Module 1 The student will post one thread of at least 250 words For each thread, students must support their assertions with at least 2 scholarly citations in APA format. Any sour

48(1) 23–40, January 2011

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X Online © 2011 Urban Studies Journal Limited

DOI: 10.1177/0042098009360688

Stef Adriaenssens and Jef Hendrickx are in the HUB—University College Brussels, Stormstraat 2, Brussels, 1000, Belgium. E-mail: [email protected] and [email protected]

Street-level Informal Economic Activities: Estimating the Yield of Begging in Brussels Stef Adriaenssens and Jef Hendrickx

[Paper first received, September 2008; in final form, October 2009]

Abstract

This article develops and applies a method to estimate the revenues of beggars in Brussels. This is relevant for three reasons. First, in the literature on the informal economy, we lack reliable empirical knowledge of informal street-level activities like begging, substantiating the expectation that beggars’ income will be low. Secondly, popular representation of beggars often depicts them as criminal and wealthy. Finally, recent legislation builds on the idea of criminal organisations behind beggars. Building on an analysis of existing attempts to measure beggars’ income, we aim for a triangulation with data from three different sources: observation, self-reports and quasi-experimental observations. This triangulation allows for more reliable and valid conclusions. Hypotheses based upon popular images and the criminalisation of begging are dismissed. The evidence does support the hypothesis based upon the literature on informal activities.

aspects of their lives that appeal to the public’s imagination.

Our starting-point is that a theory of action is valid if it is able to reconstruct the reasons of the actor. That’s where most popular theories of begging fail. Many everyday judgements about begging build upon assumptions referring to the ‘traditions’ of certain ethnic groups, detrimental effects on the safety feel- ings of the public and so forth. Nevertheless, both the public and policy-makers seem to be

1. Problem and Hypotheses

In many western European cities, begging is receiving growing attention from the public, policy-makers and social scientists (case stud- ies in Donovan, 2008; Fitzpatrick and Jones, 2005; Mitchell, 2005). Thereby, the wildest claims about the nature, the motivations and the income of beggars are made. This paper attempts to elucidate the earnings of people who beg. If one bears in mind that there is a huge gap between the definite assertions and the lack of reliable evidence, this is one of the

24 STEF ADRIAENSSENS AND JEF HENDRICKX

attached to this point of view, as expressed in everyday discourse as much as in discussions in political bodies. Related with this, a large proportion of the public seems to be con- vinced that begging is connected with deceit, fraud and organised crime.

What then are the reasons why people beg? A consistent starting-point for this question is that begging serves the same manifest function working in general has: to yield an income. To be clear: this starting-point does not preclude the existence of deceit, fraud or organised crime in begging; it just situates begging among the meaningful and purposive actions of real people. Whether begging as an income-generating activity is chosen or imposed, is part of the problem investigated in this contribution. The basic starting-point, however, is that the dominant motivation of begging is acquiring means.

We define begging as informal work in a public space, consisting of a receiver asking for a non-reciprocated gift. Begging is informal work in the sense that it is part of

those economic activities that circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights … of formal society (Feige, 1990, p. 992).

In the case of begging, this implies that it takes place within the public space. Like many other street-level informal activities (Dean and Gale, 1999), it has a discordant relation- ship to the formal and mainstream users of this space (other examples in Donovan, 2008; Venkatesh, 2006). The informal character of begging mainly refers to the second part of Feige’s definition: the work of begging nor- mally does not entitle people to formal rights and benefits. Their work does not benefit beggars with legal protection or access to, for example, health insurance, as normally results from formal jobs.

In some countries, regions or cities, beg- ging is explicitly prohibited—for example, in England and Wales (Fitzpatrick and Jones, 2005). In other places, begging is allowed and

sometimes the right to beg is even warranted, as is the case in Belgium and in the US (Hershkoff and Cohen, 1991). In Belgium, the legislator abolished the penalisation of begging and vagrancy in 1994 (Jamar and Herbots, 2006) and since then courts have acknowledged the right to beg (Fierens, 2004). Even so, begging continues to be an informal activity because of its insecure and unregu- lated nature. In fiscal and social security matters, for example, beggars find themselves in a legal no-man’s-land. They derive no rights in terms of social benefits from their activities. Furthermore, security forces often actively suppress begging activities in reality. This has a lot to do with the fact that beggars are users of a fiercely competed public space. Within the informal economy, begging is part of the sub-type of so-called survival activities, denoting that people are immersed in off-the- books transactions because of the destitute economic position they find themselves in (Portes and Haller, 2005).

In this article, we present and apply a method in order to estimate the revenues of people begging. There are three good grounds legiti- mating such an endeavour

(1) Uncovering the earnings from begging improves our understanding of the underground economy and, more specifi- cally, of survival activities.

(2) Common sense about begging is caught in a web of unsubstantiated presuppositions.

(3) Recent legislation in Western countries is based on strong assumptions about the nature of begging. Some of them relate to the income of beggars and can be tested with the help of these estimates.

It is important to stress that the first ground leads to expectations and hypotheses contra- dictory to grounds 2 and 3. We elaborate on all three grounds consecutively.

The first inspiration for this research lies in a general interest in the income from informal activities. It is important to measure

THE YIELD OF BEGGING IN BRUSSELS 25

the living standard of people thrown back on the underground economy for their survival. ‘Underground economy’ is the broader concept, denoting all off-the-books transactions and institutions, including both the informal and the illegal economy (Feige, 1990). The former refers to licit activities that take place off the books; ‘illegal’ activities are explicitly forbidden by law. Begging may both be informal as well as illegal, depend- ing on a country’s legislation. In Belgium, it is informal because the legislator has stated that begging cannot be prohibited.

Under the surface of the huge diversity in approaches of the underground economy, a consensus seems to exist that informal economies are strongly segmented (Pahl, 1987). Informal activities therefore take place within two distinct markets: a top end of relatively affluent workers, often simultane- ously employed in formal jobs, and a bot- tom end with informal work performed by marginalised groups (Slack, 2007; Williams, 2004). For the latter, the main determinant of informal activity is that their access to formal activities is blocked and they lack alternative income-generating opportunities (van Eck and Kazemier, 1988; Williams and Windebank, 2002). This subsistence motive is conceptu- alised as an informal economy of survival (for example, Portes et al., 1989) and correlates with low-quality occupations, low produc- tivity and income (Rosser et al., 2000; Trejos Solorzano and Del Cid, 2003). The statement that poverty and the corresponding lack of opportunities lead to a higher supply of infor- mal work is corroborated by data at a national level—for example, in eastern Europe, where the decline of national income in the 1990’s went hand-in-hand with the growth of infor- mal activities (Renooy et al., 2004). Although most economists studying the informal sector with macroeconomic comparative material hardly pay attention to the subsistence motive (for example, Friedman et al., 2000; Schneider, 2007), they generally do acknowledge the

relevance of national income and the preva- lence of poverty as a determinant.

In short, the literature on informal work and begging tends to classify begging as a survival activity. The overall conclusion would be that the income from begging is considerably lower than the income from formal work. Given the unattractive and harsh nature of begging (Smith, 2005), one can assume that it will even be lower than most other informal activities.

The second ground for estimating the income from begging has to do with ubiqui- tous and recurrent everyday judgements of begging. The representation of people who beg throughout the centuries is consistently built upon three associated images (Erskine and McIntosh, 1999): fraudulent beggars— for example, using children or shamming dis- abilities to evoke pity; ‘professional’ impostors working in an organised criminal network; and beggars acquiring great wealth. These three images reappear from the 16th century on (Geremek, 1980; Woodbridge, 2002). This second ground gives rise to expectations contrary to the first inspiration: the income from begging is comparable with profits from criminal activities and will be higher if more indicators of fraud are observable.

Thirdly, there exists a policy rationale for this research. The second ground refers to collective mentalities that inspire collective behaviour, such as state regulation. This has recently happened in quite a few Western countries, both in North America (Ellickson, 1996; Hopkins Burke, 2000; Mitchell, 2005) and in Europe. Similar penal laws were recently adopted in France1 and Belgium2 criminalising so-called organised begging. Thereby the explicit parallel is drawn with organised criminal activities such as pros- titution and human trafficking. The argu- mentation for the law assumes that begging is as rewarding as these criminal activities. Criminal organisations are also assumed to employ profit-maximising strategies, for

26 STEF ADRIAENSSENS AND JEF HENDRICKX

example, forcing children to accompany adult beggars, as children supposedly increase gifts substantially. The explanatory memorandum of the Belgian enactment3 arguing for the necessity of the law provides illustrations

This (act) does not have as a goal to criminalize the offence of begging again, but to punish those who exploit the begging of others, analogous to the legislation existing in prostitution (p. 4).

After the example of the exploitation of prostitution, the exploitation of mendicancy can be looked upon from the angle of human trafficking (p. 16).

The law decrees that begging with a minor is an aggravating circumstance of organised begging (article 433quater of the penal code). Article 433ter assumes that the assistance of children is inspired by the intention to “evoke pity of the passer-by” thus increasing the income of the beggar. The close resemblance between the legislative logic and popular images should be clear.

Summarising, the motivation to research the income of beggars is grounded in the social-scientific line of research on informal economic activities and in the popular images concerning begging and beggars, also leading to formal rule-making. The basic hypothesis refers to the income of beggars. Literature on informal work leads to expectations con- tradicting the popular judgements and law- making. The former hypothesises that begging generates a low income. From the latter, we infer that beggars yield a higher income from their activities, similar to, for example, human trafficking or the exploitation of prostitution. The criminalisation of (the exploitation of) begging is based on strong assumptions with little empirical foundation. Therefore, we build hypotheses that allow us to falsify these assumptions. As a direct measure of ‘exploita- tion’ and ‘criminal organisation of begging’ is impossible, we use a detour to falsify the assumptions underlying recent legislation.

We therefore hypothesise that: begging yields profits comparable with human trafficking and prostitution; and, yields are higher if begging is linked to human trafficking and if there are indications of fraudulent strategies.

Four hypotheses will be tested with respect to the exploitation of begging: two referring to the overall profitability of begging activi- ties; one referring to the difference between the profitability of begging for indigenous persons relative to migrant east European beggars; and finally one referring to the sur- plus income by the assumed properties of exploitation, in particular by begging with children. The hypotheses are stated as follows

(1) Begging generates an income under or around the poverty line.

(2) The profitability of begging is comparable with other criminal activities.

(3) Beggars who have migrated yield a higher return.

(4) Begging with children yields a higher return.

The first and the second hypotheses refer to the discussion as to whether begging is able to generate high profits. There is a contradic- tion here between the expectation based on the social-scientific literature (hypothesis 1) and the second hypothesis inspired by the prevailing collective images (as a motivator for contemporary law-making). Provided the yields of begging are so low that it hardly allows beggars to earn an income above the poverty line, the informal-sector research is confirmed. If the yields are higher, this may lay an empirical foundation for the image about the high profitability of begging. The confirmation of the second hypothesis would be consistent with the existence of criminal organisations behind begging.

The third hypothesis refers to the assump- tions of recent legislation that there exists a close connection between human traffick- ing and ‘organised’ begging. Therefore, one expects that the yields of beggars who have

THE YIELD OF BEGGING IN BRUSSELS 27

migrated are higher in comparison with those of indigenous beggars. The final hypothesis tests the assumption in recent Belgian and French penal laws that children are brought in with the intent to increase revenues.

Before we build our estimates that allow us to test these hypotheses, we first give an overview of previous attempts to measure earnings from begging, sketch the context and features of begging in Brussels, and describe the different sources of data for our estimates.

2. Previous Attempts to Measure the Income of Beggars

The serious studies of the life of beggars are often based on qualitative data (for example, Danczuk, 2000; Fitzpatrick and Kennedy, 2000; Lankenau, 1999; Wardhaugh and Jones, 1999). These studies were helpful to reveal the experiences and perceptions of people who beg, but they cannot provide reliable estimates of their income. Therefore, we concentrate ourselves on a quantitative research strategy. Reports of systematised attempts to estimate

the beggars’ income are scarce. Moreover, the existing approaches have fundamental weaknesses. Given the concealed nature of the activities and the hard-to-reach population of beggars, these shortfalls are partly inevitable. Notwithstanding, an overview of the existing methods will be a useful start in order to list feasible approaches and the shortcomings to avoid. Roughly speaking, data are either based on standardised questionnaires or on observations. Although observations and self-reports have serious biases, most studies only use one source of data. We will argue that a mixed-method approach is to be recom- mended. An overview of the reviewed studies is presented in Table 1.

There is one peculiar older illustration of questionnaire-based self-reports: in 1932–33, two sociology students conducted a survey of people who beg in Shanghai (cited in Lu, 1999). Respondents were asked to list their families’ monthly income at the time of the interview and from their previous occupa- tion. Lu’s discussion does not mention the sampling strategy used. Some contemporary

Table 1. Studies with estimates of beggars’ income

Study Method Sample Yield measured

Jiang and Wu; in Lu Questionnaire Sampling unclear Self-reported (1999) Unit: people who beg n = 700 monthly income in Shangai

(Murdoch (1994) Questionnaire Sampling unclear Self-reported daily Unit: people who beg n = 145 income from begging in central London

Bose and Hwang (2002) Questionnaire Sampling: systematic Self-reported Unit: people who beg search of public places income in Toronto n = 54 Lowest payment for interview with high response rate

O’Flaherty (1996) Questionnaire Sampling: systematic Self-reported Unit: ‘daytime search at well-known maximum and streetpeople’ in locations minimum daily Manhattan n = 209 earnings

Butovskaya et al. (2004) Observation of people Observations of Number of gifts in who beg during beggars in Moscow trains 2 minutes. 2 minutes n = 178

28 STEF ADRIAENSSENS AND JEF HENDRICKX

studies also provide little information about the crucial issue of sampling. For instance, Alison Murdoch’s research report (1994) only mentions where respondents were inter- viewed, but remains unclear about the criteria for their selection.

Others do document the sampling strategy. Bose and Hwang (2002) researched begging with the help of a standardised questionnaire in Toronto. The researchers “located panhan- dlers by systematically searching major streets and subway stations” (p. 477). They estimated the income of beggars through self-reported hourly, daily and monthly yields. The general conclusion of this research was that begging is the main source of the respondents’ income, but that it brings in rather meagre revenues. The Toronto study attempted to test the reli- ability of self-reported income of people who beg through offering different amounts of compensation for co-operation in the inter- view. According to the researchers, the estab- lishment of the lowest amount with a high response rate would serve as an indication of their income. This interesting approach could hardly be tested because the number of respondents was rather low (n = 54).

In the same vein, O’Flaherty (1996, p. 82) systematically interviewed the “daytime street- people” in New York’s Manhattan by cruising the well-known locations during several week- ends. The author does not communicate the proportion of beggars within the sample, but he did question the survival strategies, with begging as one of seven categories. The general conclusion is consistent with the study by Bose and Hwang: low earnings for long and hard work (O’Flaherty, 1996, pp. 84–85).

The basic disadvantage of self-reported measures obviously has to do with mem- ory effects and socially desirable answer- ing. Many studies on people who beg (for example, Melrose, 1999) and other excluded groups or hidden populations (Sifaneck and Neaigus, 2001) report the distrust towards outsiders. Beggars often confuse interviewers with officials, fearing that telling the truth

about their income may lead to sanctions. In our fieldwork, we also noticed that respon- dents had problems with questions about their average income, probably due to the lack of registering of their income; usually the yields are immediately consumed. These drawbacks made us decide only to use self- reported measures for information that can- not be attained otherwise.

From the observational method, we found one example: Butovskaya et al. (2004) used it to compare the amount of gifts received in a fixed time-span by people who beg in Moscow. Basically this is an interesting approach that may be able to overcome some of the weak- nesses of self-reported income measures. However, the linear relation between the num- ber of gifts observed in a fixed time-interval, on the one hand, and the income of a beggar, rests on two strong assumptions.

First, it assumes that the alms received have the same mean value for each (type of) beggar. The researchers have no data supporting this assumption and neither do they propound convincing arguments for this a priori (in fact, the problem is not addressed). Other research does indicate that most of the alms received are rather small, mainly consisting of coins, literally ‘spare money’ (Adler et al., 2000; McIntosh and Erskine, 1999). This does not exclude the possibility that the mean gift var- ies considerably between beggars. Alms-givers may give different sums to different types of beggars, or a certain specialisation of alms- givers may exist, related to their perceptions of ‘deserving poor’.

Secondly, one should be aware that the frequency of observed gifts in a given time- period is an indicator of productivity, not of income. The use of productivity as an indicator of income passes over the probable differences of working time between beggars.

Summarising, data based on observations avoid some of the drawbacks of self-reported data. Observing beggars and their alms gives access to reliable data on the frequency of gifts, but information on the working time is lacking.

THE YIELD OF BEGGING IN BRUSSELS 29

3. The Context: Poverty and Begging in Brussels

The Brussels Capital Region is the part of Belgium with a high concentration of extreme poverty. The most recent study available esti- mates the number of homeless people in the region at 1200 (Réa, 2001).

One important background regulatory fea- ture is the legal status of begging in Belgium. Since the start of begging regulation, different measures have been used: periods of penali- sation, assistance and institutionalisation alternated and sometimes even occurred in the same period (Depreeuw, 1988). In 1891, the most recent law (until further notice), prohibiting vagrancy and begging, was pro- mulgated. It lasted until 1993. By that time, there was an overall political consensus on the inhumanity of criminalising people who beg, leading to the abolition of this criminal law.

What does the begging population look like in Brussels? The survey we conducted taught us that the great majority (85.4 per cent) of Brussels beggars fall into three types: male indigenous beggars and female Roma beggars alone or accompanied by children.4 Indigenous beggars are those born in Belgium or with an official language of the Brussels capital region as a mother tongue (French or Dutch). Members of this group are often homeless and have a history of drug or alco- hol addiction. This is similar to the profile of people who beg in Britain, according to Danczuk’s study (2000).

The background and issues of Roma beg- gars are fundamentally different. The Roma in Brussels originate from Romania, the larg- est Roma population in central and eastern Europe (Ringold et al., 2003, p. 89). They pre- dominantly migrated recently, definitely after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the implosion of the communist regimes there. Important push factors are the economic backwardness of the region in comparison with western Europe, high unemployment and poverty, in particular for Roma (UNDP, 2003). Around

three-quarters of the interviewed Roma indicated that they were unemployed (UNDP, 2003). They also suffer from discrimination and racial violence, exacerbating the hopeless- ness of their situation (OSCE, 2000).

4. Methods and Ethical Aspects

In order to estimate the beggars’ income as precisely as possible, we constructed a design based on the conclusion that self- reports and observations have distinct limi- tations. Therefore, we used both methods, complemented with a quasi-experimental version of participant observation. These three distinct sources correspond to the different data we need in order to estimate the income of beggars.

The begging time is assessed through stan- dardised interviews with beggars in the Brussels capital region, conducted in the autumn of 2005 and the spring of 2006 (n = 268). Three typical problems in questioning beggars arose: the absence of a register, the volatility of beg- ging and the difficulties of questioning beggars.

First, no register of beggars exists. As earn- ings are dependent upon traffic, access to the population of beggars was constructed with the help of a detour through the places where people beg. A register of 255 possible begging locations was constructed with the help of volunteer reports, police reports and a list of public marketplaces, subway stations and supermarkets of the major chains.

A second potential problem was the assumed short-term variation in the begging popula- tion. The precarious judicial status of many people who beg, the possible transience of migratory beggars and the irregular approach by the police force all support the assumption that begging is a volatile phenomenon. The choice for a register of begging places also bears the risk that respondents were not beg- ging at the time the location was observed. Therefore, each location was visited three times at different moments of the day and in the week. Furthermore, the researchers chose

30 STEF ADRIAENSSENS AND JEF HENDRICKX

to conduct two waves of interviews: one in the autumn of 2005, one in the spring of 2006, preventing our data from being overinflu- enced by seasonal coincidences. Finally, we took measures to overcome the inaccessibility of people who beg. This group is hard to reach due to general distrust and the linguistic and ethnic diversity. There was an expectation of a significant proportion of analphabetic respondents (afterwards confirmed by the data). Face-to-face interviews guaranteed the participation of illiterate respondents. Linguistic diversity was overcome by a ques- tionnaire in four languages (French, Dutch, English and Romanian) and interviewers mastering these languages. In general, this proved to be an effective method: 85.8 per cent of the respondents agreed to be interviewed.

In order to estimate the mean frequency of gifts, data were collected through observa- tions of the three types of beggar.5 People begging were randomly selected in an area in central Brussels. The observations were made in crowded places such as the central station or the Rue Neuve. Observers posi- tioned themselves at a fair distance from the beggars, preventing interaction. Because of the crowded nature of the spaces, this hardly received attention. The researchers recorded the exact time of alms collected by beggars during 60 sessions of 36 hours in total. The duration of the observed period was quite uneven, as the researchers had no control over the beggars or their context. During these ses- sions, 225 gifts were recorded. The duration of the observations was divided evenly for each type of beggar.

The data from this second source were meant to estimate the mean begging time beggars of all three types needed to get a gift in kind or a gift in coins. However, it proved possible to determine the value of the gifts in kind or notes through these observations. Therefore, the income in a given period of begging time from gifts in kind and notes was estimable on this source of data alone. As the observation

of real beggars is a more reliable and therefore superior source of information than data of test subjects simulating begging, we preferred to rely on the former as much as possible. The reason why gifts in kind and in notes are taken together thus is based on a methodological rather than an intrinsic communality: both were measured by observations of beggars.

The third source of data was necessary in order to estimate the mean value of the gifts in coins. For the estimate of the value of gifts in coins, a quasi-experimental use of observation was set up.6 We are well aware that the denotation of ‘quasi-experimental use of observation’ is a rather inelegant formula- tion. The reference to observation was added because the design has no causal ambitions whatsoever. On the other hand, as one element is actively manipulated—the exposure of the public to a certain kind of beggar –legitimises the reference to quasi-experimentation.

Begging activities were simulated in and in the vicinity of the Rue Neuve, an important commercial area in central Brussels with frequent begging activities. Six experimental subjects engaged in begging activities during sessions of two hours. Thereby, Roma female and indigenous male beggars were simulated. The third type of beggar, female Roma accom- panied by a child or children, has not been included in the design for ethical reasons. The six test subjects consisted of four male and two female te

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