Why is the rise of China a positive development for Russia, according to Russia today?

Discussion Article

Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based

Explanations of Russia’s Foreign Policy.

‘Authoritarian at Heart and Expansionist by

Habit’?

ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

Abstract

Scholars disagree on how to interpret Russia’s assertive foreign policy. According to some observers,

Russia’s authoritarian culture and political system have historically required the Kremlin to depend on

the Western threat image at home and to engage in revisionist behaviour abroad. These observers

recommend that Western nations abstain from engaging Russia as an equal contributor to shaping the

global system. This article assesses the validity of the authoritarian expansionism theory by comparing

it to other prominent perspectives on foreign policy, realism and constructivism. The article argues

that, by perceiving Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as fundamentally threatening to the

West, the theory overlooks important sources of foreign policy contestation at home and potentially

varying directions abroad. The article selects the historically important cases of the Crimean War, the

Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War to demonstrate the theory’s flaws and to highlight the role of

factors other than Russia’s authoritarianism in the nation’s foreign policy.

RUSSIA’S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR CONTINUES TO provoke lively disagree-

ments among scholars and policy makers alike. While some view Russia as largely

accommodationist and non-threatening to the West, others perceive the Kremlin’s

objectives as expansionist and disrespectful towards existing international rules.1 The

arrival of Barak Obama to power in the USA and his attempts to ‘reset’ relations with

Russia have yet to clarify the question of the motives for the Kremlin’s international

behaviour. Those on the sceptical side argue that the reset advocates misread Russia’s

intentions and undermine Western allies (Kramer 2010a, 2010b; Cohen 2010; LeVine

2010). According to this line of reasoning, Russia’s authoritarian culture and political

The author thanks the editors of Europe-Asia Studies and two anonymous reviewers for their

comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. 1For examples of scholarship on Russia’s foreign policy, see Trenin (2009), Mankoff (2009),

Tsygankov (2010), Lucas (2009), Bugajski (2009) and Kanet (2009).

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES

Vol. 64, No. 4, June 2012, 695–713

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/12/040695-19 ª 2012 University of Glasgow

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.671568

system require the Kremlin to depend on the Western threat image at home and to

engage in revisionist behaviour abroad (Shlapentokh 2009; Cohen & Dale 2010;

Shevtsova 2010). It leads to the conclusion that the Western nations are better off

trying to contain or transform Moscow, rather than engaging with it as an equal

contributor in shaping the global system.

Behind the policy debate about Russia’s intentions are profound theoretical,

historical and ethical questions. Is a more democratic Russia likely to act in

accordance with the United States and Europe in international affairs? Does an

authoritarian Russia necessarily present a threat to the West? Should Russia’s cultural

and regime-based difference serve as a sufficient basis for excluding the nation from the

list of partners and potential allies? More generally, should a difference in political

system and values—whether it concerns Russia, China, Iran or another country—be

treated by Western nations as potentially threatening their values and interests?

This article seeks to assess the validity of the authoritarian or expansionist Russia

approach by comparing it to two other prominent perspectives on foreign policy:

realism and constructivism. Instead of focusing on Russia’s domestic authoritarian-

ism, realism and constructivism study the foreign-policy impact of international

anarchy and norms, respectively. I argue that as a guide to understanding Russia’s

international behaviour, the theory of authoritarian expansionism is at best

insufficient and at worst misleading. By emphasising Russia’s purportedly autocratic

nature, it overlooks important sources of contestation within the nation’s political

system and the potentially varying directions of its foreign policy. By perceiving

Russia’s historical and institutional distinctness as fundamentally threatening the

West, the theory of authoritarian expansionism also displays the tendency to deny

Russia its own interests and stakes within the international system. As a result, many

of the theory’s advocates blame Moscow for everything that has gone wrong in

relations with Western nations and invariably offer policy advice that amounts to

isolating or containing Russia.

The article is organised in four parts. The next section reflects on the theory of

authoritarian expansionism’s assumptions and historical evolution. After identifying

the theory’s propositions and intellectual roots, I offer an analysis of several biases

from which it suffers. I then move to an empirical analysis by selecting three cases of

Russia’s foreign policy that have been important to the progression of the theory of

authoritarian expansionism. My interpretation of these seminal cases—the Crimean

War, the Cold War and the Russia–Georgia War—highlights the role of factors other

than Russia’s authoritarianism. The conclusion summarises the article’s findings and

calls for a more complex and dynamic understanding of Russia than the theory of

authoritarian expansionism-based understanding.

The theory of Russia’s authoritarian expansionism

Authoritarian expansionism and other theories of Russia’s foreign policy

The central claims of the theory of authoritarian expansionism may be summarised in

terms of two main propositions—one of a descriptive and one of a causal nature. The

descriptive proposition states that Russia’s main foreign-policy objectives include

696 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

the preservation and expansion of the country’s imperial borders and institutions.

The causal proposition comes in two distinct versions. Version One links Russia’s

expansionism to its authoritarian culture and propensity to impose itself onto other

nations. The latter is expressed through the political regime’s overconfidence and

readiness to act unilaterally, rather than in the spirit of international cooperation.

Version Two places emphasis on the leadership’s low confidence and internal

insecurity. The regime’s insecurity and preoccupation with political survival lead to a

diversionary form of expansionism. This version assumes the public to be generally

passive and uninterested in the state’s international activities.

The two versions assume diverse types of expansionism and have distinct policy

implications. While Version One identifies what might be called ‘expansionism from

strength’ or ‘missionary expansionism’, Version Two describes expansionism that is

driven by weakness or desperation and seeks to divert the internal public’s attention

from the regime’s lack of legitimacy and effectiveness. The two versions also differ with

respect to the perception of cooperation of Western nations with Russia (see Table 1).

While both versions are sceptical of the possibility of developing a robust relationship

with Russia, Version One—by highlighting broad authoritarian support for inter-

national expansionism—is considerably more pessimistic than Version Two.

The description of Russia’s international objectives and main causes of behaviour

abroad by the theory of authoritarian expansionism contrasts with other theories of

Russia’s foreign policy. In particular, the theory of authoritarian expansionism differs

from realist and social constructivist theories. Realists typically emphasise material

capabilities and the status of a great power as state international objectives. Scholars

working in this tradition view the Russian state as acting within the same constraints

of an international anarchical system that defines the choices of other states. Although

internal factors such as ideology, nature of government and political culture matter as

well, their role is to specify, and sometimes to cover for but never to contradict,

‘genuine’ national interest. Realists view national interest as a geopolitically enduring

reality, rather than something open to interpretations, and define such interest as a

preservation and enhancement of power within the existing international system. For

instance, realists have argued that the Soviet leaders, while employing a revolutionary

ideology and acting under a totalitarian system of government, defended Russia’s

traditional state interests.2

TABLE 1 PROPOSITIONS ABOUT RUSSIA’S AUTHORITARIAN EXPANSIONISM

Type of propositions

Descriptive proposition Russia pursues an expansionist foreign policy Causal propositions 1. Active authoritarian culture is a cause of the regime’s confidence and

missionary expansionism 2. Passive authoritarian culture is a cause of the regime’s insecurity and

diversionary expansionism

2For realist studies of Soviet foreign policy, see, for example, Ulam (1968), Wohlforth (1993) and

Donaldson and Nogee (1998).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 697

To social constructivists, what matters most is not power or material capabilities

objectively defined but what those may mean to the Self in terms of acquiring

recognition from its significant Other. In the Russian context, Europe and the West in

general played the role of the significant Other and prominently figured in Russia’s

debates about national identity by creating the meaningful environment in which

Russia’s rulers defended their foreign-policy choices.3 Constructivists argue that

although state behaviour is shaped by power calculations, such behaviour can only be

understood in contexts of everyday interactions and socio-historical development.

Even if anarchy is ‘out there somewhere’, constructivists say, we ought to focus on

everyday interactions for understanding what anarchy means and how social contexts

of power are being formed and unformed. Constructivist scholars of Soviet foreign

policy therefore view such policy in terms of signalling to the Western nations the

Kremlin’s desire for equality and recognition (Nation 1992; Ringman 2002).

Table 2 compares the theory of authoritarian expansionism to other theories of

Russia’s foreign policy.

Evolution of the theory of authoritarian expansionism

The context and the long history of the theory of Russia’s expansionism may be

traced to European reactions to Nicholas’s suppression of Polish demands for

independence in 1830–1831. Russia did not limit itself to suppressing what was then

an internal revolt, but also played a prominent role during the nationalist revolu-

tions of the 1840s in Europe. In 1846, Russia led the way in suppressing the Polish

uprising in Kraków, which was a part of the Hapsburg state under the Vienna

convention. In July 1848, Nicholas suppressed revolutions in the Danubian

Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia—partly to assist Turkey in defeating the

Romanian nationalist movement. In 1849, Russia provided Austria with financial

and diplomatic assistance to strengthen its position in Italy and Nicholas committed

almost 200,000 troops to help the Hapsburgs to suppress the revolt in Hungary

(Riazanovsky 1959, p. 248).

TABLE 2 THEORIES OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

Westernising state Great power Authoritarian

expansionist state

Russia’s international objectives

Recognised part of the Western world

Capabilities and status of a great power

Empire and geopolitical expansion

Main causes of Russia’s foreign policy

Western influences

International anarchy Domestic authoritarianism

3For a development of this argument, see Neumann (1996), English (2000), Hopf (2002), Clunan

(2009) and Larson and Shevchenko (2010).

698 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

By suppressing internal opposition to the monarchical rule, Nicholas acted within

the constraints of the Holy Alliance and had no hegemonic ambitions of his own.4

Although Russia acted in a multilateral spirit and only did what the system expected

the Tsar to do, Nicholas was labelled the Gendarme of Europe. Such a presentation of

Russia was partly a product of the continent’s power struggle. Britain and France were

not satisfied with the Vienna system and each sought to challenge Russia’s rise as a

great power competitor (Taylor 1954, p. 61). No less significant, however, was Russia’s

and Europe’s growing divergence in values. European liberals now associated Poland,

and other nations that challenged monarchies, with progressive values, and Russia

with imperialism and repression. Russia was now deemed too ‘barbaric’ and

‘autocratic’ (Malia 1999, p. 99). Today, scholars such as John LeDonne continue to

argue that during the 1830s and 1840s the Russians were ‘dangerously close to the

establishment of their hegemony in the Heartland’, and that Russia’s ‘expansionist

urge’ remained ‘unabated until 1917’ (LeDonne 1997, pp. 314, 348).

Such was the political context for the emergence of the theory of authoritarian

expansionism in the liberal West. The Polish question did not go away, and the Polish

elite led another uprising in 1863, during which the European powers, again, opposed

Russia’s effort to manage the issue and preserve existing territorial boundaries.5

Intellectually, the view of Russia as a barbaric expansionist power was supported by

foreign travellers, such as the Marquis de Custine, who began to promote this view

even before the Polish uprising. The United States had begun to develop negative

perceptions of Russia after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, as immigrant

groups (especially Jewish ones) engaged in anti-Russian lobbying in the United States

to ‘liberate’ Russia from autocracy and anti-Semitism.6 The perception of Russia as a

dangerous autocratic power grew stronger as Alexander III and Nicholas II sought to

preserve their influence in the Balkans. As theories of authoritarian Panslavism began

to develop in the early twentieth century,7 scholars became convinced of the primacy

of ‘Panslavist imperialism’ in the Tsar’s outlook (Geyer 1987; Tuminez 2000).

The social revolution in Russia in October 1917 provided another powerful impetus

for developing the perception of the country as an expansionist autocracy. The Soviet

Union diverged from the West in terms of internal institutions and it challenged the

West’s sense of military security. The Bolsheviks’ dissolution of the Constituent

Assembly in January 1918, its doctrine of world revolution, and the establishment of

the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 in order to spread communist ideas

and set up new communist parties abroad, all contributed to the perception of Soviet

Russia as perpetuating—in the most dangerous way—the mode of authoritarian

expansionism. Even after the Bolsheviks had renounced the idea of world revolution

4While Prussia wanted to help Austria in exchange for dominating Germany, Russia had no such

conditions and was assisting Austria out of Holy Alliance obligations (Taylor 1954, p. 30). 5For example, in April 1863, Britain, France and Austria each sent similar notes to the Russian

government asking for Poland to be given independence and for its borders to include Lithuania and

Ruthenia (Seton-Watson 1967, p. 435). 6In 1911 the American government even abrogated the commercial treaty with Russia (Foglesong

2007, pp. 43–44). 7For overviews of Panslavist theories, see Kohn (1953), Petrovich (1956), Duncan (2000) and

Tuminez (2000).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 699

and dissolved the Comintern, the majority of the West’s politicians and scholars could

not change their mind about the Soviet system. Scholars became convinced that the

idea of peaceful coexistence was a Soviet cover for an ideological expansion or an

offensive war on the West. A classic statement of this position can be found in George

Kennan’s (1961, p. 179) condemnation of ‘a regime, the attitude of which towards

Western governments, psychologically and politically, was equivalent to that which

would prevail toward an enemy in time of war’. Many observers rejected the position

that the Soviet leaders’ attitudes reflected a defensive response to the equally hostile

Western governments, citing the Soviet Union’s authoritarian ideology as the reason

for their distrust. For Kennan, Western governments came to hate the Soviet leaders

‘for what they did ’, whereas the Bolsheviks hated the Western states ‘for what they

were, regardless of what they did’ (Kennan 1961, p. 181, emphasis in original). This

distinction has become common in Western scholarship of Soviet foreign policy since

the Cold War.8

Despite the end of the Cold War, many observers have continued to interpret Russia

as an authoritarian state with expansionist instincts, and not as a normal state or one

abiding by acceptable rules of international behaviour. Conservative representations

of the Russia-threat argument tend to focus on the nation’s political culture (Pipes

1997; Odom 2001; Cohen 2007), while more liberal interpretations place responsibility

for Russia’s ‘anti-Western’ policies on the Kremlin’s leadership (Council on Foreign

Relations 2006; Lapidus 2007; Legvold 2007, p. 98; Wallander 2008). Conservative

perception was especially visible in justifications of expanding NATO to the east by

incorporating former parts of Russia’s sphere of influence. For example, the New York

Times columnist William Safire (1994) pursued the ‘window of opportunity’ argument

by insisting on the need to extend alliance membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, the Baltic states and ultimately Ukraine, because ‘Russia is authoritarian at

heart and expansionist by habit’. It had to be done promptly, he added, ‘while Russia

is weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, when such a move would

be an insufferable provocation to a superpower’ (Safire 1994). Richard Pipes provided

the perspective of an academic and historian. He reminded his readers about Russia’s

‘heavy burden of history’ and failure to make ‘a clean break with its Soviet past’ (Pipes

1997, p. 67). To Pipes, Russians are yet to ‘overcome not only the communist legacy

but also that of the czars and their partner, the Orthodox Church, which for centuries

collaborated in instilling in their subjects disrespect for law, submission to strong and

wilful authority, and hostility to the West’ (Pipes 1997, p. 70). He then cautioned

against viewing the country as a potential ally, as Russia might still return as an enemy

‘if those who guide its destiny, exploiting the political inexperience and deep-seated

prejudices of its people, once again aspire to a glory to which they are not yet entitled’

(Pipes 1997, p. 78).

The Kremlin’s international assertiveness in the wake of the coloured revolutions in

the former Soviet region has instilled additional fears in both conservative and liberal

8For important exceptions, see revisionist scholarship on the West–Soviet relations (Holloway 1984;

Gartoff 1985; Cohen 1985; Kolko 1994). For analysis of Western scholarship as reflective of an

enemy’s perception, see Oren (2002) and Foglesong (2007). For a recent study of Sovietologists, see

Engerman (2010).

700 ANDREI P. TSYGANKOV

Western analysts. Russia has been frequently viewed as reviving the lost empire, ‘back-

pedalling’ on democracy and challenging the West’s vital interests in the world

(Brzezinski 2004; Council on Foreign Relations 2006; Cheney 2006; Satter 2007; Lucas

2009; Bugajski 2009). Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008 provided a

fresh pretext for resorting to the theory of authoritarian expansionism. Although

Russia has legitimate interests in the Caucasus, many scholars and commentators

explained the Kremlin’s intervention either in terms of Russia’s expansionist

determination to secure full control over Georgia’s territory and resources (Asmus

2010; Blank 2009; Cornell & Starr 2009b, p. 8; Sherr 2009), or the Kremlin’s perceived

insecurity in response to the coloured revolutions and its search for internal legitimacy

(Cohen 2007; Lapidus 2007; Allison 2008; Ambrosio 2009; Filippov 2009). As a result,

both conservative and liberal perspectives were sceptical about Moscow entering

cooperative arrangements with Western nations voluntarily. As an authoritarian

revisionist state, it was expected instead that Russia would use available opportunities

to upset American plans to remain the dominant world power. If this reasoning

is correct, it is suggested, American policy makers would be wise to abandon any

search for partnership with post-Soviet Russia and stay firm in resisting its power

aspirations.

Critique

The theory of authoritarian expansionism suffers from biases of essentialism, cultural

ethnocentrism and political hypocrisy.

Essentialism

The first problem concerns the theory of authoritarian expansionism’s presentation of

Russia as a never changing entity that is constantly preoccupied with imperialist plans

to subjugate and occupy other nations. This tendency to essentialise Russia and its

foreign policy downplays the role of factors others than the nation’s political culture

or the regime’s strategic design. As a result, little serious consideration is given to the

possibility that Russia’s international assertiveness may be designed as a response to

actions by the West and to seek relatively limited objectives.

For example, despite frequent claims that St Petersburg’s nineteenth-century policy

sought to topple the Ottoman Empire and conquer Constantinople,9 Russia’s eastern

goals were far less ambitious. These objectives included protection of the Orthodox

Christians in the Balkans and the right to have a secure passage of Russian vessels

through the Black Sea. Although inside Russia there had been supporters of the drive

to Constantinople within intellectual and foreign-policy circles, it would be a mistake

to view Russia’s foreign policy as driven by their views. Even after defeat in the

Crimean War, the government did not turn away from Europe as Russia’s hard-liners

had hoped. As Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov’s activities demonstrated, St

9For such claims, see, for example, Kissinger (1994, pp. 140–44), Geyer (1987, p. 65) and MacKenzie

(1993, p. 220).

EXPLANATIONS OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 701

Petersburg wanted recognition of its interests in the Black Sea, which Russia was

prepared to defend even at the cost of German unification.

Even Soviet international policy had more limited goals than many Western

scholars and politicians believed. With the exception of the brief period of the drive for

world revolution, the Kremlin mainly sought to establish the Soviet Union as a great

power and recognised member of the international community, not to expand the

Soviet geopolitical boundaries. The Cold War, including the Soviet occupation of

Eastern Europe, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the military intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979, also cannot be adequately understood without considering

actions by the Western nations. Western suspicion and mistrust toward the Soviet

Union served to strengthen its determination to act assertively. From the willingness

to work with Russia before and during the meeting at Yalta, Great Britain and the

United States soon moved to unilateral and potentially confrontational behaviour.

Ideological differences notwithstanding, Stalin and his entourage did not abandon

their attempts to mend fences with the West until Truman had made public his

doctrine of globally containing communism on 12 March 1947 and the Marshall Plan

had been proclaimed in June of the same year.

It is equally problematic to present Russia’s more recent assertiveness as a part of a

plan by the Kremlin to restore the empire and dominate its neighbours, even at the

price of confrontation with the West. Those accusing Russia of reviving the lost

empire, back-pedalling on democracy and challenging the West’s vital interests in the

world oversimplify the extremely complex process of Russia’s transformation and its

relations with Western nations. In particular, much of Russia’s assertiveness was a

product of the United States’ regime-change policy, efforts to achieve nuclear

superiority and the West’s post-Cold War advancement into what Russia perceived as

the sphere of its geopolitical interests.10 It is mislea

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