Briefly describe what Mind-Body Dualism is.

1. Using the IEP reading (attached) , explain why Descartes believes that the Mind and Body are distinct.

2. Using the Princess of Bohemia reading, explain Elizabeth’s question regarding how the Mind and Body interact.

Separately from this also answer,

1. Briefly describe what Mind-Body Dualism is.

2. Briefly describe Behaviorism.

3. Briefly describe Identity Theory.

4. Briefly describe Machine Functionalism.

Requirements: Answer all questions in detail

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print1/13René Descartes:The Mind­Body DistinctionOne of the deepest and most lasting legacies of Descartes’ philosophy is histhesis that mind and body are really distinct—a thesis now called “mind­body dualism.” He reaches this conclusion by arguing that the nature of themind (that is, a thinking, non­extended thing) is completely different fromthat of the body (that is, an extended, non­thinking thing), and therefore it ispossible for one to exist without the other. This argument gives rise to thefamous problem of mind­body causal interaction still debated today: howcan the mind cause some of our bodily limbs to move (for example, raisingone’s hand to ask a question), and how can the body’s sense organs causesensations in the mind when their natures are completely different? Thisarticle examines these issues as well as Descartes’ own response to thisproblem through his brief remarks on how the mind is united with the bodyto form a human being. This will show how these issues arise because of a misconception about Descartes’theory of mind­body union, and how the correct conception of their union avoids this version of theproblem. The article begins with an examination of the term “real distinction” and of Descartes’ probablemotivations for maintaining his dualist thesis.Table of Contents1. What is a Real Distinction?2. Why a Real Distinction?a. The Religious Motivationb. The Scientific Motivation3. The Real Distinction Argumenta. The First Versionb. The Second Version4. The Mind­Body Problem5. Descartes’ Response to the Mind­Body Problem6. References and Further Readinga. Primary Sourcesb. Secondary Sources1. What is a Real Distinction?It is important to note that for Descartes “real distinction” is a technical term denoting the distinctionbetween two or more substances (see Principles, part I, section 60). A substance is something that does notrequire any other creature to exist—it can exist with only the help of God’s concurrence—whereas, a modeis a quality or affection of that substance (see Principles part I, section 5). Accordingly, a mode requires asubstance to exist and not just the concurrence of God. Being sphere shaped is a mode of an extendedsubstance. For example, a sphere requires an object extended in three dimensions in order to exist: anunextended sphere cannot be conceived without contradiction. But a substance can be understood to exist

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print2/13alone without requiring any other creature to exist. For example, a stone can exist all by itself. That is, itsexistence is not dependent upon the existence of minds or other bodies; and, a stone can exist withoutbeing any particular size or shape. This indicates for Descartes that God, if he chose, could create a worldconstituted by this stone all by itself, showing further that it is a substance “really distinct” from everythingelse except God. Hence, the thesis that mind and body are really distinct just means that each could exist allby itself without any other creature, including each other, if God chose to do it. However, this does notmean that these substances do exist separately. Whether or not they actually exist apart is another issueentirely.2. Why a Real Distinction?A question one might ask is: what’s the point of arguing that mind and body could each exist without theother? What’s the payoff for going through all the trouble and enduring all the problems to which it givesrise? For Descartes the payoff is twofold. The first is religious in nature in that it provides a rational basisfor a hope in the soul’s immortality [because Descartes presumes that the mind and soul are more or lessthe same thing]. The second is more scientifically oriented, for the complete absence of mentality from thenature of physical things is central to making way for Descartes’ version of the new, mechanistic physics.This section investigates both of these motivating factors.a. The Religious MotivationIn his Letter to the Sorbonne published at the beginning of his seminal work, Meditations on FirstPhilosophy, Descartes states that his purpose in showing that the human mind or soul is really distinctfrom the body is to refute those “irreligious people” who only have faith in mathematics and will not believein the soul’s immortality without a mathematical demonstration of it. Descartes goes on to explain how,because of this, these people will not pursue moral virtue without the prospect of an afterlife with rewardsfor virtue and punishments for vice. But, since all the arguments in the Meditations—including the realdistinction arguments— are for Descartes absolutely certain on a par with geometrical demonstrations, hebelieves that these people will be obliged to accept them. Hence, irreligious people will be forced to believein the prospect of an afterlife. However, recall that Descartes’ conclusion is only that the mind or soul canexist without the body. He stops short of demonstrating that the soul is actually immortal. Indeed, inthe Synopsis to the Mediations, Descartes claims only to have shown that the decay of the body does notlogically or metaphysically imply the destruction of the mind: further argumentation is required for theconclusion that the mind actually survives the body’s destruction. This would involve both “an account ofthe whole of physics” and an argument showing that God cannot annihilate the mind. Yet, even though thereal distinction argument does not go this far, it does, according to Descartes, provide a sufficientfoundation for religion, since the hope for an afterlife now has a rational basis and is no longer a merearticle of faith.b. The Scientific MotivationThe other motive for arguing that mind and body could each exist without the other is more scientificallyoriented, stemming from Descartes’ intended replacement of final causal explanations in physics thought tobe favored by late scholastic­Aristotelian philosophers with mechanistic explanations based on the model ofgeometry. Although the credit for setting the stage for this scholastic­Aristotelian philosophy dominant atDescartes’ time should go to Thomas Aquinas (because of his initial, thorough interpretation andappropriation of Aristotle’s philosophy), it is also important to bear in mind that other thinkers workingwithin this Aristotelian framework such as Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Francisco Suarez,diverged from the Thomistic position on a variety of important issues. Indeed, by Descartes’ time,scholastic positions divergent from Thomism became so widespread and subtle in their differences thatsorting them out was quite difficult. Notwithstanding this convoluted array of positions, Descartesunderstood one thesis to stand at the heart of the entire tradition: the doctrine that everything ultimatelybehaved for the sake of some end or goal. Though these “final causes,” as they were called, were not the

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print3/13only sorts of causes recognized by scholastic thinkers, it is sufficient for present purposes to recognize thatDescartes believed scholastic natural philosophers used them as principles for physical explanations. Forthis reason, a brief look at how final causes were supposed to work is in order.Descartes understood all scholastics to maintain that everything was thought to have a final cause that isthe ultimate end or goal for the sake of which the rest of the organism was organized. This principle oforganization became known as a thing’s “substantial form,” because it was this principle that explained whysome hunk of matter was arranged in such and such a way so as to be some species of substance. Forexample, in the case of a bird, say, the swallow, the substantial form of swallowness was thought to organizematter for the sake of being a swallow species of substance. Accordingly, any dispositions a swallow mighthave, such as the disposition for making nests, would then also be explained by means of this ultimate goalof being a swallow; that is, swallows are disposed for making nests for the sake of being a swallow species ofsubstance. This explanatory scheme was also thought to work for plants and inanimate natural objects.A criticism of the traditional employment of substantial forms and their concomitant final causes in physicsis found in the Sixth Replies where Descartes examines how the quality of gravity was used to explain abody’s downward motion:But what makes it especially clear that my idea of gravity was taken largely from the idea I had ofthe mind is the fact that I thought that gravity carried bodies toward the centre of the earth as if ithad some knowledge of the centre within itself (AT VII 442: CSM II 298).On this pre­Newtonian account, a characteristic goal of all bodies was to reach its proper place, namely, thecenter of the earth. So, the answer to the question, “Why do stones fall downward?” would be, “Becausethey are striving to achieve their goal of reaching the center of the earth.” According to Descartes, thisimplies that the stone must have knowledge of this goal, know the means to attain it, and know where thecenter of the earth is located. But, how can a stone know anything? Surely only minds can have knowledge.Yet, since stones are inanimate bodies without minds, it follows that they cannot know anything at all—letalone anything about the center of the earth.Descartes continues on to make the following point:But later on I made the observations which led me to make a careful distinction between the idea ofthe mind and the ideas of body and corporeal motion; and I found that all those other ideas of . . .’substantial forms’ which I had previously held were ones which I had put together or constructedfrom those basic ideas (AT VII 442­3: CSM II 298).Here, Descartes is claiming that the concept of a substantial form as part of the entirely physical worldstems from a confusion of the ideas of mind and body. This confusion led people to mistakenly ascribemental properties like knowledge to entirely non­mental things like stones, plants, and, yes, even non­human animals. The real distinction of mind and body can then also be used to alleviate this confusion andits resultant mistakes by showing that bodies exist and move as they do without mentality, and as suchprinciples of mental causation such as goals, purposes (that is, final causes), and knowledge have no role toplay in the explanation of physical phenomena. So the real distinction of mind and body also serves themore scientifically oriented end of eliminating any element of mentality from the idea of body. In this way,a clear understanding of the geometrical nature of bodies can be achieved and better explanations obtained.3. The Real Distinction ArgumentDescartes formulates this argument in many different ways, which has led many scholars to believe thereare several different real distinction arguments. However, it is more accurate to consider theseformulations as different versions of one and the same argument. The fundamental premise of each isidentical: each has the fundamental premise that the natures of mind and body are completely differentfrom one another.

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print4/13The First VersionThe first version is found in this excerpt from the Sixth Meditation:[O]n the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non­extended thing [that is, a mind], and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far asthis is simply an extended, non­thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinctfrom my body, and can exist without it (AT VII 78: CSM II 54).Notice that the argument is given from the first person perspective (as are the entire Meditations). This “I”is, of course, Descartes insofar as he is a thinking thing or mind, and the argument is intended to work forany “I” or mind. So, for present purposes, it is safe to generalize the argument by replacing “I” with “mind”in the relevant places:1. I have a clear and distinct idea of the mind as a thinking, non­extended thing.2. I have a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended, non­thinking thing.3. Therefore, the mind is really distinct from the body and can exist without it.At first glance it may seem that, without justification, Descartes is bluntly asserting that he conceives ofmind and body as two completely different things, and that from his conception, he is inferring that he (orany mind) can exist without the body. But this is no blunt, unjustified assertion. Much more is at workhere: most notably what is at work is his doctrine of clear and distinct ideas and their veridical guarantee.Indeed the truth of his intellectual perception of the natures of mind and body is supposed to be guaranteedby the fact that this perception is “clear and distinct.” Since the justification for these two premises restssquarely on the veridical guarantee of whatever is “clearly and distinctly” perceived, a brief side tripexplaining this doctrine is in order.Descartes explains what he means by a “clear and distinct idea” in his work Principles of Philosophy at partI, section 45. Here he likens a clear intellectual perception to a clear visual perception. So, just as someonemight have a sharply focused visual perception of something, an idea is clear when it is in sharp intellectualfocus. Moreover, an idea is distinct when, in addition to being clear, all other ideas not belonging to it arecompletely excluded from it. Hence, Descartes is claiming in both premises that his idea of the mind andhis idea of the body exclude all other ideas that do not belong to them, including each other, and all thatremains is what can be clearly understood of each. As a result, he clearly and distinctly understands themind all by itself, separately from the body, and the body all by itself, separately from the mind.According to Descartes, his ability to clearly and distinctly understand them separately from one anotherimplies that each can exist alone without the other. This is because “[e]xistence is contained in the idea orconcept of every single thing, since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing. Possible orcontingent existence is contained in the concept of a limited thing…” (AT VII 166: CSM II 117). Descartes,then, clearly and distinctly perceives the mind as possibly existing all by itself, and the body as possiblyexisting all by itself. But couldn’t Descartes somehow be mistaken about his clear and distinct ideas? Giventhe existence of so many non­thinking bodies like stones, there is no question that bodies can exist withoutminds. So, even if he could be mistaken about what he clearly and distinctly understands, there is otherevidence in support of premise 2. But can minds exist without bodies? Can thinking occur without a brain?If the answer to this question is “no,” the first premise would be false and, therefore, Descartes would bemistaken about one of his clear and distinct perceptions. Indeed, since we have no experience of mindsactually existing without bodies as we do of bodies actually existing without minds, the argument will standonly if Descartes’ clear and distinct understanding of the mind’s nature somehow guarantees the truth ofpremise 1; but, at this point, it is not evident whether Descartes’ “clear and distinct” perception guaranteesthe truth of anything.However, in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes goes to great lengths to guarantee the truth of whatever isclearly and distinctly understood. This veridical guarantee is based on the theses that God exists and that

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print5/13he cannot be a deceiver. These arguments, though very interesting, are numerous and complex, and so theywill not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that since Descartes believes he has established God’s inability todeceive with absolute, geometrical certainty, he would have to consider anything contradicting thisconclusion to be false. Moreover, Descartes claims that he cannot help but believe clear and distinct ideasto be true. However, if God put a clear and distinct idea in him that was false, then he could not help butbelieve a falsehood to be true and, to make matters worse, he would never be able to discover the mistake.Since God would be the author of this false clear and distinct idea, he would be the source of the error andwould, therefore, be a deceiver, which must be false. Hence, all clear and distinct ideas must be true,because it is impossible for them to be false given God’s non­deceiving nature.That said, the clarity and distinctness of Descartes’ understanding of mind and body guarantees the truth ofpremise 1. Hence, both “clear and distinct” premises are not blunt, unjustified assertions of what hebelieves but have very strong rational support from within Descartes’ system. However, if it turns out thatGod does not exist or that he can be a deceiver, then all bets are off. There would then no longer be anyveridical guarantee of what is clearly and distinctly understood and, as a result, the first premise could befalse. Consequently, premise 1 would not bar the possibility of minds requiring brains to exist and,therefore, this premise would not be absolutely certain as Descartes supposed. In the end, the conclusion isestablished with absolute certainty only when considered from within Descartes’ own epistemologicalframework but loses its force if that framework turns out to be false or when evaluated from outside of it.These guaranteed truths express some very important points about Descartes’ conception of mind andbody. Notice that mind and body are defined as complete opposites. This means that the ideas of mind andbody represent two natures that have absolutely nothing in common. And, it is this complete diversity thatestablishes the possibility of their independent existence. But, how can Descartes make a legitimateinference from his independent understanding of mind and body as completely different things to theirindependent existence? To answer this question, recall that every idea of limited or finite things containsthe idea of possible or contingent existence, and so Descartes is conceiving mind and body as possiblyexisting all by themselves without any other creature. Since there is no doubt about this possibility forDescartes and given the fact that God is all powerful, it follows that God could bring into existence a mindwithout a body and vice versa just as Descartes clearly and distinctly understands them. Hence, the powerof God makes Descartes’ perceived logical possibility of minds existing without bodies into a metaphysicalpossibility. As a result, minds without bodies and bodies without minds would require nothing besidesGod’s concurrence to exist and, therefore, they are two really distinct substances.The Second VersionThe argument just examined is formulated in a different way later in the Sixth Meditation:[T]here is a great difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is by its verynature always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I consider the mind, ormyself in so far as I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself;I understand myself to be something quite single and complete….By contrast, there is no corporealor extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and thisvery fact makes me understand that it is divisible. This one argument would be enough to show methat the mind is completely different from the body…. (AT VII 86­87: CSM II 59).This argument can be reformulated as follows, replacing “mind” for “I” as in the first version:1. I understand the mind to be indivisible by its very nature.2. I understand body to be divisible by its very nature.3. Therefore, the mind is completely different from the body.Notice the conclusion that mind and body are really distinct is not explicitly stated but can be inferred from3. What is interesting about this formulation is how Descartes reaches his conclusion. He does not assert a

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print6/13clear and distinct understanding of these two natures as completely different but instead makes his pointbased on a particular property of each. However, this is not just any property but a property each has “by itsvery nature.” Something’s nature is just what it is to be that kind of thing, and so the term “nature” is herebeing used as synonymous with “essence.” On this account, extension constitutes the nature or essence ofbodily kinds of things; while thinking constitutes the nature or essence of mental kinds of things. So, hereDescartes is arguing that a property of what it is to be a body, or extended thing, is to be divisible, while aproperty of what it is to be a mind or thinking thing is to be indivisible.Descartes’ line of reasoning in support of these claims about the respective natures of mind and body runsas follows. First, it is easy to see that bodies are divisible. Just take any body, say a pencil or a piece ofpaper, and break it or cut it in half. Now you have two bodies instead of one. Second, based on this line ofreasoning, it is easy to see why Descartes believed his nature or mind to be indivisible: if a mind or an “I”could be divided, then two minds or “I’s” would result; but since this “I” just is my self, this would be thesame as claiming that the division of my mind results in two selves, which is absurd. Therefore, the body isessentially divisible and the mind is essentially indivisible: but how does this lead to the conclusion thatthey are completely different?Here it should be noted that a difference in just any non­essential property would have only shown thatmind and body are not exactly the same. But this is a much weaker claim than Descartes’ conclusion thatthey are completely different. For two things could have the same nature, for example, extension, but haveother, changeable properties or modes distinguishing them. Hence, these two things would be different insome respect, for example, in shape, but not completely different, since both would still be extended kindsof things. Consequently, Descartes needs their complete diversity to claim that he has completelyindependent conceptions of each and, in turn, that mind and body can exist independently of one another.Descartes can reach this stronger conclusion because these essential properties are contradictories. On theone hand, Descartes argues that the mind is indivisible because he cannot perceive himself as having anyparts. On the other hand, the body is divisible because he cannot think of a body except as having parts.Hence, if mind and body had the same nature, it would be a nature both with and without parts. Yet such athing is unintelligible: how could something both be separable into parts and yet not separable into parts?The answer is that it can’t, and so mind and body cannot be one and the same but two completely differentnatures. Notice that, as with the first version, mind and body are here being defined as opposites. Thisimplies that divisible body can be understood without indivisible mind and vice versa. Accordingly each canbe understood as existing all by itself: they are two really distinct substances.However, unlike the first version, Descartes does not invoke the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas tojustify his premises. If he had, this version, like the first, would be absolutely certain from within Descartes’own epistemological system. But if removed from this apparatus, it is possible that Descartes is mistakenabout the indivisibility of the mind, because the possibility of the mind requiring a brain to exist would stillbe viable. This would mean that, since extension is part of the nature of mind, it would, being an extendedthing, be composed of parts and, therefore, it would be divisible. As a result, Descartes could notlegitimately reach the conclusion that mind and body are completely different. This would also mean thatthe further, implicit conclusion that mind and body are really distinct could not be reached either. In theend, the main difficulty with Descartes’ real distinction argument is that he has not adequately eliminatedthe possibility of minds being extended things like brains.4. The Mind­Body ProblemThe real distinction of mind and body based on their completely diverse natures is the root of the famousmind­body problem: how can these two substances with completely different natures causally interact so asto give rise to a human being capable of having voluntary bodily motions and sensations? Although severalversions of this problem have arisen over the years, this section will be exclusively devoted to the version ofit Descartes confronted as expressed by Pierre Gassendi, the author of the Fifth Objections, and Descartes’

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print7/13correspondent, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Their concern arises from the claim at the heart of the realdistinction argument that mind and body are completely different or opposite things.The complete diversity of their respective natures has serious consequences for the kinds of modes each canpossess. For instance, in the Second Meditation, Descartes argues that he is nothing but a thinking thing ormind, that is, Descartes argues that he is a “thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, isunwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (AT VII 28: CSM II 19). It makes no sense toascribe such modes to entirely extended, non­thinking things like stones, and therefore, only minds canhave these kinds of modes. Conversely, it makes no sense to ascribe modes of size, shape, quantity andmotion to non­extended, thinking things. For example, the concept of an unextended shape isunintelligible. Therefore, a mind cannot be understood to be shaped or in motion, nor can a bodyunderstand or sense anything. Human beings, however, are supposed to be combinations of mind and bodysuch that the mind’s choices can cause modes of motion in the body, and motions in certain bodily organs,such as the eye, cause modes of sensation in the mind.The mind’s ability to cause motion in the body will be addressed first. Take for example a voluntary choice,or willing, to raise one’s hand in class to ask a question. The arm moving upward is the effect while thechoice to raise it is the cause. But willing is a mode of the non­extended mind alone, whereas the arm’smotion is a mode of the extended body alone: how can the non­extended mind bring about this extendedeffect? It is this problem of voluntary bodily motion or the so­called problem of “mind to body causation”that so troubled Gassendi and Elizabeth. The crux of their concern was that in order for one thing to causemotion in another, they must come into contact with one another as, for example, in the game of pool thecue ball must be in motion and come into contact with the eight­ball in order for the latter to be set inmotion. The problem is that, in the case of voluntarily bodily movements, contact between mind and bodywould be impossible given the mind’s non­extended nature. This is because contact must be between twosurfaces, but surface is a mode of body, as stated at Principles of Philosophy part II, section 15.Accordingly, the mind does not have a surface that can come into contact with the body and cause it tomove. So, it seems that if mind and body are completely different, there is no intelligible explanation ofvoluntary bodily movement.Although Gassendi and Elizabeth limited themselves to the problem of voluntary bodily movement, asimilar problem arises for sensations, or the so­called problem of “body to mind causation.” For instance, avisual sensation of a tree is a mode of the mind alone. The cause of this mode would be explained by themotion of various imperceptible bodies causing parts of the eye to move, then movements in the opticnerve, which in turn cause various “animal spirits” to move in the brain and finally result in the sensoryidea of the tree in the mind. But how can the movement of the “animal spirits,” which were thought to bevery fine bodies, bring about the existence of a sensory idea when the mind is incapable of receiving modesof motion given its non­extended nature? Again, since the mind is incapable of having motion and asurface, no intelligible explanation of sensations seems possible either. Therefore, the completely differentnatures of mind and body seem to render their causal interaction impossible.The consequences of this problem are very serious for Descartes, because it undermines his claim to have aclear and distinct understanding of the mind without the body. For humans do have sensations andvoluntarily move some of their bodily limbs and, if Gassendi and Elizabeth are correct, this requires asurface and contact. Since the mind must have a surface and a capacity for motion, the mind must also beextended and, therefore, mind and body are not completely different. This means the “clear and distinct”ideas of mind and body, as mutually exclusive natures, must be false in order for mind­body causalinteraction to occur. Hence, Descartes has not adequately established that mind and body are two reallydistinct substances.5. Descartes’ Response to the Mind­Body ProblemDespite the obviousness of this problem, and the amount of attention given to it, Descartes himself never

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print8/13took this issue very seriously. His response to Gassendi is a telling example:These questions presuppose amongst other things an explanation of the union between the soul andthe body, which I have not yet dealt with at all. But I will say, for your benefit at least, that the wholeproblem contained in such questions arises simply from a supposition that is false and cannot inany way be proved, namely that, if the soul and the body are two substances whose nature isdifferent, this prevents them from being able to act on each other (AT VII 213: CSM II 275).So, Descartes’ response to the mind­body problem is twofold. First, Descartes contends that a response tothis question presupposes an explanation of the union between the mind (or soul) and the body. Second,Descartes claims that the question itself stems from the false presupposition that two substances withcompletely different natures cannot act on each other. Further examination of these two points will occur inreverse order.Descartes’ principles of causation put forward in the Third Meditation lie at the heart of this secondpresupposition. The relevant portion of this discussion is when Descartes argues that the less real cannotcause something that is more real, because the less real does not have enough reality to bring aboutsomething more real than itself. This principle applies on the general level of substances and modes. Onthis account, an infinite substance, that is, God, is the most real thing because only he requires nothing elsein order to exist; created, finite substances are next most real, because they require only God’s creative andconservative activity in order to exist; and finally, modes are the least real, because they require a createdsubstance and an infinite substance in order to exist. So, on this principle, a mode cannot cause theexistence of a substance since modes are less real than finite substances. Similarly, a created, finitesubstance cannot cause the existence of an infinite substance. But a finite substance can cause the existenceof another finite substance or a mode (since modes are less real than substances). Hence, Descartes’ pointcould be that the completely diverse natures of mind and body do not violate this causal principle, sinceboth are finite substances causing modes to exist in some other finite substance. This indicates further thatthe “activity” of the mind on the body does not require contact and motion, thereby suggesting that mindand body do not bear a mechanistic causal relation to each other. More will be said about this below.The first presupposition concerns an explanation of how the mind is united with the body. Descartes’remarks about this issue are scattered across both his published works and his private correspondence.These texts indicate that Descartes did not maintain that voluntary bodily movements and sensation arisebecause of the causal interaction of mind and body by contact and motion. Rather, he maintains a versionof the form­matter theory of soul­body union endorsed by some of his scholastic­Aristotelian predecessorsand contemporaries. Although a close analysis of the texts in question cannot be conducted here, a briefsummary of how this theory works for Descartes can be provided.Before providing this summary, however, it is important to disclaim that this scholastic­Aristotelianinterpretation is a minority position amongst Descartes scholars. The traditional view maintains thatDescartes’ human being is composed of two substances that causally interact in a mechanistic fashion. Thistraditional view led some of Descartes’ successors, such as Malebranche and Leibniz (who also believed inthe real distinction of mind and body), to devise metaphysical systems wherein mind and body do notcausally interact despite appearances to the contrary. Other philosophers considered the mind­bodyproblem to be insurmountable, thereby denying their real distinction: they claim that everything is eitherextended (as is common nowadays) or mental (as George Berkeley argued in the 18th century). Indeed, thistraditional, mechanistic interpretation of Descartes is so deeply ingrained in the minds of philosopherstoday, that most do not even bother to argue for it. However, a notable exception is Marleen Rozemond,who argues for the incompatibility of Descartes’ metaphysics with any scholastic­Aristotelian version ofmind or soul­body union. Those interested in closely examining her arguments should consult herbook Descartes’s Dualism. A book arguing in favor of the scholastic­Aristotelian interpretation isentitled Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature; Chapter 5 specifically addresses Rozemond’sconcerns.

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print9/13Two major stumbling blocks Rozemond raises for the scholastic­Aristotelian interpretation concern themind’s status as a substantial form and the extent to which Descartes can maintain a form of the humanbody. However, recall that Descartes rejects substantial forms because of their final causal component.Descartes’ argument was based on the fact (as he understood it) that the scholastics were ascribing mentalproperties to entirely non­mental things like stones. Since the mind is an entirely mental thing, thesearguments just do not apply to it. Hence, Descartes’ particular rejection of substantial forms does notnecessarily imply that Descartes did not view the mind as a substantial form. Indeed, as Paul Hoffmannoted:Descartes really rejects the attempt to use the human soul as a model for explanations in the entirelyphysical world. This makes it possible that Descartes considered the human mind to be the only substantialform. At first glance this may seem ad hoc but it is also important to notice that rejecting the existence ofsubstantial forms with the exception of the mind or rational soul was not uncommon amongst Descartes’contemporaries.Although the mind’s status as a substantial form may seem at risk because of its meager explicit textualsupport, Descartes suggests that the mind a “substantial form” twice in a draft of open letter to his enemyVoetius:Yet, if the soul is recognized as merely a substantial form, while other such forms consist in theconfiguration and motion of parts, this very privileged status it has compared with other formsshows that its nature is quite different from theirs (AT III 503: CSMK 207­208).Descartes then remarks “this is confirmed by the example of the soul, which is the true substantial form ofman” (AT III 508: CSMK 208). Although other passages do not make this claim explicitly, they do imply (insome sense) that the mind is a substantial form. For instance, Descartes claims in a letter to Mesland dated9 February 1645, that the soul is “substantially united” with the human body (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). This“substantial union” was a technical term amongst the scholastics denoting the union between a substantialform and matter to form a complete substance. Consequently, there is some reason for believing that thehuman mind is the only substantial form left standing in Descartes’ metaphysics.Another major stumbling block recognized by Rozemond is the extent to which, if any, Descartes’metaphysics can maintain a principle for organizing extension into a human body. This was a point of somecontroversy amongst the scholastics themselves. Philosophers maintaining a Thomistic position arguedthat the human soul is the human body’s principle of organization. While others, maintaining a basicallyScotistic position, argued that some other form besides the human soul is the form of the body. This “formof corporeity” organizes matter for the sake of being a human body but does not result in a full­fledgedhuman being. Rather it makes a body with the potential for union with the human soul. The soul thenactualizes this potential resulting in a complete human being. If Descartes did hold a fundamentallyscholastic theory of mind­body union, then is it more Thomistic or Scotistic? Since intellect and will are theonly faculties of the mind, it does not have the faculty for organizing matter for being a human body. So, ifDescartes’ theory is scholastic, it must be most in line with some version of the Scotistic theory. Rozemondargues that Descartes’ rejection of all other substantial forms (except the human mind or soul) precludesthis kind of theory since he cannot appeal to the doctrine of substantial forms like the Scotists.Although Descartes argues that bodies, in the general sense, are constituted by extension, he also maintainsthat species of bodies are determined by the configuration and motion of their parts. This doctrine of“configuration and motion of parts” serves the same purpose as the doctrine of substantial forms withregards to entirely physical things. But the main difference between the two is that Descartes’ doctrine doesnot employ final causes. Recall that substantial forms organize matter for the purpose of being a species ofthing. The purpose of a human body endowed with only the form of corporeity is union with the soul.Hence, the organization of matter into a human body is an effect that is explained by the final cause orpurpose of being disposed for union. But, on Descartes’ account, the explanatory order would be reversed: a

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print10/13human body’s disposition for union is an effect resulting from the configuration and motion of parts. So,even though Descartes does not have recourse to substantial forms, he still has recourse to theconfiguration of matter and to the dispositions to which it gives rise, including “all the dispositions requiredto preserve that union” (AT IV 166: CSMK 243). Hence, on this account, Descartes gets what he needs,namely, Descartes gets a body properly configured for potential union with the mind, but without recourseto the scholastic notion of substantial forms with their final causal component.Another feature of this basically Scotistic position is that the soul and the body were considered incompletesubstances themselves, while their union results in one, complete substance. Surely Descartes maintainsthat mind and body are two substances but in what sense, if any, can they be considered incomplete?Descartes answers this question in the Fourth Replies. He argues that a substance may be complete insofaras it is a substance but incomplete insofar as it is referred to some other substance together with which itforms yet some third substance. This can be applied to mind and body as follows: the mind insofar as it is athinking thing is a complete substance, while the body insofar as it is an extended thing is a completesubstance, but each taken individually is only an incomplete human being.This account is repeated in the following excerpt from a letter to Regius dated December 1641:For there you said that the body and the soul, in relation to the whole human being, are incompletesubstances; and it follows from their being incomplete that what they constitute is a being throughitself (that is, an ens per se; AT III 460: CSMK 200).The technical sense of the term “being through itself” was intended to capture the fact that human beingsdo not require any other creature but only God’s concurrence to exist. Accordingly, a being through itself,or ens per se, is a substance. Also notice that the claim in the letter to Regius that two incompletesubstances together constitute a being through itself is reminiscent of Descartes’ remarks in the FourthReplies. This affinity between the two texts indicates that the union of mind and body results in onecomplete substance or being through itself. This just means that mind and body are the metaphysical parts(mind and body are incomplete substances in this respect) that constitute one, whole human being, whichis a complete substance in its own right. Hence, a human being is not the result of two substances causallyinteracting by means of contact and motion, as Gassendi and Elizabeth supposed, but rather they bear arelation of act and potency that results in one, whole and complete substantial human being.This sheds some light on why Descartes thought that an account of mind­body union would put Gassendi’sand Elizabeth’s concerns to rest: they misconceived the union of mind and body as a mechanical relationwhen in fact it is a relation of act and potency. This avoids Gassendi’s and Elizabeth’s version of thisproblem. This aversion is accomplished by the fact that modes of voluntary motion (and sensations, byextrapolation) should be ascribed to a whole human being and not to the mind or the body takenindividually. This is made apparent in a 21 May 1643 letter to Elizabeth where Descartes distinguishesbetween various “primitive notions.” The most general are the notions of being, number, duration, and soon, which apply to all conceivable things. He then goes on to distinguish the notions of mind and body:Then, as regards body in particular, we have only the notion of extension, which entails the notionsof shape and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion of thought, whichincludes the perceptions of the intellect and the inclinations of the will (AT III 665: CSMK 218).Here body and soul (or mind) are primitive notions and the notions of their respective modes are thenotions “entailed by” or “included in” these primitives. Descartes then discusses the primitive notion ofmind­body union:Lastly, as regards the soul and the body together, we have only the notion of their union, on whichdepends our notion of the soul’s power to move the body, and the body’s power to act on the souland cause its sensations and passions (AT III 665: CSMK 218).

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print11/13In light of the immediately preceding lines, this indicates that voluntary bodily movements and sensationsare not modes of the body alone, or the mind alone, but rather are modes of “the soul and the bodytogether.” This is at least partially confirmed in the following lines from Principles, part I, article 48:But we also experience within ourselves certain other things, which must not be referred either tothe mind alone or to the body alone. These arises, as will be made clear in the appropriate place,from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes, first, appetites likehunger and thirds; secondly, the emotions or passions . . . (AT VIIIA 23: CSM I 209).These texts indicate that the mind or soul is united with the body so as to give rise to another wholecomplete substance composed of these two metaphysical parts. And, moreover, this composite substancenow has the capacity for having modes of its own, namely, modes of voluntary bodily movement andsensation, which neither the mind nor the body can have individually. So, voluntary bodily movements arenot modes of the body alone caused by the mind, nor are sensations modes of the mind alone caused by thebody. Rather, both are modes of a whole and complete human being. On this account, it makes no sense toask how the non­extended mind can come into contact with the body to cause these modes. To ask thiswould be to get off on the wrong foot entirely, since contact between these two completely diversesubstances is not required for these modes to exist. Rather all that is necessary is for the mind to actualizethe potential in a properly disposed human body to form one, whole, human being to whom is attributedmodes of voluntary movement and sensation.Although the scholastic­Aristotelian interpretation avoids the traditional causal interaction problem basedon the requirements of contact and motion, it does run up against another version of that problem, namely,a problem of formal causation. This is a problem facing any scholastic­Aristotelian theory of mind or soul­body union where the soul is understood to be an immaterial substantial form. Recall that the immaterialmind or soul as substantial form is suppose to act on a properly disposed human body in order to result in afull­fledged human being. The problem of formal causal interaction is: how can an immaterial soulassubstantial form act on the potential in a material thing? Can any sense be made of the claim that a non­extended or immaterial things acts on anything? Descartes noticed in a letter to Regius (AT III 493: CSMK206) that the scholastics did not try to answer this question and so he and Regius need not either. Thelikely explanation of their silence is that the act­potency relation was considered absolutely fundamental toscholastic­Aristotelian philosophy and, therefore, it required no further explanation. So, in the end, even ifDescartes’ theory is as described here, it does not evade all the causal problems associated with unitingimmaterial souls or mind to their respective bodies. , However, if this proposed account is true, it helps tocast Descartes’ philosophy in a new light and to redirect the attention of scholars to the formal causalproblems involved.6. References and Further ReadingPrimary SourcesDescartes, Rene, Ouevres de Descartes, 11 vols., eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Vrin, 1974­1989.This is still the standard edition of all of Descartes’ works and correspondence in their original languages. Cited in the text as AT, volume,page.Descartes, Rene, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols., trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, DugaldMurdoch and Anthony Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984­1991This is the standard English translation of Descartes philosophical works and correspondence. Cited in the text as CSM or CSMK, volume,page.Secondary SourcesBroughton, Janet and Mattern, Ruth, “Reinterpreting Descartes on the Notion of the Union of Mind and Body,” Journal

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print12/13of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978), 23­32.A reinterpretation of the notion of mind­body union in the correspondence with Elizabeth, which addresses Radner’s interpretation of it.See below.Garber, Daniel, “Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should Have Told Elizabeth,” Southern Journal ofPhilosophy, Supp. 21 (1983), 15­32.Article addressing the issues of the primitive notions and how this theory should be used to explain mind­body causal interaction toElizabeth.Hoffman, Paul, “The Unity of Descartes’ Man,” The Philosophical Review 95 (1986), 339­369.Article arguing that Descartes’ theory of mind­body union is more in line with scholastic­Aristotelian theories of soul­body union thanpreviously supposed.Kenny, Anthony, Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy, New York: Random House, 1968. See especially chapters 4 and10.These chapters provide classic interpretations of the real distinction between mind and body and the mind­body problem.Mattern, Ruth, “Descartes’ Correspondence with Elizabeth Concerning both the Union and Distinction of Mind andBody” in Descartes: Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker, Baltimore: John Hopkins UniversityPress, 1978, 212­222.Short essay examining Descartes’ correspondence with Elizabeth on this issue and how it was supposed to direct her to a correctunderstanding of mind­body causal interaction.Radner, Daisie, “Descartes’ Notion of the Union of Mind and Body,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971), 159­170.This is the first article in Anglo­American scholarship to address the issue of mind­body union. It addresses several texts, including theletter to Elizabeth enumerating the primitive notions.Rozemond, Marleen, Descartes’s Dualism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.This book argues for a particular understanding of the real distinction between mind and body that would preclude Hoffman’s scholastic­Aristotelian account of their union.Skirry, Justin, Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, London and New York: Thoemmes­Continuum Press,2005.This book takes issue with Rozemond’s account of the mind­body union through a close re­examination of fundamental features ofDescartes’ metaphysics and by building on certain features of Hoffman’s account.Voss, Stephen, “Descartes: The End of Anthropology” in Reason, Will and Sensation, ed. John Cottingham, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994.This essay provides a close textual analysis of Descartes’ account of the union of mind and body on the supposition that he maintained aPlatonic rather than scholastic­Aristotelian theory of mind­body union.Williams, Bernard, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978. See especially chapter 4.This is another classic account of the mind­body relation in Descartes.Wilson, Margaret, Descartes, London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.Provides classic accounts of the real distinction argument and issues concerning mind­body causal interaction.Author InformationJustin SkirryEmail: [email protected]. S. A.

9/15/2015Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Descartes, Rene: Mind­Body DistinctionInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy » Printhttp://www.iep.utm.edu/descmind/print13/13Article printed from Internet Encyclopedia of 

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