You need to put yourself as a reviewer in an official journal and provide a detailed peer review feedback (2-3 pages) on a paper. Please see the attachment for the paper and some Powe

Agenda

1. Editorial policy and research fields 2. Providing feedback

1. Guidance on reviewer reports 2. Preparing and presenting a reviewer report

3. Comparing feedback 4. Responding to feedback 5. Revisions and further rounds of reviews 6. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (I) 7. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (II) 8. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (III)

Page 27UIBK | Thomas Lindner

Agenda

1. Editorial policy and research fields 2. Providing feedback

1. Guidance on reviewer reports 2. Preparing and presenting a reviewer report

3. Comparing feedback 4. Responding to feedback 5. Revisions and further rounds of reviews 6. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (I) 7. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (II) 8. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (III)

Page 29UIBK | Thomas Lindner

Guidance on how to prepare a review report1 (I)

» General guidance

» The job of the referee is to provide expert and unambiguous advice to the editor about whether or not a paper is publishable. The referee advises, the editor decides. In the case of a recommendation to invite resubmission, the referee should advise the editor about any changes that the reviewer believes are needed to make the paper publishable. In contrast, the referee should not advise the editor to require any change that does not affect the paper’s publishability. Referees are free to make suggestions for improving a paper, but it is important to make clear in their reports that these comments are suggestions to the authors for improvement or extension, not advice to the editor on requirements for publication.

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1Note that this is a particular finance (in fact, Journal of Finance) perspective

Guidance on how to prepare a review report1 (II) » Cover Letter » The ideal cover letter provides three types of information:

1. A summary of the paper’s core contribution. The editor may not be an expert in this field, and it is often hard to figure out the paper’s main point or line of reasoning.

2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the research in its current state; and 3. A frank assessment: is the core contribution of the paper, as it stands, a publishable result, and is it likely to be publishable with one round of

revision?

» Advice to the editor should be decisive. You are being asked to make a recommendation: accept, revise or reject. Reasons for uncertainty can be included in the explanation for the recommendation. If the paper is somewhat outside your area, you might suggest that a second opinion be sought and you should provide names of candidate referees, and if possible, what specific issues the alternative referee can address that you felt were outside your area of expertise.

» A revise recommendation is a serious commitment given that A-level publications are rare. You should not make a revise recommendation to simply defer judgment. It is not helpful for Editors to hear that ‘this paper seems ok, but I am not sure, let’s see what the authors can do.’ Most of the work you put into the refereeing process should be at the initial stage. That said, it is crucial that you stick with the paper and make sure the paper attains the journal’s high standard when it is resubmitted.

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1Note that this is a particular finance (in fact, Journal of Finance) perspective

Guidance on how to prepare a review report1 (II)

» Referee report

» The first section of the report (often one paragraph) should contain a concise summary of the paper’s claimed results, contributions, and general line of reasoning. The editor is typically not an expert in the paper’s subfield, so it is important for this summary to be clear. Only after this, turn to substantive issues about the importance and validity of the claimed results.

» The main job of the referee is not: 1. To help write the paper as a quasi-coauthor 2. Make an unpublishable paper publishable by directing the research 3. To ensure that the paper cites the referee’s work.

» Take a scientific stance in your report. Do not insult the authors, or use overly emotional or accusatory language. Avoid ascribing bad intent to authors (“The authors were trying for a cheap publication,” “The authors were trying to brush past literature/conflicting findings under the rug…”) and focus on the substance of the paper. If there are indications of intellectual dishonesty, state the facts rather than speculating on intent. If an accusation is made, leave it for the cover letter to the Editor.

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1Note that this is a particular finance (in fact, Journal of Finance) perspective

Guidance on how to prepare a review report1 (III)

» Content of the report

1. The importance of the paper. This is the most subjective part of the report. Space is limited in A-level journals; in many economics-related fields, they routinely reject more than 90% of submissions. There are plenty of “correct” papers that do not make a significant enough marginal contribution to existing knowledge. The editor needs to assess the importance of the contribution aided by your report. The report should contain an argument that supports your assessment of the importance of the work and detail the considerations that bear upon your judgment.

2. Problems with the paper that render it unpublishable. In this case provide a scientifically convincing argument for why these problems render the paper unpublishable (i.e. you believe the problems are serious enough that they are unlikely to be fixable in the next round). The argument needs to be clear and understandable to the editor (and authors). You should not merely list your objections to the paper. You need to explain why those objections are serious enough to render the paper unpublishable.

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1Note that this is a particular finance (in fact, Journal of Finance) perspective

Guidance on how to prepare a review report1 (IV)

» Content of the report 3. Problems with the paper that currently make it unpublishable, but which you believe could be corrected. In this

case be very clear why the paper is unpublishable (see above) and what a correction to the problem would look like. If you suspect that there are problems with the empirical work, this is where you put those concerns and specify what additional work the authors would need to do to satisfy you. Whatever you suggest is going to cost the author significant time. If the author satisfactorily addresses the issues, you should recommend publication.

4. Problems with the paper that do not render the paper unpublishable. Here you do not need to provide reasons for your opinion, but you cannot hold up publication if the authors do not address these problems. In many cases people disagree about what should and should not go into the paper. Ultimately, the author’s name goes on the paper, not yours. It is the author’s decision on how best to write the paper, not yours. Authors also have a responsibility not to waste good or important suggestions, subject to the fact that there are differences of opinion and that suggestions are costly to implement. It is not appropriate for referees to try to enforce author responsibility by taking a paper hostage if that paper is already publishable.

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1Note that this is a particular finance (in fact, Journal of Finance) perspective

Agenda

1. Editorial policy and research fields 2. Providing feedback

1. Guidance on reviewer reports 2. Preparing and presenting a reviewer report

3. Comparing feedback 4. Responding to feedback 5. Revisions and further rounds of reviews 6. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (I) 7. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (II) 8. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (III)

Page 35UIBK | Thomas Lindner

Agenda

1. Editorial policy and research fields 2. Providing feedback

1. Guidance on reviewer reports 2. Preparing and presenting a reviewer report

3. Comparing feedback 4. Responding to feedback 5. Revisions and further rounds of reviews 6. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (I) 7. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (II) 8. Presenting, providing feedback to, and discussing research (III)

Page 39UIBK | Thomas Lindner

What do you think about the paper?

» Interorganizational Diversity, Institutional Risk, and the Formation of Multipartner Syndicates

» What is good about it? What is bad?

» How clear is the theoretical contribution?

» How sound are empirics?

Page 40UIBK | Thomas Lindner

What do you think about the paper?

» Interorganizational Diversity, Institutional Risk, and the Formation of Multipartner Syndicates

» What is good about it? What is bad?

» How clear is the theoretical contribution?

» How sound are empirics?

» Prepare a review presentation with your group (90 minutes)

» Leave 45 minutes for presentation (5 minutes max) and discussion

Page 41UIBK | Thomas Lindner

1

Interorganizational Diversity, Institutional Risk,

and the Formation of Multipartner Syndicates

Abstract: We examine how interorganizational diversity affects the formation of multipartner

banking syndicates that come together to finance some of the world’s largest infrastructure

projects. Previous studies have shown that diversity negatively affects partnership formation

because it increases the costs of cooperation among the partners and the probability of conflict

between them. We extend this research and argue that the negative relationship between

interorganizational diversity and partnership formation is moderated by the institutional context

in the country where the infrastructure project will be located. We compare 1,100 realized with

over 25,000 unrealized multipartner syndicates and examine the likelihood of their formation in

countries with different levels of institutional (specifically, political and social) risk. We show

that diverse syndicates are more likely to form when investing in high-risk countries than when

investing in low-risk countries. Our findings suggest that the country-level institutional

environment is an important consideration in the formation of interorganizational partnerships.

2

INTRODUCTION

Diverse organizations often come together to accomplish common goals. Corporate

organizations collaborate across industry lines and national borders. Increasingly, they work with

nongovernmental organizations and form public–private partnerships with government entities.

Large firms work together with small firms, experienced firms with less experienced ones, and

publicly traded firms with privately or state-owned firms. The vast literature on

interorganizational partnerships, which has analyzed cooperative agreements under a multitude

of settings, shows that firms value resource complementarity but also prefer to collaborate with

similar firms (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; e.g., Gulati, 1995; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008).

Differences between firms and, more broadly, interorganizational diversity—that is, “the

distribution of differences” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1200; emphasis added) between

organizations when more than two form a partnership—increase the costs of cooperation and

monitoring, and the probability of conflict between partners (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005; Gulati

& Singh, 1998; Parkhe, 1993). Given such costs, the formation of diverse interorganizational

partnerships, especially those involving a large number of partners, is somewhat surprising.

Yet, diversity also enhances access to complementary resources (Rothaermel & Boeker,

2008; Sampson, 2007) that are particularly valuable for managing environmental uncertainty

(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). We argue in this paper

that diverse partnerships are more likely to form when firms invest in a high-risk environment.

The local institutional context of an investment—which we define as country-level political and

social risk—affects the extent to which complementary resources are needed and should

therefore influence partnership composition. When an investment in a start-up venture or a large

infrastructure project is made in a risky institutional context, complementary resources are more

3

likely to be required to manage the complexities of operating in that context. Moreover, in a

high-risk institutional environment, it is more difficult to know ex ante what specific resources

will be needed over the course of a project. Like members of an expedition who know little about

the terrain ahead, firms investing in high-risk institutional environments might want to equip

their partnership with diverse resources that can be used to manage different types of challenging

situations. Thus, when investing in high-risk locations, organizations are more likely to form

diverse partnerships to better position themselves to develop and protect their investment.

To understand how diversity affects the formation of interorganizational partnerships, we

examine the composition of multipartner banking syndicates that finance large infrastructure

projects in 72 countries around the world. More precisely, we compare the composition of 1,110

banking syndicates that formed (i.e., realized syndicates) with the composition of over 26,000

syndicates of similar size that were sampled randomly from the full population of syndicates that

could have been formed by the same banks (unrealized syndicates). We study variations in the

syndicates’ composition using a new measure of partnership-level diversity that considers the

distribution of differences among all participating organizations across four dimensions: firm

size, country of origin, previous experience, and ownership type. While on average the two

samples (realized and unrealized syndicates) have similar interorganizational diversity, we find

that highly diverse partnerships are more likely to form when the project that brings them

together is located in countries with high levels of institutional (i.e., political and social) risk.

Our study advances research on interorganizational partnerships in several ways. First, we

highlight that the institutional context influences the composition of interorganizational

partnerships. Prior research on interorganizational partnerships has emphasized that market

uncertainty impedes the formation of distant ties (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004;

4

Podolny, 1994; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). This research has focused on market uncertainty

without considering the political and social environment of the investment. By contrast,

international business studies have highlighted that institutional risk in the host country strongly

affects the formation of joint ventures with local partners (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner,

2003; Delios & Henisz, 2000; Liu & Maula, 2016; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009), but

these studies have focused largely on partnerships between multinationals and local firms.

Across these fields of research, few studies (e.g., Vasudeva, Spencer, & Teegen, 2013) have

analyzed the effects of the institutional context on the formation and composition of

interorganizational partnerships. We suggest that firms are more likely to seek diverse partners

(foreign or local) when they operate in high-risk institutional contexts. In such environments, it is

very difficult to know ex ante which resources are required over the duration of the project, and

therefore which partner is best suited for it. Hence, we argue that diverse partnerships are more

likely to be formed to complete projects in risky institutional environments.

Second, we evaluate how diversity affects the formation of multipartner syndicates (of

three or more banks) by focusing on the partnership as the unit of analysis. Prior research has

examined the formation of interorganizational partnerships as dyadic ties (Ahuja, Polidoro, &

Mitchell, 2009; e.g., Gulati, 1995). By contrast, studies that evaluate the formation of

interorganizational partnerships by focusing on the entire partnership as the level of analysis are

still rare (Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014). Yet, when considering partnership formation, an

important distinction needs to be highlighted between the effects of a difference between two

firms and the effects of diversity (i.e., the distribution of differences) that describe a partnership

involving more than two firms. This distinction is important both at a theoretical level—to

separate the concepts of difference (or distance) and diversity—and in terms of concept

5

measurement. At a theoretical level, both the costs and the benefits of diversity are nonlinear

functions of the number of partners, as differences between partners are not additive. As the

number of partners increases, information asymmetries, incentives to free-ride, and the costs of

monitoring increase considerably. Moreover, processes of coordination and exchange work

differently in multipartner settings, and the formation of coalitions within the partnership can

affect its performance and survival (Heidl et al., 2014). Consequently, interorganizational

diversity is likely to affect the formation of partnerships differently between multipartner

coalitions and two-party ones. While differences between two partners may be addressed ex-ante

with relational contracts that complement formal ones (Poppo & Zenger, 2002), such governance

structures become exponentially more difficult to devise and implement when multiple partners

with differing interests work together (García-Canal, Valdés-Llaneza, & Ariño, 2003).

Considering these complexities, we expect interorganizational diversity to have a more

pronounced negative effect on the formation of large, multipartner syndicates. Second, the

measurement of diversity as the distribution of differences between three or more organizations

is not a simple extension of the measurement of difference in interorganizational dyads. We

propose in this paper a new approach to measuring interorganizational diversity that (1) focuses

on the partnership as the level of analysis, (2) reflects the distribution of differences across all

the organizations involved, and (3) captures it along a number of relevant dimensions.

Finally, we extend the study of interorganizational partnerships to a new setting: the

formation of large, multipartner banking syndicates that come together to finance some of the

largest infrastructure investments around the world. This setting is known in the industry as

project finance (hereafter, PF) and serves as a favorable empirical context for testing the

influence of the institutional environment on the formation of diverse interorganizational

6

partnerships. The success of the large infrastructure projects in our data (including pipelines,

airport expansions, and large hydroelectric power plants) requires the continuous support of

many local stakeholders. Different national government agencies, local communities, their

mayors, and local councils are involved, as are suppliers of equipment, materials, and workforce.

Opportunities for opportunistic behavior abound, and project success depends on the successful

management of such risks. In PF, banks assume most of these risks by offering the project

company a nonrecourse loan that can only be repaid from the cash flows generated by the

infrastructure project, once successfully completed. Thus, to recover their loans, banks must

work together to mitigate the risks in the institutional environment, much like firms joined by an

R&D alliance must work together to ensure the success of their joint project.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY AND PARTNERSHIP FORMATION

Prior literature defines interorganizational partnerships as cooperative strategies that cover “any

type of agreement between two or more firms, contractual or otherwise, involving mutual

forbearance towards one or more (typically not identical) goals by providing capital, knowledge,

technology, managerial talent, and/or other valuable assets under the purview of said firms”

(Beamish & Lupton, 2016: 163 ). Research on the formation of interorganizational partnerships

has focused extensively on the structural and relational factors affecting the collaborating parties

(and Ahuja et al., 2009; e.g. Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). But scholarship in this area has paid less

attention to the attributes of the partners involved (Lavie & Miller, 2008: 623 ) or to how the

selection of partners might be influenced by “the moderating effects of country-level institutional

characteristics” (Vasudeva et al., 2013: 319; see also Sorenson and Stuart, 2008).

We suggest here not only that both the composition of a partnership and the context within

which it operates are important determinants of its formation, but also that the two might

7

interact. Specifically, the broader institutional context and the challenges therein might affect the

selection of partners with specific attributes. In the discussion that follows, we build, first, on

existing literature to highlight that in the context of multipartner syndicates or alliances, more

diverse partnerships are less likely to form than less diverse partnerships. We then examine

whether this is true in both low-risk and high-risk institutional environments and argue that the

relationship between interorganizational diversity and partnership formation is moderated by the

degree of risk in the institutional environment where the investment is located. In the context of

syndicates bringing together three or more banks to finance some of the largest infrastructure

projects around the world (the empirical setting in our study), our argument implies two

observable implications. First, we are more likely to observe less diverse syndicates forming

(compared with counterfactual syndicates that could have formed but did not), and, second, we

are likely to observe more diverse syndicates forming when their projects are located in high-risk

locations than when the projects are located in low-risk locations.

Prior research on interorganizational partnerships and alliances has studied them either

from the perspective of one firm seeking new partners or as dyadic relationships between two

firms seeking a “match” (Mindruta, Moeen, & Agarwal, 2016). In both conceptualizations, the

discussion has largely focused on differences (or lack thereof) between firms (Chung et al., 2000;

Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001; Mitsuhashi & Greve,

2009). Scholars highlighted the tension between the benefits of combining complementary

resources from different firms (e.g., combining complementary technologies or markets) and the

costs of managing the differences between them (Colombo, Grilli, & Piva, 2006; Jiang, Tao, &

Santoro, 2010; White & Siu-Yun Lui, 2005). Some studies suggested that complementarities

increase the likelihood of a partnership (Chung et al., 2000; Colombo et al., 2006). For instance,

8

Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) analyze alliances between industrial firms and find that

complementarities in industry segments and geographical markets increase the likelihood of

alliance formation.1 Chung et al. (2000) analyze underwriting syndicates and find that

complementarities in industry, status, clientele, and specialization increase the formation of

dyadic ties. Similarly, Mitsuhashi and Greve (2009) find that resource and market

complementarity increase the likelihood of alliance formation in liner shipping; and in the

biopharma industry, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) and Mindruta et al. (2016) find that

complementarities in market niches, size, and research and development capabilities increase the

probability of an alliance between two firms. Other studies, however, show that differences

between firms lower the probability of their forming a partnership. Some scholars highlight that

differences in status impede partnership formation (Chung et al., 2000; Gulati, 1995; Hallen,

2008; Podolny, 1994). Ahuja et al. (2009) find that technical, product, and market dissimilarity

decrease the likelihood of alliance formation.2

We argue that this tension is exacerbated in partnerships involving more than two firms. A

more diverse partnership has access to a wider range of resources, but it is also more difficult to

manage. A large number of partners makes it more difficult to devise formal structures to govern

the resource exchange (Li, Eden, Hitt, Ireland, & Garrett, 2012). Coordinating activities is also

more difficult when the partnership involves a large number of firms (Heidl et al., 2014), and

monitoring the efforts of different partners is cumbersome because not every firm can easily

observe the others’ activities and must instead rely on indirect reports and assessments (Lavie,

1 Authors conceptualize complementarity as “absence of overlap” in geographic regions and industry subsegments

(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999: 1466). 2 Parkhe (1991) highlighted this tension by distinguish

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