Choose one reading from this week (“Reclaiming Women’s Bodies Colonialist trope or critical epistemology,” though a formal citation is not required) and connect it to concepts from week two: marriage and reproductive politics (“A Marriage of Inconvenience”). How are these materials connected?
Choose one reading from this week (“Reclaiming Women’s Bodies Colonialist trope or critical epistemology,” though a formal citation is not required) and connect it to concepts from week two: marriage and reproductive politics (“A Marriage of Inconvenience”). How are these materials connected? Are similar frameworks used, or do they use different frameworks to explore the social dynamics at hand? The topics are different, but how do they inform one another, or what links can be made? 200-300 words
Requirements: 200-300 words
Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialisttrope or critical epistemology?1Kathy DavisAbstractIn a path-breaking essay,ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World Order (1999),ÕDonna Haraway links Our Bodies,Ourselves(the book and the slogan) to a critiqueofthe US womenÕs health movement,claiming that both draw implicitly upon colo-nialist metaphors ofdiscovery and acquisition ofterritory.HarawayÕs critique doesnot stand alone,but belongs to a broader discussion within poststructuralist feministtheory which has been concerned with denaturalizing the female body,with the rejec-tion ofÔexperienceÕas basis for feminist knowledge projects,and with deconstructingwomenÕs position as autonomous epistemic agents.Given the popularity ofthis much-cited and often reprinted essay,as well as HarawayÕs enormous inßuence on feminist(body) theory,feminist epistemology and technoscience politics,I will use her essayto consider the gap between contemporary poststructuralist feminist theory andwomenÕs health activism.On the basis ofalternative feminist theoretical (phenome-nological) perspectives on womenÕs bodies and embodiment,I conclude thatHarawayÕs critique,while provocative,has little to offer as an epistemological foun-dation for feminist health activism.Key words:Poststructuralist feminist body theory;phenomenology;womenÕs healthactivism;embodied epistemology;ÔnaturalÕbody,epistemic agency;Donna HarawayIntroductionIn a path-breaking essay,ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World OrderÕ(1999),Donna Haraway,one ofthe most important contemporary feministtheorists on womenÕs bodies and feminist politics ofknowledge,provides a dev-astating critique offeminist self-help,which was popular in US womenÕs healthmovement during the 1970s.2Armed with a gynaecological speculum,a mirror,a ßashlight,and Ð most ofall Ðeach other,in a consciousness-raising group,women ritually opened their bodies totheir own literal view.The speculum had become the symbol ofthe displacement of© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review.Published byBlackwell Publishing Ltd,9600 Garsington Road,Oxford OX4 2DQ,UK and 350 Main Street,Malden,MA02148,USA
51the female midwife by the specialist male physician and gynecologist.The mirror wasthe symbol forced on women as a signiÞer ofour own bodies as spectacle-for-anotherin the guise ofour own supposed narcissism.Vision itselfseemed to be the empow-ering act ofconquerors.More than a little amnesiac about how colonial travel narratives work,we peeredinside our vaginas toward the distant cervix and said something like,ÔLand ho!ÕWehave discovered ourselves and claim the new territory for women.ÕIn the context ofthe history ofWestern sexual politics Ð that is,in the context ofthe whole orthodoxhistory ofWestern philosophy and technology Ð visually self-possessed sexual andgenerative organs made potent tropes for the reclaimed feminist self.We thought wehad our eyes on the prize.I am caricaturing,ofcourse,but with a purpose.OurBodies,Ourselves was both a popular slogan and the title ofa landmark publicationin womenÕs health movements (Haraway,1999:67).Although the womenÕs health movement,and gynaecological self-help are not Ðand never were Ð identical,Haraway views them as expressions ofthe samefeminist politics ofknowledge.The image ofwomen recovering ownership oftheir own sexual and reproductive organs pervaded the US womenÕs healthmovement.While Haraway acknowledges that her critique is something ofacaricature,she,nevertheless,regards it as an important and,indeed,necessaryintervention in feminist health politics.Haraway argues that when feminist health activists draw upon metaphors ofÔdiscoveryÕand ÔrecoveryÕwhen they look at their bodies through a speculum,they unwittingly adopt the same objectifying medical ÔgazeÕwhich has histori-cally been central to the medical appropriation ofwomenÕs bodies.Tongue incheek,she compares feminist health activists to the well-known 1973 feministcartoon ofWonder Woman,complete with steel bracelets and stiletto high heels,seizing a speculum from a stethoscope-wearing doctor in white,while announc-ing Ôwith my speculum,I am strong! I can Þght!Õ(Haraway,1999:68).3Accord-ing to Haraway,the beliefthat women might have access to their bodies or mightcome to know their bodies in ways that stand outside the purview ofscienceand culture is mistaken.In actuality,these would-be feminist explorers are nodifferent than the male doctors they are attacking.And,indeed,they may evenbe considerably worse.Her Ôcolonial travel narrativeÕevokes troubling images ofwhite European male colonizers intent on conquering indigenous peoples in far-away places.She suggests that the ÔspeculumÕemployed by white,well-educated,feminist health activists in the seventies represented an epistemological practicewhich could never be empowering to ÔAfrican American women in povertyÕ(p.72).It does not begin to address the dramatic differences in morbidity,mor-tality and access in health care within the US.In her view,the Ôright speculumfor the jobÕwould allow feminist health activists to document these differences(Ôstatistics for freedom projectsÕ),thereby generating the painful,but necessarystructures ofaccountability between differently located women,both in the USand worldwide (p.72).In short,a new politics ofknowledge is required for aÔtruly comprehensiveÕfeminist politics ofhealth and oftechnoscience more gen-erally (Haraway,1999:84).Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
52HarawayÕs critique does not stand alone.It belongs to a broader discussionwithin poststructuralist feminist theory concerning the appropriate ingredientsofa feminist politics ofknowledge.Given the popularity ofHarawayÕs muchcited and often reprinted essay as well as her considerable inßuence on feminist(body) theory,feminist epistemology,and health politics,I will use it as a start-ing point to consider the gap between contemporary poststructuralist feministtheory on the body and womenÕs health activism.In order to explain this gap,I will now examine some ofthe points ofcontention in more detail:namely,the signiÞcance ofthe ÔnaturalÕbody (and the importance ofÔdenaturalizingÕwomenÕs bodies),the value ofexperiential knowledge (and the necessity ofÔdeconstructingÕexperience as authentic source ofknowledge),and the value ofwomenÕs epistemic agency (and the problem ofthe autonomous individual).Iwill then suggest some alternative (phenomenological) approaches to womenÕsbodies and health which can provide a more viable epistemological foundationfor a practical feminist politics ofembodiment.Feminist body theory/Feminist body politicsWomenÕs bodies and health have always been central to feminist politics.ThewomenÕs health movement was Ð and continues to be Ð one ofthe most vibrantÞelds offeminist activism.Beginning in the early 1970s with reproductive issueslike abortion rights,sterilization abuse,access to birth control and ÔmotherfriendlyÕbirthing arrangements,it has developed into a global movement whichencompasses a much broader range ofhealth issues ofconcern to women fromdifferent social,cultural,and geopolitical locations.Despite the wide range ofissues (everything from sexual violence to AIDSto the effects ofracism,poverty,and sustainable environment on health),theinternational womenÕs health movement rests upon the assumption that womenÕsmaterial bodies as well as their embodied experiences are central to the devel-opment ofa critical knowledge and health politics which is empowering towomen both individually and collectively.In contrast,feminist theory has been more ambivalent about womenÕs bodiesand embodied experience.Beginning with the Ôequality versus differencedebate,Õthe female body has posed a problem for feminists (Gatens,1999).Somefeminists have responded to the disadvantages encountered by women in thepublic sphere by citing their capacity to bear children.In this view,the biolog-ical body is held responsible for womenÕs subordinate position vis ‡ vis men insociety.Equality can only be achieved by overcoming Ð or transcending Ð the female body.For other feminists,the idea that the female body needed tobe ÔtranscendedÕfor the sake ofsexual equality was completely unaccept-able.It simply mirrored misogynist attitudes toward womenÕs bodies.It was,therefore,argued that a much better feminist strategy would be to afÞrm or even celebrate the female body and,particularly,womenÕs capacity formotherhood.Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
53Deciding between equality or difference,transcendence or celebration,proveda mission impossible,however,so attention shifted to the dilemma itself.Con-temporary feminist body theory began to focus on dismantling the dualisticthinking which linked women to their biological bodies in the Þrst place (Bordo,1987).Biology was regarded as a culprit,often used to justify womenÕs inferi-ority and social subordination.Thus,the Þrst intervention was to separate bio-logical sex from socially and culturally constructed gender.This theoretical intervention was important.,It had an unintended conse-quence however,namely,a ÔsomatophobiaÕamong feminist theorists (Spelman,1988).The fear that any mention ofthe female body would open the doors tobiological determinism meant that womenÕs biological bodies were left untheo-rized.It also meant that many feminist theorists looked at feminist healthactivism with its focus on womenÕs sexual organs,reproductive function,and thebeneÞts ofcervical self-help with grave suspicion.This activism seemed to benothing more than a reßection ofmasculinist medicineÕs obsession with womenas Ôwombs on legsÕ(Birke,1999:12).The female body was the starting point forfeminist health activism but,for feminist theory,it was a call to let the decon-struction begin.In addition to getting rid ofthe biological body,feminist theorists wereengaged in debunking claims ofobjectivity in science as little more than a mas-culinist Þction.Theorists like Evelyn Fox Keller (1985),Sandra Harding (1991),Patricia Hill Collins (2000),Dorothy Smith (1987;1990) and many others situ-ated sentient,embodied,experiential knowing as a resource for unmasking theuniversalist pretentions ofscience and for providing the basis for an alternative,critical epistemology,which would be grounded in the material realities ofwomenÕs lives.Asserting the primacy ofwomenÕs experience became the Ôsinequa nonofany feminist project ofliberation (Kruks,2001:132).ÕThe ascendancy ofpostmodernism and the Ôlinguistic turn,Õhowever,madethis project more complicated.Once regarded as the very bedrock ofsecond-wave feminism,ÔexperienceÕcame to be seen as an increasingly suspect concept(Scott,1992).Ifall knowledge was regarded as culturally shaped,then neitherwomen nor feminists had special access to the ÔtruthÕ(Haraway,1991).Whilethis critique was a needed corrective to simpliÞed claims about the authenticityofexperience and opened up space for reßexivity,it had the unintended conse-quence that the entire concept ofexperience was discarded.A seeminglyunbridgeable rift emerged between feminist theorists,who regarded experienceas nothing more than a discursive construction,and feminist health activists,who saw womenÕs embodied experience as an important corrective to the hege-mony ofmedical knowledge (Kuhlmann and Babitsch,2002).In the meantime,the ÔbodyÕhad returned to postmodern feminist theory witha vengeance as more and more feminist theorists embraced Foucault (McNay,1992;Bordo,1993;Davis,1997).The Foucauldian body,however,was not anexperiencing,sentient,lived body.It was a discursive body,a cultural text,asurface upon which culture could be inscribed.The body became a site for under-standing the workings ofmodern power or for ÔreadingÕculture.As cultural text,Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
54the female body was no longer linked to biology,nor was it treated as the seat ofauthentic experience,but rather it was viewed as a cultural construct in need ofdeconstruction.While postmodern feminist theory contributed to a more sophis-ticated understanding ofhow power works through the female body,it also stoodon somewhat uneasy footing with the question ofwomenÕs agency.Despite itsconcern for possibilities ofresistance and transformation in womenÕs bodily prac-tices,it proved to be more suited for delineating the collusions and compliancesofwomenÕs body practices with dominant cultural discourses than for theorizingcollective forms offeminist action in and through the body (Bordo,1993).It is clear that postmodern feminist body theory has raised many importanttheoretical issues.It is also clear,however,that it has left some issues under-theorized.And these are precisely the issues which are ofutmost concern for fem-inist health activism.It is,therefore,not surprising that feminist body theory hashad little to offer feminist health activism and,conversely,feminist healthactivism has had little effect on feminist body theory.It is my contention,however,that this state ofaffairs is not inevitable.Feminist theory could,in principle,havemuch to offer Ð and much to learn from Ð feminist health activism.Bridging thegap,however,would require at least three shifts in feminist body theory:a recon-ceptualization ofthe body,ofembodied experience,and ofepistemic agency.Fleshing out the bodyPostmodern feminist theories ofthe body have been successful in radicallypulling the rug out from under biological discourses that naturalize the femalebody.As Kuhlmann and Babitsch (2002) note,however,in their excellent reviewoffeminist body theory and its usefulness for womenÕs health issues,Ôwe mustface the question ofwhat price we are willing to pay in exchange for the delim-itation ofnaturalized categoriesÕ(p.436).They argue that the price ofmakingthe body central to theoretical projects (dismantling essentialism,deconstruct-ing dualisms,emphasizing ßuidity) may be a disembodied body.Even theoristswho claim that they are concerned with the materiality ofthe body (Butler,1989,1993),still lend little credence to the material reality ofwomenÕs ßesh-and-bloodbodies,bodies which are recognizable to ordinary women as their own.Thereseems to be an absence ofbodies in contemporary feminist body theory thatcan be touched,smelled,tasted,or perceived.There are no bodies with anÔinsideÕÐ reproductive organs,lungs and heart,glands and capillaries.Ulti-mately,the focus seems to be upon the surface ofthe body and on how culturebecomes imprinted upon it.While there can be no doubt that women in general and feminist healthactivists in particular need to be sensitive to the perils ofessentialism and dual-istic thinking,the silence offeminist theorists on the ßesh-and-blood body,aswell as on the possibilities that biology might have to offer for understandingwomenÕs bodies,is not without its costs.The vulnerabilities and limitations ofthe body,which invariably accompany illness,disease,disability or,quite simply,Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
55aging,are given short shrift in theories which concentrate on the body in endlessßux.The body as ongoing performance implies a transformability that beliesthe bodily constraints with which most people must live at different periods intheir lives.Postmodern feminist theory has little to offer in understanding whatit means to live with a disability or a chronic illness or even the temporary dis-comforts ofmenstrual cramps and labour pains.In her excellent study on disability,Susan Wendell suggests that postmodernfeminist theory erases much ofthe everyday reality ofliving in/with/through abody with limitations and vulnerabilities,which are particularly salient for mostwomenÕs embodied experience.Moreover,the one-sided insistence on the needto avoid dualisms underestimates the subjective appeal ofthe mind-bodydualism for women in their everyday interactions with their bodies (Wendell,1996:169).Living with chronic illness,for example,would be impossible withouta certain amount ofsplitting.The suffering that bodily vulnerability entailsmeans that a certain amount oftranscendence (ie,mind over matter) can bewelcome and,indeed,necessary for an individualÕs well-being.4Indeed,as somecritical disability scholars have argued,the most important task facing feministtheory on the body should be to think ofembodiment in terms ofits limita-tions rather than its unbridled capabilities (Breckenridge and Vogler,2001).Ina more just environment,everyone should be treated as Ôtemporarily able-bodiedÕ,resulting in a deÞnitive break with restrictive notions ofÔnormalcyÕanda reorganization ofthe lived environment with biological vulnerability in mind.Birke (1999) also takes issue with the ubiquitous feminist theoretical rebut-tal ofbiological determinism.While she also acknowledges the need to avoidessentialism and dualistic thinking,she suggests that this does not require reject-ing biology altogether.And,indeed,she warns,feminists avoid the biologicalbody at their own peril.As she puts it:…theories which deny the biological serve us ill,not least because it is through thebiological body that we live in and engage with this world at all.But also,and sig-niÞcantly,our failure to engage adequately with biology (except to criticize it for deter-minism) fails those people (and non-humans) who are most readily deÞned by it,andalso who may suffer because ofit (Birke,1999:175).Birke argues that the body is best viewed holistically,as a self-organizing andstructured materiality and organismic integrity,which both enables and con-strains an individualÕs engagement with the world around her.5Her aim is toretrieve the Ôbiological bodyÕÐ the body that is not just Ôskin deep,Õnor disem-bowelled,but has organs,an inside as well as an outside (p.2).She looks forways to understand Ôwhat goes onÕphysiologically in womenÕs bodies,whileavoiding the problems ofdeterminism which have been elaborated ad nauseamby contemporary feminist body theory.Like other feminist body theorists,Birkedoes not view the body as a static entity,hermeneutically sealed offfrom theworld.Bodies have their own developmental histories and capacities for trans-formation.Neither,however,is the body an assemblage ofpractices,a culturaltext,or an Ôimaginary.ÕIn her view,the ubiquitous emphasis on the ÔßuiditiesReclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
56and fracturingsÕofthe body may offer the promise ofendless transformation,thereby making it attractive to feminist theorists.This same transformability ofthe body,however,also opens the ßood-gates for a total manipulation ofhumanand non-human nature,resonating with the literal dismemberment ofbodies inmodern medicine.Organ transplantations,hysterectomies,and plastic surgeryall rest on a conceptualization ofthe body as Ôa set ofbits,Õwhich can beremoved or manipulated (Birke,1999:171).In contrast,Birke offers a theory ofthe biological body which includes change and organismic integrity,a bodywhich enables but which also provides constraints that defy even the mostadvanced technological interventions.In my view,Wendell and Birke provide a promising alternative to the disem-bodied body in feminist body theory.Both take up the project which feministactivists ofthe 1970s started Ð namely,a concern for womenÕs embodied vul-nerabilities and a desire to engage critically with medical knowledge.They showhow it is possible to learn from biology without falling into biological deter-minism,thereby justifying a feminist epistemology which engages with the femalebody as an anatomical and physiological entity,without ignoring the bodyÕscapacity for change.They also tackle the biological conditions which enable andconstrain an individualÕs interactions with the world around her without ignor-ing the role ofculture in giving meaning to these conditions.And,last but notleast,they assume that knowledge about womenÕs bodies and how they workshould not be left to biology,but should be an integral part offeminist inquiry.Retrieving experiencePostmodern feminist theory has provided an important cautionary warningagainst treating experience as self-explanatory and the reminder that experienceis always mediated by cultural discourses and institutional practices is welltaken.A strong case has been made for developing feminist methodologies thatcan critically analyse patriarchal or masculinist assumptions in alldomains ofknowledge,including feminist knowledge.The postmodern feminist commit-ment,however,to the theoretical project ofdeconstructing cultural discourseshas had the unintended consequence ofeclipsing the analysis ofexperience assituated knowledge.Many feminist scholars have reacted with uneasiness and even alarm atattempts to discredit womenÕs experience,arguing that feminist theory risksÔthrowing the baby out with the bathwaterÕ(Varikas,1995:99),has been leftstranded in disembodied Ôhigh altitude thinkingÕ(Kruks,2001:143),can nolonger engage meaningfully with the experience-oriented texts ofwomen whoare trying to take control oftheir own representation (Stone-Mediatore,1998:118),and,last but not least,has seriously undermined the critical potential ofexperience for disrupting dominant knowledge paradigms (Alcoff,2000:46).Alcoff(2000) argues against the necessity ofchoosing between an unreßectiveconception ofexperience as authentic source ofknowledge and the rejection ofKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
57experience as hopelessly contaminated and oflittle use to feminist theory.In herview,this is a Ôfalse dilemmaÕ,which simply replays the Ôtired modernist debatesbetween empiricism and idealismÕ(p.45).There is no reason that feminist schol-ars should not insist upon experience as Ôepistemologically indispensableÕwithout having to assume that experience is also Ôepistemologically self-sufÞcient.ÕKruks (2001) suggests that rather than rejecting experience as aÔsuspect concept,Õas Scott has advocated,feminist scholars should be devotingtheir energies to Þnding ways to theorizeit (p.131).WomenÕs experience pro-vides an essential starting point for understanding the embodied and materialeffects ofliving under speciÞc social and cultural conditions.The task at handis to link individual womenÕs subjective accounts oftheir experiences and howthese affect their everyday practices,with an analysis ofthe cultural discourses,institutional arrangements,and geopolitical contexts in which these accountsare embedded and which give meaning to them.For many feminist scholars,phenomenology provides a useful theoreticalhelpmeet for retrieving experience as a resource for feminist inquiry.Phenome-nological perspectives treat women as embodied subjects who think,act,andknow through their bodies.Their experiences are drawn upon as importantresources for understanding what it feels like to have a particular body (preg-nant,breasted),to experience a particular bodily sensation (menstrual cramps,labour pains),or to live through a speciÞc event (childbirth).Discourse alonecannot explain the affective realm ofembodiment,the Ôsentient knowingÕwhichis involved when individuals connect the physical,cognitive and cultural dimen-sions oftheir embodied lives at the site oftheir body.As Kruks (2001) puts it,the Ôfact that experiences are also discursively constructed does not diminish theimportance oftreating them…as a Ôpoint oforigin,Õor even a Ôfoundationfrom which to workÕ(p.139).There is a rich body ofstudies exploring the experience offeminine embod-iment from a phenomenological perspective,covering topics like being breastedor Ôthrowing like a girlÕ(Young,1990),pregnancy (Marshall,1996),sexualharassment or masochism (Bartky,1990),sexual trafÞcking or genital cutting(Kruks,2001;Bartky,2002).Experiences are articulated which have been mar-ginalized,distorted,or pathologized by dominant discourses.By subjectingthese experiences to phenomenological description,they are not so muchrevealed as made discursively available;ie,accessible for interpretation anddebate.In this way,many body issues which had previously been part oftacit,taken-for-granted,or ÔunnameableÕexperiences,can become part ofan explic-itly political or feminist agenda.Martin (2001) provides a three-pronged methodology which brings togethera phenomenological description ofwomenÕs accounts oftheir experiences witha discourse analysis ofcultural metaphors about womenÕs bodies and a socio-logical analysis ofhow social location (including poverty,class,and ÔraceÕ)shapes womenÕs reproductive lives.She shows how medical metaphors treat men-struation as Ôfailed productionÕin which the endometrial lining ÔdisintegratesÕorÔdecays.ÕMenopause is treated as a Ôbreakdown in the hierarchical communica-Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
58tion systemÕofthe body,whereby the ovaries regress,decline,atrophy,shrink,and become totally without Ôfunction.ÕWhile such pathologizing metaphorsshape how US women perceive their bodies and bodily functions,their storiesabout their embodied experiences also display signs ofresistance.One ofMartinÕs most interesting Þndings Ð and one which provides HarawayÕs notionofsituated knowledge with some empirical grounding Ð is that working classwomen are less inclined to adopt medical understandings about womenÕs bodies,preferring instead to emphasize how their own body feels,looks,or smells;theinconvenience and discomfort that bodily functions like menstruation or labourentail;or the signiÞcance such functions have in terms offemininity (menstru-ation as a rite ofpassage).She calls this everyday resistance a Ôphenomenolog-ical perspectiveÕin contrast to a Ômedical model,Õwhich is divorced from womenÕsexperience.MartinÕs approach illustrates how an understanding ofexperienceas discursively shaped does not preclude the detailed analysis ofhow womenexperience their bodies.Moya (1997) has criticized the poststructuralist rejection ofexperience fromthe perspective ofmarginalized women ofcolour.In an argument for a moreÔrealistÕfeminist theory,she takes up ScottÕs claim that experiences are alwaysdiscursively mediated and elaborates it to include the Ôcognitive componentÕofthis mediation through which women gain knowledge ofthe world.In her view,embodied experiences are not merely discursive constructions;they are alwaysembedded in the concrete physical realities ofan individualÕs particular sociallocation.As such,they are an invaluable source ofknowledge about the mate-rial effects ofliving in a speciÞc place at a particular moment in history.Shesuggests that feminist theorists should not turn away from but,rather,turntoward womenÕs bodies as a source ofknowledge and starting point for femi-nist analysis.The physical realities ofwomenÕs lives Ð including Ôour skin colour,the land we grew up in,our sexual longings Ð profoundly inform the contoursand contexts ofknowledge and should be part offeminist epistemology asÔtheory in the ßeshÕ(Moya,1997:135).Taken together,feminist scholars have productively drawn upon the insightsofphenomenology to retrieve experiential knowledge as a central element forfeminist epistemological projects.They have convincingly taken issue with post-structuralist critiques for providing impoverished understandings ofknowledge,which reduce womenÕs experience to discourse.The result is feminist theory thatis both disembodied and dislocated.They show how womenÕs embodied expe-riences are necessary for feminist critiques ofdominant forms ofknowledge ÐÔnot merely as endpoints or data that require theoretical illumination,but ascapable ofshedding light on theory itselfÕ(Alcoff,2000:56).Women as epistemic agentsPostmodern feminist theory has been instrumental in decentring theautonomous subject as a seat ofauthentic and undistorted knowledge about theKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
59world.It has underlined the pervasive power ofcultural discourses to shape howwomen experience their bodies as well as the body practices that they adopt.The ideologically loaded issues offreedom and choice have been problematized,whereby womenÕs agency is showed to be often more about compliance thanabout subversion (Bordo,1993).The price,however,for this emphasis on the power ofdiscourse to shapewomenÕs embodied experiences,is often a steep one.It can obstruct the possi-bility ofunderstanding how ordinary women might actively gain,evaluate,andcritically interpret knowledge about themselves,their lives,and the world aroundthem.It may become difÞcult to imagine how they mobilize knowledge for theirpersonal empowerment,let alone for collective feminist projects,as this knowl-edge is invariably embedded in oppressive cultural discourses and institutionalarrangements.In short,postmodern feminist theory does not leave much spacefor understanding how ordinary women exercise epistemic agency.Turning to Kruks (2001) once again,phenomenology can provide a correc-tive to some ofthe limitations ofpostmodern conceptions ofagency.It focuseson the embodied,sentient subject whose lived experience provides a startingpoint for a critical (feminist) epistemological project.It also provides a view ofa ÔpracticalÕsubject who acts with a certain degree ofintentionality,albeit neverfully articulated,a subject who embarks upon projects which Ôtransform some-thing into a further possibilityÕ(p.120).A phenomenological concept ofagencymakes it possible to see how womenÕs experiences are connected to practical pro-jects ofindividual empowerment.It also offers a starting point for thinkingbeyond the individualÕs experiences and enables us to imagine the suffering ofothers as well as the kinds ofintentional projects upon which they embark.InKruksÕ(2001) view,it is the recognition that others Ð however different theirprojects are Ð are also involved in intentional projects,which allows for reci-procity and the possibility ofcollective praxis (pp.124Ð125).Another approach to the problem ofwomenÕs epistemic agency is providedby Dorothy Smith (1990).While she claims an afÞnity to Foucauldian notionsofdiscourse,she employs a sociological perspective which takes speciÞc texts asa starting point for analysing how individuals actually interpret these texts andhow these texts organize their interpretive practices.For her,individuals are notsimply entangled in discourses;they have to engage with them actively,in wayswhich involve planning courses ofaction,drawing upon past knowledge,making on the spot calculations,and imagining what the results ofthe actionmight be.Without agency,discourses simply could not work.SmithÕs notion ofdiscursive agency opens up space for exploring how women knowledgeably,competently,and ßexibly draw upon,interpret,and re-articulate cultural dis-courses as they negotiate their life circumstances.Mohanty (2003),Lugones (2003),Stone-Mediatore (1998) and others havetaken issue with postmodern feminist theory,arguing that it leaves no way toengage with the myriad ways that women resist.The activity ofcriticizing hege-monic discourses and developing imaginative alternatives requires that thosewho have been marginalized in the production ofknowledge be situated as epis-Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
60temic agents,who generate critical and alternative forms ofknowledge as a basisfor empowerment.These theorists share and,indeed,have introduced some ofthe concerns ofpostmodern feminist theory Ð for example,the problem ofpriv-ileging the experiences ofwhite,middle class feminism as universal for allwomen.This does not lead,however,to the conclusion that epistemic agencyneeds to be abandoned altogether.Indeed,Mohanty (2003) has argued that aconcept ofagency is necessary for understanding the ways that US and ThirdWorld women are constantly engaged in interpreting,reßecting upon,and re-naming their experiences (pp.106Ð123).These interpretations are not only amatter ofrecycling existing metaphors and rhetorical strategies,as just Ôone dis-cursive production among othersÕ(Stone-Mediatore,1998:121).It is importantto understand how individuals come to favour certain discourses over others Ðdecisions which are shaped by situational,biographical or socio-political cir-cumstances.Lugones (2003) is also critical ofwhat she refers to as the Ôhighlyattenuated understandings ofagency in late modernityÕ(p.6).Resistance is notintentional in the sense ofa clear-cut choice among an array ofdesirable andless-than-desirable options.She argues that feminists need to become attentiveto the subtle and variegated ways women act,even when Ð at Þrst glance Ð itdoesnÕt seem to be about resistance in the narrow sense ofthe word.Resistancecan also be refusal or simply Ôtrying to survive.ÕOne ofthe goals offeminismshould be to discover the ways women might have for Ômoving together and con-nectingÕwith one another (pp.6Ð7).In conclusion,postmodern feminist theory has focused on the power ofdis-course to shape womenÕs practices.While agency is acknowledged in theabstract,little attention has been paid to women as producers ofcritical knowl-edge,as epistemic agents.This theory cannot account for why individual womenmight be motivated to employ oppositional discourses.Theorists like Kruks,Smith,Mohanty,Lugones,and others have shown,however,that it is possibleto recognize the power ofdiscourse,without discarding womenÕs epistemicagency.By exploring discourses as actively mobilized by individuals as epistemicagents,they show how women can deliberately and strategically reinterpret theirlives or actively pursue oppositional discourses.This involves an approach toagency that is not abstract but practical.Agency is always embedded in womenÕseveryday interpretive activities.This means that feminist theory needs to explorehow,why,and under what circumstances women actively use knowledge topursue oppositional ends.Embodied theoriesThis chapter opened with a fragment from an essay by the postmodern feministtheorist Donna Haraway,in which she makes a caricature ofthe politics ofknowledge which underlies feminist health activism.HarawayÕs strategy Ð whilegood for a laugh or two Ð does not seriously engage with the politics ofknowl-edge expressed in this activism and,more seriously,exacerbates rather thanKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
61bridges the gap between feminist theory and feminist activism concerningwomenÕs bodies and health.HarawayÕs intention is,ofcourse,less to discreditfeminist health activism than to address a more fundamental political concern.She is worried that feminist health activism has not sufÞciently addressed thehealth needs ofpoor women and women ofcolour in the US and,more gener-ally,has been inadequate for coming to terms with global disparities in healthand well-being.In her view,the dramatic global differences in health outcomesand the lack ofcare for even the most basic health needs require a very differ-ent feminist response than the politics ofÔselfhelp,Õwhich was so empoweringfor white,middle-class,US feminists in the 1970s.HarawayÕs concern for how differences in social location shape the politics ofknowledge is well-taken and she is right in pointing out that any comprehensivefeminist health politics would need to begin with an acknowledgment ofand aserious engagement with these differences and disparities.Although women ofcolour have always played an active role within the womenÕs health movement,Haraway does not draw upon their Ôsituated knowledgeÕor epistemic practicesin developing a feminist politics ofknowledge which reßects the speciÞcs oftheirlocation.6Paradoxically it is Haraway herself,armed with the knowledge prac-tices (statistics) ofmainstream social science,who speaks for them,dismissingtheir experiences as inconsequential for feminist theory.While I share HarawayÕs concern and believe that attention to social inequal-ities between women is ofgreat relevance to the future offeminist health politics,it is my contention that this concern deserves a more serious Ð and less ironic Ðtreatment than HarawayÕs essay provides.In other words,instead ofproducing acaricatural Ôstraw dogÕto be rhetorically knocked down,it would make more senseto develop a critique offeminist health activism which is grounded in the situ-ated knowledge practices offeminist activists Ôon the ground.ÕAs an antidote toHarawayÕs strategy,I have turned to other feminist scholars who,while engagedwith the same issues which have preoccupied poststructuralist feminist theoristslike Haraway,have come to very different conclusions.Feminist theory on thebody does not need to distance itselffrom feminist health activism in order todevelop a better feminist critique ofscience.It can instead take up and elaboratethe epistemological project which this activism has already begun.Bridging thegap would,however,require at least three shifts in feminist body theory:a recon-ceptualization ofthe body,ofembodied experience,and ofepistemic agency.The Þrst shift would be a reconceptualization ofthe body.The body is morethan a surface,a cultural ÔtextÕ,or a site for the endless deconstruction ofCarte-sian dualisms.Bodies are anatomical,physiological,experiential,and culturallyshaped entities.They age,suffer injury or illness,become disabled or inÞrm,andlimit our activities.Feminist theory must acknowledge the vulnerabilities ofwomenÕs bodies without having to resort to biological determinism or the notionofan Ôessential femaleÕbody.While most women have a body which is codedfemale,the details ofeach womanÕs embodiment vary according to her speciÞcsocial location.Bodies have their own idiosyncratic histories and are constantlyinteracting with their surroundings.And,Þnally,common bodily complaints orReclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
62problems Ð whether eating disorders or high blood pressure Ð may change overtime,becoming more or less relevant to understanding womenÕs embodiment ata particular historical moment or in a particular geographic location.WomenÕsbodies shape how they live in the world,just as how they live in the world isshaped through their bodies.The second shift would be a reconceptualization ofembodied experience.Feminist theory needs to Þnd ways to address how differently located womenperceive,feel about,and understand their bodily experiences.While it is impor-tant to acknowledge that experience is never a simple reßection ofreality,it can,nevertheless,still be used as a starting point for understanding what it means tolive in a particular body,at a speciÞc moment in time,or in a particular sociallocation.Their experiential accounts can be validated as an important source ofknowledge without treating them as authentic or absolute.WomenÕs experiencesdo not stand alone but can be juxtaposed with other forms ofknowledge:medical Þndings,cultural understandings about womenÕs bodies,or the experi-ential accounts ofother women with similar and/or different experiences.It isthe interaction between these forms ofknowledge,which allows experience tobecome a helpmeet for women to engage critically with dominant forms ofknowledge.The third shift would involve a reconceptualization ofwomenÕs epistemicagency.Agency is not simply a discursive effect,an artefact ofshifting culturaldiscourses.It involves the practical and Ð to some extent Ð intentional activitiesofsituated knowers,who interpret,reßect upon,and rework their experiences.Precisely because knowledge practices are always embedded in conditions whichare both enabling and constraining,it is important to develop sociologicallygrounded analyses ofhow women in the concrete circumstances oftheir every-day lives develop critical knowledge as well as individually or collectivelyempowering courses ofaction.Notes1This chapter draws upon my cross-cultural history on the global impact ofthe feminist classicon womenÕs health,Our Bodies,Ourselves(Davis forthcoming).2Self-help groups were formed by primarily white,middle-class women who shared informationand stories,educating themselves about their bodies,the medical establishment,and alternativetreatments.Self-help incorporates a range ofpractices including self-exams (breast,cervical,vaginal,vulvar),alternative therapies (home treatments for vaginal infections,nutritional changes,herbal remedies,menstrual extraction),as well as a wide range ofcommunity support groupsaround issues like cancer,menopause,weight management,AIDS,incest,or substance abuse.See,Kapsalis (1997);Morgen (2002);Murphy (2004).3The speculum was a particularly potent symbol for the early womenÕs health movement becauseofthe nefarious role it had played within US gynecology where it was initially employed by J.Marion Simms,the ÔFather ofAmerican Gynecology,Õin his surgical experiments on unanethesi-tized slave women.The appeal ofappropriating what had originally been an instrument ofoppres-sion to help women Ôtake back their bodiesÕwas obvious.See,Kapsalis (1997).4See,also,Davis-Floyd (1994) for a different context,but similar argument.She shows how pro-fessional women engage in a splitting offofthe body in their preference for C-sections,whichKathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
63protect them from the troubling dissonance between their professional persona as career womenand their embodied pregnant persona.5See,also,Fausto-Sterling (2005) for a similar approach which treats the biological body as adynamic system that changes according to life circumstances and cultural conditions.6Women ofcolour,active in the womenÕs health movement,have often been just as concerned withrecovering womenÕs bodies and validating womenÕs experiences as the white activists have beenwho have born the brunt ofHarawayÕs critique.See,for example,White (1990),Smith (1995),Springer (1999).ReferencesAlcoff,L.M.(2000) ÔPhenomenology,Post-structuralism,and Feminist Theory on the Concept ofExperience.ÕIn L.Fisher and L.Embree (eds),Feminist Phenomenology.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Bartky,S.L.(1990).Femininity and Domination.Studies in the Phenomenology ofOppression.NewYork:Routledge.Bartky,S.L.(2002) ÔSympathy and SolidarityÕand Other Essays.Lanham,Rowman & LittleÞeld,2002).Birke,L.(1999) Feminism and the Biological Body.New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers University Press.Bordo,S.(1987) The Flight to Objectivity:Essays on Cartesianism and Culture.Albany:SUNY Press.Bordo,S.(1993) Unbearable Weight.Feminism,Western Culture,and the Body.Berkeley:CaliforniaUniversity Press.Breckenridge,C.A.and Vogler,C.(2001) ÔThe Critical Limits ofEmbodiment:DisabilityÕs Criti-cismÕ,Public Culture 13,3 (2001):349Ð357.Butler,J.(1989) Gender Trouble:Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity.New York:Routledge.Butler,J.(1993) Bodies That Matter:On the Discursive Limits ofÔSex.ÕNew York:Routledge.Collins,P.H.(2000) Black Feminist Thought.Knowledge,Consciousness,and the Politics ofEmpo-werment,2ndedition.New York:Routledge.Davis,K.(1997) ÔEmbody-ing Theory:Beyond Modernist and Postmodernist Readings ofthe Body.ÕIn Embodied Practices.Feminist Perspectives on the Body,ed.Kathy Davis,1Ð23.London:Sage.Davis,K.(forthcoming)The Making ofOur Bodies,Ourselves.How feminist knowledge travels acrossborders.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press.Davis-Floyd,R.E.(1994) ÔMind Over Body.The Pregnant Professional.ÕIn Many Mirrors:BodyImage and Social Relations,ed.Nicole Sault,204Ð234,New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers UniversityPress.Fausto-Sterling,A.(2005) ÔThe Bare Bones ofSex:Part 1- Sex and Gender.ÕSigns 30,2:1491Ð1527.Gatens,M.(1999) ÔPower,Bodies and Difference.ÕIn Feminist Theory and the Body,ed.Janet Priceand Margrit Shildrick,227Ð234.Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press.Haraway,D.(1991) ÔSituated Knowledges:The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege ofPartial PerspectiveÕ,In Simians,Cyborgs,and Womenby Donna Haraway,183Ð202.London:FreeAssociation Books.Haraway,D.(1999) ÔThe Virtual Speculum in the New World Order.ÕIn Revisioning Women,Health,and Healing,ed.Adele E.Clarke and Virginia L.Olesen,49Ð96.New York:Routledge.Harding,S.(1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge:Thinking from womenÕs lives.Milton Keynes:Open University Press.Kapsalis,T.(1997) Public Privates.Performing Gynecology From Both Ends ofthe Speculum.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press,1997.Keller,E.F.(1985) Reßections on Gender and Science.New Haven:Yale University Press.Kruks,S.(2001) Retrieving Experience.Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics.Ithaca andLondon:Cornell University Press.Kuhlmann,K.and Babitsch,B.(2002) ÔBodies,health,gender Ð bridging feminist theories andwomenÕs health.ÕWomenÕs Studies International Forum25,4:433Ð442.Reclaiming womenÕs bodies:Colonialist trope or critical epistemology?© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation © 2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
64Lugones,M.(2003) Pilgimages/Peregrinajes.Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions.Lanham,MD.:Rowman & LittleÞeld.McNay,L.(1992) Foucault and Feminism.Cambridge:Polity.Marshall,H.(1996) ÔOur Bodies Ourselves.Why We Should Add Old Fashioned Empirical Phe-nomenology to the New Theories ofthe BodyÕ,WomenÕs Studies International Forum19,3:253Ð265.Martin,E.(2001) The Woman in the Body.Boston:Beacon Press.Mohanty,C.(2003) Feminism Without Borders.Decolonizing Theory,Practicing Solidarity.Durham,N.C.:Duke University Press.Morgen,S.(2002) Into Our Own Hands.The WomenÕs Health Movement in the United States,1969Ð1990.New Brunswick,N.J.:Rutgers University Press.Moya,P.M.L.(1997) ÔPostmodernism,ÒRealism,Óand the Politics ofIdentity:Cherr’e Moraga andChicana Feminism.Õin J.Alexander and C.Mohanty (eds),Feminist Genealogies,Colonial Lega-cies,Democratic Futures125Ð150.New York:Routledge.Murphy,M.(2004) ÔImmodest witnessing:The epistemology ofvaginal self-examination in the U.S.Feminist self-help movement.ÕFeminist Studies30,1:115Ð147.Scott,J.W.(1992) ÔExperience.Õin Feminists Theorize the Political,ed.Judith Butler and Joan W.Scott,22Ð40.New York:Routledge.Smith,D.E.(1990) The Conceptual Practices ofPower.A Feminist Sociology ofKnowledge.Boston:Northeastern University Press.Smith,D.E (1987) The Everyday World as Problematic.A feminist sociology.Toronto:University ofToronto Press.Smith,S.L.(1995) Sick and tired ofbeing sick and tired;Black womenÕs health activism in America,1890Ð1950.Philadelphia:University ofPennsylvania Press.Spelman,E.(1988) Inessential Woman:Problems ofExclusion in Feminist Thought.Boston:BeaconPress.Springer,K.(1999) (ed.),Still Lifting,Still Climbing:African American WomenÕs ContemporaryActivism.New York:New York University Press.Stone-Mediatore,S.(1998) ÔChandra Mohanty and the Revaluing ofÒExperienceÓ.ÕHypatia13,2:116Ð133.Varikas,E.(1995) ÔGender,experience,and subjectivity:The Tilly-Scott disagreement.ÕNew LeftReview211:89Ð101.Wendell,S.(1996) The Rejected Body.Feminist Philosophical Reßections on Disability.New York:Routledge.White,E.C.(1990) (ed.),The Black WomenÕs Health Book.Speaking for Ourselves.Seattle,WA:TheSeal Press.Young,I.M.(1990) Throwing Like a Girl and other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory.Bloomington:Indiana University Press.Kathy Davis© 2007 The Author.Editorial organisation ©2007 The Editorial Board ofthe Sociological Review
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247749405`A Marriage of Inconvenience?’ Feminist Perspectives onMarriageArticle in Feminism & Psychology · November 2003DOI: 10.1177/09593535030134002CITATIONS27READS11,5272 authors:Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:Exploring LGB appearance and embodiment View projectExploring the potential for creative and arts-based methods for applied psychological research seminar series 2019 ViewprojectSara-Jane FinlayUniversity of British Columbia24 PUBLICATIONS 314 CITATIONS SEE PROFILEVictoria ClarkeUniversity of the West of England, Bristol164 PUBLICATIONS 139,689 CITATIONS SEE PROFILEAll content following this page was uploaded by Victoria Clarke on 05 December 2014.The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
http://fap.sagepub.com/Feminism & Psychology http://fap.sagepub.com/content/13/4/415The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/09593535030134002 2003 13: 415Feminism & PsychologySara-Jane Finlay and Victoria Clarke`A Marriage of Inconvenience?’ Feminist Perspectives on Marriage Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com can be found at:Feminism & PsychologyAdditional services and information for http://fap.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts: http://fap.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: http://fap.sagepub.com/content/13/4/415.refs.htmlCitations: What is This? – Dec 1, 2003Version of Record >> by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
SPECIAL FEATUREÔA Marriage of Inconvenience?Õ Feminist Perspectiveson MarriageSara-Jane FINLAY and Victoria CLARKEEDITORSÕ INTRODUCTION: HETEROSEXUAL MARRIAGE: FINDING THEPOLITICAL IN THE PERSONALIs marriage the new feminism? (The Daily Telegraph[Magnet, 2003])Why do we do it?: It was thought to be an institution in terminal decline. Butmarriage refuses to go away Ð in fact itÕs getting more and more fashionable.(The Guardian[Morrison, 2002])Who needs a bit on the side?: Almost all of us, it seems. But having an affairdoesnÕt mean you donÕt love your partner. (The Observer Review[Bedell, 2003])Is love, as the song says, even lovelier the second time around? (The Independ-ent on Sunday[Pepinster and Mendick, 2001])Divorce: Can it feel this good? (The Observer [Hughes, 2001])The State of Marriage in the UKThese headlines Ð a very brief selection from articles on marriage recently pub-lished in the British press Ð reveal some confusion about the state of marriage. Onthe one hand, it is Ôin terminal declineÕ (Morrison, 2002: 2) whereas, on the other, it remains the ultimate romantic fantasy. Statistically, we know that fourout of ten marriages end in divorce and it is certainly true that there are fewer marriages now than there were in 1950 when the Ôunchallenged domestic idealÕ(Haste, 1992: 151) meant that there were 408,000 marriages in the UnitedKingdom. Although the marriage rate declined by one-third between 1980 and1990, it is not all downhill: figures for 20001show a 1.7 percent increase from theFeminism & Psychology ©2003 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 13(4): 415Ð420.[0959-3535(200312)13:4;415Ð420;036991]02_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 415 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
previous year in the number of marriages in England and Wales, with a total of267,961 marriages taking place. This is the first year that the marriage rate hasincreased since 19922. Although nine out of ten people will get married beforethey are 50, first time marriages are at an all time low. They peaked in 1970 atalmost 390,000, but have now fallen to less than half this number and, of all themarriages in 2000, 180,000 were first marriages. At the same time, the number ofdivorces in England and Wales also fell (by 2 percent) from 1999. People alsotend to marry later in life: the average age in 1961 was 26 for men and 23 forwomen; in 2000 this had risen to 30 and 28 respectively (Office for NationalStatistics, 2000). These statistics suggest that marriage is in slow decline: peopleare marrying later, marriages do not last as long and divorce is more frequent andeasier to obtain. At the same time it is clear that weddings and marriage still holdpowerful sway over the popular imagination: they appear to remain the ideal, theÔgold standardÕ of relationship achievement.Feminist Perspectives on MarriageFeminists have always been sceptical of the promotion of marriage by Churchand State and they have critiqued the discourses of love, romance and coupledomthat surround the institution of marriage in western culture (e.g. Atkinson, 1974;Firestone, 1979; Pateman, 1988; Rich, 1983). Atkinson (1974) was particularlycritical of love and marriage as the ideal relationship because, in making womenacquiesce to a subordinated role, they are complicit in their own oppression. LoveÐ she argued Ð becomes a political institution that is a necessary part of maledomination, and women are Ôinstinctively trying to recoup [. . .] definitional andpolitical losses by fusing with the enemyÕ (p. 44). Firestone (1979) was equallycondemnatory of love but, rather than constructing women as falsely conscious,she suggested that men are unable to love and parasitically feed on womenÕsemotional strength. Carole Pateman (1988) considered marriage from the perspective of a socialcontract in which ÔmenÕs domination over women, and the right of men to enjoyequal sexual access to women (p. 2) was at issue; such that Ôin a patriarchal society, marriage and female fidelity are requirements for heterosexual relation-shipsÕ (Stelboum, 1999: 43). Gayle Rubin (1975: 175) referred to this as the traffic or exchange of women: Ôwomen are given in marriage, taken in battle,exchanged for favors, sent as tribute, traded, bought, and soldÕ. Marriage is rooted in a discourse of monogamy that Ôprivileges the interests of both men andcapitalism, operating as it does through the mechanisms of exclusivity, possess-iveness and jealousyÕ (Robinson, 1997: 144). It denies women access to sexualfreedom and continues the separation of women from each other (Rosa, 1994).Marriage is, in short, considered an Ôintimate colonisationÕ (Hagan, 1993). In feminist theory, wives are seen as subordinate, economically dependent anddeferent (Johnson, 1988). In most if not all countries, women continue to havemajor responsibility for household and caring duties (Van Every, 1995). In terms416Feminism & Psychology 13(4)02_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 416 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
of economics, women are still expected to provide unpaid labour in the family(Delphy and Leonard, 1992) and are disadvantaged both within their marriages(Pahl, 1989) and in paid employment (Witz, 1993).Many feminists link marriage to an institutionalized form of heterosexualitythat structures relationships, family and identity (Bunch, 1987; Rich, 1983;Richardson, 1996). Feminist analysis of marriage is tied to critiques of mon-ogamy (e.g. Rosa, 1994; Robinson, 1997; Stelboum, 1999), the construction ofmasculinity (Holland et al., 1998), menÕs profit from womenÕs labour (Bunch,1987), and the control of sexual access and procreation (Jaggar, 1994).Dryden (1999) notes that both mainstream psychology and feminism has large-ly ignored marriage. She suggests that feminist research in the last 30 years hasconcentrated on: 1.The role of the housewife and links to depression (e.g. Friedan, 1963; Oakley,1974; Ussher, 1991)2.Division of labour and responsibility for household tasks and childcare (e.g.Van Every, 1995)3.Exploitation of womenÕs unpaid labour (e.g. Delphy and Leonard, 1992) andeconomic discrimination (e.g. Pahl, 1989)4.Domestic violence (e.g. Ussher, 1997).A fifth category could include work that has considered alternative forms of marriage such as Ôpostgender marriagesÕ (e.g. Risman and Johnson-Summerford,1998), Ôfeminist marriagesÕ (e.g. DeHardt, 1993) or Ôpeer marriagesÕ (e.g. Bem,1998). The work conducted in these five areas offers a feminist analysis of marriage; however, little of the research considers the experience of marriage forheterosexual feminists. While the Church, State and media are outspoken on marriage, many heterosexual feminists have been strangely silent about their personal perspectives. A Marriage of Inconvenience?A key aim of this special feature is to broaden feminist discussions of marriageby bringing the personal (and political) perspectives and experiences of hetero-sexual feminists (and their male partners) to the debate. This special feature consists of ten contributions: six written by heterosexual couples who are eithermarried or contemplating marriage, and four written by heterosexual feministsoffering their personal perspectives on marriage. The papers are varied in theirfocus; however, some common themes emerge across them: that marriage is notundertaken lightly, that feminist critiques of marriage and its heterosexual privi-leges are of great concern to the contributors, and that feminism has a very realplace in their lived experience of marriage. The co-authored contributions do notsimply provide an unrestrained celebration of marriage; rather they indicate the struggles that married feminists undergo in choosing to participate in an institution that is both the heart of heterosexual privilege and the heart of hetero-Special Feature: FINLAY and CLARKE: A Marriage of Inconvenience41702_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 417 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
sexual womenÕs, lesbiansÕ and gay menÕs oppression. At the same time, the single authored pieces offer substantial challenges to conventional understand-ings of marriage and Ôthe coupleÕ Ð challenges that must be answered.Some of the pieces engage with and develop the categories of research andtheory listed by Dryden: Guy Faulkner and Sara-Jane Finlay discuss economics,Christine Laennec and Michael Syrotinski consider the division of labour andhousehold responsibilities, and Paul Marchbank and Heather Marchbank describethe evolution of a post-gender marriage. Personal reflection grounds their insightsin experience. There are some perspectives missing from this collection: most of the con-tributors are white and able-bodied. Although some are critical of the institution,with the exception of Virginia BraunÕs piece on communal living and VictoriaRobinsonÕs piece on non-monogamy (see also Jackson and Scott, 14(1)3), fewoffer significant alternatives to traditional marriage, of being married (or ÔdoingÕmarriage) and the privileged status of the heterosexual couple within western culture. In neglecting these aspects, none of the contributors consider how theirmarriage will change the world for their lesbian sisters and gay brothers. As Tina Modotti in the film Frida (dir. J. Taymor, 2002), Ashley Judd toaststhe marriage of Frida Kahlo to Diego Rivera saying:I donÕt believe in marriage. I really donÕt! Let me be clear about that. I think atworst itÕs a hostile political act. A way for small-minded men to keep women inthe house and out of the way, wrapped up in the guise of tradition and conserva-tive, religious nonsense. At best itÕs a happy delusion. ItÕs two people who trulylove each other and have no idea how truly miserable theyÕre about to make eachother. But when two people know all of that and decide, with eyes wide open, toface each other and get married anyway well, then, I donÕt think itÕs conserva-tive or delusional. I think itÕs radical. And courageous. And very romantic.These sentiments are expressed throughout this special feature. Like Modotti,Virginia Braun and Victoria Robinson do not believe in marriage. Braun objectsto the reification of Ôthe coupleÕ, and particularly the heterosexual couple, andRobinson views non-monogamy as a way of avoiding what she perceives as hermotherÕs negative experience of marriage. Fortunately, few of the contributionsare Ôwrapped in tradition and religious nonsenseÕ, but some reflect on these con-cerns. Sharn Rocco contemplates a marriage that appears to be a Ôpartnership ofequalsÕ but in actuality is rather traditional. Precilla Choi discusses her attemptsto distance herself from the tradition of marriage in her family, and both MerranToerien and Andrew Williams, and Guy Faulkner and Sara-Jane Finlay try toescape from Ôreligious nonsenseÕ by recreating or rewriting the traditional reli-gious wedding ceremony. Some of the contributors discuss the Ôhappy delusionsÕthat brought them to marriage. Sara-Jane Finlay mentions her surprise at hearingherself say ÔyesÕ to her partnerÕs proposal and Vivienne Elizabeth recalls timeswhen she has called her current partner her ÔhusbandÕ, although they are not married. All the contributions are in some way radical, and although not all the418Feminism & Psychology 13(4)02_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 418 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
authors were feminist when they married (e.g. Mary Gergen and KennethGergen, and Paul Marchbank and Heather Marchbank), all provide a feministanalysis of marriage and make theirpersonal political.NOTES1.This is the most recent year for which data is available. Figures for 2001 are publishedin the summer of 2003, after this special feature goes to press. 2.Although a recent Observer Magazine article (Rice, 2003) suggests that the figures for2002 show a decline to 249,227 marriages, which is the lowest rate since 1897. TheOffice for National Statistics is yet to provide official confirmation of these figures.3.This refers to the volume and issue containing the special features. Vol. 13(4) includesÔA Marriage of Inconvenience?Õ while 14(1) includes ÔFor Better or WorseÕ.REFERENCESAtkinson, T. (1974) Amazon Odyssey. New York: Links Books. Bedell, G. (2003) ÔWho Needs a Bit on the Side?Õ The Observer Review, 9 February 2003: 1.Bem, S. L. (1998) An Unconventional Family. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Bunch, C. (1987) Passionate Politics: Essays 1968Ð1986: Feminist Theory in Action. NewYork: St MartinÕs Press. DeHardt, D. C. (1993) ÔFeminist Therapy with Heterosexual Couples: The Ultimate Issueis DominationÕ, in S. Wilkinson and C. Kitzinger (eds), Heterosexuality, pp. 253Ð6.London: Sage.Delphy, C. and Leonard, D. (1992) Familiar Exploitation: A New Analysis of Marriage inContemporary Western Society. Cambridge: Polity. Dryden, C. (1999) Being Married, Doing Gender: A Critical Analysis of GenderRelationships in Marriage. London: Routledge.Firestone, S. (1979) The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. London: TheWomenÕs Press. Friedan, B. (1963) The Feminine Mystique. London: Penguin Books.Hagan, K.L. (1993) Fugitive Information: Essays from a Feminist Hothead. New York:Harper Collins. Haste, C. (1992) Rules of Desire: Sex in Britain World War 1 to the Present. London:Pimlico.Holland, J., Ramazanoglu, C., Sharpe, S. and Thomson, R. (1998) The Male in the Head:Young People, Heterosexuality and Power. London: The Tufnell Press.Hughes, K. (2001) ÔDivorce: Can it Feel This Good?Õ, The Observer, 12 August 2001: 14.Jaggar, A.M. (1994) Living with Contradictions: Controversies in Feminist Social Ethics.Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Johnson, M. (1988) Strong Mothers, Weak Wives: The Search for Gender Equality.Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Magnet, J. (2003) ÔIs Marriage the New Feminism?Õ The Daily Telegraph, 7 January 2003:15.Morrison, B. (2002) ÔWhy Do We Do It?Õ G2: The Guardian, 14 October 2002: 2.Oakley, A. (1974) Housewife. Harmondsworth: Penguin.Special Feature: FINLAY and CLARKE: A Marriage of Inconvenience41902_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 419 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Office for National Statistics (2000) Marriage, Divorce and Adoption Statistics, 2000,Series FM2, No. 28. Available: www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vink=581(accessed 29 April 2003).Pahl, J. (1989) Money and Marriage. Basingstoke: MacMillan. Pateman, C. (1988) The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity Press. Pepinster, C. and Mendick, R. (2001) ÔTo Love, Honour . . . and Divorce?Õ TheIndependent on Sunday, 19 August 2001: 3.Rice, M. (2003) ÔLove in the 21st CenturyÕ, Observer Magazine, 20 April 2003: 18Ð21.Rich, A. (1983) ÔCompulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian ExistenceÕ, in A. Snitow, C.Stansell and S. Thompson (eds), Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, pp. 212Ð41. London:Virago.Richardson, D., ed. (1996) Theorising Heterosexuality: Telling It Straight. Buckinghamand Philadelphia: Open University Press.Risman, B.J. and Johnson-Sumerford, D. (1998) ÔDoing it Fairly: A Study of PostgenderMarriagesÕ, Journal of Marriage and the Family60: 23Ð40. Robinson, V. (1997) ÔMy Baby Just Cares For Me: Feminism, Heterosexuality and Non-MonogamyÕ, Journal of Gender Studies 6(2): 143Ð157.Rosa, B. (1994) ÔAnti-monogamy: A Radical Challenge to Compulsory HeterosexualityÕ,in G. Griffin, M. Hester, S. Rai and S. Roseneil (eds), Stirring It: Challenges forFeminism, pp. 107Ð20. London: Taylor and Francis. Rubin, G. (1975) ÔThe Traffic in Women: Notes on the ÒPolitical EconomyÓ of SexÕ, inR.R. Reiter (ed.), Toward an Anthropology of Women, pp. 157Ð210. New York andLondon: Monthly Review Press. Stelboum, J.P. (1999) ÔPatriarchal MonogamyÕ, in M. Munson and J.P. Stelboum (eds),The Lesbian Polyamory Reader, pp. 39Ð46. New York: Haworth Press Inc.Ussher, J. (1991) WomenÕs Madness: Misogyny or Mental Illness? Brighton: HarvesterWheatsheaf.Ussher, J. (1997) Fantasies of Femininity. London: Penguin.Van Every, J. (1995) Heterosexual Women Changing the Family: Refusing to be a ÔWifeÕ!London: Taylor and Francis. Witz, A. (1993) ÔWomen at WorkÕ, in D. Richardson and V. Robinson (eds), IntroducingWomenÕs Studies, pp. 239Ð57. London: MacMillan. Sara-Jane FINLAYÕs most recent post was as a Senior Lecturer and Head ofMedia Studies at the College of St Mark and St John. She is currently ÔrestingÕ.Her research interests include the construction of sexual personas and the negotiation of political identity in culture.ADDRESS: 50 Castle Frank Road, Toronto, ON, Canada, M4W 2Z6. [email: [email protected]]Victoria CLARKE is a lecturer in the School of Cognitive, Developmental and Social Psychology at the University of the West of England. Her researchinterests include lesbian, gay and heterosexual relationships and marriage.ADDRESS: School of Cognitive, Developmental and Social Psychology,Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of the West of England, Oldbury CourtRoad, Bristol BS16 2JP, UK. [email: [email protected]]420Feminism & Psychology 13(4)02_FAP13/4 articles 9/11/03 11:07 AM Page 420 by guest on January 29, 2013fap.sagepub.comDownloaded from View publication stats
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