Discuss prejudice and stereotypes in terms of: In-group and out-group Cultural differences How the media affects prejudice How might interventions reduce stereotype th
Discuss prejudice and stereotypes in terms of:
- In-group and out-group
- Cultural differences
- How the media affects prejudice
- How might interventions reduce stereotype threat?
The British Psychological
British Journal of Social Psychology (2009), 48, 1–33 Society
q 2009 The British Psychological Society
www.bpsjournals.co.uk
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Stereotype content model across cultures: Towards universal similarities and some differences
Amy J. C. Cuddy1*, Susan T. Fiske2, Virginia S. Y. Kwan2, Peter Glick3, Stéphanie Demoulin4, Jacques-Philippe Leyens4, Michael Harris Bond5, Jean-Claude Croizet6, Naomi Ellemers7, Ed Sleebos7, Tin Tin Htun8, Hyun-Jeong Kim9, Greg Maio10, Judi Perry11, Kristina Petkova12, Valery Todorov12, Rosa Rodrı́guez-Bailón13, Elena Morales13, Miguel Moya13, Marisol Palacios13, Vanessa Smith14, Rolando Perez14, Jorge Vala15
and Rene Ziegler16
1Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, USA 2Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA 3Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin, USA 4Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium 5Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong 6University of Poitiers, Poitiers, France 7Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands 8Japan Women’s University, Tokyo, Japan 9Ewha Women’s University, Seoul, South Korea 10Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK 11University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway 12Institute of Sociology, Sofa, Bulgaria 13University of Granada, Granada, Spain 14University of Costa Rica, San Pedro, Costa Rica 15University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal 16Eberhard-Karls-Universitaet Tuebingen, Tuebingen, Germany
After the first six authors, the remaining authors are listed alphabetically by the last name of our primary contact at the university. * Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Amy J. C. Cuddy, Harvard Business School, Soldiers Field Road, Boston, MA 02163 USA (e-mail: [email protected]).
DOI:10.1348/014466608X314935
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2 Amy J. C. Cuddy et al.
The stereotype content model (SCM) proposes potentially universal principles of societal stereotypes and their relation to social structure. Here, the SCM reveals theoretically grounded, cross-cultural, cross-groups similarities and one difference across 10 non-US nations. Seven European (individualist) and three East Asian (collectivist) nations (N ¼ 1; 028) support three hypothesized cross-cultural similarities: (a) perceived warmth and competence reliably differentiate societal group stereotypes; (b) many out-groups receive ambivalent stereotypes (high on one dimension; low on the other); and (c) high status groups stereotypically are competent, whereas competitive groups stereotypically lack warmth. Data uncover one consequential cross-cultural difference: (d) the more collectivist cultures do not locate reference groups (in-groups and societal prototype groups) in the most positive cluster (high-competence/high-warmth), unlike individualist cultures. This demonstrates out-group derogation without obvious reference-group favouritism. The SCM can serve as a pancultural tool for predicting group stereotypes from structural relations with other groups in society, and comparing across societies.
When Celso Curzi first emigrated from Italy in the late 1950s to be a guest worker in Germany, his bosses treated him as ‘shiftless’ and ‘unreliable’ (Landler, 2003, July 20). Well aware of the prejudices between the two countries, he never expected to stay. But he fell in love with a German woman, married, and put down roots. Even so, the intergroup prejudices were entrenched, from 2,000 years of religious, cultural, and territorial struggles. Italians viewed Germans as expert but heartless mercenaries, and Germans saw Italians as gregarious but ineffectual buffoons. Mr Curzi explained to a New York Times reporter: ‘Germans love Italians, but don’t admire them. Italians admire Germans, but don’t love them’. He illustrates (a) two potentially universal dimensions of social perception (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007) and (b) two potentially universal, ambivalent: competent but cold versus warm but incompetent.
Such stereotypes stem from phenomena common to all humans: (1) the basic survival need to identify ‘friends or foes’ and (2) the ubiquity of hierarchical status differences and competition for resources. In the US, stereotype content and its social structural correlates have proved systematic, in three respects (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Fiske et al., 2007). First, across groups, stereotypes share common dimensions of content – warmth and competence. Second, many out-groups receive ambivalent stereotypes – more positive on one dimension and less positive on another. Third, group stereotypes follow from social structure: perceived status predicts competence stereotypes and perceived competitiveness predicts (lack of) warmth stereotypes. A variety of US samples, including a representative survey, support these hypotheses.
If these are general principles, then they should not be unique to US groups or respondents. On the contrary, they should be human universals (i.e. etics) (Triandis & Marin, 1983), regardless of groups and cultures. Alternatively, SCM phenomena could indeed be culture-bound (emics) – indigenous to the US. For example, given political correctness norms, US perceivers might more often balance a negative stereotype with a subjectively positive one (making ambivalent stereotypes). Or perhaps the SCM just reflects the unusually multicultural US. Cultural influences might preclude universal principles of stereotyping.
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Stereotype content model across cultures
General overview This research has three general goals. First, while the contents of specific societal stereotypes may differ between cultures, several principles that predict those contents remain intact across cultures.
Second, a previous tenet of the intergroup relations literature, namely that out-group derogation follows from in-group preference, may not hold in quite the way assumed. From Sumner (1906) and Allport (1954) onward, intergroup relations theory has assumed that people first love their in-groups and consequently hate out-groups. But the SCM provides a more nuanced analysis, suggesting that out-groups can be liked (even if not respected) or respected (even if not liked). If the in-group can admit that out-groups have some positive features, the logical extreme is that the in-group need not be viewed as extremely superior on every dimension, to differentiate in-group from out-group. Hence: Out-group derogation does not require favouritism of reference groups relative to other societal groups.
Third, the SCM can serve as a pancultural measure of differences across cultures. Applying the same valid and systematic framework in different cultures not only allows the discovery of similarities, it also puts differences in stark relief. For example, models of personality (e.g. Eysenck & Long, 1986; Katigbak, Church, Guanzon-Lapena, Carlota, & del Pilar, 2002; McCrae & Allik, 2002), implicit trait beliefs (Church et al., 2003), emotion categories (Hupka, Lenton, & Hutchison, 1999), and value dimensions (Bond, 1988; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990) all have proven worthy tools in key cross-cultural discoveries, transcending a US-centred understanding.
The stereotype content model The term stereotype often implies uniform antipathy towards a social group (Allport, 1954; Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Sigall & Page, 1971). In this view, stereotypes are unidimensional, falling along a single general goodness–badness dimension. But stereotypes are neither univalent nor unidimensional.
Two primary dimensions of stereotype content Upon encountering out-group members, we posit that people ask two questions: Do they intend to harm me; and are they capable of harming me? The two core dimensions of general stereotype content that we propose, warmth (e.g. friendly, good-natured, sincere, and warm) and competence (e.g. capable, competent, confident, and skillful), respectively, answer these questions (for reviews, see Cuddy et al., 2008; Fiske et al., 2007). These dimensions emerge in classic person perception (Asch, 1946; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968), social-value orientations (e.g. self- and other-
profitability; Peeters, 2002), construals of others’ behaviours (Wojciszke, 1994), and voters’ ratings of political candidates (Kinder & Sears, 1981). In fact, they account for 82% of the variance in global impressions of other individuals (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Related dimensions also describe national stereotypes and prejudices towards specific groups (both reviewed below). Data from US surveys illustrate how stereotypes array on the two dimensions (Figure 1) and support SCM hypotheses (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002).
Ambivalent stereotypes Support for SCM’s ambivalent stereotypes hypothesis – that many groups are tagged as proficient in one sphere (i.e. either warmth or competence) and inferior in the
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4 Amy J. C. Cuddy et al.
Figure 1. Group competence–warmth stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002, Study 3). Key: Stars indicate
cluster centres. H, M, and L, respectively, indicate high, medium, and low; W, warmth; C, competence.
other – stems from stereotypes of specific social groups. Two types of stereotyped groups materialize in this literature – those viewed as kind but helpless, and those viewed as skillful but cunning. ‘Envious’ prejudice targets the latter, seen as threateningly competent and untrustworthy (Fiske et al., 2002; Glick, 2002; Glick & Fiske, 2001a, 2001b).1 For example, non-traditional women, such as career women and feminists, allegedly possess agentic but not communal traits, and are respected but disliked – embodying envious prejudice (Eagly & Kite, 1987; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001a; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998; Spence & Helmreich, 1979). Envious prejudice also targets Asian Americans and other "model minorities", stereotyped as excessively competent (too ambitious, too hardworking) and lacking sociability (Ho & Jackson, 2001; Hurh & Kim, 1989; Kitano & Sue, 1973; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005; Maddux, Galinsky, Cuddy, & Polifroni, 2008). Similarly, stereotypes of Jews combine business acumen with interpersonal self-interest (Allport, 1954; Glick, 2002).
Groups seen as benevolent but incapable of competing in mainstream society sit in the opposite corner of the map. This ‘pitying’ prejudice reflects liking but disrespect (Glick & Fiske, 2001a, 2001b; Jackman, 2001) and often targets traditional women (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001a) and older people (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005; Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989; Kite, Deaux, & Miele, 1991), both perceived as high on communal, but low on agentic traits.
1 The SCM also links each combination of high–low warmth–competence stereotypes to specific emotional prejudices: admiration (warm–competent); contempt (cold–incompetent); envy (cold–competent); and pity (warm–incompetent). For a discussion of these predictions and findings, please see Cuddy et al. (2007, 2008) and Fiske et al. (2002).
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Stereotype content model across cultures
Still, some groups receive evaluatively consistent stereotypes. Groups perceived as both hostile and indolent most elicit the antipathy traditionally associated with derogated groups. Conversely, in-groups and mainstream social groups are favoured as both warm and competent, eliciting pride and admiration (Fiske et al., 2002).
Overall, these four clusters of stereotype content, defined in the competence £ warmth space, should be universal. Our first goal examines this universality of content across cultures and groups.
Social structural correlates of stereotypes All complex societies organize hierarchically and compete for resources. These structural relations forecast groups’ location on the SCM’s competence £ warmth space. Stereotypes are shaped by perceived and actual economic, geographic, normative, and power relationships (Eagly & Kite, 1987; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994; Poppe, 2001). In the SCM, judged warmth and competence stem from appraisals of, respectively, (a) the potential harm or benefit of the target’s intent and (b) whether the target can effectively enact that intent. In the stereotype space, competitors lack warmth, while non-competitors are warm; high status people are competent, while low status people are incompetent. Besides US surveys (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002), the structural predictors appear in experiments on intergroup perception (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2007; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007) and interpersonal perception (Russell & Fiske, 2007).
Social structure determines competence and warmth throughout the interpersonal and intergroup perception literatures. Impression-formation research (Wojciszke, 2005) demonstrates that perceived status predicts perceived competence, and self-interest (akin to competition) predicts perceived morality (akin to warmth). Similarly, European nations’ perceived economic power (i.e. status) predicts perceived competence, and conflict (i.e. competitiveness) predicts perceived warmth (Poppe, 2001).
People link perceived traits with social structure for several reasons. First, they legitimate unfair social structures over which they feel they have no control (for a review, see Glick & Fiske, 2001a). For example, just-world thinking leads people to view outcomes as deserved (Lerner & Miller, 1978): groups with high status, well-paying jobs must have earned them through talent and hard work. And indeed, the status–competence correlation varies by individual differences in just-world beliefs (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). Similarly, system-justification legitimates group-level sociopolitical and socio-economic inequalities ( Jost & Banaji, 1994). Superordinate groups justify their advantage by viewing the status quo as fair, and even subordinate groups may endorse this view because it explains their own outcomes. In short, status predicts competence stereotypes because it justifies the apparent meritocracy. Competition negatively predicts warmth stereotypes because it can exclude groups with goals that conflict with those of the in-group. If they are not nice, why include them?
Additionally, people may simply infer a group’s traits from their social position. In interpreting behaviour, westerners tend to over-use internal dispositions, ignoring the influence of the situation (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). Thus, when a group is supposedly overrepresented in high status positions, people may attribute this to the group’s perceived competence. Likewise, when a group is viewed as competing for resources, such as tax dollars, people may attribute this behaviour to the group’s alleged malice. Thus, our first goal also addresses potentially universal principles in predictors of stereotypes.
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6 Amy J. C. Cuddy et al.
Out-group derogation and reference-group favouritism Our second goal revisits a heretofore universal principle of prejudice, namely that in-group favouritism underlies out-group derogation (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Sumner, 1906). The SCM can re-examine this idea across societies, by comparing societal in-groups, relative to societal out-groups. If many out-groups are ambivalent, as the SCM predicts, then they may be positive on at least one dimension, calling into question the necessity of absolute in-group superiority. Because of potential cultural differences in views of the in-group (see below), a cross-cultural comparison allows us to explore this question.
Our societal level of analysis revives a construct with a rich history in social psychology: reference groups (e.g. Hyman, 1942; Merton, 1957). In US SCM maps, the only unambivalently positive stereotypes describe reference groups, including personal in-groups (e.g. students) and societal prototype groups (e.g. Christians, middle-class, Whites). Defined as ‘psychologically significant for one’s attitudes and behaviour’ (Turner, 1991, p. 5), reference groups are those with which an individual identifies, and are often, but not always, in-groups (Allport, 1954; Mackie & Wright, 2001; Turner, 1991). They also can be societal prototype groups – valued mainstream groups that are not necessarily in-groups (e.g. middle-class and Whites in the US). Reference groups have theoretically served as normative standards for social comparison and most often, social aspiration (Hyman, 1942; Merton, 1957; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Because the current studies ask participants to report societal stereotypes, we consider reference groups rather than demographic in-groups. The term ‘reference group’ applies to both valued personal in-groups (e.g. students) and to societal prototype groups.
Reference-group favouritism – preferring personal in-groups (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Brown, 1998; Fiske, 1998; Sumner, 1906) or societal prototype groups (cf., Jost & Burgess, 2000) – has always seemed to underlie bias, more than out-group derogation. In the US, the Protestant work ethic exhorts people to work hard towards goals (Weber, 1905/1958); everyone can be optimistic about assimilating to the mainstream if some reference groups are apparently ideal (i.e. both warm and competent). The SCM predicts reference groups to lodge in the high–high cluster, separated from other groups, and the US data consistently support this (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Goal 2 explores the role of reference-group favouritism in out-group derogation.
Support for the SCM in the United States Our third goal explores the SCM’s applicability to cultural differences, in comparison with multiple US samples supporting the competence £ warmth space and mixied stereotypes (as reviewed: Figure 1; Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 1999, 2002). Supporting the social structure hypothesis, correlations between status and competence (positive) and between competition and warmth (negative) consistently showed moderate to large effects (see Table 1, top row), with high status groups viewed as highly competent, and competitive groups perceived as lacking warmth.
Challenges to the universality of the SCM As David Schneider writes, ‘it is hard to escape the notion that cultures provide much of the content of stereotypes; they tell us what to think’ (1996, p. 432). Indeed, culture is a fundamental, pervasive environment that influences how people feel, think, and behave (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998). Culture originates from
Study Status–competence r Competition–warmth r
Fiske et al. (2002b), Study 2 (N ¼ 147) .88** 2 .31** Preliminary study: Belgium (N ¼ 40) .75** 2 .30** Study 1: EU nations
Belgium (N ¼ 43) .72** 2 .48** France (N ¼ 150) .63** 2 .02 Germany (N ¼ 98) .68** 2 .15* The Netherlands (N ¼ 122) .84** 2 .05 Portugal (N ¼ 102) .85** 2 .17** Spain (N ¼ 199) .87** 2 .15* UK (N ¼ 41) .85** 2 .04 EU combined (N ¼ 755) .89** 2 .25**
Study 2: Asian collectivist samples Hong Kong (N ¼ 60) .87** 2 .15* Japan (N ¼ 83) .75** 2 .17** South Korea (N ¼ 91) .64** 2 .39**
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Stereotype content model across cultures
Table 1. Social structure-stereotype correlations, all studies
Note. *p , :05; **p , :01. Correlations were calculated at the level of individual participants, not group means. European Union samples included: 43 (74% female, mean age ¼ 20:3) at the Université
Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium; 150 (91% female, mean age ¼ 19:7) at Université
Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, France; 98 (53% female, mean age ¼ 23:4) at Eberhard-Karls- Universitaet Tuebingen, Germany; 122 (55% female, mean age ¼ 19:7) at Leiden University, The Netherlands; 102 (no demographic data reported) at the University of Lisbon, Portugal; 199 (no demographic data collected) at the University of Granada, Spain; and 41 (66% female, mean age ¼ 22:2) at Cardiff University, Wales, UK.
a society’s geographic, ecological, economic, demographic, genetic, and historical features. The resulting cultural systems appear in a society’s norms, ideals, and values, and persist through its institutions and socialization practices (Hofstede, 1980). No two societies are characterized by identical cultural systems, and societies’ unique cultural predispositions influence perceivers and targets.
How culture affects perceivers Countless cultural differences in how people perceive the world could undermine potentially universal principles of stereotyping. Within this vast literature, a few findings could limit the SCM’s potentially universal principles: category use; dispositional bias; legitimating ideologies; valued traits; multiculturalism; and most central, individualism-
collectivism (IC). First, culture affects basic cognitive processes (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan,
2001; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). For instance, compared with East Asians, North Americans tend to think more with the aid of categories (Chiu, 1972; Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997; Norenzayan et al., 2002), a social-cognitive process at the root of stereotyping (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). If people in non-US cultures think less with categories, a skeptic might propose that they are less likely to fall prey to the social consequences of categorical thinking (i.e. stereotyping), thus rendering SCM dimensions inapplicable.
Second, North Americans more than members of other cultures attribute people’s behaviours and outcomes (competitiveness and status) to dispositions (warmth and
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8 Amy J. C. Cuddy et al.
competence) as opposed to situations (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Miller, 1984; Morris, Nisbett, & Peng, 1995; Morris & Peng, 1994). As noted, the perceived relationship between social structure and stereotypes might rest on this attributional bias – people earn high status because they are competent, and people who are competitive must also be cold. According to the skeptic, cultures without a strong dispositional bias might not use structural outcomes to infer traits.
Third, culture shapes the ideologies that legitimate prejudice (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Crandall & Martinez, 1996; Crandall et al., 2001; Glick et al., 2000). Cultural ideologies govern what people see as good and bad, thereby stipulating which groups will become the targets of prejudice. For example, North Americans score parti- cularly high in just-world thinking (Loo, 2002), which provides moral justifications for good and bad outcomes. Especially relevant to the perceived relationship between status and competence, cultures lower in just-world thinking might not perceive the same link.
Fourth, cultures come with different values that influence which traits reflect goodness, morality, and social acceptance (e.g. Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997; Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Wheeler & Kim, 1997). For example, southern Mediterranean cultures (e.g. France, Greece, and Spain) especially value characteristics that reflect excitement-seeking and appreciation of novelty (Aaker, Benet-Martinez, & Garolera, 2001). Contrary to universality, some societies might not value highly enough SCM’s traits – competence and warmth – to use them in forming stereotypes.
Fifth, a culture’s political ideals influence how its citizens perceive out-groups. Political correctness, for instance, might lead US citizens to bestow on out-groups a partially positive stereotype, increasing the frequency of ambivalent stereotypes. Political correctness results in part from the US status as an immigrant society, with the world’s longest continuous history of receiving immigrants (Dovidio & Esses, 2001). Thus, multicultural ideals also infuse US political dialogue, making diversity an objective (Berry, 2001), which might lead US perceivers to differentiate groups on more than one evaluative dimension. A skeptic could argue that this uniquely US context underlies the SCM.
In short, ample evidence would suggest to a skeptic that cultural influences should preclude universal principles of stereotyping. The preceding five issues all predict cultural differences at least between US and East Asian perceivers, consistent with Goal 3.
Finally, cultural analyses raise an issue consistent with both Goals 2 and 3: the generality of reference-group favouritism for collectivist cultures. Interdependent (i.e. collectivist) selves do not self-promote to the same extent as independent (i.e. individualist) selves (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997), to ensure social harmony (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Collectivists self- enhance less than individualists (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kitayama et al., 1997), rate failures as more self-relevant (Heine et al., 2001; Lee & Seligman, 1997), and self-criticize more (Kitayama et al., 1997). This might generalize to the group level (Heine & Lehman, 1997; cf. Muramoto & Yamaguchi, 1997; but also see Hewstone, Bond, & Wan, 1983; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974). In-group favouritism may diminish in collectivist settings, befitting cultural ideals of maturity as modest, humble, and self-improving. Group ideals may depend on moderation: What is average is good. Collectivist cultures show less personal optimism (Heine et al., 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) and less interpersonal positivity bias (Yamagishi, Cook, & Watanabe, 1998), perhaps particularly towards reference groups. Considerable evidence thus
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Stereotype content model across cultures
suggests that more collectivist cultures may not uniformly favour reference groups. If so, out-group derogation might also weaken in these cultures.
A variety of perspectives suggest cultural differences. But much of this research compares North American (more individualist) with East Asian (more collectivist) perceivers. Most cultural psychology assumes that other western perceivers, namely Europeans, would resemble North Americans, in contrast to East Asia. These are empirical questions we explore here.
How culture affects targets Still our skeptic might persist: culture could rule out a pancultural canon of stereotyping through target group differences. The unusually diverse US population, representing myriad racial, ethnic, religious, political, professional, economic, and other types of backgrounds might force an efficient, meaningful, and systematic differentiation. The SCM’s principles of stereotyping might be particularly well-suited to forming categories in the unusually diverse, heterogeneous US population. Less heterogeneous cultures might not have the same need.
Additionally, each nation’s unique immigration history can shape that nation’s level of diversity and therefore intergroup conflict. Realistic group conflict theory (Campbell, 1965) attributes anti-immigrant prejudice to perceived economic and value competition (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Thus, from a skeptic’s perspective, this particularly salient competition might strengthen the SCM’s prediction of stereotypes in the US, compared with other places.
Pancultural principles of prejudice The SCM proposes potentially universal
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