Write an Executive Summary (EXSUM) on the assigned Non-Commissioned Officer Common Core Competencies (NCOCCC) of?Leadership?while balancing it against,?’The Leadership I

A CASE STUDY IN MISSION COMMAND

26 INFANTRY 26 INFANTRY January-March 2014January-March 2014

CPT THOMAS E. MEYER

THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE:

As we transition from more than a decade of war to garrison training, we must identify and implement mission command (MC) into our fi ghting formations and training management in order to respond to a complex and evolving security threat. Through grounded experiences at the tactical level and academic study of organizational leadership theory, I seek to connect academic theory to Army doctrine and show the successes of MC in practice through a case study of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The following issues discussed are from the point of view and perspective of an individual who has served under multiple chains of command in the positions of platoon leader, company executive offi cer, and company commander between May 2010 and April 2013.

Hypothetical Vignette Afghanistan, Regional Command-South — As the

battalion conducts air assault operations behind insurgent improvised explosive device (IED) belts, leaders are faced with an ambiguous and evolving operational environment (OE). The commanders of two companies within the battalion execute simultaneous operations, controlling their platoon leaders and maneuvering their units at the order of the battalion commander. A synchronized battalion operation combining assets from air assault capabilities to air-to-ground integration (AGI) is ongoing as companies push south of the primary insurgent IED belts and defensive zones, all driven by detailed command. The company conducting the battalion’s decisive operation pushes south and clears through enemy

disruption zones, able to fi nd, fi x, and fi nish the enemy. These two company commanders now face the exploitation phase of their operation but are “off the page” — moving beyond the initial contact and explicit direction provided by the battalion operations order. Instead of understanding commander’s intent, seizing the initiative, and exploiting the initiative (which leads to assessment and dissemination of gathered intelligence), these company commanders are hindered by the micromanagement of the command and control philosophy that results in detailed command.

The battalion ceases operations, and the companies strong- point their locations so these two company commanders can meet with the battalion commander and S3 operations offi cer. While company leadership is unable to perceive and execute the next step, platoon leaders are stifl ed and, as micromanaged cogs in the wheel, move with their respective company commanders back to the battalion command post (CP) to receive further detailed guidance. At the battalion CP, platoon leaders gather around imagery of the OE as the S3 and battalion commander brief the scheme of maneuver for this unexpected phase of the operation. As the S3 describes the scheme down to platoon movement techniques, company commanders stand behind their platoon leaders observing the concept of the operation in “receive mode” as they conceptualize the directed concept.

Following the brief, company commanders and platoon leaders move back to their individual locations and prepare to exploit their gains. This process gave the enemy 12 hours to consolidate and reorganize. Following the battalion- directed scheme of maneuver, the platoon leaders depart

in the early morning hours and face an enemy, previously broken, in prepared defensive positions protected by various IEDs. Meanwhile, company commanders act as radio operators, relaying information to battalion while awaiting further guidance to maneuver their elements. The lack of MC in this situation created a unit devoid of shared understanding. In failing to know the expanded purpose of the operation, the commanders’ ability to seize the initiative was limited, which allowed the insurgent force to consolidate forces, plan a counteroffensive, and emplace IEDs forward of coalition forces.

“Leadership is […] infl uencing Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, execute a deliberate attack of an enemy objective during a training exercise.

Photos by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division Public Affairs Offi ce

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES402-22-04 3 Feb 2021

(U) WHAT INSIGHTS ARE DERIVED FROM OPERATION ANACONDA IN REGARDS TO THE NCO COMMON CORE COMPENTENCY (NCOCCC) OF OPERATIONS? (U) (MLC 402-22-04) The NCOCCC of Operations is a combination of operational skill sets that, when mastered by senior leaders can save lives and ensure effective unified action. Some of its key tenets include: Large-scale combat operations; understanding operational and mission variables; resolving complex, ill-structured problems with the use of Mission Command; and understanding how to integrate the different branches of the military into successful joint operations (Department of the Army [DA], 2020). This final principle of conducting joint operations becomes increasingly important as contemporary conflicts continue to venture further into the realm of multi-domain warfare (Marr, 2018). In order to execute such a complex task, Joint Force Commanders (JFC) must “integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations” through the use of seven Joint Functions (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2017, p. III-1). One of these functions, Command and Control, is how the JFC directs the forces toward accomplishment of the mission, and its essential task is to “Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the staff and joint force” (JCS, 2017, p. III-2). This task is critical to the creation of a shared understanding, which allows the separate branches to work seamlessly together toward a common goal. The absence of this unifying component hinders missions and increases casualties. In Operation ANACONDA, JFC Major General (MG) Hagenbeck failed to create such a shared understanding with his subordinate Air Force assets, which contributed to increasing the amount of casualties his forces incurred. Although the warning order was published on 6 January, MG Hagenbeck did not notify the Combined Force Air Component Commander of Operation ANACONDA until 23 February, just days before the operation began (Fleri et al., 2003). The insights gained from this case study are failure to ensure the flow of information across the joint force, caused downstream effects in planning and preparation that led to diminished air support during the initial stages of the operation. As noted by Lambeth (2005) in his comprehensive analysis, “because so little air support had been requested…coalition troops entered the fight virtually unprotected by any preparatory and suppressive fire” (pp. 204-205). Operation Anaconda provides a clear case of how proficiency in the realm of Operations can result in fewer U.S. casualties.

Kenneth P. Mullan/MLC 20-008 [email protected]

APPROVED BY: MSG Trevor Petsch

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References

Fleri, E., Howard, E., Hulkill, J., & Searle, T. R. (2003). Operation Anaconda case study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2020). The Noncommissioned Officer Guide (TC 7-22.7).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2017). Joint Operations (JP 3-0). https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0ch1.pdf?ver=2018 -11-27-160457-910

Lambeth, B.S. (2005). Air power against terror: America’s conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg166centaf.13?seq=1

Marr, S. (2018). Stability in Multi-Domain Battle. U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.