Triple Notes on ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’? To gain a better sense of how someone might apply the Aristotelian approach t

ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE Virtue Theory and Abortion

The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming

better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or

of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its

terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that

will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject

this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues

raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.

VIRTUE THEORY

Virtue theory can be laid out in a framework that reveals clearly some of the essential similarities and differences between it and some versions of

deontological and utilitarian theories. I begin with a rough sketch of fa-

Versions of this article have been read to philosophy societies at University College, Lon-

don, Rutgers University, and the Universities of Dundee, Edinburgh, Oxford, Swansea,

and California-San Diego; at a conference of the Polish and British Academies in Cracow in I988 on "Life, Death and the Law," and as a symposium paper at the Pacific Division of

the American Philosophical Association in I989. I am grateful to the many people who

contributed to the discussions of it on these occasions, and particularly to Philippa Foot and

Anne Jaap Jacobson for private discussion.

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Hursthouse, Rosalind (1991), "Virtue Theory and Abortion", Philosophy & Public Affairs 20(3):223-246

224 Philosophy & Public Affairs

miliar versions of the latter two sorts of theory, not, of course, with the intention of suggesting that they exhaust the field, but on the assump- tion that their very familiarity will provide a helpful contrast with virtue

theory. Suppose a deontological theory has basically the following frame-

work. We begin with a premise providing a specification of right action:

P. i. An action is right iff it is in accordance with a moral rule or prin- ciple.

This is a purely formal specification, forging a link between the concepts of right action and moral rule, and gives one no guidance until one knows what a moral rule is. So the next thing the theory needs is a prem-

ise about that:

P.2. A moral rule is one that …

Historically, an acceptable completion of P.2 would have been

(i) is laid on us by God

or

(ii) is required by natural law.

In secular versions (not, of course, unconnected to God's being pure rea-

son, and the universality of natural law) we get such completions as

(iii) is laid on us by reason

or

(iv) is required by rationality

or

(v) would command universal rational acceptance

or

(vi) would be the object of choice of all rational beings

and so on. Such a specification forges a second conceptual link, between

the concepts of moral rule and rationality. We have here the skeleton of a familiar version of a deontological the-

ory, a skeleton that reveals that what is essential to any such version is the links between right action, moral rule, and rationality. That these

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225 Virtue Theory and Abortion

form the basic structure can be seen particularly vividly if we lay out the familiar act-utilitarianism in such a way as to bring out the contrasts. Act-utilitarianism begins with a premise that provides a specification

of right action:

P. i. An action is right iff it promotes the best consequences.

It thereby forges the link between the concepts of right action and con- sequences. It goes on to specify what the best consequences are in its second premise:

P.2. The best consequences are those in which happiness is maxi- mized.

It thereby forges the link between consequences and happiness. Now let us consider what a skeletal virtue theory looks like. It begins

with a specification of right action:

P. i. An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.'

This, like the first premises of the other two sorts of theory, is a purely formal principle, giving one no guidance as to what to do, that forges the conceptual link between right action and virtuous agent. Like the other theories, it must, of course, go on to specify what the latter is. The first

step toward this may appear quite trivial, but is needed to correct a pre- vailing tendency among many critics to define the virtuous agent as one who is disposed to act in accordance with a deontologist's moral rules.

P. i a. A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, one who has and exercises the virtues.

This subsidiary premise lays bare the fact that virtue theory aims to pro- vide a nontrivial specification of the virtuous agent via a nontrivial spec- ification of the virtues, which is given in its second premise:

i. It should be noted that this premise intentionally allows for the possibility that two virtuous agents, faced with the same choice in the same circumstances, may act differ- ently. For example, one might opt for taking her father off the life-support machine and the other for leaving her father on it. The theory requires that neither agent thinks that what the other does is wrong (see note 4 below), but it explicitly allows that no action is uniquely right in such a case-both are right. It also intentionally allows for the possibility that in some circumstances-those into which no virtuous agent could have got herself- no action is right. I explore this premise at greater length in "Applying Virtue Ethics," forthcoming in afestschrift for Philippa Foot.

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226 Philosophy & Public Affairs

P. 2. A virtue is a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well.

This premise forges a conceptual link between virtue and flourishing (or living well or eudaimonia). And, just as deontology, in theory, then goes on to argue that each favored rule meets its specification, so virtue ethics, in theory, goes on to argue that each favored character trait meets its.

These are the bare bones of virtue theory. Following are five brief com- ments directed to some misconceived criticisms that should be cleared out of the way.

First, the theory does not have a peculiar weakness or problem in vir- tue of the fact that it involves the concept of eudaimonia (a standard criticism being that this concept is hopelessly obscure). Now no virtue theorist will pretend that the concept of human flourishing is an easy one to grasp. I will not even claim here (though I would elsewhere) that it is no more obscure than the concepts of rationality and happiness, since, if our vocabulary were more limited, we might, faute de mieux, call it (human) rational happiness, and thereby reveal that it has at least some of the difficulties of both. But virtue theory has never, so far as I know, been dismissed on the grounds of the comparative obscurity of this central concept; rather, the popular view is that it has a problem with this which deontology and utilitarianism in no way share. This, I

think, is clearly false. Both rationality and happiness, as they figure in their respective theories, are rich and difficult concepts-hence all the disputes about the various tests for a rule's being an object of rational choice, and the disputes, dating back to Mill's introduction of the higher and lower pleasures, about what constitutes happiness.

Second, the theory is not trivially circular; it does not specify right ac- tion in terms of the virtuous agent and then immediately specify the vir- tuous agent in terms of right action. Rather, it specifies her in terms of the virtues, and then specifies these, not merely as dispositions to right action, but as the character traits (which are dispositions to feel and react as well as act in certain ways) required for eudaimonia.2

2. There is, of course, the further question of whether the theory eventually describes a larger circle and winds up relying on the concept of right action in its interpretation of eudaimonia. In denying that the theory is trivially circular, I do not pretend to answer this intricate question. It is certainly true that virtue theory does not claim that the correct conception of eudaimonia can be got from "an independent 'value-free' investigation of

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227 Virtue Theory and Abortion

Third, it does answer the question "What should I do?" as well as the

question "What sort of person should I be?" (That is, it is not, as one of

the catchphrases has it, concerned only with Being and not with Doing.) Fourth, the theory does, to a certain extent, answer this question by

coming up with rules or principles (contrary to the common claim that it

does not come up with any rules or principles). Every virtue generates a positive instruction (act justly, kindly, courageously, honestly, etc.) and

every vice a prohibition (do not act unjustly, cruelly, like a coward, dis-

honestly, etc.). So trying to decide what to do within the framework of

virtue theory is not, as some people seem to imagine, necessarily a matter of taking one's favored candidate for a virtuous person and asking one-

self, "What would they do in these circumstances?" (as if the raped fif- teen-year-old girl might be supposed to say to herself, "Now would Soc- rates have an abortion if he were in my circumstances?" and as if

someone who had never known or heard of anyone very virtuous were going to be left, according to the theory, with no way to decide what to do at all). The agent may instead ask herself, "If I were to do such and such now, would I be acting justly or unjustly (or neither), kindly or unkindly [and so on]?" I shall consider below the problem created by cases in which such a question apparently does not yield an answer to

"What should I do?" (because, say, the alternatives are being unkind or being unjust); here my claim is only that it sometimes does-the agent may employ her concepts of the virtues and vices directly, rather than imagining what some hypothetical exemplar would do.

Fifth (a point that is implicit but should be made explicit), virtue the- ory is not committed to any sort of reductionism involving defining all of our moral concepts in terms of the virtuous agent. On the contrary, it relies on a lot of very significant moral concepts. Charity or benevolence,

for instance, is the virtue whose concern is the good of others; that con- cept of good is related to the concept of evil or harm, and they are both related to the concepts of the worthwhile, the advantageous, and the pleasant. If I have the wrong conception of what is worthwhile and ad-

human nature" (John McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Rorty IBerkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, I980]). The sort of training that is required for acquiring the correct conception no doubt involves being taught from early on such things as "Decent people do this sort of thing, not that" and "To do such and such is the mark of a depraved character" (cf. Nico- machean Ethics i i ioa22). But whether this counts as relying on the concept of right (or wrong) action seems to me very unclear and requiring much discussion.

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228 Philosophy & Public Affairs

vantageous and pleasant, then I shall have the wrong conception of what is good for, and harnful to, myself and others, and, even with the best will in the world, will lack the virtue of charity, which involves getting

all this right. (This point will be illustrated at some length in the second half of this article; I mention it here only in support of the fact that no virtue theorst who takes her inspiration from Aristotle would even con- template aiming at reductionism.)3

Let me now, with equal brevity, run through two more standard criti- cisms of virtue theory (the sixth and seventh of my nine) to show that, though not entirely misplaced, they do not highlight problems peculiar to that theory but, rather, problems that are shared by familiar versions

of deontology.

One common criticism is that we do not know which character traits

are the virtues, or that this is open to much dispute, or particularly sub- ject to the threat of moral skepticism or "pluralism"4 or cultural relativ- ism. But the parallel roles played by the second premises of both deon- tological and virtue theories reveal the way in which both sorts of theory share this problem. It is at the stage at which one tries to get the right conclusions to drop out of the bottom of one's theory that, theoretically, all the work has to be done. Rule deontologists know that they want to

get "don't kill," "keep promises," "cherish your children," and so on as the rules that meet their specification, whatever it may be. They also know that any of these can be disputed, that some philosopher may claim, of any one of them, that it is reasonable to reject it, and that at least people claim that there has been, for each rule, some culture that

3. Cf. Bernard Williams' point in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: William Collins, I985) that we need an enriched ethical vocabulary, not a cut-down one.

4. I put pluralism in scare quotes to serve as a warning that virtue theory is not incom- patible with all forms of it. It allows for "competing conceptions" of eudaimonia and the

worthwhile, for instance, in the sense that it allows for a plurality of flourishing lives-the theory need not follow Aristotle in specifying the life of contemplation as the only one that truly constitutes eudaimonia (if he does). But the conceptions "compete" only in the sense that, within a single flourishing life, not everything worthwhile can be fitted in; the theory does not allow that two people with a correct conception of eudaimonia can disagree over

whether the way the other is living constitutes flourishing. Moreover, the theory is com- mitted to the strong thesis that the same set of character traits is needed for any flourishing life; it will not allow that, for instance, soldiers need courage but wives and mothers do not,

or that judges need justice but can live well despite lacking kindness. (This obviously is related to the point made in note i above.) For an interesting discussion of pluralism (dif- ferent interpretations thereof) and virtue theory, see Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Liberalism and Natural End Ethics," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 153-6I.

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229 Virtue Theory and Abortion

rejected it. Similarly, the virtue theorists know that they want to get jus- tice, charity, fidelity, courage, and so on as the character traits needed

for eudaimonia; and they also know that any of these can be disputed, that some philosopher will say of any one of them that it is reasonable to reject it as a virtue, and that there is said to be, for each character trait,

some culture that has thus rejected it. This is a problem for both theories, and the virtue theorist certainly

does not find it any harder to argue against moral skepticism, "plural-

ism," or cultural relativism than the deontologist. Each theory has to

stick out its neck and say, in some cases, "This person/these people/other cultures are (or would be) in error," and find some grounds for saying this.

Another criticism (the seventh) often made is that virtue ethics has unresolvable conflict built into it. "It is common knowledge," it is said, "that the requirements of the virtues can conflict; charity may prompt me to end the frightful suffering of the person in my care by killing him, but justice bids me to stay my hand. To tell my brother that his wife is being unfaithful to him would be honest and loyal, but it would be kinder to keep quiet about it. So which should I do? In such cases, virtue ethics has nothing helpful to say." (This is one version of the problem, men- tioned above, that considering whether a proposed action falls under a virtue or vice term does not always yield an answer to "What should I do?")

The obvious reply to this criticism is that rule deontology notoriously

suffers from the same problem, arising not only from the fact that its rules can apparently conflict, but also from the fact that, at first blush, it appears that one and the same rule (e.g., preserve life) can yield contrary instructions in a particular case.5 As before, I agree that this is a problem for virtue theory, but deny that it is a problem peculiar to it.

Finally, I want to articulate, and reject, what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. Perhaps because it is the major criticism, the reflection of a very general sort of disquiet about the theory, it is hard to

state clearly-especially for someone who does not accept it-but it goes something like this.6 My interlocutor says:

5. E.g., in Williams' Jim and Pedro case in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitar-

ianism: For and Against (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973). 6. Intimations of this criticism constantly come up in discussion; the clearest statement

of it I have found is by Onora O'Neill, in her review of Stephen Clark's The Moral Status

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230 Philosophy & Public Affairs

Virtue theory can't get us anywhere in real moral issues because it's bound to be all assertion and no argument. You admit that the best it can come up with in the way of action-guiding rules are the ones that

rely on the virtue and vice concepts, such as "act charitably," "don't act cruelly," and so on; and, as if that weren't bad enough, you admit that these virtue concepts, such as charity, presuppose concepts such as the good, and the worthwhile, and so on. But that means that any virtue theorist who writes about real moral issues must rely on her audience's agreeing with her application of all these concepts, and hence accepting all the premises in which those applications are en- shrined. But some other virtue theorist might take different premises about these matters, and come up with very different conclusions, and, within the terms of the theory, there is no way to distinguish be- tween the two. While there is agreement, virtue theory can repeat con-

ventional wisdom, preserve the status quo, but it can't get us any- where in the way that a normative ethical theory is supposed to, namely, by providing rational grounds for acceptance of its practical conclusions.

My strategy will be to split this criticism into two: one (the eighth) ad- dressed to the virtue theorist's employment of the virtue and vice con-

cepts enshrined in her rules-act charitably, honestly, and so on-and the other (the ninth) addressed to her employment of concepts such as that of the worthwhile. Each objection, I shall maintain, implicitly ap- peals to a certain condition of adequacy on a normative moral theory, and in each case, I shall claim, the condition of adequacy, once made explicit, is utterly implausible.

It is true that when she discusses real moral issues, the virtue theorist has to assert that certain actions are honest, dishonest, or neither; char-

itable, uncharitable, or neither. And it is true that this is often a very difficult matter to decide; her rules are not always easy to apply. But this counts as a criticism of the theory only if we assume, as a condition of adequacy, that any adequate action-guiding theory must make the diffi- cult business of knowing what to do if one is to act well easy, that it must provide clear guidance about what ought and ought not to be done which

of Animals, in Journal of Philosophy 77 (I980): 440-46. For a response I am much in sympathy with, see Cora Diamond, "Anything But Argument?" Philosophical Investiga- tions 5 (I982): 23-41.

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23I Virtue Theory and Abortion

any reasonably clever adolescent could follow if she chose. But such a

condition of adequacy is implausible. Acting rightly is difficult, and does

call for much moral wisdom, and the relevant condition of adequacy,

which virtue theory meets, is that it should have built into it an expla-

nation of a truth expressed by Aristotle,7 namely, that moral knowl-

edge-unlike mathematical knowledge-cannot be acquired merely by

attending lectures and is not characteristically to be found in people too

young to have had much experience of life. There are youthful mathe-

matical geniuses, but rarely, if ever, youthful moral geniuses, and this

tells us something significant about the sort of knowledge that moral

knowledge is. Virtue ethics builds this in straight off precisely by couch-

ing its rules in terms whose application may indeed call for the most

delicate and sensitive judgment. Here we may discern a slightly different version of the problem that

there are cases in which applying the virtue and vice terms does not yield

an answer to "What should I do?" Suppose someone "youthful in char-

acter," as Aristotle puts it, having applied the relevant terms, finds her-

self landed with what is, unbeknownst to her, a case not of real but of

apparent conflict, arising from a misapplication of those terms. Then she

will not be able to decide what to do unless she knows of a virtuous agent

to look to for guidance. But her quandary is (ex hypothesi) the result of

her lack of wisdom, and just what virtue theory expects. Someone hesi-

tating over whether to reveal a hurtful truth, for example, thinking it

would be kind but dishonest or unjust to lie, may need to realize, with

respect to these particular circumstances, not that kindness is more (or

less) important than honesty or justice, and not that honesty or justice

sometimes requires one to act unkindly or cruelly, but that one does peo-

ple no kindness by concealing this sort of truth from them, hurtful as it

may be. This is the type of thing (I use it only as an example) that people with moral wisdom know about, involving the correct application of kind,

and that people without such wisdom find difficult.

What about the virtue theorist's reliance on concepts such as that of

the worthwhile? If such reliance is to count as a fault in the theory, what

condition of adequacy is implicitly in play? It must be that any good nor-

mative theory should provide answers to questions about real moral is-

sues whose truth is in no way determined by truths about what is worth-

7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I142ai2-i6.

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232 Philosophy & Public Affairs

while, or what really matters in human life. Now although people are initially inclined to reject out of hand the claim that the practical conclu- sions of a normative moral theory have to be based on premises about what is truly worthwhile, the alternative, once it is made explicit, may look even more unacceptable. Consider what the condition of adequacy entails. If truths about what is worthwhile (or truly good, or serious, or about what matters in human life) do not have to be appealed to in order to answer questions about real moral issues, then I might sensibly seek guidance about what I ought to do from someone who had declared in advance that she knew nothing about such matters, or from someone who said that, although she had opinions about them, these were quite likely to be wrong but that this did not matter, because they would play no determining role in the advice she gave me.

I should emphasize that we are talking about real moral issues and real guidance; I want to know whether I should have an abortion, take my mother off the life-support machine, leave academic life and become a doctor in the Third World, give up my job with the firm that is using animals in its experiments, tell my father he has cancer. Would I go to someone who says she has no views about what is worthwhile in life? Or to someone who says that, as a matter of fact, she tends to think that the only thing that matters is having a good time, but has a normative theory that is consistent both with this view and with my own rather more pu- ritanical one, which will yield the guidance I need?

I take it as a premise that this is absurd. The relevant condition of adequacy should be that the practical conclusions of a good normative theory must be in part determined by premises about what is worth- while, important, and so on. Thus I reject this "major criticism" of virtue theory, that it cannot get us anywhere in the way that a normative moral theory is supposed to. According to my response, a normative theory that any clever adolescent can apply, or that reaches practical conclusions that are in no way determined by premises about what is truly worth- while, serious, and so on, is guaranteed to be an inadequate theory.

Although I reject this criticism, I have not argued that it is misplaced and that it necessarily manifests a failure to understand what virtue the- ory is. My rejection is based on premises about what an adequate nor- mative theory must be like-what sorts of concepts it must contain, and what sort of account it must give of moral knowledge-and thereby claims, implicitly, that the "major criticism" manifests a failure to under-

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233 Virtue Theory and Abortion

stand what an adequate normative theory is. But, as a matter of fact, I think the criticism is often made by people who have no idea of what virtue theory looks like when applied to a real moral issue; they drasti- cally underestimate the variety of ways in which the virtue and vice con-

cepts, and the others, such as that of the worthwhile, figure in such dis- cussion.

As promised, I now turn to an illustration of such discussion, applying

virtue theory to abortion. Before I embark on this tendentious business, I should remind the reader of the aim of this discussion. I am not, in this article, trying to solve the problem of abortion; I am illustrating how vir- tue theory directs one to think about it. It might indeed be said that thinking about the problem in this way "solves" it by dissolving it, insofar as it leads one to the conclusion that there is no single right answer, but a variety of particular answers, and in what follows I am certainly trying to make that conclusion seem plausible. But, that granted, it should still be said that I am not trying to "solve the problems" in the practical sense

of telling people that they should, or should not, do this or that if they are pregnant and contemplating abortion in these or those particular cir-

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