The focus for the review article assignment is the following is the transformation of NATO after the end of the Cold War. It would be great if you could use the Ukraine

The Origins of the Ukraine Crisis and the Need for Collective Security between Russia and the West

Tom Sauer Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium

Abstract The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imagin- able: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the exist- ing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine.

Policy Implications • The way how the ‘losers’ of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community

did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security).

• Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO’s prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable.

• American and European interests sometimes overlap, but not always, also within NATO. One can observe a pattern whereby the US pushes the Europeans to accept the American view. For instance on NATO extension (certainly in 2008), as well as on missile defence. This article implicitly argues that the European member states within NATO should be more careful to agree with the US view if it does not fit their own interests.

• EU’s Neighbourhood Policy is failing, not only vis-�a-vis Ukraine and Russia, but also in Northern Africa and the Middle East. There is a fundamental need to rethink EU’s Neighbourhood Policy.

• Of the three main great power constellations, classic balance of power is the least stable (as in our case). Collective secu- rity is more stable, and should have been the objective after the end of the Cold War. After the Ukraine crisis, the goal to create a collective security organization in the wider Europe is even more urgent. (The most stable constellation is a secu- rity community).

• Politics and policies are sometimes fraught with misperceptions, miscommunication, and miscalculations. That also applies to the global level. Some power constellations are more prone to these deficiencies than others. There is less chance for misperceptions, etc., in a security community than in a pure balance of power system. Applied to the Russian-West rela- tionship, the existing balance of power system is prone to misperceptions, miscommunication, and miscalculations.

The invasion and occupation of the Crimea by Russia and its support for the rebels in Eastern Ukraine question the viability of the global political order. The occupation is a major transgression of the basic rules by one of the main players in global politics. Many experts, however, believe that not only Putin is to be blamed, but that the West is

also responsible for the crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2016; Walt, 2015). Putin reacted to (what he regarded as) illegitimate actions by the West, including NATO enlarge- ment towards the borders of Russia. The puzzle that this article raises is why the West – first NATO, but later on the EU – was not aware that its Ukraine policy was very risky

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and could have been regarded as an offensive act by Russia, which in its turn could have triggered a reaction. The domi- nant explanation for this blindness is that the West acted by looking to the world through liberal glasses (Mearsheimer, 2014). The West believed that in term more and more states would become democratic and peaceful. The problem with this explanation is that it may explain why the EU and NATO expanded to the East, but it fails to explain why the West did not incorporate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. For this reason, the liberal theory falls short of explaining Europe’s policy on Ukraine.

This article contributes to filling this gap in the literature. It describes and explains how it comes that the West has failed to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture after the Cold War in a way that satisfied Russia. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom, whose origins can be understood by the failure to establish a col- lective security organization. Taking into account this analy- sis, it is not abnormal that the relationship between Russia and the West glided back towards a classic balance of power system.

In the remainder of this article two constellations between major powers are first described. Second, the dynamics among them is explained, including the role of perceptions and communication. Third, this theoretical framework will be applied to the relationship between Russia and the West after the Cold War leading up to the crisis in Ukraine.

Two types of global power relationships

Global policy is more shaped by large than small nations. That is at least what realists argue (Waltz, 1979, pp. 72–73). If large nations do not go along well, a large part of the world may feel the consequences. Focusing on relations between large nations, one can make a distinction between two ideal-types of relations: balance of power and collective security. The reality corresponds more to a continuum.

A first type of grand power constellation can be catego- rized as a pure balance of power relationship. Defensive realists assume that states – including large states – do not behave in an expansionist way; they are satisfied once they have a sufficient amount of power. Once they feel secure, they do not strive to have more power. Security triumphs over power. The result is a relatively stable balance of power between the major states (Waltz, 1979, Chapter 6). The bipo- lar system during the Cold War can be regarded as an example.

To be able to feel secure in a balance of power system, large nations – at least those that are landlocked – prefer to have friendly neighbours. If not, spheres of influences help to protect their country from being attacked. Spheres of influences can be formalized in the form of alliances, or can be informal. In turn, the major goal of members of an alli- ance, or a collective defence organization, is to support each other militarily in the event of external attack. According to the theory of alliances, this should deter potential enemies from attacking in the first place, and therefore yield stability and security. Even in informal spheres of influences any

potential danger will be regarded as a matter of the highest concern, and may yield an aggressive reaction and war. A structural problem of alliances is that they are constantly looking for external enemies that may jeopardize their terri- tory. This process, however, may become a self-fulfilling pro- phecy. Mistrust may create more mistrust, tensions, conflicts, and war. In short, a mismanaged balance of power system may end up in war. Second, if a balance of power system is softened by

agreed security rules among the major large nations, we speak of collective security (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991; 1995). Collective security organizations aim to enhance secu- rity by establishing rules that want to prevent and manage conflicts among its member states. These rules commit them to predictable patterns of behaviour that will posi- tively influence the threat perception. A crucial condition in this regard is that all major powers feel equal and treat each other as equal. The latter, however, does not mean that they have to share the same values and beliefs, including with respect to the type of domestic political system. A historical example of a collective security system is the

Concert of Europe (1815–1854), when the five major states in Europe agreed on basic rules with respect to external (and even internal) security. Another example of a collective security organization is the United Nations that to a large extent was paralysed as long as there were two alliances around. Again, alliances (or collective defence organizations) are difficult to reconcile with collective security systems because alliances are looking for external enemies, which stands in opposition to the idea of collective security. While collective security is generally more stable than a

balance of power, collective security organizations are not completely immune to tensions and conflicts among large nations either, and if mismanaged they may end up in an classic balance of power relationship, and eventually war. However, the main advantage of a collective security system is that it will not crumble as easily as a pure balance of power system in case of deviance.

Misperceptions and miscommunication

How state behaviour and shifts in balances of power are perceived by other states is most of the time as important as the behaviour itself. When the intentions are benign, but the actions are perceived as malign, the effect of the action may have the opposite effect as intended. A lot of factors determine the quality of perceptions between two or more actors: the nature of the political system (democratic versus authoritarian) and more in particular the degree of trust and openness, the degree of empathy, knowledge about each other, grooved thinking, and bureaucratic politics (Jervis, 1976). Misperception and miscommunication are less pre- sent in a collective security organization than in a pure bal- ance of power system. Beside the type of global power relationship, the theory

of perceptions and misperceptions may help explain the behaviour of Russia and the West in the post-Cold War per- iod. A 2015 report of the UK House of Lords EU Committee

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(2015, p.6), pointed out: ‘We [also] observe that there has been a strong element of “sleep-walking” into the current crisis, with [EU] Member States being taken by surprise by events in Ukraine. Over the last decade, the EU has been slow to reappraise its policies in response to significant changes in Russia. A loss of collective analytical capacity has weakened Member States’ ability to read the political shifts in Russia and to offer an authoritative response. This lack of understanding and capacity was clearly evident during the Ukraine crisis, but even before that the EU had not taken into account the exceptional nature of Ukraine and its unique position in the shared neighbourhood’. This state- ment can be extended to the period since the implosion of the USSR. Already since the end of the Cold War Russia did not feel respected by the West, and the West apparently never fully understood this (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009– 2010; Pouliot, 2010). That in turn has to do with a lack of knowledge of each other: Putin does not know the West; and the West does not know Putin. Both blocs also commu- nicate differently. As Hill points out (2016, p.142): ‘In Wes- tern views, the Russians should adopt a different discourse when conducting foreign policy. As a result, we completely miss the core message that Putin is trying to transmit. This frustrates Putin and causes him to think that he has to deli- ver the message again; but even more forcefully – or even forcibly, by backing up his words with military action’.

How peace is settled determines the post-war period

To explain dynamics among the two types of constellations – balance of power and collective security – power shifts between large nations have to be analysed, as realists argue (Waltz, 1979, chapters 7–9). Collective security systems have the advantage of being able to absorb changes in the bal- ance of power. The system that is most vulnerable to power shifts is the classic balance of power constellation. Power shifts in such a basic constellation may lead to (world) wars. War between major powers therefore results from a funda- mental shift in the balance of power that either leads to expansionist behaviour by the upcoming state, as is pre- dicted by the theory of Offensive Realism, or by a preven- tive war by the state that is losing power. The underlying assumption of Offensive Realism is that large nations always want to have more power, and that they are prepared to expand to the detriment of other – most of the time smal- ler, but sometimes also large – states (Mearsheimer, 2001). Examples are the rise of Germany at the end of the 19th century as well as in the interbellum, twice leading to a world war. Some observers believe that today’s Russia belongs to the category of expansionist states (Kroenig, 2016).

Wars between major powers – let alone world wars – are humanitarian disasters. After such a war, the international system is reset. These are the moments when new rules are agreed upon among the major powers and new collective security systems may see the light of day (Ikenberry, 2001). These moments can be regarded as major turning-points in

history. More in particular, the way a large nation is treated after having lost a war determines the type of configuration the world (or region) tumbles in, which in its turn determi- nes whether the period thereafter is characterized by stabil- ity or war. Losers of wars tend to take revenge, except if they are integrated in a collective security system. Winners of wars may also take revenge. Most of the time, however, winners aim for stability and order. The best way to reach that goal is to create a collective security system. Looking at the past 200 years, four major turning-points

in history can be distinguished: the Congress of Vienna (1815); the end of the First World War; the end of the Sec- ond World War; and the end of the Cold War. The large nations in the post-Napoleonic Europe decided to include France – which had lost the war – into the European secu- rity architecture. This Concert of Europe yielded stability and peace for decades, at least until the war in the Crimea in 1854, and one could argue even longer. The Concert Euro- p�een was more than a balance of power system: it was a collective security regime. In contrast, after the First World War the international

community failed to integrate Germany. The Treaty of Ver- sailles was in Germany perceived as Das Diktat. The exclu- sion of Weimar Germany led to the rise of Nazism and German expansionism, which to a substantial extent explains the origins of the Second World War. At the same time, the first global collective security organization was established in the form of the League of Nations, at least on paper. In practice, the League failed due to the absence of major powers. Their absence can in its turn be explained by a lack of institutional power given to the large powers within the League of Nations. After the Second World War global governance was man-

aged better. Having learned lessons from the previous nega- tive experiences, large nations were treated as a special category (but equally among each other) in the UN, the newly established collective security organization. The five victors were given a permanent seat and veto power in the UN Security Council. This realist element made the system work, or at least work better than the League of Nations. Furthermore, the two major powers that had lost the war – Germany and Japan – were integrated in the international community, at least in the Western part of the world. Unfor- tunately, the UN became paralysed by a balance of power system in the form of the bipolar Cold War configuration with two alliances standing opposite each other. Within the Western world, though, a security community – an improved version of collective security – was created that still exists today. In the remainder of this article, we will describe how the

end of the Cold War was mismanaged, leading to disap- pointments, misperceptions, miscommunication, and miscal- culations, creating a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy and a downward-spiral to the existing balance of power of today. The methodology that will be used is process-tracing: the major events that have led to the Ukraine crisis, and how they were perceived, will be described. At each stage, we will try to assess on which point on the continuum between

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balance of power and collective security – as defined above – the relationship stood, and was perceived as such. The claim that this article makes is that not only Russia but also the West mismanaged the transition period, resulting in a gliding back to a balance of power system that finally ended up in war in Ukraine.

Missed opportunity in the post-Cold War period: unfulfilled expectations by – and Western neglect of – Russia

At the end of the Cold War, the world was divided, with two alliances opposing each other. Not many had predicted that the Cold War would come to an end in 1989. It was certainly not pre-cooked by the leaders in the Kremlin. Soviet President Gorbachev wanted to change the economic and political system of the USSR in a gradual way. In con- trast, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact imploded in 1991. Rus- sia was left behind with a fundamentally different domestic political situation: a Communist Party that had shrunk to small proportions and a state-based economy that was radi- cally transformed by believers in shock therapy capitalism. The result was a superpower that fell apart, both geographi- cally and economically. With a GNP as small as Portugal in the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was regarded as ‘a devel- oping country with nuclear weapons’. The country was also hit by a financial crisis in 1998. The Russian political leader- ship was not very strong either. The image that remains of President Yeltsin is that of a populist that liked to drink a glass or two of vodka. Overall, the Russian foreign policy establishment and politicians felt humiliated because they had lost the Cold War, although they did not like to admit that. Compare that to the triumph of the West after the col- lapse of the Berlin Wall. The capitalist economic system proved to be stronger than the state-based economic sys- tem of the USSR, at least for the time being. The Western values of freedom and liberty prevailed. In the summer of 1990 President Bush Sr, heralded the New World Order.

As the Cold War came without much bloodshed to an end, one could have expected that the relationship between Russia and the West be built on the basis of a more peace- ful nature. Many Western pundits and politicians hoped that Russia would be integrated in the main Euro-Atlantic secu- rity organizations. Russia in its turn hoped that NATO would transform itself from being a military alliance into a predom- inantly political organization. Even better – in the eyes of Moscow – would have been the abolition of NATO and its replacement by a pan-European collective security organiza- tion. Obviously realists predicted the end of NATO too, as alliances are per definition temporarily, as was shown again by the demise of the Warsaw Pact (Mearsheimer, 1990).

Contrary to what is sometimes said, it is not that the USSR or Russia were not interested in joining the Western security organizations. Gorbachev tested the idea of NATO membership a couple of times in a prudent manner, for instance during the German reunification talks with US Sec- retary of State James Baker in May 1990 (Sarotte, 2014). Also President Yeltsin, for instance in September 1993, made

clear that Russia had an interest in joining NATO (Goldgeier, 1998, p. 88). Even President Putin in his first term was potentially interested in ‘a broader participation’ in NATO (Lyne, 2015, p. 4). Admittedly, Russia never formally asked to become a NATO member because it knew the answer in advance. Although Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme, it was never invited to become a regular NATO member. The idea of integrating Russia in the existing Euro-Atlantic

security organizations on an equal footing was not taken seriously in the West. For the West it seemed business as usual: the existence of NATO was not called into question when Germany was unified and brought under the auspices of the EU and NATO (Zelikow and Rice, 1998, p. 277). In the Western foreign policy establishments the idea of collective security was seen as an academic and long-term exercise at best. The best way for integrating Russia into the Western secu-

rity organizations would probably have been the establish- ment of a new collective security organization, possibly in the form of an upgraded Conference for Security and Coop- eration in Europe (CSCE). That scenario was dismissed in the West by those who could not imagine a future without the Atlantic Alliance. US President Bush Sr ‘warned President Mitterrand [already in April 1990] that no other organization could “replace NATO as the guarantor of Western security and stability”’. He continued: ‘Indeed, it is difficult to visual- ize how a European collective security arrangement includ- ing Eastern Europe, and perhaps even the Soviet Union, would have the capability to deter threats to Western Eur- ope’ (Sarotte, 2014, pp. 94–95). The CSCE was regarded as weak in 1991, and NATO’s Secretary-General Manfred W€orner (1991, p. 5) wanted to keep it that way: ‘With 38 members today and no doubt over 40 tomorrow, with the option of a veto imposed by just one member, and without an executive, the CSCE for the foreseeable future will remain burdened with structural weaknesses which will limit its effectiveness’. The CSCE that had helped strengthening the idea of human rights and liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR – that was upgraded to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in December 1994 – always remained in the shadow of NATO (Mosser, 2015). In short, the end of the Cold War was a missed opportu-

nity. Instead of creating a new regional security system based on the principles of collective security, the West did not abolish NATO and refused to invite Russia.

NATO Expansion and the Balkan wars

To make matters worse from a Russian point of view, NATO that was in search of a new identity acted in a way that was disliked by Russia, more in particular the war against the Bosnian Serbs (1994–1995), NATO expansion, and the war against Serbia (1999). With the USSR and the Warsaw Pact gone, NATO found new enemies (Klare, 1995), more in par- ticular authoritarian regimes outside NATO territory that were responsible for gross human rights violations. For NATO, the adagio was acting ‘out of area or [being] out of

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Collective Security between Russia and the West 85

business’. The first time ever that NATO used force was against the Serbs in Bosnia in 1994, and one year later against Serbia itself. Because of the historical ties between Serbia and Russia, this led to the first major frictions between NATO and Russia.

The move by the West that hurt the Russia-NATO relation- ship even more was inviting some Eastern European states to become members of NATO and later on the EU. These former Warsaw Pact member states were begging for mem- bership in the Western institutions, both for economic and security reasons. From a liberal point of view, they had the right to be admitted. Within the same logic, it is however hard to explain why Russia was excluded. From a realist per- spective, in contrast it is easy to understand why a regional power like Russia was not admitted.

The first time that NATO expansion was mentioned was in 1990, even before the implosion of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. From the beginning, Moscow warned that NATO expansion would create new lines of division. Russia regarded NATO extension as an expansion of NATO’s and US sphere of influence. That message was certainly heard by Western decision-makers, but apparently not fully under- stood. Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Galvin warned already in the mid-1990s: ‘We won the Cold War, but we’re losing the peace after the Cold War. There is no doubt in my mind about it. We do not think about the Russians enough, about whom they are and what they’re doing. We don’t think much about the way they think of us . . . We should consider folding NATO in a bigger organization . . . We need a whole new organization that bring the Russians on board’ (Gardner, 2014). Also George Kennan and Paul Nitze, two foreign policy giants of the Cold War categorized by Gardner (2013, p.41) as ‘alternative real- ists’, opposed NATO expansion (Kennan, 1997; Nitze, 1998). Their arguments were echoed by Western academics of whom most of them would define themselves as realists (Brown, 1995; Kamp, 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995; Mandelbaum, 1995).

Nevertheless, despite warnings from the US State Depart- ment for deteriorating relations with Russia, President Clin- ton declared in 1994 that the question was no longer ‘whether’ but ‘when’ NATO would expand. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were formally invited in 1997 to join NATO, which happened two years later. To compensate, NATO tried to mask the tensions with Russia with the sign- ing of the NATO-Russian Founding Act (1997). The latter included the promise by NATO not to station nuclear weap- ons or foreign troops on a permanent basis in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Earlier, President Clinton had pro- mised President Yeltsin that eventually a democratic Russia could become part of NATO (in line with the neoconserva- tive and neoliberal argumentation �a la Fukuyama) and sta- ted that in the meantime NATO expansion would not threaten Russia’s interests (Goldgeier, 1998, p. 97). The latter clearly showed a lack of understanding of how Russia per- ceived the situation.

To understand Russia’s reaction to NATO expansion better it is crucial to go back to what had been promised to

President Gorbachev at the time of German reunification. Gorbachev was promised that Germany would be reunified without expanding NATO. As there is a lot of myth-making around this episode, it is useful to have a closer look to what exactly has been said by whom. US Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, respectively on 9 and 10 February 1990, pointed out that German reunification would not lead to NATO expansion. James Baker, when speaking to Gorbachev in Moscow, stated: ‘We understand that it is important not only for the USSR but also for other European countries to have guarantees that – if the US maintains her military presence in Germany within the NATO framework – there will be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction of military presence one inch to the east’ (Zelikow and Rice, 1998, p. 182). Similarly, Genscher told his Soviet colleague Shevarnadze: ‘We are aware that NATO membership raises complicated questions. For us, however, one thing is certain: NATO will not expand to the East’ (Klussmann et al., 2009; Welsh, 2014). Ten days earlier, Genscher had already made the same point in a speech in Tutzing: ‘it is for NATO to declare unequivocally: irrespective of whatever happens within the Warsaw Pact, there will be no expansion of NATO’s territory to the East, that is, closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. Such security guarantees are important for the Soviet Union’ (R€uhle, 2014a, p. 3). Two days after that speech, Genscher repeats the same message at a press conference with James Baker in Washington DC: ‘What I said is there is no intention [by NATO] to extend to the East’ (Zelikow and Rice, 1998, p. 176). R€uhle (2014b, p. 236), an advocate of NATO expan- sion at that time, later on admits that the German reunifica- tion ‘was achieved through countless personal conversations in which Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders were assured that the West would not take advantage of the Soviet Union’s weakness and willingness to withdraw militarily from Central and Eastern Europe’. It was on the basis of these promises that Gorbachev agreed with the German reunification. As the historian Mary Elise Sarotte (2014, pp. 93–94) explains: ‘After hearing these repeated assur- ances, Gorbachev gave West Germany what Kohl later called ‘the green light’ to begin creating an economic and mone- tary union between East and West Germany – the first step of reunification’. The argument that these promises by the West had only

to do with East Germany and not with Eastern Europe (Kra- mer, 2009; R€uhle, 2014b, p. 236) is not correct. NATO expan- sion towards Eastern Europe was already raised by Hungary in February 1990 and by an internal State Department note a few weeks later (Sarotte, 2010, p. 118). Genscher pointed out to British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on 6 February 1990: ‘that when I talked about not wanting to extend NATO, that applied to other states besides the GDR [East Ger- many]. The West could do a lot to alleviate the current developments for the USSR. The declaration that NATO has no intention to expand its territory eastwards would be par- ticularly important. NATO does not intend to expand its ter- ritory to the East. Such a statement must not just refer to East Germany but rather be of a general nature. For example, the

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Soviet Union needs the security of knowing that Hungary, if it has a change in government, will not become part of the Wes- tern Alliance’ (Sarotte, 2010, p.117).

The argument that these promises were done orally and therefore are not legally binding is not convincing either. It is correct that these guarantees were not repeated in the German reunification agreement of 12 September 1990. Oral agreements, however,

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