High order thinking (HOT) questions, and 2) Answer one of your classmates HOT questions. This assignment is designed to evaluate the application of a variety of oral and written business a

Beyond Legacy: Assessing Olympic Games Performance

Jean-Loup Chappelet

Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Chavannes- Lausanne, Switzerland

ABSTRACT This conceptual paper proposes a new framework for evaluating the two central facets of Olympic Games performance: their deliv- ery and their legacy. This framework, which I call the “Olympic diamond”, is based on classic concepts of managerial perform- ance and public policy evaluation, developed over many years by managers and political scientists to measure public action. Indeed, the Olympic Games, which are now attributed seven years before they take place, have become a sort of public policy/pro- gramme or, more accurately, a partnership between the public authorities and private actors within a given territory (city, region, country). This partnership requires public bodies to work closely with private non-profit organisations and for-profit companies over a period of 12 years or more to implement a vast series of measures. Section 1 shows how the Games have evolved from a purely private affair to a true public policy, and discusses what is meant by Games performance. Section 2 reviews recent attempts to measure or evaluate this performance. The final section presents an approach to evaluating Olympic performance – the Olympic diamond – and describes its four vertices and five evalu- ation criteria, drawing on the 2012 London Olympics to illustrate how this framework can be applied. The conclusion discusses the Olympic diamond’s potential for evaluating and comparing other editions of the Games or other Olympics-related projects and facilities.

超越遗产:评估奥运会表现

这篇概念性论文提出了一个新的框架来评估奥运会两个核心方面 的表现:它们的传递和它们的遗产。我把这个框架称为“奥运钻石”, 它基于管理绩效和公共政策评估的经典概念, 是管理者和政治学 家多年来为衡量公共行动而发展起来的。事实上, 奥运会现在被 认为是在七年前举行的, 它已经成为一种公共政策/方案, 或者更准 确地说, 成为一个特定领土(城市、地区、国家)内公共当局和私人 行动者之间的伙伴关系。这种伙伴关系要求公共机构在12年或更 长时间内与私营非盈利组织和营利性公司密切合作, 以实施一系 列广泛的措施。第一章节展示了奥运会如何从一个纯粹的私人事 务演变成一个真正的公共政策, 并讨论了什么是奥运会的表现。 第二章节回顾了最近衡量或评估这种性能的尝试。最后一章节介 绍了一种评估奥林匹克表现的方法——奥林匹克钻石——并描述 了它的四个顶点和五个评价标准, 并以2012年伦敦奥运会为例来

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 11 March 2018 Revised 16 July 2018 Accepted 8 August 2018

KEYWORDS Olympic delivery; legacy; heritage; outcomes; effectiveness

关键词：

奥运交付; 遗产; 传统; 结 果; 有效性

CONTACT Jean-Loup Chappelet [email protected] Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, 21 Route de la Maladiere, Chavannes-Lausanne, CH-1022, Switzerland � 2019 Global Alliance of Marketing & Management Associations (GAMMA)

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL SPORT MANAGEMENT 2019, VOL. 4, NO. 3, 236–256 https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2018.1537681

说明如何应用这个框架。结论讨论了奥林匹克钻石在评价和比较 其他版本的奥运会或其他与奥运会有关的项目和设施方面的潜 力。

1. Introduction

Juan Antonio Samaranch, president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) from 1980 to 2001, always ensured his speeches at Olympic Games closing ceremo- nies included a laudatory sound bite the media could pick up on. This enabled him to put a positive spin on every edition of an event whose organisation the IOC has overseen since 1894 and which is virtually its only source of revenue. Samaranch even went as far as describing Sydney 2000, his final Olympics as IOC president, as the “best Games ever”. His successors have continued this tradition, albeit using more subtle turns of phrase. Jacques Rogge, for example, chose to paraphrase Britain’s national anthem, declaring the London 2012 Olympics to have been “happy and glorious”, whereas Thomas Bach referred to Rio’s nickname when he praised the 2016 Olympics as “marvellous Games in the marvellous city”. Later, acknowledging the fact that Rio 2016 had been staged successfully in a particularly difficult context, the IOC said the event could be described as the “most perfect imperfect Games” (Grohmann, 2016).

Nevertheless, it is unanimously agreed that while organising a successful Games is essential, it is not enough to vindicate the decision to host the event. In other words, 17 days (current duration of both the Summer and Winter Olympics) of sporting competitions do not justify the massive financial and human investment involved in staging the Olympics; for a Games to be deemed a success, it must also leave behind a positive legacy. This imperative has been recognised by the Olympic Charter since 2004, with Rule 2.14 stipulating “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” as one of the IOC’s fundamental mis- sions. Who can define what is “a positive legacy” is unclear as we know this defin- ition can vary from stakeholders to stakeholders (mayor, city official, inhabitants, businesses, etc.).

The importance of Olympic legacies is reflected in the huge number of research papers and academic conferences the subject has generated since the turn of the cen- tury (e.g., de Moragas, Kennett, and Puig, 2003). In 2014, the IOC itself set up a Sustainability and Legacy (formerly Sport and Environment) Commission to study the issue and put forward a strategy. A recent literature review (Scheu & Preuss, 2017) uncovered more than 863 academic papers relating to Olympic legacies, 204 of which were analysed in detail. However, very few of these papers describes a method for measuring and evaluating Olympic legacies.

The present conceptual paper proposes a framework for evaluating the two central facets of Olympic Games performance: their delivery and their legacy. (The neutral term “performance” is preferable to more emotive terms such as “success”, “impact”, “failure” or “benefits” which is defined differently by different stakeholders.) This framework, which I call the “Olympic diamond”, is based on classic concepts of

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managerial performance and public policy evaluation, developed over many years by managers and political scientists to measure public action. Indeed, the Olympic Games, which are now. Attributed seven years before they take place, have become a sort of public policy/programme or, more accurately, a partnership between the pub- lic authorities and private actors within a given territory (city, region, country). This partnership requires public bodies (municipal, regional and national authorities, pub- lic agencies, etc.) to work closely with private non-profit organisations (IOC, local organising committee, national Olympic committee, etc.) and for-profit companies (sponsors, suppliers, hotel owners, developers, etc.) over a period of 12 years or more to implement a vast series of measures.

Section 1 shows how the Games have evolved from a purely private affair to a true public policy requiring a specific form of governance, and discusses what is meant by Games performance. Section 2 reviews recent attempts to measure or evaluate this performance. The final section presents a new approach to evaluating performance – the Olympic diamond – and describes its four vertices and five edges (see Figure 1), drawing on the 2012 London Olympics to illustrate how this frame- work can be applied. The conclusion discusses the Olympic diamond’s potential for evaluating and comparing other editions of the Games, most notably the Winter Youth Olympic Games, inaugurated in 2012, or other Olympics-related projects and facilities.

2. Increasing Public Sector Involvement in Delivering the Olympic Games

Until the 1960s for the Summer Olympics and the 1980s for the Winter Olympics, the Games tended to be organised by private, although not-for-profit, bodies in the shape of local Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which

Figure 1. The public action framework. Source: Adapted and translated from Santo & Verrier 1993, p. 124.

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coordinated all the necessary operations and construction work. The period following World War II, especially the Cold War, saw significant growth in the size and importance of the Games, first for the Summer Olympics and then, after 1994, when the Olympic calendar was changed so the Winter Games are held two years after the Summer Games rather than in the same year, for the Winter Olympics. In fact, the stature of the Olympics was such that the Italian (Rome 1960), Japanese (Tokyo 1964, Sapporo 1972), and German (Munich 1972) governments saw hosting them as a way of marking their country’s return to the “concert of nations”. Similarly, the Mexico 1968, Sarajevo 1984 and Seoul 1988 Olympics were seen by their host nations as a sign they had been admitted to this “concert”, on a par with the countries of the West, which had monopolised the Games until then.

Municipal and regional governments also became increasingly involved in organis- ing the Games. For example, Montreal’s mayor, Jean Drapeau, obtained the 1976 Olympics as a way of building on the success of the 1967 World’s Fair (from his point of view) and cementing the city’s position as a global metropolis. When Barcelona was awarded the 1992 Games, the OCOG was presided by the city’s mayor in person, backed by strong support from his region, which saw the Games as a way of expressing Catalonia’s autonomy from Madrid. Similarly, Grenoble’s municipal councillors were heavily involved, alongside the French government, in organising the 1968 Winter Olympics. Such local and regional government involvement has been the norm for every edition of the Summer Games since the 1960s (and sometimes before that, e.g., Berlin 1936).

However, by the late 1970s the Games had lost much of their attractiveness for municipal, regional and national politicians, due to the huge deficit posted by Montreal 1976 (financed by Quebec’s provincial government), repeated Olympic boy- cotts (1972, 1976 and 1980) and Denver’s withdrawal from the 1976 Winter Games (replaced by Innsbruck, which had hosted the 1964 Games). As a result, the IOC received just one bid to host the 1980 Winter Olympics (Lake Placid) and 1984 Summer Olympics (Los Angeles) and only two bids for the 1984 Winter Olympics and 1988 Summer Olympics. Enthusiasm for hosting the Olympics was revived by the success of Los Angeles 1984 and Calgary 1988, which gave the idea that a “private” OCOG (as in these two Olympics) could deliver the Games without strong public financial support and even make a profit (on the operational budget, since there was no investment budget). As a result, no fewer than eleven cities bid to host the 2004 Summer Olympics, five of which were presented to the IOC for the final vote. However, eagerness to stage the Olympics has faded once again, with very few candidates coming forward to host the 2022 (awarded to Beijing), 2024 (Paris) and 2028 (Los Angeles) Games (Chappelet, 2017).

The last edition of the Games to try and severely restrict public sector involvement was Atlanta 1996, which nevertheless received substantial support from the American government, as shown by the report issued by the United States’ General Accounting Office (GAO, 2001). What is more, a promise by the bid committee meant that Atlanta’s OCOG had to set up a para-public agency – the Metropolitan Atlanta Olympic Games Authority (MAOGA) – to provide the deficit guarantee required by the IOC and to coordinate the different public and private stakeholders. In this

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respect, the State of Georgia, of which Atlanta is the capital, provided a large subsidy. Even with this public support, Atlanta 1996 had great difficulty balancing its budget and the transportation and security problems that arose during the Games severely compromised the event’s delivery. It remains to be seen how the recently-formed OCOG for Los Angeles 2028 will manage to stage these Games, as, even though both the city and the State of California have promised US$250 million deficit guarantees, it will not receive any financial guarantees from the federal government (although there will probably be some sort of federal contribution, mostly in kind, as in 1984).

Aware of how difficult it is to deliver the Games without a close partnership between the public authorities and private organisations, New South Wales’ provincial government set up a series of governmental agencies for the Sydney 2000 Olympics. Coordinated by a Ministry for the Olympics, each agency was responsible for a spe- cific task: Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) – opera- tions; Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) – construction work; Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA) – transport services; and Olympic Security Command Center (OSCC) – security during the Games and the preparation phase. These agencies worked closely with Australia’s federal government. The only non- public Australian organisation intimately involved in delivering the 2000 Olympics was the Australian Olympic Committee, which had given up its prerogatives on organising the event in exchange for a share of the profits of AU$100 million (Brabazon, 1999).

Nearly all Olympic Games summer and winter hosts since 2000 have adopted a similar public-private model, which is why it is possible to say that delivery of the Games is now a sort of public-private partnership, with the size of the public and pri- vate components depending on the traditions of the host country and the autonomy of its national Olympic committee (Beijing 2008 and Sochi 2014 were predominantly public; Atlanta 1996 and Salt Lake City 2002 were predominantly private). Moreover, since Sydney 2000, all summer and winter host countries have also adopted specific “Olympic laws”.

Due to this indispensable involvement of the public authorities, and the increas- ingly blurred boundary between public and private expenditure, it has become neces- sary to monitor Olympic budgets and spending, a task that is usually carried out by the government bodies responsible for evaluating public expenditure. Consequently, detailed analyses of public contributions to staging several editions of the Games are available for scrutiny. This is the case for Los Angeles 1984, Atlanta 1996 and Salt Lake City 2002 (by the [US] Government Accountability Office, formerly known as the General Accounting Office), Vancouver 2010 (by Heritage Canada) and London 2012 (by the UK’s National Audit Office – NAO). The finances of other recent Olympic projects (Sochi 2014, Rio 2016) are less transparent or reliable. In France, an Olympic law has been enacted to entrust the country’s audit office (Cour des Comptes) to auditing the finances relating to the Paris 2024 Olympics. A research programme should be established to assess these Games heritage thanks to indicators of sustainable development.

It is the duty of such public audit bodies to evaluate the performance of Olympic Games held within their country. Hence, the NAO published the following verdict

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after London 2012: “by any reasonable measure the Games were a success and the big picture is that they delivered value for money” (NAO 2012: 8). But what do “success” and “value for money” mean? Was the event a “success” and “value for money” for its financial backers? For the public? For sponsors? For the IOC? For other stakeholders? Best value for money is often defined as the most advantageous combination of cost, quality and sustainability to meet customer requirements. But who is the Games “customer” and who defines what is the most advantageous “combination”. As the literature shows, there are winners and losers with every edi- tion of the Games (Preuss 2016), and any conclusions will depend on which stake- holder’s point of view is being considered (Parent & Chappelet, 2016). In addition, other concepts, such as “impacts”, “benefits”, “sustainability” and “legacy” are used regularly, especially to support or oppose bids or organising (IOC, 2017).

These legacies can be categorised in a variety of ways (e.g., Cashman, 2003; Chappelet, 2012; Preuss, 2015), reflecting the concept’s multiple dimensions. What is more, legacy is just one of two key aspects of Olympic performance, so it is essential not to forget the delivery of the event itself. An examination of previous attempts to measure Olympic Games performance, presented in the following section, showed the need for another approach to this issue, as provided by the Olympic diamond, described in the final section.

3. Ways of Measuring Olympic Games Performance

The first attempts to measure Olympic Games performance focused entirely on the economic dimension. Since the 1980s, consultants and academics have conducted numerous economic impact studies, most of which were ex-ante studies commis- sioned by the Games’ proponents and quickly done by consulting firms, often to jus- tify a bid. Because they were carried out before the Games, some economic data needed for an accurate analysis, such as OCOG and spectator expenditure, were unknown and had to be estimated. Ex-post studies (on real data) are rare because few organisations, whether supporters or opponents, are prepared to finance them, espe- cially after the event. Most ex-ante (and ex-post) studies have been marred by import- ant biases, not to mention numerous methodological errors (Baade, 2006: Table 16.1: 181).

Economic impact studies generally give rise to two headline figures: X million dol- lars of added value and Y thousand jobs created by hosting the Games. These figures concern essentially the bid and preparation phases to the Games and the Olympic month (a period of around 8–10 years), which is when the vast majority of Olympic expenditure takes place. In fact, as long as there are few leaks, that is, expenditure outside the territory, the massive sums spent on preparing and staging the Games automatically provide a boost to the host territory’s economy, according to the eco- nomic base theory, because most of the money involved comes from outside the terri- tory and would not have been spent in it if the Games had not taken place. Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that these large X and Y numbers are correlated, the vision provided by such analyses is solely economic and generally aimed at justi- fying the expenditure the Olympics involve and winning over the host territory’s

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population. In summary, these economic impact studies are of little use to assess the Olympic Games performance.

Moreover, the Olympics are about much more than economics; they also have environmental and social impacts. For some, the only meaningful way of assessing a sport event’s success is to evaluate all three components of the triple bottom line, that is, its economic, social and environmental sustainability (Chernushenko & van der Kamp, 2001). Environmental impact studies have been carried out for several Olympic Games, starting with the 1980 Winter Olympics at Lake Placid (Chappelet, 2008), and some OCOGs have used these studies to obtain ISO 14000 or EMAS environmental management certification (e.g., Turin, 2006). Inspired by the develop- ment of corporate social responsibility within the business world, OCOGs have also begun carrying out social impact studies, and OCOGs for future editions of the Games have been strongly advised to conduct both environmental and social impact studies (Barget & Gouguet, 2010). The UN-supported ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) indicators, which have been applied to many types of investment, could provide a means for evaluating the sustainability of an Olympic investment.

The three dimensions (economic, social, environmental) underlying the notion of sustainable development are vital, as they can influence decisions on whether or not to bid for the Games, if those decisions have not already been made. They are also essential to measuring the performance of an edition of the Games. One way of com- bining them is to conduct a global cost-benefit analysis comparing all tangible and intangible costs with all tangible and intangible benefits without forgetting external- ities. The first part of such an analysis – determining and monetising costs, including intangible costs – is relatively easy, via approaches such as “welfare economics”. However, it is much harder to determine and monetise benefits. How much is a good image worth? What is the value of a positive article in a major newspaper? What are the benefits of greater participation in sport? Consequently, the conclusions of a cost- benefit analysis are highly dependent on how benefits are monetised, which makes the value of such studies contestable. These assessments of the net total benefits (or costs) of the Games must therefore be interpreted with caution. In addition, they are rarely conducted ex post, i.e. based on actual data, as interest in this type of study drops considerably after the Games. Moreover, there is very little cost-benefit analysis of the Games and even less in the way of more subtle analysis according to the CGE model (Computable General Equilibrium) which has been highly influential for some years in the evaluation of public policy projects (an exception is Giesecke & Madden, 2011, an assessment of the Sydney 2000 Games according to the CGE model).

Another important issue, but one that has rarely been considered in evaluations of Olympic Games, is the duration of any impact. Clearly, different durations have to be considered in line with the different stages in organising the Games; but how long should these durations be? Answering this question is relatively straightforward for the preparation and delivery stages, but much more difficult for the post-Games period. Over what period an Olympic legacy should be evaluated? A year? Four years? Ten years? Even longer? Vancouver 2010 emphasised “legacies now” during the prep- aration phase.

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Other difficulties can also complicate Olympic impact studies. For example, how should they take into account non-Olympic factors over the period under consider- ation, such as variations in exchange rates, the provision of special offers for tourists and the availability of cheap travel options? What expenditure should be considered Olympic expenditure and what should not? Should investment in transport infra- structure prior to the Games be categorised as Olympic expenditure, even though these facilities will be in use for many years after the event? How large an area should be considered when measuring impacts: the host city, the metropolitan area, the region (province, canton, state), or the entire country? The answer to this question will determine, for example, whether an item of Olympic expenditure is considered to come from outside the host territory (and therefore have an additional impact) or from inside the host territory (and therefore should have no additional impact). The choices made when answering these questions directly affect the impact study’s con- clusions. In addition, a lot of essential data are not available on a suitable territorial scale due to a lack of adequate statistics.

By the beginning of the 2000s, the IOC had realised that irrefutable data in a wide variety of domains was needed in order to evaluate Games performance. Because the necessary data is often non-existent or difficult to obtain after the event, as the IOC asked, they have to be collected during the organisation phase in order to facilitate later studies. In fact, the official reports produced by OCOGs after the Games used to include a lot of basic data, but these reports have gradually become communication tools rather than records of factual information. For example, Salt Lake City 2002’s official post-Games report did not provide any budget information at all (SLOOC, 2002).

The IOC’s response to this problem of data availability and, in some cases, trans- parency, which had made it impossible to carry out any serious comparison of the Games, came in 2000, when it launched the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) project (Dubi, Hug, and van Griethuysent al., 2003). The idea of OGGI was to docu- ment about 150 indicators in the economic, social and environmental spheres that could be compared from Games to Games.

Under the OGGI, OCOGs for Summer and Winter Olympics held between 2004 and 2012 were obliged to form a partnership with a host-city university, which would collect data on a range of Games indicators throughout the organisation period. The OGGI’s 126 indicators, listed by Malfas, Theodoraki, and Houlihan, (2004) along with an initial review of the project, covered all three spheres of sustainable develop- ment (economic, social, and environmental). They had to be measured at four stages during the project, giving rise to four reports, established at the start of the bidding process (Baseline report), a year before the Games, during the Games and two years after the Games (Post-Games report). OGGI reports were part of the IOC’s desire to better manage knowledge of the Games, a vast enterprise launched on the basis of the Sydney 2000 OCOG’s experiences. As a result, the OCOGs for Beijing 2008, Vancouver 2010 and London 2012 signed research agreements with, respectively, Renmin University in Beijing, the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and the University of East London. The results of this research were published (Feng 2011; UBC 2013; ESCR 2015).

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Vancouver 2010 is the only edition of the Games to have implemented the OGGI in full, with all four required reports being published online. In addition, the lead researcher of Vancouver’s project produced a very constructive review of the research (VanWynsberghe, 2015). OCOGs for editions of the Olympics before 2010 were too far advanced in their preparations or did not provide the resources needed to com- plete all four studies required by the OGGI (e.g., the OCOG for Beijing 2008 focused on volunteers, Feng, 2011). Other OCOGs complained there were too many indica- tors to measure and were allowed to produce just two reports (before and after the Games). During this time, the project was renamed the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) project, as the term “global” had frequently been interpreted as “international”, rather than as covering all the spheres of sustainable development, as origin- ally intended.

According to a University of British Columbia (UBC) press release, issued in October 2013 in conjunction with publication of the OGI post-Games report: “The 2010 Winter Olympics present

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