Does Hate Crime Legislation Reduce Hate Crimes and Contribute to Social Change? Consider a crime like murder that might have different legal consequences based on whether it is considered to be a hate crime. When someone murders another person, the o

Crime & Delinquency 2017, Vol. 63(10) 1191 –1223

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Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are “Close Cousins” or “Distant Relatives”

Colleen E. Mills1, Joshua D. Freilich1, and Steven M. Chermak2

Abstract Existing literature demonstrates disagreement over the relationship between hate crime and terrorism with some calling them “close cousins,” whereas others declare them “distant relatives.” We extend previous research by capturing a middle ground between hate crime and terrorism: extremist hate crime. We conduct negative binomial regressions to examine hate crime by non-extremists, fatal hate crime by far-rightists, and terrorism in U.S. counties (1992-2012). Results show that counties experiencing increases in general hate crime, far-right hate crime, and non-right-wing terrorism see associated increases in far-right hate crime, far-right terrorism, and far-right hate crime, respectively. We conclude that hate crime and terrorism may be more akin to close cousins than distant relatives.

1John Jay College of Criminal Justice; City University of New York, The Graduate Center New York City, NY, USA 2Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Corresponding Author: Colleen E. Mills, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; City University of New York, The Graduate Center, 524 West 59th St., 2103 North Hall, New York, NY 10019, USA. Email: [email protected]

620626CADXXX10.1177/0011128715620626Crime & DelinquencyMills et al. research-article2015

1192 Crime & Delinquency 63(10)

Keywords terrorism, violence, minorities, hate crime

Introduction

In June 2015, Dylann Storm Roof opened fire on Black congregants in the Emmanuel AME church in Charleston, South Carolina. Roof previously posted a manifesto, detailing his hatred for non-White races and confirming the racial motivation behind the shooting (Robles, 2015). Three years prior, Wade Michael Page stormed a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin, executing a mass shooting that was widely recognized as bias-motivated against the Sikh con- gregants. The authorities later revealed that Page was a White supremacist, active in the neo-Nazi music scene, and often spoke of the racial holy war (Elias, 2012). After both of these attacks, many designated the attack as domestic terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, as well as a hate crime (Elias, 2012; Gladstone & Zraick, 2015; Goode & Kovaleski, 2012; B. Levin, 2012; Murphy, 2012; Robles, 2015; “Unprosecuted Hate Crimes,” 2012). Incidents such as Page’s and Storm’s rampages blur the line between certain hate crimes and terrorism. Such confusion extends beyond the media to the schol- arly community. Existing literature recognizes the parallels between hate crime and terrorism (Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012; Green, McFalls, & Smith, 2001; Hamm, 1993; Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002; Krueger & Malečková, 2002, 2003), but some scholars disagree over the nature of the relationship. Krueger and Malečková (2002, 2003) deem them “close cous- ins” with their similarities outweighing their differences, whereas Deloughery et al. (2012) characterize them as “distant relatives,” finding their differences set them apart.

Although debate exists over the hate crime–terrorism relationship, only a limited body of research has empirically examined this relationship (Byers & Jones, 2007; Deloughery et al. 2012; Disha, Cavendish, & King, 2011; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013). Much of this work centers on the impact of the September 11 attack on hate crime offending (Disha et al., 2011; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013). To date, Deloughery et al.’s (2012) temporal analysis is the only study that examines the effects of the full range of anti-U.S. terrorist attacks on hate crimes. In addition, it is the only known study that tests for escalation from hate crimes to right-wing terrorism.

The current study extends Deloughery et al.’s (2012) important work by testing the spatial relationship between hate crime and terrorism on the county level. We unpack the relationships among (a) non-fatal hate crimes committed by non-extremists, (b) fatal far-right hate crime, and (c) terrorist

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attacks from 1992 to 2012. The current study fills another gap by utilizing bias-motivated homicides by the far-right catalogued in the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). The use of the ECDB addresses a limitation acknowl- edged by Deloughery et al. in their study as they used Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) data, which fails to account for perpetrator ideological strength or affiliation. The current study seeks to answer the following research question:

Research Question 1: Are hate crimes and terrorism more interrelated than prior research has demonstrated?

Literature Review

The Similarities and Differences Between Terrorism and Hate Crime

Some past research has highlighted the similarities between terrorism and hate crime. For example, one of the earliest forms of terrorism in the United States was racially and politically motivated violence of the postbellum Ku Klux Klan, which ushered in early legislative attempts to address the com- mon phenomenon of racially motivated terrorism. Examining the Klan’s use of violence to block African Americans’ political involvement, Law (2009) calls the Klan the “terrorist wing of the Democratic Party” (p. 132), high- lighting political motivations of the Klan’s reign of terror. Arguing that early efforts to combat political violence coincided with tackling racially moti- vated violence, Shimamoto (2004) remarks that the Enforcement Act of 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 were the first measures taken by the United States to handle terroristic racially motivated violence, so as to preserve the rights of targeted citizens much like hate crime legislation. Thus, the line between hate crime and terrorism proves blurred historically as early American terrorism was both politically and racially motivated.

Hamm (1993) notes the similarities between the language of terrorism and hate crime definitions as stated by the U.S. government. Hamm (1993) cites the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) definition of a terrorist incident as a “violent act or an act dangerous to human life in violation of the criminal laws . . . to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives” (pp. 106-107). The most recent language of federal hate crime legislation defines hate crimes as offenses motivated by “prejudice based on race, gender and gender identity, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” (U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, 2011b). Given the statutory

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language, Hamm (1993) argues that skinhead violence can be classified as hate crimes or terrorist acts, evidencing the similar nature of such acts.

Definitions of hate crime and terrorist acts reveal a number of shared traits. Both involve acts of violence against persons and property. Hate crime and terrorism definitions both focus on classifying civilian populations, or subgroups thereof, as victims (Shimamoto, 2004). Many definitions of ter- rorism rely on the political, social, and/or religious nature of the goals of terrorist perpetrators (Hoffman, 1998). Like terrorism, hate crimes express a number of socio-political objectives by targeting individuals based on their perceived group membership. Biases often prove intricately related to socio- political and/or religious views. Both acts serve as tactics in the arsenal of hate groups, a number of which are also labeled as terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan (Atkins, 2006; J. Levin, 2013). Similarly, McDevitt, Levin, and Bennet’s (2002) typology of hate crime offenders includes the “mission” category made up of members or supporters of orga- nized hate groups. “Mission” offenders are often racist White supremacist extremists who believe that they must purge the world of evil by eliminating the “other” group that threatens their group. B. Levin (2012) notes that these “hard core hatemongers are believed to be responsible for about 33%-40% of hate motivated homicides” (para. 7).

Hate crimes and terrorist incidents act as message crimes, instilling fear and psychological harm, as well as behavioral modification. Noting the close relationship between hate crime and terrorism, Krueger and Malečková (2002, 2003) describe the goal of hate crimes to terrorize a larger group beyond the immediate victim, who is selected on the basis of her or his group identity. Hate crimes constitute not only an attack on a single person, but also they send an anti-“other” message to the target’s larger community. Hate crimes thus present unique harms that distinguish them from ordinary crimes as they align more closely with terrorism. Several studies (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Lim, 2009; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001) also show that victims of hate crime suffer greater psychological and emotional harms, including depression, increased fear of victimization, anger, and stress. For example, Iganski and Lagou (2009) find that both racial minority (and the larger minority communities) and White victims of racially motivated crimes avoid certain places and are more likely to have moved (i.e., changed residences). Increased avoidance behaviors and other behavioral changes also follow in the aftermath of ter- rorist attacks, such as those of 9/11 and the 2005 London bombings (Gigerenzer, 2004, 2006; McArdle, Rosoff, & John, 2012; Prager, Beeler Assay, Lee, & von Winterfeldt, 2011; Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005).

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Hate crimes and terrorist acts can be defensive or retaliatory. Defensive hate crimes are those in which offenders “defend their turf” and send a message to the larger community to which the victim belongs (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; McDevitt et al., 2002). Interviewing White youth in Brooklyn, Pinderhughes (1993) finds that youth committed racially motivated attacks to defend their turf as they believed that the govern- ment was taking their jobs and giving them to racial minorities while Whites suffered unemployment and homelessness. Retaliatory hate crimes occur in response to some precipitating event, specifically a perceived or actual hate crime against a member of the offender’s ingroup (McDevitt et al., 2002). One study of hate crimes in New York City, for example, found that “cross-sectionally, antiwhite incidents correlate with the num- ber of antiblack incidents, and temporally these two monthly time series seem to follow a tit-for-tat pattern” (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998 in Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, p. 399). Terrorist acts can also be con- ceptualized as defensive or retaliatory. For example, the Troubles in Ireland exemplify both models with republican dissidents “defending” Ireland from the British or acting in retaliation with tit-for-tat attacks by republican dissidents and loyalists or British forces (LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009).

Although many scholars argue for the similarities between the two, oth- ers note how each are unique. In investigating the association between hate crimes and terrorism, Deloughery et al. (2012) address the claim that hate crime acts as a “poor man’s terrorist attack” that eventually escalates to more serious acts of terrorism (p. 665). Unlike most terrorist attacks that require some level of planning and resources, hate crimes are usually com- mitted on the spur of the moment.1 Therefore, hate crimes present an ave- nue for extremists to pursue their socio-political objectives without the necessity of planning. Hate crimes also pose less danger of arrest. Hate crimes are underreported and under-investigated and prosecuted (Freilich & Chermak, 2013; R. D. King, 2007; R. D. King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). Terrorist attacks garner media, government, and law enforcement attention and pose a greater threat of apprehension. Hate crimes thus present an effective route for upholding ideological beliefs while minimizing the costs of resources and risks.

Hate crime and terrorism further differ in certain ways. Hamm (1993) argues that the distinction between hate crime and terrorism is nuanced, remarking that only extreme hate crimes driven by socio-political goals should be considered terrorism. Deloughery et al. (2012) find that hate crimes constitute more of a “downward” offense with a majority party attacking a member of a minority, whereas terrorism proves to be an

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“upward” crime with a less powerful group attacking a more powerful one. Although this may be a valid distinction, it fails to acknowledge the nature of a terrorist group’s social, political, or religious objectives. Michael (2003) comments that “terrorism is almost always linked to a wider social move- ment. . . . Klan terrorism in the South was part of a broader pattern of white resistance to the civil rights struggle” (p. 105). Shimamoto (2004) also argues that both terrorism and hate crime attack fundamental notions of democracy and the state. Therefore, the argument remains that hate crimes attack society at large by attacking its norms, targeting dearly held values of equality, liberty, and basic human rights. Such a conception of hate crimes aligns them with the “upward” nature of terrorism, refuting that hate crimes are only a downward crime.

Other differences between hate crime and terrorism pertain to offender and incident characteristics. J. Levin and McDevitt (2002; see also Phillips, 2009) find that the majority of hate crimes are actually committed by groups of thrill-seeking youth who lack firm ideological beliefs or hate group affiliation.2 In addition to this thrill nature and the peer dynamics, these incidents usually involve alcohol or drug consumption and are unplanned (J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002; McDevitt et al., 2002; Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004). It must be noted though, that thrill-seeking hate crimes still send a message to the targeted group and often are an out- growth of societal cultural norms. Byers, Crider, & Biggers (1999) shows that many in their sample of thrill offenders expressed negative views of their Amish victims. These thrill hate crime offenders also thought that the larger community agreed with them that Amish persons were inferior and not a part of society. Although thrill-seeking hate crime offenders are not political extremists and are far from being firmly committed terrorists, they still may be motivated by quasi-political motives. Thrill-seeking offenders, in other words, often commit these attacks to send a message that reflects both their personal biases and what they believe to be their society’s cultural norms.

Another difference is that offenders typically do not claim responsibil- ity for the attack or publicize it as terrorists often do, but they do not necessarily need to publicize their crimes themselves (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). As message crimes, hate crimes themselves issue a warning to the victim’s larger group. Such crimes often garner enough media attention to get their objective publicized. Despite important differences between hate crime and terrorism, their similarities provide the groundwork for further investigation of the relationship between the two phenomena. See Figure 1 for summary of similarities and differences between hate crime and terrorism.

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The Theoretical Context of the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship

General Hate Crime Escalating to Extremist Hate Crime

The theoretical basis for investigating the relationships between hate crime, extremist hate crimes, and terrorism relies on intergroup conflict and related theories, including normative support and social identity theory. Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; R. D. King & Brustein, 2006; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013; C. J. Lyons, 2007) investigate the role of intergroup conflict and hate crime. Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s (1998) “defended neighbor- hoods thesis” draws on realist group conflicts theories. In brief, realist group conflict theories posit that White intolerance manifests when racial and

Similarities Differences

•• Early U.S. terrorism linked to KKK, a notorious hate organization

•• Hate crimes are often committed on the spur of the moment; and usually require less planning and resources

•• Similar language in statutes (violence, civilian populations, socio-political objectives)

•• Hate crimes are less likely to result in an arrest; are under-reported, -investigated, -prosecuted

•• Biases linked to socio-political and religious ideologies

•• Hate crimes can be downward (powerful subgroup attacking a minority subgroup)

•• Overlap between hate groups and terrorist groups

•• Many hate crimes are committed by offenders fueled by alcohol, and drugs.

•• Communicative nature •• Many hate crimes are committed by non-extremist youths, acting with others, for the “thrill” of it

•• Instill psychological harms, fear, and behavior modification

•• Hate crimes can lack a publicity aspect

•• Both can be upward (terrorism and hate crime attack notions of democracy, equality, human rights)

Figure 1. The Similiarities and Differences Between Hate Crime and Terrorism (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012; Hamm, 1993; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2004; J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Law, 2009; Lim, 2009; Messner et al., 2004; McDevitt et al., 2001; McDevitt et al., 2002; Michael, 2003; Phillips, 2009; Shimamoto, 2004).

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ethnic minority groups move into their areas, thereby representing a threat to their political and economic interests as a competing force for resources (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998). Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; C. J. Lyons, 2007) support the “defended neigh- borhoods” thesis, evidencing that racially/ethnically based hate crimes are highly correlated with the influx of minorities into former almost all-White areas.

The following section examines how the presence of general anti-“other” hate crimes can result in fatal hate crimes by far-rightists. Normative support proves to be a very significant factor in influencing the use of violence in intergroup conflict. Louis and Taylor (2002) explain how group norms shape individual members’ perceptions, specifically perceptions of intergroup con- flict. Senechal de la Roche (1996) explains that solidarity is integral for collective violence, permitting violent expression of group grievance. As such, lynching varied with local solidarity in the American South with close- knit communities seeing increased lynchings. Gurr (1968) explains that experimental evidence demonstrates that highly cohesive groups are much more likely to express hostility against “outsiders” (p. 272). Regarding the importance of normative support for violence in enabling terrorists, M. King, Noor, and Taylor (2011) note how Milgram’s experiments demon- strated that individuals are susceptible to accepting violence when sur- rounded by others who were compliant with engaging in violence. M. King et al. (2011) find that jihadi terrorists receive normative support from their families, as well as the larger community. Ingroup identification provides a mechanism for individuals to positively see themselves. Social identity the- ory dictates that people derive self-esteem through their group membership and by viewing their group positively compared with other groups; further- more, such group identification strengthens individual conformity to group norms (Cohrs & Kessler, 2013; Federico, 2013; Louis & Taylor, 2002; P. A. Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). P. A. Lyons et al. (2010) find that the interaction of ingroup identification and mean and high-level group narcis- sism among U.S. citizens was associated with negative attitudes and behav- iors toward Arab immigrants.

The research demonstrates that extremists are more likely to resort to violence against a perceived threat when they receive normative support from their ingroup. Hamm (1993) finds that skinheads are synanomic, which he defines as “hyperactively bonded to the dominant social order and to one another” (p. 212). As a result, far-right extremists should be more likely to not only be more aggressively bonded to their goals of car- rying out their socio-political objectives in sustaining “traditional” values, but also their ingroup (White, heterosexual, working-class men).

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Furthermore, far-right extremists should prove to feed off of the normative support of their ingroup in exercising violence against outgroups.

In sum, there are two causal mechanisms that could explain how regu- lar hate crimes committed by non-extremists lead to fatal ideologically motivated attacks committed by far-right extremists. First, regular hate crimes often attract attention from the media, the larger community, and committed far-rightists. These regular hate crimes may encourage far- rightists to conclude that “regular” persons in the general community share their racial and extremist grievances. For example, Green and Rich (1998) investigated the association between White supremacist rallies and demonstrations and cross burnings on the county level in North Carolina. They found that in counties where White supremacist rallies occurred, the likelihood of subsequent cross burnings increased. The authors concluded that White supremacist rallies could encourage individuals traveling to the event by drawing attention to racial grievances, and therefore facili- tating action in the form of racial intimidation. Deloughery et al. (2012) similarly explain that anti-minority hate crimes can highlight growing anti-minority sentiment to which extremists may respond with more seri- ous violence. Our argument is that regular hate crimes committed by non- extremists could (perhaps unintentionally) highlight these same racial grievances that then encourage far-right extremists to commit fatal acts of ideologically motivated hate crimes.

Second, these regular hate crimes are often fiercely denounced by gov- ernment officials, minority communities, and advocacy groups (Jenness & Grattet, 2004; J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Simi and Futrell (2010) have explained that far-rightists commonly feel stigmatized by mainstream soci- ety. Many therefore retreat to “free places” where they are better able to subscribe to and act upon their extremist beliefs, and interact with others who think like them. It is possible that these denunciations of regular hate crimes aggravate the feelings of persecution held by many far-rightists that is reinforced by others who share their views. This in turn could create a backlash effect that results in some far-rightists committing fatal hate crimes. As the far-right movement often attracts violent individuals (see, for example, Ezekiel, 1995; Freilich, Adamczyk, Chermak, Boyd, & Parkin, 2015), we wonder, in other words, whether some far-rightists engage in fatal bias-motivated violence in response to the condemnation of regular anti-minority hate crime, which presents an attack on their grievances and ideology.

Based upon both of these possible causal mechanisms, we hypothesize that places experiencing hate crimes in general are more likely to experience fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists.

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Extremist Hate Crime Escalating to Extremist Terrorism

In terms of extremist hate crime escalating to terrorism in the intergroup context, Michael (2003) discusses Sprinzak’s theory of “split-delegimitization” as applied to right-wing terrorism, which asserts that “outsiders” as well as the state simultaneously come under attack (p. 95). Michael (2003) contends that this theoretically supports the evolution of right-wing terrorism with attacks escalating from those against the “outsiders” to the state due to the state’s per- ceived alliance with the “outsiders” (p. 95). Supporting the theoretical escala- tion, Michael (2003) looks to Hewitt’s (2000) descriptive data on American domestic right-wing terrorism, which evidences a demonstrable escalation in violence against the state. Hewitt’s (2000) data show that the majority of the first wave of far-right attacks from the 1950s to the 1970s was against people based on their race or ethnicity, followed by civil rights workers. The second wave from the 1970s to the present shows that the far-right has increasingly targeted the government, including attacks against law enforcement, politicians, and government facilities. Examining the life course of American far-right groups, Kerodal, Freilich, Chermak, and Suttmoeller (2015) empirically test and find support for Sprinzak’s theory, uncovering that the far-right initially attacked non-government targets but began to equally strike both non-government and government targets after becoming disillusioned with the government. Such findings support the idea that the far-right may move from simply engaging in hate crimes against minorities to anti-government attacks as well, signaling an escalation in their activities. Deloughery et al.’s (2012) case study of Timothy McVeigh’s horrific anti-government bombing attack of the Federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 demonstrated that increases in anti-minority hate crimes were a way to express right-wing grievances and can act as a warning or a signal that some extremists will subsequently potentially “upgrade” to (anti-govern- ment or American society at large) terrorism (p. 668). As a result, we hypothe- size that counties experiencing fatal hate crimes by far-rightists would also see far-right terrorism with these extremists employing violence against both minor- ity and government targets and American society at large.

Extremist Hate Crime as Response to Terrorism

Regarding extremist hate as a response to anti-American terrorism, a review of the literature on group grievance, social control, and retaliation is useful. Black (1983) posits a theory of crime as social control, in which individuals use crime as “self-help” to express their group’s grievance against a particular subgroup to maintain social control. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) define group (or political) grievance as a mechanism for radicalization and as the “threat or harm

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to a group or cause the individual cares about can move the individual to hostil- ity and violence toward perpetrators” (p. 21). Terrorist attacks perceived to attack “traditional” or “American” values thus present extremists with a group grievance that manifests in violent retribution. Vicarious retribution occurs when an ingroup member views an entire outgroup responsible for a harm against a fellow ingroup member and thus attacks an outgroup member for ret- ribution (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006). Several schol- ars (Lickel et al., 2006; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011) explain that a popular mechanism for both radicalization and vicarious retribution is dehu- manization of the “enemy.” Lickel et al. (2006) comment that intergroup con- flict sees dehumanization of the outgroup, which facilitates vicarious retribution as outgroup members are seen “as being interchangeable and therefore equally deserving of retaliation” (p. 378). Retaliatory hate crimes involve individuals who seek revenge by targeting innocent bystanders whom they perceive as rep- resentative of a larger enemy. Several studies (Byers & Jones, 2007; Deloughery et al., 2012; Disha et al., 2011; R. D. King & Sutton, 2013; McDevitt et al., 2002) demonstrate the prevalence of hate crimes following terrorist attacks. Hate crimes targeting perceived Middle Eastern victims occurred not only after 9/11 and the Boston Marathon, but also immediately at the start of the Iran hos- tage crisis in 1979 (J. Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Retaliatory hate crimes thus act as micro-level manifestation of broader conflicts on the international scale.

The synanomic nature of far-right extremists thus explains why they are likely to respond to terrorist attacks against “traditional” or “American” val- ues with hate crimes against outgroups they perceive as a threat or as respon- sible for precipitating terrorist attacks. As a result, extremists prove more likely to exercise hate crime as a form of social control. Furthermore, norma- tive support exists for retributive violence in the course of intergroup conflict (Lickel et al., 2006). Therefore, extremists feed off of normative support to not only engage in hate crimes in general, but also specifically as a form of vicarious retribution. Retaliatory hate crimes following terrorist attacks thus express group grievance, as well as social control, by those ultra-committed to upholding the dominant social order. We hypothesize that counties that experience terrorist attacks by non-right-wing groups would be more likely to see an incr

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