim survey data avoids the confounding influence of changes in reporting crimes to the police.Studies utilizing victim surveys typically report strong support for neighborhood watch. For example, theSeattle Community Crime Prevention Program noted that community crime prevention areas displayed lowerburglary rates after program initiation than did corresponding control areas of Seattle (Cirel et al., 1977). At thesame time, reporting to the police increased, thus supporting the view that there was a real reduction in crime.Unfortunately, the lower burglary levels persisted for only 12 to 14 months and then increased to the pre-program levels (Cirel et al., 1977). This finding of time-bounded effects suggests that programs need to beperiodically reviewed and promoted in order to prolong their effectiveness. Cook and Roehl’s (1983) analysis ofChicago’s Northwest Neighborhood Federation also uncovered a 12 percent reduction in the level of criminalvictimization. The authors also reported a 26 percent increase in the feeling that residents could do somethingabout crime in their neighborhood. The meta-analysis conducted by Holloway et al. (2008) reveals similarpositive results for neighborhood watch in studies using self-report data.Despite these positive results, a major study of neighborhood watch in London did not find the samepositive results using victimization data (Bennett, 1990). Both household and personal crimes showed increasesover the course of the program compared to control areas. In fact, some control areas reported reduced crimefor the same period of time. It would appear that the neighborhood watch areas did worse than the other areas.Two Examples—Kirkholt and Safer CitiesTwo projects offer a good deal of insight into the effectiveness of community and neighborhoodinterventions. These are the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project and the Safer Cities program. Kirkholt isa clearly defined residential area comprised of more than 2,200 dwellings near Manchester, England, andowned by the local governmental authority. According to the 1984 British Crime Survey, Kirkholt had aburglary rate more than twice that of other high-risk areas in England (Forrester et al., 1988). The burglaryprevention activities included the establishment of “cocoon neighborhood watch” (very small groups of homesbanded together for surveillance and support), as well as the removal of pre-payment heating fuel meters inhomes, improvements in physical security devices, and the use of community teams to conduct securitysurveys. While overall security was an issue, the program specifically targeted repeat burglary victims(Forrester et al., 1988).Evaluation of Kirkholt took place in two phases and involved extensive interviews with residents, agencies,and other program participants. Results from Phase I, which covered the development of the project and thefirst seven months of operation, showed a large reduction in burglary from 316 offenses in the pre-programperiod to 147 offenses after program implementation (Forrester et al., 1988). At the same time, there was a99
small increase in burglary for the surrounding area. Similarly, the project demonstrated a clear impact onrepeat burglary victimization (Forrester et al., 1988, 1990). Potential problems for the Phase I results include theshort follow-up period (only seven months) and the fact that the pre-program offense levels were unduly high(Forrester et al., 1990). It is possible that the effect was only short term or that the reductions reflect amoderation of unreasonably high offense levels that had nowhere to go but down. The Phase II evaluation,however, provided greater support for the project’s impact. Overall, the burglary rate fell roughly 75 percentover the life of the project (over four years), while the remainder of the area only saw a decrease of 24 percent(Forrester et al., 1990). Additional support appeared in the fact that repeat victimization was significantlyreduced.Further evidence of the impact of the Kirkholt project can be seen in the levels of program participation.First, Forrester et al. (1990) report that there were 93 “Home Watch” (cocoon neighborhood watch) groupsoperating, with 20 to 25 households in each. This represented almost all residents in Kirkholt. Second, variouslocal interventions were initiated by the program, including after-school projects and work with the ProbationService on programs for offenders. Finally, there was a significant increase in the number of victims who tookpreventive measures after initiation of the program (Forrester et al., 1990). The evaluations concluded that bothphysical design features (e.g., the removal of the pre-payment meters) and social efforts (e.g., the cocoonneighborhood watch) were essential elements of the successful project.In the Safer Cities program, the British government provided funds for local initiatives aimed at reducingcrime and the fear of crime, and the creation of safer cities. Initial funding was made available to 20 projects in1988 and was expanded in a second phase in 1993 (Sutton, 1996; Tilley, 1992). Each individual programincluded a coordinator, police participation, various agency representatives, and a steering committee. Eachsteering committee was supposed to identify and implement preventive actions according to the unique needsof the community. Many of the interventions initiated under the Safer Cities programs included neighborhoodwatch, target hardening, property marking, community mobilization, and the use of signs and other media(Tilley and Webb, 1994).Evaluations of the Safer Cities initiatives reveal generally positive results. Most locations initiated a widearray of prevention initiatives (Sutton, 1996). Evidence shows that the level of burglary was reduced (Ekblom etal., 1996b; Mawby, 2001; Tilley and Webb, 1994), apparently as a result of neighborhood watch, targethardening, and property identification activities. Additionally, publicity concerning an area’s activities wasseen as an important part of making an impact for the larger community (Tilley and Webb, 1994). At the sametime, however, there is some evidence that burglary may have increased in adjacent areas and locations wherethe program was not adequately or fully instituted (Ekblom et al., 1996a, 1996b). Clearly, greater impacts oncrime were evident in areas where more action was undertaken. Despite these positive results, Sutton (1996)points out that many areas in need of assistance were written off by the steering committees as “lost causes,”rather than places to be aggressively targeted. Part of this was due to the fact that some steering committeeswere much more passive in their activities than others.On the Web You can read more about both the Kirkholt and Safer Cities initiatives on the British HomeOffice web site athttp://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fcpu13.pdfandhttp://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110220105210/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors164.pdfSummaryEvaluation of neighborhood crime prevention in both the United States and the United Kingdom shows thatpreventive actions can impact on the level of crime in the community. This assessment holds true whether the100
crime rate is measured by official police records or victimization surveys. A few studies, however, suggest thatcrime can become worse in some targeted neighborhoods (e.g., Bennett, 1990; Latessa and Travis, 1987; Lewis etal., 1988; Pate et al., 1987). Even in those cases where neighborhood watch has an impact, it is far fromcomplete, indicating there is still much to do to prevent crime.The key to successful crime prevention activities appears to lie in the level of program implementation.Bowers et al. (2003) note that the level of outcome intensity (that is, the actual implementation of preventionactivities), as opposed to the level of planning, preparation, training, and other factors (i.e., input intensity), isthe most important factor in making changes in crime. The greater the outcome intensity, the greater thereduction in crime. Different background characteristics of the target communities, varying types of availabledata, and varying evaluation designs also impact on the results.Community Anti-Drug ProgramsCommunity anti-drug (CAD) programs represent a recent incarnation of community crime preventioninitiatives. These programs utilize many of the same forms of intervention, including physical design changes,surveillance, group meetings, phone hotlines for anonymous reporting to the police, and citizen patrols, butalso add activities directly targeted at drug problems, such as demanding enforcement of zoning and housingcodes in order to eliminate drug houses. Many of these programs grew in the late 1980s and early 1990s inresponse to the growing drug problem in many cities.The success of CAD programs should be enhanced by increased levels of social cohesion. While there issome evidence that anti-drug programs have a positive impact on social cohesion, the research results aremixed. Lurigio and Davis (1992), reporting on initiatives in Miami, Seattle, Philadelphia and Baltimore, arguethat the programs have significantly increased the social cohesion in three of the four sites. Conversely, Roehlet al. (1995) and Davis et al. (1991) note that actual participation by residents is low (often less than 10 percent)and many programs operate with only a small core group of dedicated individuals. Results from an analysis ofanti-drug initiatives in Chicago’s public housing suggests that change may be hard if the residents activelycontribute to the problems and the interventions are being driven by outsiders (Popkin et al., 1999).The more important issue is whether CAD programs are able to reduce the levels of crime and otherproblems. Using interviews with residents of four CAD programs, Davis et al. (1991) report overall positiveresults. Residents report fewer drug problems after initiation of the program. The respondents also point toreduced signs of physical decay, increased feelings of empowerment and social control, and greater satisfactionwith the area. Similar results are found in analyses of the Community Responses to Drug Abuse program, theCommunity Partnership Demonstration Programs, and the Chicago Public Housing Authority’s Anti-DrugInitiative (Davis and Lurigio, 1996; Popkin et al., 1999; Rosenbaum et al., 1997). The evaluation of the anti-drugprograms in Chicago public housing also reveals reduced victimization. Popkin et al. (1995, 1999) point out thatresidents of target projects report reduced fighting, shootings, and drug dealing, both inside and outside thebuildings. These positive finding from anti-drug programs may reflect the intensity of resident convictionsabout drugs and drug-related offenses. Where past crime prevention programs dealt mostly with propertycrime issues, drug problems come with related gangs, violence, and personal crime problems that might causegreater concern and willingness to act by citizens.Not all CAD initiatives are embraced by or operated by local residents. Popkin et al. (1995, 1999) note thatmost of the activities in Chicago’s public housing initiative were coordinated and implemented by the policeand the housing authority. Citizen participation was difficult to engender. The authors report that the programwas successful at implementing drug and weapon sweeps, the hiring of security guards, the institution of newsecurity policies, and reducing offending behavior. Despite the positive results, some residents resented theintrusions and methods used by the housing authority. Indeed, successful legal challenges were mounted inreference to some activities, such as sweeps for weapons. The evaluators suggest that greater involvement bythe residents is needed in both the planning and implementation of anti-drug activities (Popkin et al., 1999).Citizen Patrols101
Citizen patrols present the most straightforward attempt by neighborhood residents to increase surveillance.Relatively few studies of citizen patrols exist. One examination of citizen patrol studies shows reduced burglaryrates on the order of 20 to 50 percent in patrol areas (Titus, 1984). Latessa and Allen (1980), evaluating paid,citizen foot patrol in Columbus, Ohio, report a great drop in crime in the target areas compared to pre-programfigures and control areas. In addition, citizens favor the patrols and their activity (Latessa and Allen, 1980).Similarly, Troyer and Wright (1985), assessing the impact of citizen patrols in a middle-class neighborhood andon a university campus, report that residents strongly favored the patrol and report feeling safer since itsinitiation. Citizen involvement in patrols undertaken on mass transit facilities in The Netherlands appears tohave caused a 33 percent increase in feelings of safety and a clear drop in violence (van Andel, 1989). Ingeneral, the research suggests that citizen patrols can be effective at reducing both crime and fear.The Guardian Angels are one example of citizen patrolling that has gained international attention. Despitethe large number of Guardian Angel chapters around the world, few methodologically sound evaluations ofthe program exist. Pennell et al. (1986), evaluating the Guardian Angels in San Diego, report little impact onthe level of crime. Indeed, while violent crime fell by 22 percent in the patrolled areas, the control areasexhibited a drop of 42 percent. Additionally, simple assault increased in the patrolled area. These results are notsurprising given the fact that the Angels made only two citizen arrests in the course of 672 patrols over sixmonths (Pennell et al., 1986). Kenney (1986) finds the same lack of change in crime when studying GuardianAngel patrols of the New York City subways.While the impact on crime may not be great, the Guardian Angels have engendered a great deal of goodwillamong the citizens in the areas they patrol. Respondents from several cities report a greater feeling of safetywhen Guardian Angels are around (Pennell et al., 1986). In addition, the organization is able to keep its ownmembers from becoming involved in criminal activity (Pennell et al., 1986). Other positive findings include thefact that the police believe the Guardian Angels help citizens with a variety of concerns. Early concerns aboutvigilantism held by the public and police, directed at all citizen patrols and not just the Guardian Angels, havenot been realized (Latessa and Allen, 1980; Troyer and Wright, 1985; Yin et al., 1977).Neighborhood Crime Prevention and Fear of CrimeBesides attempting to eliminate or reduce crime, neighborhood crime prevention programs have thepotential to impact fear of crime. Many evaluations investigate changes in fear, often through victim surveysthat ask residents about their feelings of safety in the community and their perceived risk of futurevictimization. Research also tests other dimensions discussed by Ferraro (1995), such as impressions of overallcrime in the community, feelings about whether citizens can have an effect on crime and neighborhoodproblems, and general feelings toward components of the criminal justice system.Reported reductions in fear of crime can be very dramatic. Figgie International (1983) claims 75 percentfewer subjects respond that they are “very fearful” of crime after neighborhood programming. In anotherstudy, 95 percent of the senior citizens who participated in crime prevention reported being less fearful infollow-up surveys (Yagerlener, 1980). Cook and Roehl’s (1983) evaluation of the Northwest NeighborhoodFederation showed decreases in perceptions of rising crime (22 percent), decreased fear of burglary (26 percent),increased feelings that residents could influence crime (26 percent), and an increase in the belief inneighborhood crime control (26 percent). Evidence from the Safer Cities program shows reduced fear andreduced worry about crime, especially in areas where crime prevention activities are well known andintensively implemented (Ekblom et al., 1996a, 1996b; Mawby, 2001; Tilley and Webb, 1994). These findings ofreduced fear are replicated in a number of other studies (Bennett, 1990; Cohn et al., 1978; Hayes, 1982;Rasmussen et al., 1979).Efforts at organizing hard to organize areas or implementing prevention with limited community supportalso demonstrate the fear-reducing capabilities of such endeavors. Bennett and Lavrakas (1989) report onconcerted efforts to organize 10 high-crime, high-fear inner-city neighborhoods in nine cities. Comparing pre-program to post-program periods, and experimental with non-equivalent control groups, the authors find thatfear was significantly reduced in six of the 10 neighborhoods. There was no change in three and an increase inone area. Further, overall concern about crime was reduced in five neighborhoods, with no changes in theremaining neighborhoods (Bennett and Lavrakas, 1989). In the analysis of community anti-drug programs in102
four cities, Davis et al. (1991) report significant reductions in fear, while no changes appear in control areas.Similarly, the Chicago Housing Authority’s Anti-Drug Initiative reduced fear, despite the relative lack ofresident participation (Popkin et al., 1999). Davis and Lurigio (1996) note that the Community Responses toDrug Abuse program increased resident satisfaction with the area. Finally, Wolfer (2001) reports that elderlyrespondents who believe there is an active neighborhood watch program nearby are less fearful than thosewho do not live in a neighborhood watch community.Not all studies, however, exhibit lower levels of fear nor are the evaluations of fear without problems. Brodieand Sheppard (1977), evaluating crime prevention programs in Denver, uncovered conflicting evidence on fearof crime. While fear of burglary decreased, fear of walking outdoors and feelings of helplessness toward crimeincreased. Rosenbaum et al. (1986) report increased fear of personal crime, no effect on fear of property crime,and increased perceptions of neighborhood crime. In addition, the programs failed to engender positiveattitudes toward the area, had little influence on area deterioration, and did not alter crime prevention effortsof individuals (Rosenbaum et al., 1986). Similarly, the Community Responses to Drug Abuse evaluation revealsno changes in residents’ perceptions of crime or fear of crime (Davis and Lurigio, 1996). Other studies alsoreport no change in levels of fear of crime (Bennett, 1987; Latessa and Travis, 1987; Pate et al., 1987).The failure to find reduced fear in some studies may be due to a variety of problems in the research. First,participation in crime prevention programs and attempts to heighten awareness of crime may engender more,not less, fear and worry. Second, the varying definitions of “fear” makes assessments of program impactdifficult. Third, the use of diverse subjects in follow-up surveys (e.g., only those who participate in the crimeprevention program, random samples of neighborhoods, or subgroups of the population) makes summarizingthe results problematic. Fourth, many programs focus on high crime, high fear areas and prevention effortsface a major challenge for changing attitudes in these locations. Finally, short follow-up times may not beenough to elicit any changes in high crime areas. In general, neighborhood crime prevention appears tosuccessfully reduce fear of crime, particularly where the interventions are appropriately implemented.Evaluation IssuesBeyond the various problems noted so far in this chapter, there are other issues that hamper theeffectiveness and evaluation of neighborhood crime prevention programs. A major concern in any evaluationor discussion of neighborhood watch entails the definition of “neighborhood” and “community.”Unfortunately, neighborhood and community are rarely explicitly defined (Tilley, 2009). At one extreme is theuse of entire cities, villages, or towns. Research often utilizes census tracts or block groups. Some analyses usemapping techniques to identify high-crime locations and use those as the target “neighborhood.” Many studiesassume that everyone knows what a neighborhood is and there is no reason to define it. What this means forresearch and program planning, however, is that everyone involved in the project may be envisioning a(slightly) different area when “neighborhood” is being considered. For example, many cities have areas that canbe identified by a name. These names may come from a feature of the area (such as “uptown” or “the parkdistrict”) or a subdivision name (such as “Shady Acres”) or some other identifier. Unfortunately, the simpleexistence of a name does not mean that the area has set boundaries or that everyone knows the boundaries.Even being able to establish boundaries would not mean that the area is homogeneous. The consequence oforganizing and evaluating a heterogeneous community is that the differences can impede success.Most research takes one of two approaches to handling “neighborhood” in the project evaluation. The first isto allow study participants to interpret “neighborhood” on an individual basis. The second is for the researcherto identify the “neighborhood” and gather information on that area, often without consideration of whetherthe chosen area is meaningful as a “neighborhood” to the people residing in it. In both cases, what may emergeare very different meanings and views about the “neighborhood.”Crime prevention research is particularly susceptible to variations in the definition of neighborhood. Surveysof crime and fear that reference the respondent’s neighborhood will invariably be tapping a range ofdefinitions. Crime prevention programs often operate on very different views of the neighborhood. As noted inChapter 4, large housing complexes (such as Cabrini-Green), the mixed use Union Avenue Corridor in Portland(which was 3.5 miles long), and North Asylum Hill in Hartford have all been considered as neighborhoods. Onthe opposite extreme, various studies (e.g., Taylor, 1988, 1997; Weisburd et al., 2012) have considered103
streetblocks or street segments as the focus. A streetblock consists of the homes on either side of a single block(that is, between two cross-streets). Taylor (1988) chooses this bounding based on a belief that it is within thisarea that social contacts, relationships and interaction are strong. The streetblock may hold more relevance toresidents than does the idea of neighborhood. The important point is that “neighborhood” may have manydifferent meanings to different individuals in varied settings.A second concern revolves around the impact of increased surveillance on levels of crime and fear.Neighborhood watch assumes that areas with higher surveillance will experience less crime. Unfortunately, thetime order between surveillance and crime is not clear. High crime can (and should) prompt increasedsurveillance. At the same time, increased surveillance should uncover more crime, especially as measured bypolice records, due to increased reports of offending. Actual decreases in the amount of crime may not show updue to elevated levels of reporting. The evaluation of crime prevention efforts, therefore, should consider boththe changes in citizen reporting practices and official and victimization levels of crime.Another key problem in evaluating the impact of neighborhood crime prevention is the fact that mostinterventions are not implemented in isolation from other prevention activities. A consequence of havingsimultaneous programs and activities is the difficulty of isolating what component causes the change (Ekblom,1993; Greenberg et al., 1985). The opposite problem is the expectation that a single intervention will have morethan a minimal impact on crime and fear when the causes of the problems are many and varied (Bursik andGrasmick, 1993). A related issue with evaluation research is the failure to adequately assess the program’simplementation. Rather than indicate failure, an evaluation showing no or negative impact may reflect the factthat the intervention was not properly implemented, the dosage applied to the problem was not enough, thefollow-up time was too short, or there was some other problem (Ekblom, 1993; Laycock and Tilley, 1995a;Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Many of these implementation problems arise from the demands for immediateresults, competition for resources, or the lack of adequate funding (Ekblom, 1993; Laycock and Tilley, 1995a).104
Citizen Participation and SupportThe results of research on neighborhood crime prevention should be qualified in light of information oncitizen participation. Many of the results are presented as generalizable to all neighborhoods. The findings,however, may not be applicable to all areas or subgroups of the population. Indeed, some studies find changesonly for program participants. Among the questions that must be answered are: Who participates incommunity crime prevention efforts? Are these individuals representative of the general population? Do crimeprevention methods affect all persons in the same, or similar, fashion?Who Participates?A demographic analysis of crime prevention participants yields mixed results. Members of community crimeprevention and those who take preventive measures more often are males, middle-to-upper income, homeowners, more highly educated, white, and live in single family dwellings (Bennett, 1989; Cook and Roehl, 1983;Fisher, 1989; Greenberg et al., 1982, 1985; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Lavrakas et al., 1981; Luxenberg et al., 1994;Podolefsky and DuBow, 1980; Roehl and Cook, 1984; Shernock, 1986; Skogan, 1988, 1989; Skogan and Maxfield,1981). These characteristics suggest a neighborhood that is demographically homogeneous and stable. Theresidents have built a stake in the neighborhood and are willing to take action to protect their investment.These findings do not mean that crime prevention measures cannot and do not appear among otherdemographic groups. While some studies claim that participants tend to be older (Lab, 1990; Menard andCovey, 1987; Shernock, 1986; Shapland, 1988; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981), others find that most participants aremiddle-aged (Brown et al., 1984; Greenberg et al., 1985; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982) or younger (Smith and Lab,1991). Some studies report that females participate more often than males (Bennett, 1989; Lab, 1990; Lavrakas etal., 1981). Similarly, there is a good deal of discrepancy about whether whites or blacks are more likely to beinvolved in community organizations (Lab, 1990; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Lavrakas et al., 1981; Shernock,1986; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).Research indicates that participation in crime prevention groups is related to levels of participation in othergroups. Various authors note that people involved in crime prevention efforts tend to be “joiners,” who havehigher feelings of responsibility toward the community than non-participants. Crime prevention is often asecondary extension of other group activities (Greenberg et al., 1982; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Lavrakas et al.,1981). This “joining” phenomenon is reflected in the findings that successful organizations tend to have astrong leader who is able to motivate participation, overcome diversity in opinions, set an agenda, and keepresidents interested (Ekblom, 1993; Laycock and Tilley, 1995a; Rosenbaum, 1988; Skogan, 1987; Tilley, 1992).Findings on the relationship between crime/fear and group participation are not as clear. Some evaluationsfind that higher perceptions of crime, fear, and neighborhood problems are related to crime prevention activity(Bennett, 1989; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Menard and Covey, 1987; Pennell, 1978; Skogan, 1987, 1989; Skoganand Lurigio, 1992; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Taylor et al., 1987). Conversely, others find little or noconnection between perceptions of crime, fear of crime, and prevention participation (Baumer and DuBow,1977; Bennett, 1989; Lab, 1990; Lavrakas and Herz, 1982; Smith and Lab, 1991).The divergent findings on participation may be due to a number of factors (Lab, 1990). First, different groupsof subjects are used in the analyses. Where one study examines the behavior of young urban residents, anothermay consider middle-aged suburbanites. Yet another may target older rural residents. It is not surprising,therefore, that different results emerge. Second, studies often measure the key variables in different ways.Victimization surveys and police data may tap different dimensions of prevention behavior. Fear measuresvary from study to study. Similarly, crime prevention can take a wide variety of forms ranging from citizenpatrols to operation identification and neighborhood watch. This diversity in study methodologies may be thecause of the varied results.Perhaps the greatest problem in comparing studies on crime prevention involves the dubious assumptionthat all prevention techniques can be subsumed under the single umbrella of “crime prevention.” While various105
authors have attempted to separate crime prevention actions into groups (Conklin, 1975; Furstenburg, 1972;Lavrakas et al., 1981; Pennell, 1978; Skogan, 1981), there have been few attempts to empirically test theproposed groupings. Lavrakas and Lewis (1980), factor analyzing data from four sources, identify two crimeprevention dimensions—avoidance and access control. While these items correspond to theoretically proposedgroupings, many crime prevention actions did not fit into either group.Lab (1990), analyzing the 1983 Victim Risk Supplement (VRS) to the National Crime Survey, finds fivedimensions of crime prevention behavior and examines crime prevention participation across the differentdomains (see Table 5.2). The domains that emerge are surveillance, avoidance, target hardening, personalsecurity, and access control. Lab and Hope (1998) attempted to replicate these results using 1994 British CrimeSurvey (BCS) data. The authors uncover five different crime prevention domains (also in Table 5.2). Thesedomains include taking evening precautions, neighborhood watch, technological security measures, fortress-type security measures, and self-defense activities. The different results in these two studies may be due tothree major factors. First, the BCS data set includes a greater array of crime prevention behaviors for analysis.Second, the two studies are based on respondents from different countries. Third, there is a 10-year time gapbetween the collection of the two data sets. Despite these issues, the fact remains that distinct domains of crimeprevention activities are utilized by respondents. Crime prevention is not unidimensional.Table 5.2 Crime Prevention Domains and ActivitiesLab (1990)Lab and Hope (1998)SurveillanceNeighborhood watch neighborhood watch activities neighborhood watch participation, marking property, home insuranceAvoidanceEvening Precautions avoidance, alter habits, go out in groupsTarget hardeningTechnological security property marking, alarms alarms, light timers, security surveyPersonal securitySelf-defense owning items for protection carry weapons, alarms, classesAccess controlFortress security locks, door peepholes deadbolts, locks, bars/grillsSource: Compiled by author from S.R Lab (1990). “Citizen crime prevention: Domains and participation.” Justice Quarterly 7:467-492; andS.R Lab and T. Hope (1998). “Assessing the impact of area context on crime prevention behavior.” Paper presented to the EnvironmentalCriminology and Crime Analysis Conference, Barcelona, Spain.Using these domains to analyze citizen participation, Lab (1990) and Hope and Lab (2001) report cleardifferences across the various groups of activities in terms of individual demographic characteristics,perceptions of crime and fear, and neighborhood characteristics. Some of the greatest differences inparticipation across the crime prevention domains are the variations by area characteristics and respondentperceptions, rather than individual demographic characteristics. The results of these two studies suggest thatanalyses of participation must consider the type of crime prevention being considered. Simply comparing one106
study to another is prone to comparing different methods and behaviors to one another.On the Web You can examine the predictors of participation in different domains of prevention from Laband Hope on the textbook web site.Problematic Assumptions in Organizing for Crime PreventionParticipation in crime prevention is clearly a problematic issue for program organizers. Prompting people tobecome active guardians is the goal of neighborhood watch and community crime prevention. Unfortunately,Rosenbaum (1987) outlines five problematic assumptions underlying neighborhood watch programs (see Table5.3). The failure of any of the assumptions would hamper both the organization and maintenance of suchprograms. Many individuals live in areas with few opportunities to participate (counter to Assumption 1).Similarly, it has been shown that many people fail to become involved even when the opportunity to do soexists (Lewis et al., 1988; Pate et al., 1987; Silloway and McPherson, 1985), and participation varies greatly basedon demographic, neighborhood, and crime prevention factors (counter to Assumption 2). High-crime areastend to be very hard to organize. The reason for this failure may be that people in high-crime areas are morefearful of crime and, in turn, are afraid to join others (often strangers) in aTable 5.3 Problematic Assumptions Underlying Neighborhood WatchAssumption 1Neighborhood watch can be easily implemented on a large scale to provide citizens with an opportunityfor participation in crime prevention activities.Assumption 2If given the opportunity to participate in neighborhood watch, most citizens would find the programappealing and would become involved regardless of social, demographic, or neighborhoodcharacteristics.Assumption 3If and when citizens get together at block watch meetings, the assumption is made that this interactionand discussion will produce a number of immediate effects. These effects include reaching a consensusabout problem definition, reducing fear of crime, increasing group cohesion, and increasing participationin both individual and collective crime prevention actions after the meeting.Assumption 4Neighborhood watch organizers (both police and community volunteers) invest in this strategy with thebelief that such activities, once initiated, will be sustained.Assumption 5A final and very fundamental assumption underlying neighborhood watch is that the collective citizenactions implied by this strategy, if set in motion, would reduce the level of criminal activity and disorderin the neighborhood, thereby setting the stage for a reduction in fear of crime and other neighborhoodimprovements.107
Source: Compiled by author from DP. Rosenbaum (1987). “The theory and research behind neighborhood watch: Is it sound fear andcrime reduction strategy?” Crime & Delinquency 33:103-134.similar position. Individuals who have constructed fortresses in and around their homes are fearful of leavingthe fortress, even for the purpose of fighting crime and fear.Assumption 3 cannot be sustained in light of the research showing a failure to increase group cohesion,reduce fear, or increase participation. Counter to Assumption 4 is the fact that maintaining crime preventionactivity is a major problem for most organizations. Many programs are initiated because of an existing crimeproblem, but most flounder once the crime problem subsides. Finally, the assumption that crime prevention iseffective at reducing crime and disorder (Assumption 5) finds only qualified support in past research. Thefailure of neighborhood watch to live up to these five assumptions leads to serious questions about its potentialto impact crime and fear.Leveraging Participation/GuardianshipHow then can citizen guardianship be stimulated? Reynald (2011) argues that incentives are needed to getpeople involved in guardianship. Sampson and Eck (2008) claim that so-called super controllers are not doingtheir job at applying incentives to those who should be more immediately involved in crime prevention. Supercontrollers are “the people, organizations and institutions that create incentives for controllers to prevent …crime” (Sampson et al., 2010). An expanded crime triangle illustrates this idea (see Figure 5.4). As depicted inthe diagram, the super controllers do not directly impact on any of the key factors that facilitate crime. Rather,the super controllers impact crime by prompting guardians, handlers, and managers to take action.Figure 5.4 Expanded Crime Triangle Source: R. Sampson and J.E. Eck (2008). “Super Controllers: Can I be your superman?” Paper presented at the POP Conference. Retrieved fromhttp://www.popcenter.org/conference/conferencepapers/2008/supercontrollers.pdfSuper controllers can influence preventive actions in a variety of ways (Sampson and Eck, 2008; Sampson etal., 2010). Liquor control agencies can threaten to withhold a license if an establishment fails to check the agesof its patrons or if too many assaults take place in and around the bar. Insurance providers can offer incentivesto homeowners to get them to install alarms or lights to deter burglars. Cities can file civil suits againstproperty owners who knowingly allow their properties to be used as sites for prostitution or drug sales/use.Newspapers and organizations can spotlight high-crime locations, which may result in patrons avoiding thelocations, or publish the names of places or events that take extra preventive precautions, thus attracting morepatrons. Finally, the action of parents, clubs, or other groups can put pressure on their neighbors, friends, andacquaintances to take actions that will reduce crime. These are only a few examples of how super controllerscan bring both positive and negative incentives to bear on target guardians, offender handlers, and place108
managers (Sampson and Eck, 2008; Sampson et al., 2010).On the Web Sampson and Eck provided a great deal of additional information on guardianship and supercontrollers in a presentation made to the Problem-Oriented Policing conference in 2008. Theirpresentation can be accessed athttp://www.popcenter.org/conference/conferencepapers/2008/supercontrollers.pdfBeyond employing super controllers, it is important to integrate different groups and individuals into crimeprevention and civic action. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argue that neighborhood social control requires inputfrom private, parochial, and public sources (see Hunter, 1985). Private control is based on interpersonalrelationships between family members, friends and close associates. Parochial control broadens the sources ofcontrol to include neighborhood networks and institutions, such as schools, churches, or businesses. Finally,public control reflects the ability to marshal input, support and resources from public agencies. Bursik andGrasmick (1993) suggest that lower-class, transient, high-crime neighborhoods have the greatest problemdeveloping control at any of these levels. Even if the residents can engender the private and parochial control,their ability to tap into the public dimension is hindered by their economic and political position in society.There is a need to actively link residents and the formal public institutions in ways that will build controland community safety (van Steden et al., 2011). Skogan (1990) notes that some communities are unable tomobilize the resources necessary to deal with disorder. Ramey and Shrider (2014) argue that strugglingneighborhoods can bring about change if they are provided outside assistance. They call for a combination ofparochial and public control into a new parochialism. Ramey and Shrider (2014) demonstrate this approachwith the Neighborhood Matching Fund in Seattle, Washington. The fund provides resources to neighborhoodswho match funding with other resources, volunteering, local funds, and other commitments that result in acommunity-building coalition. There is an investment in the community by the local residents, as well asoutsiders. Public investment has been shown to impact crime in many communities (Papachristos et al., 2011;Ramey, 2013; Ramey and Shrider, 2014; Velez and Richardson, 2012).The potential impact of neighborhood watch and community crime prevention is untested in the areas andwith the populations where the greatest margin for change exists. It is in high-crime, socially disorganizedareas where engendering participation is most challenging, in part because of a vicious cycle betweeninvolvement and fear/crime. That is, fear and perceived risk may lead people to retreat into their homes andavoid other people, which in turn mitigates the possibility of group action to address fear and victimization. Ittakes efforts from various community sources (i.e., sources of control) to break the cycle of non-participation.109
Chapter SummaryTable 5.4 Summary of the Evidence on Neighborhood Prevention ProgramsTechniquePositive ImpactMixed ResultsNW GroupsBurglaryTheftRobberyFearCommunity anti-drug programsDrugsViolenceCitizen patrolsFearBurglaryTheftRobberyThe evidence tends to support the basic idea of neighborhood crime prevention as a means of combatingcrime and the fear of crime. Table 5.4 summarizes the evidence from neighborhood initiatives. The resultsgenerally present neighborhood watch and its component activities as effective methods to reduce crime,victimization, and fear of crime. The magnitude of the changes, however, often appears to vary from study tostudy. Some studies show large absolute reductions in crime. Others present little or no change in target areasaccompanied by increased crime in control areas. Still other evaluations, although few in number, find smallincreases in crime. The discrepant results can be attributed to several factors. Foremost among the causes is thefact that the neighborhood initiatives are not always successfully implemented. This means that the failure isnot in the crime prevention program itself, but is a failure to mobilize the citizens/guardians, fully implementthe intervention, or bring the measures to bear on the problem. The failure of some evaluations to find positiveresults also may be due to the reliance on short-term follow-up, the absence of control groups for comparison,differing operationalizations of key variables (such as crime and fear), and the inability to identify individualeffects of different program components.One issue often left unaddressed in crime prevention evaluations is the problem of “crime displacement.”Crime displacement refers to the movement of crime, usually to another area, as a result of the crimeprevention initiative in the target area. The occurrence of crime displacement represents a shift in crime andnot an actual decrease in crime. The extent and impact of displacement is the subject of the next chapter.Key Termsavailable guardianscapable guardianscitizen patrolscommunity anti-drug (CAD) programsGuardian Angelsintervening guardians110
invisible guardiansKirkholt Burglary Prevention ProjectNational Neighborhood Watch (NNW)National Night Outneighborhood watchnew parochialismparochial controlpublic controlprivate controlroutine activities theorySafer Cities programStreet AngelsstreetblocksStreet Pastorssuper controllersWhistle Stop111
Chapter 6Displacement and DiffusionChapter OutlineCrime DisplacementTypes of DisplacementAssumptionsDisplacement: Benign or Malign?DiffusionOffender Choice and MobilityRoutine ActivitiesRational ChoiceCrime Pattern TheorySummaryEvidence of Displacement and DiffusionDisplacement EffectsDiffusion EffectsImplications of Displacement and DiffusionLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:List and define six forms of displacement.Discuss the assumptions underlying displacement.Provide an explanation of rational choice theory and its relation to displacement.Distinguish between benign and malign displacement and discuss each.Explain diffusion of benefits.Discuss the 10 principles of opportunity and crime.Explain the routine activities theory.Demonstrate your knowledge of offender decision making.Outline CRAVED and how it influences crime activity.Outline crime pattern theory and cognitive mapping.Discuss the impact of modern technology on the construction of cognitive maps.Discuss the evidence on the extent of each type of displacement.Provide information on the extent of the diffusion of benefits.Outcome/impact evaluations of crime prevention focus on changes in the level of the targeted crime, fear ofcrime, and/or citizen behavior. The fact that most prevention programs are place specific means thatevaluations typically focus only on changes within the target, neighborhood, or community. At the same time,crime prevention programs could have an impact beyond that which is intended. The other changes could be112
either positive or negative. The crime prevention techniques in one area may unintentionally result inincreased crime in another area, on other targets, or at different times. In essence, levels of crime or fear mayhave simply shifted in response to the prevention efforts. This shift in crime is referred to as crimedisplacement. The opposite may also occur. Crime prevention efforts targeted at a specific problem in onelocation may have a positive impact on other locations or crimes. That is, there may be a diffusion of benefits.Unfortunately, evaluations generally fail to consider the possibility of either displacement or diffusion. Thisis due to the fact that such assessment is a difficult task. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition of the needto examine displacement and diffusion in evaluations. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the concepts ofcrime displacement and diffusion, discuss the potential of offenders to shift their crime-related activities, andreview the literature on displacement and diffusion.113
Crime DisplacementCrime displacement represents change in crime due to the preventive actions of the individual or society.Most discussions of displacement focus on the shift of crime from one place to another (often called crimespillover). The assumption is that many crime prevention actions simply move the crime around instead ofeliminating the overall amount of crime. For example, an increase in police presence in one neighborhood mayreduce crime in that area but cause an increase in crime in a contiguous neighborhood. Displacement,however, can take forms other than just the geographical movement of crime.Types of DisplacementReppetto (1976) offers five forms of displacement—territorial, temporal, tactical, target, and functional (seeTable 6.1). Territorial (spatial) displacement is the most frequently discussed and represents movement ofcrime from one location to another. Temporal displacement, the movement of offending to another periodwhile remaining in the same area, may manifest itself through a shift in larcenies from the late evening to theearly morning. Under tactical displacement, the offender utilizes new means to commit the same offense. Ashift in burglary from entering through unlocked doors to breaking windows for entry represents a tacticalchange in the offense. Targetdisplacement involves a choice of different victims within the same area. Forexample, an increase in the use of weapons by store owners may force robbers to choose elderly pedestrians asvictims. Reppetto’s final form of displacement, functional displacement, suggests that offenders change to anew type of offense, such as shifting from larceny to burglary or burglary to robbery. Each of these forms ofdisplacement represents a change in offense behavior on the part of the offender. Barr and Pease (1990) offer asixth form of displacement—perpetrator. Perpetrator displacement occurs when one offender ceases hisdeviant behavior, only to be replaced by another offender. Crime prevention techniques are a logical cause ofany of these types of displacement.Table 6.1 Forms of DisplacementTerritorialMovement of crime from one area to another, typically contiguous, area ExampleA neighborhood watch program is started and the burglars move to another neighborhoodTemporalA shift in offending from one time to a different time, such as from day to night ExampleA citizen patrol is instituted at night, thus prompting burglars to work during the morninghoursTacticalChanging the methods used in the commission of a crime ExampleThe installation of deadbolt locks on doors results in burglars forcing open windows to gainentryTargetChoosing a different victim within the same area ExampleA neighborhood watch program is started but only half the homes participate, therebyleading offenders to target non-participating homesFunctionalThe offender stops committing one offense and shifts to another ExampleWhen burglary becomes more difficult due to target hardening devices the offender decides114
to commit robbery insteadPerpetratorOne offender ceases activity only to be replaced by another offender ExampleWhile crime prevention actions cause an individual to desist from further offending,another individual sees opportunities and begins offendingAssumptionsDisplacement makes a number of assumptions about both the potential offender and his target (see Table6.2). The degree to which these assumptions are accurate will impact the degree to which displacement can andwill occur.Table 6.2 Displacement Assumptions1.Crime is inelastic2.Offenders have mobility3.Offenders make rational choices4.Alternative targets and choices are availableCrime InelasticityDisplacement assumes that crime is inelastic. That is, offenders are driven to commit a certain number ofoffenses over a given period of time (Reppetto, 1976). If crime is inelastic, it is not eliminated by crimeprevention activities. Rather, it is simply moved along one of the displacement dimensions. Offenders aremotivated to commit crime and will seek out opportunities to offend. One key to displacement, therefore, isavailable opportunities. Felson and Clarke (1998) argue that opportunities are (or can be) limited, thus havingan impact on the possibility of displacement.Potential Offender MobilityDisplacement assumes mobility on the part of the offender (Reppetto, 1976). The mobility can be across time,place, tactic, or any displacement dimension. Not all potential offenders, however, have the same level ofmobility (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984). For example, youthful offenders may not have access totransportation (limiting territorial displacement) or they may be tied to school and curfews (limiting temporaldisplacement). Race may inhibit individuals from entering areas populated by other racial or ethnic groups.Some offenders may not be psychologically able to shift from one type of crime to another (functionaldisplacement). While such factors may limit displacement, they will not eliminate it for all potential offenders.Mobility is not determined solely by characteristics of the potential offenders. It may also be limited byfeatures of the surrounding environment (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2003; Brantingham, 2010). This isprimarily true in relation to territorial (spatial) displacement, although it is not limited to the spatial domain.The ability of an offender to shift to another location/time/offense may be limited by the options available tothe offender. For example, efforts taken in a small isolated community may not allow for territorialdisplacement because there are no alternatives for offending nearby. A neighborhood may also be somewhatisolated even within a large city because it has major barriers surrounding it, such as a river on one side and amajor interstate highway on another (see Figure 6.1). Individuals who offend in the bounded area of town havelimited options for where to move for future offending, while those on the other side of the river have more115
options. Boundaries may not make displacement impossible, but they limit the directions any offenders cantake if they are to be displaced (Brantingham and Brantingham, 2003).Figure 6.1 Example of a City with a Geographically Bounded Neighborhood While mobility may be limited by place, the characteristics of an area may enhance the possibility ofoffending (Brantingham, 2010). An individual who lives near an area with many targets (such as mixed-useareas with homes, businesses, and entertainment close at hand) may benefit from a wide range of differingopportunities for crime commission. Actions that limit household burglary may simply force the offender topilfer from stores or rob shoppers in the local commercial strip. In essence, physical location can shut downsome opportunities while enhancing others.Rational Choice of OffendersA very important third assumption involves the level of volition held by potential offenders. Rationalchoice theory has become a central focus in the study of crime (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke,1986a). This theory assumes that potential offenders make choices based on various factors in the physical andsocial environment. Offenders respond to payoff, effort, peer support, risks, and similar factors in makingdecisions to commit a crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1986b). Displacement views the offender as being a rationalindividual who is capable of making informed, free-willed choices. He is able to evaluate the costs and benefitsinherent in his choice and circumstances, and can make decisions based on those factors.The ability to make informed choices is required for displacement to occur. The inability to make rationaldecisions would negate displacement due to crime prevention measures. A seeming contradiction appearsbetween this assumption and the earlier assumption concerning the inelastic nature of offending. The need tocommit crime and the ability to choose which crime and where it is to be committed, however, are notexclusive of one another. It is very possible that an offender sees no alternative to crime but is capable ofmolding his actual criminal behavior around available choices.Target/Choice AvailabilityA final assumption is that alternative targets and choices are available to the offender. From a crimeprevention perspective, this assumption is easy to accept because program implementation is never complete.Some individuals decide not to participate, some targets are not hardened, some actions fail to have an impact,116
and some ideas are not well suited to a given problem. More importantly, crime prevention programs generallyfocus only on limited areas or crimes. This results in alternative choices for potential offenders.Displacement: Benign or Malign?The tenor of most discussions of displacement is clearly one of disappointment or dismay at the thought thatcrime is simply being moved across one of the displacement dimensions. Displacement, however, can bepositive. Barr and Pease (1990) divide displacement into two types—“malign” and “benign.” Maligndisplacement leads to undesirable outcomes. Efforts aimed at reducing burglary may prompt an increase inrobberies and accompanying levels of assault. Another case of malign displacement would be an offender’sneed to increase the number of crimes in order to offset the reduced payoff garnered from each offense (Gabor,1990). A third possibility is shifting crime to another area that is unprepared to respond. Such maligndisplacement may not be tolerable to society.Benign displacement suggests that changes from displacement may benefit society. For example, the newcrime or tactics that are utilized by the offenders may be less serious and offer less danger to the potentialvictims. Robbery becomes burglary, assault with a deadly weapon becomes simple assault, burglary becomespetty theft, and so on. Displacement may also bring about reduced fear of crime which offsets the problem ofactual crime (Barr and Pease, 1990).Barr and Pease (1990) also propose that displacement can “be used to achieve a spread of crime that can beregarded as equitable.” Crime is not evenly spread across the social spectrum, which leads to an unequalburden from crime and fear of crime. Barr and Pease suggest that society, either consciously or unconsciously,has allowed certain areas or neighborhoods to become what they call crime fuses. In the same manner thatelectrical fuses will carry the dangerous burden and signal a problem by blowing out before the problemspreads to the rest of the system, the crime fuse is an area where crime is allowed to operate without botheringthe rest of society until it explodes in the area. The solution is then targeted at the point of the problem beforeit does major harm to the entire community. Displacement may be benign if crime is moved to a “fuse”location. It would not be benign, however, for those living at the crime fuse. A true benign displacement wouldbe one that provides a more even or equal spread of victimization across the community (Barr and Pease, 1990).For Barr and Pease, the question of displacement deals with redistributing crime and victimization in society.117
DiffusionAnother possible effect of crime prevention programming is the diffusion of benefits. Clarke and Weisburd(1994, p. 169) define diffusion of benefits asthe spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject ofcontrol, the crimes which are the focus of intervention or the time periods in which an intervention is brought.Rather than shifting the crime, diffusion assumes that prevention efforts will benefit people and places otherthan those targeted. Diffusion is discussed under a variety of names, including “halo effect” (Scherdin, 1986)and “free bonus effect” (Sherman, 1990).What accounts for diffusion? Clarke and Weisburd (1994) offer two potential sources for diffusion—deterrence and discouragement. Deterrence can have an impact in various ways. While many preventionefforts are short-lived, the impact on crime often outlasts the period of intervention. Similarly, targeting onelocation or certain merchandise may result in protecting other targets. In each case, there is an assumption thatthe chances of being apprehended are heightened and potential offenders are deterred by the risk of beingcaught. Discouragement works by reducing the payoff and increasing the effort needed to commit a crime(Clarke and Weisburd, 1994).Both displacement and diffusion have received increased attention in recent years and many evaluationsnow make claims about apparent displacement or diffusion. Unfortunately, the difficulties inherent in assessingdisplacement and diffusion mean that these issues are not central to many evaluations. In every case, thedegree to which displacement or diffusion occur is related to the degree to which offenders can and do makejudgments about offending.118
Offender Choice and MobilityOffenders do not commit offenses totally at random. They do not simply walk down the street and attackpeople, commit robberies, break into homes, or act in other criminal ways with no reason. If offenders actedcompletely at random, committing crimes with no thought and at any moment, all of our streets would be rifewith crimes at any time and nothing anyone could do would have an impact on crime. Thankfully, we knowthat many places and times are free from crime, and many things can be done to prevent crime. This meansthat offenders, at least to some degree, make decisions on what to do, when, where, and how. The key forprevention, therefore, is to understand the factors that go into those decisions.Felson and Clarke (1998) argue that opportunity is the cornerstone for all criminal behavior. Whileopportunity alone is not sufficient for a crime, it is certainly necessary for its commission. In their words,“Individual behavior is a product of an interaction between the person and the setting” (1998, p. 1). Felson andClarke outline 10 principles of opportunity (see Table 6.3) that attempt to specify how opportunities shape andmold criminal behavior. Many of these principles deal with the variation in opportunities across time, space,and circumstances. They also suggest that reductions in opportunity can reduce crime, with little displacement.Table 6.3 Ten Principles of Opportunity and Crime1.Opportunities play a role in causing all crime.2.Crime opportunities are highly specific.3.Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and place.4.Crime opportunities depend on everyday movements.5.One crime produces opportunities for another.6.Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities.7.Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities.8.Opportunities for crime can be reduced.9.Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime.10.Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime.Source: M. Felson and R.V. Clarke (1998). Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. London: Home OfficePolice and Reducing Crime Unit.Underlying these 10 principles of opportunity are three primary theoretical orientations—routine activities,rational choice, and crime pattern theory. Felson and Clarke (1998) see each as a form of opportunity theory.The possibility of displacement and diffusion rely on implicit assumptions about the offenders and decisionmaking that appear in these theoretical perspectives.Routine ActivitiesThe routine activities theory argues that the normal movement and activities of both potential offendersand victims plays a role in the occurrence of crime. Cohen and Felson (1979) outline three criteria that mustexist for crime to occur. There must be (1) a suitable target, (2) a motivated offender, and (3) an absence ofguardians. The authors believe that much crime is due to opportunity. That does not mean that offenders donot seek out opportunities. Rather, it implies that the actual choice and commission of an offense is determinedby the mutual occurrence of the three conditions.The routine activities of people have greatly changed over the years. Since World War II many householdshave moved to two-earner incomes, which leaves many homes unoccupied during the day and, therefore,119
unguarded (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Increased mobility of the population has led to the establishment of“bedroom communities” which are removed from the watchful eyes of workers and pedestrians. Time spentaway from home, either at work or in recreation, opens up opportunities for crime.Another important change involves the increased availability of suitable targets for crime. The risk of atarget is directly related to Clarke’s (1999) discussion of hot products, or items that attract attention and aretargeted by offenders. Such products meet the tenets of being CRAVED (see Table 6.4). Products that areCRAVED are desired by the offender or others, are visible to potential offenders, and are easier to conceal,transport, and dispose of. What has value today may not be of interest tomorrow. This could be due to thematuration of the offender, the saturation of the item in society, changes in taste, or other factors (Clarke,1999). The extent to which a target meets the CRAVED criteria will have an impact on the chances of anoffense occurring.Table 6.4 The CRAVED Model for Targets of TheftConcealableAbility of thief to hide items during the crimeRemovableSize and weight make some items more portable than othersAvailableThe item must exist and be available to be stolenValuableItems that hold more value will be targetedEnjoyableThe items must bring enjoyment to the offenderDisposableThere must be a market for the stolen itemsSource: Compiled by author from R.V. Clarke (1999). Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods.London: Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.Most tests of the routine activities hypothesis focus on property crimes, although the chances of personalcrime also increase through changes in routine activities. Cohen and Felson (1979) find that the amount of timespent away from home is significantly related to the level of property crime. Similarly, Mustaine andTewksbury (1998) report that theft is influenced by activity outside the home, the number of precautions(guardianship) taken, and the types of outside activities in which victims partake. The same factors related toproperty crime also apply to enhancing the possibility of physical confrontation between individuals. Personalpredatory crimes, such as robbery and sexual assault, are also influenced by routine activities.Rational ChoiceAn implicit assumption in routine activities is that offenders make rational choices about when and where tooffend. In order for crime prevention activities to have an impact, offenders must be making (somewhat)rational decisions based on their perceptions of needs, risks, payoffs, and other factors. Whether offendersmake choices in their offenses can be answered both intuitively and through the literature. On an intuitivelevel, most people believe that human beings are free-willed. At the same time, however, people recognize thatthe available choices are limited by time, place, or circumstance. This implies a sort of soft determinism. Thatis, individuals make choices but only within the realm of available opportunities. This is true in all behaviorand not just criminal activity. For example, every individual may wish to be comfortable in his daily existence.One person may be independently wealthy while another must work. Further, the choice of work relies uponthe physical and mental abilities of the individual, the state of the economy in the area, the competition forjobs, and a host of other factors. The fact that everyone makes choices in life leads to the belief that criminalsmake similar choices. Additionally, offenders spend the majority of their time participating in normal, sociallyaccepted activities within which they make choices. It would be naive to think that this ability to make choicesis removed when criminal behavior is contemplated.Numerous studies provide evidence that offenders make rational decisions. Studies of both incarcerated andactive burglars in England reveal that offenders favor homes with a rear access, cover, isolation from other120
homes, a lack of nearby surveillance, the absence of alarms and CCTV, and that are unoccupied (Nee andTaylor, 1988; Taylor and Nee, 1988). Research also notes that offenders are attracted by visual signs of wealth,such as well-kept homes and items that can be seen through open windows (Hearnden and Magill, 2004; Neeand Taylor, 1988). Based on interviews with 31 incarcerated burglars in the United States, Rengert andWasilchick (1985) find that offenders commit their crimes when residents are away from their homes—mainlymid-morning and early afternoon. Importantly, burglars typically rely on an established set of “opportunitycues” to identify appropriate targets. Among the cues are closed-up homes without air conditioning in warmmonths, an absence of cars at home, the entire family leaving together, available concealment, visual signs ofwealth, and easy access to the home (Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985).Wright and Decker (1994), in a large-scale study of burglars in St. Louis, uncover a mixture of planning andspontaneity in offending. They report that many burglars have a potential target in mind prior to the actualdecision to commit the crime. The offenders are always “half looking” for targets, and use various cues fordeciding on appropriate targets, such as signs of valuables, the condition of the property, the type of car in thedrive, signs of occupancy, and surveillability.Bennett (1986) notes that burglars make what appear to be quick, uninformed decisions that, in reality, arerational choices based on prior experience and general knowledge. Indeed, Cromwell et al. (1991), askingburglars to “recreate” their past offenses, report that they make rational choices based on surveillability,occupancy, and accessibility. The reconstructions, however, suggest a more “limited rationality” similar to thatproposed by Clarke and Cornish (1985). Offenders tend to point out opportunistic features of various targetsand react to situations that arise during normal activity. That is, they “happen upon” vulnerable targets as theygo about their daily routine (Cromwell et al., 1991). The offenders appear to respond to a set of internalizedcues based on past experience and planning rather than specific detailed planning for each event.While the foregoing discussion focuses on burglary, choice behavior is not restricted to those offenses.Tunnell (1992) reports on the activity of repeat property offenders, which included burglars, robbers, forgers,and others. He notes that criminal activity is a rational response to situations in which the offender findshimself. Research also suggests that more serious persistent offenders undertake more planning and tend tochoose targets where the chances of observation are small (Feeney, 1986; Shover, 1991; Tunnell, 1992). Robbery,auto theft, and forgery also show evidence of offender planning and rational decision making (Fleming et al.,1994; Gill and Matthews, 1994; Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003; Morrison and O’Donnell, 1996; Petrosino andBrensilber, 2003).Various studies portray offenders as rational decision makers who base their actions on the costs andbenefits they perceive in the contemplated activity. At the same time, the research suggests that offenders donot necessarily construct detailed plans for each and every offense. Rather, the rational choices andpreconceived plans may be set into motion when the offender happens upon a situation or target that fits thegeneral description of an appropriate target. Time, place, target, surveillability, and other factors are allconsidered in a short-hand version of making a rational choice. Indeed, many daily, non-criminal decisions aremade more on the subconscious, rather than the conscious, level.Crime Pattern TheoryBrantingham and Brantingham’s (1993b) crime pattern theory proposes that crime and criminal behaviorfits patterns that can be identified and understood when viewed in terms of where and when they occur. Theyargue that crime patterns can be understood because of similarities that emerge when you consider:the specific criminal event, the site, the situation, the activity backcloth, the probable crime templates, the triggering events, and the generalfactors influencing the readiness or willingness of individuals to commit crimes.(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993b, pp. 284–285)Two keys to understanding patterns is to understand the environmental backcloth and the social/crimetemplate of the offender. The environmental backcloth refers to the social, economic, cultural, and physicalconditions within which people operate. While these dimensions are constantly changing, it is possible todiscern patterns from them. The social/crime template is the idea that people have templates that outlineexpectations of what will happen at certain times and places given certain behavior by the individual. In121
essence, the template tells an offender what should occur in a certain place, time, or situation. Understandinghow people learn about the environment and how they construct these templates is an important endeavor forunderstanding the occurrence of crime.At the outset, the routine activities of individuals expose them to different times and places. Their normaldaily activities as they go to and from work, do their shopping, socialize with others, go to school, and anyother routine activities allow them to build knowledge of their environment. Urban communities of todaygreatly contribute to the routine activities of individuals. Modern cities and urban areas are conglomerations ofsmaller, specialized land use areas that provide varying needs and activities for residents. The availability ofprivate and mass transportation allows citizens to live, work, shop, and recreate where they choose. Peoplesimply commute between the various locations. These locations can be considered nodes of activity (see Figure6.2) (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993a, 1996). The transit routes between the nodes are referred to aspaths. The extent to which an individual utilizes each node and takes various routes (paths) between the nodescontributes to his awareness space. Andresen (2014) notes that as an individual’s knowledge and attachmentsto different nodes and paths increase, he becomes more comfortable in the area.Another consideration in how individuals learn about the environment involves cognitive maps. Smith andPatterson (1980) argue that individuals create cognitive maps (mental images) of the environment that areused in making behavioral choices. There are four aspects to cognitive mapping: recognition, prediction,evaluation, and action. Recognition refers to being able to identify your location and various features in thearea. Recognition leads to prediction, which involves making connections between the identifiable objects inthe area and possible lines of behavior. During evaluation, the individual uses the information gathered in theearlier stages and determines which options are acceptable modes of behavior. It is based on the informationgained in the first three steps that an individual decides on an appropriate action. In essence, cognitivemapping entails changing nodes and paths into awareness space. To the extent to which it removes fear anduncertainty about locations, cognitive mapping helps the individual make informed choices and turn thelocation into an activity space.Figure 6.2 Simplified View of a Multinuclei Community with Nodes and Paths The further from a node or path an individual moves, the less is known about the area and the individuallacks a meaningful cognitive map. Thus, the chances for action (criminal or legitimate) are diminished.Potential offenders tend to search in the nodes and paths with which they are familiar. Besides the nodes andpaths, activity space also includes edges of the areas, which may enhance or hinder deviant behavior. Edgescan be physical, social, or economic (Brantingham, 2010). Physical edges may limit movement of potentialoffenders and victims. As such, these edges may limit offending by inhibiting the awareness space. Conversely,122
social and economic edges can enhance anonymity between strangers. These areas are frequented by diverseusers, which brings together potential victims and offenders with limited guardianship (Brantingham, 2010).Greater diversity in people and activity from both sides of the edge enhances the possibility of offenses. (SeeBrantingham and Brantingham, 1981, 1993a, 1993b, 1996 for more in-depth discussions of these ideas.)Beyond providing a framework for developing cognitive maps/awareness space/activity space, nodes canserve to promote crime in other ways (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1996). Some nodes may act as crimegenerators by drawing potential victims to the area. They also may be crime attractors. These are areas towhich potential offenders and victims are drawn, such as drug markets, sites of street prostitution, and/or adultclubs and bars. Finally, a node may serve as a hunting ground for offenders. That is, offenders recognize thatpotential victims frequent an area, there is a lack of guardians at that location, and, consequently, the offenderfollows the victims to that place.An emerging possibility for development of cognitive maps and information on potential targets has beenthe advent of the Internet and its widespread accessibility. Today, a wealth of information, including visualdepictions, can be found online. Programs such as Google Maps, Google Streetview, and government propertyweb sites provide varying levels of detail about different addresses and areas. Google Streetview, for example,allows the user to look at an address from the main street, take a 360-degree look into the area, move up anddown the street, and zoom in to look at property details. While this information reflects only a single point intime, it provides a basis of information on the area. Publicly accessible government documents also providedetails of homes and businesses, including room layouts and sizes. All of this information can be used bypotential offenders to build mental maps of a target, the surrounding area, and other useful planninginformation without ever leaving home and visiting the area. As such, the potential to plan crimes outside theassumptions of routine activities and crime pattern theories is greatly enhanced.On the Web Go to Google Maps/Streetview(http://maps.google.com/intl/en/help/maps/streetview/#utm_campaign=en&utm_medium=van&utm_source=en-van-na-us-gns-svn) and input your home address. Navigate around and observe what you cansee about your neighborhood and the houses/businesses.Although discussions of cognitive mapping usually center on territorial or spatial features of behavior, theextension to other dimensions is straightforward. The same process which provides templates of safe areas canprovide information on the most suitable targets, tactics, crimes, and times within a given setting. Theprediction and evaluation stages of cognitive mapping suggest that each of these decisions is to be consideredin the movement to criminal action.SummaryResearch provides strong evidence that crime is not totally opportunistic. Rather, criminal behavior appearsto be a rational decision based on situations in which the offender finds himself. While offenders may notspend a great deal of time planning specific offenses, information gained through normal daily activity orinteraction with others can guide the “unconscious” decision making of the offender, just like most peoplemake non-criminal daily choices. These facts suggest that both displacement and diffusion are potentialresponses to prevention behavior.123
Evidence of Displacement and DiffusionWhile displacement and diffusion are possible results of prevention activities, they are rarely directlyexamined in evaluations. Much crime prevention research tends to ignore the issue of displacement anddiffusion, or consider them only as an afterthought to the research. Claims that displacement does or does notoccur are probably ill-advised. Even in studies that include an analysis of displacement at the outset, basicflaws in the investigations limit the ability to make strong claims.Displacement EffectsAssessments of displacement need to consider a number of factors. First, all of the forms of displacementshould be open to examination. Most analyses only consider territorial displacement and totally ignore theother forms. Second, each crime/problem being targeted by the prevention initiative should be examined indetail to answer a number of questions: Who are the likely offenders? When are the offenses taking place?How are the crimes being committed? Where are they occurring? What purpose does the crime serve (i.e., whydoes it happen)? and similar concerns. The answers to these questions are crucial for both the selection of thecrime prevention measures and the potential for displacement. Interestingly, while most crime preventionprograms answer these questions when developing the intervention, they are typically ignored whendiscussions of displacement occur. This is unfortunate because answers to these questions would informexpectations about the type and extent of possible displacement.Take for example the development of a crime prevention initiative to attack residential burglary. Anexamination of crime data shows an increase in residential burglary taking place in mid to late morningsduring the work week. The homes are being entered through unlocked doors or by breaking the locks on doors.Items that are taken tend to be jewelry, silverware, and high-end electronics. The police suspect that theoffenders are adult professional burglars. Based on this information, a prevention program is initiated thatincludes the installation of stronger locks, the marking of property, the initiation of increased police patrolsduring the day, the start of a neighborhood watch group, and midday citizen patrols. The same informationprovides insight to the possible types of displacement that may emerge. To the extent that the offenders areindeed adult professional thieves, it is wise to assume that territorial displacement is a strong possibility. Theremay also be temporal displacement to nights or afternoons when the patrols are not as prevalent. The offendersmay change targets and focus on the homes without the new locks. Any evaluation of the prevention activitiesshould use this insight to build in an assessment of the different forms of displacement. Unfortunately, mostcrime prevention evaluators look only for territorial displacement to an immediately adjacent neighborhood.No attention is paid to other forms or areas.Attempts to assess displacement need to explicitly consider the potential offenders, the type of offense, thelocation, the victims, and other factors involved in the existing criminal activity (Hamilton-Smith, 2002). In-depth knowledge of the event and actors will allow the crime prevention planner and evaluator to model thepotential for displacement, and build in the appropriate intervention or evaluation methods (Brantingham andBrantingham, 2003; Hamilton-Smith, 2002).There is little reason to ever expect total displacement of crime, regardless of the type of displacementconsidered. At the same time, assuming that there will be no displacement may be just as naive. Displacementshould be considered as a possible confounding factor in every evaluation.Journey to CrimeThe fact that offenders will travel to commit crimes is known as the journey to crime and is wellestablished. The distance traveled varies by the type of crime, the physical characteristics of the area, and thedemographic characteristics of the individual. The distance traveled can be measured in two ways. First is by124
Euclidean distance, which measures in a straight line from the start to the end point. The problem with thisapproach is that it ignores the fact that physical features (such as buildings, rivers, and highways) make suchtravel impossible. Instead, people follow roadways, generally selecting those that reduce both distance andtravel time. Measures of distance in this way are called Manhattan distance.Beyond how distance is measured, it is important to note that there is a pattern of distance decay. Thismeans that the commission of crime decreases as the distance from the offender’s home increases. Individualshave the greatest cognitive maps for the area around their homes, thus is it in this activity space that theycommit more offenses. These are short journeys to crime. Elfers et al. (2008) argue that distance decay occurspartly due to the presence of opportunities that exist between the offender’s starting point and the intendedending point of travel. Bernasco (2010) adds an interesting dimension to the discussion of crime centering onone’s home. He examines crime around the offender’s current home as well as around an immediately pastresidence, using a two-year window around residency. Offenses are 22.5 times more likely around the currentor former residence, with the odds of offending around former homes diminishing over time (Bernasco, 2010).This shows that crime is likely in an individual’s awareness space, and this awareness shifts over time.While distance decay is an important factor in distance traveled, opportunities, potential payoff, and abilityto travel play a role in long distances. Property offenses, which have a greater chance of being planned, tend tohave longer travel averages (Pyle, 1974; Rhodes and Conley, 1981; White, 1932). The expectation and size ofoffense payoffs also result in longer journeys (Morselli and Royer, 2008; Snook, 2004; Van Daele and VanderBeken, 2011). Research demonstrates that the distance traveled increases when transportation and road accessis more readily available (Bicheler et al., 2012; Snook, 2004; Van Daele and Vander Beken, 2011; Vandeviver etal., 2015). Personal crimes tend to be more spontaneous and occur between family members or friends, thusmitigating long travel distances (Amir, 1971; Bullock, 1955; White, 1932).The greater distances associated with property crimes are especially important for the discussion ofcommunity crime prevention because these programs usually target property offenses. Distance also tends toincrease with the offender’s age due to the increased mobility that comes with growing older, leaving school,living on one’s own, and ownership of some means of transportation (Nichols, 1980; P.P. Phillips, 1980).Additionally, younger individuals probably hold more limited cognitive maps upon which to base offensedecisions. Having established the existence of offender mobility, it is reasonable to assume that territorialdisplacement is a possible consequence of prevention efforts.Territorial DisplacementThe most common form of displacement considered in evaluations is territorial/spatial displacement. Severalstudies claim evidence of territorial displacement. Fabricant (1979) claims that juvenile arrests cause youthfuloffenders to move to neighboring locations. Crime prevention programs in Dallas appear to shift someoffenders into surrounding suburbs (Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council, 1975). Specifically, changes in Dallasare accompanied by greater increases in six of nine Dallas suburbs. Forrester et al. (1988), investigating theeffects of target hardening and social crime prevention measures, claim that the 60 percent decrease in burglaryis partially offset by a 25 percent increase in burglary in the surrounding area. Barclay et al. (1996), studyingthe impact of bicycle patrol on auto theft in one crime hot spot, show large increases in auto theft in twoadjacent areas during the project period. The increases also persist after the program ended. Displacement isthe best explanation for these findings. Braga et al. (1999), in an analysis of a police crackdown in Jersey City,New Jersey, reports evidence of property crime displacement. In an analysis of CCTV in town centers, Brown(1995) indicates that both robbery and personal theft are displaced to other areas. Territorial displacement isalso evident in the Kirkholt and Safer Cities burglary prevention efforts (Ekblom et al., 1996a; Tilley, 1993), insome of the Burglary Reduction Initiative sites (Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Home Office 2003d), inPhiladelphia’s Operation Safe Streets project (Lawton et al., 2005), and in Rotterdam’s efforts to curb theftsfrom autos (Hesseling, 1995a).Not all research finds territorial displacement, even when the project actively searches for it. Ditton andShort (1999) and Farrington et al. (2007), examining the impact of CCTV, report no evidence of displacement.Armitage et al. (1999) also find no territorial displacement as a result of CCTV installations in three policebeats. Evaluating the impact of police enforcement of carrying concealed weapons laws in Kansas City,125
Sherman and Rogan (1995) uncover no evidence of displacement from target areas to a matched control area.Weisburd and Green (1995) report no displacement resulting from police targeting of drug hot spots in JerseyCity. Similarly, Braga et al. (1999) find no shift in calls about robbery, assault, drug offenses, street fights, ordisorder incidents from the targeted hot spots to the control areas. Weisburd et al. (2006), in a study designedspecifically to test for territorial displacement, find no such displacement in either prostitution or drugoffending. It is evident that territorial displacement appears in some analyses and not in others. Finally,McLennan and Whitworth (2008) find displacement in only 2 percent of 383 tests of the New Deal forCommunities Program in the U.K.The discrepant results from study to study may be due to the use of different displacement areas in theanalyses. Bowers and Johnson (2003) note that the selection of areas into which displacement may occur iscritical to the analysis. While most analyses look at an immediately adjacent area, it is not appropriate toassume that the closest neighboring area is the best selection for assessing territorial displacement (Andresen,2010). It is advisable to identify several buffer zones around the target or experimental area, as well as a centralarea, and measure changes in zones at different distances from the intervention site (Bowers and Johnson,2003). In their evaluation of alley gating, Bowers et al. (2003) find no displacement into the areas immediatelyaround the experimental site, but do report displacement to areas further away. One key to uncoveringterritorial displacement, therefore, may be correctly specifying the potential displacement zone.Temporal DisplacementSeveral studies make explicit note about possible offense shifts across time. Two studies claim that, whilestreet lighting reduces the incidence of crime in the relit areas, there is a corresponding increase in daylightcrime rates within the same areas (Wright et al., 1974). This suggests the possibility that the offenses simplymoved from night to day. Hesseling (1995b) reports finding temporal displacement resulting from increasedsurveillance in inner city areas. Conversely, in the Barclay et al. (1996) study of auto theft, an explicit attemptto identify temporal changes fails to show any such displacement.Tactical DisplacementCrime prevention efforts can make the criminal work harder. This is evident through the use of newmethods of committing the same crimes on the same targets. One example of this is a shift in burglary fromentering through open doors to breaking windows for access. Interviews with burglars indicate that offendersare willing to seek out and utilize different methods when confronted with barriers to committing the crime(Bennett and Wright, 1984; Cromwell et al., 1991; Reppetto, 1974). Crime prevention efforts in Seattle reveal ashift in burglary methods from hardened doors and windows to unlocked entrances (Seattle Law and JusticePlanning Office, 1975). Similarly, alley gating has moved the point of entry for burglary from the rear ofbuildings to the front of homes (Bowers et al., 2003). Allatt (1984) finds that target hardening leads to greaterinstances of forced locks and broken windows. Finch (2011), looking at the introduction of PIN and chiptechnology in credit cards, reports increased theft of cards and passwords, as well as other methods, to committhese crimes. Finally, Weisburd et al. (2006) report evidence of tactical displacement based on interviews withoffenders.Target DisplacementTarget displacement appears in various studies of crime prevention. Gabor (1981) specifically investigates theshift in offending from one set of victims to another set of potential victims. He finds that the OperationIdentification program appears to have shifted offending away from program participants to individuals whohave not joined the project. This remains true even after controlling for the pre-program victimization rates ofthe subjects. Offenders also shift from residential areas to commercial establishments as a result of propertymarking (Gabor, 1981). There is evidence that offenders target objects that are not as easily marked by the126
owners. Tilley and Webb (1994) report similar target displacement from property marking efforts. Allatt (1984)finds the unreinforced structures experience higher levels of burglary after the installation of target hardeningdevices in neighboring buildings. Similarly, Miethe (1991) notes that target hardening devices displace crime tonon-hardened targets in the same area of Seattle. Evidence from the Kirkholt burglary project shows thatefforts to prevent repeat victimization result in a move to more “new” victims who are not as involved in theprogram (Forrester et al., 1990). The Reducing Burglary Initiative in Stirchley also reports a shift in burglariesaway from homes to non-dwelling structures (Home Office, 2003b).Functional DisplacementThis final form of displacement manifests itself in terms of changes in offenses committed by the offender.The usual way of investigating such displacement is through comparison of different individual crime ratesfrom before and after program implementation. Arthur Young and Co. (1978) report that the crime preventionprogram at the Cabrini-Green housing project resulted in increased levels of assaults and robbery anddecreased numbers of burglaries and thefts. This suggests that the efforts, which deal more with propertysecurity, precipitate more personal contact offenses. Allatt (1984) makes similar claims of functionaldisplacement in connection with target hardening efforts in a housing project. Letkemann (1973) shows thatbank burglars shift to bank robbery as a response to target hardening undertaken by banks, and Laycock (1984)reveals that efforts to target harden pharmacies results in an increase in the level of pharmacy robberies andother drug offenses. Research on CCTV programs in city centers also shows shifts from motor vehicle theft totheft from motor vehicles (Brown, 1995). Felson et al. (1996) note that improvements in the New York City busterminal greatly reduced most crime and disorder. There was some evidence, however, of functionaldisplacement to minor property offenses (a form of benign displacement) (Felson et al., 1996). Finally, Finch(2011) reports that property offenders shift from credit card fraud to other forms of theft as a result ofintroducing PINs and chips to credit cards.Displacement SummaryThis review finds that displacement does appear in various forms. It is important, however, to note thatdisplacement is not an inevitable outcome of prevention initiatives. When displacement does occur, it is not 100percent. Displacement is a viable concern for discussions of crime prevention. Although the list of studiesreporting, or not reporting, each type of displacement is limited, this is probably due to the failure of mostevaluations to consider displacement. Interestingly, two reviews that claim to find little evidence ofdisplacement and argue that it should not be a major concern (Eck, 1993; Hesseling, 1994) actually uncover asignificant level of various forms of displacement. Both Hesseling’s (1994) and Eck’s (1993) analyses reveal thatroughly half of the studies show evidence of displacement, particularly territorial and target forms. The factthat the authors do not find 100 percent displacement, or displacement in all studies, leads them to conclude itis not a major problem. This is an unrealistic criterion and any evidence of displacement should be a concern tobe addressed.Guerette and Bowers (2009) examined 102 studies with a total of 572 tests for displacement or diffusion. Ascan be seen in Table 6.5, displacement appears in 26 percent of the tests. Temporal displacement is the mostcommon type uncovered (36 percent), with tactical being the least common (22 percent). While not 100 percent,at least one out of five tests for any type of displacement reports positive results. In a meta-analysis of thosestudies providing enough data for testing, Guerette and Bowers (2009) find that 42 percent of the observationsuncover displacement. These findings show that displacement is indeed a common occurrence, although not allprograms find displacement, and the displacement does not negate the positive impact of the preventionactivities.On the Web 127
You can read more about analyzing for displacement by downloading Guerette’s (2009)Analyzing Crime Displacement and Diffusion found on the Center for Problem-OrientedPolicing’s web site: http://www.popcenter.org/tools/pdfs/displacement.pdfIt is very important to note that the level of displacement is typically a small proportion of the total decreasein crime attributed to crime prevention measures. The finding of displacement qualifies the impact of thepreventive program, but it certainly does not negate the positive results attributable to the intervention. Indeed,displacement findings show that the prevention programs are capable of altering the behavior of the offenders.The offenders respond to the actions of the legitimate users and limit their criminal behavior in relation to thevarious targets. The problem is that the only way of truly knowing if crime is displaced is to interviewoffenders and ask them if the crime prevention measure altered their behavior.Table 6.5 Displacement and Diffusion by TypeTypeNDisplacedDiffusedTerritorial27262 (23%)100(37%)Target8026 (33%)19(24%)Temporal3111 (36%)5(16%)Tactical4911 (22%)6(12%)Functional14036 (26%)22(16%)Total146(26%)152(27%)Source: Adapted by author from R.T. Guerette and K.J. Bowers (2009). “Assessing the extent of crime displacement and diffusion ofbenefits: A review of situational crime prevention evaluations.” Criminology 47:1331-1368.Diffusion EffectsOffsetting displacement may be a diffusion of benefits. As noted earlier, diffusion of benefits means thatareas, items, or individuals not targeted by a crime prevention program also benefit from the intervention. Forexample, if half of the homes in a neighborhood join block watch, mark their property, and take part insurveillance activities, and everyone in the neighborhood experiences reduced victimization and fear, it isprobable that the crime prevention of the participants had an impact on the non-participants. This would be adiffusion of benefits. Not unlike displacement, however, measuring diffusion is very difficult.The typical approach to measuring diffusion is to examine the change in crime and fear in areas contiguousto the target area. Reductions in the contiguous areas could be due to diffusion effects (Clarke, 1995). At thesame time, however, the reductions in both the target and control areas could be a result of general decreasesin society. Rather than a diffusion effect, the crime prevention intervention has no impact. Determiningwhether there is no change or if the changes are due to diffusion would require additional comparison areas(or targets) that would not be expected to experience diffusion due to distance or other circumstances (seeBowers and Johnson, 2003).Another problem with identifying a diffusion effect would appear when both displacement and diffusionoccur at the same time, resulting in no apparent change in the non-treatment area (Weisburd and Green, 1995).In this case, the crime prevention program is successful at reducing crime and/or fear in the target area. At thesame time, some of the reduction is the result of displacing offenses to another area, which would normallymean that crime and/or fear in the other area increases. A simultaneous diffusion effect of equal magnitude,128
however, would offset the increase and show no net change in crime and/or fear.Despite these concerns with identifying diffusion effects, evaluations are beginning to pay more attention tothe possibilities of diffusion in their designs and analyses. Green (1995a), analyzing the impact of a programdealing with neighborhood drug problems, reports a diffusion impact in areas surrounding the targeted sites.The two blocks around the target sites show reductions in deviant behavior, although smaller in magnitude tothe experimental sites. Miethe (1991) notes that neighborhood watch efforts in Seattle appear to diffuse to non-participating targets in the same area. Painter and Farrington (1999b), in an analysis of street lighting projects,find decreases in daytime offending for the relit areas, thus suggesting temporal diffusion. Diffusion also isapparent in the Safer Cities program, particularly in areas where the prevention efforts are intensivelyimplemented (Ekblom et al., 1996a, 1996b), and in the New Deal for Communities program where 23 percent of383 comparisons show diffusion of benefits (McLennan and Whitworth, 2008). Guerette and Bowers (2009) alsoprovide evidence of diffusion in their review of situational crime prevention, finding that 27 percent of the testsexhibited diffusion (see Table 6.5). The meta-analytic results also reveal diffusion in 42 percent of thecomparisons.Felson et al. (1996) report that diffusion may actually occur in the opposite direction. That is, changesoccurring outside the target area may have an impact on the target, leading to the appearance of programeffectiveness. In their study of the New York City bus terminal, Felson et al. (1996) note that reductions incrime outside the terminal, dating from prior to the terminal improvements, may be contributing to the crimereductions inside the terminal. In essence, the external changes in robbery and assault may be diffusing intothe terminal. (Felson et al. (1996) note that the reductions are greater in the terminal, thus indicating aprogrammatic impact beyond any possible diffusion.)While concerns about displacement have existed for some time in the literature, diffusion is a more recenttopic. Diffusion should be considered as a counterbalancing force to displacement (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994).Indeed, in some instances, displacement and diffusion both emerge in studies and, in essence, cancel out oneanother. Given the fact that both forces could be at work in a project, it is important to design projects that canuncover each of these possible factors. The inability to identify displacement and diffusion would result in anincomplete analysis of program effectiveness.129
Implications of Displacement and DiffusionThe possibility of displacement and diffusion is an outcome of crime prevention that should be considered inany program. Studies aptly illustrate that displacement is a plausible outcome of crime prevention programs.At the same time, it would be naive to assume that all crime reduction in an area is due to simple displacementto another place, time, or method, or that programs cannot have a larger impact beyond the immediate target.The amount of displacement is far from 100 percent and typically reflects only a portion of the crime that isprevented in the target area. Diffusion is also a possibility that needs to be considered. Future research needs topay particular attention to both displacement and diffusion in order to adequately assess their impact onprevention programs.Key Termsaction (in cognitive mapping)activity spaceawareness spacebenign displacementcognitive mapsCRAVEDcrime attractorscrime displacementcrime fusescrime generatorscrime pattern theorycrime spilloverdiffusion of benefitsdistance decayedgesenvironmental backclothEuclidean distanceevaluation (in cognitive mapping)functional displacementGoogle Streetviewhot productshunting groundinelasticjourney to crimemalign displacementManhattan distancenodespathsperpetrator displacementprediction (in cognitive mapping)rational choice theoryrecognition (in cognitive mapping)routine activities theorysocial/crime templatesoft determinismtactical displacement130
target displacementtemporal displacementterritorial (spatial) displacement131
Chapter 7The Mass Media and Crime PreventionChapter OutlineThe Media and CrimeThe Level of Reported CrimeMedia Accounts and Actual CrimeDoes the Media Cause Crime and Fear?Mass Media Crime Prevention ActivitiesThe McGruff Prevention CampaignOther CampaignsCrime NewslettersInformation LinesSocial MediaCrime-time TelevisionPublicity and PreventionThe Media’s Responsibility for Crime PreventionSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Talk about media accounts of crime and how they relate to actual crime.Discuss research on whether the media causes crime.Diagram different ways in which the media/publicity can be used in relation to crime prevention.Demonstrate your knowledge of the “Take a Bite Out of Crime” campaign and its impact.Identify media prevention campaigns and discuss their effectiveness.Discuss the use of crime newsletters and evaluations of their effectiveness.Explain the use of information lines and their impact.Provide examples of “crime-time television” and discuss the pros and cons of these programs.Define the term anticipatory benefit and discuss its impact.We have seen that both physical design and neighborhood crime prevention programs have had an impact oncrime and fear. At the same time, that impact has been limited in important ways. One shortcoming is thatmany areas and people are not reached or not involved in the programs. Another potential problem isdisplacement which may limit the absolute reductions in crime or fear. One response is to utilize programs thatreach a wider range of people and engender greater participation. Such efforts would limit the alternativesavailable to potential offenders. The mass media offers one avenue for creating a more widespread effort.The impact of the mass media on modern society has been the focus of much research. The great growth oftelevision in the 1950s expanded the potential of the media to influence individual and group behavior. Today,132
social media has taken mass media beyond the living room into every setting on a constant basis. Inspection ofthe mass media in relation to crime has predominantly looked at the potential of the various informationmedia to create deviant behavior and fear of crime. Relatively little research has focused on the crimepreventive and fear reducing capability of the mass media. Programs such as the “Take a Bite Out of Crime”campaign and Crime Stoppers have used the media as a means of inducing crime prevention activity. Beforeexamining the media and crime prevention, it will be informative to consider the treatment of crime in themedia and the effect of the media on deviant behavior and fear.133
The Media and CrimeIn many respects, one can say that the mass media has an affinity for crime and crime-related activity. Thisis true whether one looks at the coverage of crime in the news or the content of fictional programming ontelevision. Crime accounts for a major portion of the written and broadcast media. A variety of studies haveexamined the extent of crime in newspapers and on television.The Level of Reported CrimeOne method for analyzing the reporting of crime is to undertake content analyses of newspapers. In oneearly study, Deutschmann (1959) finds that between 10 percent and 15 percent of the stories in selected NewYork and Ohio newspapers focus on crime. Graber (1980) reports greater attention to crime (22 to 28 percent ofthe stories) in daily newspapers. A wide range of other studies report that crime stories comprise betweenroughly 5 percent and 30 percent of newspaper space (Cohen, 1975; Deutschmann, 1959; Otto, 1962; Stempl,1962; Stott, 1967). Chiricos et al. (1997) claim that newspaper coverage of crime has increased more than 400percent in recent years. Similar results appear in analysis of U.K. newspapers, where the percentage of crimestories has increased from roughly 9 percent from 1945 to 1951, to 21 percent from 1985 to 1991 (Reiner et al.,2000).Television news also provides crime information. Graber (1977) notes that roughly 20 percent of the localtelevision news and 10 percent of the national news concerns crime. A follow-up study three years later revealsthat 12 to 13 percent of television news is devoted to crime (Graber, 1980). Hofstetter (1976), evaluating theextent of crime stories on national network news, reports that between 16 and 19 percent of the news isdevoted to crime. Surette (1998) notes that 10 to 13 percent of national news is crime related, while roughly 20percent of local news deals with crime. Additional evaluations of network newscasts finds that crimerepresents 10 percent of the stories (Lowry, 1971) and 13 to 18 percent of the broadcast time (Cirino, 1972).Another way the media provides crime information is through “entertainment” programs. These can taketwo different forms. The first is fictional programs. The second can be referred to as “reality programs.” Thenumber of fictionalized presentations that involve a crime theme has varied over the years. Dominick (1978)notes that the percentage of broadcasting time devoted to crime-related topics has varied from a low of 7percent in 1953 to a high of 39 percent in 1975. Surette (1998) claims that 20 to 40 percent of prime-timeprograms focus on law enforcement and the criminal justice system. The number of reality programs hasgrown since their advent in the late 1980s. They often appear as quasi-news reports on sensational, unsolvedcrimes, such as 48 Hours, Dateline, and 20/20.Media Accounts and Actual CrimeThe correspondence between the media portrayal of crime and the actual extent and types of criminalactivity shows a great deal of divergence. Typically, studies report that the media distorts the crime picture byfocusing on selected types of crime, overemphasizing the level of crime, and failing to provide accurate orcomplete information about criminal incidents. There is a disproportionate focus on violence in both news andfictional accounts (Chermak, 1998; Chermak and Chapman, 2007; Dominick, 1978; Ferguson, 2013; Gerbner etal., 1980; Higgins and Ray, 1978; Greer and Reiner, 2012; Jewkes, 2011; Marsh, 1991; Oliver, 1994; Oliver andArmstrong, 1998; Reiner et al., 2000; Robinson, 2011; Surette, 1992). This overemphasis has the potential to raisethe fear of crime in society by presenting violent offenses, especially between strangers on the street, as acommon occurrence. Potentially violent confrontations elicit the most fear.The level of crime and specific information about crime also is distorted in the media. Analyzing newspapersfrom six cities and television news from three, Chermak (1994) reports that roughly half of all crime storiesdeal with violence, while only 10 percent address property offenses. Further, the seriousness of an offense is134
significantly related to reporting practices (Chermak, 1998). Research by Lichter et al. (1994) points out thathomicides on television occur at a rate more than 1,000 times that found in real life. The media also fails toreport on the activity of the criminal justice system or provide much information about the offender and victim(Chermak, 1994; Gordon et al., 1979; Surette, 1992). Skogan and Maxfield (1981) note how the media createscrime images through the skewed presentation of actual crime occurrences. They point out that by drawingtogether different offenses, committed at different times and places, the media creates an inappropriate imageof crime in the community. The various studies show that the media concentrates on the spectacle of theoffense and ignores the potential harm, in terms of increased fear of crime, that may arise from incompletereporting.Does the Media Cause Crime and Fear?One potential problem of media presentations of crime is that viewers receive inaccurate images of crimeand the criminal justice system. Several studies note that the public image of crime is influenced by mediapresentations. Gerbner et al. (1977, 1978, 1979) and Barrile (1980) compare the perception of crime and thecriminal justice system held by individuals with differing levels of television exposure. The authorsconsistently find that respondents answer closer to the “television answer” (the answer that is commonlydepicted on television) than to the real world information. The images, therefore, are influenced by mediapresentations. Perhaps of more interest for us is the ability of the media to cause crime or fear.Media and CrimeResearch has investigated the extent to which the mass media can influence the commission of deviantbehavior. One early study of high school students relates the level of violence in the subjects’ favoritetelevision programs to their self-reported aggressive behavior (Hartnagel et al., 1975). The study finds a weakpositive association between the level of media violence and reported violent behavior. More importantly, thestudents’ perception of violence in the programs is related to violent behavior. A similar study of televisionviewing by youths (Belson, 1978) compares the violent behavior of two groups of boys—those with highexposure to media violence and those with low exposure. Belson (1978) reports that individuals with higherexposure commit more serious violent offenses. This relationship holds true for films that portray violentinterpersonal relations, unnecessary violence, realistic violence, and violence presented as acceptable. Sportsviolence, cartoon, science fiction, and slapstick violence do not elicit the same response in viewers (Belson,1978).Two studies by Phillips (1982, 1983) investigate the effect of fictionalized suicides and prize fights onpersonal violence. One study examines the number of suicides that follow fictionalized suicides on soap operas.Controlling for holidays, non-fictional suicides presented in the media, and season of the year, Phillips (1982)finds that the U.S. suicide rate and attempted suicides significantly increase after soap opera suicides. Theseincreases are true especially for urban females who are most similar to characters presented in daily soapoperas. Phillips’ second study (1983) reports a significant increase in homicide three to four days afterheavyweight prize fights. This finding persists when controlling for day of week, holidays, and season. Indeed,the effect is greater for the more publicized fights. The homicide victims after a fight generally hold the samedemographic characteristics as the fight’s loser (Phillips, 1983).Reviewing studies of television violence, Andison (1977) finds that 25 of 67 studies show a moderate positiverelationship between viewing violence and subsequent aggression. An additional 27 analyses report a weakpositive relationship. Examination of the studies in chronological order reveals increasingly strongerrelationships between media presentations and violence. There also appears to be a larger effect on adults. Thisis possibly due to accumulated exposure over longer time spans (Andison, 1977). Andison’s findings relyheavily on laboratory studies that utilize various forms of aggression such as electric shock and self-reportedfeelings of aggression. The generalizability of these findings to situations outside of the sterile, laboratoryenvironment is highly questionable and Andison (1977) notes more realistic field studies find weaker, but stillpositive, relationships between television and aggression.135
Research also has focused on pornography as a cause of violence, particularly sexual violence againstwomen. The U.S. Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (1986) concludes that there is a direct linkbetween viewing pornography and aggression found primarily in experimental laboratory studies. Whilelaboratory experiments provide the ability to control for many outside influences and, arguably, allow for acloser examination of causality (Huesmann and Malamuth, 1986), there are serious flaws in the methodologythat require caution in interpreting the results (Lab, 1987). First, many studies couple exposure to pornographywith angering the subject; thus, it is not possible to attribute subsequent aggression to the pornographicstimulus. Second, the method of aggression post pornographic exposure in laboratory studies (such asoverinflated blood pressure cuffs, electric shocks, noxious noise, and derogatory evaluations of tasks) is notequivalent to rape, assault, or other forms of violence outside the laboratory setting. Third, the sterilelaboratory setting does not provide the same conditions under which the subjects would be viewingpornography and committing aggressive acts in the real world. Finally, the study subjects are typicallyundergraduate students who are not representative of the general population (Lab, 1987).Where laboratory research claims a relatively strong media-behavior link, field and natural experimentsprovide more tentative conclusions (Lab, 1987). In a review of research on media violence, Geen and Thomas(1986) note that field experiments and natural studies show greatly equivocal results. Similarly, Coyne (2007)finds only a tenuous link between television viewing and criminal behavior. Another problem with mediastudies involves the time order of the assumed causal relationships. Most studies present the results in such away that exposure to the media causes aggressive behavior. In many analyses, it is equally plausible thatpeople who are already aggressive or are naturally prone to aggression simply choose to view more aggression(Coyne, 2007). Ferguson (2013), reviewing the literature on video games and behavior, finds little support for anexposure-behavior link. Greer and Reiner (2012) note that the impact of media presentations on subsequentbehavior is tenuous.This brief review presents qualified support for a connection between media presentations and viewerbehavior. Most studies find weak to moderate relationships between actual behavior and television accounts ofcrime and aggression. There is also a strong theoretical tradition of modeling, learning, arousal, and cognitivecuing which supports a connection between the mass media and aggression. At the very least, excessiveexposure to media violence can influence some viewers to be more aggressive (Huesmann and Malamuth,1986). The preponderance of data and positive research findings suggest that the media does have someinfluence on behavior (Surette, 1992).The Media and FearBesides causing deviant behavior, media presentations may also increase people’s fear. Several authors notethat crime news increases fear (Ditton and Duffy, 1983; Gunter, 1987; Robinson, 2011; Sherizan, 1978; van Dijk,1978). Heath (1984) and Liska and Baccaglini (1990) report that local crime stories, particularly those dealingwith sensational events, tend to raise the level of fear among readers. Examining 10 British daily newspapersand their relationship to fear, Williams and Dickinson (1993) find that fear varies with the saliency of the crimereports. That is, stories that place the offense in a framework familiar to the reader have a greater impact thanthose more removed from the reader’s experiences.High levels of television viewing also have been found to raise fear (Callanan, 2012; Doob and Macdonald,1979; Gerbner et al., 1979). Chiricos et al. (1996) report that television and radio news is related to fear, whilewritten news has no relationship with fear levels. Boda and Szabó (2011) note that there is a strong, consistentimpact of television violence on increased fear. Callanan (2012) points out that television has a greater impacton levels of fear compared to other media sources.In is important to note that the media–fear relationship is qualified by demographic factors. Television newsis linked to higher fear among victims, women, white, lower-income, and middle-aged respondents (Chiricos etal., 1996). Combining the effects of demographic factors, the news effect is limited primarily to white females.Similarly, Lane and Meeker (2003b) report that television news is related to fear among Latinos, while Weitzerand Kubrin (2004) find a connection between news and fear for blacks. In Great Britain, Crimewatch U.K., acounterpart to America’s Most Wanted, increased fear in one-third of its viewers (Dobash et al., 1998).136
SummaryThe preceding discussions show that the media does influence both criminal behavior and fear. Exposure tothe media is a daily fact of life for almost every citizen. There is a clear ability for the media to influence theimages of crime held by the populace. More importantly, the media appears to be a factor in molding behavior.In the same way that the media may contribute to aggressive behavior and fear, it is possible that exposure tothe mass media could bring about more realistic images of crime and prompt people to adopt crime preventiontechniques.137
Mass Media Crime Prevention ActivitiesFigure 7.1 Uses of Media/Publicity in Crime Prevention Source: K.J. Bowers and S.D. Johnson (2005). “Using publicity for preventive purposes.” In N. Tilley (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety. Portland, OR: Willan. Reprinted with permission.Crime prevention through the mass media can take a variety of forms and has the potential to impact indifferent ways. Bowers and Johnson (2005) show that the media (publicity) can be used for several purposes:increasing the risk to offenders, increasing the perceived risk to offenders, encouraging safety practices by thepublic, and reassuring the public (see Figure 7.1). Successful use of the media may result in reduced crime andfear of crime. Examples of the use of media in crime prevention are the McGruff campaigns, crime newsletters,information lines such as Crime Stoppers, the use of social media, and “reality television” programs. Each ofthese attempts to provide varying amounts of crime education, fear reduction, and crime prevention activitythat, hopefully, will translate into lower levels of actual crime.The McGruff Prevention CampaignPerhaps the most well-known media crime prevention campaign was instituted in the late 1970s by theCrime Prevention Coalition of America and the Advertising Council. These organizations joined forces tolaunch the “Take a Bite Out of Crime” program, featuring McGruff the crime dog. In 1982, the National CrimePrevention Council (NCPC) was formed to manage the ongoing McGruff project. The program operates todaywith the same four basic objectives it had in the beginning. First, it attempts to alter the public’s feelings aboutcrime and the criminal justice system. This is clearly an educational component aimed at instilling a realisticview of crime and the role of the legal system in stopping crime. Second, the program attempts to generatefeelings of citizen responsibility for crime and crime prevention. Third, it tries to enhance citizen cooperationwith the criminal justice system for fighting crime. The final goal is to enhance already existing crimeprevention efforts.Public service announcements on television and radio, print ads, webinars, and podcasts provide the meansof realizing these objectives. Many of the announcements feature a cartoon character known as “McGruff” (a138
dog in a trench coat) who presents simulated crimes and notes the proper actions viewers should take whenconfronted with similar situations. A number of different themes or issues have appeared over the years (seeTable 7.1). The emphasis throughout the campaign is on individual and community ability to take action.Table 7.1 NCPC/McGruff CampaignsCyberbullyingHome invasionBullying preventionBurglaryIdentity theftMortgage fraudInternet safetySafe firearms storageNeighborhood involvementHate crimeSenior fraudDrug abuseSexual assaultCell phone safetySchool violenceWork violenceSource: Compiled by author from National Crime Prevention Council (2015). http://www.ncpc.orgThe “Take a Bite Out of Crime” media campaign is the most recognizable and memorable component ofthe work of the NCPC. According to the NCPC (2015), more than three-quarters of all youths in the UnitedStates recognize McGruff and more than 4,000 law enforcement agencies use McGruff in their activities. The“Take a Bite Out of Crime” campaign has relied on a significant amount of monetary support and personneltime from various sources. The NCPC (2015) notes that advertisers have donated more than $1.4 billion worthof time and space for the program. This does not include production costs or costs of booklets, posters, andother program-related items that have been made available since the program started in 1979. Two large-scaleevaluations have been completed on the program.On the Web You can find out more about the prevention programs of the National Crime Prevention Councilby visiting their web site at http://www.ncpc.org/programsThe First EvaluationA two-pronged evaluation of this campaign was conducted from 1979 to 1981 (O’Keefe and Mendelsohn,1984). The first part of the evaluation consisted of surveying 1,200 adults from across the country. The secondphase involved a panel survey of adults in Buffalo, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The panel survey tookmeasurements three months prior to the introduction of the campaign and again after more than a year and ahalf of campaign exposure. Among the issues investigated were the level of exposure to the public serviceannouncements and the impact of the campaign on subsequent attitudes and crime prevention behaviors. Theevaluation did not include any measures of actual crime. Self-reported victimization and attitudes served as thedependent variables.The national survey found that roughly 50 percent of the respondents saw the campaign announcements(O’Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984). Unfortunately, only 3 percent of this figure were able to recall theadvertisements without some prompting by the interviewers. The vast majority (78 percent) saw theadvertisements on television. Comparison across demographic groups revealed fairly even exposure in thepopulation. The lone exception to this finding was the low number of older respondents (33 percent) whoexpressed a familiarity with the McGruff materials. O’Keefe and Mendelsohn (1984) speculated that this couldbe partly attributable to the fact that the materials typically appear later at night when the advertising time is139
not as profitable and older respondents are less likely to be watching the television.The national survey also probed the extent of knowledge retained from the messages and the self-reportedbehavior of respondents as a result of the information. Almost 90 percent of the respondents were able todescribe specific suggestions made and 22 percent said they learned something new (O’Keefe and Mendelsohn,1984). The evaluators also found that better than 50 percent of the survey subjects felt more responsible forcrime prevention because of the advertisements and a full 25 percent reported taking precautions suggested inthe announcements. Regrettably, 22 percent of those surveyed reported feeling more fearful of criminalvictimization. They attributed this feeling directly to the McGruff campaign materials. This increase in fearwas opposite to program expectations and directly contradicted the efforts to present scenarios that would notelicit increased fear.The panel survey component of the evaluation presented more in-depth results. Similar to the nationalfindings, the panel survey revealed wide exposure to the campaign materials (O’Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984).Interestingly, the level of interest in the materials was higher for those already concerned with crime and crimeprevention activities. Exposure to the advertisements had no impact on perceptions of neighborhood crime,perceived changes in the crime rate, or a sense of safety at night. Only minor, and contradictory, changes werefound in relation to individual crimes.Exposure to the public service announcements resulted in changes in crime prevention activities. Specificactivities suggested by the announcements (e.g., neighborhood watches, use of lights and locks, reportingsuspicious persons to the police) increased after exposure to the materials. Preventive measures not dealt within the messages (e.g., indoor lighting, stopping mail and paper deliveries, installing alarms) were not affected,as expected. The adoption of the crime prevention measures was not uniform across the panel subjects. Whilemen’s attitudes about crime prevention changed more than women’s, women and upper-income respondentstended to gravitate more to cooperative crime prevention activities (O’Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984). Lower-income respondents chose individual alternatives like increased lighting and more outdoor activities.The Second EvaluationA second evaluation was conducted in 1992 and involved interviewing a national sample of adults, as well aslaw enforcement and media representatives. Compared to the earlier evaluation, 80 percent of the citizenrespondents reported having seen the announcements, an increase of 30 percent (O’Keefe et al., 1996). Exposurewas greatest among younger respondents, males (by 6 percent over females), those with at least a high schooleducation, and victims. The impact of the announcements was uniformly in the expected direction.Respondents reported feeling more competent about crime prevention participation, taking more action, andbecoming more concerned about crime (O’Keefe et al., 1996). Interestingly, the evaluation did not uncoverdemographic differences between those learning from the announcements and those reporting no impact.Similar positive results appear in the media and law enforcement responses. More than two-thirds of themedia respondents reported using the materials in the past, with 75 percent of the television stations havingaired announcements during the past year (O’Keefe et al., 1996). Both the media and law enforcementrespondents noted that the materials were valuable in both crime and drug prevention efforts. Of particularnote was the introduction of “WE PREVENT” announcements in the early 1990s which asked viewers to call atoll free telephone number and request information on how to deal with problems such as random violence.Media respondents rated these announcements high in terms of quality, appropriateness, and interestcompared to other public service materials (O’Keefe et al., 1996).SummaryIn general, the “Take a Bite Out of Crime” campaign facilitates attitudinal changes in the groups thattraditionally are the least vulnerable to crime and those already interested in crime prevention issues. Thismirrors the findings of who joins neighborhood watch and other crime prevention programs. O’Keefe andMendelsohn (1984) also note that behavioral changes do not always correspond to attitudinal adjustments. Thatis, many individuals try out various crime prevention measures without reporting any attitudinal shifts about140
crime or fear. Based on both evaluations, O’Keefe et al. (1996) suggest that the program keep its main themesand continue to find ways to reach vulnerable groups in society. In addition, the campaign should attempt toidentify distinct needs of different audience groups and target announcements to their situations.Other CampaignsOther media campaigns have been targeted at a range of crime in different countries. Riley (1980; Riley andMayhew, 1980) reports on a campaign to educate individuals about auto theft and vandalism in England. Theattempt to deal with vandalism had no effect on parental attitudes or the crime rates in the target area. Autothefts, on the other hand, declined in the experimental area relative to a control location. A media campaignaimed at auto theft in Australia using television, newspapers, magazines, and letters reached only 28 percent ofthe public but was able to increase the preventive behavior of those exposed to the campaign (Wortley et al.,1998).A burglary awareness/education program in Jerusalem utilizing radio, public lectures, and various forms ofliterature was recalled by more than 50 percent of the surveyed public and 46 percent altered their behavior ortook precautions in accordance with the campaign’s suggestions (Geva and Israel, 1982). Participants alsoreported higher feelings of safety compared to non-participants or pre-exposure levels. The actual level ofburglary dropped by 32 percent in the target area compared to a 22 percent increase in the rest of Jerusalemand a 6 percent rise in the control area (Geva and Israel, 1982).Attempts to influence substance use and abuse are also common in the media. Elder et al. (2004) and Tay(2005) report that media campaigns to stem drunk driving have significantly reduced drunk driving andalcohol-related crashes. Conversely, an evaluation of the “Buzzed Driving is Drunk Driving” public serviceannouncement campaign in the United States reveals minimal impact (Flexon and Guerette, 2009). The authorsspeculate the failure may be due to the belief by many that buzzed driving is not drunk driving, thus havinglittle impact on attitudes or behavior.The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign sponsored by the White House Office of National DrugControl Policy does appear to be having success. Started in 1998, the effort has evolved into the Above theInfluence program aimed at youths aged 12 to 17 and an Anti-Meth Campaign aimed at those aged 18 to 34.The Above the Influence campaign relies on digital media, including Facebook, YouTube, and Google, as wellas more traditional media outlets (White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2012). Evaluation ofthe project reveals that more than 75 percent of teens are aware of the campaign, and teens who are awarereport significantly stronger anti-drug beliefs than those unaware of the program (59 percent to 40 percentreporting anti-drug beliefs) (White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2012). Two independentevaluations (Carpenter and Pechmann, 2011; Slater et al., 2011) uncover similar strong impacts of the Above theInfluence Campaign. These studies illustrate that media campaigns have the potential to change both behaviorsand attitudes about crime and deviance.On the Web More detail on the White House’s media campaign against drug use and abuse can be accessedat http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/anti-drug-media-campaignInconsistent and weak results in some evaluations suggest that the programs may need to be better targeted.Sacco and Trotman (1990) note that the impact of a mass media crime prevention campaign is related to thesaliency of the program for the viewer. Individuals who recognize crime as a problem are more likely to beinfluenced and report changes in attitude and behavior (see, for example, the Buzzed Driving is Drunk Drivingresults). While widespread exposure of a program is a plus, crime prevention campaigns need to reach theintended or most vulnerable audiences (see also O’Keefe at al., 1996). The generic nature of large-scaleapproaches may also hamper their effectiveness. Sacco and Trotman (1990) suggest that programs need to set141
modest, realistic goals that focus on specific attitudes and behaviors. Viewers are more likely to takeprecautions that are presented in the media than to strike out on their own to find the proper forms of crimeprevention behavior (O’Keefe and Mendelsohn, 1984). More specific media campaigns, such as area newslettersand Crime Stoppers programs, may engender increased citizen participation in crime prevention activities.Crime NewslettersProviding more salient information to the public can be accomplished through the distribution of crimenewsletters. Unlike widely distributed mass media campaigns, which are limited in terms of their time frameand the level of specificity, newsletters can be targeted to a smaller audience and tailored to the needs of thoseindividuals. Newsletters also can provide information on a wide range of related topics, including the level ofcrime in an area and prevention techniques for the public (see Table 7.2). In addition, they may providedetailed, in-depth discussions of both crime and potential crime prevention measures. Totally differentnewsletters need not be prepared for each neighborhood or targeted group. Instead, a single newsletter dealingwith general crime and crime prevention information can be developed for wide distribution. Salience can beenhanced through the insertion of separate fact sheets and information sent to different areas and individuals.Table 7.2 Newsletter Content AreasSelf-protection techniquesWays to report crimeLocations of police or protection resourcesDangerous areasOffender addressesArea crime problemsSource: Compiled by the author from E. Barthe (2010) “Crime newsletters.” In B.S. Fisher and S.R Lab (eds.), Encyclopedia of Victimologyand Crime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Crime newsletters have been utilized in a large number of locations but have received extensive evaluationonly in Evanston, Illinois (Lavrakas, 1986; Lavrakas et al., 1983), Houston (Brown and Wycoff, 1987; Lavrakas,1986), and Newark (Lavrakas, 1986; Williams and Pate, 1987). Each newsletter included various articles oncrime prevention and comments on crime problems, as well as crime information specific to different locations.The crime information included such items as the level and types of crime committed in the area, roughlocation of offenses, and relevant information about offenders and victims. This allowed the reader to assessthe particulars about the crimes and apply that information to his own situation.The newsletters had the potential to influence citizen behavior in a number of ways. First, the newsletterswere an educational tool. They could present more realistic versions of the actual crime rate and, perhaps,bring down the fear of crime. The opposite effect, however, was also possible. Fear of crime could increase dueto the distribution of crime news. This could restrict, rather than increase, citizen behavior. A secondpossibility was they could raise the level of concern about crime among the citizenry. Hopefully, any increasein concern will result in a third outcome—increased citizen crime prevention activities.The evaluation of the newsletters in the three cities followed roughly the same procedures (Brown andWycoff, 1987; Lavrakas, 1986; Williams and Pate, 1987). Each evaluation randomly assigned homes to one ofthree conditions. One set of homes received the newsletter containing crime-specific information. A secondsample of homes received newsletters without the crime information. These subjects saw only the articles andcrime prevention information. The remaining sample of homes acted as a control group and did not get anynewsletter. Despite the similarity in content and evaluation design, the evaluation results differed across thethree cities.The most consistent finding was that individuals who reported receiving the newsletters held favorable142
assessments of them. This was true for both the newsletters with and without the specific crime information(Lavrakas, 1986). There was a slight tendency for those receiving the version containing crime data to view theletters as more interesting.There was less consistency in the impact on fear of crime, concern for crime prevention, and precautionstaken. In Evanston, the newsletters increased the recipient’s knowledge of the crime problem but had no effecton the fear of crime (Lavrakas et al., 1983; Lavrakas, 1986). The Houston evaluation showed increased fear ofproperty victimization among respondents receiving crime information (Brown and Wycoff, 1987; Lavrakas,1986) and the Newark evaluation failed to uncover any changes in fear of crime or perceptions of change in thecrime problem (Lavrakas, 1986; Williams and Pate, 1987). In terms of crime prevention activity, Evanstonrespondents who received letters containing crime information took more crime prevention precautions thanthose individuals not receiving the letters or those receiving letters without crime data (Lavrakas et al., 1983;Lavrakas, 1986). Houston respondents reported similar levels of crime prevention activity across all studygroups, although those receiving the newsletter felt more competent to avoid victimization than did non-receivers (Lavrakas, 1986). Finally, Newark residents who did not receive the newsletter reported taking morecrime prevention precautions than those who received either version of the newsletter. The newsletter didresult in greater feelings of self-protection among those viewing the materials (Lavrakas, 1986).The inconsistent findings in the evaluations may be attributable to differences in the study sites. Lavrakas(1986) points out that the more effective campaign in Evanston relied on hand distribution of the newsletter.Mailed newsletters may be relegated to the status of junk mail delivered by postal workers. A second differencebetween the cities concerns the educational level of the recipients. More Evanston respondents reportedgraduation from high school and participation in higher education than did those in either of the otherlocations (Lavrakas, 1986). This factor may influence the actual level of readership and impact of thenewsletters. Third, Lavrakas (1986) notes that the Evanston evaluation relies on interviews with the head of thehousehold while both the Houston and Newark studies interviewed any adult member of the household. It isreasonable to assume that the head of a household makes most decisions on household crime preventionactivity. Failure to target the head of the house, therefore, may fail to uncover any precautions that are taken.One final problem may be the choice of information and format for the various newsletters. Both Houston andNewark borrowed the basic newsletter framework from Evanston. It is possible that the similarity ofpresentation, given the dissimilarity of cities, is partially at fault for the discrepant results.Newsletters have the potential to affect fear of crime, perceptions of crime and victimization, and crimeprevention behavior. The failure of the three newsletter evaluations presented here to uncover consistentimpacts does not mean newsletters cannot work. The problems noted above suggest that more caution needs tobe taken in the choice of format, presentation, and evaluation of a newsletter. The consistent findings of publicinterest and acceptance of the information should be enough to assure their continuation.Information LinesThe idea behind information lines is twofold. First, and foremost, is the solicitation of information aboutspecific crimes from the public. The second aspect is the public presentation of crime information involvingcitizens in crime prevention. Perhaps the most widely known program of this type is Crime Stoppers. CrimeStoppers, and variations on this program, generally operate by offering rewards to citizens for informationabout crimes. Often, unsolved offenses are presented to the public through the mass media along with a plea bylaw enforcement officials for information regarding the crime. The informant is usually guaranteed anonymityfor the information through the use of code names or numbers and reward money comes from publicdonations. Crime Stoppers started in Albuquerque, New Mexico, in 1976 and as of 2012 there were almost 1,200programs around the world (Crime Stoppers International, 2015). Programs are found in 24 countries, includingthe United States, Canada, the Caribbean, Europe, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Pacific, South Korea,India, South Africa, and other countries. While most programs are community based, there are chapters foundat various schools and colleges. Programs typically offer rewards of up to $1,000 for information leading to thearrest of a suspect. Crime Stoppers programs are a tool to bring the public, media, and the criminal justicesystem into a cooperative crime prevention effort.143
On the Web You can explore more about Crime Stoppers at http://www.crimestoppersusa.com/ andhttp://www.csiworld.org/Crime Stoppers International (2015) claims that almost 1.6 million cases have been cleared since 1976 (seeTable 7.3). More than 950,000 arrests have been made, with almost $117 million in rewards paid. In addition,the authorities have recovered $2.1 billion in stolen property and seized more than $10 billion in drugs as aresult of the Crime Stoppers program (Crime Stoppers International, 2015). Money for the rewards is typicallydonated by businesses or solicited through fundraising, and the advertisements themselves are usually donatedby the media.Several evaluations of Crime Stoppers have been conducted. Rosenbaum et al. (1989) report on a nationalevaluation of Crime Stoppers in the United States. The evaluation included a telephone survey of 602 CrimeStoppers programs and surveys of police coordinators, Crime Stoppers boards of directors, and mass mediaexecutives. The surveys show that programs typically share resources with one another and receive high praisefrom the administrators, media personnel, and police coordinators. Many media respondents indicate that,while they are not currently participating in the program, they would be happy to do so if they wereapproached. Unfortunately, these programs are difficult to evaluate in terms of any reduction in fear of crimeor lower crime and victimization (Rosenbaum et al., 1989).Table 7.3 Crime Stoppers Facts and FiguresUnited StatesInternationalNumber of cases cleared998,4061,557,182Number of arrests made665,291952,912Amount of awards paid$102M$117MValue of property recovered$1.1 B$2.1 BValue of drugs seized$3.0B$8.3BTotal $ recoveredS4.2BS10.3BSource: Compiled by the author from www.csiworld.org/stats.php and www.crimestoppersusa.comGresham et al. (2001) report on an evaluation of Crime Stoppers in the United Kingdom. The researchersinterviewed key stakeholders, conducted observations of program operations, tracked phone calls, andreviewed program documents. In 2000, more than 500,000 calls were received by Crime Stoppers, but only 12percent of those provided usable information (i.e., actionable calls), and only 5,423 arrests were made (Greshamet al., 2001). The bulk of the actionable calls reflected drug and motor vehicle offenses. Interestingly, only one-fifth of the actionable calls were in direct response to specific media presentations. The rest of the calls dealtwith offenses or crimes not presented in the media. Also of note, Gresham et al. (2001) found that most rewardswent unclaimed. More than £3.7 million (over $7 million) worth of stolen property was recovered and morethan £34 million (over $65 million) in drugs were seized (Gresham et al., 2001). As in the United States, there isstrong support for Crime Stoppers from the police, media, and public.The Crime Stoppers program in Australia has had similar success. Most of the targeted crimes presented ontelevision are violent crimes (84 percent) and almost 140,000 calls were received in 2002 (Challinger, 2003).Unfortunately, less than 2 percent of the calls resulted in an arrest. Despite that fact, almost $600,000 (U.S.)worth of stolen property was recovered and over $5 million (U.S.) in drugs were seized (Challinger, 2003).Support for the program rivals that found in U.S. and U.K. assessments.144
Social MediaThe basic idea underlying Crime Stoppers has been expanded in recent years due to the growth of theInternet and social media sites. Police departments post crime videos and information on unsolved crimes onthe organization web sites, YouTube, Facebook, and others asking for viewers to provide information on thecrime and the offender (DiBlasio, 2012). Microblogs such as Twitter, blogs, Flickr, web chats, podcasts, andother emerging social outlets, can be used in a variety of ways by law enforcement and crime prevention(NNW, 2015; IACP, 2012). First, these outlets reach a wide array of people, particularly due to the ubiquitousnature of smart phones (NNW, 2015). Second, agencies can publicize events very quickly instead of being tiedto news broadcasts or weekly show schedules. Third, more videos and events can be posted compared tobroadcast media, and more information can be shared about each event. Fourth, agencies are using theseforums to post prevention topics (IACP, 2012; LexisNexis Risk Solutions, 2014). Unfortunately, there has been alack of centralized information on these emerging programs and little information on their effectiveness. In2010, the IACP and the Bureau of Justice Assistance initiated the IACP Center for Social Media. The Center istasked with promoting the use of social media by law enforcement to solve and prevent crime. It is essentiallya clearinghouse of information for preventive action (IACP, 2015). Included are links to law enforcementagencies, documents on social media, prevention information, and other useful materials.On the Web The IACP Center for Social Media has a wealth of information. Visithttp://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/GettingStarted.aspx and explore what it offers in relation tocrime and crime prevention.Since 2010, the IACP Center for Social Media has conducted surveys of law enforcement agencies on the useof social media. The 2013 survey of 600 agencies across 46 states reveals that 95 percent of the agencies usesocial media (IACP, 2014). The respondents claim that social media has improved their ability to solve crimesand has enhanced their relationship with the community. Two-thirds use social media to solicit tips on crime,almost 80 percent use it to alert the public about crime and other issues, and 72 percent incorporate it in crimeprevention initiatives (IACP, 2014).There is no indication that programs like Crime Stoppers and social media efforts have reduced crime or thefear of crime. It is possible that fear could actually increase through the media presentation of unsolved, andoften heinous, crimes. Reduced crime could only be affected through the greater risks of apprehension as aresult of the programs. There also are concerns that publicity programs may engender negative results. Pretrialpublicity from the presentations can bias cases in court, questions can be raised about the validity of paidtestimony, and there may be problems with anonymous testimony and false accusations (Rosenbaum et al.,1989). Indeed, the U.S. national evaluation estimates that most tips come from criminals (25 percent) or fringeplayers (41 percent) rather than from common citizens (35 percent) (Rosenbaum et al., 1989). Despite thepotential problems, publicity and social media programs are valuable tools in the gathering of crime-relatedinformation and providing crime information to a wide range of citizens.Crime-Time TelevisionOne trend in the mass media since the mid-1980s has been the focus on previously unsolved crimes inprime-time network programming. Among the earliest of these programs were America’s Most Wanted,Unsolved Mysteries, and Top Cops in the United States (Nelson, 1989) and Crimewatch U.K. in the UnitedKingdom (Dobash et al., 1998). More recent shows include 20/20, PrimeTime Live, 48 Hours, and Dateline.These shows typically re-enact serious crimes for which no offender has been apprehended. Thedramatizations often use interviews with victims/witnesses and actual law enforcement personnel involved in145
the case. After the presentation of a case, viewers are prompted to call law enforcement or a toll free telephonenumber to report any information they may have about the case or the whereabouts of the suspect.The impact of these shows has been the subject of debate. Kelley (1997) notes that of the 1,133 subjectsshowcased on America’s Most Wanted, 441 have been found and taken into custody subsequent to the airing ofthe program. Leishman and Mason (2003) note that CrimeWatch U.K. claims there were 582 arrests of suspectsbetween 1984 and 2000 as a result of the show. However, the degree to which the programs can be considereddirectly responsible for most of these apprehensions is uncertain. Nelson (1989) points out that these programsencourage citizen cooperation with the police. Donovan (1998) notes that America’s Most Wanted received anaverage of 3,000 calls per show in 1994, but few contributed valuable information. A similar Dutch programclaims a clearance rate of 25 to 30 percent for broadcast crimes (Brants, 1998). While most calls may not resultin useful information, the fact that calls are being made can be considered a significant achievement of theprograms. One producer views the program as the catalyst for a “nationwide neighborhood watch association”(Nelson, 1989).On the other hand, these programs hold the potential for causing trouble. First, mass media presentationscan potentially bias court cases and lead to appeals based on excessive pretrial publicity and the inability toseat an unbiased jury. Second, depictions of crimes where the offender has not been apprehended may leadother individuals to copy the offenses. Third, Winkel (1987) notes that viewers may generalize from theresponse being promoted in the program (such as simply calling for help) to other possible responses notfeatured in the program (such as carrying weapons and taking direct action). Such a response generalizationwould be an unintended consequence of the program. Vigilante behavior is one possible generalization ofefforts to increase citizen involvement. While not all citizens will generalize beyond the message provided inthe media, there is clear evidence that such actions do grow out of media presentations (Winkel, 1987). Thepopularity of “crime-time” programs will ensure that they continue to appear on television for the immediatefuture. The extent to which they will have an impact on crime, fear of crime, and citizen participation needsfurther examination.Publicity and PreventionWhile this chapter has focused primarily on large mass media efforts, smaller-scale and targeted publicityabout prevention programs and initiatives can have an impact on the success of crime prevention efforts. Thatimpact may actually occur prior to or separate from the actual prevention initiative. That is, the publicity mayreduce crime in and of itself. The assumption underlying this possibility is that the publicity impacts theoffender’s perceptions of risk and payoff, rather than changing the behavior of victims (Johnson and Bowers,2003).Smith et al. (2002) suggest that changes in crime that predate the actual implementation of a crimeprevention program are a form of anticipatory benefit. In one sense, this could be a form of diffusion ofbenefits that arises most probably from the fact that offenders, victims, and others know about a forthcomingprevention activity and begin to respond prior to the activation of the intervention. Publicity about animpending intervention may be the impetus for the anticipatory benefits. The publicity can be intentional, as insituations where public announcements are made about a project, or it may be more informal throughnetworking that takes place during the planning and early implementation stages for an intervention.Several studies reveal evidence of anticipatory benefits stemming from publicity. Barclay et al.’s (1996)analysis of activities aimed at reducing crimes in parking lots shows reductions in crime that began afterpublicity started but before the actual intervention took place. Similarly, both Brown’s (1995) and Armitage etal.’s (1999) studies of CCTV present evidence of downward trends in crime prior to the actual installation of thecameras but after the program was announced. In an analysis of 21 Reducing Burglary Initiative sites, Johnsonand Bowers (2003) assessed the timing of reductions in burglary against the initiation of publicity and theactual prevention activities. Their results show that there is a significant reduction in burglary preceding theactual program implementation. In addition the declines correspond to the advent of the publicity on theforthcoming efforts (Johnson and Bowers, 2003). Based on these results, the authors argue that publicity has anindependent impact on crime and that programs could possibly bring down crime by publicizing a preventionprogram, even if the program never takes place (Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Johnson and Bowers, 2003)! Finally,146
Smith et al. (2002) present findings in support of the anticipatory benefit hypothesis based on an analysis of 52studies in which there was evidence of pre-initiative crime reductions. At the very least, publicity should beconsidered as a part of any prevention initiative.147
The Media’s Responsibility for Crime PreventionThroughout this chapter we have discussed the potential of the media for enhancing crime preventionactivity. Lavrakas (1997) suggests that the media must assume some of the blame for the continued failure ofpolicies to deal with crime. He argues that the media fails to critically assess claims regarding the efficacy ofcrime control policies. In particular, politicians are able to promote interventions and crime policy withoutbeing held accountable for their rhetorical arguments. The author argues that the media has a responsibility todo more than simply report what legislators say. Instead, the media should be critically questioning thosepositions and challenging politicians to provide proof for their arguments (Lavrakas, 1997).Lavrakas (1997) demonstrates his argument through an analysis of 1994 anti-crime legislation. Analyzingstories in the New York Times, Lavrakas points out that the media often focuses on the disagreement betweenlegislators about crime policy, but rarely examines the substantive merit of the various measures beingdebated. In essence, the media does a poor job at handling political posturing and tends to accept grosscomments about value or lack of value in relation to programs without demanding that the source prove theclaim.Why does the media do such a poor job? First, Lavrakas (1997) suggests that the news media is typically noteducated about criminal justice and crime policy. Few journalists receive any real education about the criminaljustice system or crime prevention. Second, the media does not hold politicians accountable for their actions orrhetoric. Consequently, politicians will not change their posturing and the public will not receive theinformation it needs to make informed decisions. What the public receives is a sanitized version of what istaking place through “sound bites” or catchy phrases. Lavrakas (1997) calls for educating the media (andpoliticians) about crime prevention, as well as demanding that more research be conducted on preventioninitiatives. He argues that crime prevention will continue to suffer until the media starts to hold policy makersaccountable for their actions.148
SummaryThe use of the media is a relatively new approach in crime prevention. Research on the exposure of thepublic to media information and the findings that media portrayals of aggression may affect levels of vieweraggression suggest that the same tools could influence crime preventive behavior. Analysis of media crimeprevention campaigns shows that media presentations can affect fear of crime, feelings of self-confidence inavoiding victimization, and the adoption of crime prevention precautions. Unfortunately, the level and extentof these changes is not uniform across the evaluations. It appears that the choice of presentation format and themodes of evaluation are key elements in uncovering positive effects. Any modification in actual crime isextremely difficult to uncover. This is primarily due to the focus on perceptions of fear and crime and not oncrime itself. Changes in the level of actual crime must rely on the successful modification of these other factors.Once the fear of crime and the level of crime prevention efforts are changed, then the ultimate goal of reducedcrime can start to appear.Key Termsanticipatory benefitcrime newslettersCrime Stoppersinformation linesMcGruffNational Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaignresponse generalizationsocial mediaTake a Bite Out of Crime149
Chapter 8Developmental Crime PreventionChapter OutlineBackgroundRisk Factors and Developmental PreventionProgramsSkills TrainingParent TrainingPreschool ProgramsMentoring ProgramsMulti-Component ProgramsSummaryDevelopmental ConcernsSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Define developmental crime prevention.Discuss the background of developmental prevention.List and discuss three theoretical models for developmental prevention.Discuss the role of risk factors in developmental prevention.Identify leading individual and family risk factors for delinquency/criminality.Demonstrate how skills training fits the developmental approach.List and discuss the effectiveness of two parenting training programs.Identify and explain the FRIENDS program.Outline the Perry Preschool program and discuss the impact of the program.Discuss mentoring programs, including Big Brothers/Big Sisters.Identify different multi-component programs.Discuss the Communities that Care program and relate how it can be applied in any setting.List and discuss different concerns or issues related to developmental crime prevention.Thus far in this book, most of the ideas suggest that relatively simple efforts, such as making physicalimprovements in communities, organizing residents to combat crime, and convincing citizens to takeprecautions and participate in anti-crime measures can have a significant impact on crime and fear. Even thediscussion on media crime prevention has a focus on protecting one’s self, one’s property, and the community.Research has shown that these primary prevention techniques can be, and are, effective. At the same time,there are numerous examples of programs that fail to affect crime or fear, and have an impact only in the shortterm. Primary prevention, however, is not restricted to those efforts. An important form of primary prevention150
entails actions that would alter the drive and motivation of potential offenders at a more basic level.Developmental crime prevention targets the potential of individuals to become criminal. The basicassumption is that criminal and deviant activity is the result of early life experiences and learning (Tremblayand Craig, 1997). Societal failure to address those factors predisposes individuals, particularly youths, to crime.The focus of developmental prevention is not very different from core criminological theories about crime anddeviance. The emphasis is on what causes individuals to commit deviant acts and what can be done about thatactivity. The major point of divergence is the focus on trying to address the causes early in the process,preferably prior to the initial act.This chapter seeks to accomplish several things. First, it will outline the basic ideas and argumentsunderlying developmental prevention, including some of the theoretical underpinnings of the perspective.Second, the related issues of risk and protective factors will be discussed as they relate to developmentalarguments and potential interventions. Finally, the chapter will discuss several major developmentalprevention programs and initiatives that have been introduced. As in other chapters, the focus of the discussionon programs is on the success of the interventions to prevent crime.151
BackgroundDevelopmental prevention has a solid foundation in the basic ideas of learning theory. The cornerstone ofdevelopmental approaches is that crime results from the behavior, beliefs, and attitudes that are learned,primarily, but not exclusively, as youths (Tremblay and Craig, 1997). This is not to suggest that classic learningtheories, such as differential association or operant conditioning, are the sole basis for understanding thedevelopmental approaches. While such learning theories provide insight on the development of behavior, theyare simply too narrow to adequately explain criminality. The fact that early life experiences influence laterbehavior points out that a wealth of information and perspectives are important contributors.In many respects, developmental prevention has benefited from the elaboration model that has becomeprominent in criminological theorizing. The elaboration model attempts to take components of varioustheories and build a single explanation that incorporates the best parts of the individual theories. These typesof explanations can be both simple and complex. Several authors have attempted to combine social control anddifferential association theories to explain the development of delinquency (Massey and Krohn, 1986;Thornberry et al., 1994). Conger and Simons (1997) offer a more complex explanation. They start withbiological factors that can play a role in cognitive development and abilities, which then impact on interactionsbetween the individual, family, friends, and school. This interaction can impede success in school and can leadto pressures later in life. Moffit (1997) offers a sequence in which neuro-psychological deficits alter anindividual’s temperament, speech, learning ability, and other factors leading to withdrawal, rejection, poor self-concept, failure at school, and other problems. The underlying theme in these examples and many otherattempts at elaborating theories is that there are a wide range of factors at work in dictating possible behaviors.In their discussion of developmental prevention of delinquency, Tremblay and Craig (1997) offer threetheoretical models. These models range from a simple, primarily single theoretical approach to a very complexmodel that incorporates many theoretical components. The simplest model is a linear explanation such asGottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime. This explanation assumes that failures in early childrearing by parents lead to low self-control by the individual and a much greater chance that crime anddeviance will be expressed. The second model assumes multiple possible pathways to adult offending (such asthat offered by Loeber, 1990). These different pathways recognize that youthful misbehavior can take differentforms, emerge at different times, and progress into different types of adult offending. The final model is notunlike the elaboration models discussed earlier in that it includes elements of strain theories (poverty),biological problems, poor parenting, cognitive deficits, and other factors, all interacting with each other andculminating in problem behavior (Tremblay and Craig, 1997). Farrington (2007) offers an elaboration model herefers to as the Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theory. The ICAP model (see Figure 8.1)incorporates ideas from learning, social control, strain, and labeling theories, as well as rational choice theory.The individual components of the model work individually and in concert with one another to build thepotential for criminality. Farrington (2007) does not argue that crime is inevitable, only that the odds aregreater. It also indicates that there are many points at which interventions could be applied to try and halt theprocess. In every case, the goal of developmental prevention is to intervene early in the process in an attemptto mitigate those factors that make an individual more prone to commit later delinquency or crime.Clearly, developmental crime prevention relies on ideas identifying the causes of crime and criminality thatare related to an individual’s disposition to commit crime. At its core, developmental prevention fits into thepositivist school of criminology. According to positivism crime is caused by factors beyond the control of theindividual.152
Figure 8.1 Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) Model Source: D.P. Farrington (2007). “Childhood risk factors and risk-focused prevention.” In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner (eds.), The OxfordHandbook of Criminology, Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted with permission from Oxford University Press.Addressing and eliminating crime and deviance, therefore, require the identification and elimination of thosefactors causing individuals to act as they do. This is directly opposed to the ideas outlined in earlier chaptersthat assume individuals have the ability to respond to crime opportunities by either choosing to commit an actor choosing not to do so. Developmental approaches place a great deal of belief in the idea that individualshave little, if any, choice in their behavior. Rather, they are conditioned through past experiences and forced toact in certain ways. (This does not mean there is absolutely no choice, only that the ability to choose is severelylimited.) The positivistic orientation to developmental prevention means that it has several goals (Crawford,2007). First, it seeks to identify risk factors for future criminality. Second, it seeks to identify protective factorsto reduce the chances for criminality. Finally, it seeks to identify ways that individuals can desist from furthertransgressions (Crawford, 2007). It is the issue of identifying risk and protective factors to which we now turn.153
Risk Factors and Developmental PreventionAny attempt to address crime through developmental factors is faced with a very broad spectrum ofvariables and issues that could be addressed. Virtually everything that occurs to individuals and aroundindividuals as they grow and mature has a potential impact on later decision making and behavior. It is notfeasible to try and address every possible factor. Indeed, attempts to do so would mean that an individual andhis environment are subject to total control and regimen. The more reasonable approach is to identify andintervene in those factors that are most likely to influence an individual’s choices and behaviors. In essence,this means identifying risk factors and implementing programs to mitigate their effect.The list of potential risk factors that have been identified for later criminality is extensive and can begrouped into different categories. These categories include individual/psychological, family, peer, community,and school. It is the first two of these that receive the bulk of attention in the developmental preventionliterature and the major ones to be focused on in this chapter (the remaining categories will be revisited in alater chapter). Farrington (2007) lists what he sees as the key individual and family risk factors (see Table 8.1).He claims that developmental prevention needs to design and implement programs to counteract these riskfactors.It is important to note that not all variables or factors that are related to criminality should be consideredrisk factors. First, many factors are strongly correlated with crime, such as age, sex, and race. Age, for example,is perhaps the most highly correlated with deviant behavior, with most crime being committed by persons intheir late teens and early twenties. The problem is that these factors cannot be changed by a preventionprogram. Therefore, they are of no practical value for developmental prevention. Second, it is important torecognize the distinction between a simple correlate and a causal factor (Farrington, 2007). Just becausesomething occurs at the same time as crime does not mean it is the cause of the crime. Farrington (2007) usesthe example that just because a delinquent has delinquent friends does not mean that the friends cause thedelinquency. Finally, it is important to recognize that the identification of risk factors is often based on findinga difference between two groups on some dimension. That dimension is then considered a risk factor. What ismore important is to find out if a change in the dimension for an individual is related to a change in the keybehavior (Farrington, 2007). For example, if most offending is committed by those earning low income, incomeis considered a risk factor. What is more important to know is whether the commission of crime (or level ofcrime) is changed at the individual level when the individual’s income goes up or down. It is this change thatindicates a causal connection between the risk factor and the behavior (Farrington, 2007).Table 8.1 Developmental Risk FactorsIndividual Risk FactorsFamily Risk FactorsLow intelligence and attainmentFamily criminalityLow empathyLarge family sizeImpulsivenessPoor parental supervisionPoor social cognitive skillsHarsh punishmentPoor/cold familial attachmentChild abuse and neglectBroken homeSource: Compiled by author from DP. Farrington (2007). “Childhood risk factors and risk-focused prevention.” In M. Maguire et al. (eds.)The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.154
An important consideration in many developmental prevention programs is that they often address crimeand delinquency indirectly. Since these programs are targeting risk factors, instead of measuring success interms of reduced criminality, they look for changes in the risk factors and in intermediate outcomes thatappear between the risk factor and later behavior. An example of this would be programs that address parentalsupervision. The underlying assumption is that better supervision and parenting methods will lead youths toavoid delinquency. In order to do that, the program analyzes change in the parenting and may focus on issuessuch as the child’s coping mechanisms and skill sets that result from the program. Delinquency reduction maybe the ultimate goal and is not fully addressed in evaluations. The following discussions of developmentalcrime prevention programs will look at behavioral changes when available, as well as other outcomes.155
ProgramsThere are many different prevention programs that entail developmental interventions. It is impossible tocover all of the diverse approaches in this chapter. Instead, the following discussion will target some of themost promising and intriguing developmental prevention programs. The interventions chosen for inclusion arethose that tend to have the following features: (1) they are aimed at young children (even infants) and theirfamilies, and (2) the youths are not those who have necessarily already exhibited anti-social behavior. Thislater criterion does not mean that delinquent youths are not handled in the program, only that the programaddresses youths regardless of their current behavioral status. Included here are programs that address skillstraining, parental education, preschool preparation, and multi-component programs that work at a broadcommunity level.Skills TrainingMany social skills training initiatives appear in school settings and appear under various titles, including lifeskills training. These programs seek to teach children how to recognize problem situations and react in anappropriate manner. This is done by attempting to teach self-control, anger management, how to recognizeyour feelings and emotions, building a positive self-image, identifying the needs and concerns of others, andhow to solve problems. In essence, the skills to be learned are how to interact with others in your environmentwithout resorting to aggressive or antisocial methods. To a large extent, the training seeks to provide youthswith the skills to combat peer pressure and aggression from other youths.The Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) program has been recognized as modelprogram. PATHS is taught in regular classrooms and, ideally, is a five-year-long curriculum offered inelementary schools (Greenberg and Kusche, 1998). The curriculum is intended to reduce both behavioral andemotional problems, while building self-control and problem-solving abilities. PATHS has undergone severalevaluations utilizing experimental and control groups of regular students, as well as special needs students. Theresults reveal improved problem-solving ability, reduced hyperactivity, increased planning activity, reducedself-reported conduct problems, less peer aggression, and reduced teacher reports of conduct problems(Greenberg and Kusche, 1996, 1997; Greenberg et al., 1995). Greenberg and Kusche (1998) suggest that PATHScan be adopted for use with different populations and for implementation outside the school setting.A second developmental training program in this venue is the FRIENDS program. FRIENDS is a cognitivetherapy intervention targeting anxiety and stress in youths (FRIENDS, 2015). The focus on stress is due to itsrelation to school failure and academic problems, as well as later substance abuse and unemployment. Theprogram has several age-graded versions that give training primarily in schools over 10 class sessions.FRIENDS stands for:F FeelingsR Relax and feel goodI I can do itE Explore solutionsN Now reward yourselfD Do it every dayS Stay calmThese sessions focus on emotional resilience, problem solving, and self-confidence (FRIENDS, 2015). Theprogram has been the subject of numerous evaluations in a variety of countries, including Australia, the UnitedKingdom, the United States, and others, and has been identified by the World Health Organization (2004) as aneffective program. Results generally show significant reductions in anxiety and increases in self-esteem (Daddset al., 1997; Lowrey-Webster et al., 2001; Rodgers and Dunsmuir, 2015; Stallard et al., 2005). The long-termimpact of FRIENDS on crime and deviance has not been evaluated. At the same time, Maggin and Johnson156
(2014), in a meta-analysis, note that methodological problems in evaluations raise some qualifications about theprogram.On the Web Visit the FRIENDS programs web site to see the variations in the program for different agegroups, available resources, and other materials at http://friendsprograms.com/Parent TrainingConcern over the preparation and ability of parents to provide an appropriate environment for children is amajor thrust in developmental prevention. These programs range from those targeting expectant mothers tothose working with families of young children to those addressing families with school age children. Threerecognized programs are examined below. These are the Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project, the SyracuseFamily Development program, and the Incredible Years project.The Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project targets the earliest stage of a child’s development, specificallywhen the child is still in the womb. The center piece of the program is home visitation by nurses beginningduring pregnancy and lasting through the child’s second birthday (Olds et al., 1997, 1998). The target subjectsare young, poor, first-time, and often unmarried mothers. Mothers were visited an average of nine timesduring pregnancy and 23 times after birth (Olds et al., 1998). The visiting nurses focus on three areas: healthand health-related activities of the mother and child; learning how to provide appropriate care to the child; andsocial and personal skills development for the mothers. In addition, the nurses provide referrals and access toother assistance and the project provides transportation for the mothers to access assistance (Olds et al., 1997).Evaluation of the program revealed a number of positive outcomes. First, maternal abuse and neglect weresignificantly reduced. Second, in a 15-year follow-up, the children reported significantly less running away,arrests, and substance abuse. Third, there were also fewer arrests of the program mothers (Olds et al., 1997,1998). The success of the project has led to its replication in other sites.The Syracuse Family Development Research Program has many similar characteristics to the nurse homevisitation program. Begun in 1969, the intervention targeted pregnant, young, single, African-Americanmothers and worked with the families from birth to age eight. The project included home visitation by childdevelopment trainers; parent training in health, nutrition, and child rearing; and individualized day care for thechildren (Lally et al., 1988). The key element of the project was weekly visits to the subjects’ homes. Similar tothe evaluations of the Elmira project, this program has proven to be effective. Children from the project havedone better academically, demonstrate better self-control, and have fewer arrests than control youths (Honig etal., 1982; Lally et al., 1987, 1988).Another program targeting parental training that has proven effective is the Incredible Years program.Whereas the first two programs discussed in this section selected expectant mothers, the Incredible Yearsinitially identified families for intervention that had youths displaying early conduct problems from age four toeight (Webster-Stratton and Hammond, 1997). The current program works with families of youths from agetwo to age 12 (Incredible Years, 2012). The program includes strong parent and child training components, aswell as a teaching training element for youths in school. Parents receive training in parenting skills, how torecognize and address their child’s problem behaviors, how to set rules and use incentives, and other keycomponents of child rearing. The child component focuses on helping them recognize emotions, how to dealwith anger, appropriate responses to problem situations, and educational skills. The teacher training elementdeals with classroom management, providing skills to youths, handling problem youths and behaviors, anddisciplinary practices (Incredible Years, 2012).On the Web 157
A great deal of additional information on the Incredible Years program is available on the web,including specific program activities for parents, children, and teachers. Take a look at thismaterial and see if you can find elements of the program in what you remember from school.http://www.incredibleyears.com/program/parent.aspThe Incredible Years program was established in 1987 and has since been implemented in hundreds of sitesin throughout the United States and other countries (SAMHSA, 2012). Evaluations have examined the impactof the program on parental training methods, interaction between youths, child behavior problems, andantisocial behavior. These evaluations reveal consistent positive results. Participating parents display morepositive parenting skills and less coercive and punitive punishments. Children display fewer antisocialbehaviors, better interpersonal skills, and better preparation for school (SAMHSA, 2012; Webster-Stratton, 2001;Webster-Stratton and Hammond, 1997). The strength of the program, its wide adoption, and its consistentpositive evaluations have led Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration to list the IncredibleYears on its National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices.Interest in and the growth of parent/child training interventions in recent years has prompted researchers totake a look at these programs as a group. In an attempt to summarize the state of the evidence on parent-childtraining programs, Piquero et al. (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 55 studies that focused on disruptivebehavior by the children. Based on data from self-reports of parents and teachers and some observational data,the authors found that these programs have a significant impact on youthful antisocial behavior anddelinquency (Piquero et al., 2009).Preschool ProgramsOne suggestion for addressing anti-social behavior involves early preparation of children for school.Preschool programs are viewed as a means of establishing a level of competence that avoids early placementinto differential ability tracts, building a positive attitude toward school, and providing basic social skills toyouths who are not prepared to enter school. The advent of preschool as a technique in fighting schoolproblems and delinquency can be found in the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and theAdministration of Justice. The expectation is that success in school will translate later to greater social successout of school and lower delinquency and criminality.Perhaps the best-known preschool program is the Head Start program. Head Start proposes thatdisadvantaged youths are not prepared to enter school without some form of early intervention targeted atsocial and intellectual skills (Gottfredson, 1987). Advocates of preschool programs point out that early schoolfailure typically persists into the later years (Schweinhart and Weikart, 1989). Head Start is meant to provideyouths with positive early experiences and, in turn, successful long-term academic careers. The extent to whichHead Start has succeeded in achieving its goals is questionable. Gottfredson (1987) notes that the program istypically not well-implemented and that any gains made in the program fade over a year or two. Head Starthas not been evaluated in terms of its effect on later delinquency or criminality.The most extensively studied preschool program is the Perry Preschool program. The program, begun in1962, seeks to provide students with a positive introduction to education. This is accomplished by involving thechildren in the planning of activities, a low child–teacher ratio, and enhanced reinforcement of studentachievement. Perhaps the most critical feature of the program is the frequent home visits with parents.Berrueta-Clement et al. (1984) claim that the program sets in progress a sequence of events that leads fromprogram participation to higher academic performance to enhanced educational commitment and scholasticachievement to prosocial behavior. Unlike most preschool programs, the Perry program includes an evaluationcomponent consisting of randomly assigning youths to either the program or a non-preschool control group.All study subjects are from low-income black families, typified by low parental education, unemployment, andsingle-parent households. All children were tracked throughout school and were periodically surveyed throughage 19, with follow-up evaluations undertaken through age 40 (see Berrueta-Clement et al., 1984, for a morethorough discussion of the program methodology).Evaluation of the Perry Preschool program presents some impressive claims. The program appears to158
significantly increase measures of academic performance, reduce the need for special education and remedialwork, prompt more positive attitudes toward school, enhance the high school graduation rate, and result inlower unemployment after graduation from high school (Berrueta-Clement et al., 1984). The program alsoclaims that fewer experimental students are arrested as either adults or juveniles than are control students.Schweinhart (1987) points out that the experimental group reports fewer serious offenses at both ages 15 and19. Results through age 27 reveal that about one-half as many program participants are arrested compared tocontrol group subjects. The frequency of their offenses is also about one-fourth of that for control youths(Schweinhart et al., 1993). Schweinhart and Xiang (2003), reporting on data through age 40, find significantlyfewer lifetime and adult arrests among experimental subjects, with fewer arrests for violent crimes, propertycrimes, and drug offenses.Other preschool projects also report positive effects on experimental subjects. The Consortium forLongitudinal Studies (Lazar et al., 1982) and reviews of various pre-school programs (Berrueta-Clement et al.,1984; Gottfredson, 1987) present data showing improved academic performance and less need for specialeducation in the future. Unfortunately, unlike the Perry Preschool program, these studies typically show thatthe results are short-term and fade within the first two years of elementary school. Most studies also either failto address the program’s impact on delinquency or fail to find any strong positive effects.Many programs that suggest positive results typically focus on academic achievement rather thandelinquency or criminality. The generalizability of the results is also limited due to the heavy study of lower-class, minority youths (Schweinhart and Weikart, 1989). No systematic study has been undertaken on morerepresentative population groups.Mentoring ProgramsThe idea of assisting in the development of youths is the cornerstone of mentoring initiatives. Mentoringinvolves pairing adult volunteers with youths in need of friendship, emotional support, guidance, and advice.Youths are typically aged 10 to 16 and from single-parent homes. Matching adults and youths is perhaps themost important part of the programs. The mentors and mentees are expected to meet two to four times permonth for three to four hours each time. Both the adult volunteers and the youths undergo initial training thatoutlines expectations and requirements for the programs (Grossman and Tierney, 1998). Many programs alsoinvolve regular contact with the parents. Mentoring programs specifically target academic failure, dropping outof school, truancy, and delinquency, among other things.Two prime examples of mentoring are Big Brothers/Big Sisters (BB/BS) and the Juvenile MentoringProgram (JUMP). Big Brothers/Big Sisters is probably the most recognizable of the many mentoring programs,having begun in 1904 in New York City. It currently boasts 325 programs across all 50 U.S. states and 13 othercountries, serving approximately 200,000 children (BB/BS, 2015). The JUMP program was initiated by the Officeof Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in 1996, which funded 164 programs in 41 states andthe District of Columbia within three years of its start. A key component of the JUMP program is itspartnership with educators and private-sector agencies (Novotney et al., 2000). In a 1998 reviews, JUMPenrolled almost 7,500 youths (Novotney et al., 2000). Beyond the BB/BS and JUMP programs, there are anestimated 5,000+ mentoring organizations in the United States (DuBois et al., 2011).On the Web Visit the BB/BS web site and explore more about the organization athttp://www.bbbs.org/site/c.9iILI3NGKhK6F/b.5962335/k.BE16/Home.htmDespite the longevity of BB/BS and mentoring programs, there has been relatively little quality research onthem. The existing research, however, presents overwhelming positive results. Grossman and Tierney (1998)present an evaluation of BB/BS programs in eight locations. They use an experimental design with random159
assignment of roughly 1,000 youths to BB/BS and a non-mentoring control group. They report that mentoredyouths are 46 percent less likely to start illegal drug use, 27 percent less likely to start alcohol use, and 32percent less likely to hit other youths. Grossman and Tierney (1998) also uncover positive impacts on academicperformance and relationships with parents. There is also evidence of stronger results for minority youths.Systematic review of the research also paints a positive picture of mentoring. DuBois et al. (2002) conducteda meta-analysis of 55 mentoring studies. The review shows favorable mentoring effects across differentdemographic groups of youths, especially disadvantaged youths. The greatest impact appears where thementors and mentees establish strong relationships. The positive effects with disadvantaged mentees isreinforced in results showing mentoring is more effective with high-risk youths (DuBois et al., 2011). Finally,Tolan et al. (2014) report on a meta-analysis of 25 studies that include delinquency as a program outcome. Theresults reveal reductions in drug use, delinquency, and aggression, as well as improved academic performance.Mentoring has a greater impact on high-risk youths (Tolan et al., 2014).The evidence on mentoring suggests it is an important developmental prevention approach. Additionally,the number of programs and youths involved demonstrate its level of acceptance in communities. The greatestobstacle in many communities is the inability to recruit enough adult mentors to meet the mentee demand.Multi-Component ProgramsThe final group of programs to be considered can be generally listed as multi-component programs. Theseinterventions often begin by targeting youths who have already displayed anti-social behavior and/ordelinquency. In that sense it is possible to classify the programs as tertiary prevention since the targets havealready exhibited the negative behavior and there is a goal of stemming further offending. At the core of theprograms there is a recognition of a need to address the causal factors leading to the deviant behavior and keepthe youths from developing more problematic activities. The programs also target youths as early as possible,thus stemming the problems in early adolescence. Multi-component programs also share the common featureof utilizing a range of interventions rather than only one or two approaches. While it is possible to findmultiple inputs in the parent training programs discussed earlier, the programs below tend to be even moreinclusive of different techniques.The first program to examine is the Seattle Social Development Project started in 1981. The primarysetting for the program is classrooms, although there is a strong home/family component to the project. Theproject was initiated to study social development of school-aged children and to identify the risk and protectivefactors for delinquency, substance abuse, and academic failure (Hawkins et al., 2007; Social DevelopmentResearch Group (SDRG), 2012). The actual intervention can be divided into three parts targeting teachers,parents, and students. The teacher component involves training in appropriate classroom managementtechniques, establishment of rules and consequences, teaching positive social skills, and motivating students.Parents are trained to recognize problematic behavior, reward positive behavior, promote academic success,and build a strong family bond to help avoid antisocial activities. Finally, children learn to recognize and copewith peer pressure, build communication skills, appropriately respond to aggression by others, and avoidproblematic situations and people (Hill et al., 2011; Hawkins et al., 2007; SDRG, 2012).On the Web The Seattle Social Development Research project has a long history and a great deal of researchbehind it. You can find much more information on the project at http://ssdp-tip.org/SSDP/index.htmlThe Seattle project has been the subject of continuing evaluation since the late 1980s. Program participants(parents and children) have been interviewed on a regular basis to assess the impact of the project. The mostrecent data have been collected on the original youth cohort, at age 33 (SDRG, 2012). The results of the project160
have been overwhelmingly positive. Results indicate that youths who completed the program were moresuccessful in school, had a higher graduation rate, committed fewer delinquent and criminal offenses, and hadlower levels of substance abuse (Hawkins et al., 2007). They also were less sexually promiscuous, and thefemales had a lower incidence of teenage pregnancy (Lonczak et al., 2002). Overall, the project was successfulat identifying early risk factors, developing training and interventions to address those factors and buildprotective factors, and had a positive impact on youthful behavior.A second program to consider is the Families and Schools Together (FAST) program. FAST is adevelopmental prevention program aimed at families of youths aged roughly four to eight (FAST, 2015). Theprogram focuses on addressing risks of educational failure, substance abuse, violence, and delinquency. Theprogram relies on parents, schools, teachers, the community, and professionals to build family bonds and targetrisk and protective factors. This involves multi-family groups that meet at the close of school days every weekfor eight weeks. Follow-up meetings occur monthly for two years afterward (Coote, 2000). The meetingsinclude structured group activities and individual family interaction. A basic core curriculum comprisesroughly 40 percent of the meetings, while the balance varies according to the needs of the groups (McDonald etal., 2012). Among the immediate goals is enhancing family functioning, building social cohesion, reducingsocial isolation, and generating social support among families (Coote, 2000; McDonald et al., 2012). FAST hasbeen implemented in multiple countries, often targeting minority and disadvantaged groups.Evaluations provide promising support for FAST. According to McDonald and Sayger (1999), parents report32 percent lower child behavior scores than parents not involved in FAST, 30 percent lower attention problems,and 31 percent lower child anxiety. Similarly, teachers report 35 percent fewer conduct disorders, 42 percentfewer attention problems, and 24 percent less anxiety. Research also shows reductions in family conflicts,greater family cohesion, reduced aggression, and fewer in-school referrals to special education programs(Coote, 2000; Gamoran et al., 2012; Kratochwill et al., 2009; McDonald and Sayger, 1999). Differences emerge inevaluations based on different ethnic groups. Nevertheless, FAST is a promising developmental preventionprogram.On the Web Communities that Care has been implemented in a number of different sites. An excellentdiscussion of the program and the efforts needed to implement the approach can be found athttp://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/1859351840.pdfFinally, one of the most ambitious multi-component developmental prevention approaches is Communitiesthat Care (CTC). Compared to other programs, CTC is unique in that there is no single intervention or set ofprograms for addressing problems. Instead, the approach requires communities to undertake an analysis of theproblems it is facing, identify the risk factors that are at work, and build an intervention that is tailored to theunique situation and needs of the community (Hawkins et al., 2008). Implementing the CTC model is acomplicated task that requires the involvement of many individuals. The process of developing interventionshas multiple stages (see Table 8.2). What is evident in the implementation plan is the need to build a unique setof interventions from the ground up. A cornerstone of CTC is a social development strategy that focuses onidentifying appropriate opportunities, teaching skills for success, building bonds between children and adults,and giving recognition for effort, improvement, and achievement (CTC, 2015). All of this means identifyingrisk factors and engendering protective factors.Table 8.2 Implementation of Communities that CarePhase1Community readiness• Define the community• Assess community willingness to embark on CTC process• Identify possible participants161
Phase2Organization and training• Invite wide range of community participants• Form subgroups and committees on key topics• Educate participants in risk assessment and preventionPhase3Assessment• Undertake risk assessment• Include entire community• Compile list of available resources and needs incommunityPhase4Development of comprehensiveplan• Create comprehensive plan• Define outcomes• Identify programs to implement• Develop evaluation plan• Implement programsPhase5Implementation and evaluation• Implement plan• Evaluate impact• Assess program operations• Identify needed modifications• Implement changesSource: Constructed by author from J.D. Hawkins (1999). “Preventing crime and violence through Communities that Care.” EuropeanJournal on Criminal Policy and Research 7: 443-458.Communities that Care has been implemented in many places both in the United States and abroad. Thereare a couple of things to note about the CTC process. First, it is looking to address multiple groups of riskfactors, including family, school, community, and individual risk factors that need to be addressed (Flynn, 2008;Tilley, 2009). Second, a CTC project is a long-term endeavor. Changes in community-level risk factors will takeanywhere from two to five years to emerge, and community-level changes in delinquency and substance abusemay take up to five to 10 years to appear (Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development, 2015). What this meansis that patience and perseverance are necessary.Evaluations of CTC uncover positive results. An early evaluation of CTC in 24 communities across sevenstates notes that CTC significantly reduces risk factors for 14- to 17-year-olds. Follow-up analyses through thetwelfth grade reveal additional positive results on key outcome measures. Results from a randomized controlgroup study of 4,407 students find that 32 percent of CTC youths are more likely to abstain from drug use, 31percent are more likely to abstain from alcohol use, 18 percent are more likely to never commit a delinquentact, and 14 percent are less likely to commit a violent act (Hawkins et al., 2014). Oesterle et al. (2014) report thatCTC appears to have slightly greater impact on male youths. Similar positive results are evident in anevaluation of CTC programs related to 41 school districts. CTC was able to reduce risk factors and lowerdelinquency and substance use among students in CTC schools (Feinberg et al., 2007). The results of these andother evaluations have led to CTC being classified as “promising” by both Blueprints and Crime Solutions.SummaryThis brief review of developmental prevention programs reveals primarily positive outcomes from theinterventions. The programs range from those addressing prenatal issues to community-wide risk factors, andthe positive results appear in evaluations conducted across many places. Some of the programs have defined162
interventions (such as in the Incredible Years program) while others (such as CTC) require extensive planningfor tailor-made programming. In several cases the programs have been promoted by different organizationsand governmental agencies as “blueprints” for prevention programming. It is important to note, however, thereare many attempts at developmental prevention programming that are not as successful as those listed above,and not all attempts to implement the above programs bring about the same positive outcomes.163
Developmental ConcernsThe positive developmental prevention results do not mean there is universal acceptance of thedevelopmental crime prevention approach. Indeed, several concerns can be noted with developmentalprevention. Perhaps the first set of concerns revolves around the ability to adequately identify early risk factorsthat can be subjected to change. Despite the long list of risk factors that have been uncovered in past research,there remain issues with whether much can be done with them. As noted earlier, many of the risk factors, suchas sex and race, are really not amenable to change. Others, like criminality of parents or communitydeprivation, require interventions where change may not be feasible, especially in any reasonable period oftime.A related concern with identifying risk factors is determining which ones need to be addressed and whichare of secondary concern. In other words, what is the risk factor? Is there a combination of factors that requireattention? What risk factors can be ignored? Unfortunately, there is no simple answer to these questions. It isevident that some developmental interventions have been effective when targeting specific risk factors. At thesame time, those types of interventions have failed in other settings when targeting the same risk factors. It isunclear why this is the case. Perhaps the CTC approach of undertaking intensive study of the immediatesituation is the most appropriate way of selecting risk factors for intervention.Another issue for developmental prevention is that it does not clearly fit into primary prevention.Developmental programs that target an entire classroom or community for intervention clearly fit withinprimary prevention. Programs that address only those individuals or situations that are at high risk fit better insecondary prevention. Many developmental programs seek to intervene once individuals have broken the lawand target reoffending. There is ample evidence that developmental pathways both emerge and change in laterlife. Individuals face new circumstances and opportunities over time that lead them to transition from one pathto another throughout their lives (see, for example, the work of Sampson and Laub, 1993). Programs thataddress these changes are tertiary prevention. While the examples presented in this chapter are mainly primaryin nature (and some lean into secondary), there are many developmental prevention interventions that aretertiary.Developmental prevention programs also face several operational concerns. These programs typically need arelatively long time to have an impact. This is easy to understand since they are targeting risk factors that arenot amenable to immediate change. An examination of the programs presented earlier shows that programsoften require two to five years before an impact can be found, and even then they require longer time to makethe changes permanent. While it is possible to dismiss this delay as inconsequential if the intervention makesreal long-lasting changes to the individual, family, schools, or community, the ability to sustain suchprogramming is not easy. Long-term programs require a great deal of funding that is often hard to sustain. Arelated problem is gaining the support of key participants for a lengthy intervention. Many individuals andgroups (particularly funding agencies and politicians) ask for results in the short term (if not immediately) thatare simply not possible when making basic changes under the developmental model. Consequently,implementing and sustaining a developmental approach is not easy. Communities facing crime and disorderare more prone to turn to interventions that have the potential for immediate results.164
SummaryThis brief discussion of developmental crime prevention offers a divergent view of how society shouldaddress crime from that found in most other discussions thus far in this book. What should also be evident isthat many elements of developmental prevention emerge from more traditional criminological discussions ofthe causes and responses to antisocial behavior. The focus on risk factors and variables that may be deeplyrooted in the family and community means that the interventions must be more involved and they will need alonger time to have an impact. The examples provided in this chapter demonstrate these facts very clearly. Thelong-term commitment required by developmental prevention, along with the typically large time gap betweenprogram initiation and outcome, is a tough sell for many who want something to be done now. Compared todevelopmental prevention programs, many of the other primary and secondary crime prevention initiativescovered in this book can make more timely changes. The potential advantage of developmental crimeprevention is the hope that the solutions are more lasting since they attempt to address the root causes of crimeand delinquency.Key TermsBig Brothers/Big Sisters (BB/BS)Communities that Care (CTC)developmental crime preventionelaboration modelElmira Prenatal/Early Infancy ProjectFamilies and Schools Together (FAST)general theory of crimeHead StartIncredible Years programIntegrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theoryJuvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP)mentoringPerry Preschool programpositivismPromoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS)Seattle Social Development ProjectSyracuse Family Development Research Program165
Chapter 9General DeterrenceChapter OutlineDeterrenceRequirements for DeterrenceThe Deterrent Effect of Legal SanctionsCross-Sectional AnalysesLongitudinal ResearchPanel StudiesMeta-AnalysesSummaryPerceptions and DeterrencePerceived CertaintyPerceived SeverityCombined Deterrence FactorsSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Define deterrence.Identify and define the two types of deterrence.List and define the requirements for a deterrent effect.Discuss the findings of cross-sectional analyses of deterrence.Relate the results of longitudinal investigations of deterrence.Explain the brutalization effect of the death penalty.Demonstrate your knowledge of panel designs and results of research using them.Discuss the problems with making claims that executions reduce the homicide rate.Discuss the research on perceptions and deterrence.Define and discuss what is meant by the experiential effect.Provide a summary on the ability to deter people from committing crime.Any discussion of primary prevention would not be complete without a look at the deterrent effects ofpunishment. Recall that primary prevention attempts to eliminate or reduce the level of deviant behavior priorto its occurrence. The bulk of the discussion so far has focused on the crime prevention activities of the generalpublic. Most people today believe that official agencies of social control are, or should be, responsible foreliminating crime. Indeed, the actions of criminal justice agencies are aimed at the elimination of crimethrough deterrence.One of the leading writers on the subject defines deterrence as “influencing by fear” (Andenaes, 1975).166
According to this writer, potential offenders decide to refrain from committing criminal acts due to a fear ofapprehension and punishment. The likelihood of deterrence increases as the risk of punishment increases. Anactual experience of punishment does not have to occur before an individual can be deterred. Instead,Andenaes (1975) assumes that the threat of punishment would be enough if the proper circumstances exist. Theidea of “threat” and interest in diverting initial or future activity prompts Andenaes to refer to deterrence as“general prevention.” It is prevention of the potential offense by use of fear. Deterrence is a major form ofcrime prevention and has served as a cornerstone of criminal justice. To ignore deterrence in a discussion ofcrime prevention would indicate a lack of understanding of the role of deterrence. On the other hand,deterrence has forged a place of its own in criminology. It is not necessary, therefore, to devote a large space todeterrence in this text. This chapter will present the underlying ideas of deterrence and briefly examine theresearch on one type of deterrence—general deterrence. More in-depth discussions of deterrence will be left forother writers.167
DeterrenceDeterrence can be broken down into two distinct types—general and specific. General deterrence aims tohave an impact on more than the single offender. The apprehension and punishment of one person hopefullyserves as an example to other offenders and potential law violators. In this instance, the incarceration of asingle burglar should deter other individuals from committing burglary. General deterrence fits primaryprevention because of its focus on preventing an act before it occurs. It looks at the effect of punishing oneindividual on the future behavior of other persons. This means changing the behavior of societal membersprior to their commission of criminal acts. General deterrence clearly fits the criteria of prevention beforeinitial criminal action.Specific deterrence refers to efforts that keep the individual offender from violating the law again in thefuture. The hope is that the experience of punishment will deter the individual who has been punished fromfuture illegal activity. The offender who is incarcerated for burglary is expected to be deterred by theexperience from committing any further acts of burglary once he is released from the institution. Thepunishment is not expected to affect anyone other than the targeted individual. Specific deterrence fits intotertiary prevention due to its focus on the activity of an individual who has already violated the law andseeking to prevent the individual from recidivating and committing future criminal acts. Specific deterrence(and the related issue of incapacitation) are taken up in Chapter 15.Table 9.1 Types of DeterrenceGeneraldeterrencePunishing offenders as an example to others with the express intent of having an impact onothers who may contemplate breaking the law; others will not offend in order to avoidpunishmentSpecificdeterrenceFocuses on the activity of an individual who has already violated the law and seeks toprevent such an individual from committing future criminal actsBoth types of deterrence assume a rational offender. Any deterrent effect rests upon the ability of anoffender to make choices of whether or not to violate society’s behavioral standards. Accordingly, the inabilityto make rational decisions would mitigate any effect of deterrence. Rationality also assumes that potentialoffenders are hedonistic (i.e., man seeks pleasure and avoids pain). Punishment is assumed to be painful to theindividual and the outcome of criminal activity represents the pleasure component. Deterrence seeks to offsetany pleasure received in the crime by introducing an equal or slightly higher level of pain. Such an actionshould result in an elimination of further law violation. General deterrence, resting heavily on the assumptionof a rational individual, suggests that the pain experienced by one person will be seen as potential pain bypersons contemplating a similar act.Requirements for DeterrenceThe deterrent effect of punishment relies on the existence of three factors. These are the severity, certainty,and celerity of the punishment. Severity involves making certain that punishments provide enough pain tooffset the pleasure received from the criminal act. The basic assumption is that the individual chooses behaviorafter weighing the benefits of the crime against the potential costs incurred if he is caught. Crime is the resultof an analysis that presents more pleasure from the illegal activity than pain. Severity seeks to eliminate thepositive, pleasurable outcome of the activity and replace it with negative, unwanted pain.Certainty deals with the chances of being caught and punished for one’s behavior. The imposition of pain168
necessitates the identification, apprehension, conviction, and sentencing of the offender. For generaldeterrence, the absence of enforcement of a law suggests to other potential offenders that the system eitherdoes not care about the questionable behavior or that the system is incapable of imposing its will and thepunishment.The third component is celerity. Celerity refers to the swiftness of the societal response. The assumptionunderlying celerity is that a punishment that is temporally far removed from the action will not have the sameimpact as a punishment occurring soon after the action. The ability of the individual to equate delayedpunishment (pain) with the earlier offense (pleasure) is greatly diminished over time. For example, a child whodisobeys his mother at 10:00 a.m. and is told “Wait until your father gets home” will most likely fail to equatethe discipline imposed by the father at 5:00 p.m. with the behavior occurring seven hours earlier. The timeframe for adults might be greatly expanded beyond a single day or week, but the principle remains the same.The pleasure received from the deviant act has long since dissipated when the pain is applied long after theactivity. The more closely the pain follows the pleasure, the greater the chance that the individual will equatethe two events.Deterrence relies on the existence of all three of these components. The absence of any one can seriouslyimpede the deterrent effect of the punishment. Despite the close interrelationship between these factors, mostresearch on deterrence has focused on only one factor at a time. The other two are taken as a given or ignoredentirely. Research almost totally ignores celerity (perhaps because of the legal requirements placed on casescheduling) and deals mainly with severity and certainty. The following discussion of deterrence research isorganized along two dimensions. The first part deals with studies of the deterrent effect of the law. Studies onthe death penalty dominate this discussion due to its traditional place in deterrence research. Studies in thissection will be further broken down into cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses. The second approach looksat studies based on the perceptual nature of deterrence. That is, what do individuals perceive about thepossibilities for apprehension and punishment? Various researchers believe that the failure of deterrence is dueto the lack of knowledge or misperceptions about the deterrent aspects of the law.169
The Deterrent Effect of Legal SanctionsStudies on deterrence take a variety of different forms. Cross-sectional studies compare differencesbetween different individuals, groups, states, or other aggregate. Longitudinal analyses look for changes overtime, primarily due to shifts in law or criminal justice system activity. Panel designs follow separate units(such as states or counties) over time. In many respects they are a combination of longitudinal and cross-sectional approaches. Finally, meta-analysis examines existing research by reanalyzing the data fromnumerous studies using a common measure to uncover results.Cross-Sectional AnalysesOne important source of deterrence research focuses on the impact of the death penalty across jurisdictions.The underlying assumption in this research is the belief that, given the severity of the penalty, the deathsentence should have a great deterrent effect. While death penalty studies are well known, these studies dealonly with an extreme form of punishment and generally ignore the issues of certainty and celerity.Consequently, it is important to look at a variety of punishments and actions.Severity of SanctionsMost cross-sectional studies of sentence severity focus on the death penalty. These studies examine thedifferences in homicide between states that have and those that do not have the death penalty. Homicide istypically the focus. The assumption is that, if the death penalty has a deterrent effect, the state with the penaltywill have lower homicide rates.In an early influential study, Ehrlich (1977), an economist, claimed a strong connection between the penaltyand lower homicide rates. Comparing death penalty to non-death penalty states, Ehrlich reported that morethan 20 homicides are deterred for every execution. The author noted that, not only does the death penaltydeter, the length of imprisonment also lowers the homicide rate (Ehrlich, 1977).The work of Ehrlich has been severely criticized on methodological grounds. Simply designating states asdeath penalty and non-death penalty does not reveal whether there are unknown differences other than thepenalty between the states (McGahey, 1980). States are certainly not similar on all counts just because they door do not use the death penalty. Other unknown factors may be the cause of the difference in homicide ratesinstead of the assumed effect of the death penalty. Another related criticism of cross-sectional studies (ingeneral) is the use of states as the level of analysis. States are not necessarily homogeneous within themselves.That is, there may be a great deal of diversity within the state. In addition, jurisdictional boundaries of statesdo not totally eliminate the possible diffusion effect of the death penalty. Persons residing in one state may beinfluenced by the use or existence of the death sentence in a neighboring state. Clearly, the populace may notknow about the law or may be affected by an execution regardless of where the penalty is imposed.Archer et al. (1983) examine the deterrent effect of the death penalty across nations to minimize thelikelihood of vicarious deterrence from one place to another. The authors look at “de jure,” or the existence ofdeath penalty statutes, instead of “de facto” death penalties, which refer to the actual use of the sentence.Archer et al. (1983) find the existence of the death penalty is related to lower homicide rates in some countriesand higher levels of homicide in other countries. A major problem with this study is its failure to considerother confounding influences on the homicide rates. The inconsistent results may be due to other differencesbetween the nations and not to a varying impact of death penalty laws. Another problem may involve thefocus on severity to the exclusion of the other deterrent factors. The simple existence of a law says nothingabout the actual use, or certainty, of that law being applied.Certainty of Punishment170
Studies examining the effect of certainty of punishment typically do not address the death penalty. Tittleand Rowe (1974), for example, look at the certainty of arrest and its effect on the overall crime rate. Using datafor Florida, the authors note that certainty of arrest has no effect when the probability of arrest (the arrest rate)is very low. Certainty only plays a part when the arrest rate reaches and exceeds 30 percent. Geerken and Gove(1977) look at the certainty of arrest for other offenses. Property offenses, which have a higher likelihood ofbeing planned and therefore should be deterred, are negatively related to the arrest rate. There is almost norelationship between more spontaneous personal crimes and arrest. Forst (1977) reports that states with higherconviction rates have lower levels of homicide. The relationship is confounded, however, by the influence ofother variables such as the racial and economic make-up of the states. Finally, Yu and Liska (1993) report thatarrest certainty is strongly related to deterrence, but the impact is race specific. That is, the black and whitecrime rates are related to the black and white arrest rates, respectively, and the relationship is stronger forblacks. These studies appear to show that while there is a connection between the certainty of arrest andpunishment and lower crime rates, the nature of the relationship is not totally clear.Combining Severity and CertaintyVarious studies have combined the analysis of severity and certainty. Gibbs (1968), based on an analysis ofdifferences between states in the number and length of prison sentences for homicide, reports that thehomicide rate is negatively related to severity and certainty of punishment. Tittle (1969), conducting a similaranalysis for Part I offenses and including controls for various demographic variables, finds a negativerelationship between severity and homicide but not for the other offenses. The remaining Part I crimes areaffected only by the certainty of the punishment. Passell (1975) reports finding an effect of both severity andcertainty looking at legal and demographic variables for states. He finds that the conviction rate (certainty) andthe prison sentence (severity) are both negatively associated with state homicide rates. Finally, Sampson (1986)assesses certainty through local arrest rates and severity by the risk of jail and imprisonment in 171 U.S. cities.Controlling for various demographic factors, both certainty and severity have an impact on robbery but havelittle effect on homicide (Sampson, 1986).SummaryWhile not in full agreement, research has uncovered statistically significant impact of severity and certaintyin the cross-sectional deterrence research. Logan (1972), however, suggests that the factors of severity andcertainty act against one another. He notes that increases in the severity of punishment may lead criminaljustice personnel to be more selective in who they subject to the punishment. Likewise, an increase in certaintycould result in alteration of the charges or public outcries for changes in the law. Either way, certainty andseverity are modified to accommodate alterations in the other factor.Longitudinal ResearchA common approach in deterrence research entails longitudinal analysis, which looks for a change in theoutcome variable as a result of introducing a change in some condition. One example of this is the examinationof homicide rates prior to and after the imposition of the death penalty. The advantages of the longitudinalapproach are many. First, the same jurisdiction is being considered at both points in time, thereby negating theproblem faced in cross-sectional studies of biased results due to differences between the areas under study.Second, with a single jurisdiction the researcher is able to isolate both the point in time that the interventionoccurs and when changes in the dependent variable occur. A third advantage of longitudinal analysis is thatthe observer can see when the changes occur, evaluate the time lag between the intervention and the change,and examine whether the effect is short or long term. That is, do the changes in the dependent variablediminish over time and return to the pre-intervention level? These advantages, among others, makelongitudinal analysis the preferred technique.171
Severity of SanctionsEhrlich (1975), examining the relationship between homicide and probabilities of apprehension, conviction,and execution, claims that each execution deters seven to eight homicides. He argues that this result persistswhen controlling for a number of demographic variables, including age of the population and socioeconomicindicators. Ehrlich’s results became the rallying cry for those in favor of the death penalty. It was also used asthe basis of arguments in favor of the death penalty in front of the U.S. Supreme Court.The results of this study came under immediate fire. Critics point to the choice of data andoperationalization of the variables as problematic issues in Ehrlich’s study. Passell and Taylor (1977) report thatEhrlich’s deterrent finding holds true only for the years 1963 to 1969. Examination of 1933 to 1962 shows nosignificant deterrent effect. The inclusion of the 1960s is an important point of contention. It was during thistime that the homicide rate was increasing, while use of the death penalty was decreasing or being removedfrom statutes. As a result, the finding of a deterrent relationship was inevitable. Passell and Taylor (1977) andBowers and Pierce (1975) also demonstrate that altering the methodological technique eliminates much of thesignificance in Ehrlich’s results.The deterrent effect of the death penalty has received much subsequent attention. D.P. Phillips (1980),comparing the weeks immediately prior to executions to subsequent weeks, finds that the imposition of thedeath penalty results in a short-term reduction in homicide. The saving in life, however, is eliminated by anincrease in homicides over time (D.P. Phillips, 1980). The executions appear to delay, instead of eliminate,homicide. Land et al. (2009, 2012) consider the effect of executions on homicide in Texas from 1994 to 2007.Texas was chosen due to its frequent use of executions. The authors find a small but significant reduction inhomicide in the month after an execution. A small rebound in homicides occurs in subsequent months (Land etal., 2012).Not all analyses report a deterrent effect for executions. Sorenson et al. (1999), examining the impact ofexecutions over a 14-year period in Texas, report that monthly homicide rates are unrelated to the number ofexecutions. Instead, various demographic measures are better predictors of the homicide rate (Sorenson et al.,1999). Katz et al. (2003), examining annual state-level data from 1950 to 1990, report that the death penalty haslittle, if any, impact on homicide rates. One strong explanation for the lack of a deterrent effect is the smallnumber of executions that take place relative to the number of people convicted and those sentenced to death.There is also a great deal of variation over time in homicide rates, making it difficult to impart any changes inhomicide to the rare executions (Donohue and Wolfers, 2005; Katz et al., 2003). Donohue and Wolfers (2005)note that the uncertainty of executions makes it difficult to assume that the death penalty would have much ofan impact. With rare exceptions, the studies looking exclusively at the severity of the sanction fail to find adeterrent impact in the death penalty.An alternative possible impact of executions is an increase in subsequent offending. Bowers and Pierce(1980) claim that there are two more homicides in the month immediately following an execution and onemore in the second month after an execution than would be normally expected. It appears that the use of thedeath penalty causes an absolute increase of three homicides after the execution. They refer to this as thebrutalization effect of the death penalty (Bowers and Pierce, 1980). Other researchers (Bailey, 1998; Cochran etal., 1994; Cochran and Chamlin, 2000) also report a brutalization effect as a result of executions.Longitudinal studies of deterrence have not been confined to the death penalty. Ross (1982), reviewing theeffects of drunk driving laws in different countries, finds increases in the severity of sanctions for drunkdriving appear to have little, if any, impact on the level of drunk driving. West et al. (1989) analyzed changes inArizona’s drunk-driving laws in July 1982, mandating a 24-hour jail sentence, license suspension, and aminimum $250 fine for a first drunk-driving offense. Using monthly statistics from 1976 to 1984, West et al.(1989) note that there was a temporary decrease in fatalities and no impact on DWI citations. Moreimportantly, the minor observed changes that did occur appear to be due to media coverage and not thelegislated changes.Studies on the impact of three-strikes laws also show qualified deterrent effects. These laws provide forlengthy prison terms for those who commit a third strikeable offense. Zimring et al. (2001) claim that theCalifornia three-strikes law was able to reduce felony offenses by roughly 2 percent, although it only impactedoffenders with fewer than two strikes already. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) uncover a much greater impact.172
They report that arrests of offenders with two prior arrests fell by 20 percent after passage of the law. It isapparent that the increased punishment has a deterrent impact.Certainty of ApprehensionCertainty of apprehension and punishment can be studied in a variety of ways. One method involvesaltering the law. For example, the British Road Safety Act established that a blood alcohol level above .08percent constitutes an offense (Ross, 1982). There is no question of the guilt of an individual meeting thiscriteria. Ross (1982) reports that most alterations in the definition of legal drunkenness result in reduced levelsof traffic casualties. The effect is short-lived, however, with the numbers of accidents returning to the pre-intervention levels. Phillips et al. (1984), reexamining the impact of the British Road Safety Act, find that thelaw has minimal impact on the number of traffic casualties. The number of miles driven and the incidence ofrainfall are better explanatory variables. Interestingly, attempts to further increase the certainty ofapprehension through the use of intensive police “blitzes” appear to have a positive deterrent effect (Ross,1982). This holds true at least for the duration of the blitz.The activity of the police may also provide a deterrent effect particularly as a result of police crackdowns oncrime hot spots. Sherman and Weisburd (1995), reporting on intensive patrol at crime hot spots, find that patrolhas a significant deterrent effect on calls for service and crime/disorder. Efforts to interrupt gang violence inBoston through intensive police and criminal justice system intervention also resulted in reduced offending(Kennedy, 2008). Cohen and Ludwig (2003) point out that redirecting police to areas experiencing high gangviolence in Pittsburgh effectively reduced firearm assaults and reports of shots fired. In a recent review ofproblem-oriented policing projects, Weisburd et al. (2010) find that eight out of 10 studies show significantdeclines in area crime. The same type of impact is evident in analyses of police crackdowns in England (Tilley,2004).Panel StudiesSeveral recent analyses have relied on panel data as a means of avoiding problems with both cross-sectionaland longitudinal approaches. A panel design follows a number of separate units (such as states, counties, orindividuals) over a period of time. In many respects it is a combination of cross-sectional and longitudinalapproaches in a single study. Shepherd (2005) notes that both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs sufferfrom serious problems. Simple longitudinal designs result in aggregating disparate observations into a singlegroup. The results from one state, for example, may be offset by those from another state, thus masking theresults from each individual state. Cross-sectional designs cannot account for changes over time and often misskey differences between study units within the same cross-section. Typical longitudinal and cross-sectionalstudies also have few observations, both across time and in terms of units (e.g., states) (Shepherd, 2005).Various panel analyses claim strong support for a deterrent effect of the death penalty. Dezhbakhsh et al.(2003) investigate the deterrent effect of capital punishment using county-level data for 1977 to 1996. This dataallows them to consider economic, demographic, and jurisdictional variations across the counties. Using acomplex statistical model, the authors claim that each execution deters 18 homicides (Dezhbakhsh et al., 2003).Shepherd (2004) conducts a similar analysis using state-level panel data and considers both sentences to deathrow and actual executions as potential deterrents. The author claims that each death row sentence deters 4.5murders, while each execution results in three fewer homicides. Shepherd (2004) also notes that deathsentences that are carried out with greater celerity also reduce the number of homicides.Interestingly, Shepherd (2005) uncovers important qualifiers on the deterrent impact of the death penalty.Undertaking a panel analysis using county-level data reports that each execution results in 4.5 fewer murders.The results, however, vary significantly across states. Indeed, the death penalty is a deterrent in six states,while it has a brutalization effect in 13 states. Attempting to identify the reason for this difference betweenstates, Shepherd (2005) considers the number of executions carried out in the different states. She finds thatthere is a threshold number of executions that must be reached in order for the death penalty to have adeterrent impact. Specifically, her analysis shows that there need to be at least nine executions for capital173
punishment to be a deterrent to homicide (Shepherd, 2005). States conducting fewer executions will see anincrease in homicides (the brutalization effect).Unfortunately, several methodological concerns with deterrence research claiming a strong impact of thedeath penalty call the conclusions into question. First, the wide variation in year-to-year homicide rates alongwith few executions makes it difficult, if not impossible, to detect any impact of the executions (Donohue andWolfers, 2005). Second, many of the measures of criminal justice system operations included in the analyses aresubject to great variation and measurement error (Fagan et al., 2006), thus affecting the overall results (Tonry,2008). Third, some studies (e.g., Dezhbakhsh et al., 2003) show increases in violent personal offenses (includingrape and assault) at the same time that they present questionable changes in homicide (Donohue and Wolfers,2005).Finally, Kovandzic et al. (2009) point out that most of the studies claiming a strong deterrent effect of thedeath penalty focus on an economic model that ignores important social/criminological variables. When thesefactors are considered, research finds little deterrent impact of the death penalty. Many others (e.g., Kleck et al.,2005; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2004; Piquero and Rengert, 1999) point out that potential and actual violentoffenders do not consider the consequences or make fully informed choices when contemplating orundertaking criminal behavior. In this case, an economic approach, which assumes a true cost–benefit analysisplace without considering criminological influences, is ill-conceived. The general consensus is that executionshave limited, if any, impact on homicide (see, for example, Donohue and Wolfers, 2005; Fagan et al., 2006; Katzet al., 2003; Kovandzic et al., 2009; Pratt et al., 2006).Meta-AnalysesThe conflicting evidence on the deterrent effect of executions and other sanctions has led some researchersto analyze published results in an attempt to provide some meaning to the state of knowledge. Pratt et al.(2006) applied meta-analysis to 40 deterrent studies looking at certainty, severity, and other factors. Theauthors arrive at several conclusions. First, deterrence measures have only a modest impact, at best, on crime.Perhaps more important is that other factors, especially non-legal factors, are more important. The impact ofdeterrence also varies across samples, with certainty having a greater impact than severity (Pratt et al., 2006).Donohue (2009) reviews six studies of the impact of imprisonment on crime. He reports a statisticallysignificant negative relationship between the level of imprisonment and area crime rates. Unfortunately, thisresult could be attributable to incapacitation, rather than deterrence (Donohue, 2009).Yang and Lester (2008) examined 95 studies of the deterrent impact of executions. Of particular note, theauthors divided the studies into five groups: time series, cross-sectional, panel, single execution, and publicitystudies. Results of the meta-analysis show conflicting evidence. The 41 time series studies reveal 28 with adeterrent effect and 12 with a brutalization effect (Yang and Lester, 2008). This corresponds to a significantdeterrent effect from combined studies. The panel studies show similar results with a statistically significantdeterrent impact. Conversely, the cross-sectional, single execution and publicity studies provide no conclusiveresults. Yang and Lester (2008), combining all 95 studies, report an overall statistically significant deterrenteffect.SummaryThis review points to a few general findings. First and foremost, research presents contradictory results onthe deterrent effect of sentences, particularly the death penalty. There is little or no evidence that severity hasan individual deterrent effect. Conversely, certainty of apprehension and punishment seems to have someimpact on the level of offending. One problem with this latter statement is the fact that many of the studiesthat look at certainty also are dealing with crimes that have a fairly severe penalty attached. Clearly, increasingthe certainty of apprehension and punishment for homicide is accompanied by either the death penalty orsubstantial lengths of imprisonment. The occurrence of one factor results in the second. Why, then, do studiesthat look at both severity and certainty only find an effect related to certainty? The answer may revolvearound the perceived risk of apprehension and punishment.174
175
Perceptions and DeterrenceThe ability of punishment to deter offenders rests upon various assumptions about the knowledge held bypotential violators regarding the law and the criminal justice system. The existence of a law or the actualimposition of a sanction will only affect individuals who perceive risks to themselves. Individuals ignorant ofthe law cannot be expected to refrain from the proscribed behavior simply due to the law’s existence. The lackof knowledge about the chances for arrest and the penalty incurred for breaking the law also may result in alack of deterrence. As noted earlier, deterrence also assumes that offenders consider the consequences ofpossible actions and make rational choices. While there is evidence that offenders make rational choices, thereis also evidence that in interpersonal offenses and many violent crimes, the offenders do not undertake thecost–benefit analysis required for deterrence (Kovandzic et al., 2009).Studies find that offenders, as well as the general population, often hold varied perceptions of legal codesand changes in the law. In one early study, Andenaes (1975) notes that the general public had little knowledgeabout penalties for offenses. More recently, Apel (2013) reviewed the empirical research and notes theindividuals often have a general knowledge about legal sanctions, and those with experience in the legalsystem hold better perceptions of offenses and penalties. Of course, just knowing the legal statutes can onlygive information about possible sanctions. Statutes do not necessarily alter the chances of apprehension or theactual imposition of the maximum penalty possible. Indeed, research demonstrates that the criminal justicesystem adjusts to accommodate changes in the law through such means as charge and plea bargaining (Tonry,2008). It is important to examine the role of perception in the study of general deterrence.Perceived CertaintyThe deterrence literature provides conflicting evidence that increased perception of risk is related to reduceddeviant behavior. Erickson et al. (1977), surveying 1,700 high school students, find that the level of perceivedcertainty of arrest or incarceration is inversely related to the level of self-reported delinquency. That is,juveniles who envision higher chances of being arrested or incarcerated for a given offense are less likely toengage in that form of deviant behavior. Nagin (1998), reviewing the deterrence literature, claims that theresearch shows a clear impact of perceived risk on reduced chances for committing crime.Other studies find little impact of perceptions. Jensen et al. (1978), studying 5,000 high school students, andPiliavin et al. (1986), examining 17- to 20-year-old dropouts, find little, if any, relationship between perceivedcertainty of apprehension and self-reported involvement. Indeed, Piliavin et al. (1986) report that theopportunity to commit a crime is more influential than the perception of risk or sanctions. Foglia (1997), testingthe influence of perceptions on high school students from low-income, high-crime areas, shows that perceivedcertainty is not related to self-reported delinquency. The author suggests that the results may be attributable toincome and residential status of the respondents.One of the problems with research on perceived certainty of punishment is the time order of the perceptionand actual involvement with the criminal justice system. Researchers have questioned whether the perceptionof apprehension deters crime or whether the actual apprehension of an individual raises the perception of risk(Bishop, 1984a, 1984b; Jensen and Stitt, 1982; Paternoster et al., 1982, 1985; Saltzman et al., 1982). This latterpossibility is termed the experiential effect. Research by Loughran et al. (2012) suggests that high-riskoffenders perceive a lower risk while low-rate offenders have a higher perceived risk. A finding of lowperceived risk along with past participation in criminal activity may indicate that the lack of past apprehensionengenders the current view of low risk (an experiential effect). The perception comes (causally) after thebehavior. There is a need to relate current perceptions to future deviant activity. This then would indicate adeterrent and not an experiential effect.Bishop (1984a, 1984b) evaluates the impact of perceptions on future behavior (deterrence effect) and theimpact of behavior on future perceptions (experiential effect). She finds that high levels of perceived risk ofapprehension result in lower levels of future behavior. This supports the deterrence argument. The effect of176
past delinquent behavior, however, has a larger effect on subsequent perceptions than the perceptions have onthe behavior. This means that the experiential effect is greater than the deterrent outcome (Bishop, 1984a). In astudy based on self-reports of college freshmen, which also find that the experiential effect is stronger than thedeterrent effect, Paternoster et al. (1985) note that inexperienced individuals who initially hold high perceptionsof risk modify their perceptions after they begin to partake in the activity without being arrested. Theexperience with the behavior, devoid of apprehension, changes the perceptions. This is the experiential effect atwork. A substantial number of other studies relate perceptions to past experience. Lochner (2007) notes thatindividuals with criminal experience hold more accurate perceptions of arrest probability and lowerperceptions of risk of being arrested. Perceptions of risk of being arrested are strongly tied to prior experience(Carmichael and Piquero, 2006; Pogarski and Piquero, 2003; Pogarski et al., 2005). Assessments of risk are alsorelated to the experiences of one’s acquaintances (Piquero and Pogarski, 2002; Stafford and Warr, 1993).Experiences are not separate from deterrence. Rather, they are a vital part of the deterrent effect (Jacobs, 1996;Paternoster and Piquero, 1995).Experience is a key component of deterrence. Research reports a moderate deterrent effect from perceivedrisk of apprehension. The level of certainty of apprehension, however, is diluted by the absence of pastapprehension. Although certainty appears to be the most important deterrent factor, based on the researchreported earlier in this chapter, perceptions of severity and celerity, as individual factors and in relation tocertainty, need to be investigated.Perceived SeverityThe perception of severity of punishment has not received as much attention as certainty of apprehension. Inone study, Meier and Johnson (1977) look at self-reports of deviant behavior and reasons given for notoffending. Focusing on adult marijuana use, they examine a variety of independent measures including legalvariables (e.g., statutory knowledge, perceived severity), social support (i.e., friends’ use), attitudes toward druguse, and various demographic factors. They find that as the perceived severity of the sanction increases thelevel of marijuana use decreases. Severity, along with the combined legal factors hold minimal influencecompared to the contribution of social background characteristics and social support factors (Meier andJohnson, 1977). A replication of this study (Williams, 1983) reports the same basic findings, further questioningthe importance of severity in deterrence.Williams and Hawkins (1989) investigate the impact of arrest and perceived consequences of arrest for wifeassault. Included in the study are measures of perceived legal sanctions, chances of going to jail, damage tointerpersonal attachments, stigma from arrest, and putting conventional activities (such as one’s job) at risk.Surveying married and cohabiting U.S. males, the authors report that the perception of stigma and socialdisapproval are the greatest concerns of the respondents. The possibility of going to jail and being sanctionedby the legal system are less of a deterrent than the social factors (Williams and Hawkins, 1989). Just as with thestudies of perceived certainty, these studies may suffer from the competing issues of experiential and deterrenteffects.Combined Deterrence FactorsA few studies attempt to gauge perceptions of certainty, severity, and/or celerity within the same analysis.Hollinger and Clark (1983) find that perceived severity and certainty have a deterrent influence. The level ofemployee theft diminishes as perceptions of risk increase and the individual sees harsher sanctions as a possibleoutcome. Pestello (1984) surveyed high school students about their school misbehavior and the perceptions ofeach of the deterrent elements as they relate to school discipline. The results show that perceived severity andcelerity of punishment increase the fear of consequences for behavior that, in turn, reduces the possibility ofmisbehavior. This is one of the few studies that reports a significant effect of severity on behavior.Unfortunately, each of these studies suffers from the problem of time order in its analyses. The measures ofperception are taken at the same time as the measures of behavior, which raises the possibility of theexperiential effect.177
Panel studies have attempted to isolate the deterrent effects from the possible confounding influences ofexperiences. Paternoster (1989a, 1989b), surveying high school students, notes that perceived severity andperceived certainty of punishment have only a minor influence on marijuana use, liquor use, petty theft, andvandalism. Decisions to offend or reoffend are based primarily on extralegal factors such as moral beliefs aboutthe behavior, and peer associations and influences (Paternoster, 1989a). A minor deterrent effect appears onlyin relationship to perceived certainty of marijuana and liquor use among prior non-offenders (Paternoster,1989b). Concentrating on drinking and driving behavior, Green (1989a, 1989b) also finds that perceivedcertainty and perceived severity have little impact. The most important influences on drunk-driving behaviorare informal, extralegal factors such as moral commitment, social approval, and demographic differences(Green, 1989a, 1989b). Piquero and Paternoster (1998) similarly find that experience is more influential thandeterrence in relation to drinking and driving. These studies add to the argument that perceptions of certaintyand severity have little influence on actual behavior.Klepper and Nagin (1989) provide one of the strongest arguments in favor of perceived certainty and severityas deterrents. The authors report that the perceived probability of detection and prosecution, as well asperceived severity of punishment, are strong deterrents for tax non-compliance. Klepper and Nagin (1989)argue that their findings are unique due to the fact that tax non-compliance is an affirmative action that mustbe consciously considered. That is, every individual must clearly choose to violate the tax law in light of bothcosts and incentives for the action. Additionally, they use a very homogeneous sample composed of 163graduate students in business with a 100 percent response rate and they provide the respondents with veryspecific scenarios that alter the level of tax non-compliance.Despite this last study, the overall research on perceptions reports similar findings to the results presented inearlier parts of this chapter. Perceptions of certainty of apprehension appears to hold the most potential forimproving the possibility of deterrence. Perceptions of both severity and celerity tend to hold little or noimpact in deterring behavior. It appears that experience plays a larger role in determining perceptions thanperceptions have on future behavior. Perceptions seem to have some deterrent impact for individuals.178
SummaryThe deterrence literature fails to find any strong compelling arguments that the law and sanctions have anymajor impact on the level of offending. The most clear-cut finding seems to indicate that increased certainty ofapprehension and punishment results in reduced offending. Severity appears to have little influence onbehavior. The failure of severity to have much impact may be due to the lack of knowledge that individualshave about the actual sanctions and the chances of being caught and receiving the punishment. An analysis ofthe perceptual literature reveals that perceptions are based on past experiences much more than futureactivities are based on present perceptions. Again, certainty seems to hold the most power.The finding that certainty of apprehension and punishment is the most important factor suggests that anydeterrent effect must rest on efforts by the criminal justice system and society to increase the level of risk. Atthe same time, changes that increase perceptions of risk, whether through experience, avoidance or somethingelse, also contribute to deterrence. This risk can come from the crime prevention techniques discussed in thisbook. Failure to increase the risk of apprehension and punishment does not mean that the crime rate will rise.Rather, it indicates that the sanctioning power of the criminal justice system alone is not enough to keepmotivated individuals from offending.Key Termsbrutalization effectceleritycertaintycross-sectional studiesdeterrenceexperiential effectgeneral deterrencehedonisticlongitudinal analysesmeta-analysispanel designsseverityspecific deterrencethree-strikes laws179
Part IISecondary PreventionThe orientation of secondary prevention focuses activity on individuals, places, and situations that have a highpotential for deviance. Secondary prevention is concerned with intervening in those situations and with thosepersons who display a tendency toward criminal behavior. As in primary prevention, the emphasis is still onpreventing crime prior to its initial occurrence. Once a criminal act has occurred, any intervention that takesplace falls under the realm of tertiary prevention. Perhaps the core concern for secondary prevention, therefore,is the prediction of future criminal activity.The problem of making predictions is taken up in Chapter 10. Typically, prediction is assumed to focus onthe behavior of individuals. Two major methods for making predictions of future dangerousness are clinicaland actuarial. These approaches generally fail to make adequate judgments and often result in large numbersof false predictions. Besides trying to make accurate predictions, it may be possible to identify risk factors forfuture behavior. In this case the idea is to uncover factors that are strongly related to later criminality. A thirdapproach is to try to identify locations or situations where deviance is more likely. Consequently the focusshifts from people to places, times, and circumstances. Each of these approaches to prediction is considered.The remaining chapters look at specific interventions. Chapter 11 focuses on situational crime prevention.Situational prevention techniques target specific problems, places, persons, or times. Problem identification andprogram planning are cornerstones of the situational approach. The impact of these interventions are morefocused than typically found in primary prevention, although many of the same ideas will be used, particularlyphysical design changes. Chapter 12 shifts our focus to the role of the police and partnerships in crimeprevention activity. Community policing and partnerships seek to build cooperative alliances among the police,other agencies, and citizens. Local problems and potential solutions are identified through the interactionamong all interested parties. Similarly, the preventive actions will depend on a variety of people. The police actas “community managers” in the situational orientation and are key actors in any partnership.Chapter 13 looks at the question of drug use and its relationship to crime. While drug use and traffickinghave become major concerns again in recent years, we know little about the causal relationship between druguse and crime. What is known is that there is a strong correlation between drug use and deviant activity.Targeting drug users, therefore, is one method of identifying individuals at risk of committing other offenses.The chapter looks at the extent of drug use, the connection between drug use and crime, and thetreatment/prevention programs aimed at curbing drug use.Another possible source of intervention, aimed primarily at youths, is schools. Schools are in a primeposition to identify and intervene with juveniles heading toward criminal activity. Chapter 14 examines therole schools play in engendering deviant lifestyles as well as the secondary preventive efforts that schools canprovide. The emphasis of secondary prevention on the future behavior of potential deviants leads todiscussions of juveniles and delinquent activity. Most intervention with adults occurs after the commission of acriminal act and, thus, falls under tertiary prevention, which is discussed later.180
Chapter 10Prediction for Secondary PreventionChapter OutlinePredicting Future OffendingTypes of PredictionPrediction and Crime PreventionRisk Factors and PredictionFamily FactorsPeer FactorsCommunity Influences on BehaviorSchool FactorsPsychological/Personality FactorsBiological Risk FactorsUsing Risk Factors as PredictorsPredicting Places and EventsHot Spots for CrimeHot ProductsRepeat VictimizationExplanations for Repeat VictimizationRepeat Victimization and Crime PreventionIssues with Repeat VictimizationSummaryImplications for Crime PreventionLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Identify key factors in making predictions about future behavior in criminal justice.Distinguish between false positive and false negative predictions.Compare and contrast clinical and actuarial prediction.Identify different categories of risk factors for crime and provide examples of factors within eachcategory.Define life-course-persistent and adolescence-limited offending.Identify three pathways to delinquent behavior.Demonstrate your knowledge of hot spots, hot products, and prospective mapping.Define repeat victimization and discuss its extent.List and discuss different types of repeat victimization.Compare and contrast risk heterogeneity and event dependency explanations for repeatvictimization.Provide arguments for why targeting repeat victimization makes sense for crime prevention.181
Secondary prevention techniques rest heavily on the idea of identification and prediction. Rather thanintervene with entire communities or neighborhoods, or establish programs to reach the general public,secondary prevention techniques rely on efforts to identify potential offenders, places, or situations that have ahigher likelihood for criminal activity. One primary problem for secondary prevention, therefore, is properidentification and prediction. Predicting who will and who will not become deviant, where and when crimewill occur, who will be a victim, what items will be targeted by offenders, and related topics is often a difficultor involved effort. This chapter briefly explores the problem of prediction and identification for preventionpurposes. The discussion is divided into three general areas. These are predicting offending behavior, analysisof risk factors for deviance, and identifying places, times, and individual victimization.182
Predicting Future OffendingMaking predictions about future behavior, whether deviant or conventional, involves making a number ofinitial decisions. Perhaps the first issue is the determination of what is being predicted. In criminal justice,predicting recidivism is perhaps the most common endeavor. Impact evaluations of interventions, whetherpunitive or rehabilitative, typically look at various measures of subsequent offending. Rearrest, reconviction,reincarceration, seriousness of future activity, and revocation of probation or parole are common measures ofrecidivism. Prediction of recidivistic activity, however, does not address the central concern of secondaryprevention, which would be predictions of initial deviant acts by individuals. This is often expressed in termsof predicting potential dangerousness. Potential dangerousness is an important consideration in the activity ofcriminal justice professionals and nowhere is this more evident than in the juvenile justice system, which ispremised upon potential future involvement in adult criminal activity. Secondary prevention hopes to keep thepotential offender from ever realizing that potential.Prediction also requires choosing the proper variables for use in the analyses. Some variables or indicatorswill predict future behavior better than others. The challenge is to identify the best predictors. The choice ofpredictor variables often reflects the orientation of the researcher making the prediction. Psychologicallytrained evaluators typically rely on information gathered by means of clinical interviews and psychologicaltests covering an individual’s personality, interpersonal relationships, and life experiences. More sociologicallyoriented classifiers look to age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, group affiliation, family background, and otherdemographic factors. Past deviant behavior and contact with formal systems of control are typically importantfor all researchers. Seldom are all of the variables used in the same study. It is the selective choice of variablesthat may invalidate or limit the applicability of the predictions.Table 10.1 Potential Outcomes of PredictionTrue positive predictionSomething is predicted to occur and it does (a successful prediction)False positive predictionSomething is predicted to occur but it does not (a failed prediction)True negative predictionSomething is predicted not to occur and it does not (a successful prediction)False negative predictionSomething is predicted not to occur but it does occur (a failed prediction)A final important consideration in predicting future behavior is the degree of accuracy in the predictions.When we make a prediction and it proves to be accurate, we are not concerned. On the other hand, makingwrong predictions can have dire consequences. Error in prediction takes two forms—false positive and falsenegative predictions. Each of these has a different impact on the individual being evaluated and/or society. Interms of criminal/deviant behavior, false positive predictions are those in which an individual is predicted todo something in the future (e.g., recidivate, offend, act dangerously) but is not found to act in that fashion afterfollow-up. Conversely, false negative predictions declare that the person is not a future threat but theindividual does engage in the negative behavior at a later time. See Table 10.1.The problems inherent in false predictions should be quite evident. “Potential” offenders or recidivists oftenare subjected to interventions or harsher and/or more prolonged treatment or punishment because of thatpotential. A false prediction means that the individual is unduly denied his freedom based on an inaccuratefinding. On the other hand, false negative predictions may result in ignoring individuals, or granting early or183
outright release to individuals who will cause further harm to society. Mistakes of this kind subject society tounnecessary harm. Given the complexity of human behavior, it is unreasonable to suggest that predictionmethods will ever be able to completely eliminate the incidence of false positive and false negative predictions.The issue, therefore, is limiting the number of false predictions.Types of PredictionPrediction generally falls into one of two categories—clinical prediction and actuarial prediction. Clinicalpredictions have predominated in criminal justice, particularly in terms of sentencing and treating individuals.Actuarial prediction has been a more recent choice given the availability of large amounts of data andproblems with clinical techniques. Each of these is discussed below.Clinical PredictionClinical predictions are based on a rater’s evaluation of an individual, usually after interviews and directexamination of the subject and his records. The training and disposition of the individual rater oftendetermines what variables and factors are important in arriving at a decision. The rater can use variouspsychological tests, demographic information about the individual, family and individual backgroundinformation, or interviews of the subject in making a determination. There are no firm rules for which itemsmust be used, when they should be used, which are the most important, or whether more than one type ofinformation is used. In most cases, the individual rater has total discretion.Research on the clinical prediction of violence reveals a great tendency for false determinations, bothpositive and negative. Monahan (1981), summarizing some of the more well-known clinical studies, findsremarkably consistent results, despite variation in what is being predicted, follow-up periods, and predictiveitems used in the studies. In all nine studies he reviews, the percentage of false positive predictions exceeds 50percent and in six of the nine analyses it is more than 80 percent. These false positive predictions aredisturbing, particularly in cases in which extended follow-up periods are considered. Longer follow-up shouldreduce the evidence of false positive predictions. For individuals predicted to commit an act of violence oraggression, few actually do so. Conversely, the false negative predictions are very small. Despite this, thecombined level of false positives and false negatives is unacceptable. These results seriously damage any claimof predictive efficacy of clinical diagnosis.A number of factors may explain the poor clinical predictions. First, the determination of subsequentoffending or dangerousness may be too strict. Many analyses require actual injury to another person orreincarceration during the follow-up period. An offender, however, may not be severely sanctioned eventhough harm is committed by the individual. Second, the variables being used to determine future behaviormay not be predictive of the type of behavior under consideration. This is a clear possibility given the level ofdisagreement found among individuals who normally conduct clinical evaluations. Ziskin (1970) notes thatagreement between two psychiatrists cannot be found more than about 50 to 60 percent of the time. A final setof problems relates to the adequacy of the information on which evaluators make their judgments. Manyclinical interviews are of short duration, which allow only minimal observation. Predictions based on limitedobservations may produce predictions relying on incomplete or distorted information. These factors, amongothers (see Ennis and Litwack, 1974; Pfohl, 1978; Scheff, 1966, 1967), may account for the great levels of falsepredictions found in clinical studies.Actuarial PredictionsActuarial prediction refers to making predictions based on known parameters in the data. The best exampleof actuarial prediction is the setting of rates by the insurance industry. The cost of life insurance is based onthe known mortality rates for the population group to which the applicant belongs. Males have shorter lifespans, on average, than females. This results in shorter periods in which to pay into the insurance account. In184
turn, the premiums for insurance are slightly higher for males. The prediction is based solely on known,statistical factors. Similarly, car insurance rates are determined by past accident levels and claims. Young malesare involved in more accidents, which leads to higher insurance premiums for all young males.The key to actuarial prediction is the identification of the appropriate predictive items. Factors typically usedin criminal justice include age, race, sex, socioeconomic status, educational status, IQ, criminal history, theimmediate offense, family background, and psychological test results. As in the clinical studies, actuarialevaluations greatly vary in their choice of items and techniques.Burgess (1928) introduced a simple form of actuarial prediction in which individuals were scored as either 0or 1 based on the presence or absence of certain predictive factors. The U.S. Parole Commission’s Salient FactorScore was a prime example of this technique incorporating items addressing past convictions, pastincarceration, age at first commitment, educational attainment, and employment history (Gottfredson et al.,1975). One point was awarded for each item characterizing an individual. Prisoners who accumulated highernumbers of points were viewed as better risks and subsequently awarded parole release. Greenwood (1982),using a Burgess-type method with self-report data from incarcerated adult offenders, claimed to be able topredict who was a high-rate and who was a low-rate offender (see Table 10.2). One point was added to aperson’s score for each of the items pertaining to the individual. A score of four or more indicated a high riskof offending. Neither the Salient Factor Scores nor the Selective Incapacitation system is in use today due to thequestionable prediction ability of the techniques.A wide variety of techniques have been used to construct actuarial prediction scales. The methods vary fromthe simple additive procedures of Burgess (1928) to more sophisticated techniques, including multipleregression, predictive attribute analysis, and association analysis. The results of these different approaches,however, do not uncover any single best method (Farrington, 1985; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985;Wilbanks, 1985). Similar results emerge when using each and there is often little predictive power in any of themethods. Wilbanks (1985) reports between 25 and 33 percent false predictions for different methods. Similarly,Farrington (1985) finds that an average of 45 to 50 percent of the predictions are false positive predictions,regardless of the method used, with false negative predictions comprising about 10 to 15 percent of thepredictors.Table 10.2 Selective Incapacitation Items1.Incarceration more than half of the two-year period preceding the most recent arrest.2.Prior conviction for the crime type being predicted.3.Juvenile conviction prior to age 16.4.Commitment to state or federal juvenile facility.5.Heroin or barbiturate use in the two-year period preceding the current arrest.6.Heroin or barbiturate use as a juvenile.7.Employed less than half of the two-year period preceding the current arrest.Source: P.W. Greenwood (1982). Selective Incapacitation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.A number of observations can be made about actuarial prediction based on the foregoing discussion. First,the level of error is smaller than that found in clinical studies (Meehl, 1954; Wilbanks, 1985). Second, the use ofdifferent predictive techniques does not appear to alter the results. The level of error remains about the sameacross methods, although different individuals are misclassified in the various approaches. Finally, on thenegative side, actuarial prediction consistently attempts to predict individual behavior based on group data.This is a totally inappropriate use of the data and is referred to as the ecological fallacy. It is not possible(barring very specific circumstances) to impute the behavior of a single person from the activity of a largergroup (Stouthamer-Loeber and Loeber, 1989). Instead, the results of an actuarial approach suggest that, given agroup of people with certain characteristics, including a certain percentage of offending individuals, the samepercentage of persons from an identical group would be expected to act in the same fashion. It is not possible,however, to identify which individuals will make up that offending percentage. Clearly, the inevitable result of185
both clinical and actuarial prediction is some degree of false prediction.On the Web Another approach to predicting criminal behavior is to look at criminal careers. Past researchhas focused on specialization, patterns in behavior, and desistance topics. A short discussion ofthis material can be found on the textbook web site.Prediction and Crime PreventionPrediction remains an integral part of many activities in the criminal justice system. Decisions made at alllevels of the system involve prediction, although rarely is “prediction” a conscious part of the decision. Choicesby police officers to arrest, by prosecutors to press charges, by judges to sentence, and by parole commissionsto release offenders all involve predicting the likelihood of future deviant behavior. Unfortunately, prediction isoften inaccurate. The usefulness of traditional clinical and actuarial techniques for prediction in crimeprevention is suspect.186
Risk Factors and PredictionA more recent trend in identifying who will commit offenses (i.e. prediction) involves the identification ofrisk factors related to deviant behavior. Most discussions of risk factors do not make the assumption thatindividuals who exhibit these traits will inevitably become criminal or act in some inappropriate fashion.Rather, the risk factors are indicators of who may become deviant in the future. There is usually no attempt tomake predictions about specific individuals. The risk factors are only indicators or flags that can signal theneed for increased attention or possible assistance for individuals.The identification of potential risk factors is not a new idea. Indeed, the idea of working with youths at riskof becoming delinquents or later adult criminals is a cornerstone of the juvenile justice system. The verypremise of the juvenile court is to work with troubled at-risk youths. Implicit in this task is the idea ofidentifying the factors underlying the juvenile’s behavior and working to alter those conditions. Likewise, mostcriminological theory is based on the idea of identifying the best predictors of criminal activity in order todevelop appropriate interventions. While not typically referred to as risk factors, the variables that are found tobe related to delinquency and criminality are risk factors. A good deal of research is on identifying risk factors.Risk factors can be broken down into various categories. Typical groupings found in the literature arefamily, peer, community, psychological/personality, and biological risk factors (see Table 10.3). While differentauthors may classify individual risk factors slightly differently, these categories are generally representative ofthose used in the literature. The information presented below is not intended as an exhaustive list of riskfactors. Rather, the intent is to offer some insight into some of the more recognized variables that have beendiscussed in the literature.Family FactorsA wide range of family situations and factors influence both the immediate care of an individual as well aslater behavior. As noted in Chapter 8, poor parental supervision and inconsistent and harsh discipline are keyearly risk factors for later deviance. In one early study, McCord (1979) found a strong relationship betweenyouthful offending and the type of parental discipline and supervision. Others (Capaldi and Patterson, 1996;Hawkins et al., 1995; Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Wells and Rankin, 1988) report that violence andaggression are more prevalent for youths from homes exercising harsh and inconsistent discipline. One factoroften promoted in the literature is the relation between parental criminality and the behavior of the offspring.Farrington (1989) claims that having a parent arrested is related to later offending by male offspring. Thisrelationship appears in a variety of other studies (e.g., Farrington, 1996; Farrington and Loeber, 1998; McCord,1977; West and Farrington, 1973).Table 10.3 Common Risk Factors Found in the ResearchFamilySchool Parental criminality Suspension/expulsion Poor parental supervision Truancy Harsh discipline School attitude Inconsistent discipline Academic failure Abuse/maltreatment School quality Family bonding/relationships Dropping out Broken homesPsychological/personality Family size Hyperactivity Socioeconomic status Impulsivity Family conflict Inability to concentrate187
Family functioning Learning disabilitiesPeers LowIQ Gang membership Anxiety Peer deviance/criminality Aggressiveness Sibling criminalityBiologicalCommunity Prenatal complications Economic deprivation/poverty Perinatal complications Disorder/incivilities Low birth weight Availability of firearms/drugs Drug use during pregnancy Socioeconomic status Poor nutrition Gang activity Neurotransmitter problems Area crime/violence Low at rest heart rate Community disorganization Neurological injuriesExposure to violence and offending also appears in the form of abuse and maltreatment. In perhaps the mostrecognized study on this topic, Widom (1989) finds that both physical abuse and neglect predict laterparticipation in criminal activity. Data from the Rochester Youth Study uncover similar findings (Smith andThornberry, 1995). While these results support commonly held beliefs about the impact of abuse on laterbehavior, there is evidence in these same studies that the impact varies by type of abuse (such as betweenphysical abuse and neglect) and inclusion of other factors (such as age, race, sex, etc.). These facts, however, donot eliminate the general finding that maltreatment is related to later deviance.Other family factors that are considered in the literature include family relations or bonding (Catalano andHawkins, 1996; Farrington and Loeber, 1998; Gorman-Smith et al., 1996; Hirschi, 1969), family size (Capaldi andPatterson, 1996; Farrington and Loeber, 1998), and broken homes (Farrington and Loeber, 1998). The mostimportant observation to make based on this varied literature is that family functioning is an importantcontributor to the present and future behavior of youths. The identification of family risk factors offers anopportunity to develop appropriate interventions.Peer FactorsThe influence of peers is generally viewed as one of the most important factors involved in adolescentbehavior (Elliott, 1994; Elliott and Menard, 1996; Lipsey and Derzon, 1998; Thornberry et al., 1995). Ofparticular importance to adolescence is the presence and/or participation in youth gangs. Participation in gangsis related to higher levels of offending (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993; Thornberry et al., 1993; Thornberry, 1998)as well as initiation into deviant activity (Elliott and Menard, 1996). Data from the Cambridge Youth Studysuggest that the antisocial behavior of siblings is also a potential predictor of delinquent activity (Farrington,1989).Community Influences on BehaviorAnother potential source of risk is the community within which an individual is raised and resides. Studiesof community influences are long-standing in criminology (see Shaw and McKay, 1942). Many analyses look tocommunity problems, such as economic deprivation, disorder/incivility, poor neighborhood integration, andsimilar factors, as contributors to individual deviance (see, for example, Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampsonand Lauritsen, 1994; Shannon, 1991; Skogan, 1990). Other community influences related to levels ofdelinquency and criminality include the availability of firearms (Block and Block, 1993; Lizotte et al., 1994;Sheley and Wright, 1995), low socioeconomic status (Elliott et al., 1989; Farrington, 1989; Lipsey and Derzon,1998; Smith and Jarjoura, 1988), and level of gang activity. Each of these community factors contributes to thelevel of risk.188
School FactorsAnother set of community factors that contribute to risk involves schools. While schools are a part of thecommunity, they may contribute uniquely to risk. Poor academic performance and school failure are commonfactors related to current and later deviance. Hirschi (1969) points out that schools and academic participationare key factors in delinquent behavior. Various studies show that dropping out of school and low academicachievement are strong correlates of delinquency (Farrington, 1989; Gold and Mann, 1972; Maguin and Loeber,1996; Thornberry et al., 1985; West and Farrington, 1973). While a relationship between school factors anddelinquency clearly exists, the exact causal mechanism between the various factors is not as easily identified.This issue will receive more attention in Chapter 13.Psychological/Personality FactorsAn array of psychological and personality variables have been identified as risk factors for aggressivebehavior. Brennan et al. (1993) note that hyperactivity among preteens is significantly related to violentbehavior during the young adult years. Similar results appear in research comparing hyperactive boys withtheir non-hyperactive siblings (Loney et al., 1983). Impulsivity and problems with concentration also arerelated to higher levels of adolescent deviance (Farrington, 1989; Farrington and Loeber, 1998; Loney et al.,1983). Other factors often related to deviant behavior include learning disabilities, low IQ, and similar issuesthat may inhibit an individual’s success in school and elsewhere (see, for example, Denno, 1990; Lipsey andDerzon, 1998; Loeber et al., 1993; Loeber et al., 1995; Maguin and Loeber, 1996).Biological Risk FactorsBiological risk factors are identified in a number of studies, although they do not receive the same degree ofattention as other factors. The major reason for this state of affairs is the fact that criminology is dominated bysocial scientists who focus their attention on other variables. Among the possible biologically based risk factorsare prenatal and perinatal complications (Brewer et al., 1995; Farrington, 1996; Kandel and Mednick, 1991; Reissand Roth, 1993). Included here are low birth weights, complications with pregnancy, drug use while pregnant,and poor nutrition. Neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, are other biological risk factors possibly related todeviant behavior (Moffitt et al., 1997). Neurotransmitters are bodily chemicals that transmit messages in thebrain. Yet another biological factor related to violent delinquent behavior is a low resting heart rate(Farrington, 1997; Raine, 1993). The evidence for the impact of many of these factors on later behavior isrelatively weak (see, for example, Denno, 1990), although there is some evidence of a relationship in variousstudies.Using Risk Factors as PredictorsMany researchers attempt to use risk factors as predictors of later deviance. Lipsey and Derzon (1998)conducted a meta-analysis to specify risk factors from two different age groups—ages six to 11 and ages 12 to14—on violent and serious behavior among individuals aged 15 to 25. They report that the key predictors fromthe six-to-11 age group are general offending and substance use, socioeconomic status of the family, andhaving antisocial parents, and being male. From the 12-to-14 age group, the best predictors are generaloffending, violence and aggression, and having antisocial peers. Overall, offending, substance use, andantisocial peers are the strongest risk factors for later deviant behavior (Lipsey and Derzon, 1998). A veryimportant qualifier in their study, however, is the fact that there is a high level of false positive predictionsusing these risk factors. That is, use of the risk factors to predict behavior will err by predicting manyindividuals will be deviant when, in fact, they will not.A second analysis attempts to show differences between risk factors for two types of offending. These arelife-course-persistent offending and adolescence-limited offending. In simple terms, Howell and Hawkins189
(1998) are attempting to identify risks of continuing deviant behavior over the long term (i.e., life-course-persistent), as opposed to offending mainly in adolescence (i.e., adolescence-limited). Among the risk factorsfor life-course-persistent offending are poor social environments, social cognitive difficulties, poor academicabilities, poor family management, and neuropsychological problems. Conversely, adolescence-limitedoffending risk factors include prior antisocial behavior, poor parent-child relations, antisocial peers, and pooracademic performance (Howell and Hawkins, 1998). Based on this information, the authors offer varioussuggestions for interventions aimed at the key risk factors.Data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study also illuminate the use of risk factors to attack deviant behavior. Kellyet al. (1997) and Browning and Loeber (1999) identify three pathways to delinquent behavior. The first,authority conflict, reflects early stubbornness, which leads to later defiance and avoidance of authority.Related problems include running away, truancy, and ungovernability. Covert behavior typically begins withminor acts of lying and theft, moves on to property crimes (such as vandalism and property destruction), thenmoderately serious delinquency (such as joyriding and more serious theft), and eventually culminates inserious property delinquency, including burglary and auto theft. The final pathway of overt behaviorcommences with aggressive activity (bullying and teasing) and leads to fighting and violence (Kelly et al.,1997). It is important to note that these pathways are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. That is, someyouths will exhibit activity in all three and others may not be limited to these avenues. The authors show thatmany of the Pittsburgh youths fall into one of these patterns. The research also notes various risk factors,especially learning disorders, prior violence, problem behavior at home, and impulsivity (Browning andLoeber, 1999; Kelly et al., 1997).These studies suggest that risk factors are useful tools in identifying potential problem individuals.Numerous jurisdictions have adopted risk assessments at various stages of criminal justice system intervention.Table 10.4 provides an example of one such risk instrument used by the state of Ohio to assess risk for thosebeing considered for community supervision and the level of supervision needed. This is a Burgess-styleinstrumentTable 10.4 Ohio Risk Assessment Instrument: Community Supervision ToolCriminal historyMost serious arrest under age 18Number of prior adult felony convictionsPrior sentence as an adult to a jail or secure correctional facilityReceived official misconduct while incarcerated as an adultPrior sentence to probation as an adultCommunity supervision ever been revoked for technical violation as an adultEducation, employment, and financial situationHighest educationEver suspended or expelled from schoolEmployed at the time of arrestCurrently employedBetter use of timeCurrent financial situationFamily and social supportParents have criminal recordCurrently satisfied with current marital or equivalent situationEmotional and personal support available from family or othersLevel of satisfaction with current level of support from family or others190
Stability of residenceNeighborhood problemsHigh crime areaDrugs readily available in neighborhoodSubstance useAge first began regularly using alcoholLongest period of abstinence from alcoholOffender ever used illegal drugsDrug use caused legal problemsDrug use caused problems with employmentPeer associationsCriminal friendsContact with criminal peersGang membershipCriminal activitiesCriminal attitudes and behavioral patternsCriminal prideExpresses concern about others’ misfortunesFeels lack of control over eventsSees no problem in telling liesEngages in risk-taking behaviorWalks away from a fightBelieves in “Do unto others before they do unto you”Source: Adapted by author from E. Latessa et al. (2009). Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System: Final Report.Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati.with offenders receiving points based on each of the risk dimensions/questions. Latessa et al. (2009) havedemonstrated the ability of the instrument to assess the risk level of different offenders. They have similarlydeveloped risk assessments for other points in criminal justice processing.Explicit attempts to assess accuracy of risk assessments do not always provide promising results (Lipsey andDerzon, 1998). Most analyses identify risk factors based on prior correlational analyses and fail to test theadequacy of any predictions based on those findings. Consequently, risk factors should be used as indicators ofpossible future problem behavior. They should not be viewed as perfect predictors of behavior. Indeed, manyindividuals, particularly youths, may exhibit multiple risk factors but fail to ever act in socially inappropriateways. Because many risk factors are indicative of conditions or situations that are not optimal for normalfunctioning, they should be considered as a signal that some intervention is needed for the best interests of theindividual. Should the interventions also reduce the level of subsequent offending, this would be an addedbonus. Perhaps more appropriately for crime prevention, individuals who are already exhibiting antisocialbehavior should be examined for signs of risk factors, and action should be taken to correct or ameliorate theproblem.191
On the Web The State of Ohio and the University of Cincinnati teamed up to create a risk assessmentinstrument. A brief introduction to that instrument can be found on the textbook web site alongwith the final report on its creation.192
Predicting Places and EventsPrediction for secondary prevention does not have to be limited to predicting which individuals in whichsituations will turn to delinquency or criminality. It is also possible to consider predicting the where and whenof offending/victimization. This activity is not a new or unique idea. Indeed, it is common for police agenciesto distribute their resources differentially across their jurisdiction and at different times of the day. Today,researchers are employing new and developing technologies and data sources for identifying the “where” and“when” of offending. The following discussion will look at prediction in terms of hot spot analysis and hotproducts. The following section will examine repeat victimization and related topics.Hot Spots for CrimeIt has long been common practice for the police to identify locations and times that are more prone tocriminal activity. Neighborhood bars, for example, experience more aggression and violence than lounges innice restaurants. Similarly, assault is more prevalent in the evening than during the mid-morning. Knowingeven these two basic facts shows that many problems cluster in both time and place. The challenge, therefore,is to identify these clusters and use that information as a starting point for implementing appropriateinterventions.Perhaps the most recognizable example of this activity involves “hot spot” research. Sherman (1995, p. 36)defines hot spots as “small places in which the occurrence of crime is so frequent that it is highly predictable,at least over a one-year period.” Analyzing calls for police service in Minneapolis, Sherman et al. (1989) findthat 50 percent of all calls for service came from only 3 percent of the locations. All domestic disturbance callsappear at the same 9 percent of the places, all assaults are at 7 percent of the locations, all burglaries occur at 11percent of the places, and all robbery, sexual misconduct, and auto theft calls appear at 5 percent of the possiblelocations.Other analyses reveal similar concentrations of crime in few locations. Spelman (1995) notes that 10 percentof the locations in Boston account for 30 percent of police calls for service. More recently, Braga et al. (2008)report that more than half of all fatal shootings occur in roughly 5 percent of the locations in town. Weisburdet al. (2004), examining data for Seattle, point out that roughly 50 percent of all crime occurs on less than 5percent of the street segments. This result has remained stable over a 14-year period of time. There can be littledoubt that crime clusters spatially.Attempts to identify hot spots are also useful in pointing out what types of crimes and locations coincide.Block and Block (1995), using mapping techniques to examine crime data for three Chicago communities,report that hot spots often surround elevated transit stops and major intersections. These are locations wherepotential victims can be located and offenders have options for escape. Looking at auto theft in Philadelphia,Rengert (1997) identifies hot spots but notes that the locations of the hot spots change according to differenttimes of the day and night. Tourist attractions and educational institutions may be hot spots for auto theftduring the day, while entertainment venues, bars, and other adult night spots become greater target areas inthe evenings and at night (Rengert, 1997). Clearly, hot spots can be anywhere—businesses, schools, abandonedbuildings, vacant lots, housing complexes or intersections—or anytime—evenings, late night, weekends,holidays, or vacation months.An important qualifier when considering hot spots should be stability over time. Is the identified crimeconcentration a temporary situation, or does the hot spot persist over a period of time? Townsley and Pease(2002) argue that relying on hot spots identified with limited temporal data may lead to targeting anomalouscrime concentrations that will disappear as the crime settles back to its normal level (i.e., a regression artifact).Perhaps more importantly, Johnson et al. (2005, 2008) claim that the movement of crime, even over shortperiods, limits the value of identifying hot spots using traditional methods. The authors suggest the use ofprospective mapping, or the creation of maps that predict future crime locations based on knowledge ofrecent events. This is based on findings that show a burglary at one location results in heightened chances of193
victimization at nearby locations (Johnson and Bowers, 2004). Prospective mapping alleviates the problem oftargeting hot spots when they move around.A finding that crime concentrates in certain locations or at certain times suggests that the targeting of hotspots may be an effective starting point for crime prevention. The identification of a hot spot should promptanalyses to uncover what factors make a location a good spot for crime (Spelman, 1995) and offer insight intopreventive responses. One set of tools that is becoming a central component to police planning is computermapping programs. Software, such as ArcGIS, MapInfo, the Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime program(STAC), and Drug Market Analysis Program (DMAP), are commonplace in policing (Rich, 1995). Mapping andhot spot research can supply information not only on crime but also on information about the neighborhood,site, or time at which an activity is taking place.Hot ProductsAn interesting new approach to hot spots is the idea of hot products. Clarke (1999) discusses hot products asitems that attract attention and are targeted by thieves. Further, such items may help explain the existence anddistribution of hot spots. Hot products are those that fit Felson and Clarke’s (1998) idea of VIVA: Value, Inertia,Visibility, and Accessibility. Value is determined by potential offenders and not necessarily the monetary costof the item. What has value today may not be of interest tomorrow. This could be due to the maturation of theoffender, the saturation of the item in society, changes in taste, or other factors. Inertia deals with the weightand portability of the item. Further, a target can only be at risk if it is Visible to potential offenders. Finally, thetarget must be Accessible to offenders (Felson and Clarke, 1998). The extent to which a target meets thesecriteria will have an impact on the chances of an offense occurring. Clarke (1999) expands on the idea of VIVAby proposing CRAVED (Concealable, Removable, Available, Enjoyable, and Disposable), which furtherexplains the existence of hot spots. Clarke argues that identifying and acknowledging the influence of “hotproducts” leads to a number of potential prevention measures. Physical design ideas, such as electronic tagging,location transmitters, barcoding, and similar methods of identifying property are prime examples of ways toaddress hot products. It is also possible to develop other actions specifically aimed at hot products.194
Repeat VictimizationTable 10.5 Typology of Repeat VictimizationRepeattypeCharacteristicsExamplesTargetCrime against the same targetCrime against the same person, building, household, vehicle, orother target, however definedTactical(virtual)Crimes requiring the sameskill, or modus operandi, tocommit. Often the same typeof targetParticular type of locks picked (on different types of property);web sites with particular types of security are repeatedlytargeted; theft of same model of car; burglary of property withsame layoutTemporalAn offending spree—temporalproximity is the definingcharacteristicMultiple burglaries of different properties in the same night;theft of car, then a robbery and getawaySpatial(near)Crime in nearby location dueto proximity andcharacteristicsHigh-crime areas; hot spotsCrimetypeThe same target victimized bydifferent types of crimeThe same target is burglarized, assaulted, robbed at differenttimesOffenderVictimization of same targetby different offendersA property appears attractive to different offenders; any easy orrewarding targetSource: G. Farrell (2005). “Progress and prospects in the prevention of repeat victimization.” In N. Tilley (ed.), Handbook of CrimePrevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan. Reprinted with permission.Yet another topic in the literature involves identifying repeat victimization and focusing efforts to preventfuture transgressions. Repeat victimization can be considered in terms of either people or places beingvictimized at least a second time within some period of time subsequent to an initial victimization event.Farrell (2005) offers six types of repeat victimization (see Table 10.5). These types are analogous to the variationfound in forms of displacement offered in Chapter 6. For example, target repeat victimization considers thesame person or place being victimized at least a second time. Target repeat is the one most commonlyreferenced in discussions of repeat victimization. No matter which type is being considered, the assumption isthat evidence of recurring victimization can be used for directing preventive actions.Repeat victimization is not an uncommon event. Polvi et al. (1990) are credited with introducing the idea ofrepeat victimization. In their analysis, the risk of being a repeat burglary victim is 12 times higher thanexpected by chance and this risk is more pronounced immediately after an initial burglary. This heightenedrisk persists for roughly three months and then levels off to normal expected levels. Victimization surveys are a195
major source of data on repeat victimization. Pease (1998) notes that 1 percent of people are victims of 59percent of all personal crimes, and 2 percent of the households are the victims of 41 percent of all householdcrimes. Pease labels these victims as supertargets because of the high concentrations of crime they experience.Farrell and Pease (2014) argue that most crime is repeat offenses against the same victims.British Crime Survey data from 1982 through 1992 reveals that roughly one-quarter to one-third of allproperty crime is committed against people victimized five or more times within a one-year period(Ellingworth et al., 1995). This means that almost two-thirds of victims are repeat victims, with roughly 50percent of personal crimes appearing as repeat victimizations (Ellingworth et al., 1995). Using data from the2000 International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), Farrell et al. (2005) find that roughly 40 percent of all crimes,43 percent of sexual crimes, and more than one-third of assaults and threats are repeats (Farrell et al., 2005).Comparing repeat victimization in the NCVS, BCS, and other victim surveys relies on what is known asseries victimizations. Series victimizations are instances where respondents report multiple acts of the sametype over the reference period but cannot provide specifics on each event. Lauritsen et al. (2012) note that whilethere are problems with accurately assessing the exact level of repeat victimization, there is consistent evidencethat the actual levels of victimization are much higher than found in annual victimization reports when seriesvictimizations are included.One problem with identifying repeat victimization involves the impact of short time frames within whichrepeats can occur. Ellingworth et al. (1995) note that most levels of repeat victimization are probablyunderreports because they rely on repeats only within a limited time frame, which minimizes the potential forrepeats before or after the survey boundaries. The problem of short time frames for repeat victimization is veryevident when considering the NCVS, which uses a six-month time frame. Compared to the 12-month timeframe of the ICVS, the NCVS reveals significantly lower repeat victimization compared to the ICVS for everycategory of victimization, including sexual offenses (51 percent repeats in the ICVS; 23 percent in the NCVS),assaults and threats (46 percent ICVS; 26 percent NCVS), and burglary (40 percent ICVS; 18 percent NCVS)(Farrell et al., 2005). Kleemans (2001) notes that 9 percent of repeat burglaries occur within one month, 30percent occur within six months, and almost half occur within one year. Thus, the time frame underconsideration makes a difference for the finding of repeat victimization.Table 10.6 Time Frame for Repeat VictimizationOffenseProportion of Repeats by Time PeriodWhereDomestic violence15% within 24 hoursMerseyside, England25% within five weeksBank robbery33% within three monthsEnglandResidential burglary25% within a weekTallahassee, Florida51% within a month11% within one weekMerseyside, England33% within one monthNon-residential burglary17% within one weekMerseyside, England43% within one monthProperty crime at schools70% within a monthMerseyside, England196
Source: D.L. Weisel (2005). Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Problem Oriented Guides for Police. Washington, DC: Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services.Beyond documenting the extent of repeat victimization, research also provides information on the timeframe of repeats. A great deal of revictimization tends to occur within a short period after the firstvictimization (Bowers et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1997; Pease, 1998). Weisel (2005) demonstrates that the timeframe for many repeats remains short for a range of offenses (see Table 10.6). For example, 15 percent ofdomestic violence repeats take place within one day and 35 percent occur within five weeks (Lloyd et al., 1994).Similarly, 25 percent of repeat burglaries occur within one week and 51 percent occur within one month(Robinson, 1998). The information on the time frame of repeats can be useful for the timing of preventioninitiatives.Explanations for Repeat VictimizationExplanations for repeat victimization can generally be divided into two categories—risk heterogeneity andstate dependence (Farrell et al., 1995). Risk heterogeneity, or a flag explanation (Gill and Pease, 1998),suggests that the prior victimization or some other factor identifies the victim or location as an appropriatetarget for further victimization. As such, subsequent victimizations may be committed by different offenderswho are attracted to the target by its apparent vulnerability or some other characteristic. Farrell et al. (1995) usethe example of repeated fights at a bar as an indication of risk heterogeneity, where people looking for fights orinterested in risky situations are attracted to establishments with a reputation for conflict. Those locationsand/or the employees of those bars are then at a higher risk for repeat victimization.Event dependency, or boost explanations (Gill and Pease, 1998), refers to situations in which (usually) thesame offender commits another offense based on the past experiences with that victim or location. Successfulpast offending leads to another attempt against the same target. It is possible under this situation that a newoffender commits a follow-up offense as a result of information shared between offenders. In this case, specificinformation about the target based on a past offense is the key to subsequent actions.Farrell et al. (1995) point out that both risk heterogeneity and event dependency assume that potentialoffenders are rational (rational choice theory) and that their experiences (routine activities) offer informationon the risk, effort, and payoff to be expected from different courses of action. Both arguments find support inGill and Pease’s (1998) study of incarcerated robbers. Their subjects indicate that repeat victimizations arerelated to information from past offenses (theirs or others) and planning. Bowers and Johnson (2004) uncoversupport for the event dependency explanation in a study of residential burglary.Repeat Victimization and Crime PreventionTargeting past victims and locations provides good information for preventing crime. Laycock and Farrell(2003) point out that targeting repeat victimization allows the police to better allocate manpower and resourceswhere they have the greatest chance to have an impact. In a similar fashion, targeting repeat victimizationoften means targeting hot spots and hot products. A focus on repeat victimization also means implementingcrime prevention in high-crime areas, thus having an impact on both the specific target and potential nearbytargets (Laycock and Farrell, 2003). Ratcliffe and McCullagh (1999) note that the analysis of past offenses canprovide information on the mode of entry, time of offending, property targeted, and other factors that can formthe basis for preventive actions. Clarke et al. (2001) suggest that studies of repeat victimization can also provideinsight into the decision-making process of the offenders. Evidence from an analysis of repeat burglarysupports the idea that burglars repeat their offense after a period of time in order to steal the items that havebeen purchased to replace the goods taken in the first offense (Clarke et al., 2001). Importantly, there is greatersimilarity in repeats committed soon after the initial act, but the similarity declines over time (Ratcliff andMcCullagh, 1999). Another advantage is that repeat victimization may involve more prolific and seriousoffenders; thus, prevention efforts have a greater potential impact (Laycock and Farrell, 2003).The authors also197
note that targeting repeat victimization should result in less displacement than initiatives that are moreunfocused.Research demonstrates that targeting repeat victimization can effectively reduce crime. The KirkholtBurglary Prevention Program, for example, targeted repeat victimization and worked with current victims as ameans of reducing further burglaries. This effort successfully reduced further offending (Pease, 1998). Farrelland Pease (2006), reviewing 11 studies from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, note thatboth repeat burglary and overall burglary are reduced by focusing prevention efforts on repeat offending. In areview of 21 burglary studies, Grove and Farrell (2012) claim that targeting repeat victimization reducedburglary in 62 percent of the analyses. Chainey (2012) reports that targeting repeat burglaries in the Traffordborough of Greater Manchester reduced burglary by 27 percent in the first year of the project.Issues with Repeat VictimizationDespite the increased interest in repeat victimization and evidence of the effectiveness of targeting repeatvictimization, there are issues that require more attention. First, while evidence shows that there is a good dealof repeat victimization, not all criminal acts are followed by another one against the same location orindividual. Identifying which acts will result in a repeat victimization prior to the subsequent act is an elusivetask. The existing research offers an after-the-fact analysis of the extent of repeat victimization. It is possible,therefore, that targeting prevention activities at past victims may result in a great deal of unnecessary effort.On the other hand, such targeting should be more effective than interventions aimed at the general public,many of whom would never become a victim in the first place.A second issue deals with virtual repeats (Pease, 1998). A virtual repeat involves a follow-up victimizationof a similar person, place, or item. For example, a series of robberies at different locations of a single company(such as a fast-food store) or theft of the same brand of car could be considered repeat victimization if thesubsequent offenses are committed due to the similarity in the situations (such as similar store layout orsimilar auto amenities). Pease (1998) suggests that these should be considered repeat victimizations. As such,they offer different issues for directing crime prevention activities. Johnson and Bowers (2002, 2004) illustratethis issue when they consider burglaries that take place at neighboring homes as a type of repeat victimization,which they call a near repeat. Their argument is that a local burglary elevates the risk of burglary, at least inthe near term, for other proximate homes.Other unanswered questions involve whether repeats should be considered in terms of people or placesbeing victimized, how many victimizations are required before it is considered a repeat (especially in terms ofcommon commercial thefts such as shoplifting), whether attempted offenses should be counted as repeats, andwhether similar (but not identical) offenses should be used as a sign of repeat victimization (Pease, 1998). Whileno clear answers are available for these questions/issues, the potential for using repeat victimization withincrime prevention remains strong.Figure 10.1 Intersection of Domains for Crime Prevention Efficiency Source: G. Farrell (2005). “Progress and prospects in the prevention of repeat victimization.” In N. Tilley (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention and198
Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan. Reprinted with permission.SummaryHot spot research, hot products, repeat victimization, and related topics represent innovative approaches tonarrowing the individuals or situations that will be targeted by crime prevention activities. Farrell (2005)illustrates the overlap of several concepts found in this chapter and suggests that the effectiveness of preventiveefforts will be most enhanced by targeting the intersection of the different domains (see Figure 10.1). Clearly,the idea of allocating resources by time and place is common in policing. It should be no more difficult toborrow that idea and apply it to general preventive efforts used by the criminal justice system or any othergroup or agency. Both hot spot and repeat victimization analyses, among others, offer insight into the “where”and “when” issues of instituting crime prevention.199
Implications for Crime PreventionPrediction is an important part of crime prevention—particularly secondary prevention. This is trueespecially for attempting to intervene with individuals and situations where a high propensity for criminal anddeviant behavior exists. The identification of persons who are headed for future juvenile or adult criminalitywould allow the introduction of appropriate crime prevention techniques prior to the deviant activity.Unfortunately, the prediction of future behavior of individuals typically results in large numbers of falsepredictions. More recent research on risk factors uncovers a number of variables related to later deviantbehavior. It may be possible to use identified risk factors as a basis for focused, preventive interventions.Another approach to prediction is to turn attention away from predicting individual behavior and towardprediction of places, times, and targets of offending. This approach suggests that it may be fruitful to orientprevention activities from the perspective of the victim, rather than the potential offender. Any technique thatassists in the delineation of potential victims or targets would offer insight into the “where” and “when” ofprevention efforts. The geographic and temporal identification of hot spots, the identification of hot products,and the use of information on repeat victimization are approaches with potential use in secondary crimeprevention. These approaches need to receive increased attention and continued refinement in order to makethe information more useful for prevention.Key Termsactuarial predictionadolescence-limited offendingauthority conflictboost explanationsclinical predictionscovert behaviorCRAVEDecological fallacyevent dependencyfalse negative predictionsfalse positive predictionsflag explanationhot productshot spotslife-course-persistent offendingnear repeatovert behaviorprospective mappingrepeat victimizationrisk factorsrisk heterogeneityvirtual repeatsVIVA200
201
Chapter 11Situational Crime PreventionChapter OutlineThe Growth of Situational PreventionThe Theoretical BasisRational Choice TheoryRoutine Activities TheoryCrime Pattern TheorySummarySituational TypologiesExpanding the TypologyIssues and Concerns with Situational PreventionImplementing Situational PreventionSituational Prevention StudiesFare Avoidance and Vandalism of Transit SystemsMotor Vehicle TheftTheft OffensesProduct DesignRevictimizationChild Sexual AssaultOther CrimesSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Define situational prevention.Identify and discuss the theoretical bases for situational prevention.Explain the changes in the situational typology over time.Provide criticisms directed at situational prevention and give responses to those criticisms.Offer several examples of situational prevention in action, including the evaluation evidence onthose techniques.Demonstrate how situational techniques can be used with personal crimes.The targeting of crime prevention efforts is nowhere more evident than under the rubric of situational crimeprevention. Many of the prevention techniques discussed under primary prevention form the basis ofinterventions discussed in this chapter. Instead of attempting to make sweeping changes in an entirecommunity or neighborhood, situational prevention is aimed at specific problems, places, persons, or times.The situational approach assumes that a greater degree of problem identification and planning will take place202
prior to program implementation and that the impact will be more focused. The identification of places,individuals, and things at risk of victimization, especially focusing on repeat victimization, are central to agreat deal of situational prevention. This chapter outlines the growth of situational crime prevention since theearly 1980s, discusses the various traditional rationales upon which it is based, and provides examples ofsituational techniques in action.203
The Growth of Situational PreventionThe root ideas for situational crime prevention can be traced largely to the crime prevention work of theBritish Home Office in the 1970s (Clarke, 1983). In pursuit of interventions that could successfully addressdifferent crime problems, the Home Office undertook a wide array of projects aimed at reducing factorsspecific to different crimes, places, and situations. Clarke (1995) points out that much of this work grew out ofthe recognition that crime often reflects the risk, effort, and payoff as assessed by the offender. In essence,offenders make choices about which opportunities are the most profitable, and act in accordance with thatassessment.Clarke (1983, p. 225) offers the following definition of situational crime prevention:situational crime prevention can be characterized as comprising measures (1) directed at highly specific forms of crime (2) that involve themanagement, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible (3) so as to reduce theopportunities for crime and increase the risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders.Implicit in this definition are a number of assumptions about the offender and crime commission that appearin various theories and theoretical perspectives. The key part of the definition is the third caveat—“reduce theopportunities” and “increase the risks as perceived by offenders.” Situational prevention rests on the idea that itis possible to make changes in the environment that will make offending less attractive to potential offenders.This assumes that offenders do not simply act on impulse, and they have control over whether they take actionor not. There is a clear belief that offenders make choices. Cusson (1993) argues that crime is deterred becausethe offender perceives risk in a given situation. As a result, offenders seek out or respond to places, times, andpotential victims that offer the least risk.204
The Theoretical BasisRational choice, routine activities, the lifestyles perspectives, and crime pattern theory are importantconsiderations for situational prevention. Each set of ideas provides insight into the ability of offenders torespond to crime opportunities. While it is common for discussions of these perspectives to focus on potentialoffenders, the potential victim is also an important part of the equation.Rational Choice TheoryThe cornerstone of situational crime prevention is the belief that offenders respond to opportunities andmake choices in offending. Rational choice theory posits that individuals make decisions on whether tocommit an offense based on an array of inputs, including the effort involved, the potential payoff, the degree ofpeer support for the action, the risk of apprehension and punishment, and the needs of the individual (Clarkeand Cornish, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986a, 1986b). This does not mean that individuals commit an offenseevery time an opportunity presents itself. Rather, potential offenders make a calculated decision about crimebased on the available choices and the risk, effort, and payoff involved. Research on burglars serves as a goodexample of the issues involved in rational choice. Bennett (1986) and Wright and Decker (1994) point out thatburglars often commit their crimes in order to fulfill other needs and desires. These may be immediate needs,such as cash for drug purchases or to meet expectations of one’s peers, or longer-term desires for property orstatus. In attempting to satisfy these drives, the offender may consider a wide range of targets and methods.Among the physical and social factors that affect a burglar’s decision may be the level of concealment, theamount of light, the presence of locks, evidence of valuable property, surveillability from other places, and thepresence of other people (Bennett, 1986; Bennett and Wright, 1984; Cromwell et al., 1991; Nee and Taylor, 1988;Rengert and Wasilchick, 1985; Wright and Decker, 1994). It is important to note that throughout thesediscussions there is at least a tacit recognition of the limited nature of the offender’s choices. Indeed, many ofthe choices may be made with little or no conscious decision making by the individual at the time of theoffense (Wright and Decker, 1994). While it may appear that rational choice is not taking place, the decisionsmay have been fashioned through a variety of past experiences, activities, and inputs. This same process shouldnot only apply to burglary, but also to other offenses.The appearance that offenders’ behavior is based on little conscious thought or choice may be due to the factthat individuals rely on crime scripts that drive their actions. Cornish (1994, p. 159) notes that scripts are “auseful analytic tool for looking at behavioral routines in the service of rational, purposive, goal-orientedaction.” A crime script outlines the steps and actions required to commit a crime, including the responses thatare needed to complete the act (Cornish and Clarke, 2008). A simple example of script steps and actions forauto theft is presented in Table 11.1. The script scene represents the steps and the script actions are the actualbehaviors at each point in the scene. Different crimes will have different scripts. While scripts are typicallydeveloped over time through experience and practice, they can become second nature, requiring little, if any,conscious thought. A potential offender, therefore, happens across a situation offering all the elements outlinedin a successful script and decides to act with little apparent decision making.Table 11.1 Crime Script for Auto TheftScript sceneScript actionPreparationGather toolsEntryEnter lotPre-conditionLoiter unobtrusively205
Instrumental pre-conditionSelect vehicleInstrumental initiationApproach vehicleInstrumental activationBreak into vehicleDoingTake vehiclePost-conditionReverse out of parking spaceExitLeave lotRoutine Activities TheoryOne source of the information upon which an offender builds scripts and bases decisions, whetherconsciously or subconsciously, is his daily routines. Routine activities theory argues that the daily activity ofindividuals results in the convergence of motivated offenders with suitable targets in the absence of guardians(Cohen and Felson, 1979). This convergence provides opportunities for crime to occur. Cohen and Felson (1979)demonstrate the importance of routine activities by showing that increases in the number of unoccupied homesduring the day and the greater availability of portable valuables during the 1960s help to explain increases inresidential burglary. Increasing mobility in society serves to bring targets and offenders together with greaterfrequency than ever before. Both the opportunity and choices for offending are enhanced.Where routine activities deals with both the offender and the victim, the lifestyle perspective specificallyfocuses on the activity of the victim as a contributing factor in criminal acts. Hindelang et al. (1978) suggestthat an individual’s lifestyle and behavioral choices help determine whether he will be victimized. For example,frequenting a bar in which violent fights are common increases the risk you will be involved in such aconfrontation. Similarly, working in a convenience store located in a high-crime neighborhood enhances thepossibility of being a robbery victim. In both situations the individual’s lifestyle has an impact on the potentialof becoming a victim or a repeat victim.It is possible to broaden the lifestyle ideas to consider both victimization risk and opportunity provision.That is, one’s lifestyle has the potential to offer opportunities to commit crime, as well as become a victim. Alifestyle that offers little structure, such as a job where you are unsupervised and are greatly mobile, may placeyou in situations where targets are identifiable and guardians are absent. Consequently, the individual has thechoice of either committing a crime or refraining from doing so. The combination of lifestyle and routineactivities ideas is a natural extension of both perspectives and offers a broader view of potential choiceparameters.Crime Pattern TheoryThe rational choice, routine activities, crime scripts, and lifestyles theories/perspectives fit nicely with crimepattern theory. This theory argues that criminal behavior fits patterns that can be understood in terms ofwhen and where crime occurs (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993b). It is through daily activities thatindividuals develop templates about the social and physical environment within which they operate. Thisinformation is important for identifying both targets as well as threats for potential offenders. Likewise,studying the behavior of offenders and analysis of past offending provides insight into the crimes and potentialprevention mechanisms.SummaryThis brief review of rational choice, crime scripts, routine activities, lifestyle, and crime patterntheories/perspectives illustrates many of the issues underlying situational crime prevention ideas. In each case,deviant activity can be seen as a result of converging factors that influence opportunities for and the decisionto commit crime. Actions that limit those choices, therefore, hold the potential to reduce crime and fear ofcrime.206
207
Situational TypologiesThe growth of situational crime prevention can be seen in the ongoing development of a situationaltypology. In one of the earliest presentations on situational prevention, Clarke (1983) provided a simple three-pronged approach to interventions:surveillancetarget hardeningenvironmental managementSurveillance included many of the ideas discussed in earlier chapters, including the concepts of naturalsurveillance, formal surveillance, and surveillance by employees (see Clarke and Mayhew, 1980). Targethardening included interventions such as locks, unbreakable glass, safes, and other security devices.Environmental management referred to making changes that reduce the opportunity for crime.As one would expect, the original three categories quickly became too simplistic and confining as thenumber of situational crime prevention interventions grew. In 1992, Clarke offered an expanded classificationof situational techniques that reflected three very general orientations: “increasing the effort,” “increasing therisk,” and “reducing the rewards.” Within each of these categories, Clarke (1992) outlined four subgroups ofprevention approaches, yielding a total of 12 situational prevention techniques (see Table 11.2).Table 11.2 Clarke’s 1992 Situational Prevention TechniquesIncreasing the EffortIncreasing the riskReducing the rewards1. Target hardening5. Entry/Exit screening9. Target removal2. Access control6. Formal surveillance10. Identifying property3. Deflecting offenders7. Surveillance by employees11. Removing inducements4. Controlling facilitators8. Natural surveillance12. Rule settingSource: Adapted by author from R.V. Clarke (1992). Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Albany, NY: Harrow andHeston.Many of the techniques are self-explanatory or rest on ideas introduced earlier in this book. Under“Increasing the Effort” are target hardening, access control, deflecting offenders, and controlling facilitators.“Deflecting offenders” involves actions that offer alternatives to undesirable behavior. Examples would includeproviding a board upon which graffiti can be painted, or a meeting place for youths away from openbusinesses or public thoroughfares (Clarke, 1992). The idea of “controlling facilitators” deals with limiting oreliminating situations or items that contribute to crime, such as guns, alcohol, or public phones (which may beused for drug sales). Methods for “Increasing the Risk” rest mainly on formal or informal surveillance efforts.“Entry/exit screening” is a form of surveillance that allows the detection of potential offenders. The screeningof passengers at airports and placing electronic sensors in merchandise to prevent its theft are two examples ofentry/exit screening. The final category of “Reducing the Rewards” includes target removal, identifyingproperty, removing inducements, and rule setting. “Target removal” reflects actions such as limiting the cashkept in the checkout register and requiring exact fare on buses. In both cases, the potential payoff from arobbery or theft is limited. Similarly, “removing inducements” means eliminating attractive targets such as asports car parked on a public street or the wearing of popular sports team jackets to school. Finally, Clarke(1992) offers “rule setting” as a means of setting a standard of conduct for employees and the public, andplacing people on notice that their behavior is being monitored for compliance.208
Throughout these techniques, Clarke attempts to show the breadth of possibilities for crime prevention. Henotes that relying on prevention activities that rest solely on making changes in hardware is too simplistic andshort-sighted (Clarke, 1992). Instead, prevention needs to consider broader social bases for interventions, whichsituational prevention techniques offer. Any examination of Clarke’s 12-stage typology can easily lead tointerventions that are dominated by physical changes in the environment. Based on Clarke’s (1983) definition,which proposes the “management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment,” a physicalinterpretation is not surprising. A closer look, however, that considers opportunity and the “choice” dimensionof situational prevention, argues for a broader interpretation of situational interventions.Expanding the TypologyClarke and Homel (1997) responded to concerns and limitations in the original 12-cell typology by proposingan expanded list of 16 situational techniques. The expansion sought to address two key issues (Clarke andHomel, 1997). First, several of the original categories could be divided to enhance internal consistency of theideas (Clarke and Homel, 1997). For example, “controlling facilitators” was divided into “controllingfacilitators” (such as guns and other items that make crime easier) and “controlling disinhibitors” (factors thatreduce the social and psychological barriers to crime commission, such as the use of alcohol and other drugs).Second, the original 12 categories failed to include techniques that focused on the social and psychologicalcontexts of offending. Clarke and Homel (1997) added categories that addressed guilt, shame, andembarrassment. Guilt and similar feelings may emerge because of the incongruence individuals see betweentheir actions and the moral code they hold or the view of significant others in their lives (Clarke and Homel,1997).This expanded typology shifted situational prevention away from the heavy emphasis on physical changestoward a greater reliance on psychological and social factors. For example, each of the original categories wasrelabeled to reflect the offender’s perceptions—“Increasing Perceived Effort,” “Increasing Perceived Risks,” and“Reducing Anticipated Rewards.” In each case the new categories recognized both an actual change in effort,risk, or reward and altered perceptions (Clarke and Homel, 1997). It is possible that a situational technique haslittle physical impact, but a major psychological impact.Table 11.3 Precipitators of CrimePromptsEvents or situations that may support the opportunity for crime, such as open doors orothers committing crimePressuresMore direct stimuli that lead to action, such as deviant peers, going along with the crowd,or following orders to do something wrongPermissibilitySituations or beliefs that place criminal behavior into an acceptable light, such as thebelief that everyone breaks the law or that the victim had it comingProvocationFactors that make an individual uncomfortable, frustrated, irritable, or otherwise arousedto the point of taking some form of actionSource: Compiled by author from R. Wortley (2001). “A classification of techniques for controlling situational precipitators of crime.”Security Journal 14:63–82.Despite these changes, Wortley (2001) argued that the typology was still not complete. In particular, the areaof “inducing guilt or shame” was not exhaustive. He posited that guilt and shame are not the same thing and209
that these concepts need to be separated. He also argued that the matrix of situational preventionoveremphasized elements that can control or inhibit offending, while ignoring the factors that precipitate orlead to crime. He offered four categories of precipitators: prompts, pressures, permissibility, and provocation(see Table 11.3).The addition of guilt, shame, and precipitating factors suggests that Clarke and Homel’s (1997) social andpsychological dimensions of both prevention and crime causation were under-developed. Clarke and Homel(1997), however, argued that Wortley’s (1996) initial suggestions broaden situational prevention beyond a“situational” approach. They point out that a basic assumption underlying situational prevention is that thereare always individuals who are willing to offend. A motivated offender is a given. Cornish and Clarke (2003)noted that Wortley’s (1996, 2001) arguments take the opposite position that offenders are not always motivated.Instead, there are factors that will provide the needed motivation for criminal activity. Attempting to addressWortley’s (2001) concerns, Cornish and Clarke (2003) offer a new situational typology that includes cues thatmay motivate individuals to offend.The typology appearing in Table 11.4 attempts to incorporate elements of precipitation into the generalsituational crime prevention framework. The original ideas of taking actions to alter the real and perceivedeffort, risks, and rewards from criminal behaviors are maintained, with expanded techniques under eachheading. Techniques addressing guilt and shame are maintained primarily under the heading of “RemoveExcuses,” as areTable 11.4 Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational PreventionIncrease the effortIncrease the risksReduce therewardsReduceprovocationsRemove excuses1. Target harden: • Steering columnlocks andimmobilizers • Anti-robberyscreens • Tamper-proofpackaging6. Extendguardianship: • Take routineprecautions: go outin groups at night,leave signs ofoccupancy, carryphone • “Cocoon”neighborhoodwatch11. Conceal targets: • Off-streetparking • Gender-neutralphone directories • Unmarkedbullion trucks16. Reducefrustrations andstress: • Efficient queuesand police service • Expandedseating • Soothing music/muted lights21. Set rules: • Rentalagreements • Harassmentcodes • Hotelregistration2. Control access tofacilities: • Entry phones • Electronic cardaccess • Baggagescreening7. Assist naturalsurveillance: • Improved streetlighting • Defensible spacedesign • Supportwhistleblowers12. Remove targets: • Removable carradio • Women’srefuges • Pre-paid cardsfor pay phones17. Avoid disputes: • Separateenclosures for rivalsoccer fans • Reducecrowding in pubs • Fixed cab fares22. Post instructions: • “No parking” • “Privateproperty” • “Extinguishcamp fires”3. Screen exits: • Ticket neededfor exit • Exportdocuments • Electronicmerchandise tags8. Reduceanonymity: • Taxi driver IDs • “How’s mydriving?” decals • School uniforms13. Identifyproperty: • Propertymarking • Vehicle licensingand parts marking • Cattle branding18. Reduceemotional arousal: • Controls onviolent pornography • Enforce goodbehavior on soccerfield • Prohibit racialslurs23. Alert conscience: • Roadside speeddisplay boards • Signatures forcustomsdeclarations • “Shoplifting isstealing”4. Deflect offenders: • Street closures9. Utilize placemanagers:14. Disrupt markets: • Monitor pawn19. Neutralize peerpressure:24. Assistcompliance:210
• Separatebathrooms forwomen • Disperse pubs • CCTV fordouble-decker buses • Two clerks forconvenience stores • Rewardvigilanceshops • Controls onclassified ads • License streetvendors • “Idiots drink anddrive” • “It’s OK to sayno” • Dispersetroublemakers atschool • Easy librarycheckout • Public lavatories • Litter bins5. Controltools/weapons • “Smart” guns • Disabling stolencell phones • Restrict spraypaint sales tojuveniles: 10. Strengthenformal surveillance: • Red lightcameras • Burglar alarms • Security guards15. Deny benefits: • Ink merchandisetags • Graffiti cleaning • Speed bumps20. Discourageimitation: • Rapid repair ofvandalism • V-chips in TVs • Censor details ofmodus operandi25. Control drugsand alcohol: • Breathalyzers inpubs • Serverintervention • Alcohol-freeeventsSource: D.B. Cornish and R.V. Clarke (2003). “Opportunities, precipitators, and criminal decisions: A reply to Wortley’s critique ofsituational crime prevention.” In M.J. Smith and D.B. Cornish (eds.), Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY:Criminal Justice Press. Reprinted with permission.Wortley’s (2001) ideas of reducing permissibility. Methods to address the precipitating factors of prompts,pressures, and provocations appear under the “Reducing Provocations” heading. Cornish and Clarke (2003)note that the addition of motivational factors to the more traditional opportunity factors in the matrix allowsthe techniques to address the behavior of various individuals with different levels of motivation to commitcrime.The situational typology serves various purposes. First, the typology places the great array of situationalcrime prevention activities and programs into a theoretical framework. Many specific interventions, such asthe installation of locks and lights, take place with little understanding of the underlying rationale for whythey should work. While there are implicit theoretical arguments in many of the programs, understanding whya program does or does not work requires more explicit recognition of the mechanisms at work. The situationaltypology helps to organize those discussions. Second, the cataloging of the diverse prevention efforts into aclassification system helps to identify the potential causal factors at work. That is, the underlying theories gainsupport when it is possible to demonstrate their applicability and usefulness. The rational choice, routineactivities, and lifestyle perspectives all contribute to the development of the situational techniques and benefitfrom the alignment of different studies into a coherent typology. The recent addition of techniques foraddressing precipitating factors broadens the theoretical traditions and causal mechanisms under considerationin prevention initiatives. Finally, on a very practical note, a classification scheme such as this serves as a simplereference tool for those attempting to implement prevention programs.On the Web Detail on each of the 25 techniques found in the Situational Crime Prevention model can beobtained by visiting the interactive table on the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site:http://www.popcenter.org/25techniques/211
Issues and Concerns with Situational PreventionAs with any topic, there are a number of concerns and unresolved issues. First, the general categorizationsare not mutually exclusive. That is, various interventions may influence more than one factor (both objectivelyand subjectively). A technique that increases risk also may increase the effort. For example, the presence ofsecurity guards or CCTV increases the risk of being caught. These actions, however, also increase the effortneeded to successfully complete an offense. At the same time, successfully completing a crime despite high riskand effort could lead to greater (psychic) rewards (or monetary gain if the presence of protection reflectedgreater value). The fact that the categories are not mutually exclusive does not negate the usefulness of theclassification scheme. Rather, it suggests that the underlying mechanisms are more complex than they firstappear in the typology.Second, the typologies are incomplete and in need of further explication. Clarke and his colleagues view thetypology as a dynamic undertaking that will require modification as research and theory emerge. The very factthat the typology evolved from 12 to 25 general techniques over roughly a 10-year period attests to thedynamic nature of the undertaking. Indeed, an attempt to finalize a typology could be viewed as limiting itsusefulness.Table 11.5 Seven Misconceptions of Situational Crime PreventionCriticismRebuttal1. It is simplistic andatheoreticalIt is based on three crime opportunity theories: routine activities, crimepattern, and rational choice. It also draws on social psychology2. It has not been shown towork; it displaces crime andoften makes it worseMany dozens of case studies show that it can reduce crime, usually withlittle displacement3. It diverts attention from theroot causes of crimeIt benefits society by achieving immediate reductions in crime4. It is a conservative,managerial approach to crimeIt promises no more than it can deliver. It requires that solutions beeconomic and socially acceptable5. It promotes a selfish,exclusionary societyIt provides as much protection to the poor as to the rich6. It promotes Big Brother andrestricts personal freedomsThe democratic process protects society from these dangers. People arewilling to endure inconvenience and small infringements of libertywhen these protect them from crime7. It blames the victimIt empowers victims by providing them with information about crimerisks and how to avoid themSource: R.V. Clarke (2005). “Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention.” In N. Tilley (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety. Portland, OR: Willan. Reprinted with permission.Clarke (2005) addresses seven common misconceptions about situational crime prevention and offersrebuttals to each (see Table 11.5). Critics often note that situational prevention addresses symptoms rather thanthe causes of crime (Clarke, 1995; Crawford, 1998; Kleinig, 2000) and this may result in only temporary, short-lived solutions to immediate problems. They also argue that the situational interventions fail to consider morebasic social and cultural problems, such as poor education, unemployment, and discrimination. Clarke (2005)counters that, despite this fact, situational crime prevention provides clear benefits to society, and does notpreclude simultaneous efforts to address other causes of crime. A second major criticism is that situational212
crime prevention is atheoretical. Such arguments fail to note the rich and developing theoretical arguments(e.g., routine activities and crime pattern) that direct a great deal of prevention activity.Critics also argue that some situational techniques may be overly intrusive and border on “Big Brother”watching everyone’s activities (Clarke, 1995; Crawford, 1998; von Hirsch, 2000). Indeed, the use of CCTV,electronic tagging, and other surveillance measures allows greater oversight of people. Interestingly, the use oftechnology (such as CCTV and x-ray technology at airports) for crime prevention has found widespreadacceptance among the general public. Critics who argue that there is little evidence that situational preventiontechniques are effective ignore the fact that many programs have successfully reduced crime. Arguments thatsituational interventions work against already marginalized groups and build barriers between citizens and thecommunity (Crawford, 1998; von Hirsch, 2000) fail to note that situational techniques can be used to protectboth the rich and the poor, and may include activities that bring citizens together in cooperative endeavors.A last issue is the failure of situational crime prevention to address fear of crime. By focusing on theperceptions of potential offenders, situational techniques are geared mainly toward the reduction of criminalactivity, and evaluations typically ignore the issue of fear. Any impact on fear would appear mainly to theextent that fear is directly related to the level of crime. This does not mean that some situational techniqueswould not affect fear. As interventions are implemented, particularly by residents and other legitimate users,fear may be reduced. Unfortunately, this possible outcome is rarely addressed.213
Implementing Situational PreventionOn the Web More information on the SARA model can be found on the Center for Problem-Oriented Policingweb site at http://www.popcenter.org/about/?p=saraBesides offering an extensive typology of potential interventions, situational prevention distinguishes itselfby approaching problems in a very systematic fashion. Situational prevention has borrowed the SARA processfrom problem-oriented policing as the model for problem-solving. Proposed by Eck and Spelman (1989), SARAstands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment. Under scanning, situational prevention starts with aspecific, identifiable crime problem. That problem is then subjected to analysis, drawing on as wide an array ofinformation and perspectives as possible. This stage offers an important distinction from many other crimecontrol efforts that rely on traditional police and criminal justice system responses to solve problems. Undersituational prevention, formal social control agents are only one source of input. Based on the findings of theanalysis, a response (intervention) is identified and implemented. At this point the prevention processcontinues with an assessment of the program’s impact, with the intent of making changes in the response, ifnecessary. Situational prevention, therefore, is a dynamic process of problem identification, responseidentification, program implementation, and evaluation and adjustment.While SARA is the most recognized approach, Ekblom (2002) proposed the 5Is as an alternative model forproblem solving that is receiving increased attention in situational prevention. The 5Is are Intelligence,Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, and Impact. The relationship between the 5Is and the morerecognized SARA process is depicted in Figure 11.1. The greatest distinction to note is the greater detailintroduced by breaking down the Response into Intervention, Implementation, and Involvement. Interventionrepresents the identification of actions and methods to “block, divert or weaken the causes, and attend to riskand protective factors, of future criminal events and careers or of wider community safety problems” (Ekblom,2011a, p. 85). Once the crime prevention action is identified, Implementation represents the actual tasks ofputting the plan into action. The third aspect, Involvement, focuses on marshalling the participation of otherpeople and organizations in the intervention. Ekblom (2011a) argues that the greater emphasis on knowledgegeneration in the 5Is makes them useful for not only situational crime prevention, but also policy making andbeyond.Regardless of the differences and similarities between SARA and the 5Is, both models set a framework forsituational crime prevention. They require clearly identifying the problem and appropriate responses. Onceresponses have been implemented, they are subjected to analysis and an evaluation of their impact. Theoutcome of this process is either sustaining the program due to its effectiveness or changing the program toaddress limitations or failures in the project.More recently, Ekblom and Hirschfield (2014) suggest that, while the 25 situational crime preventiontechniques offer a nice potpourri of potential interventions, they are too broad and not as easily applied as onemay think. They argue there is a need for a design which is more applicable and action oriented for those whohave to implement prevention and security interventions. The key is to identify what the perpetrator is tryingto achieve, how that will be done, and how you can anticipate, recognize, and control the behavior (Ekblomand Hirschfield, 2014). In essence, it is necessary to think like the perpetrator. “The offender’s behavior is bothsituationally caused … and causing of criminal … events” (Ekblom and Hirschfield, 2014, p. 6; emphasis inoriginal). The authors propose the 11 Ds (see Table 11.6). These are intervention principles that focus on thesituation and the potential offenders, relying on the 25 situational crime prevention categories, SARA, the 5Is,and other approaches.214
On the Web The Design Against Crime Research Center at the University of the Arts London is the home forthe 5Is and its application. You can access more information athttp://www.designagainstcrime.com/files/crimeframeworks/04_5i_framework.pdfFigure 11.1 Relationship Between the 5Is and SARA Source: Adapted by author from P. Ekblom (2011a). Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.Table 11.6 The D PrinciplesDefeatPhysically block access and movement or block/obscure information that offenders wantDisable/DenyEquipment helpful to offenders such as bugs or camerasDirect/DeflectOffenders towards/away from places or behaviorDeter-knownOffenders know the risk of exposure and abandon/abort the attemptDeter-unknownOffenders are uncertain what control methods they are up against, and judge the risk ofexposure as unacceptableDiscourageOffenders perceive the effort as too great and/or the reward as too little, relative to risk,so abandon/abort attemptDemotivateAwakening, within offenders, motives/emotions contrary to the mission (e.g., empathywith potential victims, removing excuses, coward image)DeceiveOffenders act on wrong information concerning risk, effort, reward thus increasingchances of arrest or altering decision to act215
DisconcertCausing offenders to make overt involuntary movement or otherwise become startledDetectPassive and active exposure; offenders self-expose making legitimate presence/behaviordistinctive; improving capacity of people to detectDetainTrace, catch, and/or hold identified offendersSource: Adapted by author from P. Ekblom and A. Hirschfield (2014). “Developing an alternative formulation of SCP principles—the Ds(11 and counting).” Crime Science 3:2.The 11 D principles fall within three basic, overlapping modes of action (depicted in Figure 11.2). Thesemodes are: Practical (where the environment is altered to limit perpetrator action), Psychological (actions thatimpact the thought processes of the perpetrator), and Personal (involving identifying, tracking, and catchingperpetrators) (Ekblom and Hirschfield, 2014). The overlap in the modes indicates that specific Ds/interventionsmay impact the perpetrator/event in more than one way.The D principles reflect a need to provide prevention and security professionals with steps for turningsituational prevention techniques into action. These principles are midrange between theory (such as rationalchoice and routine activities) and extended lists of potential interventions (such as the 25 situationaltechniques). Ekblom and Hirschfield (2014) suggest that this approach offers professionals a useful frameworkfor identifying appropriate interventions for different situations. The 11 Ds can be viewed as a refinement ofthe broader situational crime prevention ideas.Figure 11.2 Modes of Action of the D Principles Source: P. Ekblom and A. Hirschfield (2014). “Developing an alternative formulation of SCP principles—the Ds (11 and counting).” Crime Science3:2.216
217
Situational Prevention StudiesThe balance of this chapter offers a brief overview of studies examining the implementation of varioussituational crime prevention techniques. For most of the discussion, the emphasis is on the impact of variousprevention techniques. In some cases the examples highlight suggestions for situational prevention for specificcrime problems. It is not possible to provide example studies for each of the 25 techniques offered by Cornishand Clarke (2003). Instead, the studies reviewed here should provide the reader with some insight into thetypes of initiatives/approaches that have been undertaken and the breadth of the problems to which situationaltechniques have been and could be applied. A broader array of studies can be found in other forums (see, forexample, Clarke, 1992, 1993, 1996).Fare Avoidance and Vandalism of Transit SystemsThe failure to pay fares is a common problem on public transportation and a single response is not possibledue to the diversity in types of transit system (bus, train, etc.) and the means by which offenders evadepayments. An assessment of fare evasion on the British Columbia transit system identified various methods offare evasion, which formed the basis for a redesign of ticket machines and passes, promotions encouraging thepurchase of transit passes, and focused investigations of counterfeit fare media (DesChamps et al., 1991). Anevaluation of the intervention revealed significant drops in the level of fare evasion. In an evaluation of theDutch transit systems, van Andel (1989) found that fare evasion on buses often occurred due to the ability ofriders to enter and exit the buses through a rear door, thus avoiding the driver. In response, the systemintroduced monitors on the buses and a change in procedure that required passengers to enter the bus near thedriver and prove payment (van Andel, 1989). Fare evasion significantly fell from the pre-intervention levels.Actions taken to address fare evasion in the London underground transit system and the New York subwaysystem also have proven effective. The London system instituted a new ticketing system and installedautomatic gates at select stations. Comparing post-intervention to pre-intervention ticket sales, Clarke (1993)reports reductions in fare evasion of almost two-thirds. The New York subway system introduced newticketing systems, along with physical barriers and increased staff control of entrances (Weidner, 1996).Evaluating the impact by comparing the number of arrests and summonses after the changes to those before,Weidner (1996) reports a small but clear decline in the target station, with increases in neighboring stations.Public transportation systems also suffer an undue level of vandalism. In one of the most widely citedstudies, Sloan-Howitt and Kelling (1990) reported on the efforts to eliminate graffiti from New York subwaytrains. Numerous attempts to thwart graffiti artists, through such efforts as using graffiti-proof paint andsecuring rail yards, failed to have an impact. In a true situational approach, an assessment of why graffitiartists insisted on using the trains found that what was important to the artists was for their work to “get up”and for people to see it (Sloan-Howitt and Kelling, 1990). The logical solution to the problem, therefore, was todevise a means whereby no one would ever see the work, thus depriving the artist of his audience.Consequently, the subway system instituted a policy of cleaning up each train car. Once cleaned, the car wasnot allowed in service (and was immediately taken out of service) if it was ever vandalized by graffiti. Thiseliminated the ability of the artists to “get up” on the trains and eventually stopped further graffiti vandalism(Sloan-Howitt and Kelling, 1990).Poyner (1988) reports on a different approach to curbing vandalism on double-decker buses in one area ofEngland. An analysis of the problem found that offenders tended to be school-aged boys and vandalismoccurred on buses with only a driver. The lack of surveillance was addressed by installing video cameras onseveral buses, although only two buses had functioning cameras. An important companion to the hardwareintroduction was heavy publicity and an educational program aimed at youths. The project resulted in asignificant drop in repair costs (by roughly two-thirds) for the entire fleet of 80 buses (Poyner, 1988).218
Motor Vehicle TheftMotor vehicle theft is a continuing problem that has generated a variety of different proposed solutions.Mayhew et al. (1976) and Webb (1994) examined the impact of steering column locks on the level of motorvehicle theft in England, Wales, and West Germany. Both analyses show that increasing the difficulty of motorvehicle theft led to reductions in the level of theft. Since the mid-1990s, increased use of automobileimmobilizers has been undertaken to avert auto theft. Immobilizers are electronic devices that, in the absenceof the key, prevent the car from operating (Brown, 2004). These devices have been required in all new cars inthe European Union since 1995. Analysis of immobilizers in the United Kingdom reveals clear reductions inauto theft (Brown, 2004). Efforts to address motorcycle theft have often involved legislating the use of helmets(Mayhew et al., 1989). The need for helmets should reduce opportunistic theft because most offenders do nothave a helmet available to them, thus making them easily recognizable to others. Evaluations in England, TheNetherlands, and (the former) West Germany all find reduced motorcycle theft after the initiation of helmetlaws (Mayhew et al., 1989).On the Web Thefts of and from motor vehicles is not restricted to public parking lots or decks; it also occursfrom homes. You can read more about this problem athttp://www.popcenter.org/problems/residential_car_theftOther efforts to limit auto theft have included changing the design of parking decks and parking areas,increasing use of security cameras, and introducing patrols. Poyner (1991) reports on prevention efforts in twodifferent parking areas—a parking deck in town and a university parking lot. For the parking deck, it wasdetermined that physical changes aimed at restricting access to the vehicles was the key to prevention, alongwith improved lighting and increased presence of legitimate users. The evaluation showed significantreductions in auto thefts after program implementation, as compared to two other area parking lots. Theuniversity project implemented improved lighting, closed-circuit television monitoring, and changeseliminating obstructions to observation. The lot receiving closed-circuit equipment showed the greatest drop inauto thefts, and there was some evidence that a nearby lot also benefited through decreased thefts (a possiblediffusion effect) (Poyner, 1991). A study of the impact of bicycle patrols on auto theft in Vancouver uncovereda large drop in thefts during the month of patrol operation, as well as after the patrol was discontinued(Barclay et al., 1996).There is evidence that interventions to reduce auto theft have caused some displacement. One form ofdisplacement is to older cars that have not been outfitted with steering column locks or immobilizers (Brown,2004; Mayhew et al., 1976; Webb, 1994). Brown (2004) also noted evidence of tactical displacement (movementto stealing keys) due to the introduction of immobilizers. Displacement has also appeared in increased thefts ofmotorcycles and mopeds (Mayhew et al., 1976; Webb, 1994). The bicycle patrol in Vancouver uncovered largeincreases in auto thefts for adjacent areas during the month of the intervention (Barclay et al, 1996). It wouldappear that displacement is evident in some evaluations of efforts to prevent auto theft.Theft OffensesSituational techniques have been used in relation to a wide array of theft offenses. The impact of electronictagging of property has been demonstrated in a number of studies. In one study, Scherdin (1986) found that thetagging of books in a university library resulted in both a significant decrease in lost books and an increase inthe number of items processed through circulation. Perhaps of greater impact was the simultaneous reductionin lost audiovisual materials that could not be tagged (Scherdin, 1986). This suggests a diffusion of benefitsfrom the books to other library holdings. Farrington et al. (1993) report that electronic tagging significantly219
reduced the level of retail shoplifting. Similarly, Handford (1994) indicates that computer stores usingelectronic tagging experience low theft levels relative to national data for comparable stores.The marketplace also offers targets other than the stores themselves. Poyner and Webb (1992) report onefforts to eliminate thefts from shopping bags in a crowded marketplace. An analysis of the problem suggestedthat an important contributing factor was the congestion caused by narrow aisles. The solution, therefore, wasto widen the aisles, thereby relieving the congestion and increasing the surveillance opportunities. Theirevaluation of the changes showed great reductions in the level of thefts after the redesign efforts (Poyner andWebb, 1992). Holt and Spencer (2005) report on efforts to reduce robberies at ATM locations. Based oninterviews with convicted street robbers, the authors worked with banks to make ATMs safer by demarcatingsafe zones around the cash dispensers. This approach established a psychological barrier between potentialvictims and offenders. Holt and Spencer (2005) note a significant reduction in robberies at the marked ATMscompared to the control ATMs, which were unchanged.Identity theft is a major problem in modern society, particularly given the Internet and other technologiesthat allow for impersonal commerce to take place. Berg (2008) demonstrates a variety of situational techniquesthat should be effective at combating identity theft. Among the suggestions are employing antivirus programsto block the theft of personal information from a computer, data encryption to make stolen information andcomputers useless, physical security of computers, banning the use of portable devices (e.g., memory sticks)that can capture data from computers, and stronger methods to validate the identification of an individualattempting to make a purchase (Berg, 2008). The impact of situational prevention techniques on identity theftand related fraud is evident in the analysis of changes to debit and credit card procedures. Levi (2008) reportshuge reductions in losses after the introduction of computer chips to cards and the use of PINs (personalidentification numbers). Other effective interventions are the use of fraud alerts (e.g., calls to card ownerswhen unusual activity is noted on an account) and more in-depth identity checks when an individual appliesfor credit or forms of identity (e.g., passports) (Levi, 2008).Product DesignOne important aspect of situational crime prevention includes designing or redesigning at-risk products forcrime prevention. It is possible to consider physically designing products in ways that protect them from theftor being used in other offenses. As Clarke and Newman (2005) point out, the targets of crime are everydayobjects. It is possible to alter the design of objects to make them less amenable to crime.Many products lend themselves to crime. These so-called hot products which are highly targeted by thievesmay be characterized by being CRAVED—Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable andDisposable (Clarke, 1999). In essence, these are products desired by people because of their construction ormakeup and are easily targeted by offenders. For example, electronic devices such as MP3 players and PDAsare easily concealed, expensive, small enough to carry away, and easily disposable. At the same time,automobiles are not easily concealable or even disposable, but they are a common theft target. It is alsopossible with modern technology to take seemingly low-risk items and make them more susceptible to theft.This can include making fraudulent credit cards, drugs, designer bags, and food (to name a few).Ekblom (2008) points out several ways in which products play a role in crime beyond simply being a targetfor theft. Presented in terms of a Misdeeds and Security framework, products can be the target of an offense orused within offending behavior (see Table 11.7). In each case, the design of a product either makes the producta viable target for an offense, or the product facilitates some other offense. Following the CRAVED idea, manyobjects are targeted for their value. Other items may invite vandalism. Yet others can be used in thecommission of other crimes, such as altering a document to allow an underage person to purchase alcohol. Thekey throughout these ideas is the need to recognize the potential problems with products and make appropriatedesign changes.Table 11.7 Products and MisdeedsExamples220
MISappropriatedTheft of the product itselfMIStreatedVandalism or destruction of itemsMIShandledReturning of stolen goods, use of counterfeit currency, use of fake documentsMISusedUse of a product for illegal purposes such as prescription drugs or weaponsMISbehaved withContamination of products, the ability to set off false alarms without being observedSource: Constructed by author from P. Ekblom (2008). “Designing products against crime.” In R. Wortley and L. Mazerolle (eds.),Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.:Willan.Ekblom (2005) outlines several methods for securing products through design. First, he suggests that it ispossible to make products inherently secure. This can be done by making them less attractive or distinctive,and thus less likely to be targeted by offenders. A product can also be designed in such a way that it actuallyprotects other property, such as chairs which can secure purses from theft. Second, product design mayincorporate prevention/security devices within the product or its display. Ink tags on clothing or the use ofcable locks are examples of this approach. The third approach is to restrict offender access to the target or toolsused to target a product (Ekblom, 2005). Other ways of securing products against crime include adding securitydevices to products (such as security cables or alarms), securing the environment in which the product islocated (such as by using safes or access control measures), and employing remote security interventions (suchas restricting access to tools needed for crime or controlling the outlets for stolen goods) (Ekblom, 2008). Theapproach or mechanism to use in protecting products is dictated by both the product itself and the situation inwhich the product is targeted.Redesign of bicycle parking stands has received a great deal of attention in Europe due to the heavy use ofbicycles for transportation. Thorpe et al. (2012) discuss seven different designs used in London to securebicycles. Similarly, shopping carts incorporating a secure basket/safe and table clips have been designed toprotect handbags from theft (Ekblom et al., 2012; Sidebottom et al., 2012). Other projects have introduceddigital DNA (a unique non-sequential numerical code), holograms, watermarks, and bi-directional barcoding(which includes 10 to 30 times the information found in regular barcodes) affixed to products as means ofdeterring counterfeiting (Segato, 2012).A wide range of products has been the subject of design changes for prevention purposes. The automobile isa prime example of redesign for crime prevention (see Table 11.8). A number of changes have been made inautos to prevent their theft or the theft of items from them (Clarke and Newman, 2005). Ignition locks andsteering column locks are universal in new cars, and alarms and locator devices are common, particularly inmore expensive autos. Removable radios or radio faces, stronger door locks, and the marking of auto parts withidentification numbers all address theft from autos.Table 11.8 Changes Made at Manufacture to Cars and Crimes PreventedCrimeDevice or redesignUnauthorized useand joy-ridingIgnition locks; improved door locks; steering column locks; alarms; immobilizers221
Theft of cars ormajor body partsAs above but also: parts marking; GPS (global positioning system) locators; tamper-proof license plates; microdotsTheft from carsStronger door locks; alarms; lockable gas caps; redesigned emblems; security codedradios; removable radios; dispersed audio systemVandalismRetractable aerialsAssassinationArmor plating; ram barsIllegal use of rentalcarGPS locators to detect speedingSource: R.V. Clarke and G.R. Newman (2005). “Modifying criminogenic products: What role for governments?” In Clarke, R.V. and G.R.Newman (eds.), Designing Out Crime from Products and Systems. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.There are a number of other examples of product design for prevention purposes (Clarke and Newman,2005). Theft of small items from stores can be made more difficult by putting the item in large packages thatare more difficult to conceal. Purse snatching can be prevented by designing them with stronger straps thatcannot be cut or broken. Computer hacking has been made more difficult with the introduction of specialsoftware. Caller ID has helped to stem telephone harassment (Clarke and Newman, 2005). The design of smartguns recognize the owner and will only discharge if used by that person (Lester, 2001). These and many otherexamples of product design changes are made for the purpose of preventing different types of crimes.Cozens (2014) notes there is a crime life cycle for products that is tied to the market for each type ofproduct. The first stage is Introduction of a new product. The product is relatively rare and has little marketshare or recognition; thus, it is not a high target for theft. This moves to the Growth stage where sales areincreasing and knowledge and demand is on the up slope. The third stage is the Mature stage. Here the productis well known and desired. There are a lot of the items available for theft and the demand leads to theft forboth use and sale to others. This is the peak period for crime. The final stage is Decline, where the product haseither saturated the market or is being replaced with new products. Theft falls off in this stage. Some productsgo through this cycle quickly, some very slowly, and others may not fit the cycle at all (Cozens, 2014). It is notunusual that public pressure or government intervention is need to help interrupt this cycle and force projectchanges.While the idea of product design for prevention purposes has been gaining attention, relatively fewinitiatives have been subjected to evaluation (Clarke and Newman, 2005). There are evaluations that ofteninvolve weak research designs with no control groups for comparison purposes. Evaluations that have beencompleted typically suggest that the design changes are effective at bringing about significant reductions incrime (Clarke and Newman, 2005). Stronger evaluation, however, needs to be undertaken.On the Web Growth in interest in product design for prevention has been increasing in recent years. TheDesign Council in England offers a great deal of information on this topic. You can read more atits web site: http://www.designcouncil.org.uk/knowledge-resources/search/im_field_design_discipline/product-design-27222
A number of problems and issues face the movement toward product design for prevention. One primaryconcern is the fact that most designers are not trained with an eye toward crime prevention, thus making thedesign process difficult at the outset (Learmont, 2005). Second, the prevention features must be understood bythe users/consumers and be simple enough to guarantee that they are employed (Ekblom, 2005; Lester, 2001).Basically, the features need to be user friendly. Third, any changes need to adhere to the aesthetic features ofthe product. Fourth, there may be both legal and ethical questions to be addressed. The incorporation ofelectronic tracking devices, for example, raises issues of privacy (Ekblom, 2008; Lester, 2001). Yet anotherconcern with product design involves the issue of increased costs due to the extra features (Ekblom, 2008). It ispossible that product redesign can result in costs that are prohibitive. Despite these (and other) concerns,product design for prevention is a growing area of interest that should receive increased attention, particularlyfor its impact on the level of crime.RevictimizationSituational prevention has great potential in relation to targeting previous victims and offense sites. Oneplace where this was undertaken was the Kirkholt housing estate near Manchester, England (Forrester et al.,1988, 1990). A major thrust of the program was to target burglary victims to prevent further offenses. Amongthe prevention actions were improved physical security of homes, property identification, and “cocoon”neighborhood watch (small numbers of homes per group). A key element of the project was the removal ofpre-payment fuel meters in burglarized homes. Evaluations of these efforts revealed significant reductions inrepeat burglaries after program implementation. The absence of the pre-payment meters may have been themost important of the prevention measures. Anderson and Pease (1997) report on another attempt at targetingrepeat victimization in Huddersfield, England. Victims received a graduated response based on the number ofprior victimizations. Possible responses included the installation of alarms, security surveys, consultation withpolice, and cocoon neighborhood watch. Inspection of offense figures over a 25-month period shows reducedrepeat victimization in the target area and an overall burglary decline of 70 percent (Anderson and Pease,1997). Other projects targeting repeat victimization (noted in the last chapter) have shown reductions due totargeting past victims (Chainey, 2012; Grove and Farrell, 2012).On the Web More information on repeat victimization and responses to it can be found in the Tool Guidefrom the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing athttp://www.popcenter.org/tools/repeat_victimization/Child Sexual AssaultOn the Web Discussion of situational techniques for addressing organized crime and crowd violence can befound on the textbook web site.Typical discussions of situational crime prevention involve property offenses and largely avoid interpersonalcrimes. While it is possible to argue that personal crimes are more likely to be spontaneous and less likely to beplanned than property crimes, this does not mean that situational techniques cannot be used with personaloffenses. One example of situational crime prevention with personal crimes involves child sexual assault.223
Tremblay (2008) notes that the Internet has greatly enhanced the ability of pedophiles to interact, attractvictims, and gain social support for their behavior. Wortley and Smallbone (2008) argue that it is possible toattack child sexual abuse by attacking the opportunity dimension of offending. They suggest increasing theeffort by making it difficult for offenders to enter areas where children are found or by enhancing thescreening of potential employees in businesses that cater to youths. It is also possible to reduce facilitators bylimiting access to pornography or contact with other offenders. Increasing risks and reducing permissibility arealso avenues to explore with child sexual assault. Wortley and Smallbone’s (2008) discussion of situationaltechniques with child sexual assault is illustrative of the possibilities for using situational prevention to combatpersonal offenses.Other CrimesThe offense categories discussed above are just a sample of the many applications of situational techniques.The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing has produced guides addressing 80 types of offenses, ranging fromcheck and card fraud to street racing to gun violence to elderly abuse. In each guide, situational techniquesform a core of the discussion and recommendations for prevention.On the Web The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing has more information on situational approaches tocrowd control, including Madensen and Eck’s (2008) work. This can be accessed athttp://www.popcenter.org/problems/spectator_violence224
SummarySeveral observations can be drawn from studies of situational prevention. First, while there is an emphasison property crimes, situational crime prevention is applicable to personal offenses. Second, a wide array ofinterventions appears in the literature and this diversity is evident both across different crime problems andwithin the same offenses. What this suggests is that the prevention initiatives truly are “situational” in natureand cannot simply be applied to the same crime that appears in different places at different times. Third,research successfully demonstrates the effectiveness of programs that target effort, risk, and reward, and thereis emerging evidence on the use of guilt and shame. Fourth, in many analyses there is evidence of eitherdisplacement or diffusion, despite the fact that many of the research designs do not specifically test for them. Itis important to note that displacement is never 100 percent. Finally, the focused nature of situationalprevention efforts may help maximize the success of the programs. Programs that attempt to make modestchanges in specific problems at specific times and places should be more successful than multifaceted programsaiming for large-scale changes.Situational crime prevention offers an approach that seeks to target specific problems with individualizedinterventions. As such, these techniques epitomize the ideas of secondary prevention. This does not mean thatwe are looking at entirely new forms of interventions. Indeed, many of the actions discussed in the later part ofthis chapter are the same ideas we discussed under primary prevention. The success of situational approacheshas moved these ideas into the forefront of many crime prevention discussions and will continue to receive agreat deal of attention in the future. The next chapter addresses a topic that also seeks to identify specificproblems and implement targeted interventions—partnerships.Key Terms5IsCRAVEDcrime life cyclecrime pattern theorycrime scriptsdigital DNAimmobilizerslifestyle perspectiveMisdeedspermissibilitypressurespromptsprovocationsrational choice theoryroutine activities theorySARAsituational crime preventionsmart guns225
226
Chapter 12Partnerships for Crime PreventionChapter OutlineCommunity PolicingPrecursors to Community PolicingDefining Community PolicingProblem IdentificationPartnership Efforts and AssessmentCommunity PolicingHot Spots PolicingCivil Abatement and InjunctionsCCP, SACSI, and PSNGun ViolenceCrime and Disorder PartnershipsGang Suppression ProgramsProblems and ConcernsSuccessful PartnershipsSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Debate the meaning of “community policing” by discussing different definitions and key featuresof it.List and define the features of community policing.Tell what SARA stands for and discuss its component parts.Provide examples of community policing programs and talk about their effectiveness.Discuss civil abatement and injunction approaches and their impact.Talk about hot spots policing and the evidence on its effectiveness.Demonstrate your knowledge of SACSI and PSN.Discuss Operation Ceasefire and its replications.Give an overview of Crime and Disorder partnerships in the United Kingdom.List and discuss the keys to successful partnerships.The inability of the police to handle the crime problem alone and the recognition that crime and disordercannot be dealt with solely through the arrest and prosecution of offenders has led to the development ofalternative responses and methods. Partnership initiatives are at the forefront of these activities. While many ofthe ideas and interventions found in partnerships are similar to those found in general citizen crimeprevention, the onus for action is on the police and social service agencies to work in cooperation with one227
another and the general public. These endeavors often seek to target specific problems. The underlyingphilosophy is to encourage interaction and cooperation between police officers, residents, community groups,and other agencies to solve problems. Rosenbaum (2002, p. 180) notes that:the value of partnerships in theory lies in their responsiveness to the etiology of complex problems, their ability to encourage interagencycooperation both inside and outside the criminal justice system, their ability to attack problems from multiple sources of influence and totarget multiple causal mechanisms.In many respects, partnerships mirror ideas found in situational prevention. A key assumption is that thereare factors underlying the crime and disorder problems in the community. The typical police response to theproblems, that being arrest and prosecution, does little to address the causes of the problems. Arrest andprosecution deal mainly with the overt symptoms. These new approaches seek to identify problems andpotential solutions, as well as implement interventions. As such, partnerships fall squarely in the realm ofsecondary prevention. They target high-risk situations.In the United States, the most recognized partnership effort is community policing (although communitypolicing is not always called a partnership). Because of its high profile, community policing receives a greatdeal of attention in this chapter. After discussing the problems of defining community policing and identifyinghow community policing should work, the chapter turns to evaluating the effectiveness of community policingprograms and partnership initiatives.228
Community PolicingUnderstanding community policing requires some knowledge of the more traditional view of what thepolice are and what they should do. For most people, the formal police role is to answer calls about crime,undertake investigations, make arrests, and assist in the prosecution of offenders. Fighting crime (and crimeprevention) is primarily the responsibility of the police. Consequently, the police are often judged by the levelof crime in the community. Arrests are the benchmark by which the public judges police effectiveness.The police also are called on to provide order maintenance, that is, functions that do not deal with animmediate criminal action. Order maintenance includes responding to disabled autos, escorting funerals andparades, dealing with barking dogs, responding to false alarms and noise complaints, and delivering messages.Various studies show that these activities consume the majority of police time, with the police spendingroughly 20 percent of their time on actual law enforcement efforts (Kelling, 1978; Lab, 1984; Walker, 1983;Wilson, 1968). While critics argue that the police should not be involved in order-maintenance activities,Hoover (1992) argues that order maintenance is a key part of traditional policing and serves to keep societyfunctioning in an orderly fashion. As such, order maintenance enhances the law enforcement efforts of thepolice.Precursors to Community PolicingTrying to respond to all of the desires of the citizenry is not an easy task and is one possible reason for theinability of the police to control serious crime. Criticism of the police and the apparent failure of past policepractices to stem the crime problem have led to the introduction of different strategies. One approach was therevival of foot patrol. Research shows that foot patrol has had a mixed impact on crime (Bowers and Hirsch,1987; Esbensen, 1987; Police Foundation, 1981; Trojanowicz, 1983), although it appears to reduce the level ofcitizens’ fear and improve attitudes toward the police (Brown and Wycoff, 1987; Police Foundation, 1981;Trojanowicz, 1983). The police are also a key ingredient of both the establishment and maintenance ofneighborhood watch and citizen crime prevention initiatives. Underlying these activities has been therecognition that the police cannot solve crime on their own or address the increased calls for assistance by thepublic. The police need to build better relations with citizens and increase the involvement of citizens in crimeprevention and crime policy.Defining Community PolicingThe fact that elements of community policing appear in past practices demonstrates that communitypolicing is not a totally new idea, although the term “community policing” is a relatively new one. In addition,there has been a shift in the basic orientation of everyday police activity emerging under the rubric of“community policing.” This shift is from the traditional view of “crime fighting” through arrests to a view thatfighting crime involves a broader set of interventions.Arriving at a single definition of community policing has proved to be an elusive goal. While a singledefinition has not emerged, the various definitions found in Table 12.1 tap the essential elements offered bymost writers. Most of these definitions reflect the fact that community policing is more of a philosophy ofpolicing, rather than a clearly definable method (see, for example, Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Trojanowiczand Bucqueroux, 1989; Walker, 1999). Beyond the fact of this philosophical shift, the various definitions ofcommunity policing generally include several essential features. These are community involvement, problemsolving, a community base, and redefined goals for the police.Table 12.1 Definitions of Community Policing229
Weisel and Eck (1994, p. 51):A diverse set of practices united by the general idea that the police and the public need to become betterpartners in order to control crime, disorder, and a host of other problems.Wilkinson and Rosenbaum (1994, p. 110):“Community Policing” represents a fundamental change in the basic role of the police officer, includingchanges in his or her skills, motivations, and opportunity to engage in problem-solving activities and todevelop new partnerships with key elements of the community.Oliver (1998, p. 51):A systemic approach to policing with the paradigm of instilling and fostering a sense of community,within a geographical neighborhood, to improve the quality of life. It achieves this through thedecentralization of the police and the implementation of a synthesis of three key components: (1) theredistribution of traditional police resources; (2) the interaction of police and all community members toreduce crime and the fear of crime through indigenous proactive programs; and (3) a concerted effort toresolve the cause of crime, rather than the symptoms.Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (2006):Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services thatincludes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem solving, communityengagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls forservice with proactive problem solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Communitypolicing requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying andeffectively addressing these issues.Community InvolvementFirst, community policing requires cooperation between the police and other members of the community.The community members may be individual citizens, citizen groups, business associations, legislative bodies,and other local agencies (such as health departments, building inspectors, and community developmentoffices). Community involvement does not stop at the point of calling the police when something occurs.Instead, citizens must be involved in identifying and solving all sorts of community problems—not justcriminal acts.Problem SolvingThe emphasis on problem solving is perhaps the most important element of community policing. Ratherthan simply dealing with the crime that occurs through investigation and arrest, community policingchallenges officers to identify the underlying causes and contributors to the crime, and seek out solutions tothose problems. Community policing, therefore, sees crime as a symptom of more basic concerns. The policecan either deal with the symptom or try to address the ultimate cause. While law enforcement should do both,the community policing orientation shifts the primary attention to the underlying problems.This orientation also appears under the name problem-oriented policing. Problem-oriented policing meansapproaching issues and problems differently based on the uniqueness of each situation. This is a drastic shiftfrom the traditional view that the police should use the criminal code to respond to calls for service. If the codeprohibits the activity, the police can (and should) make an arrest and set the criminal justice system in motion.At best, this response will eliminate further criminal behavior through either its deterrent or incapacitativeeffect. Events that are not proscribed in the criminal code can be ignored. The problem-oriented approachargues that invoking the criminal code is only one avenue for dealing with societal issues. Instead, differentproblems require alternative solutions or interventions. The police, therefore, need to identify and pursue230
solutions to the root problem.The difference between problem-oriented policing and community policing is not always clear or great. Onepotential differentiating element is the explicit reliance on the community in community policing. This is notan absolute difference, because many “problem-oriented” approaches also rely on community involvement. Atthe same time, police sweeps and intensive patrol can be considered problem-oriented responses that do notneed or require citizen participation. Second, Hoover (1992) suggests that problem-oriented and communitypolicing differ in the duration of the police intervention. Problem-oriented policing involves sustained ordermaintenance focusing on specific problems and needs over a limited period. Conversely, community policingsets up the police as community managers who are involved in wide-ranging community issues over anextended period (Hoover, 1992). This distinction highlights the central role of the community in communitypolicing.Community BaseCritical to community policing is the decentralization of the police operation. Community policing typicallymeans assigning officers to a specific neighborhood. This may be done in a variety of ways, including theestablishment of neighborhood stations, storefront offices, foot patrol, and others. The assignments are longterm, with the expectation that the officers will intimately get to know the community, its problems, and itscitizens. Community policing assumes that the failure of the police to identify problems and relate to citizens,among others, is due to the distance that central stations and patrol cars place between officers and citizens.The daily interaction with the community should alert the officer to the problems and needs of the residents.The expected result is increased goodwill on the part of residents and an increased desire by citizens to assistand involve themselves with the police.Redefined GoalsThe fourth major element of community policing involves altering the goals of policing. In one sense, this isclosely allied to the idea of identifying and attacking the root causes of problems. At the same time, however,this could mean a great shift in how the police are judged. Most departments are judged, both by themselvesand the citizenry, in terms of the number of arrests made. Community policing initiatives, to the extent thatthey deal with underlying causes and involve officers in non-arrest activities, require that the department andofficers be held to different standards. In addition to arrests, community policing programs can be judged byreduced crime, the elimination of problem properties, increased feelings of safety, less neighborhood disorder,community cohesion, and many other outcomes. It is important to note that community policing shouldemphasize the ends, rather than the means to the ends. That is, instead of focusing on how things get done, theprimary concern is the elimination of the root problem.SummaryOther key features of community policing offered in the literature include a less rigid organizationalstructure, a focus on disorder, different training for officers, collaboration, de-emphasizing calls for service orarrests, and recognizing the complexity of criminal behavior (Carter, 1995; Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994; Hope,1994; Walker, 1999; Watson et al., 1998; Wilkinson and Rosenbaum, 1994). Many of these ideas are implicit inthe four major themes listed above. It is important to note that all of these ideas must work in unison. Justhaving one component, such as community offices, is not enough. Community policing requires fundamentalchanges in philosophy, strategy, and programming (Cordner, 1995).It is also possible to identify what community policing is not. Community policing is not police–communityrelations. While community policing should build better rapport and relations between the police and thepublic, that effort is not enough to qualify as community policing. Another common misconception is thatmoving police officers to foot patrol, storefront offices, or other methods of decentralization is the same as231
community policing. Unfortunately, unless there is a corresponding change in the other elements ofcommunity policing, these efforts only change the location of traditional policing. Community policing also isnot simply targeting a problem or location using traditional police techniques. These efforts may be new forthe police organization, but they do not involve other societal members in the problem solving. Indeed, manytraditional police activities can masquerade as community policing by shifting officers and using new names. Itis important, however, to make more fundamental changes in the organization’s operations.232
Problem IdentificationPerhaps the central task of any partnership is the identification of problems and their solutions. Eck andSpelman (1989) offer a four-step process for problem solving. These steps are referred to as SARA: Scanning,Analysis, Response, and Assessment. Scanning involves the identification of the problems, issues, and concernsin the community. This information may arise from the observations officers make as they work in thecommunity, from residents or businesses who bring problems to the officers, from other agencies (such asschools or hospitals) in the community, or from the systematic study of data and information on the area. Oneprimary method used in scanning involves computer-generated analyses of when and where crime occurs. Theanalysis of crime “hot spots” (Sherman, 1995) and the generation of crime maps represent two such attempts.Other efforts may involve the analysis of calls for service, systematic observation of the community, orsurveying citizens or community groups. In every case, the police should be working in partnership with othersto identify problems that need to be addressed.The second stage is the analysis of the problem. It is particularly important that more than just the police areinvolved in this activity. An array of individuals and agencies should participate in the analysis. For example,if drug dealing is centered in a house, apartment, or public housing building, the police, landlords, housingauthority personnel, the health department, and/or the city attorney need to be involved in the problemanalysis. If the drug activity centers on youths, it may be advisable to include the schools, probation office, oryouth groups in the process. The intent is to bring together a diversity of expertise and insight. This diversitywill bring different information and viewpoints and assist in understanding what factors are involved in theproblem.It is from this cooperative interaction that different responses will emerge. Who is involved in implementingthe response will vary greatly. In some cases the police may have little day-to-day involvement in theintervention because the identified response requires expertise and abilities that the police do not have. Anexample of this would be the use of civil litigation against owners of property where drug use is allowed tocontinue. While the police can deliver summonses, much of the work will be conducted by lawyers for thejurisdiction and other departments that can help to shut down the building (such as a health department).The final, but essential, step is assessment. Eck and Spelman (1989) note that this entire process can succeedonly if the interventions are evaluated for their effectiveness. This evaluation, however, is not meant simply asa means of gauging success. Rather, its importance is found in the feedback it provides to the process and toimproving (or altering) the intervention. A graphic depiction of the process can be seen in Figure 12.1.Variations on the SARA process or other systematic problem-solving processes that involve the communityare essential for community policing partnering. No matter what technique or approach is used, the effortrevolves around dealing with the causes of the problems, not the symptoms. Consequently, assessment of theintervention requires looking at more than just reduced crime, increased arrests, or other outcomes typicallyrelied on by the police.233
Figure 12.1 SARA Process Source: R.V. Clarke and J.E. Eck (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Washington, DC: Office of Community OrientedPolicing Services.234
Partnership Efforts and AssessmentPartnership programs have grown throughout the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and manyother countries. Under the heading of community policing, Wycoff (1995) reports that approximately 800 lawenforcement agencies in 1993 had implemented community policing in the United States. As of 2001, more than10,000 law enforcement agencies report more than 113,000 community police officers on duty in the UnitedStates (Zhao et al., 2002). Partnerships, however, appear under a variety of headings and involve police in awide range of capacities. These partnerships vary greatly, largely due to the emphasis on identifyinginterventions that address a specific problem. The following pages discuss various partnership initiatives.Community PolicingThe Chicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS) is perhaps the best example of successfully implementinga community-oriented policing approach. Chicago opted to move its entire police force into communitypolicing. CAPS began in five of the city’s 25 police beats in 1993 with the support of the police administrationand the mayor (Hartnett and Skogan, 1999). Key aspects of the program include assigning officers topermanent neighborhood beats, the involvement of residents in the identification of problems and potentialsolutions, and reliance on other agencies (both public and private) to address identified issues. Citizeninteraction is the cornerstone of the program and the police meet with neighborhood residents to engendermeaningful interaction. These meetings identify a wide range of local problems, including gangs, drugs,graffiti, burglary, and physical and social disorder (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997).As expected under community policing, CAPS responses vary from neighborhood to neighborhood.Improved police enforcement appears throughout the project and often focuses on drug problems. Efforts toclean up problem locations and generally improve the physical conditions of neighborhoods represent a majorinitiative in the program. The ability to improve the areas is directly related to the ability to mobilize other cityservices that are suited to those efforts. Mobilizing residents to provide surveillance, work with one another,call the police, and take other actions also appear throughout the project. These actions have successfullyreduced the signs of physical decay, impacted the extent of visible gang and drug activity, reduced area crimerates, and improved resident’s attitudes and assessments of the police and the city (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997).Unfortunately, CAPS is an exceptional case amid many others in which community policing is little more thana means to hire more officers and build good public relations.One of the reasons for this state of affairs is the fact that community policing programs rarely undergo anyform of rigorous impact evaluation. At best, evaluations tend to be process evaluations that look at the numberof community policing officers hired and put on the street, or the assignment of officers to “community” orneighborhood offices or beats, thus making them community police officers. Most evaluations fail to assess thedegree of problem solving taking place, the number and breadth of community members or agencies involvedin the problem identification and problem solving, or the changes in crime, fear, or disorder related to theproblem-solving efforts.Evidence does exist that the police can build cooperative partnerships with citizens and other agencies, butwhen outcome evaluations are completed, the results are typically modest. Zhao et al. (2002, 2003), analyzingthe impact of community policing, report that cities receiving community policing funds make a significantlygreater number of arrests and experience significantly lower levels of violent and property crimes. What theseanalyses do not reveal is the actual community policing activities and the types of partnering efforts that bringabout these changes. It does suggest, however, that community policing creates positive change.Hot Spots PolicingThe recognition that crimes often cluster in place and time has led to specific efforts to address that crime235
convergence, an approach called hot spots policing. Attacking hot spots requires analysis of the locale and thegeneration of interactions appropriate for the problem. This can include everything from traditional policing toproblem-oriented policing to situational crime prevention techniques. As illustrated in Chapter 10, theconfluence of crime by time and place means that prevention efforts have the potential to have a major impact.Numerous evaluations report positive results of hot spots policing. Braga and Bond (2008) compare differentproblem-oriented policing activities at 17 hot spots in Lowell, Massachusetts. Most of the interventions rely onsituational crime prevention techniques. Their analysis shows 20 percent fewer calls for service than in thecontrol areas not receiving services. More importantly, robbery is down by 40 percent, with burglary andassault down by 33 percent (Braga and Bond, 2008). Taylor et al. (2011), investigating violent crime hot spots inJacksonville, Florida, uncover mixed results. The authors compare three groups of hot spots: controls, thosereceiving saturation/directed police patrol, and those getting problem-oriented policing/situational crimeprevention. Compared to the control areas, the problem-oriented policing hot spots experience a significantdrop in violent crime. Interestingly, saturation/directed patrol hot spots show increased crime (Taylor et al.,2011).Another recent evaluation reports on the impact of hot spots policing in Philadelphia. Groff et al. (2015)conducted a randomized field experiment. The authors looked at the impact of problem-oriented policing(using the SARA approach), foot patrols, and offender-focused policing (targeting repeat offenders) in 60violent crime hot spots (with 20 hot spots randomly assigned to each condition) and 21 control hot spots. Theoffender-focused approach has the greatest impact, reducing crime by 42 percent. Neither the problem-orientedpolicing nor the foot patrols have a significant impact on crime (Groff et al., 2015). The authors claim thefailure of the problem-oriented policing activities may be due to poor implementation. Telep et al. (2014),studying proactive policing in Sacramento, California hot spots, report significant reductions in both calls forservice and Part I crime in experimental areas.Two reviews provide support for hot spots policing. A National Research Council review notes that hot spotspolicing is effective at reducing crime (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). A more recent meta-analysis also reportspositive results. Braga et al. (2014) identify 16 studies with data available for analysis. They report that 85percent of the results show that hot spots policing is effective when compared to control settings. Pooling theindividual study results, Braga et al. (2014) report a significant mean effect of hot spots policing. Problem-oriented policing approaches show twice the impact of traditional policing. The results of these reviews, alongwith individual study findings, show that hot spots policing is effective at reducing crime, although the extentof the impact varies by type of intervention and crime.Civil Abatement and InjunctionsAn interesting partnership for dealing with problems, particularly drug issues, involves the use of civilabatement and injunction procedures. Civil abatement uses mainly civil and administrative law and codes tocontrol locations and behavior at locations. These activities may involve landlords, citizens, healthdepartments, zoning boards, the police, and city/county attorneys. Injunctions involve court orders placingrules and/or restrictions on the behavior of individuals. Civil gang injunctions may prohibit gang membersfrom associating in public, marking territory, trespassing, loitering, or other similar activities (LA CityAttorney’s Office, 2009). The advent of these efforts can be traced to work in Portland, Oregon, in 1987 (Davisand Lurigio, 1998).Two notable areas in which abatement has been used involve gang behavior and drug offenses. In terms ofdrug crimes, abatement efforts seek to eliminate the use of locations for drug sales or drug use. Propertyowners can be fined, buildings can be confiscated or boarded up, tenants can be evicted, or structures can bedemolished as a result of abatement procedures (Mazerolle and Roehl, 1998). In terms of gang behavior,injunctions seek to ban gangs from congregating in public as a group, thus impacting offending behavior.Violating an injunction can result in arrest (O’Deane, 2012).Oakland’s Specialized Multi-Agency Response Teams (SMART) is a prime example of civil abatement.SMART relies on the cooperation of police, citizens, and other groups to solve neighborhood problems. Civilcourt remedies are a cornerstone of the project, although police enforcement and patrol are importantcomponents. In a series of reports, Mazerolle and her colleagues (Green, 1995b; Mazerolle and Roehl, 1999;236
Mazerolle et al., 1998) demonstrate the effectiveness of the program. One hundred target sites, divided evenlyinto experimental and control groups, formed the basis of the evaluation. At experimental sites, landlords werecontacted by police and received assistance (from the police and other agencies) in dealing with problemtenants, including evicting intransigent individuals. Civil proceedings could be brought against both thelandlords and the tenants. Data from calls for police service, interviews, and observations over more than threeyears reveal significant declines in signs of physical and social disorder, decreased drug sellers, and increasedlevels of civil behavior (Green, 1995b; Mazerolle and Roehl, 1999; Mazerolle et al., 1998). Control areas showedincreased problems or little change in key outcomes.Two other examples of civil abatement are San Diego’s Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) andProject TOUGH (Taking Out Urban Gang Headquarters) in Los Angeles. The Drug Abatement ResponseTeam (DART) works to compel landlords to take action against properties and tenants involved in drugoffending (Eck, 1998; Eck and Wartell, 1998, 1999). Project TOUGH (Taking Out Urban Gang Headquarters)does the same in relation to gang headquarters and other gang hangouts. Both programs seek to force ownersto take responsibility for their property. Cristall and Forman-Echols (2009) note that the use of civil suits is insome ways easier than invoking the criminal code because the burden of proof is “preponderance of evidence”rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt” and there is no right to jury trial. An evaluation of the DARTprogram using a randomized control trial in problem neighborhoods showed greatest improvement at fullDART intervention sites and the results persisted across a 30-month follow-up period. Evictions were moreevident in the treatment group, as were lowered levels of crime and drug problems (Eck, 1998; Eck and Wartell,1998, 1999).Injunctions have been used extensively to address gang problems, particularly in California. Project TOUGHutilizes injunctions to keep gang members away from certain properties and locations (Cristall and Forman-Echols, 2009). O’Deane (2012) compared 25 gang injunctions to 25 matched controls using one year pre- andpost-injunction data. Calls for service for Part I crimes fell almost 12 percent, and calls for service for Part IIcrimes fell almost 16 percent in the injunction areas (O’Deane, 2012). There was no decline in the control areas.Other research also reveals positive results in terms of reduced crime and fear in injunction target areas(Grogger, 2002; Maxson et al., 2004).These results show that civil abatement projects and injunctions can be successful at building coalitions ofcitizens and agencies that are effective at curbing the target problem. At the same time, however, civilabatement can be a long, cumbersome process, particularly if the property owner opts to fight the proceduresthrough the courts. Smith and Davis (1998) note that, while many landlords comply with abatement, there aresignificant costs associated with legal procedures, lost rental income, salaries for security guards, and otherinterventions. Consequently, landlords often oppose the programs and perceive themselves to be victims in theprocess. Injunctions require the identification of a specific problem, location, and remedy. In addition, thetargets of the injunction must be notified in order to be held accountable (O’Deane, 2012). Each of these factorscan pose problems for their use.CCP, SACSI, and PSNThree major U.S. initiatives for partnership building are the Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP),the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI), and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). Eachof these projects has similar features. The Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) was initiated in1994 as a partnership-building initiative to fight crime and improve the quality of life in communities (Bureauof Justice Assistance, 2001). Fifteen communities have participated in the project. The major key to CCP is touse a problem-solving approach that includes a wide array of community individuals, agencies, and groups. Ofparticular interest is to bring the individuals and groups most affected by crime into the project. Materialsavailable on the CCP spend a great deal of time describing the activities of the partnerships in each site, withspecial attention paid to the coalition-building activities (see Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2001; Kelling, 1998).Few of the sites provide outcome measures on changes in crime, and those that do generally fail to providedata for comparable control areas (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2001). It is not possible, therefore, to knowwhether the results are due to the CCP initiative or some other cause.The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) project was initiated in five sites in237
1998 to fight primarily violent personal crimes. The lead agency in the SACSI sites is the local U.S. Attorney’sOffice, which attempts to build a partnership consisting mainly of other criminal justice agencies. In addition,each partnership includes a local research team whose task is to analyze the problem in the community,participate in selecting the appropriate response, and evaluate the operations of the SACSI team. Local, state,and federal law enforcement agencies, probation and parole offices, local, state, and federal attorneys, andsocial service agencies form the primary core of participants. Most material available on the SACSI project isrestricted to process evaluations, which show that partnerships can be successfully established, although aconcerted effort is often needed to sustain them. One analysis of SACSI in St. Louis (Decker et al., 2005) didlook at reduction in the target behavior (gun crime) and notes that homicides decreased after the initiation ofthe project. An evaluation of the TimeZup SACSI program in New Haven uncovers decreased levels of violentgun crimes, calls for service, and numbers of guns seized. Other positive results included reduced fear of crimeand increased confidence in the police (Hartstone and Richetelli, 2005). An impact evaluation of Chicago’s PSNproject presents significant reductions in homicide, gun-related homicides, and aggravated assaults, althoughno impact on gang-related homicides (Papachristos et al., 2007). Finally, Rosenbaum and Roehl’s (2010) nationalevaluation of SACSI reveals decreases in homicide and violent crime in 10 program cities compared to all citiesof 100,000 population or more.The most recent federal effort at establishing partnerships to fight crime is the Project Safe Neighborhoods(PSN) project. Started in 2000, PSN can be considered an outgrowth of SACSI and it focuses primarily onreducing firearms violence (PSN, 2003). The project has five core components: partnerships, strategic plans,training, outreach, and accountability. Like SACSI, the project, led by the U.S. Attorney in each judicialdistrict, attempts to bring together law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies in order to focus onidentifying problems and initiating solutions. Each district is expected to have plans that fit the uniquesituation in the area. The public is involved mainly through an educational outreach plan. In an evaluation ofviolent crime trends in 82 PSN cities compared to 170 control cities, McGarrell et al. (2010) report a drop of 4.1percent in PSN cities and a .9 percent drop in the controls. This represents a statistically significant impact forPSN, with the results being more striking in PSN sites receiving a greater dosage of the programmaticintervention.On the Web The PSN project in Chicago maintains a web site that provides a great deal of information on itsactivities and impact. You can find out more about PSN on that site: http://psnchicago.org/Gun ViolenceSeveral partnerships have addressed gun violence, particularly among juveniles and gang members. Perhapsthe most well-known of these is Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. Begun in 1996, the project had several keyfeatures. Perhaps the most important feature was the creation of an interagency working partnership. The taskfor the group was to assess the nature of the gun problem and the dynamics of youth violence in Boston, andto identify and implement an effective intervention (Kennedy et al., 2001). The outcome of the planning was aset of interventions aimed primarily at gangs and gang members. Utilizing the manpower and resources of thepolice, probation, parole, and district attorney’s office, the project used a strict enforcement policy for allindividuals and groups involved directly or indirectly in gun violence. Dubbed “pulling levers,” the projectwould take any and all actions possible against violators. That meant that any gun violence would result in theimmediate arrest and full prosecution of violators. Probation and parole violators were vigorously prosecutedfor any violation of the conditions of their release. Gangs and gang members were notified of the project andthe potential consequences of their actions (Kennedy et al., 2001). Social service agencies and federal agencies(such as Immigration and Naturalization, which was used to deport non-citizen offenders) were also includedin the project.238
An evaluation of Operation Ceasefire shows overwhelming positive results. Braga et al. (2001) report a 63percent drop in monthly juvenile homicides after initiation of the project. Similarly, calls to the police aboutshots being fired decreased by 32 percent and there was a corresponding drop of 25 percent in assaults withguns (Braga et al., 2001). While it is not possible to claim that the drop in firearm offenses is due solely toOperation Ceasefire, there is reason to believe that the project was a major contributor to the declines.Operation Ceasefire has been replicated in other cities. In Los Angeles, among the groups participating in thepartnership were the local police departments, probation, parole, various prosecutors’ offices, communitycenters, job training programs, churches, and school groups. Tita et al. (2005) note that violent crime fell as aresult of the enforcement tactics, while a small change was found in gun and gang crime. Prevention measureshad little impact. Replication in Indianapolis finds similar positive outcomes. Corsaro and McGarrell (2009,2010) and McGarrell et al. (2006) report significant reductions in homicides, gang-related homicides, andhomicides among 15- to 24-year-olds. Atlanta focused on juvenile firearms violence and relied on similarpartners to those in the other programs. Both prevention and enforcement tactics appear in the project(Kellermann et al., 2006). The results, however, fail to show support for the program. Decreases in homicidecannot be attributed to the intervention (Kellermann et al., 2006). Despite the negative findings in Atlanta, it isevident that the “pulling levers” approach can be effective.Crime and Disorder PartnershipsThe passage of the U.K. Crime and Disorder Act in 1998 mandated the establishment of communitypartnerships to combat crime and related problems. These partnerships are meant to include the local policeand a variety of community constituencies, including housing authorities, victims, health professionals,probation officers, and others. Newburn (2002) notes that the goal is to address “multi-dimensional problemswith multi-dimensional responses.” Crime is not the only problem to be tackled, thus the need for wideparticipation by varied groups other than law enforcement. More than £925 million were spent fundingpartnerships between 1999 and 2005 (Ellis et al., 2007).A key component of the Crime and Disorder Act is that each partnership is to carry out a crime audit (datacollected for planning and evaluation purposes) every three years, based on data for the prior three years.Information should come from a variety of sources, such as police statistics, victimization surveys, probationdata, education, and environmental health. The police are required to consult with the partnership and use thedata to form prevention strategies and evaluate those strategies (Walklate, 1999). Several authors point out thatsome attempts to form partnerships have met with less than full success, the police are often the majorcontributor to the process, and the exact role of the participants is often poorly outlined (see, for example,Hughes, 2002; Phillips, 2002; Tierney, 2001). Hughes (2002) points out that many partnerships target crimes thatare easier to address (such as burglary) while ignoring more difficult crimes and social problems that areharder to change. A good deal of the published work about the Crime and Disorder Act examines the politicssurrounding the Act and the development of crime audits (see Crawford, 2001; Gilling, 2005; Hughes et al.,2002). The National Audit Office (2004) notes large reductions in reported crimes since the initiation ofpartnerships; however, it is not clear to what extent the partnerships caused the reductions. Consequently, it isunclear to what extent these new partnerships are having a significant impact on crime and disorder.Gang Suppression ProgramsIn the mid-1990s, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) initiated theCommunity-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Program. The program aimedto initiate a comprehensive set of strategies including suppression, opportunities provision, and socialinterventions. OJJDP funded program implementation and evaluation in five cities (Bloomington-Normal, IL;Mesa, AZ; Riverside, CA; Tucson, AZ; and San Antonio, TX). Each of the programs drew on the expertise oflaw enforcement, schools, employment organizations, and other social service agencies.Several factors emerge across the evaluations. First, several cities struggled with building programs thatincluded grassroots community organizations. Most of the participants remained official criminal justice239
agencies and other social service providers (Spergel et al., 2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Second, suppressionremains the primary response in at least three cities (Spergel et al., 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004b). Finally, the moresuccessful programs offered a wider array of activities that could be considered opportunities provision andsocial interventions, such as counseling, referrals, and job training.The program’s impact on gang membership and crime is also mixed. The evaluations of the Bloomington-Normal, Mesa, and Riverside programs report reduced offending and reduced arrests among youths in theexperimental neighborhoods (Spergel et al., 2001, 2002, 2003). While the Bloomington-Normal program appearsto have reduced the level of gang participation (Spergel et al., 2001), there was no apparent impact in Riverside,Tucson, or San Antonio (Spergel et al., 2003, 2004a, 2004b). Despite the mixed results of the programs, theevidence suggests that a successfully implemented program that targets a wider array of interventions than justsuppression activities has the ability to positively affect the level of gang crime and gang membership.Another major gang suppression initiative is the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI). Thisprogram was developed by the U.S. Department of Justice in response to the earlier “community-wide”program and PSN. As with the earlier initiative, CAGI seeks to build a coalition of agencies, including lawenforcement, prosecutors, social services, governments, community groups, schools, and others. CAGIaddresses enforcement, prevention, and reentry (McGarrell et al., 2012). A total of 12 cities received funding forprogram implementation.Based on the partnership approach, different CAGI cities utilize varied interventions. Directed police patrol,enhanced probation/parole supervision, active contact with gang members, enhanced enforcement, newservices for gang prevention, and educational programming are the most common activities (McGarrell et al.,2012). Evaluation of the program compared the CAGI sites to 249 comparable cities. Results show an 11.9percent decline in gun homicides the year after CAGI was initiated, with greater impact emerging in citieswith higher levels of enforcement (McGarrell et al., 2012). The authors note that the results vary by city, withsome reductions not achieving statistical significance. McGarrell and colleagues call for continued funding ofthese efforts and the use of expanded planning for the programs.Problems and ConcernsMany studies that show the potential positive impact of partnerships also demonstrate some stumblingblocks and weaknesses. Implementation is often a problem due to the change in philosophy being imposed onthe police (Bennett, 1994; Eck and Rosenbaum, 1994; Rosenbaum, 2002; Sadd and Grinc, 1994) and otherorganizations. Crawford (2001) notes that clear power differentials often exist between participants, whichmakes cooperation difficult and the participants cautious about their roles. There are also differences in thelevel and type of resources that the various partners can contribute, thus raising the possibility that those withgreater expertise and more resources have more input into the selection of problems and their solutions(Crawford, 2001; Tilley, 2005). Rosenbaum (2002) notes that some people are concerned that partnerships aredysfunctional and tend to act too slowly. Critics also claim that partnerships tend not to be truly representativeof the community, thus defeating the intended purpose of having community input (Rosenbaum, 2002). At thesame time, participants who are involved tend to develop a positive attitude toward partnership efforts(Rosenbaum, 2002; Skogan, 1995). While there remains a large number of evaluations questioning the efficacyof partnerships, the evidence appears to be turning in favor of partnership efforts. The key is to developsuccessful partnerships.240
Successful PartnershipsThe research on partnerships illuminates several keys to building successful partnerships (see Table 12.2).One of the most important factors is identifying and recruiting strong leaders and managers (Brown, 2006;Hedderman and Williams, 2001; Homel et al., 2004; Scott, 2006). These individuals are essential for maintainingfocus for the partnership and promoting enthusiasm over time. The failure to adequately identify the targetproblem and the appropriate intervention is a common problem. Building agreement is not an easy task(Homel et al., 2004; Kelling, 2005). Researching the problem to truly understand its extent and causes greatlyassists in building agreement, as well as subsequent activities (Kelling, 2005; Scott, 2006). Once the problem andintervention are identified, it is necessary to recruit qualified staff for implementing the project (Homel et al.,2004; Hedderman and Williams, 2001; Scott, 2006). Training and education of the various participants inpartnerships is essential to both the effectiveness of the efforts and their acceptance (Sadd and Grinc, 1996;Skogan, 1995; Skolnick and Bayley, 1988). Members of the partnership need to be educated about communityout-reach, coalition building, and problem identification.Table 12.2 Features of Successful Partnerships1. Identify strong leaders and managers2. Agree on the problem and intervention3. Recruit qualified staff4. Research the problem5. Build grass roots support6. Identify adequate funding and resources7. Provide good oversight of project implementation8. Evaluate the effortsSuccessfully proceeding with the intervention requires a number of other actions. Foremost among them isbuilding grass roots support in the community (Scott, 2006). Interventions have a better chance of success if thepublic cooperates rather than fights the efforts. Many partnership initiatives become unilateral activities by thepolice, or are poorly coordinated and implemented (Buerger, 1994; Moore, 1994; Sadd and Grinc, 1994, 1996;Skogan, 1995, 1996). Community support also contributes to identifying and securing adequate resources andfunding (Homel et al., 2004; Scott, 2006; Tilley, 2005). Without resources, projects cannot function. Once aproject is operating there is a need for good project oversight (Brown, 2006; Hedderman and Williams, 2001;Homel et al., 2004). A final key to success is including a meaningful process and impact evaluation (Scott,2006). This evaluation should be conducted by researchers or agencies not involved in the program delivery(Homel et al., 2004).On the Web The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing has produced a guide specifically addressing businesspartnerships. You can access it at http://www.popcenter.org/tools/partnering/241
242
SummaryA major argument underlying partnerships entails the fact that crime and community problems are beyondthe ability of the criminal justice system to solve by itself. The police and other criminal justice agencies needto partner with social service agencies, community groups, and the citizenry if they are to have an impact onthe underlying causes of crime. These collaborations have the potential to bring a wide array of new andinnovative ways of looking at problems, as well as proposing solutions to those problems. They also bringdifferent skills, abilities, and resources that can be used to implement the proposed solutions. Unfortunately, upto this point there have been relatively few good outcome evaluations conducted on community policing andpartnership initiatives. What has been produced are extensive process evaluations that point out the issues andconcerns with building and operating a coalition. The next step is to evaluate whether they have a significantimpact on crime and fear.Key TermsChicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS)civil abatementcommunity policingComprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI)Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP)Drug Abatement Response Team (DART)hot spots policinginjunctionsOperation Ceasefireorder maintenanceProject TOUGH (Taking Out Urban Gang Headquarters)problem solvingProject SafeNeighborhoods (PSN)pulling leversSARASpecialized Multi-Agency Response Teams (SMART)Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI)243
Chapter 13Drugs, Crime, and Crime PreventionChapter OutlineThe Scope of Drug UseSelf-Reported Drug UseDrug Use among Offending PopulationSummaryThe Drugs–Crime ConnectionDrug Use Causes CrimeCrime Causes Drug UseReciprocal RelationshipSpurious RelationshipSummaryInterventions and PreventionLaw Enforcement EffortsTreatment of Drug UsersPrevention ProgramsDrugs and Crime PreventionLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Provide insight to the extent of drug use in society and among offending populations.Demonstrate your knowledge of key sources of data on drug use.Diagram the possible relationships between drug use and crime, and discuss the evidence oneach.Tell what a psychopharmacological explanation of the drugs–crime relationship is.Identify different forms of drug treatment.Discuss NIDA’s principles of effective treatment.Talk about maintenance programs and their impact on drug use.Explain what a therapeutic community is and the extent of its effect.Define “detoxification” and relate its ability to affect drug use.Discuss NIDA’s principles of effective prevention.Discuss D.A.R.E. and its new version Keepin’ It REAL: what it is and what impact it has had.Explain the purpose behind education/information/knowledge programs and their impact ondrug use.The relationship between drug use and crime is a persistent concern in society. Since the mid-1970s, violentcrime stemming from the drug trade has been a regular feature on the evening news and in the print media.244
Graphic depictions of drug crimes pique the interest of both the public and the criminal justice system. Thefederal government responds to this concern by continuing its “war” on drugs. Efforts to reduce the supply ofdrugs are the primary means of attack in this war. This emphasis on supply reduction targets the drugs atvarious points—arrests of the street-level dealer, identifying and prosecuting the drug “kingpin,” and druginterdiction at the borders to the country. Less emphasis is placed (at least at the federal level) on the treatmentof substance abusers or the prevention of initial use.The issue of drug use is best addressed within the framework of secondary prevention. For manyindividuals, drug use itself is not a concern. Those who use drugs do so voluntarily. They purchase the drugand use it themselves. At no point do they forcibly make another individual use drugs. In this respect, drug useis a victimless crime. Both the offender and the victim are the same individual. Most individuals do not knowof anyone who uses illicit drugs on a daily basis, or at least are not aware that someone they know is a dailyuser. Consequently, actual drug use is not a concern. Societal concern arises from problems and issues relatedto drug use. For example, crimes committed to provide funds for drugs become a problem affecting more thanthe consensual user. There is now a clear victim. Similarly, society often bears the costs related to caring for auser’s family or handling addicted individuals. There is also evidence of pressure on youths to participate indrug use. Such pressure may force an impressionable individual into use and other related problems. The drugproblem, therefore, includes more than just the individual choice to use a drug.Drug use is one means of predicting or identifying potential problems in society. Targeting those involved indrug use may serve to alleviate the problems (crime and otherwise) that stem from drug use. As with manyinterventions, those tied to drug issues do not fall exclusively in the realm of secondary prevention. Efforts towork with current users are themselves tertiary in nature. Other methods aimed at preventing initial use maybe construed as primary prevention, especially if implemented on a broad scale. The fact that the actualconcern in dealing with drugs lies with the related crime and societal problems, however, means that drugissues are most properly dealt with in terms of secondary prevention.In discussions of the drug problem, there are a number of unresolved issues. The first deals with the actuallevel of drug use/abuse in society and changes in drug use over time. Second, implicit in the concern aboutdrug use is the assumption of a clear drug–crime connection. The common belief is that drug use causes othercriminal behavior. A third issue involves the effectiveness of different interventions. What impact do lawenforcement, treatment, and other preventive approaches have on the level of drug use and related crime?Answers to this question may suggest the proper means of dealing with drug use in the future.245
The Scope of Drug UseThe extent of drug use is somewhat difficult to gauge due to the difficulties of measuring private behavior.Unlike most other crimes, drug use has no victim independent of the offender—they are one and the same.Available data relies on self-reports of drug use in the general population or on information on knownoffenders. A discussion of both of these sources is presented below in order to gain some understanding aboutthe drug problem.Self-Reported Drug UsePerhaps the most well-known survey of drug use is the Monitoring the Future (MTF) project carried outby Johnston and associates. This project consists of surveying representative high school students (eighth,tenth, and twelfth graders), college students, and young adults (Johnston et al., 2014). “Young adults” refers tohigh school graduates within 10 years of leaving school. While the survey probes a variety of factors, the mostimportant set of information deals with the level and type of drug use. Table 13.1 presents information onlifetime, annual, and past-month drug use for high school seniors, college students, and young adults in 2013. Itcan be seen that drug use varies by type of drug.Looking at the data for all age groups in 2013, the most prevalent drug is alcohol. This is true for all threetime frames—lifetime, annual, and past month. Alcohol is used by roughly 70 percent or more of theindividuals over their lifetime, with 40 percent of twelfth graders and two-thirds of college students and youngadults claiming alcohol use during the past month. Marijuana is the next most prominent drug for all agegroups over all time periods. The remainder of the drugs are used by very few respondents. This is particularlypronounced in the “past-month” category, where 5 percent or less of any age group admits to use of any drugbesides alcohol or marijuana. While lifetime use is higher (as expected in light of the longer time frame) it isfrequent use that should be of greatest interest, thus the focus on the past-month category.Another source of information on drug use is the National Survey on Drug Use and Health which isconducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). This survey coversa representative sample of U.S.Table 13.1 Lifetime, Past Year, and Last 30 Days Drug Use by 12th Graders, College Students and Young Adults, 2013 (percentages)246
respondents aged 12 and older. Table 13.2 provides data for four adult age groups. As in the MTF, marijuana isthe most commonly used illicit drug across all age groups and time frames. Hallucinogens and cocaine are thenext most commonly used drugs, although the percentage claiming use drops significantly when consideringthe last-year or last-month time periods. For most drugs, few individuals report use in any time category.On the Web Data on drug use compiled by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administrationcan be examined at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUH.HTMThe figures in Tables 13.1 and 13.2 are interesting for several reasons. First, drugs that are of the mostconcern to society are used by very few individuals. Cocaine, crack, heroin, and the other drugs are not themost prevalent drugs in use. Alcohol, a legal drug for adults, is the most commonly used substance. Second,data based on drug use in the past year and last 30 days show the same depressed level of illicit drug useamong all groups of respondents. Lifetime and past-year use should not be used as an indicator of a drug“problem” because such use may simply reflect ordinary experimentation (Stephens, 1987). The low figures inthe tables suggest mainly experimental use of illicit drugs. Third, the use of most drugs has generally remainedstable with some small increases and decreases over time (trend data not shown). These self-report data suggestthat the drug problem (at least in terms of illicit drugs) is relatively minor, although the recent increases needto be carefully monitored.The self-report figures must be considered cautiously due to some inherent deficiencies. With the MTF datathere is a question of generalizability. The data are not representative of the entire population. The fact that thehigh school and college subjects are (or were) attending school ignores the fact that many youths drop out ofhigh school or do not go to college. Dropping out is especially great among inner-city youths, where the drugtrade appears to be most concentrated. Johnston et al. (1989) point out that roughly 15 to 20 percent of highschool students drop out and are not included in the survey each year, and that dropouts tend to use drugsmore often than non-dropouts. In a study of runaway/homeless youths, Fors and Rojek (1991) find that theseindividuals report two to seven times the level of substance use/abuse of school youths. These facts suggestthat the MTF data underreport the level of drug use.On the Web A wealth of information on substance use is available from the Monitoring the Future project.You can explore this information at http://www.monitoringthefuture.orgSelf-report figures, such as those presented here, suggest that the drug problem is not as serious as usuallypresented. Clearly, the use of illicit drugs is not running rampant in society. Few individuals use illicit drugswith even the grossest measure of regularity (within 30 days). Figures for daily use fall to almost zero for illicitdrugs. This is not to suggest that drugs are not a problem. Those who drop out appear to use drugs at aTable 13.2 Drug Use by Different Adult Age Groups, 2013 (percentages)247
much higher rate than high school graduates. Similarly, criminal offenders may be more involved in drugsthan non-offenders. The extent to which drugs are used by offenders can be examined through other sources ofinformation.Drug Use among Offending PopulationsIt is commonly assumed that many offenders are regular users of illicit drugs and that drug use is intricatelyrelated to the commission of crime. Support for such a contention comes from various studies of offenders. TheADAM II (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program provides in-depth information on drug use byoffenders in 10 cities. The original ADAM program was an expansion of the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF)program sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, which began in 1987. ADAM II is a scaled-downversion of the original ADAM program, which gathered data in 35 cities.Arrestees voluntarily agree to be interviewed and give a urine sample for testing. The urinalysis is tested for10 different drugs (including cocaine, opiates, marijuana, methadone, benzodiazepine (Valium), phencyclidine(PCP), propoxyphene (Darvon), barbiturates, and amphetamines). All information is anonymous. The dataprovide information on the type of drug use, changes in use over time (data are collected quarterly), the ageand race distribution of users, and arrest charges related to different drugs (Office of National Drug ControlPolicy, 2012). See Table 13.3.Table 13.3 Percent of Arrestees Testing Positive for Select Drugs, 2011248
ADAM II results for 2011 show that drug use is very common among arrestees. Urinalysis reveals that betterthan 60 percent of all arrestees test positive for recent drug use of any type. In five cities, greater than 70percent test positive for some drug type. Cocaine and marijuana are the most prevalent drugs according to testresults. Drug use also varies from city to city. Data from the British ADAM program shows that 69 percent ofarrestees test positive for drug use and 58 percent report alcohol use (Holloway and Bennett, 2004).On the Web Additional ADAM II data is available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/arrestee-drug-abuse-monitoring-programDrug use figures are also available for inmates of correctional institutions and those in court. Mumola andKarberg (2006) note that over one-quarter of federal inmates and almost one-third of state prisoners reportcommitting their offenses while using drugs. Additionally, over half of the prisoners report drug use in themonth before offending Sickmund et al. (2013) report that roughly 7 percent of the youths in residentialfacilities are there due to drug-related offenses, while juvenile court statistics show roughly 165,000 youthsentered court for drug law violations in 2010 (Puzzanchera and Hockenberry, 2013).These figures, based on offending populations, provide a more serious picture of drug use than those fromsurveys of the general population. As with the other data, there are potential problems to keep in mind. First,this information reflects only the individuals who are caught by the system. It is possible that the use of drugsincreases the risk of apprehension for these offenders. Those not apprehended may not use drugs, or at leastnot at the same level. Second, the ADAM II data reflect drug use in 10 major urban areas. Consequently, theresults are only generalizable to other comparable large cities. Drug use probably differs between large andsmall communities, just as crime differs.SummaryThe data on drug use, both from self-reports of the general population and from offending groups, providevaluable information. The general population data suggest that illicit drug use is not as widespread as themedia portrays. Most drug use appears to be experimental or occasional in nature. The data on offenders pointout that drug use is common among those who are apprehended for crimes. While not necessarilyrepresentative of all offenders, those who are caught make up a large group of individuals. The results,therefore, should not be dismissed simply due to low clearance rates or lack of representativeness. Drug usemay be considered a risk factor in other criminal behavior. That is, the use of drugs may be a predictor of otherdeviant activity. This fact receives further support when considering the relationship between drug use andcrime, which is taken up next.249
The Drugs–Crime ConnectionThe connection between drug use and crime has received a great deal of attention. A simple inspection ofdata reveals a strong correlation between drugs and crime. Situations in which many of the offenders testpositive for drug use provide a strong basis for claiming a causal relationship. Simple correlations, however, arenot enough to establish clear evidence of causation.The relationship between drug use and crime has been hypothesized to take a variety of forms. White (1990)outlines four possible models for the relationship (see Figure 13.1). First, drug use causes criminal activity.Second, criminal activity causes drug use. Third, there is a reciprocal relationship in which both drug use andcriminal activity cause one another. Finally, the relationship between the two is spurious with other factors(possibly the same ones) causing drug use and crime. Various studies have attempted to untangle which causalsequence is correct.Figure 13.1 Possible Relationships Between Drug Use and Delinquency The first model attempts to show that drugs cause the user to commit other crimes. Crime may be the resultof a psychopharmacological reaction, economic need, or simple participation in the drug trade (Goldstein,1989). The psychopharmacological explanation suggests that various drugs have a direct impact on the user,both physically and psychologically, which impels the individual to act in such a way that society deemsunacceptable. The intent of the individual may not be to commit a crime. The drug simply determines theaction, which may or may not be criminal. The economics of drug use can also lead to deviance. The increasingneed for money to secure drugs can lead to property crimes. Various studies show that drug users are ofteninvolved in property offenses (Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Chaiken and Chaiken, 1982; Collins et al., 1985;Harrison and Gfroerer, 1992; Johnson et al., 1985, 1988; National Institute of Justice, 1990). Participation in druguse also may lead to systemic violence (Goldstein, 1989). Systemic violence refers to violence resulting fromcompetition among drug dealers, retaliation for poor drug quality or high prices, robbery of drug dealers orusers, and other factors related to the drug trade. Using New York City data, Goldstein et al. (1992) report that74 percent of all drug-related homicides are due to systemic factors of the drug trade. To the extent that crimefits one of these categories, the first model finds qualified support. Of the three potential arguments, thepsychopharmacological explanation is the most difficult to prove and has been criticized for ignoring evidencethat much drug use actually reduces physical action and violent tendencies, and only appears in interactionwith specific dispositions and social/cultural settings (McBride and Schwartz, 1990). The economic andsystemic arguments require attention to the temporal order in the drugs–crime relationship.250
Drug Use Causes CrimeStudies claiming support for drug use causing crime typically rely on studies of drug addicts or high-rateusers of drugs. Ball et al. (1983), studying 354 heroin addicts, note that their crime rate is four to six timeshigher when they are actively using drugs. Similarly, Collins et al. (1985) report that daily heroin/cocaine userstend to commit property offenses at a substantially higher rate than weekly users or non-users. Drug use,especially involving expensive drugs and drug habits, necessitates the commission of “income-generatingcrimes” in order to maintain the pattern of use (Collins et al., 1985). Anglin and Hser (1987) and Anglin andSpeckart (1988) note that arrests and self-reported crimes increase at the onset of first narcotics use and firstdaily use, and decrease at last daily use. Use also declines during treatment and increases when subjects leavetreatment (Anglin and Hser, 1987; Anglin and Speckart, 1988). Huizinga et al. (1994) note that changes insubstance abuse precede changes in the levels of other delinquent activity.Crime Causes Drug UseThe second possibility is that involvement in crime causes drug use. Numerous studies suggest thatinvolvement in criminal behavior precedes drug use. Using longitudinal data on almost 2,000 high schoolgraduates in the Youth in Transition project, Johnston and associates (1978) report that general delinquencypredates most drug use. The authors argue that youths turn to drug use as an extension of other deviantbehavior. Data from the National Youth Survey (NYS), an ongoing longitudinal panel study, reveal essentiallythe same result. Information on delinquency, drug use, and demographic factors for the first six waves of datacollection (1976 to 1983) shows a general progression in behavior starting with minor delinquency and leadingto alcohol use, index offenses, marijuana use, and polydrug use, in that order (Huizinga et al., 1989). Except forthe early appearance of alcohol, illicit drug use temporally follows delinquent/criminal behavior. Indeed, theauthors note that minor delinquency precedes polydrug use 99 to 100 percent of the time (Huizinga et al., 1989).Chaiken and Chaiken (1990), examining data from the NYS, a survey of prison inmates, and a sample of NewYork City drug addicts, note that delinquency predates drug use at least 50 percent of the time. The samepattern of drug use following delinquency is reported by Inciardi et al. (1993) in a study of serious inner-citydelinquents. Other authors (Anglin and Hser, 1987; Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Elliott and Ageton, 1981; Elliottet al., 1989; Hunt, 1990; Johnson et al., 1985) also note that drug use follows crime. The typical explanation forthis finding is that drug use is simply another form of deviant behavior, and involvement withdelinquency/criminality provides resources and contacts necessary for entering into drug use.Reciprocal RelationshipGiven the studies reporting a different sequencing in the drugs–crime relationship, it is plausible to arguethat the actual relationship is reciprocal. That is, criminal activity leads to drug use and drug use leads tocriminal activity. Support for a reciprocal relationship can be found in many studies. Nurco et al. (1988) notethat addiction increases crime by “previous offenders.” Studies of drug addicts typically relate that arrests“increase” after drug use or intensified use, leading to the conclusion that the subjects committed offenses priorto that point in time (Anglin and Hser, 1987; Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Collins et al., 1985). Hunt (1990) pointsout that, while prostitution increases with drug use, a substantial number of female drug users participated inprostitution and other offenses prior to drug use. Finally, van Kammen and Loeber’s (1994) analysis of data forPittsburgh youths shows that property offending predicts the onset of drug use, although drug use escalates thecommission of personal crime. It would appear that, regardless of which came first, drug use and crime maycontribute to each other. Drug use leads to crime and crime leads to drug use.Spurious RelationshipThe argument that seems to be gaining the strongest support is the claim that the relationship between drug251
use and delinquency is spurious. This simply means that, while use and crime exist at the same time and varyin a similar fashion, neither is the ultimate cause of the other. Rather, they are caused by either the samecommon factors or by different factors. Huba and Bentler (1983) and Kandel et al. (1986) claim that there is nocausal relationship between drug use and crime. Rather, these two sets of behavior are caused by other similarfactors. White et al. (1987), using self-report data for almost 900 youths, point out that there are commoncauses of delinquency and drug use. Foremost among these factors are peer and school influences. The sameanalysis of the NYS data, which points out a sequence of behavior beginning with minor offending and endingwith polydrug use (Huizinga et al., 1989), concludes that the actual cause of the behaviors probably lies with acommon set of spurious influences. Other research leads to the same conclusion (Collins, 1989; Elliott et al.,1979, 1985; Fagan and Weis, 1990; Hawkins and Weis, 1985; Kandel et al., 1986; Loeber, 1988; White, 1990).SummaryThe fact that drug use is related to criminal activity cannot be disputed. The causal relationship, however, isunclear. The inability to definitively identify a causal sequencing does not render the relationship useless tocrime prevention. A strong correlation between the two behaviors means that drug use can be used as apredictor of other criminal behavior (Elliott and Huizinga, 1984; Kandel et al., 1986; Newcomb and Bentler,1988). The research cited above also suggests that each behavior contributes to the other, thereby providinginsight for intervention and treatment. It may be possible to attack crime by attacking drug use. Certainly,targeting drug users for intervention means dealing with those who are at higher risk of participating in othercriminal activities. Intervening with drug users will also reduce crime to the extent to which drug use doescontribute to criminal activity.252
Interventions and PreventionInterventions aimed at limiting drug use and related crime take a variety of forms. Most of the approachesfall under three general areas—law enforcement, treatment, and prevention. The great number and diversity ofpossible responses to the drug–crime problem cannot be adequately discussed in the space available. Indeed,some of the proposed solutions do not fit in the present discussion. The following discussion, therefore, issomewhat selective. Among the topics not covered here (or covered in abbreviated fashion) are efforts at druginterdiction and foreign policy issues, targeting organized crime, drug testing, decriminalization, andlegalization. While each of these topics is worthy of discussion, they are beyond the scope of the present work.Law Enforcement EffortsThe current “drug war” is primarily an effort that uses law enforcement techniques as the primary weaponagainst drug use. This is evident in the federal government’s budgetary priority favoring law enforcement overtreatment or prevention programs. Underlying law enforcement actions is the assumption that drug use andrelated crime can be limited or eliminated by supply reduction. Taking drugs off the street will make it moredifficult for users to locate the drugs and, if the drugs can be found, the price will be driven so high that manypotential users will simply abstain. In essence, these approaches assume that the demand for drugs is a factor ofthe supply.Police crackdowns on drug availability are common responses. New York City’s Operation Pressure Pointinvolved saturating the Alphabet City area on the Lower East Side of Manhattan with police officers andresources. Drug buyers could shop around different dealers, often in plain view, in order to secure the bestprice and quality in the area (Zimmer, 1987). The police operation was credited with thousands of arrests, theelimination of the drug supermarket, and significant reductions in robbery, burglary, and homicide (Kleiman,1988). Unfortunately, the program led some dealers and buyers to find new means for doing business (i.e.,displacement) and the program lasted only as long as the police maintained their heightened presence (Johnsonet al., 1990; Kleiman and Smith, 1990). Similar results appeared in an evaluation of a police crackdown in Lynn,Massachusetts.The fact that gangs are becoming more involved in drug use and sales (Fagan, 1989) has led variousjurisdictions to jointly target gangs and drugs. Los Angeles’s Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums(CRASH) program is a prime example of police targeting of gang behavior. These efforts, however, have yet toshow an impact on the drug problem or other gang behavior, including gang homicides (Kleiman and Smith,1990). As noted in the last chapter, the police also have been intimately involved in abatement programs thattarget drug locations.The size and scope of the drug problem appear to be more than basic police enforcement can handle.Attacking the retail level of the drug chain may result in many arrests but will probably have little impactbeyond overburdening the already overcrowded criminal justice system (Belenko, 1990). Similarly, assumptionsthat law enforcement efforts will significantly reduce the supply of drugs for any long period are ill-conceived.There is a need for an accompanying reduction in the demand for drugs.Treatment of Drug UsersDrug treatment can take a wide variety of forms and may involve greatly divergent approaches. Research ontreatment programs has provided some insights regarding what is most effective. The National Institute onDrug Abuse (NIDA) offers a list of 13 principles of effective treatment (see Table 13.4). These principles addressthe general issues that can be applied across different programs in ways that respond to the unique needs of theclients. The wide array of factors contributing to drug use/abuse means that treatment needs tocomprehensively address the problems. Figure 13.2 provides a comprehensive model for drug abuse treatment.253
Table 13.4 NIDA’s 13 Principles of Effective Treatment for Drug Abuse1.Addiction is a complex but treatable disease that affects brain function and behavior2.No single program is appropriate for all individuals.3.Treatment needs to be readily available.4.Effective treatment attends to multiple needs of the individual.5.Remaining in treatment for an adequate period of time is critical.6.Behavioral therapies—including individual, family, or group counseling—are the most commonlyused forms of drug abuse treatment.7.Medications are an important element of treatment for many patients, especially combined withcounseling and other behavioral therapies.8.An individual’s treatment and services plan must be addressed continually and modified as necessaryto ensure it meets his changing needs. Addicted or drug-abusing individuals with coexisting mentaldisorders should have both disorders treated in an integrated way.9.Many drug-addicted individuals also have other mental disorders.10.Medically assisted detoxification is only the first stage of addiction treatment and by itself does littleto change long-term drug abuse.11.Treatment does not need to be voluntary to be effective.12.Drug use during treatment must be monitored continuously, as lapses during treatment do occur.13.Treatment programs should test patients for the presence of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B and C,tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases, as well as provide targeted risk-reduction counseling,linking patients to treatment if necessary.Source: NIDA (2012). Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-based Guide, Third Edition. Washington, DC: National Instituteon Drug Abuse. Retrieved from http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/what-drug-addiction-treatmentMost interventions can be grouped into one of four general types. These are maintenance programs,detoxification, therapeutic communities, and outpatient drug-free programs. While each of these groupingspromotes a different major emphasis, many similarities and common features appear across the programs. Forexample, counseling and therapy of one sort or another appear in virtually all of the programs. A recentinnovation has been the establishment of drug courts. Each of these will be briefly examined below.254
Figure 13.2 Components of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Treatment Source: NIDA (2012). Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-Based Guide, Third Edition. Washington, DC: National Institute onDrug Abuse. Retrieved from http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/what-drug-addiction-treatmentMaintenance ProgramsMaintenance programs, a common intervention for addicted individuals, seek to establish a steady state inwhich the individual does not experience withdrawal symptoms when the drug begins to wear off.Consequently, the user will be able to function more normally and participate in everyday activities withoutthe constant need for the drug (Stephens, 1987). The most common form of maintenance program ismethadone maintenance. This involves the provision of methadone to heroin/opiate addicts. Methadone is anoral substitute for heroin, which needs to be taken only once in a 24-hour period. Over time, those onmaintenance will no longer experience the highs and lows of addiction to other drugs. A primary assumptionunderlying these programs is that the patient is unable to function without some form of drug use and thatmethadone is an acceptable substitute for other, more damaging drugs.Most methadone maintenance programs include a variety of components. Periodic urinalysis is used tocheck that patients are not using other drugs while receiving methadone. Counseling, both individual andgroup, along with guidelines for behavior and sanctions for violations, is common (Anglin and Hser, 1990).Some programs attempt to slowly detoxify their patients. That is, they attempt to reduce the methadone dosageand wean the subjects from the need for any drug use. The level of these various components, however, variesgreatly from program to program (Ball et al., 1986).On the Web The National Institute on Drug Abuse provides a great deal of information on drugs and drugtreatment interventions. You can access this information at http://www.drugabuse.gov/related-255
topics/treatment-researchEvaluations of the effectiveness of methadone maintenance programs show generally positive results (NIDA,2012). Various researchers (Anglin and McGlothlin, 1984; Ball et al., 1987; Hser et al., 1988) report thatmethadone patients use fewer illicit drugs, commit fewer crimes, and are arrested less often than when not onthe program. Additionally, the termination of methadone maintenance shows a return to pre-program levels ofdrug use and criminal activity (Anglin et al., 1989; McGlothlin and Anglin, 1981). It would appear from theseresults that maintenance is a feasible approach to the drug–crime problem. The programs, however, are notwithout critics. Stephens (1987) points out that these programs are applicable only to narcotics and ignore themuch larger numbers of other drug users. Additionally, the patients are often non-productive and on welfare.They do not necessarily re-enter the job market and become productive societal members. Anglin and Hser(1990) further point out that the research typically fails to use adequate control groups. The results, therefore,are subject to much criticism.DetoxificationClosely related to maintenance programs is detoxification. Detoxification uses drugs in a short-termprogram of controlled withdrawal. The basic idea is to wean the client from the addiction with the minimalamount of discomfort and pain. These types of programs can be found in many hospitals and facilitiesthroughout the country, and target a wide range of drugs from alcohol to heroin. Detoxification needs to beaccompanied with counseling, referral, or other services to address the social, psychological, and related issuesto the abuse (NIDA, 2012). Anglin and Hser (1990) point out that while short-term follow-up shows thatdetoxification is successful at eliminating drug use, detoxification has not been adequately evaluated over thelong-term. Bellis (1981) notes that detoxification is used by some addicts to reduce the need for massiveamounts of a drug in order to get high. The detoxification simply allows the addict to start the cycle ofaddiction over again by achieving a high with smaller amounts of the drug.Therapeutic CommunitiesTherapeutic communities emphasize providing a supportive, highly structured atmosphere within whichindividuals can be helped to alter their personality and develop social relationships conducive to conformingbehavior (Anglin and Hser, 1990). These residential programs operate as surrogate families for clients. In manycases, therapeutic communities are run by current or past clients. The daily routine is often very structured andincludes intensive group sessions. Programs may also include education, vocational training, or mandatoryemployment (NIDA, 2012). Examples of therapeutic communities are Synanon, Daytop Village, and PhoenixHouse.The research on therapeutic communities consistently show lowered drug use and criminal activity (Anglinand Hser, 1990; Coombs, 1981; DeLeon, 1984; DeLeon and Rosenthal, 1989).The Integrated Multi-PhasicProgram Assessment and Comprehensive Treatment (IMPACT) program deals with single, unemployed,minority males with long criminal histories. The program results indicate that recidivism is tied to the lengthof treatment, with longer treatment resulting in lower recidivism (Swartz et al., 1996). Inciardi (1996) reports onthe KEY program, which is a prison-based therapeutic community in Delaware. Both six- and 18-monthfollow-up data show that many more program clients remain drug- and arrest-free than do control groupclients (Inciardi, 1996). These studies bolster the claims of program success.Outpatient Drug-Free ProgramsOutpatient programs often resemble therapeutic communities in most respects except for the residentialcomponent. Individual and group counseling is the cornerstone of these programs and may involveprofessionals or simply other group members. Social skills training, vocational programming, social interaction,256
referral to other sources of assistance, and possibly short-term drug maintenance are also common components(Anglin and Hser, 1990). Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous are well-known examples of thistype of program. The impact of these programs is highly questionable. The primary concern with mostevaluations is the fact that clients can drop out at any time. These outpatient programs are more likely to sufferfrom client mortality than are other interventions (Anglin and Hser, 1990). Hubbard et al. (1984) note that theprograms have a marginal impact on crime due to their open nature. Evaluations based only on thoseindividuals who remain in treatment may result in artificially high success rates. The actual success based onall clients who enter the program, whether they complete or not, would be less impressive.On the Web Additional information and discussion of drug treatment can be found on the NIDA web site athttp://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/what-drug-addiction-treatmentSummary and Further CommentsIt is generally accepted that most forms of treatment are effective at reducing the use of and need for drugs(Fareed et al., 2011; Visher, 1990). Indeed, Simpson and Sells (1982), studying data from the Drug AbuseReporting Program (DARP), report that all four types of treatment (maintenance, therapeutic communities,out-patient, and detoxification) achieve lower drug use, lower criminal behavior, and improved employmentstatus from four to six years after treatment. These results are significantly different than for a non-treatmentcontrol group. Research also suggests that, while forced treatment has less impact than voluntary treatment(Anglin, 1988; DeLong, 1972; Maddux, 1988), it does reduce the daily use of drugs and criminal activity (Anglinand McGlothlin, 1984). Thus, the new drug courts should be able to affect drug use and related criminalbehavior. The impact of court-ordered programs may be attributable to the longer time spent in treatmentwhich is typical of these programs (Visher, 1990). At the very least, the impact of enforced treatment providesfurther support to the claim that treatment has a positive impact on use and crime.Prevention ProgramsPrevention programs that aim to keep individuals from initially using drugs (primary prevention) usuallytarget juveniles. It is during adolescence that most people experiment with and enter into patterns of drug use.Prevention modalities cover a range of issues and approaches, including the dissemination of factualinformation about drugs and their consequences, the building of self-esteem, taking responsibility for makingchoices, and learning how to handle peer pressure. Most often, prevention programs incorporate more than oneapproach. In a similar fashion to treatment programs, NIDA outlines 16 principles for effective preventionprograms (see Table 13.5). The following discussion is divided into the two most prominently promoted andevaluated prevention techniques. These are the information/education/knowledge programs and the resistanceskills techniques.On the Web As with treatment topics, the National Institute on Drug Abuse provides a great deal ofinformation on prevention activities. You can access this information athttp://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/lessons-prevention-research257
Education/Information/Knowledge ProgramsEducation/information/knowledge programs focus their efforts on providing subjects with factualinformation about drugs, drug use, and the consequences of drug use. Such programs attempt to teach subjectsabout the different drugs, how they work, andTable 13.5 NIDA’s 16 Principles of Effective Prevention for Drug Abuse1.Prevention programs should enhance protective factors and reverse or reduce risk factors.2.Prevention programs should address all forms of drug abuse, alone or in combination, includingunderage use of legal drugs; the use of illegal drugs; and the inappropriate use of legally obtainedsubstances, prescription medications, or over-the-counter drugs.3.Prevention programs should address the type of drug abuse problem in the local community, targetmodifiable risk factors, and strengthen identified protective factors.4.Prevention programs should be tailored to address risks specific to population or audiencecharacteristics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity.5.Family-based prevention programs should enhance family bonding and relationships and includeparenting skills; practice in developing, discussing and enforcing family policies on substance abuse;and training in drug education and information.6.Prevention programs can be designed to intervene as early as infancy to address risk factors for drugabuse, such as aggressive behavior, poor social skills and academic difficulties.7.Prevention programs for elementary school children should target improving academic and social-emotional learning to address risk factors for drug abuse.8.Prevention programs for middle or junior high and high school students should increase academicand social competence.9.Prevention programs aimed at general populations at key transition points, such as the transition tomiddle school, can produce beneficial effects even among high-risk families and children.10.Community prevention programs that combine two or more effective programs can be more effectivethan a single program alone.11.Community prevention programs reaching populations in multiple settings are most effective whenthey present consistent, community-wide messages in each setting.12.When communities adapt programs to match their needs, community norms, or differing culturalrequirements, they should retain core elements of the original research-based intervention.13.Prevention programs should be long-term with repeated interventions to reinforce the originalprevention goals.14.Prevention programs should include teacher training on good classroom management practices suchas rewarding appropriate student behavior.15.Prevention programs are most effective when they employ interactive techniques, such as peerdiscussion and parent role-playing, that allow for active involvement in learning about drug abuseand reinforcing skills.16.Research-based prevention programs can be cost-effective.Source: NIDA (2014). Drug Facts: Lessons from Prevention Research. Washington, DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Retrieved fromhttp://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/lessons-prevention-researchtheir effects on the user. Information may also include data on the extent of drug use and what happens if anindividual is caught and processed in the criminal justice system. The basic assumption is that such knowledgewill allow the individual to make an informed choice about drug use. Proponents assume that, armed withthese facts, most individuals will opt to avoid drugs.Evaluations provide mixed results concerning these programs. Botvin (1990) points out that these programsare effective at increasing subjects’ knowledge about drugs. Schaps et al. (1986) also claim that drug educationreduces the use of alcohol and marijuana by females but has no impact on comparable males. The change inuse, however, is short-lived and no effect is noted one year after the program ended. Tobler (1986), analyzing258
results from 143 drug prevention programs for youths, notes that information (knowledge) techniques have noimpact on behavior. Other authors (Abadinsky, 1989; Botvin, 1990; Botvin and Dusenbury, 1989; Eiser andEiser, 1988; Hanson, 1980; Kinder et al., 1980; Swadi and Zeitlin, 1987; Weisheit, 1983) report similar negativeresults and even suggest that the knowledge leads many youths to experiment with drugs in order to “find outfor themselves” about drugs. The programs appear to pique the curiosity of some youths and prompt anincreased, rather than decreased, use of drugs.Resistance Skills TrainingResistance skills training comes under a variety of names with the most well-known being the “Just Say No”campaign and the D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) program. While many individuals view thisas too simplistic an approach, resistance skills training involves a set of ideas dealing with recognizingproblematic situations and issues, dealing with peer pressure, recognizing pressure from media presentations,knowing proper responses to temptations, building self-esteem and assertiveness, and knowing how and whento take a stand. The implicit assumption in this type of prevention is that drug use is largely a function ofsituation and peer involvement. Youths need to learn how to recognize peer pressure and how to make properdecisions in the face of that pressure. These programs may also provide factual information about drugs withinthe larger discussion of resisting temptations to participate in drug use. A key part of any informationpresented deals with the actual levels of use in society, emphasizing the fact that most individuals do not useillicit drugs. This provides youths with data that say they are in the majority if they resist drugs.Research on the impact of resistance skills training is mixed. Botvin and associates have conducted a seriesof studies on the impact of Life Skills Training (LST) on subsequent tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana use(Botvin and Eng, 1980, 1982; Botvin et al., 1980; Botvin et al., 1983; Botvin et al., 1984). The reports show thatthe LST program is successful at reducing the number of youths who smoke, drink, and use marijuana. Theprogram appears to be most effective at reducing the use of tobacco (Botvin and Dusenbury, 1989). Thelongevity of the impact may be somewhat at issue with the longest follow-up being only two years. Otherstudies have reported similar positive results, especially for tobacco use (Botvin, 1990; Luepker et al., 1983;McAlister et al., 1980; Telch et al., 1982).Perhaps the most recognized intervention is D.A.R.E. Begun in Los Angeles in 1983, D.A.R.E. targetselementary school youths through a police-officer-taught curriculum. In recent years D.A.R.E. has expanded tojunior and senior high schools, as well as implementing a parent program. An estimated 22,000 police officersin 7,000 communities have taught D.A.R.E. to more than 25 million elementary school students since theprogram’s inception (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1995). Various methodologically rigorous evaluations of theoriginal D.A.R.E. program fail to find any significant impact on drug use behavior. Ringwalt et al. (1991),Clayton et al. (1991), and Rosenbaum et al. (1994), looking at schools from different jurisdictions, all report noimpact on substance use. In a recent evaluation, D.A.R.E. participants and control youths were tracked formore than a six-year period to assess the impact of the program. Rosenbaum and Hanson (1998) conductedsurveys twice a year in order to consider the influence of D.A.R.E., other programs, dropping out, and otherfactors that could alter the results. The authors report that D.A.R.E. had little impact on attitudes, beliefs, orsocial skills directly addressed by the program. More importantly, D.A.R.E. had no significant impact on anymeasure of drug use. For suburban subjects, there was some evidence of higher drug use among D.A.R.E.participants (Rosenbaum and Hanson, 1998). Wysong et al. (1994) also found no impact in a similarlongitudinal analysis.On the Web Information on the new D.A.R.E. program—Keepin’ It REAL can be found athttp://www.kir.psu.edu259
Due partly to these negative evaluations, D.A.R.E. has been reimaged as Keepin’ It REAL. This 10-sessioncurriculum is still taught to children and adolescents in schools by law enforcement officers. The focus of theprogram is on resistance skills. REAL stands for Refuse, Explain, Avoid, and Leave, and provides skills foryouths to address situations, events, and people who promote or encourage them to use drugs or participate inother problem behaviors. The program is based on the NIDA prevention principles (refer to Table 13.5). At thispoint, the new program’s effectiveness remains to be proven.Given the lack of positive results, how do you explain the popularity and persistence of D.A.R.E.? There areseveral possible explanations. First, D.A.R.E. has a strong national organization behind it. Second, the programis minimally intrusive into the lives of the youths, primarily due to its presentation in schools. Third, the abilityto bring police and juveniles together in a non-threatening situation has a great deal of appeal. Finally, theprogram may contribute to a more positive school environment.Summary of Prevention ProgramsThe evidence on prevention programs suggests that the impact is often minimal. Resistance skills trainingpresents mixed results. Programs that emphasize providing factual information about drugs fail to have muchimpact. In fact, these efforts may cause an increased curiosity on the part of adolescents and subsequentexperimentation and use of illicit drugs. Other programs that stress self-esteem, self-awareness, andinterpersonal growth in the absence of specific strategies for dealing with drugs (typically referred to asaffective education programs) also demonstrate minimal influence on drug use (Botvin, 1990; Schaps et al.,1986; Tobler, 1986). While there appears to be hope for the prevention of drug use, most of the programs needto be evaluated with longer follow-up periods and better research designs, particularly using adequatecomparison groups.260
Drugs and Crime PreventionThe relationship between drug use and criminal activity is a complex one. The extent to which drug usecauses crime or crime causes drug use is not clear. There is certainly a strong correlation between the twoactivities. This suggests that knowledge of one can be used to attack the other. From the standpoint ofsecondary crime prevention, drug use can be used as a predictor of individuals at a higher risk of committingother criminal acts. While not every user of drugs commits other offenses, the evidence shows that those whoregularly use illicit drugs and/or use a large amount of drugs are more disposed to criminal behavior. At thevery least, drug use can identify individuals for further intervention.To the extent to which drug use is a cause or contributor to criminal activity, drug prevention and treatmentprograms may be effective at limiting or eliminating other crime. The treatment and prevention proposals andprograms discussed in this chapter show that effective strategies do exist. Most need further analysis overlonger periods in order to definitively outline their impact and potential. In a strict sense, the treatmentprograms outlined above are tertiary prevention programs—they deal with individuals who have alreadyentered into drug use. Likewise, the prevention programs fall into the realm of primary prevention due to theirimplementation in schools and the targeting of all youths. If the emphasis is simply on targeting the drug usewith no concern for related problems, these efforts belong under the headings of primary and tertiaryprevention.The emphasis of the present discussion, however, is on the role drug use plays in contributing to and/orcausing other criminal acts. This brings the topic squarely into the realm of secondary crime prevention.Arguments about the victimless status of drug use, possession, and other drug crimes are automatically beyondthe concerns of secondary prevention. The criminal status of drug use does not affect its place as a tool insecondary prevention. Consequently, other arguments, such as those over legalization and decriminalization,are not germane to the discussion. These topics are left for other authors to consider.Key TermsADAM (II) (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) programD.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)detoxificationKeepin’ It REALmaintenance programsmethadone maintenanceMonitoring the Future (MTF) projectNational Survey on Drug Use and HealthNational Youth Survey (NYS)psychopharmacological explanationreciprocalresistance skills trainingspurioussystemic violencetherapeutic communities261
262
Chapter 14The School and Crime PreventionChapter OutlineTheoretical ViewsEducational Factors and DelinquencyIQ and DelinquencySchool Practices and DelinquencyVictimization in SchoolResponses to In-School VictimizationSchool Programs for Delinquency PreventionElementary and High School ProgramsPeer PressureAnti-Bullying EffortsAlternative SchoolsPolice in SchoolsOther InterventionsThe Future of School/Educational Programs in Crime PreventionLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Provide insight into the role of schools and education in causing crime and delinquency.Define “tracking” and demonstrate how it relates to delinquency.Discuss the relationship between IQ and delinquency.Talk about the extent of victimization at school and responses to that problem.Demonstrate your knowledge of Project PATHE and its impact.Explain how altering the school atmosphere can change behavior.Identify at least four school programs that address conflict management/resolution.Talk about the G.R.E.A.T. program, including what it is and what evaluations of it show.Discuss bullying prevention programs and their impact.Explain what alternative schools are and related information on the degree to which they have animpact on delinquency.The school has come to be seen as a prime actor in the development and prevention of delinquent behavior.This ascendance to prominence is reflected in a number of theories of deviant behavior, research focusing onthe correlates and causes of behavior, government and private reports linking schools and education todelinquency, and the advent of delinquency intervention programs intimately tied to schools and education.Teachers and others in the schools have a great deal of contact with society’s youths and are in a position toidentify problems as they emerge. The ability to use school problems and concerns to predict possible problems263
later in life places school personnel in the midst of secondary prevention. Although not criminal, schoolproblems are used as indicators of possible future delinquent or criminal activity both in and out of school.Schools are also prime locations for implementing secondary prevention programs. Many interventions oftendeal with predelinquent youths and youths having problems in school.The relationship between school and delinquency is not always easy to understand. Many of the associationsare indirect and must be understood within the context of the educational mission and the form of society.Consequently, prevention programs may not always seem to be aimed at delinquency. Rather, theinterventions are geared toward the specific problematic factors found in the schools. The present chapter willattempt to develop the role of schools as an agent of secondary prevention through a three-step process. First, itis necessary to discuss the theoretical support for the role schools play in delinquency. Second, the specificaspects of the educational process that are important for discussing delinquency must be examined. Finally, thechapter will examine programs that have been established to intervene in the harmful aspects of school, withspecial attention paid to programs demonstrating an impact on subsequent delinquency and in-schoolmisbehavior.264
Theoretical ViewsMany theorists emphasize the importance of schools in developing behavior. Cohen (1955), Cloward andOhlin (1960), and Merton (1968) point to blocked attainment and feelings of failure as a source of deviantbehavior. Each of these theorists claims that an individual faced with little or no chance of success in legitimateendeavors will turn to deviant avenues for sources of success and support. For juveniles who have not yetentered the adult world, the school becomes the setting for gauging success and failure. For example, a juvenilewho is faced with failing grades while his friends are successful at their studies may be labeled as a failure bythose same friends and/or teachers. The lack of success may push a youth to seek out others having the samedifficulties. In an attempt to regain some feeling of status and success, failing youths may turn to deviance andacting-out behaviors.The actual causal process relating schools and delinquency can take a variety of forms. Hirschi (1969) claimsthat diminished academic ability results in poor academic achievement. Failure in school can foster dislike forschool attendance, a lack of concern for societally proscribed behavior, and eventual movement into delinquentbehavior. An expanded, more detailed causal process (Gold, 1978) proposes that incompetence as a studentleads to failed aspirations and success expectations that, in turn, results in being excluded from more successfulstudents and student activities. This exclusion invariably lowers a youth’s self-image and feelings of worth,resulting in associating with other marginal youths or deviant behavior as a means of salvaging a positive self-image. Gold (1978) refers to this choice of deviance as an ego defense, which acts to counterbalance thenegative feedback experienced in the school setting. While only examples, these processes are indicative ofhow schools and the educational process can influence behavior.These causal chains rest on the assumption that youths value scholastic achievement. Negative evaluationsin the educational setting would then hold the potential for lowering the juvenile’s self-esteem. Support for thisproposition is found in many studies. One of the more influential studies of the educational system in theUnited States found that parents of all social classes are very interested in their children’s scholastic success(Coleman, 1966). Vinter and Sarri (1965) report that this emphasis on educational success extends to the youthsthemselves. Two studies show that minority and poor students place a higher value on education than do otherstudents (Coleman, 1966; Reiss and Rhodes, 1959). Despite this near-universal desire to achieve in school,lower-class and minority students invariably make up the group that most often fails. In addition, those whofail in school typically exhibit misbehavior and delinquency both in and out of school.Any number of studies can be pointed to in support of the school failure–delinquency relationship. Polk andHafferty (1966) note that students who do poorly in school and are not committed to scholastic achievementadmit to higher levels of deviant behavior. Hirschi (1969), studying approximately 4,000 boys, finds that youthswith low commitment to school and educational achievement display higher levels of self-reporteddelinquency. Thornberry et al. (1985) show that students who drop out of school exhibit higher levels ofdelinquency and adult criminal behavior than do high school graduates. Jarjoura (1993) specifies the dropouteffect by demonstrating that the dropout–delinquency relationship only holds when the reason for droppingout is related to school problems. Studies by Gold and Mann (1972), West and Farrington (1973), and Jerse andFakouri (1978) report that delinquents generally achieve lower grades than non-delinquents. A wide variety ofother studies, using both self-report and official measures of deviance and various measures of academicachievement, support the academic achievement–delinquency relationship (Empey and Lubbeck, 1971; Kellyand Balch, 1971; Kelly and Pink, 1975; Phillips and Kelly, 1979; Polk and Schafer, 1972; Polk et al., 1974;President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967).265
Educational Factors and DelinquencyThe relationship between educational achievement and delinquency is not a simple one. Various interveningvariables enter into the formula. The basic causal processes outlined earlier provide reasonable starting pointsfor identifying the specific aspects of school and education that lead a juvenile to deviant activity. Most ofthese explanations involve student success and achievement. The ability of a student to achieve can be affectedby factors independent of the school. The ability of the student prior to entering school can affect academicsuccess. One possible measure of ability is the IQ test. Another set of influences on achievement may be theformat and workings of the school itself. Factors such as tracking, in-school indicators of success, and thequality of the teachers and resources can all affect student outcomes. An important additional factor may bethe extent of victimization in the school. The victimization of an individual may drive the student away fromschool. Victimization problems in schools can result in a preoccupation with crime and safety, rather thanobtaining a meaningful education. The following paragraphs attempt to outline the impact of various factorson student success.IQ and DelinquencyThe role of intelligence in the etiology of deviant behavior has been a matter of debate for many years. Theearly IQ tests were used to screen entrants to the United States in order to keep the mentally deficient out ofthe country. The so-called feeble-minded (those with low IQs) were viewed as a threat to the moral andintellectual life of the nation. It was assumed that these individuals would disproportionately contribute to thelevel of delinquency and criminal activity.These early fears have found much support in later research. Hirschi and Hindelang (1977), in a review ofthe major research in the area, establish that IQ is an important correlate of delinquency. A variety of studiessubstantiate that low IQ is positively correlated to higher levels of official delinquency (Reiss and Rhodes, 1961;Short and Strodbeck, 1965; Wolfgang et al., 1972) and self-reported measures of delinquency (Hirschi andHindelang, 1977; Weis, 1973; West, 1973). The major question unanswered in most of these analyses is whetherIQ is a direct causal factor or simply lays the groundwork for other factors to intervene. Hirschi and Hindelang(1977) claim that IQ is not a direct causal factor. Instead, low IQ leads to a number of other events that, in turn,facilitate the acquisition of delinquent behavior. Among the intervening factors suggested by these authors isschool achievement, academic performance, and attitude toward school. The introduction of these factors intothe IQ–delinquency relationship as control variables tends to eliminate the relationship (Hirschi andHindelang, 1977; West, 1973; Wolfgang et al., 1972). The influence of IQ, therefore, appears only in thoseinstances when IQ affects other school variables.School Practices and DelinquencyAchievement in school emerges as the key element in the relationship between school and delinquency. Thefailure to succeed in school leads to frustration, withdrawal from the institution, and an increased potential fordeviant behavior. A variety of school practices can operate against success and school attachment and lead todelinquency. Among these practices is tracking, poor instruction, irrelevant instruction, and methods ofevaluation.Tracking refers to the process of assigning students to different classes or groups based on the perceivedneeds of the student. Some school districts, or groups of districts, have established magnet vocational highschools devoted to training and deemphasizing post-secondary education for some youths. This is an extensionof the old placement of students into “college preparatory” or “vocational” groups. Schafer et al. (1971) showthat students in the vocational track, regardless of their social class, prior grades, or IQ score, respond withlower grades. In addition, these students typically participate in fewer activities and are more likely to drop out266
of school, misbehave, and commit delinquent acts. The reasons for the lower achievement lay in theexpectation, by both teachers and students, that lower-track students will not succeed, are not in theeducational mainstream, and are not worth as much as college-bound students (Kelly and Pink, 1975; Schafer etal., 1971).Many students also are faced with poor and/or irrelevant instruction. Views that lower-class and minoritystudents are not college material often result in the assignment of less competent teachers to schools andclasses serving these youths (Schafer and Polk, 1967; Schafer et al., 1971). In addition, these schools typicallyreceive less financial support. As a result, the students develop a sense of failure, a lack of self-esteem, and maybecome dissatisfied and bitter toward the system. The practice of segregating some youths and implicitlylabeling them as second class (particularly if they are in special classes within a larger school) can result in aself-fulfilling prophesy. They are expected to do worse and thus they live up (down?) to this expectation.The irrelevance of instruction for some students grows out of the types of materials they are being taught,especially in the vocational education tracks (Wertleib, 1982). Schools are seldom able to keep up with the rapidchanges and modifications in jobs and the workforce. The materials being taught in the school are outmodedbefore the youth has the opportunity to use the information. Vast changes in production and technology haveestablished jobs for which many youths are unqualified and have eliminated jobs that previously employedhundreds or thousands of people. Instruction becomes more irrelevant when students cannot find employmentupon leaving school. These factors make the instruction irrelevant and obsolete (Papagiannis et al., 1983).Students often are trained in very specific tasks that they cannot use outside of the school. At the same time,they are not prepared to enter college, undertake further instruction, or secure other jobs.The emphasis on testing invariably leads to feelings of failure. For the “A” student, grades are a reward forhard work and indicate positive achievement. The movement toward proficiency tests (mandated forpromotion and graduation in many states) often results in resentment on the part of those students who do notpass the tests. The failing student may be held back or placed into special classes that segregate and label him.Slow and failing youths may be excluded from many of the extracurricular activities that can help make schoola fun, enjoyable experience. Failing students may be humiliated in front of other students, may not be expectedto achieve, and are often considered second-class citizens within an institution they are forced to attend(Schafer and Polk, 1967).Victimization in SchoolOne result of these and other school practices is the attempt by some students to gain recognition and statusthrough alternative, albeit unacceptable, behavior. School misbehavior leads to further alienation, exclusionfrom the mainstream of the student body, and further acting out. It also leads to an atmosphere in whicheducation becomes secondary to security.For the offending youth, school misbehavior can be seen as accomplishing three things (Gold, 1978). First,the behavior is aimed at the source of the problem—the school. Second, the youth’s peers are present in schoolto view the activity and the offender is able to “show off” or bring attention to himself. Finally, themisbehavior is a declaration that the youth will not sit idly by while the school continuously belittles him.Continued sanctions and acting out may lead to delinquent behavior outside of the school setting.Misbehavior also has an impact on others in the school, either directly as the target of an offense orindirectly through vicarious victimization and a shift in emphasis from learning to survival. The problem ofcrime in school has been described as “a serious national problem” (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985). TheU.S. Department of Justice routinely collects data on crime and victimization in schools. Figures from 2012(Table 14.1) show that a total of 1,364,900 crimes were committed against students at school (Robers et al.,2014). This represents 52.4 offenses for every 1,000 students. Violent crimes are not uncommon, with more thanhalf of the reported victimizations (almost 750,000). More than 52 students out of every 1,000 (5.2 percent)report being victimized. In light of media accounts of violent acts in schools (especially homicides), it isimportant to note that a good deal of in-school violence appears as threats and minor acts, including pushingand shoving (Anderson, 1998; Lockwood, 1997), rather than serious violence. Indeed, few homicides occur inschool, with only 11 during the 2010 to 2011 school year (Robers et al., 2014).267
Table 14.1 Student Victimization at School 2012aStudent CharacteristicsTotalTheftViolentbSerious ViolentcTotal N1,364,900615,600749,20089,000Rate per 1,000 students52.423.628.83.4a Data for students aged 12 to 18.b Violent crimes include rape, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault.c Serious violent crimes include the violent crimes except for simple assault.Source: Constructed by author from S. Robers et al. (2014). Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2013. Washington, DC: National Centerfor Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department ofJustice. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfTable 14.2 Teacher Reports of Victimization at School, 2011 to 2012N%Threat of injury352,9009.2Physically attacked209,8005.4Source: Compiled by author from S. Robers et al. (2014). Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2013. Washington, DC: National Center forEducation Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfStudents are not the only individuals victimized at schools. Teachers and staff are also subject to crime andsubsequent feelings of fear. During the 2011 to 2012 school year, over 350,000 teachers (9.2 percent) reportedbeing threatened with injury by a student during school (Robers et al., 2014). Almost 210,000 teachers (5.4percent) were actually the victim of physical attack by a student at school (see Table 14.2).On the Web Extensive information on victimization at school is compiled each year by the Departments ofEducation and Justice. Detailed results can be found athttp://www.nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicatorsBullyingA major topic of concern for many youths and their parents is the problem of bullying. The issue of bullyinghas received a great deal of attention over the past decade. This is partly due to the events at Columbine HighSchool and other schools, where part of the blame/explanation for the behavior was attributed to past bullying.268
While most bullying does not lead to such levels of retaliatory violence, it clearly has an impact on the victim.Bullying behavior can be classified into four types: verbal, physical, social, and cyberbullying. Too often it isassumed that bullying is primarily verbal, such as teasing and name calling. It is important to note that manyforms of bullying involve physical confrontations that are actually forms of criminal victimization. Includedhere are hitting, shoving, and punching. Starting rumors about someone or ostracizing them from participatingin events are examples of social bullying. The final major form, cyberbullying, involves the use of the Internetand other technologies to attack the victim. This can occur through posts on social media (such as Facebook,Myspace, and so on), texts, sexting, and unwanted Internet contacts.Information on the extent of bullying generally comes from survey data. The 2011 NCVS provides abreakdown of types of bullying at school and cyberbullying in any setting as reported by youths aged 12 to 18(see Table 14.3). Almost 40 percent of the students report being the victim of at least one form of bullying atschool. The most common form of reported bullying is being made fun of, insulted, or called names (17.6percent of respondents). Roughly one out of six is the subject of rumors, and almost 8 percent are physicallybullied. Cyberbullying, which is not restricted to the school setting, is reported by 9 percent of the students.Responses to In-School VictimizationVictimization has the potential of eliciting a variety of responses, many of which are debilitating or may leadthe victim into criminal or delinquent behavior. One immediate response is fear. Robers et al. (2014) note thatroughly 4 percent of students report being afraid at school. Lab and Clark (1996), studying junior and seniorhigh schools in one large Midwestern county, found that more than 11 percent of the students fear beingattacked at school. Additionally, 16 percent rate their school as “unsafe” or “very unsafe.” This fear of schoolleads students to avoid school or take what they see as protective actions.Table 14.4 presents data on the avoidance behaviors due to fear among students aged 12 to 18 over a six-month period (Robers et al., 2014). A total of 5.5 percent of students report avoiding school or places at school.Almost 5 percent avoid specific places in school due to fear, including hallways, restrooms, and the cafeteria.Other studies also show that a small but significant number of youth (10 percent or more) either stay home oravoid certain places/events at school due to fear of assault or theft (Kaufman et al., 1998; Lab and Clark, 1996;Lab and Whitehead, 1994; Metropolitan Life, 1993, 1994; Ringwalt et al., 1992).Table 14.3 Student Reports of Bullying, 2011Bullying at school Total29.7% Made fun of/called names/insulted17.6 Subject of rumors18.3 Threatened with harm5.0 Pushed/shoved/tripped/spat on7.9 Tried to make do things they did not want to do3.3 Excluded from activities on purpose5.6 Property destroyed on purpose2.8Cyberbullying anywhere Total9.0 Harmful info on Internet3.6 Harassing instant messages2.7 Harassing text messages4.4 Harassing e-mails1.9 Harassment while gaming1.5269
Source: Compiled by author from S. Robers et al. (2014). Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2013. Washington, DC: National Center forEducation Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, and Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfAnother student response to crime and fear is to carry weapons to school for protection. Robers et al. (2014)report that almost 5.4 percent of youths carried a weapon in the past month at school. Lab and Clark (1996)report that 24 percent of junior and senior high school students have carried a weapon to school for protectionat least once over a six-month period. Studies focusing on inner-city schools report even higher levels ofweapons in school (Sheley et al., 1995).For many youths, joining a gang is perceived as a way to garner protection and support in the face ofthreats. If a youth is victimized by gang members, either directly or by mistake, joining a gang further becomesa self-defense mechanism. It is natural for people to seek out support from those around them. Most victimswill turn to family members for such assistance. Another source of support is close friends and peers. Joininggangs as a response to victimization, however, is a double-edged sword. While the gang may supply somesense of protection, it typically demands participation in illegal behavior and conflict with other gangs andindividuals. These demands often result in further victimization of the individual, rather than protection fromvictimization. At the same time that gang membership may alleviate victimization, joining a gang can alsocontribute to ongoing victimization, albeit as a member of a group and not just as an individual.Table 14.4 Students Avoiding School or Activities Due to Fear of Attack or Harm, 2011PercentageTotal5.5Stayed home from school0.8Avoided school activities1.2Avoided class0.7Avoided one or more places4.7 Entrances to school0.9 Hallways/stairways2.5 Cafeterias1.8 Restrooms1.7 Other places1.1Source: Compiled by author from S. Robers et al. (2012). Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2011. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfThe level of misbehavior, victimization, fear, and safety responses by students in schools is a concern forvarious reasons. First, these concerns detract from the primary mission of educating youths. Time spent oncrime and disruption means less time spent in getting an education. Similarly, avoiding school means theyouths are missing out on important classroom time. Second, many of the responses to victimization and fear270
are more inappropriate than appropriate. Certainly, the presence of weapons offers the possibility of moreserious confrontations and problems, not to mention the illegality of bringing weapons to school. The failure toaddress these problems will simply add to the other deleterious aspects of schools.271
School Programs for Delinquency PreventionA wide range of programs and educational strategies have emerged to address delinquency both in andoutside of schools. Among the suggested educational changes are the provision of relevant instruction, the useof flexible groupings that allow movement in and out of ability levels, the development of meaningful anduseful instruction, the use of teaching materials relevant for students of different backgrounds, the use ofalternative grading strategies, and the institution of disciplinary measures that do not alienate or segregatestudents from the mainstream of the school (Schafer and Polk, 1967). Sadly, many of the suggested changeshave not been instituted or have received only cursory attention in widely scattered locales. This indicates thatthe impact of such changes on education in general, and delinquency in particular, is still unknown. At thesame time, several programs and strategies have received significant attention.On the Web The National School Safety Center was established in 1984 by the federal government and is nowan independent organization that provides services to make schools safe. It offers a great dealof information and expertise on prevention activities. You can investigate what it offers athttp://www.schoolsafety.us/homeElementary and High School ProgramsPrograms dealing with academic performance and school misbehavior can be found throughout theeducational system. Unfortunately, most of these efforts fail to address the impact of the programs onsubsequent delinquency and crime. Many researchers simply assume that changes in achievement, self-esteem,and other school-based outcomes will, in turn, affect delinquency (Gottfredson, 1987). Most programs thatspecifically address the question of delinquency are those that appear in junior and senior high schools. Thereason for this is simple—in general, youths do not come to the attention of the juvenile justice system untilthey reach these grades. Prior to that time, misbehavior is handled in the home or is simply ignored.School AtmosphereAltering the general school environment is one suggestion for addressing misconduct in schools. Opening upparticipation in decision making (to both students and staff) allows everyone to take ownership of both thesolutions and the successes of controlling problems. Gottfredson (1986a, 1986b) reports on the effectiveness ofProject PATHE (Positive Action Through Holistic Education) in Charleston, South Carolina. This projecttakes a broad-based approach to the school environment by bringing teachers, administrators, students,parents, and agencies together in making decisions about education and the school. Underlying this approach isthe idea that the various parties must see a stake in education and believe that education is important. Theparties will care more about education if they have some say in the educational process. Project PATHEisolates a variety of factors including school pride, career-oriented programs, student team learning, andindividual services as targets for change.Project PATHE was initiated in five middle schools and two high schools from 1980 to 1983. Pre- and post-program measures, as well as data from two non-equivalent comparison schools were used in an evaluation ofthe program. The results offered mixed support. Experimental schools report higher test scores and graduationrates than the control schools (Gottfredson, 1986a). Attendance at school, however, did not seem to be affectedby the program. Delinquency measures showed the greatest degree of disparity across and within schools. At272
the school level, there was some improvement in overall delinquency in the high school but no significantchange for the middle schools. The control schools also showed no change over the study period. Changes inindividual types of delinquency appeared in various schools. For example, drug use was reduced in one schoolbut not in others. Some teachers reported lower levels of victimization in individual schools.These results suggest that, while the program has no overall effect on the schools as a group, improvementscan be found in individual schools (Gottfredson, 1986b). The qualified success of Project PATHE may be due toalterations in the school system and study design after the onset of the project. Changes in the schooladministration, the closing and consolidating of some schools, and the inability of some programs to beadequately implemented during the study suggest that the project would produce better results in a morestable setting (Gottfredson, 1986b).On the Web More information on Project PATHE can be found athttp://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SPT/Programs/136Lab and Clark (1996) also investigated the idea of altering the school environment through cooperativedecision making. Evaluating 44 junior and senior high schools, the authors note that order and control in aschool is engendered most effectively by bringing students, staff, and administrators together. The traditionalmethods of administratively imposing strict control and harsh discipline on students is not productive (Lab andClark, 1996). The authors also find that schools with lower victimization and problem behaviors are those thatwork to develop a “normative” approach to discipline and control. This means that schools in which there ismore agreement on discipline and control measures experience fewer problems than schools in which there islittle agreement (Lab and Clark, 1996). Schools should strive, therefore, to build consensus through inclusion inthe decision-making process.The Charlotte School Safety Program attempts to address the issue of school safety by developing acooperative problem-solving process that involves students, school staff, and police (Kenney and Watson,1998). The program emphasizes changing the school environment using techniques similar to those found incommunity-oriented policing. Problem identification and problem solving are key elements of the interventionand an attempt is made to integrate these activities into the normal classroom curriculum. It is important tochange the attitudes of the students and to turn the student body into an agent for positive change in theschool (Kenney and Watson, 1998). The program was tested in the 11th grade social studies classes of a singleCharlotte high school during the 1994 to 1995 school year. The problem-solving activities were addressed oneto two days each week within small groups of six to 10 students.An evaluation of the Charlotte program indicates positive changes in the target school compared to amatched control school. The evaluation used surveys of students at both schools, interviews with school staff,observations within the school, and inspections of student problem-solving worksheets. The first evidence ofsuccess is the ability of the students to identify and agree on problems in the school, and their ability to suggestand implement changes in school procedures. Kenney and Watson (1998) also note significant reductions instudent’s fear of crime at school, reduced fighting, fewer threats against teachers, lower numbers ofsuspensions for violence, and fewer calls for police assistance. Little change in these items was evident at thecontrol school. Teachers also report fewer class disruptions and improved relations between students andfaculty (Kenney and Watson, 1998). The greatest concern with the evaluation is its reliance on a single schooland work with only those students in 11th grade social studies. In general, the results of research on changingthe school environment suggest the efforts bring about positive changes in the schools.Conflict Management/ResolutionTeaching students how to handle conflict and make proper choices when faced with difficult situations (such273
as peer pressure to use drugs or commit a crime) is a popular intervention that takes a variety of forms.Conflict management/resolution is a common program in schools. These programs appear under a variety ofnames, including dispute resolution, dispute mediation, conflict resolution, conflict management, and others.The basic goal of these programs is to avoid and/or resolve conflicts before they escalate into serious problems(such as physical confrontations). School programs typically include a strong teaching component in whichkids learn that conflict is natural and that it can be managed through various processes (Ohio Commission onDispute Resolution and Conflict Management, 1993). A key component in many programs is peer mediation,in which students are trained to assist one another in resolving disputes in such a way that all parties to thedispute accept the resolution. Many elements of school-based programs can be found in community mediationand dispute resolution programs (see Garofalo and Connelly, 1980 for a discussion of these programs). Thegrowth of programs in the community and the generally positive evaluations of those programs (see, forexample, Bridenback et al. 1980; Coates and Gehm, 1989; Reichel and Seyfrit, 1984; Roehl and Cook, 1982) havecontributed to the establishment of school-based programs.The Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (RCCP) in New York City included student mediation as acore component of the intervention. This program includes programming in the elementary, secondary, andspecial education curriculum, as well as a separate parent program (DeJong, 1993). The elementary curriculumconsists of 12 lessons dealing with issues of communication, cooperation, feelings, diversity, peacemaking, andresolving conflicts. The entire curriculum (in primary and secondary schools) consists of 51 lessons andincludes a heavy reliance on peer mediation and parental involvement. DeJong (1993) reports that studentssuccessfully learn the lessons, are involved in fewer fights, and believe that they can handle problems better asa result of the program. The impact of the program increases with the number of lessons and the quality of theteacher training (Samples and Aber, 1998).Similarly, the Responding in Peaceful and Positive Ways (RIPP) program targets sixth graders andincludes lessons on appropriate responses to conflict situations and how students can avoid violence (Farrelland Meyer, 1997). Evaluations of the program show fewer discipline problems, fewer suspensions from school,and less fighting by students participating in the program. The State of Ohio initiated a number ofdemonstration projects in schools aimed at providing students with problem-solving skills and instituting peermediation programs in the schools. Based on the first three years of the program, participating schools reportreduced suspensions and increased successful mediations. Students also report a greater willingness to stopfights and talk out disputes as a result of the program (Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and ConflictManagement, 1993). Unfortunately, this program has not undergone a rigorous evaluation.The growth of conflict management/resolution programs in schools remains an important effort in manyplaces, despite that fact that many programs have not undergone rigorous evaluations and many studiessuggest that the approach may not have a great impact (Bynum, 1996). The reason for this may be the fact thatmany programs do not reach a large enough portion of the student body and the programs are not very wellintegrated into other school activities. School-based conflict management programs are still relatively new andneed to undergo further evaluation.Peer PressureOn the Web More details on G.R.E.A.T. and its individual components can be found at http://www.great-online.orgG.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training) is a well-known program targeting peer pressureand the tendency for some youths to turn to gangs and gang behavior. Not unlike the Drug Abuse ResistanceEducation (D.A.R.E.) program, G.R.E.A.T. is taught by local police officers in middle schools. The originalcurriculum, consisting of nine lessons, was expanded to 13 one-hour lessons and is presented in middle schools274
(see Table 14.5). The goal of the program is to “prevent youth crime, violence and gang involvement” (Bureauof Justice Assistance, 2005). The thrust of the program is to provide youths with the necessary skills foridentifying high-risk situations and resisting the pressure/allure of taking part in gangs and gang activity.Beyond targeting just ganging, program curriculaTable 14.5 G.R.E.A.T. Middle School Curriculum1.Welcome to G.R.E.A.T.: A Gang and Violence Prevention Program• Lesson Goal: Students will identify the relationship among crime, violence, drug abuse, and gangs.2.What’s the Real Deal?: The Real Deal on Gangs and Violence• Lesson Goal: Students will analyze information sources and identify realistic, normative beliefsabout gangs and violence.3.It’s About Us: Being Part of the Community• Lesson Goal: Students will define their roles and responsibilities in the family, school, andcommunity.4.Where Do We Go From Here?: How to Set Goals• Lesson Goal: Students will write realistic and achievable goals.5.Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Making the Right Choice• Lesson Goal: Students will practice decision-making skills.6.Do You Hear What I Am Saying?: How to Communicate Effectively• Lesson Goal: Students will practice effective communication skills.7.Walk in Someone Else’s Shoes: Thinking of Others• Lesson Goal: Students will identify active-listening skills, how to recognize the emotional state ofothers, and how to demonstrate empathy toward victims of crime and violence.8.Say It Like You Mean It: Some Ways of Refusing• Lesson Goal: Students will practice effective refusal skills.9.Getting Along Without Going Along: Dealing With Peers• Lesson Goal: Students will practice effective refusal skills.10.Keeping Your Cool: Managing Your Anger• Lesson Goal: Students will practice anger-management skills. – Practice Cooling Off11.Keeping It Together: How to Calm Others• Lesson Goal: Students will identify how anger-management skills help prevent violence and275
conflicts.12.Working It Out: How to Solve Conflicts• Lesson Goal: Students will practice conflict-resolution techniques.13.G.R.E.A.T. Days Ahead: Applying Your G.R.E.A.T. Skills• Lesson Goal: Students will explain how their G.R.E.A.T. Project helped them develop a feeling ofcommitment and ownership of their school and their community.Source: Bureau of Justice Assistance (2014). Gang Resistance Education and Training. http://great-online.org/Components/MiddleSchool.Aspxare geared toward increasing self-esteem, changing attitudes, addressing peer pressure, and eliminatingparticipation in violent behavior. A key component of G.R.E.A.T. is to teach non-violent conflict resolutiontechniques to the youths.The G.R.E.A.T. program has undergone extensive evaluation. A longitudinal evaluation of the originalG.R.E.A.T. programs showed positive outcomes. Esbensen et al. (2004), using data for four years followingprogram participation, reported less victimization, less risk-taking behavior, improved attitudes toward thepolice, increased numbers of prosocial peers, and more negative views about gangs among those youthsreceiving the G.R.E.A.T. lessons. Unfortunately, the evaluation failed to find any impact on the more importanttarget of the project—reduced gang participation. While this is disappointing, the promising results led thesponsors of the G.R.E.A.T. program to undertake a revision of the curriculum, which resulted in the current 13-lesson scheme.The revised curriculum has been the subject of a rigorous national evaluation. A total of 195 classrooms in31 schools in seven cities were included in the analysis, with a total of more than 3,800 students. One hundredthirty classrooms received the G.R.E.A.T. training, and 93 classrooms served as the controls. Data was gatheredover a five-year period of time, including four years post-program participation (Esbensen et al., 2011).Preliminary results based on the first year of follow-up data reveal overall positive results. Results show thatparticipants are more positive about the police, are less positive about gangs, more often use refusal skills theyhave been taught, are better able to resist peer pressure, and are less involved in gangs (Esbensen et al., 2011).Most importantly, the data reveal 39 percent less gang membership among G.R.E.A.T. participants (Esbensen etal., 2013). These positive results are also sustained at four years post-participation. G.R.E.A.T. participants arestill 24 percent less likely to be gang members and they maintain positive attitudes toward police, use refusalskills, and hold more negative attitudes toward gangs (Esbensen et al., 2013). All of these results are significant.Despite these positive results, the evaluation shows no impact on criminal and violent activity (Esbensen etal., 2013; Pyrooz, 2013). This may be a result of the fact that G.R.E.A.T. targets entire classrooms, which includeyouths at both low risk and high risk for gang membership. As a result, G.R.E.A.T. may influence a youth’sself-identification as a gang member, but it may have little impact on the level of attachment to gangs andcriminal gang activity among those who join (Pyrooz, 2013). While G.R.E.A.T. is a promising program, its fullimpact on behavior is not known.Anti-Bullying EffortsBullying prevention is identified as an exemplary program for attacking violence by youths (Elliott, 2000).The most notable of these efforts is that of Olweus and his colleagues (Olweus 1994, 1995; Olweus and Limber,2000). Bullying behavior includes both physical and verbal aggression that is repeated over time and is meantto intentionally harm the victim (Olweus and Limber, 2000). Studies in Norwegian, Swedish, and U.S. schoolsfind that at least 15 percent of the students report being either bullied or being the offender (Melton et al., 1998,Olweus, 1993).Developed in Norway, the model anti-bullying program is aimed at the entire school and relies on active276
student, teacher, and parent participation. The program attempts to raise awareness about the problem ofbullying, establish rules and regulations governing the behavior and responses to offending, train staff on howto integrate discussions on bullying into the curriculum, require meetings between parents and teachers, andhold meetings between bullies and their victims. The program also works with the families of offenders toaddress the problems outside of school. Based on survey data gathered before the onset of the program andperiodically over a two-year follow-up period, Olweus (1994, 1995) reports significant reductions in bullying,classroom disruption, and general delinquency. Replicating the program in England, Whitney et al. (1994)report similar positive results, particularly for students in younger grades. This suggests that the interventionshould be targeted at young students before bullying behavior becomes ingrained in individuals. Finally,Melton et al. (1998), testing the program in South Carolina grade schools, find significant reductions inbullying, as well as vandalism, general delinquency, and school misbehavior.On the Web The Olweus Bullying Prevention Program has been recognized as a blueprint for violenceprevention and has been adopted around the world based on its proven impact. Read moredetails on the program at http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/modelprograms/BPP.htmlBased on these results, anti-bullying programs appear promising as a means to prevent both the initialaggression and subsequent offending and antisocial behavior. Olweus and Limber (2000), however, offerseveral cautions related to implementing the program. First, the program is better suited to elementary schoolsthan junior or senior high schools. This suggests that earlier intervention is preferable over later projects.Second, the program requires significant time and effort on behalf of teachers and parents. Third, significanttraining of teachers and parents is required for the successful implementation of the program. Finally, schoolsneed to actively include non-teaching staff, parents, and students in the daily operation of the intervention.Alternative SchoolsMany school programs are targeted at specific groups of youths, rather than at the entire school. Suchprograms may seek to remove those having problems from the school or may set up individual classrooms orprograms within the school. Alternative schools represent a major attempt to dispel the negative experiencesof many problem youths. The basic idea behind alternative schools is the provision of a positive learningatmosphere, which increases feelings of success within an atmosphere of warmth and acceptance (Gold, 1978).The process involves recognizing the needs of the individual student and meeting those needs throughinterventions such as one-on-one instruction, unstructured grading practices, instruction tailored to theinterests of the student, the development of close relationships between students and teachers, the involvementof the students in the instruction process, and advancement based on individual progress.Although alternative education programs have become commonplace, few evaluations of these schools lookat their effect on delinquent behavior, especially acts committed outside of the school. Gottfredson (1987)reports on the effectiveness of 17 school-based delinquency prevention programs in 15 high-crimecommunities. Most of the interventions entail alternative schools or classrooms within mainstream schools.The programming within the schools includes personalized instruction, student participation in decisionmaking, the use of behavior modification techniques, informal control, and peer assistance. Overall, the resultsshow reduced delinquency, improved school safety, reduced in-school victimizations, enhanced attachment toschool, and reductions in interactions with delinquent peers (Gottfredson, 1987). While not all of the projectsshow the same degree of success, the pattern across the studies suggests that alternative educational practicescan make a difference. The results must be tempered somewhat due to the lack of adequate comparison groupsand the subsequent possibility of alternative factors that may be influencing the results. The consistency of theresults, however, suggests that these problems may be minor.277
Cox (1999) considers the impact of an alternative school program for middle school students (grades six toeight). Youths attend the program for one semester and then return to their regular school. While at thealternative school, students participate in activities aimed at improving their academic performance and self-esteem, as well as lowering their delinquent behavior. The program evaluation compared students randomlyassigned to the alternative school and a control group. The results show an immediate impact on self-esteemand grades. Unfortunately, there is no change in self-reported delinquency, and the positive changes disappearafter the subjects return to their regular school. Cox (1999) speculates that a one-semester program may not belong enough to ensure long-term change. Students may need prolonged exposure to the alternative schoolformat.One meta-analysis suggests that alternative schools have little, if any, impact on delinquency. In a meta-analysis, the data from different studies is reanalyzed in order to make direct comparisons between the results.Cox et al. (1995) analyzed the results from 57 studies conducted from 1966 to 1993. The authors uncover someevidence that alternative school programs increase school performance, improve attitudes toward school, andother similar outcomes. Unfortunately, they are unable to find any significant improvement in clientdelinquency. Compounding these results is the fact that the most methodologically rigorous studies show theleast impact. Gold and Mann (1983) also caution that alternative school settings may isolate youths from themainstream students and that this may cause other problems, particularly with later reintegration to regularschools. It would appear, therefore, that further study and experimentation with alternative schools is neededbefore making strong claims for its impact on subsequent delinquent behavior.Police in SchoolsThe use of police officers in schools has grown considerably since the early 1990s. Violent crime, drugviolations, weapons violations, and bullying, as well as highly publicized shootings, have aroused concern andcalls for increased police officer presence in schools (Booth et al., 2011). Student surveys shows that more than70 percent of students report that their school has either a security guard or an assigned police officer (Roberset al., 2014). See Table 14.6.Table 14.6 Activities of Law Enforcement in SchoolsLaw EnforcementAdvise/MentorTeachingPatrolAdvise staffD.A.R.E.Operate metal detectorsMediate disputesAnti-gang classesConduct safetyAdvise studentsAnti-hate classesinspectionsWork with parent-teacherLaw-related educationRespond to crime/disordergroupsFirearm safetyreportsAdvise athletic teamsCrime awareness andMake arrestsMentor studentspreventionWrite reportsChaperone eventsConflict resolutionPerform drug sweepsPresent awardsProblem solvingSource: L.F. Travis and J.K. Coon (2005). The Role of Law Enforcement in Public School Safety: A National Survey. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.The presence of school resource officers (SROs) has become commonplace. A 2005 survey of almost 1,400schools across the United States found that 48 percent had SROs and 76 percent relied on public lawenforcement (Travis and Coon, 2005). James and McCallion (2013) report that there are more than 19,000 policeofficers and deputies employed as SROs in the United States. Most police in schools were involved in278
traditional police functions, including patrolling, making arrests, and providing security. At the same time,many police officers in schools, particularly those serving in an SRO capacity, provided mentoring andreferrals, training to teachers and parents, taught programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education(D.A.R.E.), and chaperoned school events (Travis and Coon, 2005). Indeed, McDevitt and Finn (2005), in asurvey of SROs, uncover that two-thirds of the officers report performing law enforcement activities in theschools, with less than one-third reporting activities such as mentoring or counseling. May et al. (2014) notethat most SRO activity involves monitoring the campus.The introduction of police to schools has not been without controversy. Some observers argue that SROs tryto balance their roles as law enforcers and mentors/instructors/problem solvers. Others contend that thewidespread introduction of police into the school setting criminalizes school discipline.At the same time as police have been introduced to school, there has been an introduction of zero tolerancepolicies whereby students are suspended or expelled for certain behaviors such as bringing a weapon to school.Critics contend that the introduction of police resource officers and zero tolerance policies are signs ofcriminalization in schools (Rich-Shea and Fox, 2014). In other words, instead of seeing discipline problems asrequiring solutions by teachers and principals, these practices treat students as quasi-criminals and mandatequasi-criminal justice solutions and thereby label youths as criminals. Critics see this as part of a more generaltrend to ignore problems of poverty and deindustrialization. For example, “the transfer of disciplinaryresponsibilities from school professionals to the police also supports this purpose given that police are ill-equipped to recognize and address the psychological and social roots of school misconduct” (Hirschfield andCelinska, 2011, p. 7).Evaluations of effective school–police partnerships indicate that more is needed than simply placing policeofficers in schools. First, police officers cannot address problems of overcrowding, low attendance, largeminority populations, and low funding. Second, evaluations show that parent cooperation is essential and thatany law enforcement presence needs to be accompanied “with intensive monitoring, counseling, and otherrelated services that strengthen cooperation and collaboration with other community-based groups” (Brady etal., 2007).Other InterventionsA wide range of other interventions are being used to alter youthful behavior, both in schools and in thecommunity. The U.S. Department of Education has initiated two programs in recent years aimed at dealingwith crime and other problem issues for youths. These are the Safe and Drug Free Schools program and theSafe Schools/Healthy Children initiative. While driven by legislative mandates, the two programs incorporate awide range of different interventions. Much of the diversity rests on the decisions of the different schooldistricts, who they include in the planning of programs (e.g., parents, police, etc.), and what programs theydecide to implement. The programs have provided a great deal of funding and had a major impact onprogramming in schools. Along with other agencies (including the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention), the Department of Education has undertaken various evaluations under theseprograms. Unfortunately, the research has been focused primarily in two areas—measuring the extent ofvictimization and fear in schools, and process evaluations of the implementation of programs. Relatively littlecomprehensive outcome evaluation has been conducted.Truancy reduction programs have received increased attention in recent years in many jurisdictions. Manyof these efforts involve a combination of picking up truant youths and returning them to school (or takingthem into custody) and holding parents accountable for their truant children. Two underlying issues drivemost of these efforts. First, removing truants from the street eliminates any offenses those youths might havecommitted while out of school. The school provides supervision, thereby reducing the level of crime during theschool day. Second, reducing truancy should lead to increased educational attainment and higher graduationrates. This should lead to greater chances of (meaningful) employment and fewer chances of turning to crimein the future. Clearly, the arguments underlying such initiatives make sense and easily lead to anti-truancyinitiatives. The impact of such programs on crime (both current and long-term), however, is unknown. Mosttruancy reduction programs rely on process evaluations, which count the number of youths handled and themethods used to dispose of the cases.279
Another recent movement has been to establish after-school programs for youths. As with other programs,these efforts have multifaceted goals. Perhaps the most common argument underlying these initiatives is thatkeeping youths busy and supervised after school mitigates the possibility of them getting into trouble. Indeed,there is clear evidence that youthful offending peaks in the late afternoon and early evening, particularly onschool days, with roughly 20 percent of all juvenile violent crime occurring on school days between 3:00 P.M.and 7:00 P.M. (OJJDP, 1999). Therefore, projects that can keep juveniles busy after school hold the potential ofreducing the level of crime in the community. This same argument underlies the calls for midnight basketballleagues and other initiatives that occupy unsupervised free time. A secondary argument used to support manyafter-school programs reflects the belief that educationally based programs can increase the academicachievement of participating youths. Interestingly, despite the great interest in these kinds of interventions,almost no evaluation has been conducted. Most of the existing literature focuses on what these programs looklike and how to initiate one, rather than on whether they are successful at achieving their intended mission.This holds true for both crime and educational outcomes.A great deal of additional research is needed on these programs. While concerted efforts have gone intodeveloping these interventions and implementing the projects, relatively little time and effort has gone intoassessing the impact of the projects on delinquency and youthful misconduct. Most of the evaluations aresimple process studies that tell how the program was initiated, who was involved, how many meetings tookplace, and how much money was spent. What is needed now is to know how much delinquency was avertedand to what extent the schools are safer places.280
The Future of School/Educational Programs in Crime PreventionThere is little doubt that schools hold a key position in the growth and development of youths. Schools dealwith virtually every child for a major portion of his formative years. The trend in society has been to delay theentry of people into the societal mainstream and prolong the period known as adolescence. As a result, schoolshave had to assume more and more responsibility for the socialization of children. Increased responsibility forhandling adolescents may prove to be a mixed blessing. Schools have so far failed to adequately respond tojuvenile misbehavior displayed both in and out of school. To fault the schools, however, without consideringthe position that has been thrust upon them is not warranted. The schools have not expected or been preparedto lead the fight against delinquent activity. The criticism that they have failed in handling delinquencyignores this fact, and the additional fact that they have not been given the resources to adequately do theirmultifaceted job. Despite these facts, the school is a logical point for intervention.The programs that have been initiated and evaluated provide some hope that future deviant behavior can beprevented. There are clear indications that some educational interventions are effective at reducing recidivism.Anti-bullying and dispute resolution are two that show positive results. Other promising approaches need to besubjected to thorough, long-term evaluations. Educational programs aimed at stemming misbehavior should beallowed sufficient time to operate prior to declaring them effective or ineffective. Just as society does notexpect that an individual can be educated in a short time span, neither should it expect that short-termprograms can reverse trends that have been growing for many decades. For example, the stigma of trackingcannot be overcome in the span of a single year in alternative classes. Positive outcomes from interventionprograms should be used as a guide for expanding and altering the overall educational system. A companionproblem is the fact that many educational programs and interventions have not undergone outcomeevaluations. The Safe and Drug Free Schools program, the Safe Schools/Healthy Children initiatives, truancyreduction efforts, and most after-school programs have been the subject of process evaluations with littleattention paid to their impact on crime and delinquency. A great deal of attention should be paid to evaluatingthese efforts.The educational system should continue to serve as a focal point for modifying behavior and preventingdeviant activity. Teachers and educators are in an ideal position to observe juvenile behavior, providingassistance, and alerting others to potential problems. The failure to incorporate the school and educationsystem in crime prevention is to ignore a tool that has a great potential for success. The fact that schools andthe criminal justice system can work together can be seen in various programs that have establishedcooperative arrangements between these institutions (Lindsey and Kurtz, 1987; Rubel, 1989). This does notmean that the solution to crime has been found. It does suggest that one of the most important ingredients incrime prevention has been underused.Key Termsalternative schoolsbullyingfeeble-mindedG.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training)meta-analysispeer mediationProject PATHE (Positive Action Through Holistic Education)Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (RCCP)Responding in Peaceful and Positive Ways (RIPP)school resource officers (SROs)tracking281
282
Part IIITertiary PreventionThe following chapters are devoted to a brief overview of tertiary prevention methods. Tertiary crimeprevention deals with the elimination of recidivistic behavior on the part of offenders. The emphasis is onactions taken to keep the confirmed offender from further harming society. Although the identification ofindividuals for insertion into prevention measures is straightforward (i.e., past deviant behavior), prediction isstill an important component of many tertiary prevention approaches. Prediction at this stage of preventionfocuses on predicting recidivism and not initial offending.For the most part, tertiary prevention rests within the confines of the formal justice system. Chapter 15explores the impact of specific deterrence and incapacitation on the level of crime and recidivism. Specificdeterrence involves the imposition of sanctions upon the individual in the hopes that these actions will keepthat specific individual from further engaging in crime once the punishment has ceased. Perhaps the clearestexample of this approach is the setting of different imprisonment periods for different crimes and individualswith the aim of deterring offending once the individual is released. Incapacitation typically looks at thereduction in crime attributable to the confinement period itself. Physical control over a person’s behaviormakes the commission of criminal actions in larger society an impossibility. Incapacitation can also beaccomplished using emerging technology through electronic monitoring. Specific deterrence and incapacitationare related features of imprisoning offenders. The effects of these actions on recidivism and the overall crimerate, as well as the costs of these approaches, are discussed.Chapter 16 looks at the alternative goal of criminal justice intervention with offenders—rehabilitation. Therehabilitative ideal dominated the correctional end of the formal justice system throughout most of thetwentieth century. This domination, however, has often been rhetorical and not in practice. Nevertheless, awide array of rehabilitative practices has been introduced. The most common comment made aboutrehabilitation, however, is that “nothing works.” This view has stirred controversy since its declaration in themid-1970s and forms a basis for the chapter. Despite the discouraging results, rehabilitation continues to be amajor focus of system effort. Numerous innovative approaches have emerged in recent years which advancethe idea of rehabilitation. Two of these, restorative justice and specialty courts, are considered in this chapter.Each of the following discussions is limited in scope and depth. The areas of deterrence, incapacitation, andrehabilitation each have voluminous literature devoted to them. It is not the aim of the chapters to explore themany nuances and issues raised in these areas. Instead, the chapters are intended to summarize the availablematerials as to their impact on crime and recidivism.283
Chapter 15Specific Deterrence and IncapacitationChapter OutlineThe Specific Deterrent Effect of Criminal SanctionsStudies of ImprisonmentArrest for Domestic ViolenceSummaryIncapacitationThe Collective Incapacitation of ImprisonmentThe Selective Incapacitation of ImprisonmentElectronic MonitoringFuture ImplicationsLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Show the difference between specific deterrence and incapacitation.Discuss the effectiveness of imprisonment to have a specific deterrent effect.Outline the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, cite its findings, and discuss the resultsof its replication studies.Compare and contrast collective and selective incapacitation.List and define assumptions underlying incapacitation.Present information on the findings from studies of collective incapacitation of imprisonment.Discuss the costs of achieving a collective incapacitation effect.Outline findings on selective incapacitation or imprisonment.Point out problems with selective incapacitation.Compare and contrast active and passive electronic monitoring systems.List and discuss potential advantages of EM.Provide information on the effectiveness of EM to reduce recidivism and have other effects.Discuss problems and concerns with the use of EM.Specific deterrence and incapacitation are two prominent methods for preventing convicted offenders fromcommitting further crimes. Both methods seek to prevent crime through intervention with individuals whohave already harmed society and shown a disposition toward deviant activity. The prevention of crimethrough these approaches revolves around punishment of the offender. The form of punishment mostconsidered in evaluations of specific deterrence and incapacitation is incarceration. Despite the similarity in thepunishment, the actual process by which specific deterrence and incapacitation brings about crime preventionis very different.Specific deterrence is aimed at the individual offender and their future behavior. Chapter 9 discussed the284
general deterrent effect of punishment. At that time the emphasis was on the ability of the criminal law and itssanctions, whether de jure or de facto, to deter individuals who have not yet violated the criminal law but havethe potential for so doing in the future. The emphasis shifts in specific deterrence from the non-offender to thecriminal. Concern also shifts to the actual imposition of the law and its sanctions. Specific deterrence seeks toprevent the offender from further deviant actions through the imposition of punishments that will negate anypleasure or advantage gained by participation in criminal activity.Incapacitation also seeks to prevent future crime on the part of the offender. The method by which thisoccurs is the simple control of the individual, which prohibits the physical possibility of future criminalactivity. For example, if the person is locked up and under total physical control, it is a physical impossibilityfor the individual to commit a crime in society. The most commonly discussed form of incapacitation isincarceration. There is no assumption on the part of incapacitation that the individual will be deterred fromcommitting further crimes once released from the institution. The only consideration is the number of offensesthat can be prevented by keeping the offender locked up for a specified period. An alternative form ofincapacitation is electronic monitoring of offenders.285
The Specific Deterrent Effect of Criminal SanctionsRelatively little research has been devoted to the study of specific deterrence. Interest in deterrence hasfocused on the impact of laws and sanctions on the general population and not just the individuals who aresubjected to the actions of the criminal justice system. Intuitively, specific deterrence should be a logicaloutcome of system intervention. Among the goals of bringing an offender to justice is the prevention of futurecriminal activity by that individual. Punishments are different for different offenses due to the type of offenseand the assumptions regarding the hedonistic value of the offense and the punishment. The sanction is meantto offset the amount of pleasure received through the crime. By so doing, the individual will see no advantageor gain in future transgressions. As in general deterrence, the individual is assumed to be a rational personmaking decisions based on a cost–benefit analysis.Although many types of punishment are imposed by the criminal justice system, incarceration is assumed tohave the greatest potential for deterring the individual from future criminal acts. This does not mean that fines,probation, community service orders, cease and desist orders, and other penalties have no deterrent value.These other forms of punishment, however, leave the individual their freedom and generally represent morelenient attitudes toward the behavior in question. The hope is that they will have some deterrent capabilitybecause they are reserved for more minor offenses. Incarceration is used in cases in which the offense is moreheinous or the individual is a repeat offender for whom more mild punishments have not had the desiredimpact. The expected deterrent effect of punishment, regardless of the type, however, is not uniformly found inthe research.Studies of ImprisonmentMany evaluations of specific deterrence look to the effect of imprisonment on subsequent offending. Theeasiest form of evaluation considers the recidivism rate of individuals who have spent some time in aninstitution. This approach presents a bleak picture for specific deterrence. In one early analysis, Glaser (1964)reported that approximately one-third of prison releases are eventually reincarcerated. This figure representssubjects who were not deterred from further offending by their punishment. While this finding is somewhatdisturbing, the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment is probably even worse. This is due to the fact thatGlaser considers only reincarceration, and many offenses do not result in a prison sentence. Indeed, Langanand Levin (2002) note that two-thirds of offenders released from prison are rearrested within three years,almost half are reconvicted, and 25 percent are reincarcerated. Durose et al. (2014) find that two-thirds of stateprison releasees are rearrested within three years and 77 percent are rearrested within five years.The simple use of aggregate recidivism data can be misleading. One common mistake is the lumpingtogether of serious with less serious offenders or offenders with differing offense careers. Recidivism istypically higher for individuals who have longer offense histories and those receiving harsher sentences (Gibbs,1975). Consequently, the failure to randomly assign individuals to different punishments or to considercomparable groups of prisoners makes the interpretation of aggregate recidivism figures highly suspect. Suchresults, however, are commonly cited as representative of recidivism rates for institutionalized groups.An alternative method for analyzing specific deterrence considers the effect of length of imprisonment onparole outcome. This approach usually compares the recidivism rate for parolees who serve differing amountsof time in an institution. One study of parole outcome looks at almost 15,000 burglars paroled in 1968 and 1969.Babst et al. (1972) examine the recidivism rate for 22 groups of burglars categorized by drug use, alcohol use,prior record, and age at release for the study subjects. Comparing similar groups of subjects with varyinglengths of institutional stay reveals no consistent relationship between the time served and parole outcomeafter one year. The few instances in which a difference is accountable to length of stay appears in subgroupsthat contain few individuals (Babst et al., 1972).Beck and Hoffman (1976) and Gottfredson et al. (1977) also examine the impact of sentence length on paroleoutcome. In the first study, the authors divide subjects into five groups based on their risk of recidivating while286
on parole. Using a two-year follow-up, the authors report that, in general, there is more recidivism as thelength of time served in prison increases (Beck and Hoffman, 1976). Significantly, individuals who are given afairly good prognosis for success on parole tend to do worse as the amount of time spent in prison increases.Gottfredson et al. (1977), dividing their subjects into nine separate categories based on various discriminatingfactors, reveal that the time served in prison has no impact on recidivism for four categories of parolees, whilethree groups of subjects show higher recidivism as the time served increases to 49 months. Conversely, timeserved has a positive impact for those who spend 50 months or more in prison (Gottfredson et al., 1977). Theresults of these studies strongly suggest that the length of imprisonment has a differential effect for differentrisk subjects.One major problem with most studies is the inability to randomly assign parolees to varying lengths of timeserved and then compare the parole outcome figures. Berecochea and Jaman (1981), however, randomly variedthe time served, with one group serving six additional months in prison. Looking at 12- and 24-month follow-up figures, the authors find no statistically significant differences in the likelihood of return or returns for newcomplaints. They conclude that the severity of punishment is unrelated to recidivism (Berecochea and Jaman,1981). The major problem with this study is that the six-month difference in length of imprisonment may notbe sufficient for a specific deterrent effect to become viable.Finally, Weisburd et al. (1995) examine the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment on white-collarcriminals. The authors use data from various jurisdictions and follow up incarcerated offenders over a 10-yearperiod. Contrary to expectations, there is no evidence that imprisonment deters the subjects from furtheroffending (Weisburd et al., 1995). Indeed, there is evidence that those in prison recidivate at a slightly higherrate than those in the control group. The authors speculate that, for white-collar criminals, the prisonexperience adds little to the impact of arrest, prosecution, and conviction. Thus, the non-prison controls havebeen equally deterred without the need for imprisonment.These studies of length of imprisonment and deterrence suffer from various problems. First, Nagin et al.(2009) suggest that imprisonment may actually be more criminogenic than deterrent. Thus, the use ofimprisonment for a specific deterrent effect may actually result in more offending post-release. Second, studiesof the specific deterrent effect of imprisonment fail to consider the types of treatment received by the subjects.The failure to consider the rehabilitative programming that inmates receive may alter the study results. Villetazet al. (2006) report that non-custodial sanctions have a greater deterrent effect than imprisonment.Arrest for Domestic ViolenceSeveral studies of specific deterrence examine the differential impact of police decisions on subsequentspouse abuse. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (Sherman and Berk, 1984) investigates thedeterrent effect of arrest, separation, and police counseling in misdemeanor spouse abuse situations. Officerswere instructed to randomly apply the different responses (randomization determined by the researchers) in allcases of spouse abuse. The only exceptions to this process include cases in which the police officer isthreatened, there is a demand for arrest by one party, or there is an injury as a result of the offense. Examining314 cases over a 17-month period, the authors claim that arrests result in lower recidivism suggesting a strongspecific deterrent effect (Sherman and Berk, 1984). Unfortunately, a number of problems are inherent in thestudy (Binder and Meeker, 1988). First, officers were not always able or willing to impose the sanction dictatedby the experimental procedure. Second, few officers actually participated in the study. The officers were self-selected and a few of these provided the vast majority of the cases for study. Third, a self-report follow-up wascompleted on less than one-half of the cases. Finally, it is possible that many of the subjects chose not to fileofficial reports or reply to self-reports concerning subsequent instances of spouse abuse.Replications of the Minneapolis study fail to confirm the original results. Dunford (1990) reports that arrestsin Omaha, Nebraska, have no greater impact on future activity than does separating or counseling the partiesinvolved in the dispute. Interestingly, issuing warrants for suspects who left before the police arrived results infewer subsequent arrests compared to those not arrested by warrant. Dunford (1990) suggests that this positiveimpact may be due to the fact that those who fled prior to the arrival of the police had more to lose from anarrest, thus an arrest or formal system involvement would be a deterrent. A second replication in Charlotte,North Carolina (Hirschel et al., 1991, 1992), uncovers results similar to those in Omaha. The researchers reveal287
that arrest is no better at deterring subsequent behavior than issuing citations or advising and separating thedisputants. The results persist in both official and self-report data. Both of these evaluations pay particularattention to the shortcomings of the Sherman and Berk (1984) study and appear to have avoided the sameproblems. Consequently, the results of the original study need to be viewed with skepticism.Where the prior studies considered the impact of arrest, other analyses consider the impact of prosecution onsubsequent domestic violence. Thistlethwaite et al. (1998), studying misdemeanor domestic assault in HamiltonCounty, Ohio, report that offenders receiving more severe punishments tend to recidivate less often. Time onprobation or in jail, however, is not related to future domestic violence (Thistlethwaite et al., 1998). Conversely,Davis et al. (1998) claim that the outcome of prosecution (i.e., cases declined, dismissed, or not convicted) is notrelated to recidivism in Milwaukee County data. Clearly, the factors related to deterring repeat domesticviolence remain unknown.SummaryStudies of specific deterrence are not confined to imprisonment and domestic violence. A number of studieson fines for drunk driving (e.g., Briscoe, 2004; Moffat and Poynton, 2007; Wagenarr et al., 2007; Weatherburnand Moffatt, 2011) find little or no specific deterrent impact of fines. Coupled with other analyses, there doesnot appear to be strong support for specific deterrence. As noted earlier, Nagin et al. (2009), reviewingimprisonment studies, find a more criminogenic impact than a deterrent effect.Problems within study designs appear to be a major problem in the analyses. The inability to randomlyassign punishments or choose subjects represents one stumbling block. A second failure involves the decisionof researchers to ignore relevant factors such as the use or type of treatment applied to the subjects. Indeed,many studies of specific deterrence grew out of interest about the rehabilitative effect of imprisonment andvarious programs. Few evaluations address the possible confounding influence of any rehabilitative programthat may have existed. The present state of knowledge does not provide strong support for the argument.288
IncapacitationWhile imprisonment may not deter an individual from committing deviant acts again in the future, it doeskeep the subject from committing crimes against society while in the institution. Simply put, incapacitationprovides control over the individual, thus precluding behavior that is harmful to society. Incapacitation doesnot imply anything about the individual’s behavior once released from incarceration or control. Incapacitationcan take two different forms—collective and selective. Collective incapacitation refers to the imposition ofsentences upon everyone exhibiting the same behavior with no concern for the potential of the individual. Forexample, all burglars receive the same sentence. No consideration is given to the potential of the differentindividuals who commit the offense. The end result is punishment aimed at all similar offenders with theintent of eliminating subsequent offenses. The basis of collective incapacitation is the legal finding of a pastoffense.Under selective incapacitation the emphasis is on identifying high-risk offenders and subjecting only thatgroup to intervention. All offenders found guilty of the same crime are not punished equally. Those who arejudged to be greater threats to society may receive longer, harsher terms of imprisonment. Others judged to beof little threat are subjected to minimal time in prison or sentenced to an alternate punishment. The intent is tomaximize the incapacitation effect without subjecting all offenders to long prison terms or control. A goodexample of selective incapacitation is three-strikes laws that mandate lengthy imprisonment for thoseconvicted of a third offense.The evaluation of incapacitation effects rests on a number of assumptions concerning criminal activity. Themost basic assumption is that individuals commit some base rate of offenses every year. Using this figure, it ispossible to estimate the number of offenses that are averted through the incapacitation of an individual. Forexample, if it is assumed that an individual commits 10 crimes per year, the incapacitative effect of a one-yearprison sentence is a reduction of crime by 10 offenses for every person so incarcerated. This finding must bequalified, however, by other considerations.It is also assumed that there is a constant rate of offending over time and an individual’s criminal career isnot simply put on hold while incapacitated. Instead, the number of years served in prison, for example, issubtracted from the overall number of years offending. The inability to make this assumption would result inno incapacitative effect because the time served would simply postpone and not eliminate the level ofoffending. A further assumption is that an incapacitated individual is not replaced by another offender. Thesimple replacement of one individual by another would again result in no net change in offending.Replacement could take two forms. First, the incapacitation of an individual who commits crimes as part of agroup may result in the continuation of crime by the remaining group members. Second, crimes committed inthe context of an ongoing business interest, such as organized crime, may result in the business finding areplacement for the incapacitated subject.These assumptions have varying effects on the evaluation of collective and selective incapacitation. Thefollowing discussion focuses on the incapacitative effect of two interventions—imprisonment and electronicmonitoring.The Collective Incapacitation of ImprisonmentThe evidence on collective incapacitation from imprisonment offers results ranging from small to largechanges in the level of crime. Clarke (1974), using the Philadelphia cohort data (Wolfgang et al., 1972),estimates that incarcerating boys prior to age 18 reduces index offenses by 5 percent for white youths and 15percent for non-whites. Adjusting the figures to reflect the contribution of juvenile activity to the overall crimerate, Clarke (1974) notes that incapacitating juveniles will only result in a modest 1 to 4 percent decrease in theindex crime rate. Greenberg (1975), using official records to estimate the criminal careers of adult offenders,claims that doubling the amount of time spent in prison would only decrease crime by 0.6 percent to 4.0percent. Conversely, reducing the prison population by 50 percent would only increase the number of crimes289
by 1.2 percent to 8.0 percent (Greenberg, 1975). Finally, Peterson and Braiker (1980), using self-report data onthe level of offending prior to incarceration and estimates of the average individual crime rate, find thatincarceration reduces the level of burglary by only 6 percent and auto theft by 7 percent (Peterson and Braiker,1980). They claim a much larger incapacitation effect for armed robbery, where 22 percent of the offenses areaverted through the imprisonment of offenders.Each of the studies presented above assumes a constant crime rate across all offenders. The actual level ofoffending, however, probably varies greatly from individual to individual. Marsh and Singer (1972) considerindividual differences in the level of offending by dividing their target population of robbers into sixsubgroups, each with different offense rates. Examination of the effect of a one-year increase in incarcerationfor each subgroup reveals an incapacitation effect ranging from 35 to 48 percent (Marsh and Singer, 1972). Thisis a great departure from the figures uncovered in the studies using constant, aggregate crime rates.Differences in criminal justice system policies also may result in varying incapacitation effects. Petersiliaand Greenwood (1978) estimate that a five-year mandatory sentence imposed on felony offenders would resultin a 31 percent decrease in violent crimes and a 42 percent decrease in burglaries. Withholding the mandatorysentence until a second felony conviction would reduce the incapacitative effect to 16 percent for violentoffenses and 15 percent for burglaries. Van Dine et al. (1979), looking at data for Columbus, Ohio, claim that afive-year mandatory sentence for a first felony offense would result in a 17.4 percent decrease in violent indexcrimes. Incarceration after a second offense would result in a 6 percent reduction. Cohen (1983) reports thatfive-year mandatory sentences for prisoners with prior records would reduce index crimes by Washington,D.C. arrestees by 13.7 percent.The costs of incapacitation can be examined in terms of the number of people who need to be incarcerated.Cohen (1978) estimates the level of increased incarceration necessary to achieve a 10 percent reduction in indexcrime, a reduction of 100 index crimes, and a 10 percent reduction in violent crimes. Estimates for variousstates are found in Table 15.1. The table shows that small reductions in crime require large increases in thepercentage of people sentenced to prison. For example, a 10 percent reduction in the California index crimerate requires a corresponding 157.2 percent increase in the prison population. The smallest change related to adecrease in index crimes appears in Mississippi, where it is still necessary to increase the incarceratedpopulation by 33.7 percent. Using data from the Netherlands, Wermink et al. (2013) claim that, in order to avert400 convictions, it is necessary to incarcerate an additional 5,707 offenders. It is clear that incapacitation exactsa high cost in terms of the number of offenders who need to be incarcerated.Table 15.1 Level of Change Needed in Imprisonment Necessary for IncapacitationPercentage Increase in Prison Population Needed to Achieve:State10% Decrease in IndexCrimesReduction of 100 IndexCrimes10% Decrease in ViolentCrimeCalifornia157.236.122.8New York263.567.257.0Massachusetts310.5103.426.6Ohio82.534.712.0290
Kentucky86.144.816.0NewHampshire118.098.98.4Mississippi33.739.113.0North Dakota122.0144.219.6Source: Adapted by author from J. Cohen (1978). “The incapacitative effect of imprisonment: a critical review of the literature.” In A.Blumstein et al. (eds.), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates. Washington, DC:National Academy Press.Incapacitation also involves an increased monetary burden for society. Walker (1985) presents a number ofestimates related to an incapacitation strategy. Using conservative figures related to the number of people whomust be incarcerated (based on Van Dine et al., 1979), Walker (1985) notes that, nationally, a 25 percentincapacitation effect necessitates the incarceration of 1,200,000 new prisoners. Each of these new prisoners willrequire bed space and upkeep, and these costs can be considerable. Henrichson and Delaney (2012) compute theyearly costs of imprisonment at $31,286 per inmate for states. Based on Walker’s projected increase in neededbeds, the increased costs to the states would exceed $375 billion! This does not include the costs of constructingthe space.It would appear that the costs, both in terms of numbers of persons in prison and the dollars needed toaccomplish this feat, outweigh the benefits accrued from the effort. A possible solution to this would be theincapacitation of only the individuals who are a clear threat to society. Such selective incapacitation mayeliminate the need to increase the prison population in order to bring about lower levels of crime.The Selective Incapacitation of ImprisonmentSelective incapacitation differs from collective efforts by imposing punishment on a select few individuals.The emphasis is on the identification of offenders who are high risk. The individuals who are more likely todisplay antisocial behavior in the future, and thus pose a risk to society, are subjected to longer periods ofincarceration. Advocates of selective incapacitation point to the lower cost of incarcerating only a portion of alloffenders along with presumed savings in the number of future offenses.The idea of selective incapacitation received its greatest boost from a Rand Corporation report written byGreenwood (1982). In an attempt to identify a group of individuals who should be incapacitated, Greenwoodsurveyed almost 2,200 prison inmates in California, Texas, and Michigan who were serving time for burglaryor robbery. Examining self-report records and official documents concerning past behavior, arrests,convictions, and incarcerations, the author composed a seven-item scale that purportedly distinguishesbetween high-, medium-, and low-rate offenders (see Table 15.2). Greenwood (1982) applied this scale to theTexas and California prisoners to test for the incapacitative effect of the scale.Table 15.2 Greenwood’s Selective Incapacitation Prediction Scale1.Prior conviction for the same offense2.Incarcerated for more than 50 percent of the preceding two years291
3.Conviction before the age of 164.Served time in a juvenile facility5.Drug use in the preceding two years6.Drug use as a juvenile7.Employed less than 50 percent of the preceding two yearsSource: P.W. Greenwood (1982). Selective Incapacitation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.Greenwood (1982) suggests that by reducing the time served by low- and medium-risk inmates andincreasing the terms for high-risk offenders, it is possible to reduce robbery by 15 percent while lowering theCalifornia prison population by 5 percent. He compares this to a collective incapacitation approach that wouldrequire a 25 percent increase in the prison population to achieve the same 15 percent reduction in robberies. Onthe other hand, a 15 percent decrease in burglary requires a 7 percent increase in the number of prisoners inCalifornia, even using a selective incapacitation approach (Greenwood, 1982). Figures for Texas are not asencouraging, with a 10 percent decrease in robbery requiring a 30 percent increase in the prison roles. A similarreduction in burglary requires a 15 percent rise in the prison population. The differences between Californiaand Texas are due to the much lower offense rates in Texas, which affect the estimates. Despite thecontradictory results, advocates of selective incapacitation often point to the 15 percent robbery reductionaccomplished through an overall decrease of 5 percent in the prison population (Greenwood, 1982).Greenwood’s (1982) figures have been severely criticized by other researchers. Visher (1986, 1987) points outthat there are serious problems with the data, including the inability of some inmates to accurately recall pastevents and time periods, and problems with estimating the level of offending prior to incarceration. Largedifferences between California, Texas, and Michigan offense rates complicate the analysis (Visher, 1986).Reanalyzing the data, Visher (1987) reports lower estimates of the number of crimes committed andsubsequently lower estimates of incapacitation. She finds a selective incapacitative effect of only 5 to 10percent in California and increased crime in both Texas and Michigan. These new estimates seriously questionthe efficacy of selective incapacitation.A number of other problems permeate the issue of selective incapacitation. The foremost concern rests onthe ability to predict future behavior. As discussed in Chapter 10, the ability to predict behavior is poor at best.Second, incapacitation assumes that the rate of offending remains constant over time. If an offender’s careerwould end during the time served in prison, the value of incarceration is lost. Third, estimates of incapacitationtypically assume constant levels of arrest, conviction, and incarceration. This assumption is very questionable.High-rate offenders face a greater chance of detection and subsequent system action, simply because of theirincreased level of behavior. Fourth, prison inmates may not be representative of the entire criminal populationand results based on studies of inmates have questionable generalizability. Finally, there is a serious questionconcerning society’s right to punish an individual for potential dangerousness and not just actual behavior.Implicit in selective incapacitation is the imposition of a longer sentence in order to avoid what might happenif an individual is released. Given the poor ability to accurately predict future behavior, this approach subjectsmany individuals to unnecessary punishment. In summary, although selective incapacitation holds muchintuitive appeal, there does not seem to be a solid empirical basis for invoking the process at this time.Electronic Monitoring292
Incapacitation can also be achieved without the use of incarceration. The advent of electronic monitoring(EM) introduced a new avenue to incapacitation. Home confinement using EM has prospered largely due totwo things: (1) the growth and problems encountered by the prison system in the United States, and (2) thegreat developments in technology over the past 40 years. Many jurisdictions are under court orders to reducethe size of their jail or prison populations. The initial response to these challenges has been the call foradditional prisons. The public, however, is reluctant to pay the costs for new bed space, despite their calls forgetting tough on offenders.The response to overcrowding, legal challenges, rising crime, and public sentiment has been thedevelopment of various alternatives to incarceration. Electronic monitoring is one possible solution to the callfor increased supervision and protection of society when offenders are released into the community. The ideaof keeping track of individuals using an electronic device dates back to Schwitzgebel et al. (1964), whodescribed an EM system and discussed its potential uses. Jack Love, a New Mexico judge, took the idea ofmonitoring offenders from a 1977 comic strip in which Spiderman was tracked by means of a wrist transmitterand commissioned the development of a tracking device. The device, often called a “GOSSlink” after itsinventor Michael Goss, was first used in 1983 on a small group of offenders in New Mexico (Niederberger andWagner, 1985). The primary aim of the EM system was to monitor compliance with curfews and homeconfinement (Vaughn, 1989). Interest in this novel technique quickly prompted the development of similardevices by various companies and the adoption or testing of the technology in jurisdictions across the country.The initial forms of EM involved the use of radio frequency (RF) transmitters. These transmitters fall intoone of two primary systems or types—active or passive. Active, or continuous signaling, systems keep trackof the offender on a continuous basis. This system consists of a transmitter, receiver, and a central computer.The transmitter is a small, tamper-proof device, often smaller than a package of cigarettes, which is typicallystrapped to the offender’s ankle. A constant signal is emitted by the transmitter and is picked up by a receiver.Early receivers were attached to the home phone. Today, the receiver can be at a remote location andcontacted via wireless systems. The receiver notifies the central computer of a violation if the offender movesout of a specified range. A probation officer or other individual typically checks on the violation in order toconfirm the information and take appropriate action. The computer system can be programmed to allow theoffender to go to work, attend school, or participate in other activities. The system simply logs the times theoffender leaves and returns home. A continuous computer printout of the offender’s activity can be evaluatedat any time.The passive system consists of similar equipment, but requires periodic activation of the system. Thissystem is also referred to as a programmed contact system. A passive system may randomly call theoffender’s home to certify the presence of the individual. When called, the offender must place thetransmitter/encoder into a verifier/receiver. The individual may also be required to answer questions that areused in a voice verification. The system can also be activated by a mobile (drive-by) monitor. Passive systemsare often set up with a graduated schedule of contacts in which the system checks on offenders more often inthe early weeks and gradually reduces the number of contacts as time passes without violations (Gable, 1986;Maxfield and Baumer, 1990).The most recent innovation has been a coupling of these systems with global positioning system (GPS)technology (Lilly, 2006). GPS technology uses satellites to locate a person or monitor their movements. Thiscan be done on either a continuous basis or intermittently. One major advantage of this technology is there isno need for a home monitoring device or the use of any telephone lines. GPS technology has been used formany years for locating stolen vehicles. Adding GPS to EM programs makes it more difficult for offenders toabscond.On the Web An extensive discussion of electronic monitoring is offer by DeMichele and Payne in their 2009work Offender Supervision with Electronic Technology: Community Corrections Resources. SecondEdition. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, found on the textbook web site.293
Proponents of electronic monitoring point to a variety of advantages stemming from its use. First, EM canpossibly alleviate the overcrowding of correctional institutions. Second, the use of electronic monitorsenhances the ability to supervise offenders in the community and can incapacitate offenders better than simpleprobation or parole. Third, the system reduces the costs of monitoring offenders in the community. Fourth, EMprovides an “intermediate” level of punishment for offenders who do not need to be sentenced to an institution,yet may need more than simple probation. Fifth, advocates see EM as a more humane method for dealing withoffenders as compared to incarceration. Finally, electronic monitors assist reintegration into society byallowing offenders to remain in the community, maintain family and friendship ties, and support the family.The discussion that follows focuses primarily on issues of recidivism.Extent of EM UseThe adoption of EM has steadily increased since its initial use in New Mexico in 1983. In 1986, there were 10known manufacturers of EM equipment and only 10 jurisdictions in the United States using the technology(Friel et al., 1987; Schmidt, 1986). The number of EM programs has increased greatly since that time. The use ofEM technology has spread beyond the United States to more than 17 countries, including Canada, the UnitedKingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Argentina, Israel, and Taiwan (Stacey, 2006). In the United States,a 2009 estimate placed EMS use at almost 110,000 offenders on RF systems and another 91,000 under GPStracking (DeMichele and Payne, 2009). Haverkamp et al. (2004) provide estimates for yearly caseloads on EMfor various European countries (see Table 15.3), with approximately 20,000 in England and 3,000 in Sweden.EM is not intended to be used with all offenders. The fact that the beginnings of EM and home confinementare rooted in the problem of jail and prison overcrowding points to the idea that these alternatives are meantfor offenders who would normally be confined in an institution. Most programs require that potential clientscome from pools of offenders ordered to jail, prison, pretrial detention, or those who cannot raise bail (Charles,1989; Ford and Schmidt, 1985; Maxfield and Baumer, 1990; Vaughn, 1989). Excluding offenders from EM whowould normally be set free with minimal or no supervision avoids the problem of using the new program as ameans of intervening with an entire new set of clients. EM programs do not wish to be seen as a form of net-widening (i.e., bringing more people under the umbrella of social control). Programs also tend to target lessserious offenders or offenders deemed inappropriate for incarceration (such as DUI offenders), although seriousoffenders (such as sex offenders and violent gang members) are targeted by some programs (Friel et al., 1987;Gies et al., 2013; Maxfield and Baumer, 1990; Padgett et al., 2006).Table 15.3 Estimates of EM Use in Europe, 2004CountryYearly EM NumberEngland20,000Sweden3,000Belgium2,100The Netherlands390France255294
Portugal39Source: Adapted by author from R. Haverkamp et al. (2004). “Electronic monitoring in Europe.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Lawand Criminal Justice 12:36-45.Impact on Offending and Technical ViolationsInterestingly, despite the growth in EM forms and the number of individuals under EM, relatively littleresearch has been conducted on its impact. The evaluations that have been done on EM generally showfavorable results in terms of both technical violations and further offending. Evaluation of one post-convictionprogram in Kenton County, Kentucky, reveals that roughly 8 percent of the offenders placed on EM commitsome technical violation resulting in their removal from the program (Ball et al., 1988; Lilly et al., 1987). Moreimportantly, slightly more than 5 percent of the offenders commit new crimes. This recidivistic behavior,however, is significantly less than that of a pre-program control group of offenders (20 percent recidivism).Evaluation of a Palm Beach County, Florida, program reveals similar positive results with less than 10 percentrecidivism (Ball et al., 1988; Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Department, 1987). Unfortunately, the Palm Beachprogram provides no figures for comparable offenders handled under alternative or traditional methods. Thislack of a control group leaves in doubt the actual impact of the program.Two evaluations in Florida provide strong support for EM. Padgett et al. (2006) examining data for 1998 to2002, note that those on EM commit fewer technical violations and have lower recidivism levels, despite thefact that those on EM are higher-risk clients. The second evaluation (Bales et al., 2010), considering EM usefrom 2001 to 2007, finds that EM usage reduces offender failure by 31 percent compared to those not on EM.The impact is significant for all types of offenders (violent, property, or drug). In addition, the use of GPAsystems is more effective than RF equipment (Bales et al., 2010).Electronic monitoring is also used as a form of pretrial supervision for individuals who cannot post bond orwho would otherwise be released. Cooprider and Kerby (1990), reporting on a pretrial program in Lake County,Illinois, note that those released on EM have a higher violation rate than those released on recognizance (19 percent compared to 13 percent), although the violations are for technical problems and not new offenses. Asecond evaluation of EM reports a higher violation rate for pretrial releasees than post-conviction offenders (27per cent compared to 19 percent) (Maxfield and Baumer, 1990). Violations could include new charges,absconding, and technical violations. Maxfield and Baumer (1990) and Baumer et al. (1993) suggest that greaterviolations by pretrial subjects may be due to the fact that a wider array of clients and problems are involved atpretrial than at post-conviction. Those on post-conviction release also have a greater degree of certaintyconcerning the future, whereas pretrial subjects are awaiting word of the future. In general, studies dealingwith pretrial use of EM present generally favorable results with relatively low levels of violations.An interesting variation in the use of EM involves the enforcement of domestic violence protection orders.Erez et al. (2004) report on a program in which defendants are ordered to wear the ankle bracelet but the basemonitoring unit is placed in the home of the victim. When a defendant nears the victim’s home, the EM systemregisters the defendant’s presence and an alert is sent to the authorities and the victim. Victims can also carry amonitor when away from home to protect against the defendant (Erez et al., 2004). An analysis of more than600 cases in which the EM was used shows few violations, with most involving simple “drivebys” and noattempt to actually contact the victim (Erez et al., 2004).Electronic monitoring with GPS monitoring is also used with sex offenders in New Jersey and California.The New Jersey State Parole Board (NJPB, 2007) notes that the technology has been employed with 225dangerous sex offenders. The California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation reports using GPSmonitoring with almost 7,000 sex offenders in 2011 (Gies et al., 2013). The use of GPS offers a variety ofadvantages, most notably the ability to place an offender at an offense location during the commission of acrime. This enhances the ability to clear a case and greatly improves the odds of getting a conviction. Based ondata for the first year of operation, only one of 225 New Jersey parolees under GPS surveillance committed anew sex crime, with an additional 19 committing a technical violation (NJPB, 2007). This is significantly lowerthat the U.S. recidivism rate for sex offenders.295
Impact on OvercrowdingThe goal of reducing overcrowding also has not been realized. The fact that most programs deal with arelatively small number of individuals at any point in time means that there is little if any relief forovercrowded jails and prisons. The continued growth of the prison/jail population, despite the growth of EM, isadequate evidence showing that EM has had no impact on overcrowding. Changing the analysis to anexamination of the number of days spent outside of an institution, however, provides more positive results.Offenders in Kenton County spent 1,712 days of incarceration at home. The Palm Beach County offenderscompleted 10,716 incarceration days in the community (Ball et al., 1988). Where the number of offenders is notlarge, each day outside the institution represents an improvement in the crowding situation.Issues and ConcernsDespite the great growth and support for EM, a number of problem areas and concerns are advanced byvarious writers. One area of concern relates to operational issues faced by agencies using the technology.Vaughn (1989) notes that EM is a labor-intensive system that operates 24 hours a day. This round-the-clockmonitoring increases the personnel costs to the administrative agency, especially if the agency is traditionallyoriented to daytime operations (Friel and Vaughn, 1986). In addition, many offenders spend only a short timeon the system before being granted outright release or moving on to other programs. This great turnovermeans that the screening process, data entry, program hook-up, and other tasks must be undertaken on acontinuing basis with new clients (Vaughn, 1989).Second, critics of electronic monitoring point out the potential of the technology to simply extend the reachof the criminal justice system. They note that most innovations aimed at reducing the size and scope ofintervention actually result in more persons under some form of social control (i.e., net-widening). Becauseelectronic monitoring does not eliminate or limit the existing institutional space, it is possible that thetechnology will increase the number of individuals under daily supervision of the criminal or juvenile justicesystems. While few studies attempt to evaluate the degree of net-widening that may be taking place, Ball et al.(1988), Lilly et al. (1987), and Maxfield and Baumer (1990) provide preliminary evidence that net-widening isnot occurring to any great degree.Another concern is that the use of EM may place the public at greater risk. EM programs cannot guaranteethat the offenders will not or cannot commit additional offenses while in the community. There is nothing tophysically keep an offender from offending or absconding. There are times, such as when an offender issupposed to be at school or work, when he is not being monitored. Any mistake by the equipment at detectinga violation also leaves society at risk.Finally, EM is viewed by many as an Orwellian means of controlling the population. The government istaking on the image of Big Brother—always watching us in order to correct our behavior whenever we stepout of line. The extent of that ability is apparent in the fact that there are offenders under 24-hour surveillanceusing GPS technology. Electronic monitoring can extend state intervention into our homes and daily activities.The fact that EM requires the compliance of the entire family exacerbates this feeling of control. Manyindividuals object to such interventions on the basis of the sanctity of the home and the fear of an overreachinggovernment. While the technology and monitoring may be legal, there is the larger social question of where todraw the line of governmental intervention in the community.SummaryThe use of electronic devices to monitor offenders has quickly found a place in the daily operations of thecriminal justice system. Since the early 1980s, EM has grown from the plot of a comic strip to programs inevery state and other countries. The growth can be attributed to the overcrowding of prisons, the developmentof the technology, the desire to do something with offenders, and the acceptance of the idea by criminal justicesystem personnel and the public. This review suggests that EM is a viable method for handling both adults andjuveniles at post-conviction and pretrial stages of intervention. The low violation rates and the dominance of296
technical violations favor the use of EM. Despite concerns and shortcomings, EM appears to be a permanentcomponent of criminal justice supervision.297
Future ImplicationsThe research on specific deterrence and incapacitation presents a mixed picture. Studies of specificdeterrence present contradictory results concerning the deterrent effects of punishment. While society calls forstronger sanctions, it may be that these interventions play an aggravating role in deviant behavior. Theoffender may view harsh punishment as a breaking point with conventional society and an opportunity to turnto further deviant activity. The act of putting an individual behind bars may be more criminogenic thandeterrent. The uncertain knowledge about individual hedonistic values makes the selection and imposition ofpunishment for deterrence a difficult, if not impossible, task. The lack of attention paid to specific deterrenceand the inability to separate rehabilitation from punishment in research impedes the evaluation of thisapproach.Incapacitation, whether collective or selective, has great intuitive appeal for society. The idea of punishingan individual for the harm he caused is an accepted method for dealing with deviant behavior. Extending thatperiod of punishment in order to keep an individual from committing another offense is an easily acceptablemodification. The costs of such a policy, however, may be high. The number of persons who must be housed inorder to achieve even a small decrease in crime is staggering even using the most conservative figures.Translating these bodies into dollars leads to budgets that the public has not been willing to accept. As withspecific deterrence, the research literature holds little promise for an acceptable incapacitation strategy at thistime.Another possible alternative is incapacitating offenders in the community through the use of EM. Electronicmonitoring offers a cost-effective means for releasing offenders into the community while providing a degreeof control over them. The evaluation research suggests that the level of both technical violations and newoffending is relatively low. Despite problems and concerns with EM programs, they appear to be a viablealternative to incapacitation through incarceration.Key Termsactive (continuous signaling) systemBig Brothercollective incapacitationelectronic monitoring (EM)global positioning system (GPS) technologyincapacitationMinneapolis Domestic Violence Experimentnet-wideningpassive systemprogrammed contact systemradio frequency (RF) transmittersselective incapacitationspecific deterrencethree-strikes laws298
Chapter 16RehabilitationChapter OutlineThe “What Works?” ArgumentSubsequent AnalysesOutcome MeasuresLevels of EvaluationSummaryEvaluations of Rehabilitation ProgramsCognitive-Behavioral InterventionsIntensive SupervisionRestorative JusticeSpecialized CourtsAssessing Rehabilitation and Crime PreventionLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Give arguments on both sides of the “nothing works” controversy.List and discuss different outcome measures used in treatment research.Compare and contrast aggregate and individual-level evaluation.Provide examples of cognitive behavioral interventions, relate their approach, and tell howeffective they are.Explain what ISP programs are and what impact they have had.Define restorative justice and name three different types.Outline victim–offender mediation.Explain how family group conferencing works.Discuss circle sentencing.Relate the impact of restorative justice in terms of participant satisfaction and recidivism.Explain how drug courts are expected to influence their clients.Briefly discuss the common elements of drug court programs.List advantages of drug courts.Identify problems/issues with drug court programs.Throughout most of the twentieth century, the major method of achieving tertiary prevention was therehabilitation of offenders. Various forms of rehabilitation dominated the handling of criminals, and acomplete listing and brief explanation of all of the various treatment programs set up to deal with deviantbehavior would fill many volumes. Despite the move toward increased punitiveness since the 1970s,rehabilitation has remained a driving interest in the correctional field. Given this, one would assume that there299
is clear evidence of successful intervention. The state of the evidence, however, is not as clear. This chapterexamines the debate on the rehabilitation controversy, discusses the problems inherent in the research anddebate, and considers a few promising rehabilitation approaches. Space and time constraints prohibit all but abrief examination of specific intervention approaches. Many other texts have been written and devotedexclusively to the examination of rehabilitation.300
The “What Works?” ArgumentNo one truly interested in the study of rehabilitation can be unaware of the eulogy placed on treatment that“with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had noappreciable effect on recidivism” (Martinson, 1974). With this single statement, the very basis of correctionalintervention was shaken. The foundation for this assessment was an examination of literature on rehabilitationappearing between 1945 and 1967 (Lipton et al., 1975). The authors considered 231 studies in which there was atreatment evaluation with a control group, an outcome measure attributable to the treatment, sufficientinformation about the intervention and evaluation for making a judgment, a sufficiently large sample size tomake inferences, and, in general, a sound research methodology. The authors examined a wide range ofintervention techniques, including counseling, educational and vocational training, medical treatment,psychological therapy, probation, parole, and community programs. As already noted, the effect of thesevarious programs on recidivism was negligible (Martinson, 1974). Other outcome variables, such as adjustmentto prison, attitude adjustment, and educational improvement, show some positive effects on offenders. Thesechanges, however, are relatively unimportant given the major goal of preventing further criminal behavior.Subsequent AnalysesThe finding of little or no effect of rehabilitation on recidivism appears in a variety of other reports since thework of Martinson (1974) and Lipton et al. (1975). Wright and Dixon (1977), reviewing 96 studies from 1965 to1974, report that treatment has little impact on recidivism. The authors further note that most of theevaluations employ poor research design, fail to use random assignment, and do not present adequateinformation for subsequent analysis. Another examination of 18 rehabilitation programs in New York City,comparing both pre- and post-program levels of deviance and program participants with a control group,arrives at the same conclusion (Fishman, 1977). Fishman reports higher recidivism for participants under age18, no difference for those ages 19 and 20, lower recidivism for young adult participants (ages 21 to 39), and nodifference for subjects aged 40 and over. Comparison of recidivism rates for the various projects does notuncover any significant differences among the rehabilitative techniques.A reanalysis of the Lipton et al. (1975) findings undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences concludesthat the original authors “were reasonably accurate and fair in their appraisal of the rehabilitation literature”(Sechrest et al., 1979). The only major point of departure in the reanalysis involves the feeling that the earlieranalysis overstates the effectiveness of the reviewed programs. Sechrest et al. (1979) claim that the earlier reportfalls short in its criticism of the studies. The original review appears to have overlooked a variety of criticalproblems within the research reports, particularly concerning the methodological shortcomings and the resultsof the evaluations. Other reviews of the literature also fail to find strong support for rehabilitation. Gensheimeret al. (1986) report that, of 44 studies spanning 1967 to 1983, there is no evidence of a rehabilitative effectaccruing from the interventions. Finally, Lab and Whitehead (1988), presenting data from 55 research reportsfrom 1975 to 1984, reveal 33 comparisons with no difference or worse recidivism by experimentals and only 15with positive results. Based on these literature reviews, which span a variety of decades and rehabilitativestrategies, it is possible to conclude that rehabilitation is not very effective at reducing recidivism.Not all researchers, however, are ready to sound the death knell for rehabilitation. One leading proponent ofrehabilitation (Palmer, 1975), claims that Martinson (1974) ignores a variety of positive findings in his analysis.Palmer (1975) notes that certain programs have positive effects on certain individuals under certain conditions.The emphasis should not be on finding a single cure-all for the entire range of offenders (Palmer, 1975). Indeed,Martinson (1979) agrees that there are instances in which rehabilitation does have a positive impact on anindividual’s behavior. Nevertheless, the overall finding that most programs report little or no success with themajority of subjects still holds true (Martinson, 1979). Support for the belief that some programs work withsome select individuals also can be found in reviews by Graziano and Mooney (1984), Garrett (1985), andMayer et al. (1986). While the evidence shows some reduced recidivism, the greatest changes appear in other301
outcome measures (e.g., psychological adjustment, academic improvement, institutional adjustment). The dataalso suggest that more rigorous studies find less of an impact on recidivism than evaluations that are not asconcerned with the research methodology.Andrews et al. (1990) argue that treatment has a definite positive impact on recidivism. The authors suggestthat treatment that pays attention to the principles of risk, need, and responsivity (basically matching thecorrect subjects with the correct intervention) can have a significant impact on recidivism (Andrews et al.,1990). They purportedly prove their point through a reanalysis of the Whitehead and Lab (1989) data and ananalysis of adult data. Lab and Whitehead (1990), however, argue that Andrews and associates fail to definetheir terms in such a way that their argument can be tested, and they fail to follow their own criteria inclassifying subjects and studies. More importantly, their presentation is tautological. That is, they use acircular argument in which they use the existing literature to identify risk, need, and responsivity and then usethat same literature as data to prove the correctness of their position (Lab and Whitehead, 1990; Logan andGaes, 1993). Anyone can prove something that already exists.In a series of papers, Lipsey (1990, 1999; Lipsey and Wilson, 1993, 1998) reports on perhaps the mostextensive evaluations of the rehabilitation literature. Throughout the analyses, the author finds positive effectsfrom rehabilitative treatment. For example, Lipsey and Wilson (1998) report an overall 6 percent difference inrecidivism between experimental and control subjects across 200 studies. It is important to note, however, thatthere is a great deal of heterogeneity across the studies, with different types of treatment having differenteffects. Treatments that focus on interpersonal skills, cognitive-behavioral interventions, multimodalapproaches, and community-based programs typically have a greater impact than other interventions (Lipseyand Wilson, 1998; Lösel, 1995). Lipsey (1990) argues that research on the impact of rehabilitation needs toconsider the type of treatment, the setting in which it is delivered, the method of evaluation, and other factorswhen assessing the evidence. Lowenkamp et al. (2006) note that interventions with stronger program integrity(that is, strong program implementation, good offender assessment, etc.) are more effective at reducingrecidivism than those that have weak integrity.There is no uniform opinion regarding the effectiveness of rehabilitation. This state of disarray can beattributed to underlying conceptual differences between the opponents in the debate. Major points ofdivergence are the choice of outcome measure and the level of evaluation. Each of these factors can alter theresults of evaluations and reviews.Outcome MeasuresThe traditional measure of success in rehabilitation has been the elimination of deviant behavior. Usuallythis means lowering recidivism. Measuring recidivism, however, can be very difficult. Recidivism has beendefined in many ways—ranging from reincarceration (a very strict criterion) to simple referral of the individualto any source of help (a very lax definition). Each of the definitions is problematic. For example,reincarceration is a relatively rare event for some types of offenders and, therefore, the levels of recidivismmay be quite low. Alternatively, recidivism measured as simple contact with the police can greatly inflate theoutcome. The varied choice of recidivism measure is a major problem in attempts to review and consolidatethe results of different reports.Perhaps the most common outcome measures in the rehabilitation literature are those that do not look torecidivism or deviant behavior. These measures include educational and vocational achievement, changes inself-esteem, attitudinal shifts, psychological adjustment, community adjustment, and costs of intervention.Many proponents of rehabilitative efficacy point to improvements in these dimensions as proof of programeffectiveness. Unfortunately, while many of these outcomes are found in the literature, changes in thesedimensions often appear during the in-program period and fail to persist long after release from the program.The alternative outcome measures, however, should remain secondary concerns to the prevention of criminalactivity. The major problem for rehabilitation is future deviant behavior. Unless a clear connection can befound between the alternative outcomes and lower recidivism, these outcomes should remain secondary in theevaluation of rehabilitation programs. Indeed, the emphasis of tertiary crime prevention is on subsequent levelsof recidivism.302
Levels of EvaluationThe debate between critics and proponents of rehabilitation often rests on the appropriate level of evaluationto be employed in the analysis. Studies that report negative findings for rehabilitation usually rely on aggregateevaluation. Aggregate-level evaluation looks for changes across large groups of subjects. Changes in rates ofoffending or recidivism are the common metric by which programs are to be judged. A small or nonexistentchange in the overall rate of crime is indicative of a failed intervention. In essence, aggregate evaluationsearches for quantitative changes in behavior. The reviews cited earlier, which indicated minimal impact (e.g.,Gensheimer et al., 1986; Lab and Whitehead, 1988; Lipton et al., 1975; Martinson, 1974; Sechrest et al., 1979;Whitehead and Lab, 1989; Wright and Dixon, 1977) all rely heavily on the failure of rehabilitation to shiftrecidivism rates.Proponents of rehabilitation favor individual-level evaluations. The individual level focuses on qualitativechanges rather than quantitative shifts in offending. These qualitative movements may appear as simpleadjustments in the type of offending. For example, an offender may shift from robbery, which involves aphysical confrontation, to property offenses, such as burglary or larceny. This would affect the rate for specificoffenses but do little for the overall crime rate. Individual-level analysis also is able to focus on other, non-crime-related measures of change. Attitudinal shifts, psychological adjustment, ability to relate to others, andincreased life skills are examples of alternate outcomes that can be found when looking at individual progress.Virtually any program can point to at least a few successes when the criteria for success is movement alongone of these qualitative dimensions. It is this individual level of evaluation that prompts Palmer (1975, 1983),Martinson (1979), Garrett (1985), and others to claim that some rehabilitation works for some clients.SummaryThere is still a great deal of debate on the impact of rehabilitation on recidivism, although most reviewsclaim to find at least some positive support for rehabilitation. Strong claims of success typically rely onalternative outcome measures. Evaluations that do not use random assignment of study subjects or follow strictmethodological techniques tend to show better results (Garrett, 1985; Mayer et al., 1986), as do evaluations ofdemonstration projects where there is a great deal of control over the intervention and its implementation (see,for example, Lipsey et al., 2001). Perhaps the key to developing effective interventions is matching theappropriate subjects to the proper treatment. Andrews et al. (1990) incorporate this in their discussion of risk,need, and responsivity. Unfortunately, as we have seen elsewhere in this book, correctly identifying risk is anelusive problem. The majority of programs do not know which clients are best served by their treatment, nordo they know how to identify the proper subjects once they are aware of differential program impact. As aresult, tertiary crime prevention can be achieved only in a limited way.303
Evaluations of Rehabilitation ProgramsRehabilitation efforts persist despite the many criticisms of rehabilitation. A variety of interventionprograms continue to be tried and some present encouraging results. Several programs attempt to adhere to thebasic premises of risk, need, and responsivity as proposed by Andrews et al. (1990). Other programs are theoutgrowth of existing correctional programs, such as intensive supervision probation (ISP) (an enhancedform of probation). The following presentations are not meant to be all-inclusive nor representative of all typesof intervention. It should briefly acquaint the reader with a few interesting approaches of the recent past.Cognitive-Behavioral InterventionsThe results of meta-analyses of treatment programs and the debate about the effectiveness of correctionaltreatment have led to several suggestions about appropriate treatment. Cullen and Gendreau (2000) outlineseveral general principles that appear to underlie effective programs. First, interventions should target knownpredictors of deviant behavior and recidivism. Second, interventions should be behavioral and address thecognitive processes that lead to antisocial activity. Such interventions would seek to alter the decision-makingprocesses of individuals, help offenders to identify prosocial responses to challenges, and develop skills andtechniques for avoiding problem behavior. Third, successful programs will target high-risk offenders incommunity settings using well-trained staff and interventions matched to the needs of offenders. Theseprograms generally fall under the heading of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Cullen and Gendreau(2000) claim that interventions that follow these guidelines will achieve positive results.Various programs appear under the CBT heading. Multi-Systemic Therapy and the Cognitive Thinking SkillsProgram are two examples. The idea that behavior is affected by a wide array of social and environmentalfactors underlies Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) (Cullen and Gendreau, 2000). Multi-Systemic Therapy is acommunity-based intervention that attempts to address family, peer, school, community, and other influencesthat may prompt or lead to deviant behavior. The actual intervention will vary based on the needs of theindividual, and it is dynamic and changes according to the needs and progress of the client. Each clientreceives intensive services, in the community, from a team of therapists who are held accountable for thesuccesses or failures of the program (Cullen and Gendreau, 2000). Evaluations of MST reveal reduceddelinquency and improvements in risk-related behaviors (Borduin et al., 1995; Brown et al., 1999).The Cognitive Thinking Skills Program (CTSP) is also a multi-modal intervention that utilizes a range oftechniques targeting cognitive-behavioral problems (Gaes et al., 1999). The CTSP focuses on identifyingcognitive deficits and inappropriate decision making by individuals. Typical problems are impulsive behavior,egocentric activity, selfishness, and an inability to express oneself (Gaes et al., 1999). Highly trained programstaff offer 70 hours of skills training to clients. CTSP has been adopted across Canada, as well as in several U.S.states and the United Kingdom. Gaes et al. (1999), reviewing evidence on CTSP, report that fewer treatmentsubjects recidivate than non-treatment control clients. While the differences tend to be statistically significant,many of the differences are small. The most positive findings emerge from CTSP implementation incommunity settings (Gaes et al., 1999).The increased use of cognitive-behavioral interventions has prompted several meta-analytic reviews. Lipseyet al. (2001) considered only 14 evaluations that included experimental or quasi-experimental designs with afocus on recidivism. The results show that all but one project reports lower recidivism among experimentalyouths, although in only three of the 13 positive findings are the results statistically significant (Lipsey et al.,2001). Despite this fact, the authors point out that the global mean difference (i.e., the results across all studies)is statistically significant, indicating that the results are greatly influenced by a minority of the evaluations.The strongest results appear in demonstration projects in which the intervention is set up specifically fortesting and evaluation, and there is reason to believe that the program is better implemented and delivered(Lipsey, 1999; Lipsey et al., 2001). The better results also appear in studies of juveniles treated in thecommunity.304
Lipton et al. (2002) examined 44 studies of programs from around the globe. Overall, CBI significantlyreduced recidivism, although there is a great deal of variability in impact among the studies. In a final analysisof 14 studies from the United States and Canada, Lipsey and Landenburger (2006) report the combined resultwas statistically significant and in favor of CBI. Unfortunately, while all 14 studies reported positive results,only four were statistically significant from zero, indicating that the overall results were driven by only a fewprojects.Intensive SupervisionMany proponents of rehabilitation point to the intensive supervision of probationers and parolees as a tool inreducing subsequent deviant activity. Intensive supervision (ISP) programs exist in every state. Typical featuresof ISP are team supervision, a high number of contacts between the client and officer, curfew and/or housearrest, restitution, employment or school attendance, drug testing, community service, counseling, andtreatment (Byrne, 1990; Petersilia and Turner, 1993).The New Jersey ISP program is a good example of such interventions. The program deals with relativelylow-risk, non-violent offenders who have spent a short time in prison. The average caseload for the probationofficer is 16, with the expectation that the officer will have almost daily contact with each client (either inperson or by phone) (Pearson, 1985). The number of contacts is lessened as the client is found to be reliable andno infractions are detected. Evaluation of the New Jersey program shows that ISP clients have a lowerrecidivism rate (measured as new arrests) than individuals who remain in prison (Pearson, 1988; Pearson andHarper, 1990). The lower recidivism rate, however, may be due to the fact that ISP clients are not randomlyselected and may be at lower risk for recidivism at the outset (Pearson, 1988). Indeed, the fact that ISP dealswith less serious offenders can artificially inflate the success of the program (Clear and Hardyman, 1990).Evaluations of other ISP programs present varying results. Erwin (1990), using data on 2,322 clients inGeorgia, notes that the ISP clients commit less serious subsequent offenses. Unfortunately, there is nodifference in reincarceration rates in three and five year follow-ups for ISP clients and individuals who servedtheir time in prison (Erwin, 1990). These results are even more discouraging in light of the fact that theprogram actually targets low-risk offenders (Morris and Tonry, 1990). Three California ISP programs report nodifference in subsequent arrests or incarceration for randomly assigned subjects (Petersilia and Turner, 1990).At the same time, the study reports more violence by ISP clients, possibly due to the random assignment usedin conjunction with serious offenders. Evaluations across sites in the United States also fail to find any strongimpact on recidivism (see Gowdy, 1993; Petersilia and Turner, 1993; Turner et al., 1992). As expected fromintensive monitoring, most studies report relatively high rates of technical violations (Erwin, 1990; Gowdy,1993; Pearson, 1988; Pearson and Harper, 1990; Petersilia and Turner, 1990, 1993; Turner et al., 1992). Latessaand Allen (2003), reviewing ISP evaluations, report that ISP clients recidivate less than control subjects (i.e., atleast 5 percent lower recidivism) in four studies, recidivate more in six analyses, and perform comparably tocontrols in six other evaluations.Research on intensive supervision suggests varied effects. Results differ somewhat by type of offender andmeasures of recidivism. There appears to be limited evidence of a positive effect of intensive supervision. Thefact that the public accepts ISP as a viable program, perhaps due to the perceived safety from increasedsurveillance, may explain the continued interest in the program.Restorative JusticeAn emerging and growing approach for addressing criminal acts is restorative justice. As opposed toretributive justice, which focuses on the lawbreaker and the imposition of sanctions for the purposes ofdeterrence, vengeance and/or punishment, restorative justice seeks to repair the harm that was done to boththe victim and the community. At the same time, there is an underlying assumption that the offender canbenefit or be “repaired” by participating in the restorative process. This is accomplished by bringing together arange of interested parties in a non-confrontational setting, including the victim and the offender, as well asfamily members or friends, criminal justice system personnel, and members of the general community. The305
participants, as a group, seek to understand the actions that led to the criminal or antisocial behavior, revealthe feelings and concerns of all parties, negotiate or mediate a solution agreeable to everyone, and assist inimplementing that solution (Bazemore and Maloney, 1994). Kurki (2000, p. 266) notes that “restorative justice isabout relationships—how relationships are harmed by crime and how they can be rebuilt to promote recoveryand healing for people affected by crime.”While the term “restorative justice” is relatively new, elements of restorative justice have been around for along time. Braithwaite (1999, p. 2) notes that “[r]estorative justice has been the dominant model of criminaljustice throughout most of human history for all the world’s peoples.” Weitekamp (1999) points out that manyof the restorative justice practices being used today can be traced directly to historical traditions that havesurvived in indigenous cultures. Of particular note are the practices of Aboriginal tribes, Inuits, and NativeAmerican and Native Canadian Indian tribes.On the Web Various organizations offer information on different forms of restorative justice and theoperations of the programs. Two such sources of information are the International Institute forRestorative Practices (http://www.iirp.edu) and the Restorative Justice Online Blog(http://restorativejustice.org).Restorative justice takes a variety of different forms, although they all attend to the same basic tenets.Indeed, “restorative justice” is often referred to as “transformative justice,” “social justice,” “balanced andrestorative justice,” “peacemaking,” or other terms. Braithwaite (2002) notes that many of these terms andprograms have been incorporated into the more general idea of restorative justice. Most discussions ofrestorative justice outline four primary types of programs—victim–offender mediation, family groupconferencing, neighborhood reparative boards, and peacemaking/sentencing circles.Victim–Offender MediationVictim–Offender Mediation, also referred to as Victim–Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORP), is a directoutgrowth of the dispute resolution/dispute mediation programs of the early 1970s (Umbreit, 1999). Victim–offender mediation (VOM) is typically a post-conviction process (although pre-conviction programs exist) inwhich the victim and the offender are brought together to discuss a wide range of issues. A trained mediatoralso attends these meetings. Participation in VOM is voluntary for the victim, but the offender may be requiredby the court to participate as a part of the court process (Umbreit, 1999). Victim–Offender Mediation programsmay be a part of the formal criminal justice system, or may be run by other agencies that are not directlyconnected to the system.The most important concern addressed in the VOM meetings is to identify for the offender the types andlevel of harm suffered by the victim as a result of the crime. At the same time, the offender is given the chanceto explain why he committed the act and the circumstances that may underlie his behavior. The focus of themeetings is on repairing the harm done to the victim, helping the victim heal (both physically andemotionally), restoring the community to the pre-crime state, and reintegrating the offender into society(Umbreit et al., 2003). Both parties are considered equal participants in the process and given time to expressthemselves and their feelings about the crime. The outcome of these meetings should be a mutually agreeableresolution. Among the potential tangible outcomes for the victim may be the offender making monetaryrestitution or providing service to repair the harm done. Perhaps of equal importance are changes inunderstanding by both parties about each other, and changes in behavior and attitude on the part of theoffender.Family Group Conferencing306
Family group conferencing (FGC) is based on practices of the Maori in New Zealand. The greatestdifference between FGC and VOM is the inclusion of family members, close friends, and other support groupsof the victim and offender in the conferences. There is also the possibility of including criminal justice systempersonnel, including social workers, police officers, and an offender’s attorney (Van Ness and Strong, 2015).This expansion of participants is very important, in that the families and support persons are expected to takesome responsibility in monitoring the offender and making certain that any agreements are carried out afterthe conference (Kurki, 2000).Family group conferencing first appeared in 1989 in New Zealand with an exclusive focus on juveniles aged14 to 17 (Kurki, 2000). While most conferences deal with minor juvenile misbehavior, they can include seriousoffenses and repeat offenders. Similar to VOM, the emphasis in FGC is on engendering discussion among theparties about what took place, why it occurred, and the most appropriate steps to take to address the harm.Unlike VOM, the conferences do not include a formal mediator. Rather, FGC includes a facilitator whoattempts to keep the discussions moving in a positive direction until an agreement can be reached among allparties. Conferences can be held either pre-trial or post-trial, and have become a part of police and pre-trialdiversion programs in both the United States (McGarrell et al., 2000) and Australia (Moore and O’Connell,1994).Neighborhood Reparative BoardsNeighborhood reparative boards (NRBs), or neighborhood accountability boards, have existed since themid-1990s and typically deal with non-violent youthful offenders. Not unlike other restorative practices, NRBsseek to restore the victims and community to pre-offense states, require the offender to make amends, and aidthe offender in understanding the impact of his actions on the victim and community. Cases are referred to theboards by the court, most often prior to formal adjudication.Despite the philosophical similarities between NRBs and other types of restorative conferencing, there areseveral key differences in how this approach operates. First, victims are not required to participate. Indeed,many early boards frowned on victim participation (Strickland, 2004), although victim participation isbecoming more common. Second, while the conferences are often open to the public, actual participation islimited by the board and who they wish to interview. The board questions the offenders and examinesstatements made by members of the offender’s family and others knowledgeable about the event (Bazemoreand Umbreit, 2001). Third, the boards are composed of a small group of citizens who have been speciallytrained in conducting hearings and constructing appropriate sanctions.At the conclusion of the hearing, the board undertakes private deliberations and outlines a suggested set ofactions to be followed by the offender. If the offender agrees with the plan, the board oversees the offender’scompliance with the terms and reports to the court about the success or failure of the offender (Bazemore andUmbreit, 2001). Typical conditions of agreements include restitution, apologies, and community service (Karp,2001).Peacemaking/Sentencing CirclesPeacemaking/sentencing circles are based on North American Indian processes, which invite all interestedparties to participate in determining the appropriate sanctions for offenders (Van Ness and Strong, 2015).Included in the circles are all of those typically found in FGCs, as well as other community members who wishto be included. Most cases handled by sentencing circles involve minor offenses, although some programs willconsider more serious crimes (Stuart, 1996). A major difference between circle sentencing and the other formsof restorative justice is that this approach is regularly used with both adults and juveniles (Kurki, 2000).Every participant in the sentencing circle is given the opportunity to speak, express his feelings about thecrime, and offer opinions and rationales about the outcome of the discussion. The fact that the circles include(potentially) a wide array of participants means that a great deal of planning and preparation is needed beforethe actual meeting (Kurki, 2000). The intended outcome of the circle is consensus on a plan of action, whichmay include explicit sentencing recommendations (potentially jail or prison) to the trial judge and/or a range307
of community-based interventions (Van Ness and Strong, 2015). The decision of the circle is often binding onthe offender and a failure to adhere to the decision may result in further criminal justice system processing orbeing returned to the circle (Van Ness and Strong, 2015).The Impact of Restorative JusticeRestorative justice programs are intended to have a number of different possible outcomes, includingrepairing the harm done to the victim and rehabilitating the offender. Many evaluations focus on victim andoffender satisfaction with the process, and the level of compliance or completion of the agreed-uponsettlement. With very few exceptions, both victims and offenders express satisfaction with the restorativeprocess in which they have participated (Braithwaite, 1999). Evaluations of VOM typically reveal that between75 and 100 percent of the participants express satisfaction with the mediation (Kurki, 2000). Similarly highlevels of satisfaction arise from FGCs (Bazemore and Umbreit, 2001; Moore and O’Connell, 1994; Umbreit et al.,2003). The level of satisfaction is also reflected in feelings by participants that the process is fair (McGarrell etal., 2000; Umbreit, 1999; Umbreit and Coates, 1993; Umbreit et al., 2003).A companion to satisfaction is the ability of the meetings to achieve consensus on a solution and whetherthe parties carry through with the agreement. Again, there is evidence that most meetings culminate in anagreement and most parties comply with the settlement (Braithwaite, 1999; Kurki, 2000; Schiff, 1999; Umbreitand Coates, 1993). Restitution is a common component of many agreements and evaluations reveal that 90percent or more of the offenders in FGC comply with the ordered restitution (Wachtel, 1995). McGarrell et al.(2000) note that participants in a conferencing program completed the program at a significantly higher ratethan normal diversion clients.This information on satisfaction and compliance must be tempered somewhat by the fact that participationin the programs is voluntary. This is especially true for victims, although offenders can also opt out of theprocess in many places. The fact that the program is voluntary may mean that only individuals who are moreamenable to the process to begin with are included in the programs. There may be a built-in bias in favor ofpositive results. Umbreit et al. (2003), for example, point out that only 40 to 60 percent of the victims andoffenders who are asked to participate in VOM agree to do so. Similarly, McCold and Wachtel (1998) reportthat almost six out of 10 FGC cases never materialize due to a refusal to participate.While reductions in the level of subsequent offending is the crime prevention goal one would desire fromrestorative justice, there is relatively little research on offender recidivism in the restorative justice literature.Umbreit and Coates (1993), comparing youths who participated in VOM to those undergoing typical juvenilejustice processing in three states, report significantly less recidivism on behalf of the VOM sample. In theiranalysis of restorative justice conferences for youths in Indianapolis, McGarrell et al. (2000) report a 40 percentreduction in recidivism for the program youth when compared to those undergoing normal system processing.Umbreit et al. (2001) provide evidence that youths completing VOM projects in two Oregon counties reducetheir offending by at least 68 percent in the year after program participation compared to the year before theintervention. Calhoun and Pelech (2010) note the conferencing in Calgary (Canada) led offenders to assumegreater responsibility and repaired the victim–offender relationship. Other research (Hayes and Daley, 2004;Rodriguez, 2005) reveals reduced recidivism after conferencing, although the impact varies across types ofoffences and offenders. Finally, Latimer et al. (2005), conducting a meta-analysis, reported that restorativejustice is more effective at reducing recidivism than traditional criminal justice programs. There also remains aneed to identify and understand the conditions under which different restorative justice programs work and donot work (Braithwaite, 2002).SummaryThe increasing interest in restorative justice in recent years has led to the growth of programs around theworld. Despite the growing popularity with restorative justice approaches, a great deal of additional research isneeded on its impact, especially in relation to sentencing circles. There is still a lack of good evaluation of thepreventive efficacy of the interventions. A lingering concern is that there is an underlying level of coercion in308
most programs and many programs do not allow (or at least frown upon) the presence of defense attorneys,thus raising the issue of an accused’s constitutional rights and procedural safeguards (Feld, 1999; Levrant et al.,1999). Feld (1999) notes that there is a distinct imbalance of power in most restorative justice programs. This isespecially problematic when juvenile offenders must face not only the victim but also the victim’s supportgroups, members of the criminal justice system, and potentially strangers from the general community.Specialized CourtsSpecialized courts for addressing specific forms of offenders and offenses are becoming common throughoutthe United States. Three specialized courts are considered here: drug courts, teen courts, and mental healthcourts.Drug CourtsDrug courts are perhaps the most recognizable and widespread (although it can be argued that the juvenilecourt system is itself a specialized court). The tremendous increase in drug crimes in the late 1980s and early1990s, coupled with the get-tough approach to crime and mandatory sentencing laws, helped contribute toovercrowded court dockets and overcrowding in the correctional system. In an attempt to address theseproblems in 1989, Dade County, Florida, established the first separate court for processing drug offenders. Theunderlying philosophy for drug courts is to use the court’s authority to prompt participation in and successfulcompletion of treatment aimed at reducing drug use and related criminal behavior. The courts represent acoalition of prosecutors, police, probation officers, judges, treatment professionals, social service agencies, andother community groups working together to get the offenders off drugs and keep them off drugs (Drug CourtsProgram Office, 2000). The court can use its coercive powers to force offenders into the program and tomaintain abstinence from drugs by dismissing criminal charges or withholding sentencing of offenders if theyagree to enter and complete the drug court program. Drug courts operate both at the pre-adjudication andpost-adjudication stage of criminal justice processing.There is a set of common core elements that are found throughout most drug court programs. Among thecommon elements are frequent appearances before the court, regular drug testing, treatment assessment,participation in at least one treatment program, and aftercare. The court appearances typically follow agraduated pattern with more appearances in the early weeks of the program and fewer appearances as theclient demonstrates progress. Initial appearances could be as often as twice a week or as seldom as two to threetimes a month. These appearances serve as a time for the judge to offer praise and support, warn the offenderto do better, or threaten the offender with sanctions if his behavior and progress do not improve (Gottfredsonet al., 2003). Regular drug testing is a critical second component of drug court intervention. The knowledge thatthey will be tested on a regular basis for an extended period provides an added level of accountability to theentire process.The third common element, treatment assessment, serves to identify the needs of the individual offender andto match up the offender with the appropriate interventions. Common treatment programs may includedetoxification, methadone maintenance, support groups, counseling, and other activities directly related to thedrug problem. Treatment can also take the form of educational programming, vocational training, employmentassistance, housing assistance, and similar help with everyday living experiences (Drug Courts Program Office,1998). The mandated treatment typically lasts for at least one year, although the specifics of the treatmentregimen may change over that period. The final major component is an aftercare plan for the individual.Rather than simply releasing the individual from the drug court and treatment program, most programs offersome form of follow-up assistance ranging from further treatment to support groups.On the Web 309
More information on drug courts can be found on the National Institute of Justice web site athttp://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-court/Pages/welcome.aspx and the National Associationof Drug Court Professionals at http://www.nadcp.orgThe National Institute of Justice (2015) reports that there are more than 3,400 drug courts in operation andone found in every state. Over 1,500 are adult courts, 433 are for juveniles, 300 are focused on families, and therest target other groups (National Institute of Justice, 2015). The great growth in drug courts is partlyattributable to the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which authorizedfederal funding for drug court programs.Evaluations of the effectiveness of drug court programs present a mixed picture. Most analyses report thatdrug court participants recidivate at a significantly lower level than comparison groups (Brewster, 2001;Goldkamp and Weiland, 1993; Gottfredson et al., 2003; Harrell, 1998; Henggeler et al., 2006; Listwan et al., 2003;MacKenzie, 2006; Marlowe, 2010; Spohn et al., 2001). A five-year longitudinal analysis of adult drug courtsacross the United States reports that participants are significantly more likely (by 17 percent) to remain drug-free, as well as commit 12 percent fewer crimes (Rossman and Zweig, 2012). One major issue in many analysesis that the evaluations fail to consider those who do not complete the treatment or use those who do notcomplete as the control group. It should not be surprising to find that those who complete the programrecidivate less because they are successes to begin with, while those who did not complete are failures at theoutset of the evaluation and would be expected to also commit more offenses. A second concern is that manyevaluations only measure recidivism during program participation (GAO, 1997).The number of drug courts is growing every year and the idea is expanding to specialized drug courts forDWI, veterans, reentry, and other topics/groups. The driving forces behind the movement are a combination offederal and state funding, vociferous support from drug court advocates, savings over incarcerating offenders,and an acceptance that combining treatment with the sanctioning power of the court is the best way toproceed.Teen CourtsTeen courts (sometimes called youth courts) are an emerging alternative to processing youths in atraditional juvenile court setting. The teen court philosophy is based on restorative justice, and youths act asjudge (about half the time), attorney (prosecutor and defense attorney), and jury in cases involving statusoffenses, misdemeanors, and occasionally a low-level felony. The most common penalty is community service.Other sentences include serving as a teen court jury member, writing essays and apologies, community service,and monetary restitution. It is estimated that there are more than 1,050 teen court programs operating in 49states and the District of Columbia handling over 110,000 cases per year, making them a primary diversionoption (National Association of Youth Courts, 2015).On the Web The National Association of Youth Courts has a wealth of information on teen courts athttp://www.youthcourt.netResearch on the impact of teen courts provides promising, but not conclusive, results. A recent study of anIllinois teen court found that recidivism was only 12 percent after one year and 19 percent after two years(Rasmussen, 2004). A multi-site study of teen courts in Alaska, Arizona, Maryland, and Missouri foundstatistically less recidivism for teen court youths in two of the four sites. In Alaska, 6 percent of teen courtyouths recidivated, compared to 23 percent of non-teen court youths; in Missouri, 9 percent of teen courtyouths recidivated, compared to 28 percent of non-teen court youths. The authors of the study concluded that“teen courts represent a promising alternative for the juvenile justice system” (Butts et al., 2002, p. 34). Two310
studies using random assignment found no significant effect (Patrick and Marsh, 2005; Stickle et al., 2008).Finally, a study of the Xenia, Ohio, teen court program found no impact on recidivism, and the authorsconcluded that their finding of no impact and previous systematic research suggests that teen courts are“equivalent to or only slightly better than traditional diversion” (Norris et al., 2011, p. 215).Teen court is not intended to deal with serious delinquency. Most of the offenses handled are low-levelinfractions such as shoplifting, curfew violation, possession of marijuana, and disorderly conduct, althoughtwo-thirds of the courts accept cases involving assaults (National Association of Youth Courts, 2015). It is alsonoteworthy that the use of volunteer staff and low budgets mean that teen courts are inexpensive. As oneauthor put it, teen court may be a “partial solution to the juvenile justice system’s failure to give anythingmore than a ‘slap on the wrist’ to first-time offenders” (Rasmussen, 2004, p. 615).Mental Health CourtsThe final specialized court to be addressed is mental health courts. As with the prior specialized courts,mental health courts seek to address the specialized needs and circumstances of mentally ill individualsbrought to the criminal courts for processing. The major deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill over the past30 years has resulted in an increasing number of mentally ill individuals being arrested and processed in thecriminal justice system. This is largely due to the lack of an alternative intervention that is more suited to theneeds and problems of individuals and families faced with mentally ill individuals. While there were fewmental health courts in 1990, today there are more than 250 (Rossman et al., 2012), including specializedjuvenile mental health courts (Cocozza and Shufelt, 2006).The primary goal of mental health courts is to reduce the number of mentally ill individuals suffering frombeing handled in the criminal courts and subsequently being sent to the correctional system (MHA, 2009).Other goals are to enhance community safety, improve the living conditions of the clients, coordinate servicesand resources needed by the mentally ill, and provide needed treatment for those in need. These goals areaccomplished by establishing a specialized court docket that marshals the expertise of mental healthprofessionals, social service providers, and criminal justice system personnel. The court provides screening andassessment, followed by treatment that is overseen by the court (Council of State Governments Justice Center,2008). Many of those requiring help suffer from severe mental illness and have co-occurring problems,especially substance abuse (Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2008; MHA, 2009).On the Web Mental Health America (MHA) provides a great deal of useful information about mental healthneeds and interventions, including mental health courts on its web site at http://www.nmha.org/Evaluations of mental health courts, while few in number, present promising results. An assessment of courtoperations and outcomes by the Council of State Governments Justice Center (2008) finds that individualsprocessed through the courts have few repeat bookings, few new charges, and spend fewer days in jail. This isaccompanied with greater independent functioning on the part of the clients. An analysis of courts in theBronx and Brooklyn, New York, reports similar positive results. In a three-year evaluation, Rossman et al.(2012) uncover lower recidivism (in terms of both rearrest and reconviction) for mental health court clients incomparison to matched cases processed in regular court. The differences between the courts are statisticallysignificant. These results suggest that mental health courts are effective at assisting those with specializedneeds.On the Web 311
You can get more detailed information on the evaluation of mental health courts in New Yorkby downloading the document at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/NIJ/grants/238264.pdfSummaryThe growth of specialty courts offers new avenues for intervening with problem individuals and situations.The flexibility inherent in these courts allows them to address the unique situations and individual needs ofthose handled. The great growth and success of drug courts has set the stage for the development of both teenand mental health courts. Across the various types of courts, the evidence on their effectiveness is largelypositive.312
Assessing Rehabilitation and Crime PreventionThe results of the various summaries and programs presented here raise both hopes and concerns over theeffectiveness of rehabilitation as a tool of crime prevention. Even though many specific rehabilitation programsare, by necessity, omitted from the present discussion, the array of reviews and programs that are discussedshow a mixed bag on recidivism. This results in many researchers giving up on rehabilitation as a viable formof crime prevention. It is important to note, however, that some interventions show promising results. Amongthose promising programs are cognitive-behavioral therapies and multi-dimensional interventions, both ofwhich match offenders and treatments in intensive programming, particularly in the community.The greatest support for rehabilitation programs can be found in studies that use alternate outcomemeasures. There is clear evidence that rehabilitation can improve an individual’s outlook and self-esteem.Various programs have been successful at increasing the educational and vocational achievement of clients.Psychological adjustment has been improved by some interventions. These and other outcomes, however, donot address the central concern of tertiary crime prevention. Tertiary prevention is focused on the eliminationor lowering of subsequent levels of delinquent/criminal behavior. It is here that evaluations of rehabilitationhave had limited success.Proponents of rehabilitation point to these alternate forms of success along with the great cost savings ofmany programs as a rationale for continued work with offenders. Indeed, few studies show a deleteriousimpact from rehabilitation. The clients simply do no better than if they had been handled through conventionalprocessing and incarceration. Any cost savings of rehabilitation over traditional handling without any risk tosociety may be reason enough to continue experimenting with various interventions. Also, the failure of pastprograms should inform us about possible effective programs. Evidence that this is occurring can be seen in themany attempts to match the proper client to the proper intervention.Interestingly, many of the most recent rehabilitation efforts, such as ISP, restorative justice, and specialtycourts, rely on the community as either the source of or setting for interventions. Intensive supervision workswith clients outside the residential setting. Restorative justice includes a wide array of community membersand groups in the interventions. Specialized courts seek rehabilitation and treatment in the community setting.The reason for this is the recognition and belief that the community influence and atmosphere are importantaspects of rehabilitation and crime prevention. The ideas of identifying and using community resources are nodifferent from that found in both primary and secondary crime prevention. While these rehabilitative effortshave not always engendered great reductions in recidivism, the positive results that are available suggest thatthese are fruitful directions for tertiary prevention to pursue.Key Termsaggregate-level evaluationcircle sentencingcognitive-behavioral therapy (CBI)Cognitive Thinking Skills Program (CTSP)drug courtsfamily group conferencing (FGC)individual-level evaluationintensive supervision probation (ISP)mental health courtsMulti-Systemic Therapy (MST)neighborhood reparative boards (NRBs)peacemaking/sentencing circlesrestorative justicerisk, need, and responsivity313
tautologicalteen courtsvictim–offender mediation (VOM)314
Chapter 17Some Closing Thoughts on Crime Prevention and theFutureChapter OutlineThe State of the EvidenceImproving Our KnowledgeRecognizing the Diversity in Crime PreventionSummaryLearning ObjectivesAfter reading this chapter you should be able to:Provide an overview of the evidence on crime prevention.Identify problems of evaluation that need to be addressed in future analyses.Crime prevention encompasses a wide diversity of ideas and approaches. Indeed, no two individuals willnecessarily see or define crime prevention in exactly the same way. It is not unlike the old parable whereseveral blind men are led to an elephant and asked to explain what it is in front of them. The individualtouching the trunk will define it differently than those persons touching a leg or the tail. While it may be easierfor sighted people to provide a more complete description, it is still probable that each individual willemphasize or concentrate on different aspects of the elephant. Discussions of crime prevention often providethat same type of variation in explanations. Both the person relating the information and the individualhearing it may be envisioning slightly different things. While neither is inherently right or wrong, they are notexactly the same.Throughout this book, an attempt has been made to offer a variety of perspectives on crime prevention. Inessence, I have tried to touch the elephant at a variety of different places and relate the important facts abouteach. At the same time, there has been a conscious effort to relate the varied parts to one another in order totry to show how the parts can make up a more meaningful whole. Each of the individual chapters can, for themost part, stand on its own. Each relates some facet of crime prevention. Taking them together, however,should offer a more complete view of crime prevention in its many possible incarnations. I am equallyconvinced that I have missed a leg or an ear, here or there. In the balance of this brief concluding chapter, I willattempt to offer some summary comments about crime prevention, and point out areas or ideas that I haveomitted or given only cursory attention.315
316
The State of the EvidenceThere should be no doubt that crime prevention works. Effective interventions have been offered throughoutthe chapters. The extent of crime prevention’s impact, however, varies across time and place, as well as fromone approach to another. Indeed, not every program has the same impact in every situation. Crime may bereduced in one place while there is no impact on the fear of crime. Transplanting that same program to anotherlocation may result in the opposite outcome—crime stays the same but fear is reduced. No single approach tocrime prevention has proven to be applicable in all situations. Indeed, most interventions appear to work inlimited settings with different types of offenders and problems. The greatest challenge, therefore, is to identifythe causal mechanisms at work so that effective programs can be replicated in other places and other times.Traditionally, actions that fall under primary prevention have been the ones most people think of when theyhear of crime prevention. Physical security devices and neighborhood prevention programs dominate manydiscussions. There is little doubt that changes in the physical design of a building or an area can alter the formand extent of crime. At the very least, these actions make crime more difficult for the potential offender tosuccessfully complete. Citizens also report feeling safer as a result of such design changes. Neighborhood watchand other cooperative citizen programs also show promise at changing crime and citizens’ perceptions. Themajor stumbling block is getting fearful citizens out of their homes and into these prevention groups. Programsand initiatives still struggle with engendering citizen participation after more than 30 years of concentratedefforts to build such grassroots organizations.Even when primary prevention efforts do take hold, there are many unanswered questions that need to beaddressed. Foremost among those questions is how much of the impact on crime is the result of overallreductions and how much is simply displaced? While not all crime is displaced, there is ample evidence tosuggest that displacement is a real possibility in most analyses. One important challenge, therefore, is to furtherinvestigate the mechanisms that cause displacement and identify measures that can mitigate the extent of itsoccurrence.The shift toward situational prevention is evidence of an admission that prevention initiatives need to betargeted at smaller, more well-defined problems and that the interventions need to be cooperative venturesbetween different individuals and groups. Many times the activities under situational prevention are the sameas those found in primary prevention programs. Situational prevention and community policing are perhapsthe most recognizable ideas under what constitutes secondary prevention. At the same time, other efforts andinterventions, such as those taking place in schools to deal with problem youths, also qualify as secondarytechniques. What draws these diverse ideas together is the explicit attempt to deal with individuals, groups, orplaces that have a high potential to cause later trouble. There is clear evidence that careful consideration of aproblem can lead to effective solutions. Among the key problems here are the difficulties in predicting thefuture, problems with engendering support from other individuals and groups, and convincing people that thecriminal justice system cannot do the job by itself. While much secondary prevention relies on the police andthe system to initiate activities, the solutions often fall outside the training and abilities of system personnel.The community must be involved.Despite the growth of prevention activities that focus on citizen and community involvement, the formalsystem of justice remains an important player in the prevention of crime. No one has yet called for eliminatingthe criminal justice system in favor of informal community action. Indeed, the criminal justice system isimportant in dealing with the people and situations in which a crime has already occurred. Specific deterrence,incapacitation, and rehabilitation are functions for which the system retains primary responsibility. At thesame time that society turns these activities over to formal social control agencies, it is clear that thecommunity has a role to play in tertiary prevention. The move to keep offenders in the community, whetherthrough intensive supervision, electronic surveillance, or drug courts, is growing. Efforts to punish andrehabilitate offenders are also including the community more and more. Where tertiary prevention remains apart of the formal system of justice, there is evidence that a broader base for interventions is emerging.In general, crime prevention encompasses a broad range of ideas and activities. More importantly, many ofthe efforts have been successful at reducing crime and fear of crime. Unfortunately, uncovering the exact317
mechanism at work is not always evident and continuing work is needed in these areas.318
Improving Our KnowledgeWhile there is clear evidence that many crime prevention initiatives successfully reduce crime and fear,there is parallel data that show minimal impact of the same efforts at other places or times. The key issue,therefore, becomes unraveling the mechanism at work in the differing assessments. In general, more attentionneeds to be paid to the evaluation component of the prevention programs. First, many programs have not beensubjected to any evaluation beyond simple description of the process used in establishing the intervention andthe success of that process in terms of the number of meetings held and the level of attendance. This type ofevaluation tells nothing about the impact on crime and fear of crime, although the programs are often toutedas successful because of the organizing efforts. A second evaluation problem is the lack of appropriate controlor comparison groups in the research. Where reductions in criminal behavior do appear, the studies often failto adequately assess the changes in relation to an area or group which is not the subject of the intervention.Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make an informed judgment on the success or failure of the project.The reason for this failure is often tied to the fact that many evaluations are afterthoughts to the project. Theevaluation is added after the project is initiated, thus making it more difficult to undertake a strong researchdesign. It is impossible at that point to undertake an experimental design, and difficult to set up a strong quasi-experimental design.The problem of evaluation is further complicated by the introduction of many actions at the same time. Forexample, physical design changes, neighborhood watch, citizen patrols, Operation Identification, and mediacampaigns often overlap. It becomes impossible to evaluate which, if any, intervention has a positive (ornegative) impact on crime. The default assumed by most observers when positive results emerge (i.e., reducedcrime and reduced fear) is that the entire package is a success. Unfortunately, it may be that a singlecomponent is driving the results and there is no need to implement the large-scale, perhaps costly, package ofinitiatives. Knowing what aspect of the project worked best is an important piece of information. Conversely,finding that a package of initiatives has little or no impact may lead the evaluators to conclude overall failurewhen the more appropriate assessment might be that the individual efforts are working against one another.For example, the installation of home security devices may serve to drive people into their fortress at the sametime that block watch is trying to bring the residents together. An evaluation may show no impact on crimeand suggest that the project is a failure. An assessment that can disentangle the two initiatives, however, mayshow that the block watch organizing has a positive impact, while the physical security impedes positivechange. Research needs to focus on disentangling the impact of simultaneous prevention efforts.A fourth evaluation issue is to recognize that every crime prevention technique cannot be expected to havean equal or positive impact in all possible situations. Some techniques are better suited for certain problemsand places than others. This is one of the central tenets of situational prevention and community policingefforts. Evaluations need to carefully assess the match between techniques and the location and timing of theirimplementation. This concern is not only evident in primary and secondary prevention efforts, but is alsopivotal for tertiary crime prevention, particularly in relation to rehabilitation and treatment efforts. Researchshows that certain programs have a positive impact on certain individuals, given the proper conditions. Themajor problem is in predicting potential offenders and identifying those who are amenable to differentinterventions. Many positive results of crime prevention interventions may be directly attributable to utilizingthe proper approach in individual circumstances.A final concern for evaluation deals with the time frame in which a technique is expected to make adifference. Many interventions are evaluated shortly after implementation. The expectation is that the programshould have an immediate impact of crime, fear, and other factors. In reality, however, many changes taketime to appear. This may be due to several factors. First, an intervention that appears to be in full operationmay require a longer period to make changes in long-standing community or individual behaviors. Second,change may be gradual and the initiation of positive outcomes may not be identifiable in an evaluationundertaken immediately after the project. A third possibility is that a short-term evaluation finds a significantchange in crime and/or fear. Unfortunately, long-term evaluation may uncover a diminishing impact, perhapsback to pre-program levels. In each of these cases, the evaluation must be cognizant of the potential319
confounding introduced by short follow-up periods.320
Recognizing the Diversity in Crime PreventionOne goal of the book has been to demonstrate the diversity of crime prevention techniques. At the sametime, it is important to recognize that the topics and literature covered in the chapters is somewhat selective.There are many topics that have not been addressed, and most of those that do appear in these pages couldreceive a great deal more attention. There is simply no way to comprehensively cover all the differentpermutations that make up crime prevention in a single book. The following paragraphs are meant to alert thereader to some of the other topics that fall under the rubric of crime prevention.One key topic that has not been addressed is the politics of crime prevention. Crawford (1998) and Gilling(1997) both address the political forces that have directed crime prevention initiatives, particularly in theUnited Kingdom. They argue that many prevention programs follow the prevailing political sentiment in thecountries. Thus, neighborhood watch will be promoted at one point, physical design will dominate at anothertime, and an emphasis on working with offenders may emerge at yet a different point. Large societal changes,such as social prevention, will require the right political climate to emerge before any significant alterationsappear. These arguments may be more salient in the United Kingdom and other countries where the nationalgovernment has more influence over policy than in the United States, but this perspective is somewhatapplicable in the United States when one considers that the federal government does set funding and researchpriorities. A clear example of this is the fact that community policing is a “favored child” in Washington, D.C.at this point. Another example may be that most communities have some area that serves, in Barr and Pease’s(1990) words, as a “crime fuse.” The choice of that area, whether conscious or unconscious, is tied to politicalconsiderations. Perhaps the most important issue to remember is that crime prevention, in whatever form, doesnot exist in a vacuum. The political nature of crime prevention is one area that could receive more attention.A wide range of other topics has received minimal or no attention in this book. Some of those includepossible discussions of juvenile diversion, gun control, interventions with gangs, three-strikes laws, shaming ofoffenders, and private police and private security. The book has also avoided technical discussions of securitydevices, such as the relative value of different locks, doors, or alarms. These topics, along with many others,could be included in discussions of crime prevention. Indeed, there are other materials that focus on many ofthese areas. Many topics are emerging at a rate faster than most people can keep up with the information.Improved technology is a prime example of these changes. These issues are fodder for other discussions.321
SummaryThe ideas and topics addressed in this book are among the many possible prevention approaches that areused and are emerging to address the persistent problems of crime and fear in society. Such efforts willcontinue to grow. The effectiveness of these ideas rests on quality evaluation and a willingness to adapt andchange. Only through research and modifications can the programs evolve into effective interventions.Evaluation of crime prevention techniques will remain a pivotal issue in dealing with crime and fear of crimethroughout the future.322
Glossary5Is: an alternative model for problem solving that is receiving increased attention in situational prevention; the5Is are intelligence, intervention, implementation, involvement, and impactAccess control: the idea of only allowing people who have legitimate business in an area to enter; reduces theopportunity for crime by increasing the effort needed to enter and exit a building or area for the purpose ofcommitting crimeAction (in cognitive mapping): the behavior determined to be appropriate based on the information gained inthe first three steps of cognitive mapping (i.e., recognition, prediction, and evaluation)Active (continuous signaling) system: a form of electronic monitoring of offenders that keeps track of theoffender on a continuous basis; system consists of a transmitter, receiver, and a central computerActivity space: the term for a location where it is deemed through cognitive mapping or experience as a placeto take actionActivity support: actions taken to build a community atmosphere; efforts that enhance the ability to recognizeneighbors and identify needs of the community; efforts that enhance social cohesion among residents andcontribute to a communal atmosphere, which works to eliminate crime and other common problems;includes efforts such as street fairs, community days, and other social eventsActuarial prediction: estimate based on known parameters in the data; an example is the setting of life or autoinsurance ratesADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program: a means of ascertaining the extent of drug use byarrested subjects; arrestees voluntarily agree to be interviewed and give a urine sample for testingADAM II (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program: the most recent scaled-down version of the originalADAM programAdolescence-limited offending: offending that takes place mainly in adolescenceAggregate-level evaluation: looking for changes across large groups of subjects; changes in rates of offendingor recidivismAlley gating: erecting gates on alleys that run behind homes and businesses, thereby restricting access toresidents or other legitimate usersAlternative schools: individual classrooms or programs within a school set up to dispel the negativeexperiences of many problem youths; the provision of a positive learning atmosphere that increasesfeelings of success within an atmosphere of warmth and acceptanceAnticipatory benefit: changes in crime that predate the actual implementation of a crime prevention program;most probably due to the fact that offenders, victims, and others know about a forthcoming preventionactivity and begin to respond prior to activation of the interventionAssize of arms: obligation for men to have weapons available for use when called on to protect thecommunity323
Authority conflict: offending pathway that begins with early stubbornness and leads to later defiance andavoidance of authority; running away, truancy, and ungovernabilityAvailable guardians: guardians who are present but are not actively paying attention to what is happening inthe areaAwareness space: nodes and paths with which an individual has gained knowledge that can be used fordetermining whether to actBenign displacement: the argument that changes due to displacement may benefit societyBig Brother: term used to refer to the ability of the government to monitor the behavior of the citizenryBig Brothers/Big Sisters (BB/BS): youth mentoring program boasting 325 programs across all 50 U.S. statesand 13 other countriesBoost explanations: also known as event dependency; situations in which (usually) the same offender commitsanother offense based on the past experiences with that victim or locationBrutalization effect: the argument that the use of the death penalty causes an increase in subsequenthomicidesBullying: behavior that includes both physical and verbal aggression that is repeated over time and is meant tointentionally harm the victimCapable guardians: guardians who are visible and actively observing/monitoringCelerity: requirement for deterrence; refers to the swiftness of societal response to an offenseCertainty: requirement for deterrence; deals with the chances of being caught and punished for one’s behaviorChicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS): program that includes assigning officers to permanentneighborhood beats, the involvement of residents in the identification of problems and potential solutions,and reliance on other agencies (both public and private) to address identified issuesChicago Area Project: founded in 1931, sought to work with the residents to build a sense of pride andcommunity, thereby prompting people to stay and exert control over the actions of people in the areaCircle sentencing: also referred to as peacemaking circles; all interested parties are invited to participate indetermining the appropriate sanctions for offenders; includes families, friends, agency representatives, andmembers of the general community; intended outcome of the circle is consensus on a plan of action thatmay include explicit sentencing recommendations to the trial judge and/or a range of community-basedinterventionsCitizen patrols: often a key element of neighborhood watch; its purpose is to put more eyes on the street inorder to increase the chances of detecting strangers in the area and discovering crimes in progress;residents are discouraged from physically intervening into any suspicious activityCivil abatement: the use of civil codes to attack crime problems; most notable is the involvement of landlords,citizens, health departments, zoning boards, and city/county attorneys in addressing drug problemsClinical predictions: predictions based on a rater’s evaluation of an individual, usually after interviews anddirect examination of the subject and his recordsClosed-circuit television (CCTV): systems that allow the active or passive surveillance of activityCognitive maps: mental images of the environment324
Cognitive Thinking Skills Program (CTSP): a multi-modal intervention that utilizes a range of techniquestargeting cognitive-behavioral problems; focuses on identifying cognitive deficits and inappropriatedecision making by individualsCognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT): short-term, goal-oriented psychotherapy treatment that takes a hands-on, practical approach to problem-solvingCollective incapacitation: the imposition of sentences on everyone exhibiting the same behavior with noconcern for the potential of the individualCommunities that Care (CTC): approach that requires a community to undertake an analysis of the problemsit is facing, identify the risk factors that are at work, and build an intervention tailored to the uniquesituation and needs of the communityCommunity anti-drug (CAD) programs: residents banding together with each other, the police, and variousagencies and organizations to attack drug use, drug sales, and related problemsCommunity policing: a newer philosophy of policing rather than a clearly definable method; generallyincludes community involvement, problem solving, a community base, and redefined goals for the policeComprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI): a gang suppression initiative developed by the U.S.Department of Justice that seeks to build a coalition of agencies, including law enforcement, prosecutors,social services, governments, community groups, schools, and othersComprehensive Communities Program (CCP): a partnership-building initiative designed to fight crime andimprove the quality of life in communities by using a problem-solving approach that includes a wide arrayof community individuals, agencies, and groupsConstable: an unpaid position responsible for coordinating the watch and ward system and overseeing otheraspects of the lawContext: the idea that “the relationship between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, butcontingent” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 69); the impact of prevention efforts is contingent on the context inwhich they operate, and subsequently will affect whether the program has a similar impact in differentsettingsCost–benefit evaluation: also known as cost–benefit analysis; seeks to assess whether the costs of anintervention are justified by the benefits or outcomes that accrue from itCovert behavior: offending pathway that typically begins with minor acts of lying and theft, moves on toproperty crimes, and then moderately serious delinquency, and eventually culminates in serious propertydelinquencyCRAVED: Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and DisposableCrime and Disorder Act (CDA): U.K. legislation that mandated the cooperation of many agencies inaddressing crime problemsCrime attractors: areas to which potential offenders and others are drawn, such as drug markets, sites of streetprostitution, or adult clubs and barsCrime control: maintenance of a given or existing level of crime and management of that amount of behavior;fails to adequately address the problem of fear of crimeCrime displacement: the shift of crime due to the preventive actions of the individual or society; six types:territorial, temporal, tactical, target, functional, and perpetrator325
Crime fuses: places where society allows crime to run relatively unchecked as a safety valve for the rest ofsocietyCrime generators: locations that draw potential victims to the areaCrime life cycle: the notion that products go through a cycle of stages where they are at varying levels of riskfor crimeCrime newsletters: printed materials targeted to a limited audience and tailored to the needs of thoseindividuals; provide detailed, in-depth discussions of both crime and potential crime prevention measuresCrime pattern theory: theory proposing that crime and criminal behavior fit patterns that can be identifiedand understood when viewed in terms of where and when they occur; crime patterns can be understoodbecause of similarities that emerge when you consider “the specific criminal event, the site, the situation,the activity backcloth, the probable crime templates, the triggering events, and the general factorsinfluencing the readiness or willingness of individuals to commit crimes” (Brantingham and Brantingham,1993b, pp. 284–285)Crime prevention: any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crimeCrime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED): in general, efforts to alter physical design toaffect crimeCrime science: a new discipline, or at the very least a new paradigm, for addressing crime by coupling effortsto prevent crime with the detection of and intervention with offenders; “the application of the methods ofscience to crime and disorder” (Laycock, 2005)Crime scripts: outlines of the steps and actions required to commit a crime, including the responses that arenecessary to complete the actCrime spillover: the shift of crime from one place to anotherCrime Stoppers: the most widely known information-line program; generally operates by offering rewards tocitizens for information about crimesCross-sectional studies: studies that compare differences among different individuals, groups, states, or otheraggregatesD.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education): in-school program taught by law enforcement officers,emphasizing resistance skills trainingDefensible space: proposes “a model which inhibits crime by creating a physical expression of a social fabricwhich defends itself” (Newman, 1972)Deterrence: “influencing by fear” (Andenaes, 1975)Detoxification: the use of drugs in an effort to remove an individual from an addiction to another illicit drug;the basic idea is to wean the client from the addiction with a minimal amount of discomfort and painDevelopmental crime prevention: an approach that targets the potential of individuals to become criminalDevelopmental prevention: focuses on at-risk factors that may lead individuals to deviant behaviorDiffusion of benefits: “the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which aredirectly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of control, the crimes which are the focus ofintervention or the time periods in which an intervention is brought” (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994, p. 169)326
Digital DNA: a unique non-sequential numerical codeDistance decay: the commission of crime decreases as the distance from the offender’s home increasesDrug Abatement Response Team (DART): a team that works to compel landlords to take action againstproperties and tenants involved in drug offendingDrug courts: represent a coalition of prosecutors, police, probation officers, judges, treatment professionals,social service agencies, and other community groups working together to get the offenders off drugs andkeep them off drugsEcological fallacy: the attempt to predict individual behavior based on group data; imputing the behavior of asingle person from the activity of a larger groupEdges: areas on the periphery of nodes and paths that are prime spots for deviant behavior; edges, bothphysical and perceptual, experience greater diversity in people and activityElaboration model: an approach that attempts to take components of various theories and build a singleexplanation that incorporates the best parts of the individual theoriesElectronic monitoring (EM): a form of home confinement in which individuals can be tracked by placing anelectronic device on themElmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project: a project that targets the earliest stage of a child’s development,specifically when the child is still in the womb; home visitation by nurses begins during pregnancy andcontinues through the child’s second birthdayEnvironmental backcloth: the social, economic, cultural, and physical conditions within which people operateEscape: the ability of both offenders and victims to escape from an area before or after an offenseEuclidean distance: measures in a straight line from the start to the end pointExperiential effect: the idea that the actual apprehension of an individual raises the perception of riskEvaluation: refers to investigating the usefulness of some exercise or phenomena; evaluation of crimeprevention refers to investigating the impact of a prevention technique or intervention on the level ofsubsequent crime, fear, or other intended outcomeEvaluation (in cognitive mapping): the process by which the individual uses the information gathered in theearlier stages of cognitive mapping and determines which options are acceptable modes of behaviorEvent dependency: also known as a boost explanations; situations in which (usually) the same offendercommits another offense based on past experiences with that victim or location; successful past offendingleads to another attempt against the same targetFalse negative predictions: predictions that declare that the person is not a future threat but the individualdoes engage in the negative behavior at a later timeFalse positive predictions: predictions in which an individual is predicted to do something in the future (e.g.,recidivate, offend, act dangerously) but is not found to act in that fashion after follow-upFamilies and Schools Together (FAST): a developmental prevention program aimed at families of youthsaged roughly four to eightFamily group conferencing (FGC): similar to victim–offender mediation, but includes family members, closefriends, and other support groups of the victim and offender in the conferences; may also include criminal327
justice system personnel (e.g., social workers, police officers, offender’s attorney)Fear: “an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates with crime. Thisdefinition of fear implies that some recognition of potential danger, what we may call perceived risk, isnecessary to evoke fear” (Ferraro, 1995, p. 8)Fearing subject: someone who becomes responsible for the safety of himself and his propertyFeeble-minded: term used in the early 1900s to denote those with low IQsFlag explanation: also called risk heterogeneity; a prior victimization or some other factor identifies the victimor location as an appropriate target for further victimizationFormal or organized surveillance: the use of guards or employees specifically tasked with watching foroffendingFunctional displacement: when offenders change to a new type of offense, such as shifting from larceny toburglary or burglary to robberyFunctional fear: fear as a good thing, when the individual uses it as motivation to take precautionsGeneral deterrence: aims to have an impact on more than the single offender; the apprehension andpunishment of a single individual serves as an example to other offenders and potential law violatorsGeneral theory of crime: an explanation that assumes that failures in early child rearing by parents lead tolow self-control by the individual and a much greater chance that crime and deviance will be expressedGeneralizability: a measure of whether results would be applicable in other places, settings, and timesGlobal positioning system (GPS) technology: technology that uses satellites to locate a person or monitor hismovementsGold standard: term that has come to be used to refer to true experimental design in evaluationGoogle Streetview: an application that allows the user to look at an address from the main street, take a 360-degree look around where the observer is positioned, move up and down the street, and zoom in to look atdetailsG.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training): taught by local police officers in middle schools; goalof the program is to “prevent youth crime, violence and gang involvement” (Bureau of Justice Assistance,2005); provides youths with the necessary skills for identifying high-risk situations and resisting thepressure or allure of taking part in gangs and gang activity; program curricula are geared toward increasingself-esteem, changing attitudes, and eliminating participation in violent behaviorGuardian Angels: one example of citizen patrolling that has gained international attention; mainly found inlarge urban areas and consisting primarily of young individualsHead Start: best-known preschool program; proposes that disadvantaged youths are not prepared to enterschool without some form of early intervention targeted at social and intellectual skillsHedonistic: attribute of humans to seek pleasure and avoid painHot products: items that attract attention and are targeted by thievesHot spots: “small places in which the occurrence of crime is so frequent that it is highly predictable, at leastover a one-year period” (Sherman, 1995, p. 36)328
Hot spots policing: specific efforts by police to address crime convergence in “hot spots”; requires analysis ofthe locale and the generation of interactions appropriate for the problemHue and cry: alarm and call for help raised by those watching over the town when threats were identifiedHunting ground: nodes where offenders recognize that potential victims frequent the area, there is a lack ofguardians, and, consequently, the offender follows victims to that placeImage: refers to building a neighborhood or community that does not appear vulnerable to crime and is notisolated from the surrounding communityImmobilizers: electronic devices that, in the absence of the key, prevent a car from operatingImpact evaluations: evaluations that focus on what changes (e.g., to the crime rate) occur after introduction ofa policy, intervention, or programIncapacitation: method to prevent future crime on the part of the offender by imposing control over theindividual that prohibits the physical possibility of future criminal activityIncivility: various factors involved in disorder and community decline; two general categories of incivilityoutlined in the literature are physical (e.g., deterioration of buildings, litter, graffiti, vandalism, abandonedbuildings and cars) and social (e.g., public drunkenness, vagrancy, groups of loitering youths, harassmentsuch as begging or panhandling, visible drug sales and use)Incredible Years program: program that identifies families for intervention that have youths displaying earlyconduct problems from ages four to eight; program includes strong parent and child training components,as well as a teaching training element for youths in schoolIndividual-level evaluation: an evaluation that focuses on qualitative changes rather than quantitative shifts;may appear as simple adjustments in the type of offendingInelastic: term used to describe crime in which offenders are driven to commit a certain number of offensesover a given period of timeInformation lines: programs with a dedicated telephone line for the solicitation of information about specificcrimes from the public; involving citizens in crime preventionInjunctions: court orders placing rules and/or restrictions on the behavior of individualsIntegrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) theory: theory that incorporates ideas from learning, socialcontrol, strain, and labeling theories, as well as rational choice theoryIntensive supervision probation (ISP): probation using team supervision, a high number of contacts betweenthe client and officer, curfew and/or house arrest, restitution, employment or school attendance, drugtesting, community service, counseling, and treatmentIntervening guardians: guardians who are visible, monitoring the area, and take action when somethingoccursInvisible guardians: guardians who are not evident or visible in the areaJourney to crime: the fact that offenders will travel to commit crimesJuvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP): a program initiated by the Office of Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention (OJJDP) in 1996; its key component is partnership with educators and private-sector agenciesKeepin’ It REAL: a new version of D.A.R.E. that includes a 10-session curriculum taught to children and329
adolescents in schools by law enforcement officers, with a focus on resistance skills; REAL stands forRefuse, Explain, Avoid, and LeaveKirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: major anti-burglary initiative in the United Kingdom that relied onpartnershipLex talionis: the principle of “an eye for an eye”; retributionLife-course-persistent offending: offending that continues over the long term, including as a juvenile and asan adultLifestyle perspective: grows out of research on victimization and specifically focuses on the activity of thevictim as a contributing factor in criminal acts; an individual’s lifestyle and behavioral choices helpdetermine whether he will be victimizedLongitudinal analyses: look for changes over time, primarily due to shifts in law or criminal justice systemactivityMacro-level crime prevention: looks at large communities, society as a whole, or other very large collectivesMaintenance programs: programs that seek to establish a steady state in which the individual does notexperience withdrawal symptoms when the drug begins to wear offMalign displacement: the idea that efforts aimed at reducing crime may prompt an increase in offending ormore serious crimeManhattan distance: distance measured in terms of roadways, walkways, and other paths that avoidobstruction and reduce both distance and travel timeMaryland Scale of Scientific Methods: rating method for determining how closely a study adheres to thestandards of a true experimental designMcGruff: part of the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign; a cartoon dog in a trench coat who presentssimulated crimes and depicts the proper actions viewers should take when confronted with similarsituationsMechanical surveillance: surveillance that utilizes cameras or other devices to observe activities, or lights tosimply increase the ability of people to see what is taking placeMechanism: “what it is about a program which makes it work” (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p. 66)Mental health courts: special courts that seek to address the specialized needs and circumstances of mentallyill individuals brought to the criminal courts for processing; specialized court docket that marshals theexpertise of mental health professionals, social service providers, and criminal justice system personnel;provides screening and assessment, followed by treatment that is overseen by the courtMentoring: an approach that involves pairing adult volunteers with youths in need of friendship, emotionalsupport, guidance, and adviceMeso-level crime prevention: prevention techniques that target larger communities or neighborhoods, orlarger groups of individuals or businesses, for interventionMeta-analysis: the reanalysis of data from various studies in order to make direct comparisons between theresultsMethadone maintenance: outpatient programs that involve the provision of methadone to heroin/opiateaddicts; the primary assumption is that the patient is unable to function without some form of drug use and330
that methadone is an acceptable substitute for other, more damaging drugsMicro-level crime prevention: prevention techniques that target individuals, small groups, small areas, orsmall businesses for interventionMilieu: idea that placement of a community within a larger, low-crime, high-surveillance area will inhibitcriminal activityMinneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment: project to investigate the deterrent effect of arrest, separation,and police counseling in misdemeanor spouse abuse situationsMisdeeds: per Ekblom’s Misdeeds and Security framework, products can be MISappropriated, MIStreated,MIShandled, MISused, or MISbehaved withMonitoring the Future (MTF) project: annual survey of representative high school students (eighth, 10th, and12th graders), college students, and young adults; probes a variety of factors; the most important set ofinformation deals with the level and type of drug useMotivation reinforcement: actions taken to build a community atmosphere; efforts that enhance the ability torecognize neighbors and identify needs of the community; efforts that enhance social cohesion amongresidents and contribute to a communal atmosphere, which works to eliminate crime and other commonproblems; includes efforts such as street fairs, community days, and other social eventsMulti-Systemic Therapy (MST): a community-based intervention that attempts to address family, peer,school, community, and other influences that may prompt or lead to deviant behavior; involves parentaland family interventions, social-cognitive strategies, and academic skills services to address a range ofrelated risk factors and behavioral problemsNational Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS): the best known of the victimization surveys, an annual datacollection conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)National Neighborhood Watch (NNW): a division of the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) that empowerscitizens to become active in community efforts through participation in Neighborhood Watch groupsNational Night Out: program coordinated by local police agencies; consists of educational programs,neighborhood organizing, social events, and anti-drug and anti-crime activitiesNational Survey on Drug Use and Health: a survey conducted by the Substance Abuse and Mental HealthServices Administration (SAMHSA) that measures drug use by a representative sample of U.S. respondentsaged 12 and olderNational Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: media effort to combat drug use and abuse that relies on theheavy use of digital media, including Facebook, YouTube, and GoogleNational Youth Survey (NYS): an ongoing, longitudinal panel study of youths; collects information ondelinquency, drug use, and demographic factorsNatural surveillance: designing an area that allows legitimate users to observe the daily activities of bothfriends and strangers; permits residents to observe criminal activity and take action (also called informalsurveillance)Near repeat: offenses that take place at neighboring locations; a type of repeat victimizationNeighborhood reparative boards (NRBs): also known as accountability boards, boards that seek to restorevictims and community to pre-offense states, require the offender to make amends, and aid the offender inunderstanding the impact of his actions on the victim and community331
Neighborhood watch: bringing together neighbors and residents of an area in order to promote crimeprevention activityNet-widening: bringing more people under the umbrella of social controlNew parochialism: an approach that argues that struggling neighborhoods can bring about change if they areprovided outside assistance by a combination of parochial and public controlNodes: locations of activity, such as home, work, school, and shoppingObligatory policing: a form of citizen policing in which male citizens were required to band together intogroups for the purpose of policing each otherOperation Ceasefire: partnership in Boston to address gun violence, particularly among juveniles and gangmembers; creation of an interagency working partnership to assess the nature of the gun problem and thedynamics of youth violence and to identify and implement an effective interventionOperation Identification: marking property to increase the difficulty for offenders to dispose of marked itemsOrder maintenance: police functions that do not deal with an immediate criminal action; includes respondingto disabled autos, escorting funerals and parades, dealing with barking dogs, responding to false alarms andnoise complaints, and delivering messagesOTREP (Opportunity is the result of Target, Risk, Effort, and Payoff): assumption that offenses can beavoided when there is a high risk of apprehension with little potential payoffOutcome evaluations: See Impact evaluationsOvert behavior: offending pathway that commences with aggressive activity (bullying and teasing) and leadsto fighting and violent activityPanel designs: research designs that follow a number of separate units (such as states, counties, or individuals)over a given periodPanel survey: survey in which a group of subjects is surveyed repeatedly over a specified period; the NCVSsurveys the same households every six months over a three-year periodParens patriae: philosophy underlying the juvenile court that argues that youths need help rather thanprocessing in adult court, which is geared toward punishment rather than preventionParochial control: sources of control from neighborhood networks and institutions, such as schools, churches,or businessesParochial police: police hired by the wealthy to protect their homes and businessesPart I crimes: part of the Uniform Crime Reports and also known as index crimes; includes the violent crimesof murder, rape, robbery, and assault, as well as the property crimes of burglary, larceny, auto theft, andarsonPart II crimes: part of the Uniform Crime Reports; includes all offenses not included in the Part I categoryPassive system: a form of electronic monitoring that requires periodic activation of the system; the systemrandomly calls the offender’s home to certify the presence of the individual; also referred to asProgrammed contact systemPaths: transit routes between nodes332
Peacemaking (sentencing) circles: based on North American Indian processes, groups that invite allinterested parties to participate in determining the appropriate sanctions for offendersPeer mediation: a program in which students are trained to assist one another in resolving disputes in such away that all parties to the dispute accept the resolutionPermeability: access and egress to an areaPermissibility: situations or beliefs that place criminal behavior into an acceptable light; for example, the beliefthat everyone breaks the law or that the victim had it comingPerpetrator displacement: occurs when one offender ceases his deviant behavior, only to be replaced byanother offenderPerry Preschool program: also known as High/Scope; most extensively studied preschool program; seeks toprovide students with a positive introduction to education by involving the children in the planning ofactivities, with a low child-to-teacher ratio, and enhanced reinforcement of student achievementPositivism: a belief that crime is caused by factors beyond the control of the individualPrediction (in cognitive mapping): making connections between the identifiable objects in the area andpossible lines of behaviorPressures: direct stimuli that lead to action; deviant peers, going along with the crowd, or following orders todo something wrongPrimary prevention: “identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunitiesfor or precipitate criminal acts” (Brantingham and Faust, 1976)Private control: control based on interpersonal relationships among family members, friends, and closeassociatesProblem-oriented policing: approaching issues and problems differently based on the uniqueness of eachsituationProblem solving: perhaps the most important element of community policing; deals with crime by identifyingthe underlying causes and contributors to crime and seeking out solutions to those problemsProcess evaluations: evaluations that consider the implementation of a program or initiative and involvedetermining the procedures used to implement a specific programProgrammed contact system: See Passive systemProject PATHE (Positive Action Through Holistic Education): a broad-based approach to the schoolenvironment that brings teachers, administrators, students, parents, and agencies together to makedecisions about education and the schoolProject Safe Neighborhoods (PSN): an outgrowth of SACSI that focuses primarily on reducing firearmsviolence through partnerships, strategic plans, training, outreach, and accountabilityProject TOUGH (Taking Out Urban Gang Headquarters): a program that works to compel landlords to takeaction against properties and tenants used as gang headquarters and other gang hangoutsPromoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS®): a five-year-long curriculum offered in elementaryschools focusing on self-control, understanding emotions, building a positive self-image, relationships, andinterpersonal problem solving; intended to reduce both behavioral and emotional problems while buildingself-control and problem-solving abilities333
Prompts: events or situations that may support the opportunity for crime, such as doors that are open or otherswho are committing crimeProspect: the ability of individuals to see an area; areas that offer greater prospect should engender less fearand victimization than locations that limit sight linesProspective mapping: the creation of maps that predict future crime locations based on knowledge of recenteventsProvocations: factors that make an individual uncomfortable, frustrated, irritable, or otherwise aroused to thepoint of taking some form of action, of which crime is one possibilityPsychopharmacological explanation: an approach suggesting that various drugs have a direct impact on theuser, both physically and psychologically, which impels the individual to act in a way that society deemsunacceptablePublic control: the ability to marshal input, support, and resources from public agenciesPublic health model: an approach that classifies prevention as primary, secondary, or tertiaryPulling levers: a term used to signify a strict enforcement policy for all individuals and groups involveddirectly or indirectly in a crime problem; coined in Operation CeasefireRadio frequency (RF) transmitters: used in electronic monitoring, a set of equipment used to generate andtransmit electromagnetic waves carrying messages or signals; one of two primary systems or types—activeor passiveRational choice theory: an approach that assumes that potential offenders make choices based on variousfactors in the physical and social environment; offenders respond to payoff, effort, peer support, risks, andsimilar factors in making decisions to commit a crimeReal territoriality: engendered by walls, fences, gates, or other items that place a physical barrier in front ofpeopleRealistic evaluation: evaluation that considers the phenomenon in its entirety rather than relying exclusivelyon experimental approaches; two key ideas central to realistic evaluation are mechanism and contextReciprocal: in relation to crime, the idea that criminal activity leads to drug use and drug use leads to criminalactivityRecognition (in cognitive mapping): being able to identify your location and various features in the areaReducing Burglary Initiative (RBI): program in the United Kingdom that relies on local communities toidentify the causes of the burglary problems in their area and to develop appropriate interventions; includesa wide range of interventions, many of which are physical design changes, such as target hardening, theinstallation of alley gates, lighting improvements, fencing, and property markingRefuge: the presence or absence of concealment in which offenders could hide from potential victims; providesboth hiding places and protection for potential offendersRepeat victimization: people or places being victimized at least a second time within a certain period of timesubsequent to an initial victimization eventResistance skills training: a set of ideas that address recognizing problematic situations and issues, dealingwith peer pressure, recognizing pressure from media presentations, knowing proper responses totemptations, building self-esteem and assertiveness, and knowing how and when to take a stand334
Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (RCCP): a school program including student mediation as a corecomponent; elementary curriculum consists of 12 lessons dealing with issues of communication,cooperation, feelings, diversity, peacemaking, and resolving conflictsResponding in Peaceful and Positive Ways (RIPP): a program that targets sixth graders and includes lessonson appropriate responses to conflict situations and how students can avoid violenceResponse generalization: the act of generalizing from the response being promoted in a program (such assimply calling for help) to other possible responses not featured in the program (such as carrying weaponsand taking direct action)Restorative justice: an approach that seeks to repair the harm done to both the victim and the community andto “repair” the offender; accomplished by bringing together a range of interested parties in a non-confrontational setting, including the victim and the offender, as well as family members or friends,criminal justice system personnel, and members of the general communityRisk factors: individual or environmental conditions that have been found to be associated with an increasedlikelihood of antisocial behavior, such as crime or violenceRisk heterogeneity: also called a flag explanation; a prior victimization or some other factor identifies thevictim or location as an appropriate target for further victimizationRisk, need, and responsivity: according to advocates of rehabilitation, the three factors that are essential tomeet for successful interventions; basically involves matching the correct subjects with the correctinterventionRoutine activities theory: argues that the normal movement and activities of both potential offenders andvictims play a role in the occurrence of crime; crime requires (1) a suitable target, (2) a motivated offender,and (3) an absence of guardiansSafer Cities program: a program under which the British government provided funds for local initiativesaimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime, and the creation of safer cities; key was building multi-agency partnerships for fighting social, physical, and economic problems in urban areasSARA: problem-solving approach that includes Scanning, Analysis, Response, and AssessmentSchool resource officers (SROs): police officers assigned to schools who are involved in mentoring andreferrals, training teachers and parents, teaching programs, and performing traditional police functionsSeattle Social Development Project: a comprehensive developmental crime prevention strategy; programcreates a template for communities and researchers to work together to evaluate particular risk factors in aspecific context and match interventions that have been successful at addressing those risk factors whilestrengthening protective factorsSecond-generation CPTED: an approach to crime prevention that focuses on the four components of: (1)social cohesion between residents, businesses, and others; (2) connectivity of the local area to governmentagencies, businesses, and others that can contribute to area improvement; (3) community cultural initiativesthat can bring people together; and (4) threshold capacity that builds cohesion among residents and servesto enhance the community and support the needs and efforts of the residentsSecondary prevention: “engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene”(Brantingham and Faust, 1976, p. 288)Secured By Design (SBD): an ongoing program in England that emphasizes and promotes the inclusion ofsafety and security measures in new and existing buildings335
Selective incapacitation: emphasizes identifying high-risk offenders and subjecting only that group tointerventionSeverity: requirement for deterrence; involves making certain that punishments provide enough pain to offsetthe pleasure received from the criminal actSituational crime prevention: “characterized as comprising measures (1) directed at highly specific forms ofcrime (2) that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in assystematic and permanent a way as possible (3) so as to reduce the opportunities for crime and increase therisks as perceived by a wide range of offenders seeks to identify existing problems at the micro level andinstitute interventions which are developed specifically for the given problem” (Clarke, 1983, p. 225)Smart guns: guns that recognize the owner and will only discharge if used by that personSocial media: tools that allow people, including police organizations, to create, share or exchange information,ideas, and pictures/videos in virtual communitiesSocial prevention: activities typically aimed at alleviating unemployment, poor education, poverty, andsimilar social ills that may reduce crime and fear by attending to the root causes underlying deviantbehaviorSocial/crime template: the idea that people have templates that outline expectations of what will happen atcertain times and places given certain behavior by the individual; a template tells an offender what shouldoccur in a certain place, time, or situationSoft determinism: individuals make choices but only within the realm of available alternatives presented tothemSpecialized Multi-Agency Response Teams (SMART): a civil abatement strategy that relies on thecooperation of police, citizens, and other groups to solve neighborhood problemsSpecific deterrence: efforts that keep an individual offender from violating the law again in the futureSpurious: when neither factor is the ultimate cause of the other; rather, both are caused by either the samecommon factors or by different factorsStatus offenses: offenses that are only illegal if committed by individuals of a certain status; typically usedwith juveniles and outlines behavior such as curfew violation, smoking, playing in the street, andincorrigibilityStrategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI): a partnership program initiated in five sitesin 1998 to fight primarily violent personal crimesStreet Angels: a U.K. citizen patrol group boasting 120 patrolsStreet Pastors: a U.K. citizen patrol group that operates in 250 locations and claims more than 9,000 volunteersStreetblock: area containing the homes on either side of a single block (that is, between two cross-streets)Super controllers: “the people, organizations and institutions that create incentives for controllers to prevent… crime” (Sampson et al., 2010)Surveillance: any action that increases the chance that offenders will be observed by residentsSymbolic territoriality: things such as signs, landscaping, or other items that signal a change in ownership orarea336
Syracuse Family Development Research Program: a program with characteristics similar to those of nursehome visitation programs; targeted pregnant, young, single, African-American mothers and worked withthe families from birth to age eight; project included home visitation by child development trainers, parenttraining (health, nutrition, and child rearing), and individualized daycare for the childrenSystemic violence: violence resulting from competition between drug dealers, retaliation for poor drug qualityor high prices, robbery of drug dealers or users, and other factors related to the drug tradeTactical displacement: utilizing new means to commit the same offenseTake a Bite Out of Crime: a public information media campaign; objectives include altering the public’sfeelings about crime and the criminal justice system, generating feelings of citizen responsibility andcooperation with the criminal justice system, and enhancing already existing crime prevention effortsTarget displacement: choosing different victims within the same areaTarget hardening: efforts that make potential criminal targets more difficult to victimize, such as theinstallation of locks, bars on windows, unbreakable glass, intruder alarms, fences, safes, and other devicesTautological: the nature of a circular argumentTeen courts: sometimes called youth courts; an emerging alternative to processing youths in a traditionaljuvenile court setting; youths act as judge (about half the time), attorney (prosecutor and defense attorney),and jury in cases involving status offenses, misdemeanors, and occasionally a low-level felonyTemporal displacement: the movement of offending to another time period while remaining in the same area;may manifest itself through a shift in larcenies from the late evening to the early morningTerritorial (spatial) displacement: movement of crime from one location to anotherTerritoriality: the ability and desire of legitimate users of an area to lay claim to the areaTertiary prevention: “deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in such a fashion that they willnot commit further offenses” (Brantingham and Faust, 1976, p. 288)Therapeutic communities: residential communities that emphasize providing a supportive, highly structuredatmosphere within which individuals can be helped to alter their personality and develop socialrelationships conducive to conforming behavior; operate as surrogate families for clientsThief takers: voluntary bounty hunters; organized under the leadership of English magistrates; typically,reformed criminals “paid” to protect the public by being able to keep a portion of all recovered propertyThird-generation CPTED: an approach to crime prevention that uses green sustainable design to improvecommunities and reduce crime (and other social) problems, including four major components: (1) places, (2)people, (3) technology, and (4) networksThreats to external validity: factors that would limit the generalizability of the results to other places,settings, and timesThreats to internal validity: factors that could cause the results other than the measures that wereimplementedThree-strikes laws: laws that mandate lengthy imprisonment for those convicted of a third offenseTracking: the process of assigning students to different classes or groups based on the perceived needs of thestudent; common forms of tracking appear in high school, where students find themselves placed into“college preparatory” or “vocational” groups337
True negative prediction: when something is predicted not to occur and it does not (a successful prediction)True positive prediction: when something is predicted to occur and it does so (a successful prediction)Uniform Crime Reports (UCR): the most widely used and cited official measures of crime in the UnitedStates; collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation; reflects the number of criminal offenses known tothe policeVicarious victimization: a sympathetic reaction or empathetic fear of crime due to knowing someone who hasbeen the victim of a crime or simply being told of a harmful act against a third partyVictim–offender mediation (VOM): typically a post-conviction process in which the victim and the offenderare brought together with a mediator to discuss a wide range of issues; the most important concernaddressed in the meetings is to identify for the offender the types and level of harm suffered by the victimas a result of the crime; focus of the meeting is on repairing the harm done to the victim, helping the victimheal (both physically and emotionally), restoring the community to the pre-crime state, and reintegratingthe offender into societyVictimization surveys: surveys of the population carried out to measure the level of criminal victimization insocietyVigilante movement: an approach that mirrored early ideas of “hue and cry”; a major component of enforcinglaw and order in the growing frontier of the young country in which posses of citizens were formed whenan offender needed to be apprehended and punishedVirtual repeats: follow-up victimizations of a similar person, place, or item after the initial action; for example,a series of robberies at different locations of a single company (such as a fast-food store) or theft of thesame brand of carVIVA: the risk of a target is directly related to Value, Inertia, Visibility, and AccessWatch and ward: a system whereby the responsibility for keeping watch over the town or area, particularly atnight, was rotated among the male citizensWhistle Stop: residents blow a whistle if they see something happening out of the ordinary as they areshopping, working, or simply walking out of doors338
ReferencesAbadinsky, H. (1989). Drug Abuse: An Introduction. Chicago: Nelson Hall.Akers, R.L., A.J. LaGreca, C. Sellers, and J. Cochran (1987). “Fear of crime and victimization among the elderlyin different types of communities.” Criminology 25:487–506.Allatt, P. (1984). “Residential security: Containment and displacement of burglary.” Howard Journal 23:99–116.Amir, M. (1971). Patterns of Forcible Rape. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Andenaes, J. (1975). “General prevention revisited: Research and policy implications.” Journal of Criminal Lawand Criminology 66:338–365.Anderson, D. and K. Pease (1997). “Biting back: Preventing repeat burglary and car crime in Huddersfield.” InClarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case-Studies, Second Edition. Guilderland, NY:Harrow and Heston.Anderson, D.C. (1998). “Curriculum, culture, and community: The challenge of school violence.” In Tonry, M.and M.H. Moore (eds.), Youth Violence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Anderson, K.B. (2013) Consumer Fraud in the United States, 2011: The Third FTC Survey. Washington, DC:Federal Trade Commission. Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/04/130419fraudsurvey.pdfAnderton, K.J. (1985). The Effectiveness of Home Watch Schemes in Cheshire. Chester, U.K.: CheshireConstabulary.Andison, F.S. (1977). “TV violence and viewer aggression: A culmination of study results, 1956–1976.” PublicOpinion Quarterly 41:314–331.Andresen, M. (2010). “Displacement.” In Fisher, B.S. and S.P. Lab (eds.), Encyclopedia of Victimology and CrimePrevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Andresen, M.A. (2014). Environmental Criminology: Evolution, Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge.Andrews, D.A., I. Zinger, R.D. Hoge, J. Bonta, P. Gendreau, and F.T. Cullen (1990). “Does correctionaltreatment work? A clinically relevant and psychologically informed meta-analysis.” Criminology 28:369–404.Anglin, M.D. (1988). “The efficacy of civil commitment in treating narcotics addiction.” Journal of Drug Issues18:527–546.Anglin, M.D. (1990). “Treatment of drug abuse.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q. Wilson (eds.), Drugs and Crime.Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Anglin, M.D. and Y. Hser (1987). “Addicted women and crime.” Criminology 25:359–397.Anglin, M.D. and Y. Hser (1990). “Treatment of drug abuse.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q. Wilson (eds.), Drugs andCrime. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Anglin, M.D. and W.H. McGlothlin (1984). “Outcome of narcotic addict treatment in California.” In Times,F.M. and J.P. Ludford (eds.), Drug Abuse Treatment Evaluation: Strategies, Progress and Prospects.Washington, DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse.Anglin, M.D. and G. Speckart (1988). “Narcotics use and crime: A multisample, multimethod analysis.”Criminology 26:197–233.Anglin, M.D., G.R. Speckart, M.W. Booth and T.M. Ryan (1989). “Consequences and costs of shutting offmethadone.” Addictive Behaviors 14:307–326.Aos, S. (2003a). “Cost and benefits of criminal justice and prevention programs.” In Kury, H, and J. Obergfell-Fuchs (eds.), Crime Prevention: New Approaches. Mainz, Germany: Weisser Ring.Aos, S. (2003b). The Criminal Justice System in Washington State: Incarceration Rates, Taxpayer Costs, CrimeRates, and Prison Economics. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy.Apel, R. (2013) Sanctions, perceptions, and crime: Implications for criminal deterrence. Journal of QuantitativeCriminology 29:67–101.Archer, D., R. Gartner and M. Beittel (1983). “Homicide and the death penalty: A cross-sectional test of a339
deterrence hypothesis.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 74:991–1013.Armitage, R. (2000). An Evaluation of Secured By Design Housing within West Yorkshire. Briefing Note 7/00.London: Home Office.Armitage, R. (2007). “Sustainability versus safety: Confusion, conflict and contradiction in designing outcrime.” In Farrell, G., K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson, and M. Townsley (eds.), Imagination for Crime Prevention:Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Armitage, R., G. Smythe, and K. Pease (1999). “Burnley CCTV evaluation.” In Painter, K. and N. Tilley (eds.),Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal JusticePress.Armitage, R., I. Colquhoun, P. Ekblom, L. Monchuk, K. Pease, and M. Rogerson (2010) Residential Design andCrime: Final Report. London: CABE and Home Office.Armitage, R. and L. Monchuk (2011). “Sustaining the crime reduction impact of designing out crime: Re-evaluating the Secured by Design scheme 10 years on.” Security Journal 24:320–343.Armitage, R., L. Monchuk, and M. Rogerson (2011). “It looks good, but what is it like to live there?: Exploringthe impact of innovative housing design on crime.” European Journal of Criminal Police and Research17:29–54.Arthur Young and Co. (1978). Second Year Report for the Cabrini–Green High Impact Project. Chicago: ChicagoCity Department of Development and Housing.Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (2009). Secured By Design. http://www.securedbydesign.comAssociation of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (2015). Design Guides. http://www.securedbydesign.comAtkins, S., S. Husain, and A. Storey (1991). The Influence of Street Lighting on Crime and the Fear of Crime.London: Home Office.Babst, D.V., M. Koval, and M.G. Neithercutt (1972). “Relationship of time served to parole outcome for differentclassifications of burglars based on males paroled in fifty jurisdictions in 1968 and 1969.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 9:99–116.Bachman, R., A. Randolph, and B.L. Brown (2011). “Predicting perceptions of fear at school and going to andfrom school for African American and White students: The effects of school security measures.” Youth &Society 43:705–726.Bailey, W.C. (1998). “Deterrence, brutalization, and the death penalty: Another examination of Oklahoma’sreturn to capital punishment.” Criminology 36:711–734.Baker, G. and A. Gray (2005) Research on the Effectiveness of Police Practice in Reducing Residential Burglary,Report 8: Victims of Burglary. New Zealand: Ministry of Justice.Bales, W., K. Mann, T. Blomberg, G. Gaes, K. Barrick, K. Dhungang, and B. McManus (2010). A Quantitativeand Qualitative Assessment of Electronic Monitoring. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Ball, J.C., E. Corty, R. Bond, and A. Tommasello (1987). “The reduction of intravenous heroin use, non-opiateabuse and crime during methadone maintenance treatment: Further findings.” Paper presented at theAnnual Meeting of the Committee on Problems on Drug Dependency, Philadelphia.Ball, J.C., E. Corty, S.P. Petroski, H. Bond, and A. Tommasello (1986). “Medical services provided to 2,394patients at methadone programs in three states.” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 3:203–209.Ball, J.C., J.W. Shaffer, and D.N. Nurco (1983). “The day-to-day criminality of heroin addicts in Baltimore: Astudy in the continuity of offense rates.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 12:119–142.Ball, R.A., C.R. Huff, and J.R. Lilly (1988). House Arrest and Correctional Policy: Doing Time at Home. NewburyPark, CA: Sage.Barclay, P., J. Buckley, P.J. Brantingham, P.L. Brantingham, and T. Whinn-Yates (1996). “Preventing auto theftin suburban Vancouver commuter lots: Effects of a bike patrol.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Preventing MassTransit Crime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Barr, R. and K. Pease (1990). “Crime placement, displacement, and deflection.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris(eds.), Crime and Justice, vol. 12. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Barrile, L.G. (1980). “Television and attitudes about crime.” Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College.Barthe, E. (2010). “Crime newsletters.” In Fisher, B.S. and S.P. Lab (eds.), Encyclopedia of Victimology andCrime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Baum, K. (2007). Identity Theft, 2005. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.340
Baumer, T.L. (1985). “Testing a general model of fear of crime: Data from a national survey.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 22:239–255.Baumer, T.L. and F. DuBow (1977). “Fear of crime in the polls: What they do and do not tell us.” Paperpresented at the American Association of Public Opinion Research Meeting.Baumer, T.L., M.G. Maxfield, and R.I. Mendelsohn (1993). “A comparative analysis of three electronicallymonitored home detention programs.” Justice Quarterly 10:121–142.Bazemore, G. and D. Maloney (1994). “Rehabilitating community service: Toward restorative service in abalanced justice system.” Federal Probation 58:24–35.Bazemore, G. and M.S. Umbreit (2001). “A comparison of four restorative conferencing models.” JuvenileJustice Bulletin. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Beck, A. and A. Willis (1999). “Context-specific measures of CCTV effectiveness in the retail sector.” In Painter,K. and N. Tilley (eds.), Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Monsey,NY: Criminal Justice Press.Beck, J.L. and P.B. Hoffman (1976). “Time served and release performance: A research note.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 13:127–132.Belenko, S. (1990). “The impact of drug offenders on the criminal justice system.” In Weisheit, R. (ed.), Drugs,Crime and the Criminal Justice System. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.Bellis, D.J. (1981). Heroin and Politicians: The Failure of Public Policy to Control Addiction in America.Westport, CT: Greenwood.Belson, W.A. (1978). Television Violence and the Adolescent Boy. Westmead, U.K.: Saxon House.Bennett, R.R. and J.M. Flavin (1994). “Determinants of fear of crime: The effect of cultural setting.” JusticeQuarterly 11:357–382.Bennett, S.F. and P.J. Lavrakas (1989). “Community-based crime prevention: An assessment of the EisenhowerFoundation’s neighborhood program.” Crime and Delinquency 35:345–364.Bennett, T. (1986). “Situational crime prevention from the offender’s perspective.” In Heal, K. and G. Laycock(eds.), Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory into Practice. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.Bennett, T. (1987). An Evaluation of Two Neighborhood Watch Schemes in London. Cambridge: Institute ofCriminology.Bennett, T. (1989). “Factors related to participation in neighbourhood watch schemes.” British Journal ofCriminology 29:207–218.Bennett, T. (1990). Evaluating Neighborhood Watch. Aldershot: Gower.Bennett, T. (1994). “Community policing on the ground: Developments in Britain.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.),The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Bennett, T. and R. Wright (1984). Burglars on Burglary. Brookfield, VT: Gower.Berecochea, J.E. and D.R. Jaman (1981). Time Served in Prison and Parole Outcome: An Experimental Study.Report No. 2. Sacramento: California Department of Corrections.Berg, A. (2008). “Preventing identity theft through information technology.” In McNally, M.M. and G.R.Newman (eds.), Perspectives on Identity Theft. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Berk, R.A. and P.H. Rossi (1999). Thinking About Program Evaluation, Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage.Bernasco, W. (2010). “A sentimental journey to crime: Effects of residential history on crime location choice.”Criminology 48:389–416.Berrueta-Clement, J.R., L.J. Schweinhart, W.S. Barnett, A.S. Epstein, and D.P. Weikart (1984). Changed Lives:The Effects of the Perry Preschool Program on Youths Through Age 19. Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press.Bevis, C. and J.B. Nutter (1977). Changing Street Layouts to Reduce Residential Burglary. St. Paul, MN:Governor’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Control.Bicheler, G., C.A. Orosco, and J.A. Schwartz (2012). “Take the car keys away: Metropolitan structure and thelong road to delinquency.” Journal of Criminal Justice 40:83–93.Biderman, A.D., L.A. Johnson, J. McIntyre, and A.W. Weir (1967). Report on Victimization and AttitudesToward Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America (BB/BS) (2015).http://www.bbbs.org/site/c.9iILI3NGKhK6F/b.5962335/k.BE16/Home.htm341
Binder, A. and J.W. Meeker (1988). “Experiments as reforms.” Journal of Criminal Justice 16:347–358.Bishop, D.M. (1984a). “Deterrence: A panel analysis.” Justice Quarterly 1:311–328.Bishop, D.M. (1984b). “Legal and extralegal barriers to delinquency: a panel analysis.” Criminology 22:403–319.Bjørgo, T. (2013) Strategies for Preventing Terrorism. New York: Palgrave.Blevins, K., J. Kuhns, and S. Lee (2012) Understanding Decisions to Burglarize from the Offender’s Perspective.Charlotte: University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology.Retrieved from http://airef.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/BurglarSurveyStudyFinalReport.pdfBlock, R.L. and C.R. Block (1993). “Street Gang Crime in Chicago.” Research in Brief. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.Block, R.L. and C.R. Block (1995). “Space, place and crime: Hot spot areas and hot places of liquor-relatedcrime.” In Eck, J.E. and D. Weisburd (eds.), Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Blueprints for Healthy Youth Development (2015). Communities that Care.http://www.blueprintsprograms.com/evaluationAbstracts.php?pid=9a3e61b6bcc8abec08f195526c3132d5a4a98cc0Boda, Z. and G. Szabó (2011). “The media and attitudes towards crime and the justice system: A qualitativeapproach.” European Journal of Criminology 8:329–342.Boggs, S.L. (1971). “Formal and informal crime control: An exploratory study of urban, suburban and ruralorientations.” Sociological Quarterly 12:319–327.Bolkcom, C.A. (1981). Rock Island Anti-Crime Block Club Organizing. Washington, DC: National CriminalJustice Reference Service.Booth, B., V.B. Van Hasselt, and G.M. Vecchi (2011). “Addressing school violence.” FBI Law EnforcementBulletin 80(5):1–9.Borduin, C.M., B.J. Mann, L.T. Cone, S.W. Henggeler, B.R. Fucci, D.M. Blaske, and R.A. Williams (1995).“Multi-systemic treatment of serious juvenile offenders: Long-term prevention of criminality and violence.”Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 63:569–578.Botvin, G.J. (1990). “Substance abuse prevention: Theory, practice and effectiveness.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q.Wilson (eds.), Drugs and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Botvin, G.J., E. Baker, N. Renick, A.D. Filazzola, and E.M. Botvin (1984). “A cognitive-behavioral approach tosubstance abuse prevention.” Addictive Behaviors 9:137–147.Botvin, G.J. and L. Dusenbury (1989). “Substance abuse prevention and the promotion of competence.” In Bond,L.A. and B.E. Compas (eds.), Primary Prevention and Promotion in the Schools. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Botvin, G.J. and A. Eng (1980). “A comprehensive school-based smoking prevention program.” Journal ofSchool Health 50:209–213.Botvin, G.J. and A. Eng (1982). “The efficacy of a multicomponent approach to the prevention of cigarettesmoking.” Preventive Medicine 11:199–211.Botvin, G.J., N. Renick, and E. Baker (1983). “The effects of scheduling format and booster sessions on a broadspectrum psychological approach to smoking prevention.” Journal of Behavioral Medicine 6:359–379.Bowers, K.J., A. Hirschfield, and S.D. Johnson (1998). “Victimization revisited: A case study of non-residentialrepeat burglary on Merseyside.” British Journal of Criminology 38:429–452.Bowers, K.J. and S.D. Johnson (2003). “Measuring the geographical displacement and diffusion of benefit effectsof crime prevention activity.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 19:275–301.Bowers, K.J. and S.D. Johnson (2004). “Who commits near repeats? A test of the boost explanation.” WesternCriminology Review 5(3):12–24.Bowers, K.J. and S.D. Johnson (2005). “Using publicity for preventive purposes.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Handbook ofCrime Prevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Bowers, K.J., S.D. Johnson, and A.F.G. Hirschfield (2003). Pushing Back the Boundaries: New Techniques forAssessing the Impact of Burglary Schemes. Home Office Online Report 24/03. London: Home Office.Bowers, W.J. and J.H. Hirsch (1987). “The impact of foot patrol staffing on crime and disorder in Boston: Anunmet promise.” American Journal of Police 6:17–44.Bowers, W.J. and G.L. Pierce (1975). “The illusion of deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s research on capitalpunishment.” Yale Law Journal 85:187–208.Bowers, W.J. and G.L. Pierce (1980). “The illusion of deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s research on capital342
punishment.” Yale Law Journal 85:187–208.Brady, K.P., S. Balmer, and D. Phenix (2007). “School-police partnership effectiveness in urban schools: Ananalysis of New York City’s impact schools initiative.” Education and Urban Society 39:455–478.Braga, A.A. and B.J. Bond (2008). “Policing crime and disorder hot spots: A randomized controlled trial.”Criminology 46:577–607.Braga, A.A., D. Hureau, and C. Winship (2008). “Losing faith? Police, black churches, and the resurgence ofyouth violence in Boston.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 6:141–172.Braga, A.A., D.M. Kennedy, A.M. Piehl, and E.J. Waring (2001). “Measuring the impact of Operation Ceasefire.”In National Institute of Justice, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Braga, A.A., A.W. Papachristos and D.M. Hureau (2014). “The effects of hot spots policing on crime: Anupdated systematic review and meta-analysis.” Justice Quarterly 31:633–663.Braga, A.A., D.L. Weisburd, E.J. Waring, L.G. Mazerolle, W. Spelman, and F. Gajewski (1999). “Problem-oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment.” Criminology 37:541–580.Braithwaite, J. (1999). “Restorative justice: Assessing optimistic and pessimistic accounts.” In Tonry, M. (ed.),Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 25. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press.Brantingham, P.L. (2010). “Crime pattern theory.” In Fisher, B.S. and S.P. Lab (eds.), Encyclopedia ofVictimology and Crime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (1981). “Notes on the geometry of crime.” In Brantingham, P.J. andP.L. Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (1984). “Burglar mobility and crime prevention planning.” In Clarke,R. and T. Hope (eds.), Coping with Burglary. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (1993a). “Nodes, paths and edges: Considerations on the complexity ofcrime and the physical environment.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 13:3–28.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (1993b). “Environment, routine, and situation: Toward a patterntheory of crime.” In Clarke, R.V. and M. Felson (eds.), Routine Activities and Rational Choice. NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (1996). “Environmental criminology and violent choices.” Paperpresented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, Chicago.Brantingham, P.L. and P.J. Brantingham (2003). “Anticipating the displacement of crime using the principles ofenvironmental criminology.” In Smith, M.J. and D.B. Cornish (eds.), Theory for Practice in SituationalCrime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Brantingham, P.J. and F.L. Faust (1976). “A conceptual model of crime prevention.” Crime & Delinquency22:284–296.Brants, C. (1998). “Crime fighting by television in The Netherlands.” In Fishman, M. and G. Cavender (eds.),Entertaining Crime: Reality Television Programs. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.Brennan, P.A., B.R. Mednick, and S.A. Mednick (1993). “Parental psychopathology, congenital factors, andviolence.” In Hodgins, S. (ed.), Mental Disorder and Crime. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Brewer, D.D., J.D. Hawkins, R.F. Catalano, and H.J. Neckerman (1995). “Preventing serious, violent, andchronic offending: A review of evaluations of selected strategies in childhood, adolescence, and thecommunity.” In Howell, J.C., B. Krisberg, J.D. Hawkins, and J. Wilson (eds.), Sourcebook on Serious, Violent,and Chronic Juvenile Offenders. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Brewster, M.P. (2001). “An evaluation of the Chester County (PA) drug court program.” Journal of Drug Issues31:171–206.Bridenback, M.L., P.L. Imhoff, and J.P. Blanchard (1980). The Use of Mediation/Arbitration in the JuvenileJustice Process: A Study of Three Programs. Tallahassee, FL: Office of the State Courts Administrator.Briscoe, S. (2004). The Impact of Increased Drink-driving Penalties on Recidivism Rates in NSW. Alcohol StudiesBulletin 5. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.Brodie, D.Q. and D.I. Sheppard (1977). “Neighbors Against Crime Together: A project evaluation.” Paperpresented at the National Conference on Criminal Justice Evaluation.Brown, B. (1995). CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case Studies. London: Home Office Police Research Group.343
Brown, E.J., T.J. Flanagan, and M. McLeod (1984). Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office.Brown, L.P. and M.A. Wycoff (1987). “Policing Houston: Reducing fear and improving service.” Crime &Delinquency 33:71–89.Brown, R. (2004). “The effectiveness of electronic immobilization: Changing patterns of temporary andpermanent vehicle theft.” In Maxfield, M.G. and R.V. Clarke (eds.), Understanding and Preventing CarTheft. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Brown, R. (2006). “The role of project management in implementing community safety initiatives.” InKnutsson, J. and R.V. Clarke (eds.), Putting Theory to Work: Implementing Situational Prevention andProblem-Oriented Policing. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Brown, T.L., S.W. Henggeler, S.K. Schoenwald, M.J. Brondino, and S.G. Pickerel (1999). “Multisystemictreatment of substance abusing and dependent juvenile delinquents: Effects on school attendance atposttreatment and 6-month follow-up.” Children’s Services: Social Policy, Research and Practice 2:81–93.Browning, K. and R. Loeber (1999). “Highlights of findings from the Pittsburgh Youth Study.” OJJDP FactSheet, No. 95. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Buck, A.J., S. Hakim, and G.F. Rengert (1993). “Burglar alarms and the choice behavior of burglars: A suburbanphenomenon.” Journal of Criminal Justice 21:497–508.Buerger, M.E. (1994). “The limits of community.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge of CommunityPolicing: Testing the Promises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Bullock, H.A. (1955). “Urban homicide in theory and fact.” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and PoliceScience 45:565–575.Bullock, K. (2014). Citizens, Community and Crime Control. New York: Palgrave.Bureau of Justice Assistance (1995). Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE). Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice.Bureau of Justice Assistance (1997). Comprehensive Communities Program: Promising Approaches.Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.Bureau of Justice Assistance (1998). The Watch Your Car Program. Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice.Bureau of Justice Assistance (2001). Comprehensive Communities Program: Program Account. Washington, DC:U.S. Department of Justice.Bureau of Justice Assistance (2005). Gang Resistance Education and Training. Washington, DC: Bureau ofJustice Assistance. Retrieved from http://www.great-online.orgBureau of Justice Assistance (2014). Gang Resistance Education and Training. http://great-online.org/Components/MiddleSchool.AspxBureau of Justice Assistance (2015). Neighborhood Watch Logic Model.https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-crime-prevention/cbcp6.htmBureau of Justice Statistics. (2010). Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2007, Statistical Tables.Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Burgess, E.W. (1928). “Factors influencing success or failure on parole.” In Bruce, A.A., A.J. Harno, E.W.Burgess, and L. Landesco (eds.), The Workings of the Indeterminate-sentence Law and the Parole System inIllinois. Springfield, IL: Illinois State Board of Parole.Bursik, R.J. and H.G. Grasmick (1993). Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective CommunityControl. New York: Lexington.Butts, J.A., J. Buck, and M.B. Coggershall (2002). The Impact of Teen Court on Young Offenders. Washington,DC: Urban Institute Press.Bynum, T. (1996). “Reducing school violence in Detroit.” Paper presented at the National Institute of JusticeCrime Prevention Conference, Washington, DC.Byrne, J.M. (1990). “The future of intensive supervision and the new intermediate sanctions.” Crime &Delinquency 36:6–41.Calhoun, A. and W. Pelech (2010). “Responding to young people responsible for harm: A comparative study ofrestorative and conventional approaches.” Contemporary Justice Review 13:287–306.Callanan, V.J. (2012). “Media consumption, perceptions of crime risk and fear of crime: Examining race/ethnic344
differences.” Sociological Perspectives 55:93–115.Capaldi, D.M. and G.R. Patterson (1996). “Can violent offenders be distinguished from frequent offenders?Prediction from childhood to adolescence.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 33:206–231.Caplan, G. (1964). Principles of Preventive Psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.Carmichael, S.E. and A.R. Piquero (2006). “Deterrence and arrest ratios.” International Journal of OffenderTherapy and Comparative Criminology 50:71–87.Carpenter, C.S. and C. Pechmann (2011). “Exposure to the Above the Influence antidrug advertisements andadolescent marijuana use in the United States, 2006–2008.” American Journal of Public Health 101:948–954.Carter, D.L. (1995). “Community policing and D.A.R.E.: A practitioner’s perspective.” BJA Bulletin (June).Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.Catalano, R.F. and J.D. Hawkins (1996). “The social development model: A theory of antisocial behavior.” InHawkins, J.D. (ed.), Delinquency and Crime: Current Theories. New York: Cambridge University Press.Cedar Rapids Police Department (1975). Installation, Testing, and Evaluation of a Large-scale Burglar AlarmSystem for a Municipal Police Department—A Second Phase Completion Report. Cedar Rapids, IA: CedarRapids Police Department.Chaiken, J.M. and M.R. Chaiken (1982). Varieties of Criminal Behavior. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.Chaiken, J.M. and M.R. Chaiken (1990). “Drugs and predatory crime.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q. Wilson (eds.),Drugs and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Chainey, S. (2012). “Repeat victimization: Summary (1 of 5).” Available at http://www.jdibrief.comChallinger, D. (2003). Crime Stoppers: Evaluating Victoria’s Program. Canberra, Australia: Australian Instituteof Criminology.Charles, M.T. (1989). “The development of a juvenile electronic monitoring program.” Federal Probation53(2):3–12.Chermak, S.M. (1994). “Body count news: How crime is presented in the news media.” Justice Quarterly11:561–582.Chermak, S.M. (1998). “Predicting crime story salience: The effects of crime, victim, and defendantcharacteristics.” Journal of Criminal Justice 26:61–70.Chermak, S.M. and N. Chapman (2007). “Predicting crime story salience: A replication.” Journal of CriminalJustice 35:351–363.Chiricos, T.G., S. Eschholz, and M. Gertz (1996). “Crime news and fear: Toward an identification of audienceeffects.” Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting.Chiricos, T.G., M. Hogan, and M. Gertz (1997). “Racial composition of neighborhood and fear of crime.”Criminology 35:301–324.Cirel, P., P. Evans, D. McGillis, and D. Whitcomb (1977). Community Crime Prevention Program, Seattle,Washington: An Exemplary Project. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Cirino, R. (1972). Don’t Blame the People. New York: Vantage Books.Clarke, R.V. (1983). “Situational crime prevention: Its theoretical basis and practical scope.” In Tonry, M. and N.Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice, vol. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Clarke, R.V. (1992). Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston.Clarke, R.V. (1993). “Fare evasion and automatic ticket collection on the London underground.” In Clarke, R.V.(ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 1. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Clarke, R.V. (1995). “Situational crime prevention.” In Tonry, M. and D.P. Farrington (eds.), Building a SaferSociety: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Clarke, R.V. (1996). Preventing Mass Transit Crime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Clarke, R.V. (1999). Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating and Reducing Demand for Stolen Goods.London: Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.Clarke, R.V. (2005). “Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Handbook ofCrime Prevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Clarke, R.V. and D. Cornish (1985). “Modeling offenders’ decisions: A framework for policy and research.” InTonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice, vol. 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Clarke, R.V. and J.E. Eck (2005). Crime Analysis for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps. Washington, DC: Officeof Community Oriented Policing Services345
Clarke, R.V. and R. Homel (1997). “A revised classification of situational crime prevention techniques.” In Lab,S.P. (ed.), Crime Prevention at a Crossroads. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.Clarke, R.V. and P.M. Mayhew (1980). Designing Out Crime. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.Clarke, R.V. and G.R. Newman (2005). “Modifying criminogenic products: What role for governments?” InClarke, R.V. and G.R. Newman (eds.), Designing Out Crime from Products and Systems. Monsey, NY:Criminal Justice Press.Clarke, R.V., E. Perkins, and D.J. Smith, Jr. (2001). “Explaining repeat residential burglaries: An analysis ofproperty stolen.” In G. Farrell and K. Pease (eds.), Repeat Victimization. Monsey, NY: Criminal JusticePress.Clarke, R.V. and D. Weisburd (1994). “Diffusion of crime control benefits: Observations on the reverse ofdisplacement.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 2. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Clarke, S. (1974). “Getting em out of circulation: Does incarceration of juvenile offenders reduce crime?”Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 65:528–535.Clayton, R.R., A. Cattarello, and K.P. Walden (1991). “Sensation seeking as a potential mediating variable forschool-based prevention interventions: A two-year follow-up of DARE.” Journal of HealthCommunications 3:229–239.Clear, T.R. and P.L. Hardyman (1990). “The new intensive supervision movement.” Crime & Delinquency36:42–60.Cloward, R. and L. Ohlin (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. New York, NY:The Free Press.Coates, R.B. and J. Gehm (1989). “An empirical assessment.” In Wright, M. and B. Galaway (eds.), Mediationand Criminal Justice: Victims, Offenders and Community. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Cochran, J.K. and M.B. Chamlin (2000). “Deterrence and brutalization: The dual effects of executions.” JusticeQuarterly 17:685–706.Cochran, J.K., M.B. Chamlin, and M. Seth (1994). “Deterrence or brutalization?: An impact assessment ofOklahoma’s return to capital punishment.” Criminology 32:107–134.Cocozza, J.J. and J.L. Shufelt (2006). Juvenile Mental Health Courts: An Emerging Strategy. Delmar, NY: TheNational Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice.Cohen, A.L. (1955). Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.Cohen, J. (1978). “The incapacitative effect of imprisonment: a critical review of the literature.” In Blumstein,A., J. Cohen, and D. Nagin (eds.), Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of CriminalSanctions on Crime Rates. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Cohen, J. (1983). “Incapacitation as a strategy for crime control: possibilities and pitfalls.” In Tonry, M. and N.Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice, vol. 5. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Cohen, J. and J. Ludwig (2003). “Policing crime guns.” In Ludwig, J. and P.J. Cook (eds.), Evaluating Gun Policy:Effects on Crime and Violence. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.Cohen, L.E. and M. Felson (1979). “Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activities approach.”American Sociological Review 44:588–608.Cohen, S. (1975). “The evidence so far.” Journal of Communication 25:14–24.Cohn, E.S., L. Kidder, and J. Harvey (1978). “Crime prevention vs. victimization: The psychology of twodifferent reactions.” Victimology 3:285–296.Coleman, J.S. (1966). Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Collins, J.J. (1989). “Alcohol and interpersonal violence: Less than meets the eye.” In Weiner, N.A. and M.E.Wolfgang (eds.), Pathways to Criminal Violence. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Collins, J.J., R.L. Hubbard, and J.V. Rachal (1985). “Expensive drug use and illegal income: A test of explanatoryhypotheses.” Criminology 23:743–764.Communities that Care (CTC) (2015). http://www.communitiesthatcare.net/how-ctc-works/social-development-strategy/Conger, R.D. and R.L. Simons (1997). “Life-course contingencies in the development of adolescent antisocialbehavior: A matching law approach.” In T.P. Thornberry (ed.) Advances in Criminological Theory. NewYork: Aldine.Conklin, J.E. (1975). The Impact of Crime. New York: Macmillan.346
Conklin, J.E. (2003). Why Crime Rates Fell. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.Coombs, R.H. (1981). “Back on the streets: Therapeutic communities’ impact upon drug abusers.” AmericanJournal of Alcohol Abuse 8:185–201.Cook, R.F. and J.A. Roehl (1983). Preventing Crime and Arson: A Review of Community-based Strategies.Reston, VA: Institute for Social Analysis.Cook, T.D. and D.T. Campbell (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings.Chicago: Rand McNally College.Cooprider, K.W. and J. Kerby (1990). “A practical application of electronic monitoring at the pretrial stage.”Federal Probation 54:28–35.Coote, S. (2000) “Families and Schools Together (FAST).” Paper presented at the Reducing CriminalityConference, Perth, Australia.Cordner, G.W. (1995). “Community policing: Elements and effects.” Police Forum 5(3):1–8.Cornish, D. (1994). “The procedural analysis of offending and its relevance for situational prevention.” InClarke R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 3. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Cornish, D.B. and R.V. Clarke (1986a). The Reasoning Criminal. New York: Springer-Verlag.Cornish, D.B. and R.V. Clarke (1986b). “Situational prevention, crime displacement and rational choice theory.”In Heal, K. and G. Laycock (eds.), Situational Crime Prevention: From Theory into Practice. London: HerMajesty’s Stationery Office.Cornish, D.B. and R.V. Clarke (2003). “Opportunities, precipitators and criminal decisions: A reply to Wortley’scritique of situational crime prevention.” In Smith, M.J. and D.B. Cornish (eds.), Theory for Practice inSituational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Cornish, D.B. and R.V. Clarke (2008). “The rational choice perspective.” In Wortley, R. and L. Mazerolle (eds.)Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Corsaro, N. and E. McGarrell (2009). “Testing a promising homicide reduction strategy: Rassessing the impactof Indianapolis’ ‘pulling levers’ intervention.” Journal of Experimental Criminology 5:63–82.Corsaro, N. and E. McGarrell (2010). “Reducing homicide risk in Indianapolis between 1997 and 2000.” Journalof Urban Health 87:851–864.Council of State Governments Justice Center (2008). Mental Health Courts: A Primer for Policymakers andPractitioners. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance. Retrieved fromhttp://www.bja.gov/publications/mhc_primer.pdfCovington, J. and R.B. Taylor (1991). “Fear of crime in urban residential neighborhoods: Implications ofbetween- and within-neighborhood sources for current models.” Sociological Quarterly 32:231–249.Cox, S.M. (1999). “An assessment of an alternative education program for at-risk delinquent youth.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 36:323–336.Cox, S.M., W.S. Davidson, and T.S. Bynum (1995). “A meta-analytic assessment of delinquency-relatedoutcomes of alternative education programs.” Crime & Delinquency 41:219–234.Coyne, S.M. (2007). “Does media violence cause violent crime?” European Journal of Criminal Policy andResearch 13:205–211.Cozens, P.M. (2014) Think Crime! Using Evidence, Theory and Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign (CPTED) for Planning Safer Cities. Quinns Rocks, Australia: Praxis Education.Cozens, P.M. and T. Davies (2013). “Crime and residential security shutters in an Australian suburb: Exploringperceptions of ‘eyes on the street,’ social interaction and personal safety.” Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety 15:175–191.Cozens, P.M., G. Saville and D. Hillier (2005). “Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED): Areview and modern bibliography.” Property Management 23:328–356.Crawford, A. (1998). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices. London:Longman.Crawford, A. (2001). “Joined-up but fragmented: Contradiction, ambiguity and ambivalence at the heart ofNew Labour’s ‘Third Way’.” In Matthews, R. and J. Pitts (eds.), Crime, Disorder and Community Safety.New York: Routledge.Crawford, A. (2007). “Crime prevention and community safety.” In Maguire, M., R. Morgan, and R. Reiner(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press347
Crime Stoppers International (2015). http://csiworld.org/Cristall, J., and Forman-Echols, L. (2009). Property Abatements—The Other Gang Injunction: Project T.O.U.G.H.Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance. National Gang Center Bulletin 2.Cromwell, P.F., J.N. Olson, and D.W. Avary (1991). Breaking and Entering: An Ethnographic Analysis ofBurglary. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Cullen, F.T. and P. Gendreau (2000). “Assessing correctional rehabilitation: Policy, practice and prospects.” InHorney, J. (ed.), Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System. Criminal Justice 2000.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Cusson, M. (1993). “A strategic analysis of crime: Criminal tactics as responses to precriminal situations.” InClarke, R.V. and M. Felson (eds.), Routine Activity and Rational Choice. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.Dadds, M.R., S.H. Spence, D.E. Holland, P.M. Barrett, and K.R. Laurens (1997). “Prevention and earlyintervention for anxiety disorders: A controlled trial.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology65:627–635.Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council (1975). Geographic Crime Displacement in the Dallas Area. Dallas, TX:Dallas Area Criminal Justice Council.Davis, R.C. and A.J. Lurigio (1996). Fighting Back: Neighborhood Antidrug Strategies. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage.Davis, R.C. and A.J. Lurigio (1998). “Civil abatement as a tool for controlling drug dealing in rental properties.”Security Journal 11:45–50.Davis, R.C., A.J. Lurigio, and D.P. Rosenbaum (1993). Drugs and the Community: Involving CommunityResidents in Combating the Sale of Illegal Drugs. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas.Davis, R.C., B.E. Smith, A.J. Lurigio, and W.G. Skogan (1991). Community Response to Crack: Grassroots Anti-Drug Programs. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Davis, R.C., B.E. Smith, and L.B. Nickles (1998). “The deterrent effect of prosecuting domestic violencemisdemeanors.” Crime & Delinquency 44:434–442.Decker, S.H., G.D. Curry, S. Catalano, A. Watkins, and L. Green (2005). Strategic Approaches to CommunitySafety Initiative (SACSI) in St. Louis. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.DeJong, W. (1993). “Building the peace: The resolving conflict creatively program (RCCP).” NIJ Program Focus.Washington, DC: Department of Justice.DeLeon, G. (1984). “Program-based evaluation research in therapeutic communities.” In Tims, F.M. and J.P.Ludford (eds.), Drug Abuse Treatment Evaluation: Strategies, Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC:National Institute on Drug Abuse.DeLeon, G. and M.S. Rosenthal (1989). “Treatment in residential therapeutic communities.” In Kleber, H. (ed.),Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders: A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association, vol. 2.Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.del Frate, A.A. (1998). Preventing Crime: Citizens’ Experiences Across the World. UNICRI Issues and ReportsNo. 9. New York: United Nations.DeLong, J.V. (1972). “Treatment and rehabilitation.” Dealing with Drug Abuse: A Report to the Ford Foundation.New York: Praeger.DeMichele, M. and B. Payne (2009). Offender Supervision with Electronic Technology: Community CorrectionsResources, Second Edition. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance. Retrieved fromhttp://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdfDenno, D.W. (1990). Biology and Violence: From Birth to Adulthood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.DesChamps, S., P.L. Brantingham, and P.J. Brantingham (1991). “The British Columbia transit fare evasionaudit: A description of a situational prevention process.” Security Journal 2:211–218.Deutshmann, P.J. (1959). News-page Content of Twelve Metropolitan Dailies. Cincinnati, OH: Scripps-HowardResearch Center.Dezhbakhsh, H., P.H. Rubin, and J.M. Shepherd (2003). “Does capital punishment have a deterrent effect?: Newevidence from postmoratorium panel data.” American Law and Economics Review 52:344–376.DiBlasio, N. (2012). “YouTube: The latest crime solver.” USA Today July 5:A1.Ditton, J. and J. Duffy (1983). “Bias in the newspaper reporting of crime news.” British Journal of Criminology23:159–165.348
Ditton, J. and E. Short (1999). “Yes, it works, no, it doesn’t: Comparing the effects of open-street CCTV in twoadjacent Scottish town centres.” In Painter, K. and N. Tilley (eds.), Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV,Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Dobash, R.E., P. Schlesinger, R. Dobash, and C.K. Weaver (1998). “‘Crimewatch UK’: Women’s interpretation oftelevised violence.” In Fishman, M. and G. Cavender (eds.), Entertaining Crime: Television RealityPrograms. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.Dominick, J.R. (1978). “Crime and law enforcement in the mass media.” In Winick, C. (ed.), Deviance and MassMedia. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Donnelly, P. and C. Kimble (1997). “Community organizing, environmental change, and neighborhood crime.”Crime & Delinquency 43:493–511.Donohue, J.J. (2009). “Assessing the relative benefits of incarceration: The overall change over the previousdecades and the benefits on the margin.” In Raphael, S. and M.A. Stoll (eds.), Do Prisons Make Us Safer?:The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom. New York: Sage.Donohue, J.J. and J. Wolfers (2005). “Uses and abuses of empirical evidence in the death penalty debate.”Stanford Law Review 58:791–846.Donovan, P. (1998). “Armed with the power of television: Reality crime programming and the reconstruction oflaw and order in the United States.” In Fishman, M. and G. Cavender (eds.), Entertaining Crime: RealityTelevision Programs. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.Doob, A.N. and G.E. Macdonald (1979). “Television viewing and fear of victimization: Is the relationshipcausal?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37:170–179.Doran, B.J. and M.B. Burgess (2012). Putting Fear of Crime on the Map: Investigating Perceptions of CrimeUsing Geographic Information Systems. New York: Springer.Drug Courts Program Office (1998). Looking at a Decade of Drug Courts. Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice.Drug Courts Program Office (2000). About the Drug Courts Program Office. Washington, DC: U.S. Departmentof Justice.DuBois, D.L., N. Portillo, J.E. Rhodes, N. Silverthorn, and J.C. Valentine (2011). “How effective are mentoringprograms for youth?: A systematic assessment of the evidence.” Psychological Science in the Public Interest12:57–91.DuBois, D.L., B.E. Holloway, J.C. Valentine, and H. Cooper (2002). “Effectiveness of mentoring programs foryouth: A meta-analytic review.” American Journal of Community Psychology 30:157–197.Dunford, F.W. (1990). “System initiated warrants for suspects of misdemeanor domestic assault: A pilot study.”Justice Quarterly 7:631–654.Durose, M.R., A.D. Cooper, and H.N. Snyder (2014). Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005:Patterns from 2005 to 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved fromhttp://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdfEck, J.E. (1993). “The threat of crime displacement.” Criminal Justice Abstracts 25:527–546.Eck, J.E. (1994). “Drug Markets and Drug Places: A Case-control Study of the Spatial Structure of Illicit DrugDealing.” Ph.D. dissertation, College Park, MD: University of Maryland.Eck, J.E. (1998). “Preventing crime by controlling drug dealing on private rental property.” Security Journal11:37–43.Eck, J.E. (2002). “Learning from experience in problem-oriented policing and situational prevention: Thepositive functions of weak evaluations and the negative functions of strong ones.” In N. Tilley (ed.),Analysis for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Eck, J.E. and D.P. Rosenbaum (1994). “The new police order: Effectiveness, equity, and efficiency in communitypolicing.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises. ThousandOaks, CA: Sage.Eck, J.E. and W. Spelman (1989). “A problem-oriented approach to police service delivery.” In Kenney, D. (ed.),Police and Policing: Contemporary Issues. New York: Praeger.Eck, J.E. and J. Wartell (1998). “Improving the management of rental properties with drug problems: Arandomized experiment.” In Mazerolle, L.G. and J. Roehl (eds.), Civil Remedies and Crime Prevention.Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.349
Eck, J.E. and J. Wartell (1999). “Reducing crime and drug dealing by improving place management: Arandomized experiment.” NIJ Research Preview. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Ehrlich, I. (1975). “The deterrent effects of capital punishment: A question of life and death.” AmericanEconomic Review 65:397–417.Ehrlich, I. (1977). “Capital punishment and deterrence: Some further thoughts and additional evidence.”Journal of Political Economy 85:741–788.Eiser, C. and J.R. Eiser (1988). Drug Education in Schools. New York: Springer-Verlag.Ekblom, P. (1993). “Scoping and scoring: Linking measures of action to measures of outcome in a multi-scheme,multi-site crime prevention programme.” In Zahm, D. and P. Cromwell (eds.), Proceedings of theInternational Seminar on Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis. Coral Gables, FL: FloridaCriminal Justice Executive Institute.Ekblom, P. (2002). “From the source to the mainstream is uphill: The challenge of transferring knowledge ofcrime prevention through replication, innovation and anticipation”. In N. Tilley (ed.), Analysis for CrimePrevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Ekblom, P. (2005). “Designing products against crime.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Ekblom, P. (2008). “Designing products against crime.” In Wortley, R. and L. Mazerolle (eds.), EnvironmentalCriminology and Crime Analysis. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Ekblom, P. (2011a). Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety using the 5Is Framework. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.Ekblom, P. (2011b). “Deconstructing CPTED … and reconstructing it for practice, knowledge management andresearch.” European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 17:7–28.Ekblom, P., K. Bowers, L. Gamman, A. Sidebottom, C. Thomas, A. Thorpe, and M. Willcocks (2012). “Reducinghandbag theft.” In Ekblom, P. (ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner.Ekblom, P. and A. Hirschfield (2014). “Developing an alternative formulation of SCP principles—the Ds (11 andcounting).” Crime Science 3:2.Ekblom, P., H. Law, and M. Sutton (1996a). Safer Cities and Domestic Burglary. London: Home Office Researchand Statistics Directorate.Ekblom, P., H. Law, and M. Sutton (1996b). Domestic Burglary Schemes in the Safer Cities Programme.Research Findings No. 42. London: Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate.Ekblom, P. and K. Pease (1995). “Evaluating crime prevention.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.), Crime andJustice: A Review of Research, vol. 19. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Elder, R., R. Shults, D. Sleet, J.L. Nichols, R.S. Thompson, and W. Rajab (2004). “Effectiveness of mass mediacampaigns for reducing drinking and driving and alcohol-involved crashes: A systematic review.”American Journal of Preventive Medicine 27:57–65.Elfers, H., D. Reynald, M. Averdijk, W. Bernasco, and R. Block (2008). “Modelling crime flow betweenneighbourhoods in terms of distance and of intervening opportunities.” Crime Prevention and CommunitySafety 10:85–96.Ellingworth, D., G. Farrell, and K. Pease (1995). “A victim is a victim is a victim? Chronic victimization in foursweeps of the British Crime Survey.” British Journal of Criminology 35:360–365.Elliott, D.S. (1994). “Serious, violent offenders: Onset, developmental course, and termination.” Criminology32:1–21.Elliott, D.S. (2000). “Editor’s introduction.” In Olweus, D. and S. Limber (eds.), Bullying Prevention Program:Blueprints for Violence Prevention. Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science.Elliott, D.S. and S.S. Ageton (1981). The Epidemiology of Delinquent Behavior and Drug Use Among AmericanAdolescents, 1976–1978. Boulder, CO: Behavioral Research Institute.Elliott, D.S., S.S. Ageton, and R.J. Canter (1979). “An integrated theoretical perspective on delinquent behavior.”Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 16:3–27.Elliott, D.S. and D.H. Huizinga. (1984). The Relationship Between Delinquent Behavior and ADM Problems.Boulder, CO: Behavioral Research Institute.Elliott, D.S., D.H. Huizinga, and S.S. Ageton (1985). Explaining Delinquency and Drug Use. Beverly Hills, CA:350
Sage.Elliott, D.S., D.H. Huizinga, and S. Menard (1989). Multiple Problem Youth: Delinquency, Substance Use andMental Health Problems. New York: Springer-Verlag.Elliott, D.S. and S. Menard (1996). “Delinquent friends and delinquent behavior: Temporal and developmentalpatterns.” In Hawkins, J.D. (ed.), Delinquency and Crime: Current Theories. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.Ellis, E., J. Fortune and G. Peters (2007). “Partnership problems: Analysis and re-design.” Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety 9:34–51.Empey, L.T. and S.G. Lubbeck (1971). Explaining Delinquency. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.Ennis, B.J. and T.R. Litwack (1974). “Psychiatry and the presumption of expertise: Flipping coins in thecourtroom.” California Law Review 62:693–752.Ennis, P.H. (1967). Criminal Victimization in the U.S.: A Report of a National Survey. President’s Commissionon Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Field Surveys II. Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.Erez, E., P. Ibarra, and N.A. Lurie (2004). “Electronic monitoring of domestic violence cases: A study of twobilateral programs.” Federal Probation 68(1). Retrieved fromhttp://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/June_2004/monitoring.htmlErickson, M.L., J.P. Gibbs, and G.F. Jensen (1977). “The deterrence doctrine and the perceived certainty of legalpunishments.” American Sociological Review 42:305–317.Erwin, B.E. (1990). “Old and new tools for the modern probation officer.” Crime & Delinquency 36:61–74.Esbensen, F. (1987). “Foot patrols: Of what value?” American Journal of Police 6:45–65.Esbensen, F. and D. Huizinga (1993). “Gangs, drugs and delinquency in a survey of urban youth.” Criminology31:565–589.Esbensen, F., D.W. Osgood, D. Peterson, T.T. Taylor, and D.C. Carson (2013). “Short- and long-term outcomeresults from a multisite evaluation of the G.R.E.A.T. program.” Criminology and Public Policy 12, 375–412.Esbensen, F., D. Peterson, T.J. Taylor, A. Freng, and D.W. Osgood (2004). “Gang prevention: A case study of aprimary prevention program.” In F. Esbensen, S.G. Tibbetts and L. Gaines (eds.), American Youth Gangs atthe Millennium. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.Esbensen, F., D. Peterson, T.J. Taylor, A. Freng, D.W. Osgood, D.C. Carson, and K.N. Matsuda (2011).“Evaluation and evolution of the gang resistance education and training (G.R.E.A.T.) program.” Journal ofSchool Violence 10:53–70.Everson, S. and P.F. Woodhouse (2007). “Designing out crime: Has section 17 of the UK’s Crime and DisorderAct 1998 been effective?” In Farrell, G., K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson and M. Townsley (eds.), Imagination forCrime Prevention: Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Fabricant, R. (1979). “The distribution of criminal offenses in an urban environment: A spatial analysis ofcriminal spillovers and of juvenile offenders.” American Journal of Economics and Society 38:31–47.Fagan, J. (1989). “The social organization of drug use and drug dealing among urban gangs.” Criminology27:633–670.Fagan, J., and J.G. Weis (1990). Drug Use and Delinquency Among Inner City Youth. New York: Springer-Verlag.Fagan, J., F.E. Zimring, and A. Geller (2006). “Capital punishment and capital market: Market share and thedeterrent effects of the death penalty.” Texas Law Review 84:1803–1867.Families and Schools Together (FAST) (2015). http://www.familiesandschools.org/Fareed, A., Vayalapalli, S., Stout, S., Casarella, J., Drexler, K., and Bailey, S. P. (2011). “Effect of methadonemaintenance treatment on heroin craving: A literature review.” Journal of Addictive Diseases 30:27–38.Farrell, A.D. and A.L. Meyer (1997). “The effectiveness of a school-based curriculum for reducing violenceamong urban sixth-grade students.” American Journal of Public Health 87:979–988.Farrell, G. (2005). “Progress and prospects in the prevention of repeat victimization.” In Tilley, N. (ed.),Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Farrell, G. and K. Pease (2006). “Preventing repeat residential burglary victimization.” In Welsh, B.C. and D.P.Farrington (eds.), Preventing Crime: What Works for Children, Offenders, Victims and Places. New York:Springer.351
Farrell, G. and K. Pease (2014). “Repeat victimization.” In Bruinsma, G. and D. Weisburd (eds.), Encyclopedia ofCriminology and Criminal Justice. New York: Springer.Farrell, G., C. Phillips, and K. Pease (1995). “Like taking candy: Why does repeat victimization occur?” BritishJournal of Criminology 33:384–399.Farrell, G., A. Tseloni, and K. Pease (2005). “Repeat victimization in the ICVS and the NCVS.” Crime Preventionand Community Safety 7(3):7–18.Farrington, D.P. (1985). “Predicting self-reported and official delinquency.” In Farrington, D.P. and R. Tarling(eds.), Prediction in Criminology. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.Farrington, D.P. (1989). “Early predictors of adolescent aggression and adult violence.” Violence and Victims4:79–100.Farrington, D.P. (1996). “The explanation and prevention of youthful offending.” In Hawkins, J.D. (ed.),Delinquency and Crime: Current Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Farrington, D.P. (1997). “The relationship between low resting heart rate and violence.” In Raine, A., P.A.Brennan, D.P. Farrington and S.A. Mednick (eds.), Biosocial Bases of Violence. New York: Plenum.Farrington, D.P. (2007). “Childhood risk factors and risk-focused prevention.” In Maguire, M., R. Morgan and R.Reiner (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Farrington, D.P., T.H. Bennett, and B.C. Welsh (2007). “The Cambridge evaluation of the effects of CCTV oncrime.” In Farrell, G., K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson, and M. Townsley (eds.), Imagination for Crime Prevention:Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Farrington, D.P., S. Bowen, A. Buckle, T. Burns-Howell, J. Burrows, and M. Speed (1993). “An experiment onthe prevention of shoplifting.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 1. Monsey, NY: CriminalJustice Press.Farrington, D.P. and R. Loeber (1998). “Transatlantic replicability of risk factors in the development ofdelinquency.” In Cohen, P., C. Slomkowski, and L.N. Robbins (eds.), Where and When: Geographic andGenerational Influences on Psychopathology. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.Farrington, D.P. and K.A. Painter (2003). “How to evaluate the impact of CCTV on crime.” Crime Preventionand Community Safety 5(3):7–16.Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (2014). Crime in the United States, 2013. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013Feeney, F. (1986). “Robbers as decision makers.” In Cornish, D.B. and R.V. Clarke (eds.), The ReasoningCriminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. New York: Springer-Verlag.Feinberg, M.E., M.T. Greenberg, D.W. Osgood, J. Sartorius, and D. Bontempo (2007). “Effects of theCommunities that Care model in Pennsylvania on youth risk and problem behaviors.” Prevention Science8:261–270.Feld, B.C. (1999). “Rehabilitation, retribution and restorative justice: Alternative conceptions of juvenilejustice.” In G. Bazemore and L. Walgrave (eds.), Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of YouthCrime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Felson, M., M.E. Belanger, G.M. Bichler, C.D. Bruzinske, G.S. Campbell, C.L. Fried, K.C. Grofik, I.S. Mazur, A.B.O’Regan, P.J. Sweeney, A.L. Ullman, and L.M. Williams (1996). “Redesigning hell: Preventing crime anddisorder at the port authority bus terminal.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Preventing Mass Transit Crime. Monsey,NY: Criminal Justice Press.Felson, M. and R.V. Clarke (1998). Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention.London: Home Office Police and Reducing Crime Unit.Ferguson, C.J. (2013). Adolescents, Crime and the Media: A Critical Analysis. New York: Springer.Ferguson, K.M. and C.H. Mindel (2007). “Modeling fear of crime in Dallas neighborhoods: A test of socialcapital theory.” Crime & Delinquency 53:322–349.Ferraro, K.F. (1995). Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimization Risk. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.Ferraro, K.F. and R.L. LaGrange (1987). “The measurement of fear of crime.” Sociological Inquiry 57:70–101.Ferraro, K.F. and R.L. LaGrange (1988). “Are older people afraid of crime?” Journal of Aging Studies 2:277–287.Figgie International (1983). The Figgie Report, Part IV: Reducing Crime in America, Successful CommunityEfforts. Willoughby, OH: Figgie International.Finch, E. (2011). “Strategies of adaptation and diversification: The impact of chip and PIN technology on the352
activities of fraudsters.” Security Journal 24:251–268.Fisher, B.S. (1989). “The ‘community hypothesis’ revisited: The effects of participation after controlling for self-selection bias.” Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, Washington, DC.Fisher, B.S. and J.L. Nasar (1992). “Fear of crime in relation to three exterior site features: Prospect, refuge, andescape.” Environment and Behavior 24:35–65.Fishman, R. (1977). “An evaluation of criminal recidivism in projects providing rehabilitation and diversionservices in New York City.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 68:283–305.Fleming, Z., P. Brantingham, and P. Brantingham (1994). “Exploring auto theft in British Columbia.” In Clarke,R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 3. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Flexon, J.L. and R.T. Guerette (2009). “Differential effects of an offender-focuses crime prevention mediacampaign.” Journal of Criminal Justice 37:608–616.Flynn, R.J. (2008). “Communities that Care: A comprehensive system for youth prevention and promotion, andCanadian applications to date.” IPC Review 2:83–106.Foglia, W.D. (1997). “Perceptual deterrence and the mediating effect of internalized norms among inner-cityteenagers.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 34:414–442.Ford, D. and A. Schmidt (1985). Electronic Monitored Home Confinement. National Institute of Justice Researchin Action. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Forrester, D.H., M.R. Chatterton, and K. Pease (1988). “The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention DemonstrationProject.” Home Office Crime Prevention Paper No. 13. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.Forrester, D.H., S. Frenz, M. O’Connell, and K. Pease (1990). The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II.London: Home Office.Fors, S.W. and D.G. Rojek (1991). “A comparison of drug involvement between runaways and school youths.”Journal of Drug Education 21:13–25.Forst, B.E. (1977). “The deterrent effect of capital punishment: A cross-state analysis of the 1960s.” MinnesotaLaw Review 61:743–767.Fowler, F. and T.W. Mangione (1982). Neighborhood Crime, Fear and Social Control: A Second Look at theHartford Program. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Fowler, F., M.E. McCalla, and T.W. Mangione (1979). Reducing Residential Crime and Fear: The HartfordNeighborhood Crime Prevention Program. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement andCriminal Justice.Friel, C.M. and J.B. Vaughn (1986). “A consumer’s guide to the electronic monitoring of probationers.” FederalProbation 50(3):3–14.Friel, C.M., J.B. Vaughn, and R. del Carmen (1987). Electronic Monitoring and Correctional Policy: TheTechnology and its Application. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.FRIENDS (2015). The FRIENDS Program. http://friendsprograms.com/Furstenburg, F.F. (1972). “Fear of crime and its effects on citizen behavior.” In A. Biderman (ed.), Crime andJustice: A Symposium. New York: Nailburg.Gable, R.K. (1986). “Application of personal telemonitoring to current problems in corrections.” Journal ofCriminal Justice 14:167–176.Gabor, T. (1981). “The crime displacement hypothesis: An empirical examination.” Crime & Delinquency27:390–404.Gabor, T. (1990). “Crime displacement and situational prevention: Toward the development of someprinciples.” Canadian Journal of Criminology 32:41–73.Gaes, G.G., T.J. Flanagan, L.T. Motiuk, and L. Stewart (1999). “Adult correctional treatment.” In Tonry, M. andJ. Petersilia (eds.), Prisons. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Gamoran, A., R.N. López Turley, A. Turner, and R. Fish (2012). “Differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic families in social capital and child development: First-year findings from an experimental study.”Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 30:97–112.Garofalo, J. (1979). “Victimization and the fear of crime.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 16:80–97.Garofalo, J. (1981). “Crime and the mass media: A selective review of research.” Journal of Research in Crimeand Delinquency 18:319–350.353
Garofalo, J. and K.J. Connelly (1980). “Dispute resolution centers, part I: major features and processes.”Criminal Justice Abstracts 12:416–436.Garofalo, J. and M. McLeod (1988). “Improving the use and effectiveness of neighborhood watch programs.”NIJ Research in Action. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Garrett, C.J. (1985). “Effects of residential treatment on adjudicated delinquents: A meta-analysis.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 22:287–308.Gates, L.B. and W.M. Rohe (1987). “Fear and reactions to crime: A revised model.” Urban Affairs Quarterly22:425–453.Geen, R.G. and S.L. Thomas (1986). “The immediate effects of media violence on behavior.” Journal of SocialIssues 42:7–27.Geerken, M.R. and W.R. Gove (1977). “Deterrence, overload, and incapacitation: An empirical evaluation.”Social Forces 56:424–447.General Accounting Office (GAO) (1997). Drug Courts: Overview of Growth, Characteristics, and Results.Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Gensheimer, L.K., J.P. Mayer, R. Gottschalk, and W.S. Davidson (1986). “Diverting youth from the juvenilejustice system: A meta-analysis of intervention efficacy.” In Apter, S.J. and A.P. Goldstein (eds.), YouthViolence: Programs and Prospects. New York: Pergamon.Gerbner, G., L. Gross, M.F. Eleey, M. Jackson-Beeck, S. Jeffries-Fox, and N. Signorielle (1977). “TV violence no.8: The highlights.” Journal of Communication 27:171–180.Gerbner, G., L. Gross, M. Jackson-Beeck, S. Jeffries-Fox, and N. Signorielle (1978). “Cultural indicators: Violenceprofile no. 9.” Journal of Communication 28:176–207.Gerbner, G., L. Gross, N. Signorielle, and M. Morgan (1980). “Television violence, victimization, and power.”American Behavioral Scientist 23:705–716.Gerbner, G., L. Gross, N. Signorielle, M. Morgan, and M. Jackson-Beeck (1979). “The demonstration of power:Violence profile no. 10.” Journal of Communication 29:177–196.Geva, R. and I. Israel (1982). “Anti-burglary campaign in Jerusalem: Pilot project update.” Police Chief 49:44–46.Gibbs, J.P. (1968). “Crime, punishment, and deterrence.” Social Science Quarterly 48:515–530.Gibbs, J.P. (1975). Crime, Punishment and Deterrence. New York: Elsevier.Gies, S.V., R. Gainey, M.I. Cohen, E. Healy, M. Yeide, A. Bekelman and A. Bobnis (2013). Monitoring High-riskGang Offenders with GPS Technology: An Evaluation of the California Supervision Program Final Report.Washington, DC: Department of Justice.Gill, M. and R. Matthews (1994). “Robbers on robbery: Offenders’ perspectives.” In Gill, M. (ed.), Crime atWork: Studies in Security and Crime Prevention. Leicester, U.K.: Perpetuity Press.Gill, M. and K. Pease (1998). “Repeat robbers: Are they different?” In Gill, M. (ed.), Crime at Work: Increasingthe Risk for Offenders. Leicester, U.K.: Perpetuity Press.Gill, M. and A. Spriggs (2005). Assessing the Impact of CCTV. London: Home Office.Gilling, D. (1997). Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics. London: UCL Press.Gilling, D. (2005). “Partnerships and crime prevention.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Glaser, D. (1964). The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.Gold, M. (1978). “Scholastic experiences, self-esteem, and delinquent behavior: A theory for alternativeschools.” Crime & Delinquency 24:290–308.Gold, M. and D. Mann (1972). “Delinquency as defense.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 42:463–477.Gold, M. and D. Mann (1983). “Alternative schools for troublesome youths.” Urban Review 14:305–316.Goldkamp, J.S. and D. Weiland (1993). “Assessing the impact of Dade County’s felony drug court.” NIJResearch in Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.Goldstein, P.J. (1989). “Drugs and violent crime.” In Weiner, N.A. and M.E. Wolfgang (eds.), Pathways toCriminal Violence. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Goldstein, P.J., H.H. Brownstein, and P.J. Ryan (1992). “Drug-related homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988.”Crime & Delinquency 38:459–476.Gomme, I.M. (1986). “Fear of crime among Canadians: A multi-variate analysis.” Journal of Criminal Justice14:249–258.354
Gomme, I.M. (1988). “The role of experience in the production of fear of crime: A text of a causal model.”Canadian Journal of Criminology 30:67–76.Gordon, M.T., J. Reiss, and T. Taylor (1979). Crime in the Newspapers and Fear in the Neighborhoods: SomeUnintended Consequences. Evanston, IL: Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University.Gorman-Smith, D., P.H. Tolan, A. Zelli, and L.R. Huesmann (1996). “The relation of family functioning toviolence among inner-city minority youths.” Journal of Family Psychology 10:115–129.Gottfredson, D.C. (1986a). “An empirical test of school-based environmental and individual interventions toreduce the risk of delinquent behavior.” Criminology 24:705–731.Gottfredson, D.C. (1986b). An Assessment of a Delinquency Prevention Demonstration with both Individual andEnvironmental Interventions. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.Gottfredson, D.C. (1987). “Examining the potential of delinquency prevention through alternative education.”Today’s Delinquent 6:87–100.Gottfredson, D.M., M.R. Gottfredson, and J. Garofalo (1977). “Time served in prison and parole outcomesamong parolee risk categories.” Journal of Criminal Justice 5:1–12.Gottfredson, D.M., P.B. Hoffman, M.H. Sigler, and L.T. Wilkins (1975). “Making paroling policy explicit.” Crime& Delinquency 21:34–44.Gottfredson, D.M., S.S. Najaka, and B. Kearley (2003). “Effectiveness of drug treatment courts: Evidence from arandomized trial.” Criminology and Public Policy 2:171–198.Gottfredson, G.D. and D.C. Gottfredson (1985). Victimization in Schools. New York: Plenum.Gottfredson, M.R. and T. Hirschi (1990). A General Theory of Crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Gowdy, V.B. (1993). “Intermediate sanctions.” NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department ofJustice.Graber, D. (1977). “Ideological components in the perceptions of crime and crime news.” Paper presented at theMeeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems.Graber, D. (1980). Crime News and the Public. New York, NY: Praeger.Graziano, A.M. and K. Mooney (1984). Children and Behavior Therapy. New York: Aldine.Green, D.E. (1989a). “Past behavior as a measure of actual future behavior: An unresolved issue in perceptualdeterrence research.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 80:781–804.Green, D.E. (1989b). “Measures of illegal behavior in individual-level deterrence research.” Journal of Researchin Crime and Delinquency 26:253–275.Green, L. (1995a). “Cleaning up drug hot spots in Oakland, California: The displacement and diffusion effect.”Justice Quarterly 12:737–754.Green, L. (1995b). “Policing places with drug problems: The multi-agency response team approach.” In Eck, J.E.and D. Weisburd (eds.), Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Greenberg, D. (1975). “The incapacitative effect of imprisonment: some estimates.” Law and Society Review9:541–580.Greenberg, M.T. and C. Kusche (1996). The PATHS Project: Preventive Intervention for Children: Final Report.Washington, DC: National Institute of Mental Health.Greenberg, M.T. and C. Kusche (1997). “Improving children’s emotion regulation and social competence: Theeffects of the PATHS curriculum.” Paper presented at the Society for Research in Child DevelopmentMeeting, Washington, DC.Greenberg, M.T. and C. Kusche (1998). Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS): Blueprints forViolence Prevention. Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science.Greenberg, M.T., C. Kusche, E.T. Cook, and J.P. Quamma (1995). “Promoting emotional competence in school-aged children: The effects of the PATHS curriculum.” Development and Psychopathology 7:117–136.Greenberg, S.W., W.M. Rohe, and J.R. Williams (1982). Safe and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical Characteristicsand Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods. Washington, DC: NationalInstitute of Justice.Greenberg, S.W., W.M. Rohe, and J.R. Williams (1985). Informal Citizen Action and Crime Prevention at theNeighborhood Level: Synthesis and Assessment of the Research. Washington, DC: National Institute ofJustice.Greene, J.R. and S.D. Mastrofski (1988). Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality? New York: Praeger.355
Greenwood, P.W. (1982). Selective Incapacitation. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.Greer, C. and R. Reiner (2012). “Mediated mayhem: Media, crime, criminal justice.” In Maguire, M., R. Morgan,and R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Gresham, P., J. Stockdael, I. Bartholomew, and K. Bullock (2001). An Evaluation of the Impact of Crimestoppers.Briefing Note 10/01. London: Home Office.Groff, E.R., J.H., Ratcliffe, C.P. Haberman, E.T. Sorg, N.M. Joyce, and R.B. Taylor (2015). “Does what police doat hot spots matter? The Philadelphia policing tactics experiment.” Criminology 53:23–53.Grogger, J. (2002). “The effects of civil gang injunctions on reported violent crime: Evidence from Los AngelesCounty.” Journal of Law and Economics 4, 69–90.Grohe, B., M. DeValve, and E. Quinn (2012). “Is perception reality?: The comparison of citizens’ levels of fear ofcrime versus perception of crime problems in communities.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety14:196–211.Grossman, J.B. and J.P. Tierney (1998). “Does mentoring work?: An impact study of the Big Brothers Big Sistersprogram.” Evaluation Review 22:403–426.Grove, L. and G. Farrell (2012). “Once bitten, twice shy: Repeat victimization and its prevention.” In B.C. Welshand D.P. Farrington (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Crime Prevention. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Guerette, R.T (2009). Analyzing Crime Displacement and Diffusion, Tool Guide No. 10. Centre for Problem-Oriented Policing. Available at http://www.popcenter.org/tools/pdfs/displacement.pdfGuerette, R.T. and K.J. Bowers (2009). “Assessing the extent of crime displacement and diffusion of benefits: Areview of situational crime prevention evaluations.” Criminology 47:1331–1368.Gunter, B. (1987). Television and the Fear of Crime. London: Libby.Hamilton-Smith, N. (2002). “Anticipated consequences: Developing a strategy for the targeted measurement ofdisplacement and diffusion of benefits.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Evaluation for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY:Criminal Justice Press.Handford, M. (1994). “Electronic tagging in action: A case study in retailing.” In Gill, M. (ed.), Crime at Work:Studies in Security and Crime Prevention. Leicester, U.K.: Perpetuity Press.Hanson, D.J. (1980). “Drug education: Does it work?” In Scarpitti, F.S. and S.K. Datesman (eds.), Drugs and theYouth Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Harrell, A. (1998). “Drug courts and the role of graduated sanctions.” NIJ Research Preview. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.Harrell, E. and L. Langton (2013). Victims of Identity Theft, 2012. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Harrison, L. and J. Gfroerer (1992). “The intersection of drug use and criminal behavior: Results from thenational household survey on drug abuse.” Crime and Delinquency 38:422–443.Hartnagel, T.F., T.J. Teevan, and J.J. McIntyre (1975). “Television violence and violent behavior.” Social Forces54:341–351.Hartnett, S.M. and W.G. Skogan (1999). “Community policing: Chicago’s experience.” National Institute ofJustice Journal (April):3–11.Hartstone, E.C. and D.M. Richetelli (2005). Final Assessment of the Strategic Approaches to Community SafetyInitiative in New Haven. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Haverkamp, R., M. Mayer and R. Levy (2004). “Electronic monitoring in Europe.” European Journal of Crime,Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 12:36–45.Hawkins, J.D. (1999). “Preventing crime and violence through Communities that Care.” European Journal onCriminal Policy and Research 7: 443–458.Hawkins, J.D., M.W. Arthur, and R.F. Catalano (1995). “Preventing substance abuse.” In Tonry, M. and D.P.Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.Hawkins, J.D., E.C. Brown, S. Oesterle, M.W. Arthur, R.D. Abbott, and R.F. Catalano (2008). “Early effects ofCommunities that Care on targeted risks and initiation of delinquent behavior and substance use.” Journalof Adolescent Health 43:15–22.Hawkins, J.D., S. Oesterle, E.C. Brown, R.D. Abbott, and R.F. Catalano (2014). “Youth problem behaviors 8years after implementing the Communities that Care prevention system: A community-randomized trial.”JAMA Pediatrician 168:122–129.356
Hawkins, J.D., B.H. Smith, K.G. Kosterman, and R.F. Catalano (2007). “Promoting social developments andpreventing health and behavior problems during the elementary grades: Results from the Seattle SocialDevelopment Project.” Violence and Offenders 2:161–181.Hawkins, J. D., and J.G. Weis (1985). “The social development model: An integrated approach to delinquencyprevention.” Journal of Primary Prevention 6:73–97.Hayes, H. and K. Daly (2004). “Conferencing and reoffending in Queensland.” Australian and New ZealandJournal of Criminology 37:167–191.Hayes, J.G. (1982). The Impact of Citizen Involvement in Preventing Crime in Public Housing. Charlotte, NC:Charlotte Housing Authority.Hayes, R. and D.M. Downs (2011). “Controlling retail theft with CCTV domes, CCTV public view monitors,and protective containers: A randomized controlled trial.” Security Journal 24:237–250.Haywood, J., P. Kautt, and A. Whitaker (2009). “The effects of ‘alley-gating’ in an English town.” EuropeanJournal of Criminology 6:361–381.Hearnden, I. and C. Magill (2004) Decision-making by House Burglars: Offenders’ Perspectives. London: HomeOffice.Heath, L. (1984). “Impact of newspaper crime reports on fear of crime: Multimethodological investigations.”Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 47:263–276.Hedderman, A. and C. Williams (2001). Making Partnerships Work: Emerging Findings from the ReducingBurglary Initiative. Briefing Note 1/01. London: Home Office.Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok (2007). “Does three strikes deter? A nonparametric estimation.” Journal of HumanResources 42:309–330.Heller, N.B., W.W. Stenzel, A.D. Gill, R.A. Kolde, and S.R. Shimerman (1975). Operation Identification Projects:Assessment of Effectiveness. Washington, DC: Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.Henggeler, S.W., C.A. Halliday-Boykins, P.B. Cunningham, J. Randall, S.B. Shapiro, and J.E. Chapman (2006).“Juvenile drug court: Enhancing outcomes by integrating evidence-based treatments.” Journal ofConsulting and Clinical Psychology 74:42–54.Henig, J.R. (1984). Citizens against crime: An assessment of the neighborhood watch program in Washington,D.C. Washington, DC: George Washington University, Center for Washington Area Studies.Henrichson, C. and R. Delaney (2012). The Price of Prisons: What Incarceration Costs Taxpayers. New York:Vera Institute of Justice. Retrieved fromhttp://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/http___www.vera.org_download_file=3495_the-price-of-prisons-updated.pdfHesseling, R.B.P. (1994). “Displacement: A review of the empirical literature.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), CrimePrevention Studies, vol. 3. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Hesseling, R.B.P. (1995a). “Theft from cars: Reduced or displaced?” European Journal on Criminal Policy andResearch 3:79–92.Hesseling, R.B.P. (1995b). “Functional surveillance in The Netherlands: Exemplary projects.” Security Journal6:21–25.Higgins, P.B. and M.W. Ray (1978). Television’s Action Arsenal: Weapon Use in Prime Time. Washington, DC:U.S. Conference of Mayors.Hill, P.L., B.W. Roberts, J.T. Grogger, J. Guryan, and K. Sixkiller (2011). “Decreasing delinquency, criminalbehavior, and recidivism by intervening on psychological factors other than cognitive ability: A review ofthe intervention literature.” In Cook, P.J., J. Ludwig, and J. McCrary (eds.) Controlling Crime: Strategiesand Tradeoffs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Hindelang, M. (1975). Public Opinion Regarding Crime, Criminal Justice, and Related Topics. Washington, DC:Department of Justice.Hindelang, M., M.R. Gottfredson, and J. Garofalo (1978). Victims of Personal Crime: An Empirical Foundationfor a Theory of Personal Victimization. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.Hirschel, J.D., I.W. Hutchinson, C.W. Dean, J.J. Kelly, and C.E. Pesackis (1991). Charlotte Spouse AssaultReplication Project: Final Report. Charlotte, NC: University of North Carolina at Charlotte.Hirschel, J.D., I.W. Hutchinson, and C.W. Dean (1992). “The failure of arrest to deter spouse abuse.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 29:7–33.357
Hirschfield, P.J. and K. Celinska (2011). “Beyond fear: Sociological perspectives on the criminalization of schooldiscipline.” Sociological Compass 5:1–12.Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.Hirschi, T. and M. Hindelang (1977). “Intelligence and delinquency: A revisionist review.” AmericanSociological Review 42:571–587.Hofstetter, C.R. (1976). Bias in the News. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.Holcomb, J.E. and S.P. Lab (2003). “Evaluation: Building knowledge for crime prevention.” In Kury, H. and J.Obergfell-Fuchs (eds.), Crime Prevention: New Approaches. Mainz, GER: Weisser Ring.Holden, R.N. (1992). Law Enforcement: An Introduction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Hollinger, R.C. and J.P. Clark (1983). “Deterrence in the workplace: perceived certainty, perceived severity ofemployee theft.” Social Forces 62:398–419.Hollis-Peel, M.E., D.M. Reynald, M. van Bavel, H. Elffers, and B.C. Welsh (2011). “Guardianship for crimeprevention: A critical review of the literature.” Crime, Law and Social Change 56:53–70.Holloway, K. and T. Bennett (2004). “The results of the first two years of the NEW-ADAM Programme”. HomeOffice Online Report 19/04. London: Home Office.Holloway, K., T. Bennett, and D.P. Farrington (2008). Crime Prevention Research Review No. 3: DoesNeighborhood Watch Reduce Crime? Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice Office of CommunityOriented Policing Services.Holt, T. and J. Spencer (2005). “A little yellow box: The targeting of automatic teller machines as a strategy inreducing street robbery.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety 7(2):15–28.Home Office (2001). Installing Alley-gates: Practical Lessons from Burglary Prevention Projects. Briefing Note2/01. London: Home Office.Home Office (2003a). Reducing Burglary Initiative Project Summary—Fordbridge, Solihull. Supplement 2 toFindings #204. London: Home Office.Home Office (2003b). Reducing Burglary Initiative Project Summary—Stirchley, Birmingham. Supplement 4 toFindings #204. London: Home Office.Home Office (2003c). Reducing Burglary Initiative Project Summary—Rochdale. Supplement 1 to Findings #204.London: Home Office.Home Office (2003d). Reducing Burglary Initiative Project Summary—Yew Tree, Sandwell. Supplement 3 toFindings #204. London: Home Office.Home Office (2004). Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention. London: Home Office.Homel, P., S. Nutley, B. Webb, and N. Tilley (2004). Investing to Deliver: Reviewing the Implementation of theUK Crime Reduction Program. London: Home Office.Honig, A.S., J.R. Lally, and D.H. Mathieson (1982). “Personal and social adjustment of school children after fiveyears in the Family Development Research Program.” Child Care Quarterly, 11:136–146.Hoover, L.T. (1992). “Police mission: An era of debate.” In Hoover, L.T. (ed.), Police Management: Issues andPerspectives. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.Hope, T. (1994). “Problem-oriented policing and drug market locations: Three case studies.” In Clarke, R.V.(ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 2. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Hope, T. and S.P. Lab (2001). “Variation in crime prevention participation: Evidence from the British CrimeSurvey.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal 3(1):7–22.Hough, M. (1995). Anxiety about Crime: Findings from the 1994 British Crime Survey. London: Home Office.Howell, J.C. and J.D. Hawkins (1998). “Prevention of youth violence.” In Tonry, M. and M.H. Moore (eds.),Youth Violence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Hser, Y., M.D. Anglin, and C. Chou (1988). “Evaluation of drug abuse treatment: A repeated measure designassessing methadone maintenance.” Evaluation Review 12:547–570.Huba, G.J. and P.M. Bentler (1983). “Causal models of the development of law abidance and its relationship topsycho-social factors and drug use.” In Laufer, W.S. and J.M. Day (eds.), Personality Theory, MoralDevelopment and Criminal Behavior. Lexington: D.C. Heath.Hubbard, R.L., J.V. Rachal, S.G. Craddock, and E.R. Cavanaugh (1984). “Treatment outcome prospective study(TOPS): Client characteristics and behaviors before, during and after treatment.” In Tims, F.M. and J.P.Ludford (eds.), Drug Abuse Treatment Evaluation: Strategies, Progress and Prospects. Washington, DC:358
National Institute on Drug Abuse.Huesmann, L.R. and N.M. Malamuth (1986). “Media violence and antisocial behavior: An overview.” Journal ofSocial Issues 42:1–6.Huizinga, D.H., R. Loeber, and T. Thornberry (1994). Urban Delinquency and Substance Abuse: Initial Findings:Research Summary. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Huizinga, D.H., S. Menard, and D.S. Elliott (1989). “Delinquency and drug use: Temporal and developmentalpatterns.” Justice Quarterly 6:419–456.Hughes, G. (2002). “Crime and disorder reduction partnerships: The future of community safety?” In Hughes,G., E. McLaughlin, and J. Muncie (eds.), Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Hughes, G., E. McLaughlin, and J. Muncie (2002). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Hunt, D.E. (1990). “Drugs and consensual crimes: Drug dealing and prostitution.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q. Wilson(eds.), Drugs and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Hunter, A. (1978). “Symbols of incivility: Social disorder and fear of crime in urban neighborhoods.” Paperpresented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, Dallas.Hunter, A. (1985). “Private, parochial and public school orders: The problem of crime and incivility in urbancommunities.” In Suttles, G.D. and M.N. Zald (eds.), The Challenge of Social Control: Citizenship andInstitution Building in Modern Society. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Pub.Hunter, R. (2010). “Crime prevention: Micro, meso, and macro levels.” In Fisher, B.S. and S.P. Lab (eds.),Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Inciardi, J.A. (1996). “A corrections-based continuum of effective drug abuse treatment.” NIJ Research Preview.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.Inciardi, J.A., R. Horowitz, and A.E. Pottieger (1993). Street Kids, Street Drugs, Street Crime: An Examination ofDrug Use and Serious Delinquency in Miami. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.Incredible Years (2012). Incredible Years: Parents, Teachers and Children’s Training Series. Retrieved fromhttp://www.incredibleyears.com/program/Incredible-Years_factsheet.pdfInternational Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2012). Social Media and Crime Prevention, Fact Sheet.Retrieved from https://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/Fact%2520Sheets/Crime%2520Prevention%2520Fact%2520Sheet.pdf&sa=U&ei=eGuNVYnkOZSXoQTCxJToAg&ved=0CAYQFjAB&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNEf_SiggsW9zNhzXQowtBDD7C9kgwInternational Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2014). 2013 Social Media Survey Results. Retrieved fromhttp://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/2013SurveyResults.pdfInternational Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2015). IACP Center for Social Media.http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Internet Crime Complaint Center (2013). 2012 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved fromhttp://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2012_ic3report.pdfJackson, J. and E. Gray (2009). “Functional fear and public insecurities about crime.” British Journal ofCriminology 49:1–22.Jackson, J. and E. Gray (2010). “Functional fear and public insecurities about crime.” British Journal ofCriminology 50:1–22.Jacobs, B.A. (1996). “Crack dealers and restrictive deterrence: Identifying narcs.” Criminology 34:409–432.Jacobs, J. (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Random House.James, N. and G. McCallion (2013). School Resource Officers: Law Enforcement Officers in Schools. Washington,DC: Congressional Research ServiceJarjoura, G.R. (1993). “Does dropping out of school enhance delinquent involvement?: Results from a large-scale national probability sample.” Criminology 31:149–172.Jeffery, C.R. (1971). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Jenkins, A.D. and I. Latimer (1987). Evaluation of Merseyside Home Watch. Liverpool: Merseyside Police.Jensen, G.F., M.L. Erickson, and J.P. Gibbs (1978). “Perceived risk of punishment and self-reporteddelinquency.” Social Forces 57:57–78.Jensen, G.F. and B.G. Stitt (1982). “Words and misdeeds: Hypothetical choices versus past behavior as measures359
of deviance.” In Hagan, J. (ed.), Deterrence Reconsidered: Methodological Innovations. Beverly Hills, CA:Sage.Jerse, F.W. and M.E. Fakouri (1978). “Juvenile delinquency and academic deficiency.” Contemporary Education49:108–109.Jewkes, Y. (2011). Media and Crime, Second Edition. Los Angeles: Sage.Johnson, B.D., K. Anderson, and E.D. Wish (1988). “A day in the life of 105 drug addicts and abusers: Crimescommitted and how the money was spent.” Sociology and Social Research 72:185–191.Johnson, B.D., P.J. Goldstein, E. Prebel, J. Schmeidler, D.S. Lipton, B. Sprunt, and T. Miller (1985). Taking Careof Business: The Economics of Crime by Heroin Abusers. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.Johnson, B.D., T. Williams, K.A. Dei, and H. Sanabria (1990). “Drug abuse in the inner city: Impact on hard-drug users and the community.” In Tonry, M. and J.Q. Wilson (eds.), Drugs and Crime. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.Johnson, D., V. Gibson and M. McCabe (2014). “Designing in crime prevention, designing out ambiguity:Practice issues with the CPTED knowledge framework available to professionals in the field and itspotentially ambiguous nature.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety 16:147–168.Johnson, S.D. and K.J. Bowers (2002). “Domestic burglary repeats and space-time clusters: The dimensions ofrisk.” European Journal of Criminology (forthcoming).Johnson, S.D. and K.J. Bowers (2003). “Opportunity is in the eye of the beholder: The role of publicity in crimeprevention.” Criminology and Public Policy 2:497–524.Johnson, S.D. and K.J. Bowers (2004). “The burglary as a clue to the future: The beginnings of prospective hot-spotting.” The European Journal of Criminology 1:237–255.Johnson, S.D. and K.J. Bowers (2010). “Permeability and burglary risk: Are cul-de-sacs safer?” Journal ofQuantitative Criminology 26:89–111.Johnson, S.D., K. Bowers, and A. Hirschfield (1997). “New insight into the spatial and temporal distribution ofrepeat victimization.” British Journal of Criminology 37:224–241.Johnson, S.D., K.J. Bowers, and K. Pease (2005). “Predicting the future or summarizing the past? Crimemapping as anticipation.” In Smith, M.J. and N. Tilley (eds.), Crime Science: New Approaches to Preventingand Detecting Crime. Portland, OR: Willan.Johnson, S.D., S.P. Lab, and K.J. Bowers (2008). “Stable and fluid hotspots of crime: Differentiation andidentification.” Built Environment 34:32–45.Johnston, L.D., P.M. O’Malley, and J.G. Bachman (1989). Drug Use, Drinking, and Smoking: National SurveyResults from High School, College, and Young Adult Populations. Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.Johnston, L.D., P.M. O’Malley, J.G. Bachman, J.E. Schulenberg, and R.A. Miech (2014). Monitoring the FutureNational Survey Results on Drug Use, 1975–2013. Volume 2: College Students and Adults Ages 19–55. AnnArbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Retrieved fromhttp://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs.htmlJohnston, L.D., P.M. O’Malley, and L.K. Eveland (1978). “Drugs and delinquency: A search for causalconnections.” In Kandel, D.B. (ed.), Longitudinal Research on Drug Use: Empirical Findings andMethodological Issues. Washington, DC: Hemisphere Pub.Jones, J. (2010). “Americans still perceive crime as on the rise.” Gallup Politics. Retrieved fromhttp://www.gallup.com/pool/144827/americans-perceive-crime-rise.aspxKandel, D.B., O. Smicha-Fagan, and M. Davies (1986). “Risk factors for delinquency and illicit drug use fromadolescence to young adulthood.” Journal of Drug Issues 16:67–90.Kandel, E. and S.A. Mednick (1991). “Perinatal complications predict violent offending.” Criminology 29:519–529.Kaplan, H.M., K.C. O’Kane, P.J. Lavrakas, and E.J. Pesce (1978). Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign: Final Report on Commercial Demonstration; Portland, Oregon. Arlington, VA: WestinghouseElectric Corp.Karp, D.R. (2001). “The offender/community encounter: Stakeholder involvement in the Vermont reparativeboards.” In Karp, D.R. and T. Clear (eds.), What Is Community Justice? Case Studies of Restorative Justiceand Community Supervision. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.360
Katz, L., S.D. Levitt, and W. Shustorovich (2003). “Prison conditions, capital punishment, and deterrence.”American Law and Economics Review 5:318–343.Kaufman, P., X. Chen, S.P. Choy, K.A. Chandler, C.D. Chapman, M.R. Rand, and C. Ringel (1998). Indicators ofSchool Crime and Safety, 1998. Washington, DC: Office of Educational Research and Improvement andOffice of Justice Programs.Keane, C. (1995). “Victimization and fear: Assessing the role of offender and offence.” Canadian Journal ofCriminology 37:431–455.Kellermann, A.L., D. Fuqua-Whitley, and C.S. Parramore (2006). Reducing Gun Violence: Community ProblemSolving in Atlanta. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Kelley, J. (1997). “Police lines often clogged with false, unreliable clues.” USA Today Jan. 31:1–2.Kelling, G.L. (1978). “Police field services and crime: The presumed effects of a capacity.” Crime & Delinquency24:173–184.Kelling, G.L. (1998). Columbia’s Comprehensive Communities Program: A Case Study. Washington, DC:BOTEC Analysis Corporation.Kelling, G.L. (2005). “Community crime reduction: Activating formal and informal control.” In Tilley, N. (ed.),Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Kelly, B.T., R. Loeber, K. Keenan, and M. DeLamatre (1997). “Developmental pathways in boys’ disruptive anddelinquent behavior.” Juvenile Justice Bulletin. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention.Kelly, D.H. and R. Balch (1971). “Social origins and school failure: A re-examination of Cohen’s theory ofworking class delinquency.” Pacific Sociological Review 14:413–430.Kelly, D.H. and W.T. Pink (1975). “Status origins, youth rebellion, and delinquency: A reexamination of theclass issue.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 4:339–347.Kennedy, D. (2008). Deterrence and Crime Prevention. London: Routledge.Kennedy, D.M., A.A. Braga, and A.M. Piehl (2001). “Developing and implementing operation ceasefire.” InNational Institute of Justice, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Kennedy, L.W. and H. Krahn (1984). “Rural–urban origin and fear of crime: The case for rural baggage.” RuralSociology 49:247–260.Kennedy, L.W. and R.A. Silverman (1985). “Perception of social diversity and fear of crime.” Environment andBehavior 17:275–295.Kenney, D.J. (1986). “Crime on the subways: Measuring the effectiveness of the Guardian Angels.” JusticeQuarterly 3:481–498.Kenney, D.J. and T.S. Watson (1998). Crime in the Schools: Reducing Fear and Disorder with Student ProblemSolving. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.Kinder, B.N., N.E. Pape, and S. Walfish (1980). “Drug and alcohol education programs: A review of outcomestudies.” International Journal of the Addictions 15:1035–1054.Kleck, G., B. Sever, S. Li, and M. Gertz (2005). “The missing link in general deterrence research.” Criminology43:623–659.Kleemans, E.R. (2001). “Repeat burglary victimisation: Results of empirical research in the Netherlands.” In G.Farrell and K. Pease (eds.), Repeat Victimization. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Kleiman, M.A.R. (1988). “Crackdowns: The effects of intensive enforcement on retail heroin dealing.” InChaiken, M. (ed.), Street Level Drug Enforcement: Examining the Issues. Washington, DC: NationalInstitute of Justice.Kleiman, M.A.R. and K.D. Smith (1990). “State and local drug enforcement: In search of a strategy.” In Tonry,M. and J.Q. Wilson (eds.), Drugs and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Kleinig, J. (2000). “The burdens of situational crime prevention: An ethical commentary.” In von Hirsch, A., D.Garland, and A. Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford:Hart.Klepper, S. and D.S. Nagin (1989). “The deterrent effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishmentrevisited.” Criminology 27:721–746.Klockars, C.B. (1985). The Idea of Police. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.361
Kodz, J. and K. Pease (2003). Reducing Burglary Initiative: Early Findings on Burglary Reduction. Findings #204.London: Home Office.Kohfeld, C.W., B. Salert, and S. Schoenberg (1981). “Neighborhood associations and urban crime.” CommunityAction (Nov/Dec):37–44.Kovandzic, T.V., L.M. Vieraitis, and D.P. Boots (2009). “Does the death penalty save lives? New evidence fromstate panel data, 1977–2006.” Criminology and Public Policy 8:803–844.Kratochwill, T.R., L. McDonald, J.R. Levin, P.A. Scalia, and G. Coover (2009). “Families and schools together:An experimental study of multi-family support groups for children at risk.” Journal of School Psychology47:245–265.Kurki, L. (2000). “Restorative and community justice in the United States.” In Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime andJustice: A Review of Research, vol. 27. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Kushmuk, J. and S.L. Whittemore (1981). A Reevaluation of the Crime Prevention Through EnvironmentalDesign Program in Portland, Oregon. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Lab, S.P. (1984). “Police productivity: The other eighty percent.” Journal of Police Science and Administration12:297–302.Lab, S.P. (1987). “Pornography and aggression: A response to the U.S. Attorney General’s commission.”Criminal Justice Abstracts 19:301–321.Lab, S.P. (1990). “Citizen crime prevention: Domains and participation.” Justice Quarterly 7:467–492.Lab, S.P. and R.D. Clark (1996). Discipline, Control and School Crime: Identifying Effective InterventionStrategies. Final Report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Lab, S.P. and T. Hope (1998). “Assessing the impact of area context on crime prevention behavior.” Paperpresented to the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis Conference, Barcelona, Spain.Lab, S.P. and J.T. Whitehead (1988). “An analysis of juvenile correctional treatment.” Crime & Delinquency34:60–85.Lab, S.P. and J.T. Whitehead (1990). “From ‘nothing works’ to ‘the appropriate works’: The latest stop on thesearch for the secular grail.” Criminology 28:405–418.Lab, S.P. and J.T. Whitehead (1994). “Avoidance behavior as a response to in-school victimization.” Journal ofSecurity Administration 17(2):32–45.Lacoste, J. and P. Tremblay (2003). “Crime and innovation: A script analysis of patterns in check forgery.” InSmith, M.J. and D.B. Cornish (eds.), Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY:Criminal Justice Press.LaGrange, R.L. (1993). Policing American Society. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.Lally, J.R., P.L. Mangione, and A.S. Honig (1987). The Syracuse University Family Development ResearchProgram: Long-range Impact of an Early Intervention with Low-income Children and Their Families. NewYork: W.T. Grant Foundation.Lally, J.R., P.L. Mangione, and A.S. Honig (1988). “The Syracuse University Family Development ResearchProgram: Long-range impact on an early intervention with low-income children and their families,” inPowell, D. R. and I. E. Sigel (eds.), Parent Education as Early Childhood Intervention: Emerging Direction inTheory, Research, and Practice. Annual Advances in Applied Developmental Psychology. Norwood, NJ:Ablex.Land, K.C., R.H.C. Teske, and H. Zheng (2009). “The short-term effects of executions on homicides: Deterrence,displacement, or both?” Criminology 47:1009–1044.Land, K.C., R.H.C. Teske, and H. Zheng (2012). “The differential short-term impacts of executions on felonyand non-felony homicides.” Criminology and Public Policy 11:541–564.Lane, J. (2002). “Fear of gang crime: A qualitative examination of the four perspectives.” Journal of Research inCrime and Delinquency 39:437–471.Lane, J. and K. Fox (2012). “Fear of crime among gang and non-gang offenders: Comparing the effects ofperpetration, victimization, and neighborhood factors.” Justice Quarterly 29:491–523.Lane, J. and J.W. Meeker (2000). “Subcultural diversity and the fear of crime and gangs.” Crime & Delinquency46:497–521.Lane, J. and J.W. Meeker (2003a). “Fear of gang crime: A look at three theoretical models.” Law and SocietyReview 37:425–456.362
Lane, J. and J.W. Meeker (2003b). “Ethnicity, information, sources and fear of crime.” Deviant Behavior 24:1–26.Lane, J. and J.W. Meeker (2005). “Theories and fear of gang crime among whites and Latinos: A replication andextension of prior research.” Journal of Criminal Justice 33:627–641.Lane, J. and J.W. Meeker (2011). “Combining theoretical models of perceived risk and fear of gang crime amongwhites and Latinos.” Victims and Offenders 6:64–92.Langan, P.A. and D.J. Levin (2002). Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics.Langworthy, R.H. and L.F. Travis III (1994). Policing in America: A Balance of Forces. New York, NY:Macmillan.Lasley, J. (1998). “‘Designing out’ gang homicides and street assaults.” NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.Latessa, E., P. Smith, R. Lemke, M. Makarios, and C. Lowenkamp (2009). Creation and Validation of the OhioRisk Assessment System: Final Report. Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati.Latessa, E.J. and H.E. Allen (1980). “Using citizens to prevent crime: An example of deterrence and communityinvolvement.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 8:69–74.Latessa, E.J. and H.E. Allen (2003). Corrections in the Community, Third Edition. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.Latessa, E.J. and L.F. Travis (1987). “Citizen crime prevention: Problems and perspectives in reducing crime.”Journal of Security Administration 10:38–50.Latimer, J., C. Dowden, and D. Muise (2005). “The effectiveness of restorative justice practices: A meta-analysis.” Ottawa, Canada: Canada Department of Justice. Cited in Rodriguez, N. (2007). “RestorativeJustice at Work: Examining the impact of restorative justice resolutions on juvenile recidivism.” Crime &Delinquency 53:355–379.Lauritsen, J.L., J.G. Owens, M. Planty, M.R. Rand, and J.L. Truman (2012). Methods for Counting High-frequency Repeat Victimizations in the National Crime Victimization Survey. Washington: Bureau ofJustice Statistics.LaVigne, N.G., S.S. Lowry, J.A. Marksman and A.M. Dwyer (2011) Evaluating the Use of Public SurveillanceCameras for Crime Control and Prevention—A Summary. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.Lavrakas, P.J. (1986). “Evaluating police-community anticrime newsletters: The Evanston, Houston, andNewark field studies.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work? BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.Lavrakas, P.J. (1997). “Politicians, journalists, and the rhetoric of the ‘crime prevention’ public policy debate.”In Lab, S.P. (ed.), Crime Prevention at a Crossroads. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.Lavrakas, P.J. and E.J. Herz (1982). “Citizen participation in neighborhood crime prevention.” Criminology20:479–498.Lavrakas, P.J. and D.A. Lewis (1980). “The conceptualization and measurement of citizens’ crime preventionbehaviors.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 17:254–272.Lavrakas, P.J., J. Normoyle, W.G. Skogan, E.J. Herz, G. Salem, and D. Lewis (1981). Factors Related to CitizenInvolvement in Personal, Household, and Neighborhood Anti-Crime Measures: Executive Summary.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Lavrakas, P.J., D.P. Rosenbaum, and F. Kamiski (1983). “Transmitting information about crime and crimeprevention to citizens: The Evanston newsletter quasi-experiment.” Journal of Police Science andAdministration 11:463–473.Lawton, B.A., R.B. Taylor, and A.J. Loungo (2005). “Police officers on drug corners in Philadelphia, drug crime,and violent crime: Intended, diffusion and displacement impacts.” Justice Quarterly 22:427–451.Laycock, G. (1984). Reducing Burglary: A Study of Chemist’s Shops. London: Home Office.Laycock, G. (1985). Property Marking: A Deterrent to Domestic Burglary? Crime Prevention Planning Unit:Paper 3. London: Home Office.Laycock, G. (1990). “Operation identification: How much of a solution?” Paper presented at the AmericanSociety of Criminology Annual Meeting, Baltimore.Laycock, G. (2002). “Methodological issues in working with policy advisers and practitioners.” In Tilley, N.(ed.), Analysis for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Laycock, G. (2005). “Defining crime science.” In Smith, M.J. and N. Tilley (eds.), Crime Science: New363
Approaches to Preventing and Detecting Crime. Portland, OR: Willan.Laycock, G. and G. Farrell (2003). “Repeat victimization: Lessons for implementing problem-oriented policing.”In Knutsson, J. (ed.), Problem-oriented Policing: From Innovation to Mainstream. Monsey, NY: CriminalJustice Press.Laycock, G. and N. Tilley (1995a). “Implementing crime prevention.” In Tonry, M. and D.P. Farrington (eds.),Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Laycock, G. and N. Tilley (1995b). Policing and Neighbourhood Watch: Strategic Issues. London: Home OfficePolice Research Group.Lazar, I., R. Darlington, H. Murray, J. Royce, and A. Snipper (1982). “Lasting effects of early education: A reportfrom the Consortium for Longitudinal Studies.” Monographs of the Society for Research in ChildDevelopment, no. 47.Learmont, S. (2005). “Promoting design against crime.” In Clarke, R.V. and G.R. Newman (eds.), Designing OutCrime from Products and Systems. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Leavell, H.R. and E.G. Clarke (1965). Preventive Medicine for the Doctor in His Community: An EpidemiologicalApproach, Third Edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.Lee, M. (2007). Inventing Fear of Crime: Criminology and the Politics of Anxiety. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.:Willan.Leishman, F. and P. Mason (2003). Policing and the Media: Facts, Fictions and Factions. Cullompton, Devon,U.K.: Willan.Lester, A. (2001). Crime Reduction through Product Design. Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute ofCriminology.Letkemann, P. (1973). Crime as Work. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Levi, M. (2008). “Combating identity and other forms of payment fraud in the UK: An analytical history.” InMcNally, M.M. and G.R. Newman (eds.), Perspectives on Identity Theft. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Levrant, S., F.T. Cullen, B. Fulton, and J.F. Wozniak (1999). “Reconsidering restorative justice: The corruption ofbenevolence revisited?” Crime & Delinquency 45:3–27.Lewis, D.A., J.A. Grant, and D.P. Rosenbaum (1988). The Social Construction of Reform. Evanston, IL:Northwestern University Press.Lewis, D.A. and G. Salem (1986). Fear of Crime: Incivility and the Production of a Social Problem. NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction.LexisNexis Risk Solutions (2014). Survey of Law Enforcement Personnel and Their Use of Social Media.http://www.lexisnexis.com/investigationsLichter, S.R., L.S. Lichter, and S. Rothman (1994). Prime Time: How TV Portrays American Culture.Washington, DC: Regnery.Lilly, J.R. (2006). “Issues beyond empirical EM reports.” Criminology and Public Policy 5:93–102.Lilly, J.R., R.A. Ball, and J. Wright (1987). “Home incarceration with electronic monitoring in Kenton County,Kentucky: An evaluation.” In McCarthy, B.R. (ed.), Intermediate Punishments: Intensive Supervision, HomeConfinement and Electronic Surveillance. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Lindsey, E.W. and P.D. Kurtz (1987). “Evaluation of a school-juvenile court team approach to delinquencyprevention.” Children and Youth Services Review 9:101–115.Lipsey, M.W. (1990). “Juvenile delinquency treatment: A meta-analytic inquiry into the variability of effects.”Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, Denver.Lipsey, M.W. (1999). “Can rehabilitative programs reduce the recidivism of juvenile offenders? An inquiry intothe effectiveness of practical programs.” Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 6:611–641.Lipsey, M.W., G.L. Chapman, and N.A. Landenberger (2001). “Cognitive-behavioral programs for offenders.”Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 578:144–157.Lipsey, M.W. and J.H. Derzon (1998). “Predictors of violent or serious delinquency in adolescence and earlyadulthood: A synthesis of longitudinal research.” In Loeber, R. and D.P. Farrington (eds.), Serious andViolent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Lipsey, M.W. and N.A. Landenberger (2006). “Cognitive-behavioral interventions.” In Welsh, B.C. and D.P.Farrington (eds.), Preventing Crime: What Works for Children, Offenders, Victims, and Places. New York:Springer.364
Lipsey, M.W. and D.B. Wilson (1993). “The efficacy of psychological, educational, and behavioral treatment.”American Psychologist 48:1181–1209.Lipsey, M.W. and D.B. Wilson (1998). “Effective interventions for serious juvenile offenders: A synthesis ofresearch.” In Loeber, R. and D.P. Farrington (eds.), Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors andSuccessful Interventions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Lipton, D., R. Martinson, and J. Wilks (1975). The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey ofTreatment Evaluation Studies. New York: Praeger.Lipton, D., F.S. Pearson, C.M. Cleland, and D. Yee (2002). “The effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural treatmentmethods on recidivism.” In McGuire, J. (ed.), Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment: Effective Programmesand Policies to Reduce Re-offending. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons.Liska, A.E. and W. Baccaglini (1990). “Feeling safe by comparison: Crime in the newspapers.” Social Problems37:360–374.Liska, A.E., J.L. Lawrence, and A. Sanchirico (1982). “Fear of crime as a social fact.” Social Forces 60:760–770.Listwan, S.J., J.L. Sundt, A.M. Holsinger, and E.J. Latessa (2003). “The effects of drug court programming onrecidivism: The Cincinnati experience.” Crime & Delinquency 49:389–411.Lizotte, A.J., J.M. Tesoriero, T.P. Thornberry, and M.D. Krohn (1994). “Patterns of adolescent firearmsownership and use.” Justice Quarterly 11:51–73.Lloyd, S., G. Farrell, and K. Pease (1994) Preventing Repeated Domestic Violence: A Demonstration Project onMerseyside. London: Home Office.Lochner, L. (2007). “Individual perceptions of the criminal justice system.” American Economic Review 97:444–460.Lockwood, D. (1997). “Violence among middle school and high school students: Analysis and implications forprevention”. NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Loeber, R. (1988). “Natural histories of conduct problems, delinquency and related substance abuse.” In Lahey,B.B. and A.E. Kazdin (eds.), Advances in Clinical Child Psychology, vol. 11. New York: Plenum Press.Loeber, R. (1990). “Development and risk factors of juvenile antisocial behavior and delinquency.” ClinicalPsychology Review 10:1–41.Loeber, R., S.M. Green, K. Keenan, and B.B. Lahey (1995). “Which boys will fare worse? Early predictors or theonset of conduct disorder in a six-year longitudinal study.” Journal of the American Academy of Child andAdolescent Psychiatry 34:499–509.Loeber, R. and M. Stouthamer-Loeber (1986). “Family factors as correlates and predictors of juvenile conductproblems and delinquency.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review ofResearch, vol. 7. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Loeber, R., P. Wung, K. Keenan, B. Giroux, M. Stouthamer-Loeber, W.B. VanKammen, and B. Maughan (1993).“Developmental pathways in disruptive child behavior.” Development and Psychopathology 5:103–133.Logan, C.H. (1972). “General deterrence effects of imprisonment.” Social Forces 51:63–72.Logan, C.H. and G.G. Gaes (1993). “Meta-analysis and the rehabilitation of punishment.” Justice Quarterly10:245–264.Lonczak, H.S., R.D. Abbott, J.D. Hawkins, R. Kosterman, and R.F. Catalano (2002). “Effects of the Seattle SocialDevelopment Project on sexual behavior, pregnancy, birth, and STD outcomes by age 21.” Archives ofPediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 156:438–447.Loney, J., M.A. Whaley-Klahn, T. Kosier, and J. Conboy (1983). “Hyperactive boys and their brothers at 21:Predictors of aggressive and antisocial outcomes.” In Van Dusen, K.T. and S.A. Mednick (eds.), ProspectiveStudies of Crime and Delinquency. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhof.Lösel, F. (1995). “The efficacy of correctional treatment: A review and synthesis of meta-evaluations.” InMcGuire, J. (ed.), What Works: Reducing Reoffending. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons.Loughran, T.A., A.R. Piquero, J. Fagan, and E.P. Mulvery (2012). “Differential deterrence: Studyingheterogeneity and changes among serious youthful offenders.” Crime & Delinquency 58:3–27.Lowenkamp, C.T., E.J. Latessa, and P. Smith (2006). “Does correctional program quality really matter?: Theimpact of adhering to the principles of effective intervention.” Criminology and Public Policy 5:575–594.Lowrey-Webster, H.M., P.M. Barrett, and M.R. Dadds (2001). “A universal prevention trial of anxiety anddepressive symptomatology in childhood: Preliminary data from an Australian study.” Behavior Change365
18:36–50.Lowry, D. (1971). “Greshaw’s law and network TV news selection.” Journal of Broadcasting 15:397–408.Luepker, R.V., C.A. Johnson, D.M. Murray, and T.F. Pechacek (1983). “Prevention of cigarette smoking: Threeyear follow-up of educational programs for youth.” Journal of Behavioral Medicine 6:53–61.Lumb, R.C., R.D. Hunter, and D.J. McLain (1993). “Fear reduction in the Charlotte Housing Authority.” InZahm, D. and P. Cromwell (eds.), Proceedings of the International Seminar on Environmental Criminologyand Crime Analysis. Coral Gables, FL: Florida Criminal Justice Executive Institute.Lurigio, A.J. and R.C. Davis (1992). “Taking the war on drugs to the streets: The perceptual impact of fourneighborhood drug programs.” Crime & Delinquency 38:522–538.Luxenburg, J., F.T. Cullen, R.H. Langworthy, and R. Kopache (1994). “Firearms and Fido: Ownership ofinjurious means of protection.” Journal of Criminal Justice 22:159–170.Lynch, J. and D. Cantor (1992). “Ecological and behavioral influences on property victimization at home:Implications for opportunity theory.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 29:335–362.MacKenzie, D.L. (2006). What Works in Corrections: Reducing the Criminal Activities of Offenders andDelinquents. New York: Cambridge University Press.Maddux, J.F. (1988). “Clinical experience with civil commitment.” In Leukefeld, C.G. and F.M. Tims (eds.),Compulsory Treatment of Drug Abuse: Research and Clinical Practice. Washington, DC: National Instituteon Drug Abuse.Madensen, T.D. and J.E. Eck (2008). Spectator Violence in Stadiums. Problem-specific Guide Series #54.Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing.Maggin, D.M. and A.H. Johnson (2014). “A meta-analytic evaluation of the FRIENDS program for preventinganxiety in student populations.” Education and Treatment of Children 37:277–306.Maguin, E. and R. Loeber (1996). “Academic performance and delinquency.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.),Crime and Justice, vol. 20. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Maguire, K. (2011). Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Retrieved from http://www.albany.edu/sourcebookMaguire, K. and A.L. Pastore (1995). Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1994. Washington, DC: Bureau ofJustice Statistics.Marlowe, D.B. (2010). The Facts on Juvenile Drug Treatment Courts. Alexandria, VA: National Association ofDrug Court Professionals. Retrieved from http://www.ndrc.orgMarsh, H.L. (1991). “A comparative analysis of crime coverage in newspapers in the United States and othercountries from 1960–1989: A review of the literature.” Journal of Criminal Justice 19:67–80.Marsh, M. and M. Singer (1972). Soft Statistics and Hard Questions. Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute.Martinson, R. (1974). “What works? Questions and answers about prison reform.” The Public Interest 35:22–54.Martinson, R. (1979). “New findings; new views: A note of citation regarding sentencing reform.” Hofstra LawReview 7:243–258.Massey, J.L. and M.D. Krohn (1986). “A longitudinal examination of an integrated social process model ofdeviant behavior.” Social Forces 65:106–134.Mawby, R.I. (2001). Burglary. Portland, OR: Willan.Maxfield, M.G. and T.L. Baumer (1990). “Home detention with electronic monitoring: Comparing pretrial andpostconviction programs.” Crime & Delinquency 36:521–536.Maxson, C.L., K.M. Hennigan, D.C. Sloane, and K.A. Kolnick (2004). Can Civil Gang Injunctions ChangeCommunities?: A Community Assessment of the Impact of Civil Gang Injunctions. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.May, D.C., B. Wright, G. Cordner, and S. Fessel (2014). “School resource officers: Effective tools when usedproperly?” In D.C. May (ed.) School Safety in the United States: A Reasoned Look at the Rhetoric. Durham,NC: Carolina Academic Press.Mayer, J.P., L.K. Gensheimer, W.S. Davidson, and R. Gottschalk (1986). “Social learning treatment withinjuvenile justice: a meta-analysis of impact in the natural environment.” In Apter, S.J. and A.P. Goldstein(eds.), Youth and Violence: Problems and Prospects. New York: Pergamon.Mayhew, P., R.V. Clarke, and D. Elliot (1989). “Motorcycle theft, helmet legislation and displacement.” HowardJournal 28:1–8.366
Mayhew, P., R.V. Clarke, A. Sturman, and J.M. Hough (1976). Crime as Opportunity. London: Her Majesty’sStationery Office.Mazerolle, L.G. and J.A. Roehl (1998). “Civil remedies and crime prevention: An introduction.” In Mazerolle,L.G. and R. Roehl (eds.), Civil Remedies and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Mazerolle, L.G. and J.A. Roehl (1999). “Controlling drug and disorder problems: Oakland’s Beat HealthProgram.” NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Mazerolle, L.G., J. Roehl, and C. Kadleck (1998). “Controlling social disorder using civil remedies: Results froma randomized field experiment in Oakland, California.” In Mazerolle, L.G. and J. Roehl (eds.), CivilRemedies and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.McAlister, A., C.L. Perry, J. Killen, L.A. Slinkard, and N. Macoby (1980). “Pilot study of smoking, alcohol, anddrug abuse prevention.” American Journal of Public Health 70:719–721.McBride, D.C. and J.A. Schwartz (1990). “Drugs and violence in the age of crack cocaine.” In Weisheit, R. (ed.),Drugs, Crime and the Criminal Justice System. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.McCleary, R., B.C. Nienstedt, and J.M. Erven (1982). “Uniform crime reports as organizational outcomes: Threetime series experiments.” Social Problems 29:361–371.McCold, P. and B. Wachtel (1998). Restorative Policing Experiment: The Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Police FamilyGroup Conferencing Project. Pipersville, PA: Community Service Foundation.McCollister, K.E., M.T. French and H. Fang (2010). “The cost of crime to society: New crime-specific estimatesfor policy and program evaluation.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 108:98–109.McCord, J. (1977). “A comparative study of two generations of native Americans.” In Meier, R.F. (ed.), Theoryin Criminology: Contemporary Views. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.McCord, J. (1979). “Some child-rearing antecedents of criminal behavior in adult men.” Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology 37:1477–1486.McCoy, H.V., J.D. Wooldredge, F.T. Cullen, P.J. Dubeck, and S.L. Browning (1996). “Lifestyles of the old andnot so fearful: Life situation and older persons’ fear of crime.” Journal of Criminal Justice 24:191–205.McDevitt, J. and P. Finn (2005). National Assessment of School Resource Offers Programs: Survey of Students inThree Large New SRO Programs. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.McDonald, L., S. FitzRoy, I. Fuches, I. Fooken, and H. Klasen (2012). “Strategies for high retention rates of low-income families in FAST (Families and Schools Together): An evidence-based parenting programme in theUSA, UK, Holland, and Germany.” European Journal of Developmental Psychology 9:75–88.McDonald, L. and T.V. Sayger (1999). “Impact of family and school based prevention program on protectivefactors for high risk youth.” Drugs and Society 12:61–85.McGahey, R.M. (1980). “Dr. Ehrlich’s magic bullet: Economic theory, econometrics, and the death penalty.”Crime & Delinquency 26:485–502.McGarrell, E.F., S. Chermak, J. Wilson and N. Corsaro (2006). “Reducing homicide through a ‘level-pulling’strategy.” Justice Quarterly 23:214–231.McGarrell, E.F., N. Corsaro, N.K. Hipple, and T.S. Bynum (2010). “Project safe neighborhoods and violent crimetrends in US cities: Assessing violent crime impact.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 26:165–190.McGarrell, E.F., N. Corsaro, C. Melde, N.K. Hipple, J. Cobbina, T.S. Bynum, and H. Perez (2012). An Assessmentof the Comprehensive Anti-gang Initiative: Final Project Report. Washington, DC: National Institute ofJustice.McGarrell, E.F., A.L. Giacomazzi, and Q.C. Thurman (1997). “Neighborhood disorder, integration, and the fearof crime.” Justice Quarterly 14:479–500.McGarrell, E.F., K. Olivares, K. Crawford, and N. Kroovand (2000). Returning Justice to the Community: TheIndianapolis Juvenile Restorative Justice Experiment. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute.McGlothlin, W.H. and M.D. Anglin (1981). “Shutting off methadone: Costs and benefits.” Archives of GeneralPsychiatry 38:885–892.McLean, S.J., R.E. Worden and M. Kim (2013). “Here’s looking at you: An evaluation of public CCTV camerasand their effects on crime and disorder.” Criminal Justice Review 38:303–334.McLennan, D. and A. Whitworth (2008). Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits: Evidence from theNew Deal for Communities Programme. Wetherby, West Yorkshire, U.K.: Communities and LocalGovernment Publications. Retrieved from367
http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/737988.pdfMeehl, P.E. (1954). Clinical vs. Actuarial Prediction. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Meier, R.F. and W.T. Johnson (1977). “Deterrence as social control: The legal and extralegal production ofconformity.” American Sociological Review 42:292–304.Melton, G.B., S.P. Limber, P. Cunningham, D.W. Osgood, J. Chambers, V. Flerx, S. Henggeler, and M. Nation(1998). Violence Among Rural Youth: Final Report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention.Menard, S. and H.C. Covey (1987). “Patterns of victimization, fear of crime, and crime precautions innonmetropolitan New Mexico.” Journal of Crime and Justice 10:71–100.Mental Health America (MHA) (2009). Position Statement #53: Mental Health Courts. Retrieved fromhttp://www.nmha.org/go/position-statements/53Merry, S.E. (1981). “Defensible space undefended: Social factors in crime control through environmentaldesign.” Urban Affairs Quarterly 16:397–422.Merton, R.K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Macmillan.Metropolitan Life (1993). Violence in America’s Public Schools. New York: Louis Harris and Assoc.Metropolitan Life (1994). Violence in America’s Public Schools: The Family Perspective. New York: Louis Harrisand Assoc.Miethe, T.D. (1991). “Citizen-based crime control activity and victimization risks: An examination ofdisplacement and free-rider effects.” Criminology 29:419–440.Millie, A. and M. Hough (2004). “Assessing the impact of the reducing burglary initiative in southern Englandand Wales.” Home Office Online Report 42/04. London: Home Office.Miller, T.R., M.A. Cohen and B. Wiersma (1996). Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look. Washington,DC: National Institute of Justice. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/victcost.pdfMinistry of Justice (2005). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Principles. New Zealand Ministryof Justice. http://www.justice.govt.nz/policy/crime-prevention/environmental-designMoffat, S. and S. Poynton (2007) “The deterrent effect of higher fines on recidivism: Driving offences.” Crimeand Justice Bulletin 106. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.Moffitt, T.E. (1997). “Adolescence-limited and life-course-persistent offending: A complementary pair ofdevelopmental theories.” In Thornberry, T.P. (ed.), Developmental Theories of Crime and Delinquency. NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction.Moffitt, T.E., A. Caspi, P. Fawcett, G.L. Brammer, M. Raleigh, A. Yuwiler, and P.A. Silva (1997). “Whole bloodserotonin and family background relate to male violence.” In Raine, A., P.A. Brennan, D.P. Farrington, andS.A. Mednick (eds.), Biosocial Bases of Violence. New York: Plenum.Monahan, J. (1981). The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Healthand Human Services.Moore, D. and T. O’Connell (1994). “Family conferencing in Wagga Wagga: A communitarian model ofjustice.” In C. Adler and J. Wundersitz (eds.), Family Conferencing and Juvenile Justice: The Way Forwardor Misplaced Optimism? Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of Criminology.Moore, M.H. (1994). “Research synthesis and policy implications.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge ofCommunity Policing: Testing the Promises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Morris, N. and M. Tonry (1990). Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a RationalSentencing System. New York: Oxford University Press.Morrison, S.A. and I. O’Donnell (1996). “An analysis of the decision-making practices of armed robbers.” InHomel, R. (ed.), The Politics and Practice of Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal JusticePress.Morselli, C. and M.N. Royer (2008). “Criminal mobility and criminal achievement.” Journal of Research inCrime and Delinquency 45:4–21.Mumola, C. and J. Karberg (2006). Drug Use and Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004. Washington,DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.Mustaine, E.E. and R. Tewksbury (1998). “Predicting risks of larceny theft victimization: A routine activityanalysis using refined lifestyle measures.” Criminology 36:829–858.Nagin, D.S. (1998). “Criminal deterrence research at the outset of the twenty-first century.” Crime and Justice368
23:1–42.Nagin, D.S., F.T. Cullen, and C.L. Jonson (2009). “Imprisonment and reoffending.” In Tonry, M. (ed.) Crime andJustice: A Review of Research, vol. 38. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Nagin, D.S. and G. Pogarsky (2004). “Time and punishment: Delayed consequences and criminal behavior.”Journal of Quantitative Criminology 20:295–317.Nasar, J.L. and B.S. Fisher (1993). “‘Hot spots’ of fear and crime: A multi-method investigation.” Journal ofEnvironmental Psychology 13:187–206.National Association of Town Watch (2015). About. https://natw.org/aboutNational Association of Youth Courts (2015). Facts and Stats. http://www.youthcourt.net/?page_id=24National Audit Office. (2004). Reducing Crime. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) (2015). http://www.ncpc.orgNational Institute of Justice (1990). Drugs and Crime: 1989 Drug Use Forecasting Report. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.National Institute of Justice (2015). Drug Courts. http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-courts/Pages/welcome.aspxNational Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) (2012). Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-basedGuide, Third Edition. Washington, DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Retrieved fromhttp://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition/frequently-asked-questions/what-drug-addiction-treatmentNational Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) (2014). Drug Facts: Lessons from Prevention Research. Washington,DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Retrieved fromhttp://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/lessons-prevention-researchNational Neighborhood Watch (NNW) (2015) USAonWatch. http://nnw.org/Nee, C. and M. Taylor (1988). “Residential burglary in the Republic of Ireland: A situational perspective.”Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 27:105–116.Neighborhood and Home Watch Network (2015). The History of Neighborhood and Home Watch.http://www.ourwatch.org.uk/about_us/our_history/Nelson, S. (1989). “Crime-time television.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 58:1–9.New Jersey State Parole Board (NJPB) (2007). Report on New Jersey’s GPS Monitoring of Sex Offenders.Trenton, NJ: New Jersey State Parole Board.New South Wales (2015). Safer By Design.http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/community_issues/crime_prevention/safer_by_designNewburn, T. (2002). “Community safety and policing: Some implications of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.”In Hughes, G., E. McLaughlin, and J. Muncie (eds.), Crime Prevention and Community Safety: NewDirections. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Newcomb, M.D. and P.M. Bentler (1988). Consequences of Adolescent Drug Use. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Newman, O. (1972). Defensible Space: People and Design in the Violent City. New York: Macmillan.Newman, O. (1996). Creating Defensible Space. Washington, DC: Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment.Newman, O. and K.A. Franck (1980). Factors Influencing Crime and Instability in Urban HousingDevelopments. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Newman, O. and F. Wayne (1974). The Private Street System in St. Louis. New York, NY: Institute forCommunity Design Analysis.Nichols, W.W. (1980). “Mental maps, social characteristics, and criminal mobility.” In Georges-Abeyie, D.E.and K.D. Harries (eds.), Crime: A Spatial Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.Niederberger, W.V. and W.F. Wagner (1985). Electronic Monitoring of Convicted Offenders: A Field Test Report.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Norris, C. and M. McCahill (2006). “CCTV: Beyond penal modernism?” British Journal of Criminology46(1):97–118.Norris, M., S. Twill, and C. Kim (2011). “Smells like teen spirit: Evaluating a midwestern teen court.” Crime &Delinquency 57:199–221.Novotney, L.C., E. Mertinko, J. Lange, and T.K. Baker (2000). Juvenile Mentoring Program: A Progress Review.369
Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Nubani, L. and J. Wineman (2009). “The role of space syntax in identifying the relationship between space andcrime.” Paper presented at the 5th Space Syntax Symposium, Delft, Holland.Nurco, D.N., T.W. Kinlock, T.E. Hanlon, and J.C. Ball (1988). “Nonnarcotic drug use over an addiction career: Astudy of heroin addicts in Baltimore and New York City.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 29:450–459.O’Brien, R.M. (1985). Crime and Victimization Data. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.O’Deane, M.D. (2012) Gang Injunctions and Abatement: Using Civil Remedies to Curb Gang-related Crimes.Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.Oesterle, S., J.D. Hawkins, A.A. Fagan, R.D. Abbott, and R.F. Catalano (2014). “Variation in the sustained effectsof the Communities that Care prevention system on adolescent smoking, delinquency, and violence.”Prevention Science 15:138–145.Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (2006). http://www.cops.usdoj.govOffice of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (1999). Violence after School. Washington, DC:Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). ADAM II: 2011 Annual Report. Washington, DC: The WhiteHouse.Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management (1993). Conflict Management in Schools:Sowing Seeds for a Safer Society. Columbus, OH: Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and ConflictManagement.O’Keefe, G.J. and H. Mendelsohn (1984). “Taking a Bite Out of Crime”: The Impact of a Mass Media CrimePrevention Campaign. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.O’Keefe, G.J., D.P. Rosenbaum, P.J. Lavrakas, K. Reid, and R.A. Botta (1996). Taking a Bite Out of Crime: TheImpact of the National Citizens’ Crime Prevention Media Campaign. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Olds, D., J. Eckenrode, C.R. Henderson, H. Kizman, J. Powers, R. Cole, K. Sidora, P. Morris, L.M. Pettitt, andD.W. Luckey (1997). “Long-term effects of nurse home visitation on maternal life course and child abuseand neglect: 15 year follow-up of a randomized controlled trial.” JAMA 278:637–643.Olds, D., C.R. Henderson, R. Cole, J. Eckenrode, H. Kitzman, D. Luckey, L. Pettitt, K. Sidora, P. Morris, and J.Powers. (1998). “Long-term effects of nurse home visitation on children’s criminal and antisocial behavior:15 year follow-up of a randomized controlled trial.” JAMA 280:1238–1244.Oliver, M.B. (1994). “Portrayals of crime, race, and aggression in ‘reality-based’ police shows: A contentanalysis.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 38:179–192.Oliver, M.B. and G.B. Armstrong (1998). “The color of crime: Perceptions of caucasians’ and African-Americans’ involvement in crime.” In Fishman, M. and G. Cavender (eds.), Entertaining Crime: TelevisionReality Programs. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.Oliver, W.M. (1998). Community-Oriented Policing: A Systemic Approach to Policing. Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice Hall.Olweus, D. (1993). “Victimization by peers: Antecedents and long-term outcomes.” In K.H. Rubin and J.B.Asendorf (eds.), Social Withdrawal, Inhibition, and Shyness. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.Olweus, D. (1994). “Bullying at school: Basic facts and effects of a school-based intervention program.” Journalof Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines 35:1171–1190.Olweus, D. (1995). “Bullying or peer abuse at school: Facts and intervention.” Current Directions inPsychological Science 4:196–200.Olweus, D. and S. Limber (2000). Bullying Prevention Program. Blueprints for Violence Prevention. Boulder,CO: Institute of Behavioral Science.Ortega, S.T. and J.L. Myles (1987). “Race and gender effects on fear of crime: An interactive model with age.”Criminology 25:133–152.Otto, H.A. (1962). “Sex and violence on the American newsstand.” Journalism Quarterly 40:19–26.Padgett, K.G., W.D. Bailes, and T.G. Blomberg (2006). “Under surveillance: An empirical test of theeffectiveness and consequences of electronic monitoring.” Criminology and Public Policy 5:61–92.Painter, K. and D.P. Farrington (1997). “The crime reducing effect of improved street lighting: The Dudleyproject.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, Second Edition.Gulderland, NY: Harrow and Heston.370
Painter, K. and D.P. Farrington (1999a). “Improved street lighting: Crime reducing effects and cost-benefitanalysis.” Security Journal 12:17–32.Painter, D. and D.P. Farrington (1999b). “Street lighting and crime: Diffusion of benefits in the Stoke-on-Trentproject.” In Painter, K. and N. Tilley (eds.), Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and CrimePrevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Department (1987). “Palm Beach County’s in-house arrest work release program.”In McCarthy, B.R. (ed.), Intermediate Punishments: Intensive Supervision, Home Confinement andElectronic Surveillance. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Palmer, T. (1975). “Martinson revisited.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 12:133–152.Palmer, T. (1983). “The effectiveness issue today: An overview.” Federal Probation 46:3–10.Papachristos, A.V., T.L. Meares, and J. Fagan (2007). “Attention felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoodsin Chicago.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4:223–272.Papachristos, A.V., C.M. Smith, M.L. Scherer, and M.A. Fugiero (2011). “More coffee, less crime?: Therelationship between gentrification and neighborhood crime rates in Chicago, 1991 to 2005.” City andCommunity 10:215–240.Papagiannis, G.J., R.N. Bickel, and R.H. Fuller (1983). “The social creation of school dropouts: Accomplishingthe reproduction of an underclass.” Youth and Society 14:363–392.Parker, K.D. (1988). “Black–white differences in perceptions of fear of crime.” Journal of Social Psychology128:487–494.Parker, K.D. and M.C. Ray (1990). “Fear of crime: An assessment of related factors.” Sociological Spectrum10:29–40.Passell, P. (1975). “The deterrent effect of the death penalty: A statistical test.” Stanford Law Review 28:61–80.Passell, P. and J.B. Taylor (1977). “The deterrent effect of capital punishment: Another view.” AmericanEconomic Review 65:445–451.Pate, A., M. McPherson, and G. Silloway (1987). The Minneapolis Community Crime Prevention Experiment.Washington, DC: Police Foundation.Paternoster, R. (1989a). “Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency:Deterrence and the rational choice perspective.” Law and Society Review 23:7–40.Paternoster, R. (1989b). “Absolute and restrictive deterrence in a panel of youth: Explaining the onset,persistence/desistance, and frequency of delinquent offending.” Social Problems 36:289–309.Paternoster, R. and A. Piquero (1995). “Reconceptualizing deterrence: An empirical test of personal andvicarious experiences.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 32:251–286.Paternoster, R., L.E. Saltzman, G.P. Waldo, and T.G. Chiricos (1982). “Causal ordering in deterrence research:An examination of the perceptions-behavior relationship.” In Hagan, J. (ed.), Deterrence Reconsidered:Methodological Innovations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Paternoster, R., L.E. Saltzman, G.P. Waldo, and T.G. Chiricos (1985). “Assessments of risk and behavioralexperience: An exploratory study of change.” Criminology 23:417–436.Patrick, S. and R. Marsh (2005). “Juvenile diversion: Results of a 3-year experimental study.” Criminal JusticePolicy Review 16:59–73.Pawson, R. and N. Tilley (1997). Realistic Evaluation. London: Sage.Pearson, F.S. (1985). “New Jersey’s intensive supervision program: A progress report.” Crime & Delinquency31:393–410.Pearson, F.S. (1988). “Evaluation of New Jersey’s intensive supervision program.” Crime & Delinquency 34:437–448.Pearson, F.S. and A.G. Harper (1990). “Contingent intermediate sentences: New Jersey’s intensive supervisionprogram.” Crime & Delinquency 36:75–86.Pease, K. (1998). Repeat Victimization: Taking Stock. London: Home Office Police Research Group.Pease, K. (1999). “A review of street lighting evaluations: Crime reduction effects.” In Painter, K. and N. Tilley(eds.), Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: CriminalJustice Press.Pennell, F.E. (1978). “Private vs. collective strategies for coping with crime: The consequences for citizenperceptions of crime, attitudes the police and neighborhood activity.” Journal of Voluntary Action Research371
7:59–74.Pennell, S., C. Curtis, and J. Henderson (1986). Guardian Angels: An Assessment of Citizen Response to Crime.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Perkins, D.G. and R.B. Taylor (1996). “Ecological assessments of community disorder: Their relationship to fearof crime and theoretical implications.” American Journal of Community Psychology 24:63–107.Perry, K. (1984). “Measuring the effectiveness of neighborhood crime watch in Lakewood, Colorado.” PoliceJournal 57:221–233.Pestello, H.F. (1984). “Deterrence: A reconceptualization.” Crime & Delinquency 30:593–609.Petersilia, J. and P.W. Greenwood (1978). “Mandatory prison sentences: Their projected effects on crime andprison populations.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 69:604–615.Petersilia, J. and S. Turner (1990). “Comparing intensive and regular supervision for high-risk probationers:Early results from an experiment in California.” Crime & Delinquency 36:87–111.Petersilia, J. and S. Turner (1993). “Intensive probation and parole.” In Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime and Justice, vol.17. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Peterson, M.A. and H.B. Braiker (1980). Doing Crime: A Survey of California Prison Inmates. Santa Monica,CA: RAND Corp.Petrosino, A.J. and D. Brensilber (2003). “The motives, methods and decision making of convenience storerobbers: Interviews with 28 incarcerated offenders in Massachusetts.” In Smith, M.J. and D.B. Cornish(eds.), Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Pfohl, S.J. (1978). Predicting Dangerousness. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.Phillips, C. (2002). “From voluntary to statutory status: Reflecting on the experience of three partnershipsestablished under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.” In Hughes, G., E. McLaughlin and J. Muncie (eds.),Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Phillips, D.P. (1980). “The deterrent effect of capital punishment.” American Journal of Sociology 86:139–148.Phillips, D.P. (1982). “The impact of fictional television stories on US adult fatalities: New evidence on the effectof the mass media on violence.” American Journal of Sociology 87:1340–1359.Phillips, D.P. (1983). “The impact of mass media violence on US homicides.” American Sociological Review48:560–568.Phillips, J.C. and D.H. Kelly (1979). “School failure and delinquency: Which causes which?” Criminology17:194–207.Phillips, L., S. Ray, and H.L. Votey (1984). “Forecasting highway casualties: The British Road Safety Act and asense of deja vu.” Journal of Criminal Justice 12:101–114.Phillips, P.P. (1980). “Characteristics and typology of the journey to crime.” In Georges-Abeyie, D.E. and K.D.Harries (eds.), Crime: A Spatial Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.Piliavin, I., C. Thornton, R. Garten, and R.L. Matsueda (1986). “Crime, deterrence, and rational choice.”American Sociological Review 51:101–119.Piquero, A. and R. Paternoster (1998). “An application of Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization of deterrenceto drunk driving.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 35:3–39.Piquero, A. and G.F. Rengert (1999). “Studying deterrence with active residential burglars: A research note.”Justice Quarterly 16:451–472.Piquero, A.R., D.P. Farrington, B.C. Welsh, R. Tremblay, and W.G. Jennings (2009). “Effect of earlyfamily/parent training programs on antisocial behavior and delinquency.” Journal of ExperimentalCriminology 5:83–120.Piquero, A.R. and G. Pogarski (2002). “Beyond Stafford and Warr’s reconceptualization of deterrence: Personaland vicarious experiences, impulsivity, and offending behavior.” Journal of Research in Crime andDelinquency 39:153–186.Podolefsky, A. and F. DuBow (1980). The Reactions to Crime Papers, Vol. II: Strategies for Community CrimePrevention. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.Pogarski, G., K. Kim, and R. Paternoster (2005). “Perceptual change in the national youth survey: Lessons fordeterrence theory and offender decision-making.” Justice Quarterly 22:1–29.Pogarski, G. and A.R. Piquero (2003). “Can punishment encourage offending? Investigating the ‘resetting’effect.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40:95–120.372
Police Foundation (1981). The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.Polk, K., D. Frease, and L. Richmond (1974). “Social class, school experience, and delinquency.” Criminology12:84–96.Polk, K. and D. Hafferty (1966). “School culture, adolescent commitments, and delinquency.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 4:82–96.Polk, K. and W.E. Schafer (1972). Schools and Delinquency. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Polvi, N., T. Looman, C. Humphries, and K. Pease (1990). “Repeat break and enter victimization: Time courseand crime prevention opportunity.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 17:8–11.Popkin, S.J., V.E. Gwiasda, D.P. Rosenbaum, J.M. Amendolia, W.A. Johnson, and L.M. Olson (1999).“Combating crime in public housing: A qualitative and quantitative longitudinal analysis of the ChicagoHousing Authority’s anti-drug initiative.” Justice Quarterly 16:519–558.Popkin, S.J., L.M. Olson, A.J. Lurigio, V.E. Gwiasda, and R.G. Carter (1995). “Sweeping out drugs and crime:Residents’ views of the Chicago Housing Authority’s Public Housing drug elimination program.” Crime &Delinquency 41:54–72.Poyner, B. (1988). “Video cameras and bus vandalism.” Security Administration 11:44–51.Poyner, B. (1991). “Situational crime prevention in two parking facilities.” Security Journal 2:96–101.Poyner, B. (1994). “Lessons from Lisson Green: An evaluation of walkway demolition on a British housingestate.” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 4. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Poyner, B. and B. Webb (1992). “Reducing theft from shopping bags in city center markets.” In Clarke, R.V.(ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Albany, NY: Harrow and Heston.Pratt, T.C., F.T. Cullen, K.R. Blevins, L.E. Daigle, and T.D. Madensen (2006). “The empirical states of deterrencetheory: A meta-analysis.” In Cullen, F.T., J.P. Wright, and K.R. Blevins (eds.), Take Stock: The Status ofCriminological Theory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967). Task Force Report:Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (2003). Fact Sheet, Project Safe Neighborhoods: America’s Network AgainstGun Violence. Retrieved from http://psn.gov/crime.aspPuzzanchera, M. and S. Hockenberry (2013). Juvenile Court Statistics 2010. Pittsburgh, PA: National Center forJuvenile Justice.Pyle, G.F. (1974). The Spatial Dynamics of Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of GeographyResearch Paper #159.Pyrooz, D.C. (2013). “Gangs, criminal offending, and an inconvenient truth: Considerations for gang preventionand intervention in the lives of youth.” Criminology and Public Policy 12:427–436.Raine, A. (1993). The Psychopathology of Crime: Criminal Behavior as a Clinical Disorder. San Diego, CA:Academic Press.Ramey, D.M. (2013). “Immigrant revitalization and neighborhood violent crime in established and newdestination cities.” Social Forces 92:597–629.Ramey, D.M. and E.A. Shrider (2014). “New parochialism, sources of community involvement, and the controlof street crime.” Criminology and Public Policy 13:193–216.Rand, M.R. (2009). Criminal Victimization, 2008. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Rand, M.R., J.P. Lynch, and D. Cantor (1997). Criminal Victimization, 1973–1995. Washington, DC: Bureau ofJustice Statistics.Rasmussen, A. (2004). “Teen Court referral, sentencing, and subsequent recidivism: Two proportional hazardsmodels and a little speculation.” Crime & Delinquency 50:615–635.Rasmussen, M., W. Muggli, and C.M. Crabill (1979). Evaluation of the Minneapolis Community CrimePrevention Demonstration. St. Paul, MN: Crime Control Planning Board.Ratcliffe, J. and M. McCullagh (1999). “Burglary, victimization and social deprivation.” Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety: An International Journal 1:37–46.Ratcliffe, J.H., T. Taniguchi and R.B. Taylor (2009). “The crime reduction effects of public CCTV cameras: Amulti-method spatial approach.” Justice Quarterly 26:746–770.Reichel, P. and C. Seyfrit (1984). “A peer jury in the juvenile court.” Crime & Delinquency 30:423–438.Reid, A.A. and M.A. Andresen (2012). “The impact of closed-circuit television in a car park on the fear of crime:373
Evidence from a victimization survey.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety 14:293–316.Reiner, R., S. Livingstone, and J. Allen (2000). “No more happy endings? The media and popular concern aboutcrime since the Second World War.” In Hope, T. and R. Sparks (eds.), Crime, Risk and Insecurity. NewYork: Routledge.Reiss, A.J. and A.L. Rhodes (1959). A Sociopsychological Study of Adolescent Conformity and Deviation.Washington, DC: U.S. Office of Education.Reiss, A.J. and A.L. Rhodes (1961). “The distribution of juvenile delinquency in the social class structure.”American Sociological Review 26:720–732.Reiss, A.J. and J.A. Roth (1993). Understanding and Preventing Violence. Washington, DC: National AcademyPress.Rengert, G.F. (1997). “Auto theft in central Philadelphia.” In Homel, R. (ed.), Policing for Prevention: ReducingCrime, Public Intoxication and Injury. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Rengert, G.F. and J. Wasilchick (1985). Suburban Burglary: A Time and a Place for Everything. Springfield, IL:Thomas.Rennison, C.M. and M.R. Rand (2003). Criminal Victimization, 2002. Washington, DC: Bureau of JusticeStatistics.Reppetto, T.A. (1974). Residential Crime. Cambridge, MA: BallingerReppetto, T.A. (1976). “Crime prevention and the displacement phenomenon.” Crime & Delinquency 22:166–177.Reynald, D.M. (2011). Guarding Against Crime: Measuring Guardianship within Routine Activities Theory.Burlington, VT: Ashgate.Rhodes, W., J. Norman, and R. Kling (1997). An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Automobile Parts Marking onPreventing Theft. Washington, DC: Abt Assoc.Rhodes, W.M. and C. Conley (1981). “Crime and mobility: An empirical study.” In Brantingham, P.J. and P.L.Brantingham (eds.), Environmental Criminology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Rich, T.F. (1995). “The use of computerized mapping in crime control and prevention programs.” NIJ Researchin Action. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.Rich-Shea, A.M. and J.A. Fox (2014). “Zero-tolerance policies.” In Muschert, G.W., S. Henry, N.L. Bracy, andA.A. Peguero (eds.), Responding to School Violence: Confronting the Columbine Effect. Boulder, CO: LynneRienner.Rifai, M.Y. (1982). “Methods of measuring the impact of criminal victimization through victimization surveys.”In H.J. Schneider (ed.), The Victim in International Perspective. New York: de Gruyter.Riger, S., M.T. Gordon, and R. LeBailly (1978). “Women’s fear of crime: From blaming to restricting the victim.”Victimology 3:274–284.Riley, D. (1980). “An evaluation of a campaign to reduce car thefts.” In Clarke, R.V.G. and P. Mayhew (eds.),Designing Out Crime. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.Riley, D. and P. Mayhew (1980). Crime Prevention Publicity: An Assessment. London: Home Office.Ringwalt, C.L., S.T. Ennett, and K.D. Holt (1991). “An outcome evaluation of project D.A.R.E.” HealthEducation Research: Theory and Practice 6:327–337.Ringwalt, C.L., P. Messerschmidt, L. Graham, and J. Collins (1992). Youth’s Victimization Experiences, Fear ofAttack or Harm, and School Avoidance Behaviors. Final Report. Washington, DC: National Institute ofJustice.Robers, S., Kemp, J., Rathbun, A., and Morgan, R. (2014). Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2013.Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, and Bureau ofJustice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved fromhttp://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfRobers, S., J. Zhang, J. Truman, and T.D. Snyder (2012). Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2011.Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012002.pdfRobinson, M. (1998). “Burglary revictimization: The time period of heightened risk.” British Journal ofCriminology 38:78–87.Robinson, M.B. (2011). Media Coverage of Crime and Criminal Justice. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.Rodgers, A. and S. Dunsmuir (2015). “A controlled evaluation of the ‘FRIENDS for Life’ emotional resiliency374
programme on overall anxiety levels, anxiety subtype levels and school adjustment.” Child and AdolescentMental Health 20:13–19.Rodriguez, N. (2005). “Restorative justice, communities, and delinquency: Whom do we reintegrate?”Criminology & Public Policy 4:103–130.Roehl, J.A. and R.F. Cook (1982). “The neighborhood justice centers field test.” In Tomasic, R. and M.M. Feeley(eds.), Neighborhood Justice: Assessment of an Emerging Idea. New York: Longman.Roehl, J.A. and R.F. Cook (1984). Evaluation of the Urban Crime Prevention Program: Executive Summary.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Roehl, J.A., H. Wong, R. Huitt, and G.E. Capowich (1995). A National Assessment of Community-based Anti-drug Initiatives: Final Report. Pacific Grove, CA: Institute for Social Analysis.Rogers, C. (2013). “Alley-gates in urban South Wales: Six years down the road. Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety 15:106–126.Rosenbaum, D.P. (1987). “The theory and research behind neighborhood watch: Is it sound fear and crimereduction strategy?” Crime & Delinquency 33:103–134.Rosenbaum, D.P (1988). “Community crime prevention: Review and synthesis of the literature.” JusticeQuarterly 5:323–396.Rosenbaum, D.P (2002). “Evaluating multi-agency anti-crime partnerships: Theory, design and measurementissues.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Evaluation for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Rosenbaum, D.P, R.L. Flewelling, S.L. Bailey, C.L. Ringwalt, and D.L. Wilkinson (1994). “Cops in the classroom:A longitudinal evaluation of Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE).” Journal of Research in Crime andDelinquency 31:3–31.Rosenbaum, D.P. and G.S. Hanson (1998). “Assessing the effects of school-based drug education: A six-yearmultilevel analysis of project D.A.R.E.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 35:381–412.Rosenbaum, D.P. and S.L. Kaminska-Costello (1998). Salt Lake City’s Comprehensive Communities Program: ACase Study. Washington, DC: BOTEK Analysis Corporation.Rosenbaum, D.P., P.J. Lavrakas, D.L. Wilkinson, and D. Faggiani (1997). Community Responses to Drug AbuseNational Demonstration Program: An Impact Evaluation. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Rosenbaum, D.P., D.A. Lewis, and J.A. Grant (1985). The Impact of Community Crime Prevention Programs inChicago: Can Neighborhood Organizations Make a Difference? Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.Rosenbaum, D.P., D.A. Lewis, and J.A. Grant (1986). “Neighborhood-based crime prevention: Assessing theefficacy of community organizing in Chicago.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), Community Crime Prevention:Does It Work? Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Rosenbaum, D.P., A.J. Lurigio, and P.J. Lavrakas (1989). “Enhancing citizen participation and solving seriouscrime: A national evaluation of Crime Stoppers programs.” Crime & Delinquency 35:401–420.Rosenbaum, D.P. and J. Roehl (2010). “Building successful anti-violence partnerships: Lessons from the strategicapproaches to community safety initiative (SACSI).” In Klofas, J.M., N.K Hipple, and E.F. McGarrell (eds.),The New Criminal Justice: American Communities and the Changing World of Crime Control. New York:Routledge.Ross, H.L. (1982). “Interrupted time series studies of deterrence of drinking and driving.” In Hagan, J. (ed.),Deterrence Reconsidered: Methodological Innovations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Rossman, S.B., J.B. Willison, D. Mallik-Kane, K. Kim, S. Debus-Sherrill, and P.M. Downey (2012). CriminalJustice Interventions for Offenders with Mental Illness: Evaluation of Mental Health Courts in Bronx andBrooklyn, New York. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238264.pdfRossman, S.B. and J.M. Zweig (2012). The Multisite Adult Drug Court Evaluation. National Association of DrugCourt Professionals. Retrieved fromhttp://nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Multisite%20Adult%20Drug%20Court%20Evaluation%20-%20NADCP.pdfRoundtree, P.W. (1998). “A reexamination of the crime-fear linkage.” Journal of Research in Crime andDelinquency 35:341–372.Rubel, R.J. (1989). “Cooperative school system and police responses to high risk and disruptive youth.” Violence,Aggression and Terrorism 3:295–325.Rubenstein, H., C. Murray, T. Motoyama, and W.V. Wourse (1980). The Link Between Crime and the Built375
Environment: The Current State of Knowledge. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Sacco, V.F. and M. Trotman (1990). “Public information programming and family violence: Lessons from themass media crime prevention experience.” Canadian Journal of Criminology 32:91–105.Sadd, S. and R. Grinc (1994). “Innovative neighborhood oriented policing: An evaluation of community policingprograms in eight cities.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing thePromises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Sadd, S. and R. Grinc (1996). “Implementation challenges in community policing: Innovative neighborhood-oriented policing in eight cities.” NIJ Research in Brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.Saltzman, L., R. Paternoster, G.P. Waldo, and T.G. Chiricos (1982). “Deterrent and experiential effects: Theproblem of causal order in perceptual deterrence research.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency19:172–189.SAMHSA (2012). Incredible Years. http://www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/ViewIntervention.aspx?id=93#std174SAMHSA (2014). Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables. Washington,DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.Samples, F. and L. Aber (1998). “Evaluations of school-based violence prevention programs.” In Elliott, D.S.,D.P. Farrington, and K.R. Williams (eds.), Violence in American Schools. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Sampson, R. and J.E. Eck (2008). “Super controllers: Can I be your superman?” Paper presented at the POPConference. Retrieved fromhttp://www.popcenter.org/conference/conferencepapers/2008/supercontrollers.pdfSampson, R., J.E. Eck, and J. Dunham (2010). “Super controllers and crime prevention: A routine activityexplanation of crime prevention success and failure.” Security Journal 23:37–51.Sampson, R.J. (1986). “Crime in cities: the effects of formal and informal social control.” In Reiss, A.J. and M.Tonry (eds.), Communities and Crime. Crime and Justice, vol. 8. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Sampson, R.J. and J.H. Laub (1993). “Crime in the making: Pathways and turning points through life.”Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Sampson, R.J. and J. Lauritsen (1994). “Violent victimization and offending: Individual-, situational-, andcommunity-level risk factors.” In Reiss, A.J. and J.A. Roth (eds.), Understanding and Preventing Violence,Vol. 3: Social Influences. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Saville, G. and G. Cleveland (2003). “An introduction to 2nd generation CPTED: Parts 1 and 2.” CPTEDPerspectives 6(1):7–9; 6(2):4–8.Schafer, W.E., C. Olexa, and K. Polk (1971). “Programmed for social class: Tracking in high school.” In Polk, K.and W.E. Schafer (eds.), Schools and Delinquency. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Schafer, W.E. and K. Polk (1967). “Delinquency and the schools.” In President’s Commission on LawEnforcement and the Administration of Justice. Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime.Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.Schaps, E., J.M. Moskowitz, J.H. Malvin, and G.A. Schaeffer (1986). “Evaluation of seven school-basedprevention programs: A final report of the Napa project.” International Journal of the Addictions 21:1081–1112.Scheff, T.J. (1966). Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory. Chicago: Aldine Press.Scheff, T.J. (1967). Mental Illness and the Social Processes. New York: Harper and Row.Scherdin, M.J. (1986). “The halo effect: Psychological deterrence of electronic security systems.” InformationTechnology and Libraries (Sept.):232–235.Schiff, A. (1999). “The impact of restorative interventions on juvenile offenders.” In Bazemore, G. and L.Walgrave (eds.), Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime. Monsey, NY: CriminalJustice Press.Schlossman, S. and M. Sedlak (1983). The Chicago Area Project Revisited. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.Schmidt, A. (1986). “Electronic monitors.” Federal Probation 50(2):56–59.Schweinhart, L.J. (1987). “Can preschool programs help prevent delinquency?” In Wilson, J.Q. and G.C. Lowrey(eds.), From Children to Citizens, Vol. 3: Families, Schools and Delinquency Prevention. New York: Springer-Verlag.Schweinhart, L.J., H.V. Barnes, and D.P. Weikart (1993). Significant Benefits. Ypsilanti, MI: High/Scope Press.376
Schweinhart, L.J. and D.P. Weikart (1989). “Early childhood experience and its effects.” In Bond, L.A. and B.E.Compas (eds.), Primary Prevention and Promotion in the Schools. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Schweinhart, L.J. and Z. Xiang (2003). “Evidence that the High/Scope Perry Preschool program prevents adultcrime.” Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting, Denver, CO.Schwitzgebel, R.K., R.L. Schwitzgebel, W.N. Pahnke, and W.S. Hurd (1964). “A program of research inbehavioral electronics.” Behavioral Science 9:233–238.Scott, M.S. (2006). “Implementing crime prevention: Lessons learned from problem-oriented policing projects.”In Knutsson, J. and R.V. Clarke (eds.), Putting Theory to Work: Implementing Situational Prevention andProblem-Oriented Policing. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office (1975). Evaluation Report: Target Hardening. Washington, DC: LawEnforcement Assistance Administration.Sechrest, L., S.O. White, and E.D. Brown (1979). The Rehabilitation of Criminal Offenders: Problems andProspects. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Segato, L. (2012). “Packaging against counterfeiting.” In Ekblom, P. (ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime ProofingEveryday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Shadish, W., T. Cook and D. Campbell (2002). Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for GeneralizedCausal Inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.Shah, S.A. and L.H. Roth (1974). “Biological and psychophysiological factors in criminality.” In Glaser, D., (ed.),Handbook of Criminology. Chicago: Rand-McNally.Shannon, L.W. (1991). Changing Patterns of Delinquency and Crime: A Longitudinal Study in Racine. Boulder,CO: Westview.Shapland, J. (1988). “Policing with the public?” In Hope, T. and M. Shaw (eds.), Communities and CrimeReduction. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.Shaw, C.R. and H.D. McKay (1931). Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency, vol. 2, no. 13. Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office.Shaw, C.R. and H.D. McKay (1942). Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.Sheley, J.F., Z.T. McGee, and J.D. Wright (1995). Weapon-related Victimization in Selected Inner-city HighSchool Samples. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Sheley, J.F. and J.D. Wright (1995). In the Line of Fire: Youth, Guns and Violence in Urban America. New York:Aldine de Gruyter.Shepherd, J.M. (2004). “Murders of passion, execution delays and the deterrence of capital punishment.”Journal of Legal Studies 33:283–322.Shepherd, J.M. (2005). “Deterrence versus brutalization: Capital punishment’s differing impacts among states.”Michigan Law Review 104:203–255.Sherizan, S. (1978). “Social creation of crime news: All the news fitted to print.” In Winick, C. (ed.), Devianceand Mass Media. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Sherman, L.W. (1990). “Police crackdowns: Initial and residual deterrence.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.),Crime and Justice, vol. 12. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Sherman, L.W. (1995). “Hot spots of crime and criminal careers of places.” In Eck, J.E. and D. Weisburd (eds.),Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Sherman, L.W. and R.A. Berk (1984). “The specific deterrent effect of arrest for domestic assault.” AmericanSociological Review 49:261–272.Sherman, L.W., D.P. Farrington, B.C. Welsh, and D.L. MacKenzie (2002). Evidence-based Crime Prevention.New York: Routledge.Sherman, L.W., P.R. Garten, and M.E. Buerger (1989). “Hot spots of predatory crime: Routine activities and thecriminology of place.” Criminology 27:27–56.Sherman, L.W., D.C. Gottfredson, D.L. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S.D. Bushway (1997). PreventingCrime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Sherman, L.W., D.C. Gottfredson, D.L. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S.D. Bushway (1998). “Preventingcrime: What works, what doesn’t, what’s promising.” Research in Brief. Washington, DC: National Instituteof Justice.377
Sherman, L.W. and D.P. Rogan (1995). “Effects of gun seizures on gun violence: ‘Hot spots’ patrol in KansasCity.” Justice Quarterly 12:673–694.Sherman, L.W. and D. Weisburd (1995). “General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime ‘hot spots’: Arandomized, controlled trial.” Justice Quarterly 12:625–648.Shernock, S.K. (1986). “A profile of the citizen crime prevention activist.” Journal of Criminal Justice 14:211–228.Short, J.F. and F.L. Strodbeck (1965). Group Process and Gang Delinquency. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.Shover, N. (1991). “Burglary.” In Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 14. Chicago:University of Chicago Press.Sickmund, M., T.J. Sladky, W. Kang, and C. Puzzanchera (2013). “Easy access to the census of juveniles inresidential placement.” Retrieved from http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/Sidebottom, A., P. Guillaume, and T. Archer (2012). “Supermarket carts to reduce handbag theft.” In Ekblom, P.(ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Silloway, G., and M. McPherson (1985). “The limits to citizen participation in a government-sponsored crimeprevention program.” Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting.Simpson, D.D. and S.B. Sells (1982). Highlights of the DARP Follow-up Research on the Evaluation of DrugAbuse Treatment Effectiveness. Washington, DC: National Institute on Drug Abuse.Skogan, W.G. (1981). “On attitudes and behaviors.” In Lewis, D.P. (ed.), Reactions to crime. Beverly Hills, CA:Sage.Skogan, W.G. (1987). “The impact of victimization on fear.” Crime & Delinquency 33:135–154.Skogan, W.G. (1988). “Community organizations and crime.” In Tonry, M. and N. Morris (eds.), Crime andJustice, vol. 10. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Skogan, W.G. (1989). “Communities, crime, and neighborhood organization.” Crime & Delinquency 35:437–357.Skogan, W.G. (1990). Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods. NewYork: Free Press.Skogan, W.G. (1995). “Community policing in Chicago: Year two.” NIJ Research Preview. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice.Skogan, W.G. (1996). “The community’s role in community policing.” NIJ Journal 231:31–34.Skogan. W.G. and K. Frydl (eds.), Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciencesand Education, National Research Council (2004). Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence.Washington, DC: National Academies Press.Skogan. W.G. and S.M. Hartnett (1997). Community Policing: Chicago Style. New York: Oxford UniversityPress.Skogan, W.G. and A.J. Lurigio (1992). “The correlates of community antidrug activism.” Crime & Delinquency38:510–521.Skogan, W.G. and M.G. Maxfield (1981). Coping with Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions. BeverlyHills, CA: Sage.Skogan, W.G. and M.A. Wycoff (1986). “Storefront police offices: The Houston field test.” In Rosenbaum, D.P.(ed.), Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work? Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Skolnick, J.H. and D.H. Bayley (1988). “Theme and variation in community policing.” In Tonry, M. and M.Morris (eds.), Crime and Justice, vol. 10. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Slater, M.D., K.J. Kelly, F.R. Lawrence, L.R. Stanley, and M.L.G. Comello (2011). “Assessing media campaignslinking marijuana non-use with autonomy and aspirations: ‘Be Under Your own Influence’ and ODNCP’s‘Above the Influence’.” Prevention Science 12:12–22.Sloan-Howitt, M. and G. Kelling (1990). “Subway graffiti in New York City: ‘getting’ up’ vs. ‘meaning it andcleaning it’.” Security Journal 1:131–136.Smith, B.E. and R.C. Davis (1998). “What do landlords think about drug abatement laws?” In Mazerolle, L.G.and J. Roehl (eds.), Civil Remedies and Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Smith, C. and T.P. Thornberry (1995). “The relationship between childhood maltreatment and adolescentinvolvement in delinquency.” Criminology 33:451–481.Smith, C.J. and G.E. Patterson (1980). “Cognitive mapping and the subjective geography of crime.” In Georges-378
Abeyie, D.E. and K.D. Harries (eds.), Crime: A Spatial Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press.Smith, D.R. and G.R. Jarjoura (1988). “Social structure and criminal victimization.” Journal of Research inCrime and Delinquency 25:27–52.Smith, G.B and S.P. Lab (1991). “Urban and rural attitudes toward participating in an auxiliary policing crimeprevention program.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 18:202–216.Smith, M.J., R.V. Clarke, and K. Pease (2002). “Anticipatory benefits in crime prevention.” In N. Tilley (ed.),Analysis for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Smith, W.R. and M. Torstensson (1997). “Gender differences in risk perception and neutralizing fear of crime:Toward resolving the paradoxes.” British Journal of Criminology 37:608–634.Snook, B. (2004). “Individual differences in distance travelled by serial burglars.” Journal of InvestigativePsychology and Offender Profiling 1:53–66.Social Development Research Group (SDRG) (2012). http://www.sdrg.orgSorenson, J., R. Wrinkle, V. Brewer, and J. Marquart (1999). “Capital punishment and deterrence: Examiningthe effect of executions on murder in Texas.” Crime & Delinquency 45:481–493.Sorenson, S.L. (1998). “Empowering capable guardians in high crime and low income settings.” Security Journal11:29–35.Spelman, W. (1993). “Abandoned buildings: Magnets for crime?” Journal of Criminal Justice 21:481–296.Spelman, W. (1995). “Criminal careers of public places.” In Eck, J.E. and D. Weisburd (eds.), Crime and Place.Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Spergel, I.A., K.M. Wa, and R.V. Sosa (2001). Evaluation of the Bloomington-Normal Comprehensive GangProgram. Final Report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Spergel, I.A., K.M. Wa, and R.V. Sosa (2002). Evaluation of the Mesa Gang Intervention Program (MGIP). FinalReport. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Spergel, I.A., K.M. Wa, and R.V. Sosa (2003). Evaluation of the Riverside Comprehensive Community-wideApproach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression. Final Report. Washington, DC: Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Spergel, I.A., K.M. Wa, and R.V. Sosa (2004a). Evaluation of the Tucson Comprehensive Community-wideApproach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression. Final Report. Washington, DC: Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Spergel, I.A., K.M. Wa, and R.V. Sosa (2004b). Evaluation of the San Antonio Comprehensive Community-wideApproach to Gang Prevention, Intervention and Suppression. Final Report. Washington, DC: Office ofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.Spohn, C., R.K. Piper, T. Martin, and E.D. Frenzel (2001). “Drug courts and recidivism: The results of anevaluation using two comparison groups and multiple indicators of recidivism.” Journal of Drug Issues31:149–176.Stacey, T. (2006). “Electronic tagging of offenders: A global view.” International Review of Law Computers andTechnology 20:117–121.Stafford, M. and M. Warr (1993). “A reconceptualization of general and specific deterrence.” Journal ofResearch in Crime and Delinquency 30:123–135.Stallard, P., N. Simpson, S. Anderson, T. Carter, C. Osborn, and S. Bush (2005). “An evaluation of the FRIENDSprogramme: A cognitive behavior therapy intervention to promote emotional resilience.” Archives ofDisease in Childhood 90:1016–1019.State of Victoria Department of Sustainability and Environment (2005). Safe Design Guidelines for Victoria.East Melbourne: Department of Sustainability and Environment.Stead, P.J. (1983). The Police of France. New York, NY: Macmillan.Stempl, G. (1962). “Content patterns of small metropolitan dailies.” Public Opinion Quarterly 39:88–90.Stephens, R.C. (1987). Mind-Altering Drugs: Use, Abuse, and Treatment. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Stickle, W.P., N.M. Connell, D.M. Wilson, and D. Gottfredson (2008). “An experimental evaluation of teencourts.” Journal of Experimental Criminology 4:137–163.Stott, M. (1967). “A content comparison of two evening network television programs with four morning Ohiodaily newspapers”. Master’s thesis, The Ohio State University.Stouthamer-Loeber, M. and R. Loeber (1989). “The use of prediction data in understanding delinquency.” In379
Bond, L.A. and B.E. Compas (eds.), Primary Prevention and Promotion in the Schools. Newbury Park, CA:Sage.Strickland, R.A. (2004). Restorative Justice. New York: Peter Lang.Stuart, B. (1996). “Circle sentencing: Turning swords into ploughshares.” In B. Galaway and J. Hudson (eds.),Restorative Justice: International Perspectives. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Surette, R. (1992). Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.Surette, R. (1998). Media, Crime and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities, Second Edition. Pacific Grove, CA:Brooks/Cole.Sutton, M. (1996). Implementing Crime Prevention Schemes in a Multi-agency Setting: Aspects of Process in theSafer Cities Programme. London: Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate.Swadi, H. and H. Zeitlin (1987). “Drug education to school children: Does it really work?” British Journal ofAddiction 82:741–746.Swartz, J.A., A.J. Lurigio, and S.A. Slomka (1996). “The impact of IMPACT: An assessment of the effectivenessof a jail-based treatment program.” Crime & Delinquency 42:553–573.Synovate (2007). Federal Trade Commission: 2006 Identity Theft Survey Report. McLean, VA: Synovate.Tay, R. (2005). “The effectiveness of enforcement and publicity campaigns on serious crashes involving youngmale drivers: Are drink driving and speeding similar?” Accident Analysis and Prevention 37:922–929.Taylor, B., C.S. Koper, and D.J. Woods (2011). “A randomized controlled trial of different policing strategies athot spots of violent crime.” Journal of Experimental Criminology 7:149–181.Taylor, D.G., R.P. Taub, and B.L. Peterson (1987). “Crime, community organization, and causes ofneighborhood decline.” In Figlio, R.M., S. Hakim, and G.F. Rengert (eds.), Metropolitan Crime Patterns.Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Taylor, M. and C. Nee (1988). “The role of cues in simulated residential burglary.” British Journal ofCriminology 28:396–407.Taylor, R.B. (1988). Human Territorial Functioning. New York: Cambridge University Press.Taylor, R.B. (1997). “Crime, grime and responses to crime: Relative impacts of neighborhood structure, crime,and physical deterioration on residents and business personnel in the twin cities.” In Lab, S.P. (ed.), CrimePrevention at a Crossroads. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.Taylor, R.B. and S. Gottfredson (1986). “Environmental design, crime, and prevention: An examination ofcommunity dynamics.” In Reiss, A.J. and M. Tonry (eds.), Communities and Crime. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.Taylor, R.B., B.A. Koons, E.M. Kurtz, J.R. Greene, and D.D. Perkins (1995). “Street blocks with morenonresidential land use have more physical deterioration: Evidence from Baltimore and Philadelphia.”Urban Affairs Review 31:120–136.Teedon, P., T. Reid, P. Griffiths, K. Lindsay, S. Glen, A. McFadyen, and P. Cruz (2009) Secured By DesignImpact Evaluation: Key Findings. Glasgow: Caledonian Environment Centre.Teedon, P., T. Ried, P. Griffiths, and A. McFayden (2010). “Evaluating Secured by Design door and windowinstallations.” Crime Prevention and Community Safety 12:246–262.Telch, M.J., J.D. Killen, A.L. McAlister, C.L. Perry, and N. Macoby (1982). “Long-term follow-up of a pilotproject on smoking prevention with adolescents.” Journal of Behavioral Medicine 5:1–8.Telep, C.W., R.J. Mitchell, and D. Weisburd (2014). “How much time should the police spend at crime hotspots?: Answers from a police agency directed randomized field trial in Sacramento, California.” JusticeQuarterly 31:905–933.Thistlethwaite, A., J. Wooldredge, and D. Gibbs (1998). “Severity of dispositions and domestic violencerecidivism.” Crime & Delinquency 44:388–398.Thornberry, T.P. (1998). “Membership in youth gangs and involvement in serious and violent offending.” InLoeber, R. and D.P. Farrington (eds.), Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and SuccessfulInterventions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Thornberry, T.P., D. Huizinga, and R. Loeber (1995). “The prevention of serious delinquency and violence:Implications from the program of research on the causes and correlates of delinquency.” In Howell, J.C., B.Krisberg, J.D. Hawkins, and J.J. Wilson (eds.), Sourcebook on Serious, Violent, and Chronic JuvenileOffenders. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.380
Thornberry, T.P., M.D. Krohn, A.J. Lizotte, and D. Chard-Wierschem (1993). “The role of juvenile gangs infacilitating delinquent behavior.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 30:55–87.Thornberry, T.P., A.J. Lizotte, M.D. Krohn, M. Farnsworth, and S.J. Jang (1994). “Delinquent peers, beliefs, anddelinquent behavior: A longitudinal test of interactional theory.” Criminology 32:47–84.Thornberry, T.P., M. Moore, and R.L. Christiansen (1985). “The effect of dropping out of high school onsubsequent criminal behavior.” Criminology 23:3–18.Thorpe, A., S.D. Johnson, and A. Sidebottom (2012). “Designing against bicycle theft.” In Ekblom, P. (ed.)Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Tien, J.M., V.F. O’Donnell, A.I. Barnett, and P.B. Mirchondani (1977). Street Lighting Projects: NationalEvaluation Program, Phase I Summary Report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcementand Criminal Justice.Tierney, J. (2001). “Audits of crime and disorder: Some lessons from research.” Crime Prevention andCommunity Safety: An International Journal 3(2):7–18.Tilley, N. (1992). “Safer cities and community safety strategies.” Crime Prevention Unit Paper 38. London:Home Office.Tilley, N. (1993). Understanding Car Parks, Crime and CCTV: Evaluation Lessons from Safer Cities. London:Home Office Police Research Group.Tilley, N. (2002). “Introduction: Evaluation for crime prevention.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Analysis for CrimePrevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Tilley, N. (2004). “Using crackdowns constructively.” In Hopkins Burke, R. (ed.), Hard Cop, Soft Cop.Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Tilley, N. (2005). “Introduction: Thinking realistically about crime prevention.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Handbook ofCrime Prevention and Community Safety. Portland, OR: Willan.Tilley, N. (2009). Crime Prevention. Cullompton, Devon, U.K.: Willan.Tilley, N. and J. Webb (1994). Burglary Reduction: Findings from Safer Cities Schemes. London: Home OfficePolice Research Group.Tita, G.E., K. J. Riley, G. Ridgeway, and P.W. Greenwood (2005). Reducing Gun Violence: Operation Ceasefirein Los Angeles. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Tittle, C.R. (1969). “Crime rates and legal sanctions.” Social Problems 16:408–423.Tittle, C.R. and A.R. Rowe (1974). “Certainty of arrest and crime rates: A further test of the deterrencehypothesis.” Social Forces 52:455–462.Titus, R.M. (1984). “Residential burglary and the community response.” In Clarke, R. and T. Hope (eds.), Copingwith Burglary: Research Perspectives on Policy. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.Tobler, N.S. (1986). “Meta-analysis of 143 adolescent drug prevention programs: Quantitative outcome resultsof program participants compared to a control or comparison group.” Journal of Drug Issues 16:537–567.Tolan, P.H., D.B Henry, M.S. Schoeny, P. Lovegrove, and E. Nichols (2014). “Mentoring programs to affectdelinquency and associated outcomes of youth at risk: A comprehensive meta-analytic review.” JournalExperimental Criminology 10:179–206.Tonry, M. (2008). “Learning from the limitations of deterrence research.” In Tonry, M. (ed.), Crime and Justice:A Review of Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Tonry, M. and D.P. Farrington (1995). “Strategic approaches to crime prevention.” In Tonry, M. and D.P.Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press.Toseland, R.W. (1982). “Fear of crime: Who is most vulnerable?” Journal of Criminal Justice 10:199–210.Townsley, M. and K. Pease (2002). “Hot spots and cold comfort: The importance of having a workingthermometer.” In Tilley, N. (ed.), Analysis for Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Travis, L.F. and J.K. Coon (2005). The Role of Law Enforcement in Public School Safety: A National Survey.Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.Tremblay, P. (2008). “Convergence settings for non-predatory ‘boy lovers’.” In Wortley, R. and S. Smallbone(eds.), Situational Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Tremblay, R.E. and W.M. Craig (1997). “Developmental juvenile delinquency prevention.” European Journal onCriminal Policy and Research 5(2):33–49.381
Trojanowicz, R. (1983). An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan. EastLansing: Michigan State University.Trojanowicz, R. and B. Bucqueroux (1989). Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective. Cincinnati, OH:Anderson Publishing Co.Troyer, R.J. and R.D. Wright (1985). “Community response to crime: Two middle-class anti-crime patrols.”Journal of Criminal Justice 13:227–242.Truman, J.L. and L. Langton (2014). Criminal Victimization, 2013. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.Tunnell, K.D. (1992). Choosing Crime: The Criminal Calculus of Property Offenders. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.Turner, S., J. Petersilia, and E.P. Deschenes (1992). “Evaluating intensive supervision probation/parole (ISP) fordrug offenders.” Crime & Delinquency 38:539–556.U.K. Office of Fair Trading (2006). Research on Impact of Mass Marketed Scams: A Summary of Research intothe Impact of Scams on UK Consumers. London: Office of Fair Trading.Umbreit, M.S. (1999). “Avoiding the marginalization and ‘McDonaldization’ of victim–offender mediation: Acase study of moving toward the mainstream.” In Bazemore, G. and L. Walgrave (eds.), Restorative JuvenileJustice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Umbreit, M.S. and R.B. Coates (1993). “Cross-site analysis of victim offender mediation in four states.” Crime &Delinquency 39:565–585.Umbreit, M.S., R.B. Coates, and B. Vos (2001). Juvenile Victim Offender Mediation in Six Oregon Counties.Salem: Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission.Umbreit, M.S., B. Vos, R.B. Coates, and K.A. Brown (2003). Facing Violence: The Path of Restorative Justice andDialogue. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (2011). Improving Urban SecurityThrough Green Environmental Design. Retrieved from http://www.unicri.it/news/files/2011-04-01_110414_CRA_Urban_Security_sm.pdfU.S. Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (1986). Final Report. Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office.van Andel, H. (1989). “Crime prevention that works: The care of public transport in the Netherlands.” BritishJournal of Criminology 29:47–56.Van Daele, S. and T. Vander Beken (2011). “Outbound offending: The journey to crime and crime sprees.”Journal of Environmental Psychology 31:70–78.van Dijk, J.M. (1978). “Public attitudes toward crime in the Netherlands.” Victimology 3:265–273.van Dijk, J.M. and J. deWaard (1991). “A two-dimensional typology of crime prevention projects.” CriminalJustice Abstracts 23:483–503.Van Dine, S., J.P. Conrad, and S. Dinitz (1979). Restraining the Wicked: The Dangerous Offender Project.Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.van Kammen, W.B. and R. Loeber (1994). “Are fluctuations in delinquent activities related to the onset andoffset in juvenile illegal drug use and drug dealing?” Journal of Drug Issues 24:9–24.Van Ness, D.W. and K.H. Strong (2015). Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative Justice, Fifth Edition.New York: Routledge (Anderson).van Steden, R., B. van Caem, and H. Boutellier (2011). “The ‘hidden strength’ of active citizenships: Theinvolvement of local residents in public safety projects.” Criminology and Criminal Justice 11:433–450.Vandeviver, C., S. Van Daele, and T. Vander Beken (2015). “What makes long crime trips worth undertaking?:Balancing costs and benefits in burlgars’ journey to crime.” British Journal of Criminology 55:399–420.Vaughn, J.B. (1989). “A survey of juvenile electronic monitoring and home confinement programs.” Juvenileand Family Court Journal 40:1–36Velez, M.B. and K. Richardson (2012). “The political economy of neighborhood homicide in Chicago.” BritishJournal of Criminology 52:490–513.Villetaz, P., M. Killias, and I. Zoder (2006). The Effects of Custodial vs. Noncustodial Sentences on Re-offending:A Systematic Review of the State of the Evidence. Retrieved fromhttp://campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/22/Vinter, R.D. and R.S. Sarri (1965). “Malperformance in the public school: A group work approach.” Social Work10:3–13.382
Visher, C.A. (1986). “Incapacitation and crime control: Does a ‘lock ’em up’ strategy reduce crime?” JusticeQuarterly 4:513–544.Visher, C.A. (1987). “The Rand inmate survey: A reanalysis.” In Blumstein, A., J. Cohen, J.A. Roth, and C.A.Visher (eds.), Criminal Careers and “Career Criminals.” Washington, DC: National Academy Press.Visher, C.A. (1990). “Incorporating drug treatment in criminal sanctions.” NIJ Reports No. 221. Washington, DC:National Institute of Justice.von Hirsch, A. (2000). “The ethics of public television surveillance.” In A. von Hirsch, D. Garland, and A.Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart.Wachtel, T. (1995). “Family group conferencing: Restorative justice in practice.” Juvenile Justice Update 1(4):1–2, 13–14.Wagenarr, C., M. Maldonado-Molina, D.J. Ericson, L. Ma, A.L. Tobeler, and K.A. Konro (2007). “Generaldeterrence effects of U.S. statutory DUI fine and jail penalties: Long-term follow-up in 32 states.” AccidentAnalysis and Prevention 39:982–994.Walker, S. (1983). The Police in America: An Introduction. New York: McGraw-Hill.Walker, S. (1985). Sense and Nonsense About Crime: A Policy Guide. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.Walker, S. (1999). The Police in America: An Introduction, Third Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill.Walklate, S. (1999). “Some questions for and about community safety partnerships and crime.” CrimePrevention and Community Safety: An International Journal 1(3):7–16.Waples, S. and M. Gill (2006). “The effectiveness of redeployable CCTV.” Crime Prevention and CommunitySafety 8(1):1–16.Warr, M. (1984). “Fear of victimization: Why are some women and the elderly more afraid?” Social ScienceQuarterly 65:681–702.Watson, E.M., A.R. Stone, and S.M. DeLuca (1998). Strategies for Community Policing. Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice Hall.Weatherburn, D. and S. Moffatt (2011). “The specific deterrent effect of higher fines on drink-drivingoffenders.” British Journal of Criminology 51:789–803.Webb, B. (1994). “Steering column locks and motor vehicle theft: Evaluations from three countries.” In Clarke,R.V. (ed.), Crime Prevention Studies, vol. 3. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Webster-Stratton, C. (2001). “The Incredible Years: Parent, teacher and child training series.” Blueprints forViolence Prevention. Boulder: University of Colorado.Webster-Stratton, C. and M. Hammond (1997). “Treating children with early-onset conduct problems: Acomparison of child and parent training interventions.” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology65:93–109.Weidner, R.R. (1996). “Target hardening at a New York City subway station: Decreased fare evasion—at whatprice?” In Clarke, R.V. (ed.), Preventing Mass Transit Crime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Weis, J.G. (1973). “Delinquency Among the Well-to-do.” Ph.D. dissertation. University of California atBerkeley.Weisburd, D., S. Bushway, C. Lum, and S. Yang (2004). “Trajectories of crime at places: A longitudinal study ofstreet segments in the city of Seattle.” Criminology 42:283–322.Weisburd, D. and L. Green (1995). “Measuring immediate spatial displacement: Methodological issues andproblems.” In Eck, J.E. and D. Weisburd (eds.), Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Weisburd, D., E.R. Groff, and S. Yang (2012). The Criminology of Place: Street Segments and Our Understandingof the Crime Problem. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.Weisburd, D., C. Telep, J. Hinkle, and J. Eck (2010). “Is problem-oriented policing effective in reducing crimeand disorder? Findings from a Campbell systematic review.” Criminology and Public Policy 9:139–172.Weisburd, D., E. Waring, and E. Chayet (1995). “Specific deterrence in a sample of offenders convicted ofwhite-collar crime.” Criminology 33:587–607.Weisburd, D., L.A. Wyckoff, J. Ready, J.E. Eck, J.C. Hinkle, and F. Gajewski (2006). “Does crime just movearound the corner? A controlled study of spatial displacement and diffusion of crime control benefits.”Criminology 44:549–592.Weisel, D.L. (2005). Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Problem Oriented Guides for Police. Washington, DC:Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services.383
Weisel, D.L. and J.E. Eck (1994). “Toward a practical approach to organizational change: Community policinginitiatives in six cities.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing thePromises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Weisheit, R.A. (1983). “The social context of alcohol and drug education: Implications for program evaluations.”Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education 29:72–81.Weitekamp, E.G.M. (1999). “The history of restorative justice.” In Bazemore, G. and L. Walgrave (eds.),Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Weitzer, R. and C.E. Kubrin (2004). “Breaking news: How local TV news and real-world conditions affect fearof crime.” Justice Quarterly 21:497–520.Wells, L.E. and J.H. Rankin (1988). “Direct parental controls and delinquency.” Criminology 26:263–285.Welsh, B.C. and D.P. Farrington (2009). Making Public Places Safer: Surveillance and Crime Prevention. NewYork: Oxford University Press.Wermink, H., R. Apel, R. Nieuwbeerta, and A.A.J. Blokland (2013). “The incapacitation effect of first-timeimprisonment: A matched samples comparison.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 29:579–600.Wertleib, E.L. (1982). “Juvenile delinquency and the schools: A review of the literature.” Juvenile and FamilyCourt Journal 33:15–24.West, D.J. (1973). Who Becomes Delinquent? London: Heinemann.West, D.J. and D.P. Farrington (1973). The Delinquent Way of Life. New York: Crane Russack.West, S.G., J.T. Hepworth, M.A. McCall, and J.W. Reich (1989). “An evaluation of Arizona’s July 1982 drunkdriving law: Effects on the city of Phoenix.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 19:1212–1237.White, H.R. (1990). “The drug use-delinquency connection in adolescence.” In Weisheit, R. (ed.), Drugs, Crimeand the Criminal Justice System. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.White, H.R., R.J. Pandina, and R.L. LaGrange (1987). “Longitudinal predictors of serious substance use anddelinquency.” Criminology 25:715–740.White, R.C. (1932). “The relation of felonies to environmental factors in Indianapolis.” Social Forces 10:498–509.Whitehead, J.T. and S.P. Lab (1989). “A meta-analysis of juvenile correctional treatment.” Journal of Researchin Crime and Delinquency 26:276–295.White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (2012). Drug Free Communities Support Program.http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/Drug-Free-Communities-Support-ProgramWhite House Office of National Drug Control Policy (2015). Drug Free Communities Support Program.http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/Drug-Free-Communities-Support-ProgramWhitney, I., I. Rivers, P. Smith, and S. Sharp (1994). “The Sheffield project: Methodology and findings.” InSmith, P. and S. Sharp (eds.), School Bullying: Insights and Perspectives. London: Routledge.Widom, C.S. (1989). “The cycle of violence.” Science 244:160–166.Wilbanks, W.L. (1985). “Predicting failure on parole.” In Farrington, D.P. and R. Tarling (eds.), Prediction inCriminology. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.Wilkinson, D.L. and D.P. Rosenbaum (1994). “The effects of organizational structure on community policing: Acomparison of two cities.” In Rosenbaum, D.P. (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing thePromises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Will, J.A. and J.H. McGrath (1995). “Crime, neighborhood perceptions, and the underclass: The relationshipbetween fear of crime and class position.” Journal of Criminal Justice 23:163–176.Williams, F.P. (1983). “Deterrence and social control: Rethinking the relationship.” Journal of Criminal Justice13:141–151.Williams, H. and A.M. Pate (1987). “Returning to first principles: Reducing fear of crime in Newark.” Crime &Delinquency 33:53–70.Williams, K.R. and R. Hawkins (1986). “Perceptual research on general deterrence: A critical review.” Law andSociety Review 20:545–572.Williams, P. and J. Dickinson (1993). “Fear of crime: Read all about it?” British Journal of Criminology 33:33–56.Wilson, J.Q. (1968). Varieties of Police Behavior. New York: Harvard University Press.Wilson, J.Q. and G. Kelling (1982). “Broken windows.” Atlantic Monthly (March):29–38.Winge, S. and J. Knutsson (2003). “An evaluation of the CCTV scheme at Oslo central railway station.” CrimePrevention and Community Safety 5(3):49–59.384
Winkel, F.W. (1987). “Response generalization in crime prevention campaigns.” British Journal of Criminology27:155–173.Wolfer, L. (2001). “Strengthening communities: Neighborhood watch and the elderly in a Pennsylvania town.”Crime Prevention and Community Safety: An International Journal 3(3):31–40.Wolfgang, M.E., R.M. Figlio, and T. Sellin (1972). Delinquency in a Birth Cohort. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.Wood, E. (1961). Housing Design, A Social Theory. New York: Citizens’ Housing and Planning Counsel of NewYork.World Health Organization (2004). Prevention of Mental Disorders: Effective Interventions and Policy Options.Geneva: WHO.Wortley, R. (1996). “Guilt, shame and situational crime prevention.” In Homel, R. (ed.), The Politics and Practiceof Situational Crime Prevention. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.Wortley, R. (2001). “A classification of techniques for controlling situational precipitators of crime.” SecurityJournal 14:63–82.Wortley, R., R. Kane, and F. Gant (1998). “Public awareness and auto-theft prevention: Getting it right for thewrong reason.” Security Journal 10:59–64.Wortley, R. and S. Smallbone (2008). “Applying situational principles to sexual offenses against children.” InWortley, R. and S. Smallbone (eds.), Situational Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse. Monsey, NY: CriminalJustice Press.Wright, R., M. Heilweil, P. Pelletier, and K. Dickinson (1974). “The impact of street lighting on street crime.”Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.Wright, R.T. and S.H. Decker (1994). Burglars on the Job: Streetlife and Residential Break-ins. Boston:Northeastern University Press.Wright, W.E. and M.C. Dixon (1977). “Community prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency.” Journalof Research in Crime and Delinquency 14:35–67.Wycoff, M.A. (1995). “Community policing strategies.” NIJ Research Preview. Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Justice.Wysong, E., R. Aniskiewicz, and D. Wright (1994). “Truth and DARE: Tracking drug education to graduationand as symbolic politics.” Social Problems 41:448–472.Yagerlener, W.G. (1980). Crime Prevention Project of the Walter P. Reuther Senior Centers. Washington, DC:National Criminal Justice Reference Service.Yang, B. and D. Lester (2008). “The deterrent effect of executions: A meta-analysis thirty years after Ehrlich.”Journal of Criminal Justice 36:453–460.Yin, R.K., M.E. Vogel, J.M. Chaiken, and D.R. Both (1977). Citizen Patrol Projects, National Evaluation Program,Phase I Summary Report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.Yu, J. and A.E. Liska (1993). “The certainty of punishment: A reference group effect and its functional form.”Criminology 31:447–464.Zhao, J.S., B. Lawton, and D. Longmire (2015). “An examination of the micro-level crime-fear of crime link.”Crime & Delinquency 61:19–44.Zhao, J.S., M.C. Scheider, and Q. Thurman (2002). “Funding community policing to reduce crime: Have COPSgrants made a difference?” Criminology and Public Policy 2:7–32.Zhao, J.S., M.C. Scheider, and Q. Thurman (2003). “A national evaluation of the effect of COPS grants on policeproductivity (arrests). 1995–1999.” Police Quarterly 6:387–409.Zimmer, L. (1987). “Operation Pressure Point: The disruption of street-level drug trade on New York’s lowereast side.” Occasional paper. New York: New York University School of Law.Zimring, F.E., G. Hawkins, and S. Kamin (2001). Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out inCalifornia. New York: Oxford University Press.Ziskin, J. (1970). Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.385
386
Name IndexAllatt, P. 133–4Allen, H.E. 103Andenaes, J. 178, 188Anderson, D. 240Andison, F.S. 142Andresen, M.A. 70Andrews, D.A. 331, 334Anglin, M.D. 271, 277Aos, S. 37Apel, R. 188Archer, D. 181–2Armitage, R. 78, 132, 156Atkins, S. 69Babst, D.V. 314Baccaglini, W. 143Ball, R.A. 326Ball. J.C. 271Barclay, P. 131, 132, 156Barr, R. 117, 117, 120–1, 353Barrile, L.G. 141Baumer, T.L. 327Beck, A. 70Beck, J.L. 314Bellis, D.J. 277Bennett, S.F. 104Bennett, T. 73, 96, 97, 98, 99, 125, 219Bentler, P.M. 272Berecochea, J.E. 314Berg, A. 236Berk, R.A. 315Bernasco, W. 130Berrueta-Clement, J.R. 168–9Berry, K. 98Bevis, C. 75Birsik, R.J. 112Bishop, D.M. 189Bjørgo, T. 33Blevins, K. 73Block, C.R. 208Block, R.L. 208Boda, Z. 143Bolkcom, C.A. 99Bond, B.J. 252Botvin, G.J. 281–2387
Bowers, K.J. 75, 101, 132, 134, 135, 136, 144, 144, 156, 213, 214Bowers, W.J. 184Braga, A.A. 131, 132, 208, 252, 253, 257Braiker, H.B. 318Braithwaite, J. 337Brantingham, P.J. 30, 32, 126, 127, 128Brantingham, P.L. 126, 127, 128Brennan, P.A. 204Brodie, D.Q. 104Brown, B. 69, 131, 156Brown, R. 235Browning, K. 205Burgess, E.W. 199, 205Bursik, R.J. 89Calhoun, A. 341Callanan, V.J. 143Chaiken, J.M. 272Chaiken, M.R. 272Chainey, S. 214Chermak, S.M. 140Chiricos, T.G. 20, 139, 143Clark, R.D. 292, 293, 296Clarke, J.P. 190Clarke, R.V. 118, 121, 122, 123, 125, 209–10, 213, 218, 221–2, 222, 223–4, 227, 228, 228, 233, 236, 250Clarke, S. 317–18Clayton, R.R. 282Cleveland, G. 80Cloward, R. 286Coates, R.B. 341Coheen, J. 185Cohen, A.L. 286Cohen, J. 318Cohen, L.E. 94, 123, 124, 220Collins, J.J. 271Conger, R.D. 161Conklin, J.E. 3Cook, R.F. 99, 104Cooprider, K.W. 325Cornish, D. 125, 220, 224, 227, 233Corsaro, N. 257Covington, J. 20Cox, S.M. 302Coyne, S.M. 142Cozens, P.M. 58, 80, 96, 239Craig, W.M. 161Crawford, A. 33, 96, 259, 352Cristall, J. 254Cromwell, P.F. 125Cullen, F.T. 334–5Cusson, M. 218–19388
Davies, T. 96Davis, R.C. 102, 104, 254–5, 316de Waard, J. 33Decker S.H. 125Decker, S.H. 219DeJong, W. 298Delaney, R. 319Derzon, J.H. 204–5Deutschmann, P.J. 139Dezbakhsh, H. 186Dickinson, J. 143Ditton, J. 69, 131–2Dixon, M.C. 330–1Dominick, J.R. 140Donnelly, P. 75Donohue, J.J. 184, 187Donovan, P. 155Downs, D.M. 70DuBois, D.L. 170Dunford, F.W. 315Durose, M.R. 313Eck, J.E. 94, 111, 111–12, 134, 229–30, 246, 249–50, 250Ehrlich, I. 181, 183Ekblom, P. 29, 37, 50, 230, 231, 232, 237Elder, R. 148Elfers, H. 130Ellingworth, D. 211Erez, E. 325Erickson, M.L. 188–9Erwin, B.E. 336Esbensen, F. 300Fabricant, R. 131Fakouri, M.E. 287Farrell, G. 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 215Farrington, D.P. 33, 70, 71, 131–2, 136, 161, 163–4, 164, 199, 201, 235, 287Faust, F.L. 30, 32Felson, M. 94, 118, 122, 123, 124, 134, 136, 209, 220Ferguson, C.J. 143Ferraro, K.F. 13, 14, 14–15, 20, 104Finch, E. 133, 134Finn, P. 303–4Fisher, B.S. 71–2Fishman, R. 331Foglia, W.D. 189Forman-Echols, L. 254Forrester, D.H. 100, 131Fors, S.W. 266Forst, B.E. 182Franck, K.A. 76389
Gabor, T. 133Gaes, G.G. 335Garofalo, J. 92, 96Garrett, C.J. 331, 333Geen, R.G. 142Geerken, M.R. 182Gendreau, P. 334–5Gensheimer, L.K. 331Gerbner, G. 141Gibbs, J.P. 182Gill, M. 70, 213Gilling, D. 352Glaser, D. 313Gold, M. 287, 302–3Goldstein, P.J. 271Gottfredson, D.C. 168, 295, 302Gottfredson, D.M. 314Gottfredson, M.R. 161Gove, W.R. 182Graber, D. 139, 140Grasmick, H.G. 89, 112Gray, E. 21Grazioano, A.M. 331Green, D.E. 191Green, L. 132, 136Greenberg, D. 318Greenberg, M.T. 165Greenberg, S.W. 77Greenwood, P.W. 199, 318, 320Greer, C. 143Gresham, P. 153Groff, E.R. 252–3Grohe, B. 18Grossman, J.B. 170Grove, L. 214Guererte, R.T. 134, 135, 136Hafferty, D. 287Handford, M. 235Hanson, G.S. 282Haverkamp, R. 323, 324Hawkins, J.D. 205Hawkins, R. 190Hayes, R. 70Haywood, J. 75Hearnden, I. 73Heath, L. 143Helland, E. 185Henrichson, C. 319Hesseling, R.B.P. 72, 132, 134Hindelang, M. 221, 288Hirschel, J.D. 315390
Hirschfield, A. 230, 232Hirschi, T. 161, 203, 286–7, 288Hoffman, P.B. 314Hofstetter, C.R. 140Hollinger, R.C. 190Hollis-Peel, M.E. 95Holloway, K. 98, 99Holt, T. 236Homel, R. 223, 224Hoover, L.T. 245, 247Hope, T. 108–9Hough, M. 18, 98Howell, J.C. 205Hse, Y. 271, 277Huba, G.J. 272Hughes, G. 258Huizinga, D.H. 271Hunbbard, R.L. 278Hunt, D.E. 272Hunter, R. 33Inciardi, J.A. 272, 278Jackson, J. 21Jacobs, J. 27Jaman, D.R. 314James, N. 303Jarjoura, G.R. 287Jeffery, C.R. 27–8Jensen, G.F. 189Jerse, F.W. 287Johnson, A.H. 166Johnson, D. 61Johnson, S.D. 75, 132, 144, 144, 156, 209, 213, 214Johnson, W.T. 190Johnston, L.D. 264, 266, 271Kandel, D.B. 272Kaplan, H.M. 63Karberg, J. 269Katz, L. 184Kelley, J. 155Kelling, G. 233–4Kelly, B.T. 205Kenney, D.J. 103, 297Kerby, J. 325Kimble, C. 75Klepper, S. 191Knutsson, J. 70Kovandzic, T.V. 186–7Kubrin, C.E. 143Kurki, L. 337391
Kusche, C. 165Kushmuk, J. 60, 77LaGrange, R.L. 14, 14–15Land, K.C. 184Landenburger, N.A. 336Lane, J. 20, 143Langan, P.A. 313Latessa, E.J. 98, 103, 207Latimer, J. 341Lauritsen, J.L. 211LaVigne, N.J. 70Lavrakas, P.J. 104, 108, 151, 157Laycock, G. 7–73, 33–4, 50, 134, 213Lee, M. 13, 21Leishman, F. 155Lester, D. 187Letkemann, P. 134Levi, M. 236Levin, D.J. 313Lewis, D.A. 97, 108Lichter, S.R. 140–1Liliavin, I. 189Lilly, J.R. 326Limber, S. 301Lipsey, M.W. 204–5, 332, 335Lipton, D. 330, 331, 335–6Liska, A.E. 143, 182Lochner, L. 189Loeber, R. 205, 272Logan, C.H. 182Loughran, T.A. 189Lowenkamp, C.T. 332Ludwig, J. 185Lurigio, A.J. 102, 104Maggin, D.M. 166Magil, C. 73Maguire, K. 16–17, 17Mann, D. 287, 302–3Marsh, M. 318Martinson, R. 330, 331, 333Mason, P. 155Maxfield, M.G. 17, 141, 326May, D.C. 304Mayer, J.P. 331Mayhew, P. 234Mazerolle, L.G. 254McCahill, M. 69McCallion, G. 303McCleary, R. 5McCold, P. 341392
McCollister, K.E. 12McCord, J. 201McCoy, H.V. 19, 20McCullagh, M. 213McDevitt, J. 303–4McDonald L. 172McGarrell, E.F. 19, 257, 340, 341McKay, H.D. 26–7, 89McLean, S.J. 70McLennan, D. 132McLeod, M. 92, 96Meeker, J.W. 143Meier, R.F. 190Melton, G.B. 301Mendelsohn, H. 146–7, 148Merry, S.E. 79Merton, R.K. 286Miethe, T.D. 133, 136Millie, A. 98Moffit, T.E. 161Monahan, J. 198Monchuk, L. 78Mooney, K. 331Mumola, C. 269Mustaine, E.E. 124Nagin, D.S. 189, 191, 314–15, 316Nasar, J.L. 71–2NBennett, T. 74Nelson, S. 155Newburn, T. 257Newman, G.R. 236Newman, O. 28, 56–9, 57, 65–7, 74, 76, 79–80, 84Norris, C. 69Nurco, D.N. 272Nutter, J.B. 75O’Brien, R.M. 4–5O’Keefe, G.J. 91, 96, 146–8Oainter, K. 68–9Oesterle, S. 174Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 246Ohlin, L. 286Oliver, W.M. 246Olweus, D. 300–1Padgett, K.G. 325Painter, K. 136Palmer, T. 331, 333Passell, P. 182, 183–4Paternoster, R. 189, 191Patterson, G.E. 126393
Pawson, R. 50Pease, K. 37, 50, 117, 117, 120–1, 209, 211, 213, 214, 240, 353Pelech, W. 341Pennell, S. 103Perkins, D.G. 81Pestello, H.F. 190–1Petersilia, J. 318Peterson, M.A. 318Phillips, D.P. 141–2, 184Phillips, I. 185Pierce, G.L. 184Piquero, A.R. 168, 191Polk, K. 287Polvi, N. 211Popkin, S.J. 102Poyner, B. 76, 234, 235–6Pratt, T.C. 187Ramey, D.M. 112Ratcliffe, J. 70, 213Reid, A.A. 70Reiner, R. 143Rengert, G.F. 124–5, 208Reppetto, T.A. 73, 116–17, 117Reynald, D.M. 80, 95, 111Rhodes, W. 73Riley, D. 148Ringwalt, C.L. 282Robers, S. 292, 293Roehl, J.A. 99, 102, 104, 256Rogan, D.P. 132Rojek, D.G. 266Rosenbaum, D.P. 104–5, 110, 110–11, 152–3, 244, 246, 256, 259, 282Ross, H.L. 184, 185Rossman, S.B. 345Roundtree, P.W. 19Rowe, A.R. 182Rubenstein, H. 67Sacco, V.F. 149Sampson, R. 111–12, 111Sampson, R.J. 182Sarri, R.S. 287Saville, G. 80Sayger, T.V. 172Schafer, W.E. 289Schaps, E. 281Scherdin, M.J. 235Schweinhart, L.J. 169Schwitzgebel, R.K. 322Sechrest, L. 331Sells, S.B. 279394
Shaw, C.R. 26–7, 89Shepherd, J.M. 186Sheppard, D.I. 104Sherman, L.W. 45–6, 49, 132, 185, 208, 315Short, E. 69, 131–2Shrider, E.A. 112Sickmund, M. 269Simons, R.L. 161Simpson, D.D. 279Singer, M. 318Skogan, W.G. 17, 112, 141Sloan-Howitt, M. 233–4Smallbone, S. 240–1Smith, B.E. 254–5Smith, C.J. 126Smith, M.J. 156Smith, W.R. 19Sorenson, J. 72, 184Speckhart, G. 271Spelman, W. 208, 229–30, 249–50Spelman. W. 81Spencer, J. 236Sutton, M. 101Szabó, G. 143Tabarrok, A. 185Tay, R. 148Taylor, D.G. 252Taylor, R.B. 20, 81, 82, 106, 183–4Teedon, P. 78Telep, C.W. 253Tewksbury, R. 124Thistlethwaite, A. 316Thomas, S.L. 142Thornberry, T.P. 287Thorpe, A. 238Tien, J.M. 69Tierney, T.P. 170Tiley, N. 50Tilley, N. 70, 133Tita, G.E. 257Tittle, C.R. 182Tobler, N.S. 281Tolan, P.H. 170Tonry, M. 33Tortensson, M. 19Townsley, M. 209Travis, L.F. 98Tremblay, P. 240Tremblay, R.E. 161Trotman, M. 149Troyer, R.J. 103395
Tunnell, K.D. 125Umbreit, M.S. 341van Andel, H. 233van Dijk, J.M. 33Van Dine, S. 318van Kammen, W.B. 272Villeraz, P.M. 315Vinter, R.D. 287Visher, C.A. 321Wachtel, B. 341Walker, S. 319Waples, S. 70Wasilchick, J. 124–5Watson, T.S. 297Wayne, F. 74Webb, B. 234, 235–6Webb, J. 133Weidner, R.R. 233Weisburd, D. 121, 132, 185, 208, 314Weisel, D.L. 211, 246Weitekamp, E.G.M 337Weitzer, R. 143Welsh, B.C. 69, 71Wermink, H. 318–19West, D.J. 287West, S.G. 184–5White, H.R. 270, 272–3Whitehead, J.T. 331, 332Whitney, I. 301Whittemore, S.L. 60, 77Whitworth, A. 132Widom, C.S. 202Wilbanks, W.L. 199Wilkinson, D.L. 246Williams, K.R. 190Williams, P. 143Willis, A. 70Wilson, D.B. 332Winge, S. 70Winkel, F.W. 155Wolfer, L. 104Wolfers, J. 184Wood, H. 27Wortley, R. 224, 224, 227, 240–1Wright, R. 73, 74, 125Wright, R.D. 103Wright, R.T. 219Wright, W.E. 330–1Wycoff, M.A. 251396
Xiang, Z. 169Yang, B. 187Yu, J. 182Zhao, J.S. 18, 252Zimring, F.E. 185Ziskin, J. 198397
Subject IndexNote: page numbers in italic type refer to Figures; those in bold type refer to Tables11 D principles 230, 231, 232, 23220/20 15548 Hours 1555Is (Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Involvement, and Impact) 230, 231, 354Above the Influence campaign 149abuse: risk factor in secondary prevention 202access control 57, 57, 59, 74, 354Accessible (VIVA element) 209accountability boards see neighborhood reparative boards (NRBs)ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers), England 63action (in cognitive mapping) 127, 354active (continuous signaling) system 322, 354activity space 127, 128, 130, 354activity support 57, 57, 60, 354actuarial prediction 193, 197, 198, 199–200, 354ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program 268, 354ADAM II (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program 268–9, 269, 354adolescence-limited offending 205, 354after-school programs 305aggravated assault, economic impact of 12aggregate-level evaluation 333, 354–5Airdrie, Scotland 69alarms 73, 83Alaska 344Alcoholics Anonymous 278alley gating 75, 132, 133, 355alternative schools 301–3, 355America’s Most Wanted 155“an eye for an eye” (lex talionis) 24, 362Anti-Meth Campaign 149anticipatory benefit 156, 355architectural design, and crime prevention see environmental design, and crime preventionarea improvement 83area permeability 74–6Arizona 184–5arson, economic impact of 11assaults: arrest rates 6; economic impact of 11, 11assize of arms 25, 355Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), England 63Atlanta 77, 257ATMs, and theft offences 236Australia: Crime Stoppers 153; environmental design 64, 65, 66; media crime prevention 148398
authority conflict 205, 355available guardians 95, 355awareness space 126, 355bank robbery, economic impact of 10–11, 11benign displacement 120, 121, 355bicycle theft 238Big Brother 229, 327, 355Big Brothers/Big Sisters (BB/BS) 170, 355biological risk factors, and secondary prevention 202, 204black people, and the fear of crime 18Bloomington-Normal, IL 258boost explanations 213, 355Boston 185, 208, 256boundaries, and crime displacement 118–19, 119bounty hunters 25British Colombia 233British Crime Survey (BCS) 7, 91, 99, 108–9; and repeat victimization 211British Home Office see Home Office, U.K.brutalization effect 184, 186, 355building design 83bullying 292–4, 293, 294, 355; anti-bullying programs 300–1Bureau of Justice Assistance: economic impact of crime 12; and neighbourhood watch programs 89, 90, 91Bureau of Labor Statistics; economic impact of crime 12burglary: crime rates 5; economic impact of 12; ethnographic research on 49; impact of alley gates on 75; and rational choice theory 219Burglary Reduction Initiative 39, 131buzzed driving 149Cabrini-Green housing project 133CAD see community anti-drug (CAD) programsCAD (Crime and Disorder Act), U.K. 39, 63–4, 257–8, 357Cadoxton, South Wales 75CAGI (Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative) 258–9, 357Calgary, Canada 341California 185, 254, 318, 320, 321, 325, 336Cambridge Youth Study 203Campbell Collaboration 47Canada 70capable guardians 95, 355CCP (Comprehensive Communities Program) 255, 357CCTV see closed-circuit television (CCTV)Cedar Rapids, Ohio 73celerity 180, 190, 355certainty, of punishment 179–80, 355; cross-sectional research 182–3; longitudinal research 185; perceptions of 188–191Charlotte School Safety Program 296–7Charlotte, Carolina 99, 315Chicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS) 208, 251, 255–6, 355–6Chicago Area Project 26–7, 356Chicago Public Housing Authority Anti-Drug Initiative 102, 104child sexual assault 240–1Cincinnati 98circle sentencing 339–40, 356399
citizen participation 107–13, 109, 111, 113citizen patrols 93, 103, 356civil abatement 253–5, 356clinical prediction 193, 197–8closed-circuit television (CCTV) 69–71, 83, 132, 134, 356; and anticipatory benefits 156; and motor vehicle theft 235Code of Hammurabi 24cognitive maps 126–7, 127, 356Cognitive Thinking Skills Program (CTSP) 335, 356cognitive-behavioral therapy 334–6, 356collective incapacitation 317–19, 319, 356Columbine High School 292Columbus, Ohio 103, 318Communities That Care (CTC) 172–4, 173, 356community anti-drug (CAD) programs 92–3, 356; evaluation of 101–2community cohesion, impact of neighborhood crime prevention on 96–7community influences, and secondary prevention 202, 203Community Partnership Demonstration Programs 102community policing 244–9, 251–2, 350, 356–7Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums (CRASH), Los Angeles 274Community Responses to Drug Abuse 102, 104, 105Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative (CAGI) 258–9, 357Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) 255Comprehensive Communities Programs 39computer mapping software 209conflict management/resolution, in schools 297–8constable 25, 357consumer fraud 9context 357; and evaluation 39, 48–9, 50cost-benefit evaluation 40–1, 357costs, of crime and victimization 10–13, 11, 12courts, specialized 342–6covert behavior 205, 357CPTED see Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums), Los Angeles 274CRAVED 123, 123, 209, 236, 357crime: costs of 10–13, 11, 12; official measures of 2–6, 4; precipitators of 224; scale of problem 2–10, 21–2Crime and Disorder Act (CAD), U.K. 39, 63–4, 257–8, 357crime and disorder partnerships 257–8crime attractors 128, 357crime audits 257, 258crime control 29, 357crime displacement 53, 115–21, 117, 118, 119, 357; evaluation of 121, 129–35, 135; implications of 137 see also crime spillovercrime fuses 121, 353, 357crime generators 128, 357crime inelasticity 118, 118crime life cycle 239, 357crime newsletters 149–52, 150, 357–8crime pattern theory 126–8, 127, 221, 358crime prevention 23–4; classifications of 30–4, 31; definition 29, 358; diversity in 352–3; future developments in 348–53; historical overview 24–8;politics of 352–3 see also primary prevention; secondary prevention; tertiary preventionCrime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 53, 56–63, 57, 61–2, 358; implementation of 63–5, 64, 65; limitations/failures of 87, 88,89, 93–4; second-generation CPTED 79–80, 84, 87, 94; third-generation CPTED 80–1, 81 see also environmental design, and crime prevention400
crime rates: and fear of crime 17, 20; impact of neighborhood crime prevention on 97–9; Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 2–6, 4crime science 33–4, 358crime scripts 219–20, 220, 358Crime Solutions, U.S. Office of Justice 67crime spillover 116, 358 see also crime displacementCrime Stoppers 152–3, 153, 358CrimeSolutions.gov 95Crimewatch U.K. 143, 155criminal justice system 54; economic impact of crime on 11–12cross-sectional studies 358; deterrence effect of legal sanctions 180, 181–3; limitations of 186CTC (Communities That Care) 172–4, 173, 356CTSP (Cognitive Thinking Skills Program) 335, 356cul-de-sacs 76cyberbullying 292, 293D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) 281, 282, 303–4, 358Dade County, Florida 342Dallas 131DARP (Drug Abuse Reporting Program) 279DART (Drug Abatement Response Team) 254, 359Dateline 155Dayton, Ohio 75dead-end streets 76death penalty, deterrence effect of 180, 181–2, 183–4, 186–8defensible space 56–9, 57, 66–7, 79, 358Delaware 278delinquent behavior, and schools 285–6; delinquency prevention programs 294–8, 299, 300–5, 303; educational factors 288–94, 291, 293, 294;future developments 306–7; theoretical basis 286–7Denver 98, 104deterrence 77–180, 121, 179, 192; definition 178, 358; and legal sanctions 180–8 see also general deterrence; specific deterrencedetoxification 277, 358Detroit 98developmental crime prevention 30, 31, 54, 159–60, 176, 358; background to 160–3, 162; developmental concerns 174–5; mentoring programs169–71; multi-component programs 171–4, 173; parent training 166–8; preschool programs 128–69; risk factors 163–4, 164; skills trainingprograms 165–6differential association theories 161diffusion of benefits 53, 116, 121, 156, 358–9; evaluation of 121, 135–7; implications of 137digital DNA 238, 359discouragement 121disorderly conduct, arrest rates 6displacement: and motor vehicle theft 235 see crime displacementdistance decay 130, 359District of Columbia 344diversity, in crime prevention 352–3domestic violence 315–16; and electronic monitoring (EM) 325Drug Abatement Response Team (DART) 254, 359Drug Abuse Reporting Program (DARP) 279Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) 281, 282, 303–4, 358 see also Keepin’ in Realdrug courts 342–3, 359Drug Free Communities Support Program 92–3drugs and crime 32, 194, 270–3; 253–5, 262–4; crime prevention 283–4; drug use among offenders 268–9, 269; law enforcement interventions273–4; prevention programs 279, 280, 281–3; self-reported drug use 264–5, 265, 267, 268, 268; treatment programs 274–9, 275, 276, 342–3401
drunk driving 148–9, 191, 316; deterrence 184–5drunkenness, arrest rates 6Dudley, U.K. 68–9ecological fallacy 200, 359edges 127, 359ego defense 287elaboration model 160–1, 359elderly people, and the fear of crime 17, 19, 104electronic monitoring (EM) 321–7, 324, 328, 359electronic tagging of property 235Elmira Prenatal/Early Infancy Project 166–7, 359embezzlement, economic impact of 12England: anti-bullying programs 301; deterrence effect of police crackdowns 185; historical patterns of law enforcement 24–5; media crimeprevention 148; motor vehicle theft 234; rational choice of offenders 124; transport system vandalism 234 see also U.K.environmental backcloth 126, 359environmental design, and crime prevention 27–8, 55–6, 82–5, 83, 222; defensible space 56–9, 57, 66–7, 79, 358; impact of physical design 65–76,67, 83; implementation of 63–5, 64, 65; and incivility and disorder 81–2; limitations/failures of 87, 88, 89, 93–4; physical design ofneighborhoods 76–8 see also Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)escape 71–2, 359ethnographic research on burglars 49Euclidean distance 130, 359Europe: electronic monitoring (EM) usage 323, 324evaluation 36–7, 50–1; alternative schools 302–3; citizen patrols 103; closed-circuit television (CCTV) 69–71; community anti-drug (CAD)programs 101–2; community policing 251–2; cost-benefit evaluation 40–1; crime newsletters 151–2; Crime Stoppers 152–3; crime-timetelevision programs 155–6; definition 359; developmental prevention programs 169, 170, 172, 174; displacement and diffusion 121, 129–37, 135;drug courts 343; drug education programs 281; electronic monitoring (EM) usage 324–6; experimental design 45–50, 46, 47, 48; follow-upperiods 44; G.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training) 300; hot spots policing 252–3; impact evaluation 37–8, 39, 40; incapacitation317–21, 319, 320; issues in 351–2; McGruff Prevention Campaign 146–8; measurement issues in 43–4; mental health courts 345; methadonemaintenance programs 277; methodology 45–50, 46, 47, 48; neighborhood crime prevention 95–106; process evaluation 39–40; realisticevaluation 49–50; rehabilitation programs 333, 334–46; resistance skills training 281; theory in 41–3evaluation (in cognitive mapping) 127, 359Evanston, Illinois 150, 151, 152event dependency 213, 359–60experiential effect 189experimental design 45–50, 46, 47, 48false negative predictions 197, 198, 199, 360false positive predictions 197, 198, 199, 360Families and Schools Together (FAST) 172, 360family factors, and secondary prevention 201–3, 202family group conferencing (FCG) 338–9, 340, 360fare avoidance, in transit systems 233FAST (Families and Schools Together) 172, 360FCG (family group conferencing) 338–9, 340, 360fear of crime 21; benefits of 20–1; and citizen participation 108; and crime rates 17, 20; definition 13–14, 360; demographics of 17–18; impact oflighting 69; and incivility 19–20; level of 16, 16–17; and mass media crime prevention 53–4; measurement of 14, 14–16, 15, 43; methodologicalfactors 20; and neighborhood crime prevention 103–5; perceived risk and harm 19; in schools 292–4, 293, 294; and situational crimeprevention 229; and social media 154; and vicarious victimization 18Fear of Crime in America Survey 15, 16fearing subject 21, 360Federal Emergency Management Agency; economic impact of crime 12402
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 7, 9feeble-minded 288, 360flag explanation 212–13, 360 see also risk heterogeneityFlorida 182follow-up periods, in evaluation 44Fordbridge, U.K. 78formal or organized surveillance 58, 72, 360fraud 6, 12“free bonus” effect 121FRIENDS program 165–6functional displacement 117, 117, 360; evaluation of 133–4, 135functional fear 21, 360functional surveillance 72functionalism 29G.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training) 298, 299, 300, 361Gallup Poll; fear of crime 15, 16gangs 203, 274; civil abatement and injunctions 253–5; Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) 298, 299, 300, 361; gang suppressionprograms 258–9; and gun violence 256, 257; in schools 293–4 see also G.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training)general deterrence 54, 177–80, 179, 192, 360; and legal sanctions 180–8; and perceptions 188–91; perceptions 188–91General Social Survey; fear of crime 15general theory of crime 161, 360generalizability 46, 360Georgia 336Glasgow, Scotland 69, 74, 78global positioning system (GPS) 323, 325–6, 360“gold standard”, of evaluation methods 45, 50, 360Google Streetview 128, 361Goss, Michael 322Guardian Angels 93, 103, 361guardianship: building of 9–95, 94; leveraging of 111–13gun violence 256–7“halo effect” 121Hamilton County, Ohio 316Head Start program 168, 361hedonistic 179, 312, 328, 361Highwayman Act (1692) 25Home Office, U.K. 28, 63, 101, 218Home Watch, U.K. 91, 100homicide: deterrence effect of death penalty on 180, 181–2, 183–4, 186–8; drug-related 271; economic impact of 12, 12Hope, T. 108–9hot products 123, 209–10, 361hot spots 208–9, 249, 361; policing of 252–3, 361Houston 150, 151–2Huddersfield, U.K. 240hue and cry 25, 361hunting ground 128, 361IACP Center for Social Media 154ICAP (Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential) 161, 162, 362ICVS (International Crime Victims Survey) 211–12403
identity theft 236; victimization rates 7–9, 8Illinois 344image 57, 57, 59, 82, 361immobilizers 234, 235, 361IMPACT (Integrated Multi-Phasic Program Assessment and Comprehensive Treatment) program 278impact (outcome) evaluations 37–8, 39, 40, 361imprisonment see incarcerationincapacitation 309, 311–12, 316–17, 328, 350; collective incapacitation of imprisonment 317–19, 319; definition 361; electronic monitoring (EM)321–7, 324; future implications 327–8; selective incapacitation of imprisonment 32–321, 320incarceration 312; collective incapacitation of 317–19, 319; selective incapacitation of 32–321, 320; studies of 313–15incivility 81–2, 361–2; and the fear of crime 19–20Incredible Years program 167–8, 362Indianapolis 257, 341indigenous people, and restorative justice 337, 338–40individual-level evaluation 333, 362inelastic 118, 362Inertia (VIVA element) 209informal surveillance 58, 83 see also natural surveillanceinformation lines 152–3, 153, 362injunctions 253–5, 362insurance industry 199Integrated Cognitive Antisocial Potential (ICAP) 161, 162, 362Integrated Multi-Phasic Program Assessment and Comprehensive Treatment (IMPACT) program 278intensive supervision probation (ISP) 334, 336–7International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) 211–12Internet Crime Complaint Center 9intervening guardians 95, 362invisible guardians 95, 362IQ, and delinquency 288–9ISP (intensive supervision probation) 334, 336–7, 362Jacksonville, Florida 252Jersey City, New Jersey 131, 132Jerusalem 148“joiners” 107–8journey to crime 130–1, 362JUMP (Juvenile Monitoring Program) 170, 362“Just Say No” campaign 281juvenile courts: development of 26 see also teen courtsJuvenile Monitoring Program (JUMP) 170, 362Kansas City 132Keepin’ it REAL 282, 362 see also D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education)Kenton County, Kentucky 324, 326KEY program 278Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project 99–100, 131, 133, 214, 240, 362Lake County, Illinois 325larceny, economic impact of 12law enforcement, and drug use 273–4learning theory 160legal sanctions, deterrence effect of 180–8404
lex talionis (“an eye for an eye”) 24, 362Life Skills Training (LST) 281–2life-course persistent offending 205, 362lifestyle perspective 220–1, 362–3lighting 68–9, 72, 83, 132Liverpool, U.K. 75London, U.K. 233; impact of neighborhood crime prevention 96, 97, 98, 99; neighborhood watch programs 98longitudinal analysis 363; deterrence effect of legal sanctions 180, 183–5; limitations of 186Los Angeles 257, 274, 282loss of time/income, of victims 11Love, Jack 322Lowell, Massachusetts 252LST (Life Skills Training) 281–2Lynn, Massachusetts 274macro-level crime prevention 33, 363maintenance programs 267–77, 363malign displacement 120, 363Manhattan distance 130, 363Maori people, New Zealand 338–9Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods 45–6, 47, 363mass media see mediamass-marketing fraud 9McGruff Prevention Campaign 145, 145–8, 363 see also Take Bite Out of Crime campaignmeasurement issues in evaluation 43–4mechanical surveillance 58, 363mechanism 50, 363media: and crime 139–44; and crime prevention 53–4, 138–9, 144, 144–58, 147, 150, 153; and the fear of crime 18, 143mental health courts 344–5, 363mentoring programs 169–71, 363Merchant Police of England 25Mesa, AZ 258meso-level crime prevention 33, 363meta-analysis: alternative schools 302–3, 363; deterrence effect of legal sanctions 180, 187–8methadone maintenance 267–77, 363–4Metropolitan Police, London, historical development of 25Michigan 320, 321micro-level crime prevention 33milieu 57, 57, 59, 364Milwaukee County 316mini neighborhoods 76Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment 208, 315, 364misdeeds 237, 363, 237Mississippi 318Missouri 344Monitoring the Future (MTF) 264, 265, 266, 364motivation reinforcement 57, 57, 60, 364motor vehicle theft 234–5; economic impact of 11, 12; and product design 238, 238; property identification programs 73motorcycle theft 234Multi-Systemic Therapy 335, 364Narcotics Anonymous 278405
National Association of Town Watch 91National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) 145National Crime Survey, Victim Risk Supplement 108National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 6–8, 364; and bullying 292, 293; economic impact of crime 10–11, 11, 12; fear of crime 15, 16; andrepeat victimization 211–12National Incident-based Reporting System (NIBRS); economic impact of crime 12National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 274, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282National Neighborhood Watch (NNW) 91, 92, 364National Night Out 92, 364National Opinion Survey on Criminal Justice 15National School Safety Center 295National Survey on Drug Use and Health 264–75, 364, 267National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign 149, 364National Youth Survey (NYS) 271–2, 273, 364–5natural surveillance 27, 57, 57, 58, 365NCVS see National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)near repeat 214, 365neighborhood crime prevention 53, 86–7, 88, 89, 113, 113–14; building guardianship 93–5, 94; citizen participation 107–13, 109, 111, 113; evaluationof 95–106; types of 89–93, 90, 91 see also neighborhood watchNeighborhood Matching Fund, Seattle, Washington 112neighborhood reparative boards (NRBs) 339, 365neighborhood watch programs 44, 89–92, 90, 91, 349, 365; impact on crime rates 97–8; problematic assumptions underlying 110, 110–11 see alsoneighborhood crime preventionneighborhoods: definition issues 105–6; physical design of 76–8net-widening 324, 326–7, 365Netherlands 72, 103, 233, 318–19networks (third-generation CPTED concept) 80, 81New Deal for Communities, U.K. 132, 136New Haven 255New Jersey 325–6, 336New Mexico 322new parochialism 112, 365New South Wales, Australia 64, 66New York City 103, 126, 134, 233, 272, 274, 331, 345New Zealand: alarms 73; environmental design 64, 65; Maori people 338–9Newark 150, 151–2newspapers, and crime reporting 139–40, 140–1, 143NIBRS (National Incident-based Reporting System); economic impact of crime 12NIDA (National Institute on Drug Abuse) 274, 275, 276, 279, 280, 282NNW (National Neighborhood Watch) 91, 92, 364nodes 126, 127, 128, 365Norman Conquest of England 24–5North Asylum Hill, Hartford 76–7Northwest Neighborhood Federation, Chicago 99, 104Norway 70, 301NRBs (neighborhood reparative boards) 339, 365NYS (National Youth Survey) 271–2, 273, 364–5Oakland 253–4obligatory policing 24, 365offenders: choice and mobility of 118, 118, 118–19, 119–20, 122, 122–9, 123, 127, 179, 188; drug use among 268–9, 269; journey to crime 130–1;white-collar 314 see also rehabilitation406
Office of Fair Trading (U.K.) 9Office of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) 258official data: and environmental design 77; and evaluation 43; and impact of neighborhood crime prevention 97–8; and repeat victimization 211Ohio 298; Risk Assessment Instrument 205, 206–7, 207OJJDP (Office of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) 258Oldham, U.K. 75Omaha, Nebraska 315Operation Ceasefire 256–7, 365Operation Identification 72, 92, 133, 365Operation Safe Streets, Philadelphia 131opportunities for crime 118, 122, 122–3“opportunity cues” 124–5order maintenance 245, 365Oregon 341Oslo, Norway 70OTREP (Opportunity is the result of Target, Risk, Effort, and Payoff) 63, 365outcome evaluations see impact evaluationsoutpatient drug-free programs 278overt behavior 205, 365Palm Beach, Florida 324–5, 326panel designs 191, 365; deterrence effect of legal sanctions 180, 185–7panel survey 365–6parens patriae 26, 366parent training 166–8parochial control 112, 366parochial police 25, 366Part I crimes 182, 366; arrest rates 6; crime rates 3, 5Part II crimes 366; arrest rates 6; crime rates 3, 5–6partnerships in crime prevention 193, 243–4, 261; CCP, SACSI, and PSN 255–6; civil abatement and injunctions 253–5; community policing 244–9,251–2; crime and disorder partnerships 257–8; gang suppression programs 258–9; gun violence 256–7; hot spots policing 252–3; problemidentification 249–50, 250; successful partnerships 259–60, 260passive system 322, 366paths 126, 366PATHS® (Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies) 165, 367peacemaking (sentencing) circles 339–40, 366 see also circle sentencingPeel, Sir Robert 25peer factors 202, 203; in schools 298, 299, 300peer mediation 297, 366people (third-generation CPTED concept) 80, 81perceptions, and deterrence 188–91permeability 84, 366permissability 224, 224, 227, 241, 366perpetrator displacement 117, 117, 366Perry Preschool program 168–9, 366personal crime; crime rates 3–4Philadelphia 70, 131, 208, 252physical disorder 81–2physical injuries to victims 11Pittsburgh 185Pittsburgh Youth Study 205place (third-generation CPTED concept) 80, 81407
police: foot patrols 245; impact of neighborhood crime prevention on public attitudes towards 97; impact of neighborhood watch on levels ofreporting to 98–9; role of 244; in schools 303, 303–4 see also community policingpolice crackdowns: deterrence effect of 185; and drug use 274politics of crime prevention 352–3pornography 142positivism 161–3, 366potential dangerousness 196prediction (in cognitive mapping) 127, 366prediction, for secondary prevention 193, 195–8, 197; implications for crime prevention 200, 215–16; predicting places and events 207–10; andrepeat victimization 210, 210–15, 212; risk factors 201–7, 202, 206–7; types of 197–200, 200preschool programs 128–69President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967) 3, 6, 13, 21–2, 27, 168pressures 224, 224, 366primary prevention 30–1, 31, 33, 175, 349–50, 366; overview 53–4PrimeTime Live 155prison overcrowding 326private control 112, 367private police forces; Merchant Police of England 25problem solving 367; in community policing 247problem-oriented policing 247, 367process evaluation 39–40, 367product design 236–40, 237, 238programmed contact system 322 see also passive systemProject PATHE (Positive Action Through Holistic Education) 295–6, 367Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) 255–6, 367Project TOUGH (Taking Out Urban Gang Headquarters) 254, 367Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS®) 165, 367prompts 224, 224, 367property crime 235; crime rates 3, 4; and rational choice of offenders 124–5; and routine activities theory 123–4; victimization rates 7property identification programs 72–3, 83, 92, 133prospect 71–2, 367prospective mapping 209, 367provocations 224, 224, 367PSN (Project Safe Neighborhoods) 255–6, 367psychological/personality factors; and secondary prevention 202, 204psychology 26psychopharmacological explanation 270, 367public control 112, 367public health model 30–3, 31, 34, 367–8publicity, and crime prevention 156pulling levers 256, 257, 368punishment, deterrence effect of see deterrenceradio frequency (RF) transmitters 322, 368Radio Watch 93randomized control trials 45–50, 46, 47, 48rape: economic impact of 12; and women’s fear of crime 20rational choice theory 119–20, 124–5, 213, 219–20, 220, 368RBI see Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), U.K.RCCP (Resolving Conflict Creatively Program) 297–8, 368real territoriality 58, 368realistic evaluation 49–50, 368408
recidivism 313–14; measurement of 332–3 see also rehabilitationreciprocal 270, 272, 368recognition (in cognitive mapping) 126–7, 368Reducing Burglary Initiative (RBI), U.K. 77–8, 98, 135, 156, 368refuge 71–2, 368rehabilitation 309–10, 329–30, 346–7, 350; the “what works?” argument 330–4; evaluation of 333, 334–46repeat victimization 133, 210, 210–15, 212, 240, 368resistance skills training 281, 283, 368Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (RCCP) 297–8, 368Responding in Peaceful and Positive Ways (RIPP) 298, 368–9response generalization 369restorative justice 337–41, 369retail stores: closed-circuit television (CCTV) 70RIPP (Responding in Peaceful and Positive Ways) 298, 368–9risk factors 331, 369; prediction for secondary prevention 201–7, 202, 206–7risk heterogeneity 212–13, 369risk, need, and responsivity 332, 369Riverside, CA 258Road Safety Act, U.K. 185Rochdale, U.K. 98Rochester Youth Study 202Roman, Charles 25Rotterdam, Netherlands 131routine activities theory 94, 94, 123, 123–4, 213, 220–1, 369rural populations, and the fear of crime 17Sacramento, California 253SACSI (Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative) 39, 255, 371Safe and Drug Free Schools program 304Safe Schools/Healthy Children 304Safer Cities program 99, 100–1, 104, 131, 136, 369Safer Neighbourhoods Survey, London, U.K. 21Salient Factor Score (U.S. Parole Commission) 199San Antonio, TX 258San Diego 103, 254SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) 229–30, 231, 249–50, 250, 369scams 9Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment (SARA) 229–30, 231, 249–50, 250, 369Schnectady, New York 70school resource officers (SROs) 303–4, 369schools, and crime prevention 32, 194, 285–6; alternative schools 301–3; delinquency prevention programs 294–8, 299, 300–5, 303; educationalfactors and delinquency 288–94, 291, 293, 294; future of 306–7; secondary prevention 202, 203–4; theoretical basis 286–7Scotland 74Seattle 135, 136, 208Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program 99Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office 74Seattle Social Development Project 171–2, 369second-generation CPTED 84, 369–70secondary prevention 31, 32, 33, 175, 350, 370; overview 193–4Secured by Design (SBD) 63–4, 64, 74, 78, 370selective incapacitation 32–321, 199, 200, 320, 370series victimizations 211409
severity of sanctions 179, 192; cross-sectional research 181–3; definition 370; longitudinal research 183–5; perceptions of 190–1sexual assault: economic impact of 12; and women’s fear of crime 20situational crime prevention 28, 32, 193, 217–18, 241–2, 350; case studies 233–41, 237, 238; definition 218, 370; growth of 218–19; implementationof 229–32, 231, 231, 232; issues and concerns 227–9, 228; situational typologies 221–4, 222, 224, 225–6, 227; theoretical basis 219–21, 220skills training programs 165–6SMART (Specialized Multi-Agency Response) 253–4, 370smart guns 239, 370social control theories 161social isolation, and the fear of crime 19social media 370; and crime prevention 154–5; and cyberbullying 292, 293social prevention 31, 370social/crime template 126, 370socio-economic status, and the fear of crime 18sociology 26soft determinism 124, 370South Carolina 301Specialized Multi-Agency Response (SMART) 253–4, 370specific deterrence 178–9, 179, 309, 311–16, 350, 370; future implications 327–8spurious 270, 272–3, 370St. Louis 74–5, 125, 255status offenses 26, 370–1Statutes of Winchester (1285) 25Stirchley, U.K. 78, 133Stoke-on-Trent, U.K. 68–9stolen property, economic impact of 12Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) 39, 255, 371Street Angels 93, 371street layout 76, 83Street Pastors 93streetblock 106, 371suicides, and the media 141–2super controllers 111, 111–12, 371Surrey, British Columbia 70surveillability 71–2surveillance 57, 57, 58, 61, 222, 229, 371; and neighbourhood watch programs 90–1, 92, 93, 106sustainable communities, U.K. 63–4, 64symbolic territoriality 58, 371Syracuse Family Development Research Program 167, 371systemic violence 271, 371tactical displacement 116, 117, 371; evaluation of 132–3, 134, 135; and motor vehicle theft 235Take a Bite Out of Crime 15, 145, 145–8, 371target displacement 116–17, 117, 371; evaluation of 135target hardening 57, 57, 59–60, 74, 133–4, 222, 371targets, choice and availability of 118, 120tautological 332, 371teachers: poor teaching quality, and delinquency 289; victims of crime in schools 291, 291technology (third-generation CPTED concept) 80, 81teen courts 343–4, 371 see also juvenile courtstelevision: crime-time programs 155–6; news and crime reporting 140temporal displacement 116, 117, 371–2; evaluation of 132, 134, 135territorial (spatial) displacement 116, 117, 118, 372; evaluation of 131–2, 135410
territoriality 57, 57–8, 61, 61–2, 372tertiary prevention 31, 32–3, 175, 350, 372; overview 309–10Texas 184, 320, 321theft 235–6; economic impact of 10, 11, 11, 12theory, and evaluation 41–3therapeutic communities 278, 372thief takers 25, 372third-generation CPTED 372threats to external validity 46–9, 48, 372threats to internal validity 45, 46, 372three-strike laws 185, 372Top Cops 155tracking 289, 372Trafford, Greater Manchester 214truancy reduction programs 305true negative prediction 197, 372true positive prediction 197, 372Tucson, AZ 258Type 1 effects of physical design 67, 67Type 2 effects of physical design 67, 67Type 3 effects of physical design 67, 67U.K.: ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring) program 269; area permeability 74; citizen patrols 93; closed-circuit television (CCTV) 69–71;crime and disorder partnerships 257–8; Crime Stoppers 153; environmental design 63–4, 64; impact of lighting 68–9; neighborhood watch 91,96, 97, 98, 99; newspapers and crime reporting 139–40, 143; physical design of neighborhoods 76; politics of crime prevention 352–3; ReducingBurglary Initiative (RBI) 77–8, 98, 135, 156, 368; scams 9 see also England; Scotland; WalesU.S.: alarms 73; area permeability 74–5; citizen patrols 93; closed-circuit television (CCTV) 70; community policing 251; electronic monitoring(EM) usage 323; environmental design 64–5; historical patterns of law enforcement 25; neighbourhood watch programs 91; newspapers andcrime reporting 139; physical design of neighborhoods 76–7; politics of crime prevention 353; rational choice of offenders 124–5; surveillance72U.S. Department of Education 304U.S. Fire Administration 12U.S. Office of Justice 67UCR see Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 2–6, 4, 10, 372; economic impact of crime 10–11, 11, 12Union Avenue Corridor (UAC), Portland, Oregon 77United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) 80 Unsolved Mysteries 155urban environments, and crime 27–8urban residents, and the fear of crime 17Value (VIVA element) 209Vancouver, Canada 235vandalism: arrest rates 6; economic impact of 12; in transit systems 233–4vicarious victimization 18, 372victim survey data: and environmental design 77; and evaluation 43; and impact of neighborhood crime prevention 99; and repeat victimization211victim-offender mediation (VOM) 338, 340, 341, 372–3Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORP) 338victimization: costs of 10–13, 11, 12; and the fear of crime 17; in schools 288, 290–4, 291, 293, 294victimization surveys 6–10, 8, 373Victoria, Australia 64, 65vigilante movements 25, 373411
violence, and media portrayals of crime 141violent crime: crime rates 3, 4; victimization rates 7Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 1994 343Virginia 65virtual repeats 214, 373Visible (VIVA element) 209VIVA (Value Inertia, Visibility, and Access) 209, 373vocational education tracks 289–90VOM (victim-offender mediation) 338, 340, 341, 372–3VORP (Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs) 338Wales: motor vehicle theft 234; property identification programs 72–3Washington, D.C. 318watch and ward 24–5, 26, 373WE PREVENT 148West Germany 234West Yorkshire, U.K. 78Whistle Stop 92, 93, 373white-collar criminals 314women, and the fear of crime 17, 19, 20wool industry, protection of 25Xenia, Ohio 344Yew Tree, Sandwell, U.K. 98youth courts (teen courts) 343–4zero tolerance policies, in schools 304412
Collepals.com Plagiarism Free Papers
Are you looking for custom essay writing service or even dissertation writing services? Just request for our write my paper service, and we'll match you with the best essay writer in your subject! With an exceptional team of professional academic experts in a wide range of subjects, we can guarantee you an unrivaled quality of custom-written papers.
Get ZERO PLAGIARISM, HUMAN WRITTEN ESSAYS
Why Hire Collepals.com writers to do your paper?
Quality- We are experienced and have access to ample research materials.
We write plagiarism Free Content
Confidential- We never share or sell your personal information to third parties.
Support-Chat with us today! We are always waiting to answer all your questions.
