Need to present a Discussion with a word count of above 150+ words and each discussion need a separate reference link for sure. 1) End point detection and Response (EDR) (150 w
Need to present a Discussion with a word count of above 150+ words and each discussion need a separate reference link for sure.
1) End point detection and Response (EDR) (150 words)
2)VMware carbon Black (Endpoint) ( Need this same topic in two different formats and 2 different URL links as well needed) (150+150 = 300 words)
3)SMishing (150 words)
4)Malvertising ( Need this same topic in two different format like we did previously and 2 different URL links as well needed) ( 150+150 = 300 words)
Need to present a research report on with a word count no more than 70-110 words(not more than the count provided) and should provide a separate
URL reference link too
1) End point detection and Response (EDR). 70-110 words
2) VMware carbon Black (Endpoint) ( Need this same topic in two different formats and 2 different URL links as well needed) (70+70 = 140 words)
3)SMishing 70-110 words
4)Malvertising ( Need this same topic in two different format like we did previously and 2 different URL links as well needed) (70+70 = 140 words+)
It is suggested you use a Research Theme to help you stay focused, and to provide continuity throughout your research. Here is a list of ideas, but this list is not all-inclusive:
- Current technologies available to support management functions,
- Best Practices,
- Future improvements/technologies, or
- Other standards related to your specific field.
Note: The content should be in a general words with no technical jargons.
This question is from a cyber security subject so that the matter should relate to cyber security for sure and should connect to readers.
NO PLAGIARISM STRICTLY
Each one should be different and no each topic information should be similar to the other topic strictly.
Deadline: 01/26/2023 12PM CST
Security in Computing, Fifth Edition
Chapter 3: Programs and Programming
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
1
Brief Review Chapter 2
Authentication is someone proving who they are
Authorization is about access control
Certification Error
2
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Objectives for Chapter 3
Learn about memory organization, buffer overflows, and relevant countermeasures
Common programming bugs, such as off-by-one errors, race conditions, and incomplete mediation
Survey of past malware and malware capabilities
Virus detection
Tips for programmers on writing code for security
3
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Program Security
This chapter deals with writing of programs and will be built upon in later chapters.
Is a program secure?
What characteristics?
Time to break security
Run for a time without failure
Zero tolerance
Factor of QUALITY
Quantity and types of faults as evidence of quality
4
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Terminology
Bugs: A software bug is an error, flaw, failure or fault in a computer program or system that causes it to produce an incorrect or unexpected result, or to behave in unintended ways.
Error: When a human makes a mistake (non malicious) in performing some software activity, the error may lead to a fault, or an incorrect step, command, process, or data definition in a computer program.
Failure: Is a departure from the system's required behavior.
5
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
5
Types of Flaws
Validation error (incomplete or inconsistent): permission checks
Domain error: controlled access to data
Serialization and aliasing: program flow order
Inadequate identification and authentication: basis for authorization
Boundary condition violation: failure on first or last case
Other exploitable logic errors
6
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Memory Allocation
7
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Much of this chapter requires basic knowledge of how memory is organized, and this is a nice, simple diagram to refresh students on how it works. The key takeaways: code and data separated, with the heap growing up toward high addresses and the stack growing down from the high addresses.
7
Data vs. Instructions
8
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
The same hex value in the same spot in memory can either be a meaningful data value or a meaningful instruction depending on whether the computer treats it as code or data. This will be the basis of the attacks in the following slides.
8
Buffer Overflows
Occur when data is written beyond the space allocated for it, such as a 10th byte in a 9-byte array
In a typical exploitable buffer overflow, an attacker’s inputs are expected to go into regions of memory allocated for data, but those inputs are instead allowed to overwrite memory holding executable code
The trick for an attacker is finding buffer overflow opportunities that lead to overwritten memory being executed, and finding the right code to input
9
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
How Buffer Overflows Happen
char sample[10];
int i;
for (i=0; i<=9; i++)
sample[i] = ‘A’;
sample[10] = ‘B’;
10
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
This is a very simple buffer overflow. 10 bytes to store buffer, but Character B is placed in memory that wasn’t allocated by or for this procedure.
This is a very simple buffer overflow. Character B is placed in memory that wasn’t allocated by or for this procedure.
10
Memory Organization
11
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Similar to the earlier picture on memory organization, only this one shows where the system data/code reside vs. where the program code and its local data reside. This context is important for understanding how an attack that takes place inside a given program can affect that program vs. how it can affect the rest of the system.
11
Where a Buffer Can Overflow
12
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
The memory that’s overwritten depends on where the buffer resides.
Examples of buffer overflow effects in the context of the earlier AAAAAAAAAAB example. The memory that’s overwritten depends on where the buffer resides.
12
The Stack
13
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
13
The Stack after Procedure Calls
14
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
When procedure A calls procedure B, procedure B gets added to the stack along with a pointer back to procedure A. In this way, when procedure B is finished running, it can get popped off the stack, and procedure A will just continue executing where it left off.
When procedure A calls procedure B, procedure B gets added to the stack along with a pointer back to procedure A. In this way, when procedure B is finished running, it can get popped off the stack, and procedure A will just continue executing where it left off.
14
Compromised Stack
15
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Instead of pointing at procedure B in this case, the program counter is pointing at code that’s been placed on the stack as a result of an overflow.
15
Overwriting Memory for Execution
Overwrite the program counter stored in the stack
Overwrite part of the code in low memory, substituting new instructions
Overwrite the program counter and data in the stack so that the program counter points to the stack
16
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Harm from Buffer Overflows
Overwrite:
Another piece of your program’s data
An instruction in your program
Data or code belonging to another program
Data or code belonging to the operating system
Overwriting a program’s instructions gives attackers that program’s execution privileges
Overwriting operating system instructions gives attackers the operating system’s execution privileges
17
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Overflow Countermeasures
Staying within bounds
Check lengths before writing
Confirm that array subscripts are within limits
Double-check boundary condition code for off-by-one errors
Limit input to the number of acceptable characters
Limit programs’ privileges to reduce potential harm
Many languages have overflow protections
Code analyzers can identify many overflow vulnerabilities
Canary values in stack to signal modification
18
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Incomplete Mediation
Mediation: Verifying that the subject is authorized to perform the operation on an object
Preventing incomplete mediation:
Validate all input
Limit users’ access to sensitive data and functions
http://www.somesite.com/subpage/userinput.asp?parm1=(808)555-1212&parm2=2009Jan17
19
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
19
Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use
Mediation performed with a “bait and switch” in the middle
Example: A student is buying a school book that costs $100. The student removes five $20 bills from a wallet, carefully counts them in front of the seller, and lays them on the table. Then the seller turns around to write a receipt. While the seller's back is turned, the student takes back one $20 bill. When the seller turns around, the student hands over the stack of bills, takes the receipt, and leaves with the book. Between the time the security was checked (counting the bills) and the access (exchanging the sculpture for the bills), a condition changed: What was checked is no longer valid when the object (that is, the sculpture) is accessed.
20
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
20
Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use
Mediation performed with a “bait and switch” in the middle
21
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
To carry out this authorization sequence, the access control mediator would have to look up the file name (and the user identity and any other relevant parameters) in tables. The mediator could compare the names in the table to the file name in the data structure to determine whether access is appropriate. More likely, the mediator would copy the file name into its own local storage area and compare from there. Comparing from the copy leaves the data structure in the user's area, under the user's control. It is at this point that the incomplete mediation flaw can be exploited. While the mediator is checking access rights for the file my_file, the user could change the file name descriptor to your_file, the value shown in Figure 3-3. Having read the work ticket once, the mediator would not be expected to reread the ticket before approving it; the mediator would approve the access and send the now-modified descriptor to the file handler.
21
Race Conditions
22
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example 1 (no race condition): A booker books the last seat on the plane, and thereafter the system shows no seat available. See next slide to continue.
22
Race Conditions
23
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example 2 (race condition): Before the first booker can complete the booking for the last available seat, a second booker looks for available seats. This system has a race condition, where the overlap in timing of the requests causes errant behavior.
23
Other Programming Oversights
Undocumented access points (backdoors)
Off-by-one errors
Integer overflows
Unterminated null-terminated string
Parameter length, type, or number errors
Unsafe utility libraries
24
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Malware
Programs planted by an agent with malicious intent to cause unanticipated or undesired effects
Virus
A program that can replicate itself and pass on malicious code to other nonmalicious programs by modifying them
Worm
A program that spreads copies of itself through a network
Trojan horse
Code that, in addition to its stated effect, has a second, nonobvious, malicious effect
25
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Types of Malware
26
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Types of Malware (cont.)
27
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
History of Malware
28
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
History of Malware (cont.)
29
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Harm from Malicious Code
Harm to users and systems:
Sending email to user contacts
Deleting or encrypting files
Modifying system information, such as the Windows registry
Stealing sensitive information, such as passwords
Attaching to critical system files
Hide copies of malware in multiple complementary locations
Harm to the world:
Some malware has been known to infect millions of systems, growing at a geometric rate
Infected systems often become staging areas for new infections
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From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Transmission and Propagation
Setup and installer program
Attached file
Document viruses
Autorun
Using nonmalicious programs:
Appended viruses
Viruses that surround a program
Integrated viruses and replacements
31
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Malware Activation
One-time execution (implanting)
Boot sector viruses
Memory-resident viruses
Application files
Code libraries
32
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Virus Effects
33
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Countermeasures for Users
Use software acquired from reliable sources
Test software in an isolated environment
Only open attachments when you know them to be safe
Treat every website as potentially harmful
Create and maintain backups
34
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Virus Detection
Virus scanners look for signs of malicious code infection using signatures in program files and memory
Traditional virus scanners have trouble keeping up with new malware—detect about 45% of infections
Detection mechanisms:
Known string patterns in files or memory
Execution patterns
Storage patterns
https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/
35
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Virus Signatures
36
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Countermeasures for Developers
Modular code: Each code module should be
Single-purpose
Small
Simple
Independent
Encapsulation
Information hiding
Mutual Suspicion
Confinement
Genetic diversity
37
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Code Testing
Unit testing
Integration testing
Function testing
Performance testing
Acceptance testing
Installation testing
Regression testing
Penetration testing
38
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Design Principles for Security
Least privilege
Economy of mechanism
Open design
Complete mediation
Permission based
Separation of privilege
Least common mechanism (no sharing)
Ease of use
39
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Other Countermeasures
Good
Proofs of program correctness—where possible
Defensive programming – to ensure the continuing function of a piece of software under unforeseen circumstances.
Design by contract (DbC) – specify pre-/post- conditions.
Bad
Penetrate-and-patch
Security by obscurity (secrecy of design)
40
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
Flaws & Controls
Two classes of security flaws: those that compromise or change data and those that affect computer service.
There are three controls on such activities: development controls, operating system controls, and administrative controls.
Development controls limit software development activities, making it harder for a developer to create malicious programs. These same controls are effective against inadvertent mistakes made by developers. Program controls help produce better software.
The operating system provides some degree of control by limiting access to computing system objects. They limit access as a way of promoting the safe sharing of information among programs.
Administrative controls limit the kinds of actions people can take, and improves system usability, reusability, and maintainability.
41
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
41
Summary
Buffer overflow attacks can take advantage of the fact that code and data are stored in the same memory in order to maliciously modify executing programs
Programs can have a number of other types of vulnerabilities, including off-by-one errors, incomplete mediation, and race conditions
Malware can have a variety of harmful effects depending on its characteristics, including resource usage, infection vector, and payload
Developers can use a variety of techniques for writing and testing code for security
For fun: http://www.fogcam.org/
42
From Security in Computing, Fifth Edition, by Charles P. Pfleeger, et al. (ISBN: 9780134085043). Copyright 2015 by Pearson Education, Inc. All rights reserved.
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