In United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the difference between a business and an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the area around their home or business (called the curtilage).

In United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the difference between a business and an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the area around their home or business (called the curtilage). In the case, a government agent seized a bag of shredded documents from a dumpster located on the property of Bet-Air, Inc. Hall filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the search and seizure was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Review United States v. Hall (1995) and discuss the following:

What was the Court of Appeal’s decision?

Was the search and seizure a violation of the Fourth Amendment? Why or why not?

Would the result have been different if the dumpster was on private property rather than on commercial property?

Suppose you were an executive at Bet-Air. What recommendations would you make to help Bet-Air assert an expectation of privacy in the dumpster?

Your initial response should be a minimum of 200 words.

Requirements: 200 word min

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 199547 F.3d 1091 (1995)UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Terrence HALL, Defendant-Appellant.No. 93-4456.March 16, 1995.United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.*1092 Joel Hirschhorn, Coral Gables, FL, for appellant.1092Kendall B. Coffey, U.S. Atty., Phillip DiRosa, Linda Collins Hertz, Lisa T. Rubio,Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, for appellee.Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior CircuitJudge.HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:In February, 1993, a jury convicted Terrence Hall, chairman of Bet-Air, Inc., aclosely held Miami-based seller of spare aviation parts and supplies of fourteencounts of violating various federal laws in connection with Bet-Air’s sale ofrestricted military equipment parts to Iran. After conviction, the district courtsentenced Hall to a prison term of fifty-one months. We affirm.*1093 FACTS1093In June, 1988, Special Agent William T. Parks of the United States CustomsService began investigating allegations that Bet-Air was supplying restrictedmilitary parts to Iran. Bet-Air subsequently supplied records in response to twoenforcement subpoenas relating to the investigation. On June 27, 1989, Parks andan Assistant United States Attorney met with two attorneys then representing Bet-Air. At the meeting, Bet-Air agreed to voluntarily supply the government withrequested corporate minutes within ten days.On July 3, 1989, Agent Parks entered Bet-Air’s property and removed a bag ofpaper shreddings from a garbage dumpster located near the Bet-Air offices in aparking area reserved for Bet-Air employees. In order to get to the dumpster,Parks had to travel forty yards on a private paved road. No signs indicated that theroad was private, and Parks testified that at the time he traveled on the road, hedid not know he was on private property. Thus, notwithstanding its location on Bet-Air’s private property, the dumpster was readily accessible to the public. One of thereconstructed shredded documents was titled “British Airways — Bet-Air, Inc.,Minutes of Meeting.” On July 5, 1989, Parks met with Bet-Air’s new attorney whoprovided Parks with the Bet-Air corporate minutes previously requested. ThoseReadHow cited

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]documents did not include the minutes from the British Airways-Bet-Air meeting.Parks used the shredded documents as the basis for obtaining a search warrant ofthe Bet-Air premises. Pursuant to the search warrant, Parks and other lawenforcement officers seized numerous documents and other records from Bet-Air’spremises.PROCEDURAL HISTORYIn August, 1990, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned afourteen count indictment against Hall and several codefendants. In April, 1991,Hall moved to suppress all evidence derived from the warrantless search of thegarbage dumpster and all evidence seized during the search pursuant to a warrantof the Bet-Air premises.[1] The magistrate judge found that Bet-Air had a”substantially reduced expectation of privacy in the roadway and surrounding area,including the garbage dumpster” and, therefore, recommended that the motion tosuppress be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report andrecommendation. Following a jury trial, Hall was convicted as charged on allcounts of the indictment and sentenced to a term of fifty-one months imprisonmentas to each of the fourteen counts, the sentences to run concurrently with eachother. Hall appeals.ISSUESIn this appeal, Hall raises the following claims: (1) the district court erred indenying his motion to suppress documents and records seized pursuant to theexecution of a search warrant where the probable cause for the warrant wasobtained through a warrantless search of a dumpster located in Bet-Air’s”curtilage”; (2) the prosecutor’s closing remarks were improper and prejudicial;and, (3) the district court improperly exercised its sentencing discretion in applyingthe Sentencing Guidelines to a pre-Guidelines case.CONTENTIONSHall contends that Bet-Air had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shreddeddocuments. He argues that Bet-Air took at least four affirmative measures tosafeguard its privacy interest in the documents: the documents were shredded; thedocuments were sealed inside a green garbage bag; the green garbage bag wasplaced inside an enclosed garbage dumpster; and the garbage dumpster waswithin the “commercial curtilage” adjacent to Bet-Air offices forty yards from publicproperty. Hall also argues that Parks’s entry onto Bet-Air’s premises constitutedunauthorized entry onto private property.The government contends that Bet-Air’s subjective expectation of privacy in itsgarbage was not objectively reasonable because the company did not take stepsto limit the public’s access to the dumpster. Additionally, *1094 the governmentcontends that at the time of the entry, Agent Parks believed the road leading toBet-Air’s premises to be a public road.1094DISCUSSIONA. Suppression Motion

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a mixedquestion of law and fact. United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1254 (11thCir.1990). The findings of fact are viewed under the clearly erroneous standard,and the district court’s application of the law to those facts is subject to de novoreview. Wilson, 894 F.2d at 1254. The facts are to be construed in the light mostfavorable to the party who prevailed below. Wilson, 894 F.2d at 1254.In California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988),the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search and seizure of garbage left in aplastic bag on the curb in front of, but outside the curtilage of, a private house didnot violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court, relying on Katz v. United States,389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J.,concurring), held that such a search would only violate the Fourth Amendment ifthe persons discarding the garbage manifested a subjective expectation of privacyin their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable. Greenwood, 486U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. at 1628.In Greenwood, law enforcement officials had on two separate occasions asked theneighborhood’s regular trash collector to pick up and turn over to them the plasticgarbage bags which had been left on the curb in front of the house in whichGreenwood lived. The officers’ search of the garbage turned up items consistentwith narcotics use. These items formed the basis for affidavits in support ofwarrants to search Greenwood’s home. The police discovered narcotics in bothsearches, and Greenwood subsequently moved to suppress the evidence as fruitsof warrantless searches. The Court found that by disposing of the garbage inopaque plastic bags, Greenwood demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacyin the discarded garbage. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. TheCourt concluded, however, that Greenwood had exposed his garbage to the publicsufficiently to render his subjective expectation of privacy objectivelyunreasonable. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628.As support for his assertion that Bet-Air’s expectation of privacy in its discardedgarbage was objectively reasonable, Hall points to the fact that Parks obtaineddocuments that were shredded, then placed inside a green garbage bag, whichwas in turn placed inside a garbage dumpster. We believe that the manner inwhich Bet-Air disposed of its garbage serves only to demonstrate that Bet-Airmanifested a subjective expectation of privacy in its discarded garbage. SeeGreenwood, 486 U.S. at 39, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. Whether Park’s actions wereproscribed by the Fourth Amendment, however, turns on whether society isprepared to accept Bet-Air’s subjective expectation of privacy as objectivelyreasonable. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628.The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches andseizures. …” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is well established that the FourthAmendment protections apply to commercial premises. “The businessman, like theoccupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business freefrom unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.” See v.Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1739, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). TheFourth Amendment, moreover, “protects people, not places.” Katz, 389 U.S. at351, 88 S.Ct. at 511. Thus, whether the Fourth Amendment’s protections areinvoked to protect the sanctity of the home or of commercial property, thetouchstone of the inquiry into the objective reasonableness of an expectation ofprivacy is whether the governmental intrusion infringes upon the personal andsocietal values the Fourth Amendment protects. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]*1095 170, 182-83, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1743-44, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984).[2]1095The fact that the test of the legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is the same inboth the residential and commercial sphere does not mean, however, that thefactors which tend to be of probative value in resolving the inquiry when thegovernmental intrusion involves a residence, are to be accorded the same weightwhen the inquiry is directed at the legitimacy of a privacy expectation incommercial property. The Supreme Court’s treatment of the expectation of privacythat the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property has differedsignificantly from the protection accorded an individual’s home. Donovan v.Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981).[3]Such distinctions are inevitable given the fundamental difference in the nature anduses of a residence as opposed to commercial property. These distinctions aredrawn into sharp focus when, as in this case, the government intrudes into thearea immediately surrounding the structure. In order for persons to preserveFourth Amendment protection in the area immediately surrounding the residence,they must not conduct an activity or leave an object in the plain view of thoseoutside the area. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316, 107 S.Ct. 1134,1147, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The occupant of acommercial building, in contrast, must take the additional precaution ofaffirmatively barring the public from the area. The Supreme Court has consistentlyheld that the government is required to obtain a search warrant only when itwishes to search those areas of commercial property from which the public hasbeen excluded. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 316, 107 S.Ct. at 1147 (Brennan, J.,dissenting); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S.Ct. at 1740.Whether Bet-Air’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable,that is, whether Park’s actions infringed on any societal values the FourthAmendment protected, requires, we believe, an inquiry into the nature of theprivacy interest asserted and the extent of governmental intrusion. The SupremeCourt’s teachings in Greenwood will guide our inquiry.Relying on the fact that the dumpster was within the “commercial curtilage” of Bet-Air’s property and that it could only be accessed by traveling forty yards on aprivate road, Hall asserts that the company’s subjective expectation of privacy wasobjectively reasonable. Hall’s argument has two parts: Parks’s trespass ontoprivate property and the dumpster’s proximity to Bet-Air’s offices.The dumpster’s location on Bet-Air’s private property does not contributesignificantly to a finding that the company’s expectation of privacy was objectivelyreasonable. Hall’s heavy emphasis on Parks’s trespass onto Bet-Air’s privateproperty is misplaced. The law of trespass forbids intrusions onto *1096 land thatthe Fourth Amendment would not proscribe. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S.Ct.at 1743. We note that although the road leading to Bet-Air’s dumpster was private,the magistrate judge found that no “objective signs of restricted access such assigns, barricades, and the like” were present. Moreover, the magistrate judge alsofound that at the time Parks travelled the road, he believed it was a public road.Hall has not come forth with any evidence disputing Parks’ assertion. We also notethat the Supreme Court has long since uncoupled the application of the FourthAmendment’s protections from the common law doctrine of trespass. The FourthAmendment’s reach does not turn upon the mere presence or absence of physicalintrusion into an enclosure. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct. at 512.[4] “Theexistence of a property right is but one element in determining whetherexpectations of privacy are legitimate.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183, 104 S.Ct. at 1744;1096

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, n. 12, 58L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (noting that “even a property interest in premises may not besufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particularitems located on the premises or activity conducted thereon”).As we noted earlier, the owner of commercial property has a reasonableexpectation of privacy in those areas immediately surrounding the property only ifaffirmative steps have been taken to exclude the public. Greenwood, moreover,demonstrates that one indicator of the objective reasonableness of an expectationof privacy in discarded garbage is the degree to which persons expose theirgarbage to the public. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. We do notread Greenwood as measuring the degree of exposure only through reference tothat which is in plain view. In Greenwood, the Supreme Court considered theextent to which the public had been afforded access to the discarded trash.Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. Admittedly, the Court, inGreenwood, was not faced with an intrusion onto private property. As we havealready demonstrated, however, the probative value of the fact that the dumpsterwas located in the area immediately surrounding Bet-Air’s property is substantiallyattenuated due to the lack of any evidence that Bet-Air took steps to exclude thepublic. Hall argues that the government has not demonstrated that the generalpublic was invited onto Bet-Air’s private property. We do not believe this is theappropriate inquiry when an expectation of privacy is asserted in the areaimmediately surrounding a commercial building. Rather, the Supreme Court hasconsistently stated that a commercial proprietor has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy only in those areas where affirmative steps have been taken to exclude thepublic. Cf. Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Colo. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S.861, 865, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 2115, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974). This failure to exclude thepublic takes on increased significance when the asserted expectation of privacy isin discarded garbage. The common knowledge that garbage left on the side of apublic street is “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops andother members of the public” renders an expectation of Fourth Amendmentprotection unjustified. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. Acommercial proprietor incurs a similarly diminished expectation of privacy whengarbage is placed in a dumpster which is located in a parking lot that the businessshares with other businesses, and no steps are taken to limit the public’s access tothe dumpster. It is common knowledge that commercial dumpsters have long beena source of fruitful exploration for scavengers.Hall’s other arguments in support of the objective reasonableness of Bet-Air’sexpectation *1097 of privacy are unpersuasive. They can be reduced to theassertion that the dumpster was located within the “commercial curtilage” of Bet-Air’s property and that a private garbage collection company collected thegarbage.1097″The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediatelysurrounding a dwelling house….” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 107 S.Ct. at 1139. Theconcept of curtilage plays a part in determining the reach of the FourthAmendment’s protections. The Supreme Court used the concept of curtilage inHester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924), todistinguish between the area outside a person’s house which the FourthAmendment protects, and the open fields, which are afforded no FourthAmendment protection. In general, the curtilage is defined as the area around thehome which “harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and theprivacies of the home.” Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 n. 4,107 S.Ct. at 1140 n. 4.

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]Whether the Fourth Amendment protects privacy interests within the curtilage of adwelling house depends on four factors: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to becurtilage to the home; (2) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; (3)whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; and, (4)the steps the resident takes to protect the area from observation. Dunn, 480 U.S.at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1139. The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed theapplicability of the common law concept of curtilage to commercial property. Giventhe Court’s view of the relationship between the Fourth Amendment andcommercial premises, however, we have little doubt that were the Court toembrace the so-called “business curtilage” concept, it would, at a minimum,require that the commercial proprietor take affirmative steps to exclude the public.Such a requirement is apparently foreordained through a long line of casebeginning with See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943(1967). In light of Bet-Air’s failure to exclude the public from the area immediatelysurrounding its offices, we refuse to apply the so-called “business curtilage”concept in this case.Hall also attempts to distinguish this case from Greenwood, pointing out that aprivate collector handled Bet-Air’s garbage. In Greenwood, the Court found thatthe reasonableness of the expectation of privacy was further diminished due to thefact that a garbage collector handled the garbage. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40,108 S.Ct. at 1628. Hall argues that a conveyance of garbage to a private garbagecollector increases the objective reasonableness of Bet-Air’s expectation ofprivacy. We do not read Greenwood as attributing any weight to such a distinction.Rather, the Court’s reliance on the garbage’s conveyance to the garbage collectoris properly read as one more example of the fact that a third party was affordedaccess to the discarded garbage. The Court noted that the garbage collector mighthave sorted through the garbage or permitted others, including the police, to do so.Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 1628. We fail to see how contracting witha private garbage collection service diminishes the probative value of the fact thatthe garbage was conveyed to a third party. Presumably, both private and publicgarbage collectors are equally able to sort through the garbage they collect.Accordingly, we do not believe that Parks infringed upon any societal values theFourth Amendment protects when he searched Bet-Air’s garbage. Bet-Air did nottake sufficient steps to restrict the public’s access to its discarded garbage;therefore, its subjective expectation of privacy is not one that society is prepared toaccept as objectively reasonable.B. Prosecutorial MisconductDuring the trial, Hall attempted to contradict the government’s assertion that hesought to resell military parts when he incorrectly designated them for civilian use.In closing arguments, Hall’s lawyer stated that the testimony of a governmentwitness, a former Bet-Air employee, “was that Hall told [the government witness] toreturn the [restricted military parts], if she could, to the people that Bet-Air hadpurchased it from.” *1098 In the government’s rebuttal closing argument, theprosecutor stated:1098if [the jury] can find anywhere in this record … that [the governmentwitness] was told by Terry Hall to return the goods … I will faint righthere on this floor because it never happened.Hall’s lawyer objected immediately indicating that the transcript of the witness’stestimony contradicted the prosecutor’s assertion. At the side bar conference,

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]Hall’s lawyer presented the district court with a trial transcript which purportedlydemonstrated the inaccuracy of the prosecutor’s statements. Following the sidebar conference, the district court gave a curative instruction and sustained Hall’sobjection. The district court, complying with the prosecutor’s request, instructed thejury that the transcript of the government witness’s cross-examination testimonydid not support Hall’s lawyer’s assertion that the prosecutor had misstated theevidence. The district court also instructed the jury that[w]hat … the lawyers say is not evidence … and … you, of course, willrely upon your own individual and collective memories as to what wassaid and not said.Following the district court’s instruction, the prosecutor stated in his rebuttalclosing:I am telling you and you rely on your own recollection but I am tellingyou that Knowles never testified nor is there any evidence that Mr. Halltold her to return those goods.Hall argues that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the prosecutor’sclosing statements misstated the evidence and injected the prosecutor’s owncredibility into the trial. Furthermore, Hall contends the district court’s curativeinstruction exacerbated the error and confirmed the prosecutor’s misstatements,thereby prejudicing the jury against him. The government contends that Hall’slawyer contributed to the district court’s “misstatement” when he provided the courtwith the wrong transcript of the government witness’s testimony. Additionally, thegovernment claims the evidence fully supported the prosecutor’s remarks and thatthe witness’s testimony did not support the inference Hall sought to draw.A prosecutor’s statement justifies the reversal of a conviction if it “undermined thefairness of the trial and contributed to a miscarriage of justice.” United States v.Obregon, 893 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir.1990). This court applies a two-part testto claims of prosecutorial misconduct: the challenged statements must beimproper, and must have prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights.Obregon, 893 F.2d at 1310. A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudiciallyaffected when a reasonable probability arises that, but for the remarks, theoutcome would be different. Kennedy v. Dugger, 933 F.2d 905, 914 (11thCir.1991). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are fact specific inquiries whichmust be conducted against the backdrop of the entire record. Obregon, 893 F.2dat 1310. Our review of this record convinces us that the prosecutor’s statementsdid not undermine the fairness of the trial and did not contribute to a miscarriage ofjustice.At the time Hall’s lawyer made the objection, he had in his possession a transcriptof the cross-examination of the government’s witness rather than her redirecttestimony which, in fact, contained the language that allegedly would havesupported his objection. We have reviewed the witness’s redirect testimony andfind it ambiguous. We cannot say that it clearly supports the inference that eitherthe government or Hall sought to attach to it. Given this ambiguity, the prosecutor’sremarks were not improper. We also do not believe that the prosecutor’s remarksserved to inject his credibility into the trial. Finally, we find no error in the districtcourt’s curative instruction. The district court instructed the jury that the witness’stestimony was not in the cross-examination transcript. This statement was entirelyaccurate: the disputed testimony was in the redirect transcript. We note, moreover,that any confusion which might have existed was entirely attributable to Hall’s

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM]lawyer when he provided the district court with the wrong transcript.*1099 C. Sentencing1099Hall argues that the district court improperly applied the Sentencing Guidelines tothis pre-Guidelines case; therefore, it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I,Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution.We review a district court sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v.Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1298 (11th. Cir.1990). A sentence which falls within therange the statute provides generally will not be reviewed on appeal. Funt, 896 F.2dat 1298. The sentence the district court imposed was within the statutory limitsprovided for the crimes of which Hall was convicted.[5] The Guidelines were merelyone of several factors which the district court considered in imposing sentencing.Moreover, the district court on several occasions acknowledged that this was apre-Guidelines case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposingsentence.CONCLUSIONWe find no error in the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and theimposition of sentence, nor do we find any impropriety in the prosecutor’s closingstatements. Accordingly, Hall’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.AFFIRMED.[1] The government conceded that Hall had standing to bring the suppression motion.[2] Compare Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1819, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978)(noting that the Fourth Amendment’s protection of commercial property is based upon societal valuesthat have their roots in the origin of the Amendment) with Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100S.Ct. 1371, 1387, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s respect for the sanctityof the home is based on traditions firmly rooted in the origins of the Republic).[3] Donovan v. Dewey involved a federal mine inspector’s attempt, pursuant to a federal regulation, toconduct a warrantless inspection of a stone quarry. Relying on a line of cases which permits thewarrantless inspections of businesses which operate in a pervasively regulated industry, the Courtfound that the warrantless inspection provision of the regulation did not violate the Fourth Amendment.Warrantless inspections of businesses have been justified by the need to further urgent federalregulatory interest. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972)(warrantless inspection of gun dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (permitting warrantless search of retail liquor dealers if authorized byCongress). This deviation from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the area of pervasivelyregulated industries stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court’s historical view of the relationshipbetween the Fourth Amendment and the home. As then Justice Rehnquist noted, it is seriously doubtfulthat Congress could authorize Constitutionally permissible warrantless entries into private residences tofurther a strong interest in regulating a prohibited activity. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608,101 S.Ct. 2534, 2543, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).[4] By uncoupling the Fourth Amendment’s reach from traditional common law property interests theCourt undoubtedly sought to extend the Amendment’s coverage. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.347, 350, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (noting that the Fourth Amendment protectionsextends further and often have nothing to do with generalized notions of private property and, in anyevent, protection of property is left primarily to the law of the individual states). In so doing, the Courtestablished that a property interest is neither necessary nor sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendmentprotection. See also Brian J. Serr, Great Expectation of Privacy: A New Model For Fourth AmendmentProtection, 73 Minn.L.Rev. 583, 618 (1989).

US v. Hall, 47 F. 3d 1091 – Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1995 – Google Scholarhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=978439786591326423&q=United+States+v.+Hall,+47+F.3d+1091&hl=en&as_sdt=2006[11/3/2018 9:16:39 AM][5] Hall was sentenced to four years and three months in prison. Title 18 U.S.C. § 371, a violation ofwhich was charged in Count I, permits a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Title 18 U.S.C.§ 1001, violations of which were charged in Counts II, III, V through XI, XIII and XIV, permits amaximum sentence of five years imprisonment. Title 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778(b) and (c), violations of whichwere charged in Counts IV and XII, permits a maximum sentence of ten years of imprisonment.

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