criminal justice report and need an explanation and answer to help me learn. Complete the Threat Assessment Plan IV Evaluation of Protective Resources? worksheet ( attached) and p

criminal justice report and need an explanation and answer to help me learn.

Complete the Threat Assessment Plan IV Evaluation of Protective Resources? worksheet ( attached) and post it to the CLC Peer Review Forum on Day 4 of Topic 4. (Your instructor will establish the Groups for the CLC Peer Review Forum.) Review your peers work and provide substantive feedback regarding the lessons from the OKC bombing and its application for future threats to the specific environment (Respond only to Q. 4 in the worksheet) You will need to complete your comments by day 7 of Topic 4. You will submit your Topic 4 assignment to the instructor at the end of Topic 4 without the peer review revisions; you will need to make revisions from instructor feedback and peer feedback, before submitting Part IV in your TAP in Topic 8. Responses need to reflect the terminology of the industry.
Be sure to cite three to five relevant scholarly sources in support of your content. Use only sources found at the GCU Library, government websites or those provided in Class Resources. Some resources are attached if you can use them.
This assignment uses a rubric. Please review the rubric prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion.
While APA style is not required for the body of this assignment, solid academic writing is expected, and in-text citations and references should be presented using APA documentation guidelines
Requirements: Worksheet completion
JUS-470 Topic 4 Evaluation of Protective Resources
Instructions: Research a case study on the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and address the following questions regarding the protection of assets.
Your response to each question should be within the listed word count parameters, and you will need to cite in-text and list your references at the end of the worksheet. You may use bullet points when a list is necessary. Each question need to be answered by using the terminology of the industry.
Be sure to cite three to five relevant scholarly sources in support of your content. Use only sources found at the GCU Library, government websites or those provided in Class Resources.
This assignment uses a scoring guide. Please review the scoring guide prior to beginning the assignment to become familiar with the expectations for successful completion.
While APA style is not required for the body of this assignment, solid academic writing is expected, and in-text citations and references should be presented using APA documentation guidelines, which can be found in the APA Style Guide, located in the Student Success Center.
You are required to submit this assignment to LopesWrite. A link to the LopesWrite technical support articles is located in Class Resources if you need assistance.
In general, describe the types of technology that have been used in the past and what is currently being used to protect assets from various threats. (150-200 words)
What technologies were being used to protect the assets when the attack in OKC took place? (150-200 words)
How was the OKC attack able to be executed when those technologies were in place? What technologies available today, would have improved the chances of better protecting the assets? (150-200 words)
Regarding the environment that you have chosen in this course, apply the lessons of the OKC bombing by explaining how you can better protect the assets in your environment from various threats. (250-300 words) NOTE: This is the question that you will address in the Peer Review Forum.
References

401 Regulation of Emerging Risks Matthew T. Wansley* Why has the EPA not regulated fracking? Why has the FDA not regulated e-cigarettes? Why has NHTSA not regulated autonomous vehicles? This Article argues that administrative agencies predictably fail to regulate emerging risks when the political environment for regulation is favorable. The cause is a combination of administrative law and interest group politics. Agencies must satisfy high initial informational thresholds to regulate, so they postpone rulemaking in the face of uncertainty about the effects of new technologies. But while regulators passively acquire more information, fledgling industries consolidate and become politically entrenched. By the time agencies can justify regulation, the newly entrenched industries have the political capital to thwart them. This Article offers a prophylactic against this predictable regulatory failure. It defends an experimentalist model of regulation, in which agencies are empowered to impose moratoria on risky emerging technologies while regulators organize experiments to learn about the risks they pose and the means to mitigate them. The agency-coordinated experiments would expedite the promulgation of empirically informed rules. The moratoria would extend the political window for regulatory action and protect the public in the interim. The Article applies this experimentalist model to the regulation of fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. It also identifies legal strategies for implementing experimental regulation under existing law. It challenges the conventional wisdom that agencies should postpone regulation until they can confidently predict the effects of new risky technologies. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………. 403?I. MISMATCH BETWEEN EXISTING LAW AND EMERGING RISKS ………………………………………………… 407?*Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. I thank AlexanderBlenkinsopp, Javier Botero, Dan Epps, Joe Fishman, Brian Galle, Maggie Gardner, Jake Gersen, Erica Goldberg, Daniel Greco, Michael Klarman, Alan Lawn, Will Ortman, Will Murray, Todd Rakoff, Matthew Stephenson, Cass Sunstein, Susannah Tobin, Tim Willenken, Hannah Wiseman and audiences at Duquesne, Georgia State, Harvard, and Indiana for comments. I thank Pat Gavin, Ben Gifford, Allison Kempf, and Isaac Park for excellent research assistance and the editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their outstanding work.
402 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 A. Existing Law …………………………………………………… 408?1. Notice and Comment Rulemaking …………… 408?2. Cost-Benefit Analysis …………………………….. 409?3. Judicial Review ……………………………………… 411?B. Entrenchment …………………………………………………. 412?1. Interest Group Entrenchment ………………… 414?2. Social Norm Entrenchment …………………….. 415?II. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR REGULATING EMERGING RISKS ……………………………………………………….. 419?A. Precautionary ………………………………………………….. 420?B. Common Law ………………………………………………….. 423?C. Laboratory of Democracy ………………………………….. 426?III. AN EXPERIMENTALIST MODEL ……………………………………… 430?A. Plausibility Standard ………………………………………. 430?B. Experiment Power ……………………………………………. 432?1. Benefits of Randomization ……………………… 433?2. Practical Challenges to Randomized Experiments ………………………. 434?3. Ethical Challenges to Randomized Experiments ………………………. 435?C. Moratorium Power …………………………………………… 436?1. Protecting Experimental Conditions ……….. 437?2. Preventing Entrenchment ………………………. 437?3. Moratoria and Capture …………………………… 438?4. Alternatives to Moratoria ……………………….. 439?D. Circumscribed Judicial Review …………………………. 440?1. Judicial Review of the Experiment and Moratorium Powers ……………………………….. 440?2. Judicial Review of Subsequent Rules ………. 442?IV. APPLICATIONS …………………………………………………………… 443?A. Fracking …………………………………………………………. 443?1. Risks and Benefits …………………………………. 444?2. Existing Regulation ……………………………….. 448?3. Prescriptions …………………………………………. 451?B. E-Cigarettes ……………………………………………………. 455?1. Risks and Benefits …………………………………. 456?2. Existing Regulation ……………………………….. 458?3. Prescriptions …………………………………………. 460?C. Autonomous Vehicles ……………………………………….. 464?1. Risks and Benefits …………………………………. 465?2. Existing Regulation ……………………………….. 468?3. Prescriptions …………………………………………. 470?
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 403 V. SECOND BEST STRATEGIES UNDER EXISTING LAW ………….. 472?A. Interim Final Rules …………………………………………. 473?B. Negotiated Regulation ……………………………………… 476?CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………….. 478? INTRODUCTION Emerging risks differ from other risks that the state regulates in two ways. The first is epistemic: the information necessary to answer potentially dispositive questions about how the risk should be regulated will not be available when regulators first become aware of the technology. For example, regulators do not currently know whether fracking contaminates groundwater, whether e-cigarettes help smokers quit, or what effects autonomous vehicles will have on the rate of collisions.1 But effective regulation of each of these risks requires answers to these basic questions. The second is political: emerging risks create a brief window during which a wide range of regulatory interventions are politically viable. But that window can quickly elapse as interest groups and social norms become entrenched. Before fracking became intertwined in our economy and e-cigarettes became widely used, there was no powerful, organized interest group coalition opposing regulation. Now, even if evidence accumulates that suggests restrictions are justified, restrictive regulation may no longer be possible. The window for a safe transition to autonomous vehicles may also close suddenly if a high-profile collision turns public opinion against the technology. There is a mismatch between existing administrative law and these features of emerging risks. The conventional rulemaking process requires agencies to satisfy high, early informational hurdles that they would struggle to meet when regulating emerging risks. A regulatory agency must generally give notice of a proposed rule, provide an opportunity for comments on the proposed rule, and respond to those comments.2 It must also conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the rule.3 After an agency promulgates the rule, the rule will be subject to judicial 1. For a review of the evidence on each of these issues, see infra Part IV. 2. See 5 U.S.C. ? 553(b)?(c) (2012) ([N]otice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register . . . After notice . . . the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.?). 3. Exec. Order No. 13,563 ? 1(b), 3 C.F.R. ? 215 (2012) ([E]ach agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs . . . .?).
404 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 review, and the agency will be expected to justify its substantive decisions during the rulemaking process.4 Each of these hurdles can be insurmountable obstacles to regulating emerging risks. An agency may lack sufficient information to respond to skeptical comments from regulated parties. It could offer only speculative predictions about a rules costs and benefits. It would create a rulemaking record vulnerable to judicial challenge. Consequently, agencies often postpone regulating emerging risks. But while agencies wait to acquire more information, interest groups organize and social norms crystallize. When agencies are prepared to regulate, the political window for optimal regulation may have elapsed. This Article proposes that regulatory agencies should be granted a new set of powers to regulate emerging risks. Specifically, agencies should be empowered to (1) organize experiments with new risky technologies; and (2) impose moratoria or other limits on the use of those technologies outside of the experimental conditions. Agencies would be able to initiate these powers without having to satisfy the procedural requirements of the conventional rulemaking process, and some of their decisions would be protected from judicial review. But the powers would be temporary and limited in scope. Once the experiments conclude, agencies would need to proceed to rulemaking or end the moratoria. The new powers would enable early, effective regulation of emerging risks. The experiment power would allow agencies to rapidly acquire reliable information about the risk and how to regulate it. The moratorium power would protect against interference with experimental conditions and prevent the political window for regulatory action from elapsing while the experiments were ongoing. The time and scope limits would protect against agencies using these powers as a de facto regulatory tool. This Article defends the utility of these specific legal reforms. But they are intended to illuminate a new way of thinking about how public policy should respond to emerging risks. The Article contrasts this new model with the three main alternative models for regulating emerging risks: (1) the Precautionary model5?banning new risky 4. See 5 U.S.C. ? 706(2) (2012) (providing that courts shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law? or unsupported by substantial evidence?). 5. See generally, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010).
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 405 technologies until they are proven safe; (2) the Common Law model6?allowing market innovation until regulation is proven cost-benefit justified; and (3) the Laboratory of Democracy model7?relying on state and local governments to test out regulatory solutions and choosing the best.8 Each of these models has its disadvantages. The Precautionary model does not provide a determinate answer when a new technology both creates new risks and mitigates existing risks, unless the state simply bans all potentially risky technologies regardless of their benefits and forgoes socially useful innovation. The Common Law model allows for market innovation, but also permits interest groups to entrench themselves and impede even cost-benefit justified regulation. The Laboratory of Democracy model can start a race to the bottom, in which the regulatory regime that most favors firms interests wins out. Critically, none of these models provide a mechanism for what the regulation of emerging risks needs most: rigorously controlled experiments that produce useful knowledge about which regulatory response is best. This Article defends an Experimentalist model for regulating emerging risks, building on recent scholarship arguing for a greater use of randomized experiments in regulation.9 The Experimentalist model aims to maximize the potential for regulatory learning, while preserving regulatory options. This new model should not apply to all areas of risk regulation. For many risks, from asbestos to climate change, the relevant science is settled, so there is little marginal value to publicly organized experiments. For other risks, especially catastrophic risks, randomized experiments might not be feasible or ethical. Some risks are latent for decades, so controlled experiments would take too long for any concurrent moratoria to be meaningfully temporary. Likewise, when science learns of a new risk from old technologies?for example, when we learn that plastics are leaching endocrine disruptors10?imposing a 6. See generally, e.g., Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The Discovery of Better Environmental Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705 (2008); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 (1999). 7. See generally, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 8. See infra Part II. 9. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 931?33 (2011); Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129?30 (2014). 10. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVT. PROGRAMME & WORLD HEALTH ORG., STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTING CHEMICALS ? 2012, iii (Åke Bergman et. al. eds., 2013),
406 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 moratorium would be difficult because the relevant interest groups might have already mobilized. Most importantly, although experiments would help resolve questions of fact, they provide no help with questions of value that regulators inevitably confront. Few experts dispute that obesity has become a significant public health problem.11 But the regulatory choices?and the questions of moral and political philosophy that underlie them?remain labyrinthine. Experiments and moratoria can be useful for a heterogeneous set of sources of emerging risks: consumer products, industrial processes, and the byproducts of research in science and engineering. To this Articles list of fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles, one might add genetically modified organisms,12 nanotechnology,13 or other emerging risks. But the most important risks to regulate may be those that have yet to emerge. So while the Article proposes solutions to three current issues in risk regulation, the point of the examples is to give some empirical plausibility to the claim that agencies ought to have the experiment and moratorium powers available to address emerging risks in the future. Fully institutionalizing an Experimentalist model of regulation would require a new statute authorizing the experiment and moratorium powers. That one statute could be leveraged to solve a broad set of recurring problems in health, safety, and environmental regulation. As long as a new, risky technology fits within the substantive areas of risk that an agency was statutorily authorized to regulate, the experiment and moratorium powers could be used to regulate the risk. But because the prospect of adopting any new regulatory statute in the current political environment is minimal,14 the Article concludes with second-best strategies for partially implementing the Experimentalist model under existing law. http://www.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78101/1/9789241505031_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/AK7L-BTPJ]. 11. E.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Obesity, Public Health, and the Food Supply, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 3, 3 (2007) (It is undisputed that obesity is one of the major public health concerns of our day.?). 12. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 403?06 (2002) (advocating a more precautionary approach for regulation of genetically modified foods). 13. See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, Nanotechnology Governance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1323, 1325?26 (2008) (discussing nanotechnology and its current regulation, and suggesting improvements in its regulatory scheme). 14. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (observing that Congress has not passed a major environmental statute in nearly a quarter-century, nor has it produced more than incremental reforms to federal energy legislation during that time, despite dramatic technological, economic, and social changes in these fields that would seem to demand a legislative response.?).
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 407 The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the mismatch between existing administrative law and the features of emerging risks. Part II critiques the alternative models that scholars have proposed for regulating emerging risks. Part III presents the Experimentalist model and defends granting agencies experiment and moratorium powers. Part IV applies that model to the regulation of fracking, e-cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. Part V proposes second-best strategies for partially implementing experiment and moratorium powers under existing law. I. MISMATCH BETWEEN EXISTING LAW AND EMERGING RISKS Administrative law conditions an agencys rulemaking power on the agency satisfying a series of informational hurdles. The most important of these are (1) notice and comment rulemaking; (2) cost-benefit analysis; and (3) judicial review. Scholars have long contested the utility of these hurdles for most rules.15 I take no position on these larger debates; I address only the desirability of these information hurdles for rules designed to regulate emerging risks. I defend three claims about existing law and its effects on emerging risks. First, for many emerging risks, there will be a gap between the information an agency will have about the risk and its possible means of mitigation, and the information the agency needs to satisfy these information hurdles. Second, as a result of this gap, agencies will often postpone regulation of emerging risks as they wait to acquire more information. Third, while agencies wait, the political environment for regulation may change, and the rule that an agency later determines to be justified may no longer be politically viable. I cannot prove any of these claims in the abstract. The only way to offer evidence for these claims is with specific examples. Part IV demonstrates each of these claims?the gap between the information the agency has and the information it would need to regulate, the postponement of regulation, and the change in political economy during that postponement?for both fracking and e-cigarettes. It also offers suggestive evidence that these claims might be true for autonomous vehicles as well. My hope is that these empirical examples will convince the reader that the more general claims are likely to be true. This Part analyzes in more detail the informational hurdles that existing law requires and the mismatch they create for emerging risks. It then explains why the political economy for regulation might change as an agency waits to acquire information to meet those hurdles. 15. See infra notes 19?22, 24, 26?34, 36?42 and accompanying text.
408 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 A. Existing Law The law governing administrative rulemaking comes from four sources: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA?),16 organic statutes, judicial doctrines, and executive orders. These sources of law have largely congealed into a standardized procedure for agency rulemaking. First, an agency provides notice of a proposed rule and facilitates public comment on the rule. Second, the agency conducts an analysis of a rules costs and benefits. Third, the final rule is subject to judicial review. 1. Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the APA, rulemaking starts when an agency publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register, which must include either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.?17 The agency must then provide interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments,? and, after considering those public comments, the agency must incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.?18 The agency must also keep a public record of the rulemaking process, which includes copies or an index of written factual material, studies, and reports relied on or seriously consulted by agency personnel in formulating the proposed? rule.19 Although these procedural requirements may sound modest, in practice they place substantial informational demands on agencies. Through judicial interpretation, the APA requirement that agencies must attach a ?concise general statement of basis and purpose to final rules . . . has blossomed into a requirement that agencies provide a ?reasoned explanation for rules and that they rationally respond to outside comments passing a ?threshold requirement of materiality. 20 Therefore, agencies must offer reasons for their own decisions in 16. 5 U.S.C. ?? 500?596 (2012). 17. 5 U.S.C. ? 553(b)(3) (2012). 18. 5 U.S.C. ? 553(c). 19. Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association, Special Feature, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2002). But see id. at 35 (The obligation to disclose written factual material, studies, and reports relied on or seriously consulted by agency personnel is limited to materials whose disclosure would be required under the Freedom of Information Act.?). 20. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on Deossifying? the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) (quoting Portland Cement Assn v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
2016] REGULATION OF EMERGING RISKS 409 rulemaking and reasons in response to comments from private parties that will satisfy reviewing courts. Firms that seek to avoid regulation can strategically use the informational demands of notice and comment rulemaking to delay or prevent new rules. For example, they can deliberately flood the agency with comments, knowing that the agency will be held accountable for responding to them during judicial review.21 Agencies are therefore faced with the choice of expending precious resources to respond in detail, ignoring the comments and risking judicial invalidation of the rule, or forgoing regulation altogether. Because agencies often elect to forgo regulation, some scholars have argued that the rulemaking process has ossified.22 Regardless of whether the rulemaking process has become too demanding in general, the notice and comment requirements are crippling when agencies seek to regulate emerging risks. In this context, agencies often lack the facts to offer a reasoned justification for their rules, and they are often unable to rebut regulated parties comments raising doubts about the proposed rule in light of factual uncertainties. Consequently, agencies face strong pressure to forgo regulation of emerging risks. 2. Cost-Benefit Analysis A series of executive orders, uninterrupted since the Reagan administration, require agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of certain proposed rules.23 Some regulatory statutes impose a cost-benefit 21. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329?34 (2010) (explaining how a commitment to open government in the administrative system allows regulated firms to use the informational requirements of the rulemaking process strategically). 22. See McGarity, supra note 20, at 1426 (As long as . . . agency decisionmakers believe that they must expend additional resources in anticipation of overly intrusive judicial review, they will be reluctant to undertake new rulemaking initiatives, to experiment with more flexible regulatory techniques, and to revisit old rulemaking efforts.?). Scholars dispute whether the empirical evidence supports the claim that the rulemaking process has ossified. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950?1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1445?64 (2012) (examining success rates of proposed rules at the Department of the Interior to argue that evidence of ossification as a serious problem appears weak). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1495?1503 (2012) (analyzing Testing the Ossification Thesis to point out deficiencies in the study and suggesting improvements to better understand the breadth of ossification issues). 23. For the current Executive Order, see Exec. Order No. 13,563 ? 1(b), 3 C.F.R. ? 215 (2012) ([E]ach agency must . . . propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs . . . .?).
410 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:2:401 mandate as well.24 The centralized Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA?), which reviews significant regulatory actions,25 has institutionalized the practice of cost-benefit analysis and expanded its use across the administrative state.26 Cost-benefit analysis provides a decision-making procedure for regulation: acquire information about the relevant risk and the effects of potential rules to regulate it and select a rule for which the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.27 Its proponents claim that it can counteract cognitive bias in regulatory decision-making,28 solve regulatory principal-agent problems,29 and police regulatory capture.30 It has also been the target of persistent criticisms.31 One frequent criticism of cost-benefit analysis is that it requires exhaustive, specific information for its calculations to be meaningful and, in practice, that information is often unclear, incomplete, or unavailable.32 I take no position on the general question of whether the informational demands of cost-benefit analysis are so frequently disproportionate to what is available that regulators should abandon 24. For a discussion of the relationship between statutory cost-benefit mandates and the practice of cost-benefit analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE 12?15 (2003). 25. A regulatory action is significant? if it will [h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more? or if it satisfies at least one of four other criteria. Exec. Order No. 12,866 ? 3(f), 3 C.F.R. ? 638 (1994). 26. For more on OIRA, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013); and Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006). 27. Some defenders of cost-benefit analysis defend it as an optimization tool. See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 991 (2001) (arguing in favor of a marginal-cost?marginal-benefit analysis). But in practice agencies using cost-benefit analysis more often choose a rule for which the expected benefits range exceeds the expected costs range. For examples, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (And Almost As Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167 (2014). 28. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1059 (2000) ([Cost-benefit analysis] is most plausibly justified on cognitive grounds?as a way of counteracting predictable problems in individual and social cognition.?). 29. See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2001) (Many of the philosophical difficulties with cost-benefit analysis disappear when a principal-agent perspective is taken.?). 30. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1370 (2013) (defending cost-benefit analysiss role in regulatory review on the ground that it has the potential to reduce agency capture?). 31. For leading criticisms of cost-benefit analysis, see generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLI

Collepals.com Plagiarism Free Papers

Are you looking for custom essay writing service or even dissertation writing services? Just request for our write my paper service, and we'll match you with the best essay writer in your subject! With an exceptional team of professional academic experts in a wide range of subjects, we can guarantee you an unrivaled quality of custom-written papers.

Get ZERO PLAGIARISM, HUMAN WRITTEN ESSAYS

Why Hire Collepals.com writers to do your paper?

Quality- We are experienced and have access to ample research materials.

We write plagiarism Free Content

Confidential- We never share or sell your personal information to third parties.

Support-Chat with us today! We are always waiting to answer all your questions.