Write an Executive Summary on the ‘The Operation Overlord Case Study’ through the NCO C3?lens of Communication. Your task is to participate in lessons within the MLC, compl

OPERATION OVERLORD AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

MAJ Stephen S. Seitz

CDR Kelly M. Oakeley

CDR Francisco Garcia-Huidobro

Joint Forces Staff College

Joint and Combined Staff Officer School

Class #02-2I

6 June, 2002

Faculty Advisor: Mr. Gerald Mitchell

Seminar #7

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Introduction

Operation OVERLORD provides an ideal case study for the joint military planner. An analysis

of Operation OVERLORD using the timeless principles of war provides insight that can still be useful

today when planning combined, joint, and coalition operations. With the onset of the global war on

terrorism, modern joint planners face complex challenges. These threats will have to be met by

fighting as a combined, joint, and coalition team. In this light, now is a good time to look back at the

planning and execution of the largest and most complex combined, joint, and multinational amphibious

operation in the history of warfare for some lessons learned and planning perspectives. Extremely

detailed planning and innovative preparation ultimately led to the liberation of France, the fall of

Germany, and Allied victory in Europe. The origins of Operation OVERLORD will be summarized

next, followed by an example of each principle of war as it pertained to the operation.

The Origins of Operation OVERLORD

In August 1942, an important event occurred that would influence planning for the invasion of

Normandy. It was a raid on the small French port of Dieppe by Canadian forces. It was a disaster, but

highlighted problems that a large-scale cross-channel amphibious assault would face. The idea was to

hold the port for a short time, divert forces away from the Russians, and then re-embark, “thereby

testing the feasibility of a large-scale invasion in France.” An infantry division with commando and

tank support assaulted the beach but they were pinned down by artillery fire (there was no preliminary

naval bombardment). About half of the forces, over 3,000 men, were soon captured, wounded, or

killed. The lessons learned were many. Plywood landing ships “were easily shot to pieces;” ship-to-

shore communications were inadequate; commanders didn’t know what was happening on the front;

and specialized equipment was needed to rapidly move soldiers and equipment off of the beach (9:17-18).

At the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, Operation ROUNDUP (a plan for a cross-channel

invasion in 1943) was postponed until mid-1944. There, it was also decided to setup an Anglo-

American headquarters in London to plan the invasion of France. British Army Lieutenant General

Fredrick E. Morgan was selected to head a planning staff and given the title Chief of Staff Supreme

Allied Commander. His team was known by his duty title acronym, COSSAC (9:20).

The mission of COSSAC was to plan Operation OVERLORD (formerly ROUNDUP). The

task was to plan for “a full-scale invasion of Europe, to take place as early as possible in 1944.” With

this strategic objective already defined, the COSSAC planners had to develop a concept of operation.

The first obstacle was the lack of naval equipment; German U-boats were sinking more tonnage than

could be replaced. However, by the summer of 1943, the Allies essentially won the Battle of the

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Atlantic (U-boats vs. British ships). This was largely attributed to technology advancements and

escorts by American warships. The next challenge was to determine where to land. Many variables

had to be considered. For example, Pas-de-Calais seemed the obvious landing point, since it offered

the shortest route (facilitating deployment and resupply with minimum sea time, and responsive air

support from airfields within range in England). The Germans also realized this and placed heavy

defenses there. Another problem was the lack of large harbors in the area comparable to other

potential coastal landing sites. They eventually chose the less fortified beaches of Normandy (150

miles southwest of Pas-de-Calais). One of the most important advantages of this location was that it

was South of the Seine River and most of the heavily fortified areas were north of the Seine; by

destroying bridges, the German response could be greatly hampered. If sufficient supplies could be

built up at Normandy, the Allies could advance across Northern France and assault Germany (9:20-22).

After much research, the COSSAC team decided on four specific beaches – code-named Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword – on the Northern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula near the mouths of the Orne and Vire rivers. General Morgan and his planners devised a scheme that entailed landing three divisions (about thirty thousand men, with twenty thousand more in reserve) on the beaches and dropping two airborne divisions (one U.S. and one British, using both paratroopers and gliders) nearby. This plan was unanimously approved at a conference held in Quebec in August 1943 (9:22).

With their strategic concept approved, the COSSAC staff now needed to further develop

operational objectives. They faced a well-entrenched enemy; extremely detailed planning and

preparation would be required for success. The German Army had occupied the entire French coast

since it began occupation in the summer of 1940. The Germans had initially intended to attack Britain

from France, but their attack into Russia left relatively few troops in the west. Hitler wanted to fortify

the coast enough to prevent British landings. German success at Dieppe supported this strategy. With

the entry of the Americans into the war, Hitler began to construct the “Atlantic Wall” in early 1942.

Field Marshall Karl Gerd von Rundstedt was tasked to defend the 3,100-mile coastline. Since von

Rundstedt had no clear idea of where the Allies would attack, he was forced to give priority to certain

areas (the focus being the Pas-de-Calais region and areas around the major ports) at the expense of the

remaining coastline. The defenses consisted of numerous obstacles, minefields, barbed wire, concrete

walls, artillery positions, hundreds of concrete bunkers, and early warning radar sites (9:22-25).

As planning forged ahead, a myriad of engineering efforts were undertaken to address the

challenges of a massive amphibious assault and its supporting logistics requirements. General

Eisenhower was appointed the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in December

1943. His headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was

established near London in early 1944. COSSAC was then incorporated into SHAEF. After much

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deliberation, the United Kingdom’s General Montgomery was selected to be the ground commander.

In January, Montgomery arrived in Britain to inherit the COSSAC OVERLORD plan. He believed it

had many flaws. For example, he felt the front was too narrow and the number of divisions “should be

increased from three to five to permit an extension of the invasion to the west of the Vire River (Utah

Beach), thus enabling Cherbourg to be captured more rapidly” (see Annex A, Map 1) (9:26, 30-33).

Operation BOLERO was initiated to move American troops to Britain and Operation

FORTITUDE began (a massive deception plan primarily aimed at making the Germans believe the

assault would occur near Calais). By January 1944, the southern counties in England became a

massive training ground focused on preparing men and equipment for the assault (9:31-32).

“Y-Day”, set for 1 June, was the date when everything had to be ready to go, awaiting only the supreme commander’s word. After Y-Day no further corrections could be made to the master plan. This key date was revealed to a select audience consisting of the general staff, the senior planners, and the actual assault commanders (down to the divisional level)…in London, on 15 May (9:40-41).

The SHAEF staff also began final tactical planning in January for Operation NEPTUNE. NEPTUNE

was the first phase of Operation OVERLORD (9:41). It was the “expansion of the strategic

[OVERLORD] plan into a combined tactical plan of the three services.” It included input from all

three “tactical Commanders-In-Chief” (to include addressing Montgomery’s previously mentioned

concerns) who “collectively became known as the Neptune Joint Commanders” (16:44-45).

After a weather briefing indicating a powerful storm in the region, Eisenhower postponed the

planned 4 June invasion for 24 hours. Further analysis forecast no improvement on the 5th, but a short

window of “fair conditions” on the 6th. “At 0400hrs on 4 June, Eisenhower took the final and

irrevocable decision; D-Day would be 6 June” (7:128-129).

Objective and Simplicity

The objective and simplicity principles of war will be addressed using the same example, the

Allied plan for the ground phase of OVERLORD.

The purpose of objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to fight. … Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective should be avoided.

The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations because simple plans, and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable, allowing better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations (13:3-17, 3- 17).

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At a macro-level, the U.S. strategic objective was to “defeat Germany first” (19:175). By today’s

definitions, OVERLORD was essentially a campaign plan that had both strategic and operational

objectives. The overarching strategic objective of COSSAC (given at its inception) was “a full-scale

invasion of Europe, to take place as early as possible in 1944” (9:21). The fundamental operational

objective of OVERLORD was simply: “to secure a lodgment area on the continent from which further

operations could be developed” (16:99). Despite the magnitude of OVERLORD (aimed at an

unconditional defeat of Germany) and the numerous tactical operations that it would require; the

campaign plan stated the commander’s intent clearly, simply, and succinctly. The understanding

conveyed to subordinate commands would enable confidence, encouraged freedom of maneuver, and

ultimately be key to both operational and tactical success (10:72).

Eisenhower and his staff wrote a deliberately simple and inclusive order for OVERLORD…: “Land on the Normandy coast. Build up the resources needed for a decisive battle in the

Normandy-Brittany region and breakout of the enemy’s encircling positions. Land operations in the first two phases under the tactical direction of Montgomery.

Pursue on a broad front with two army groups, emphasizing the left to gain necessary ports and reach the boundaries of Germany and threaten the Ruhr. On our right we would link up with the forces that were to invade France from the South. Build up our new base along the western border of Germany, by security ports in Belgium and in Brittany as well as in the Mediterranean.

While building up our forces for the final battles, keep up an unrelenting offensive to the extent of our means, both to wear down the enemy and to gain advantages for the final fighting. Complete the destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine, in the meantime constantly seeking bridgeheads across the river.

Launch the final attack as a double envelopment of the Ruhr, again emphasizing the left, and follow this up by an immediate thrust through Germany, with the specific direction to be determined at the time. Clean out the remainder of Germany.”

It was from this ultra-simple overall objective plan – which developed almost exactly as Eisenhower and his staff had hoped and planned, a rarity in the annals of the military – that all of the hundreds of small battles were to grow (10:72).

The initial focus of OVERLORD planning was to “gain a lodgment between the Seine and

Loire Rivers.” The idea was to force the Germans across the natural barrier of the Seine River, which

they estimated would take 90 days. Following a pause to regroup and resupply, they would then

advance beyond the Seine toward Germany (6:13).

The strategic bombing campaign began months before the invasion (11) (see Map 2). Pursuit of

the operational objectives was to begin the night before the amphibious invasion with a two division

airborne assault in the American zone (see Map 3). The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would land

in the vicinity of St Mere-Eglise, which was inland from Utah Beach (see Map 4) and secure roads

leading to the beach to prevent the Germans from reinforcing their coastline defenses. The following

morning the First Army under Bradley would assault the coast. The U.S. VII Corps would land at

Utah Beach with the 4th Division. The U.S. V Corps would land to their east with the 1st and part of

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the 29th Divisions at Omaha Beach. After securing a foothold in Normandy, the V Corps would

expand the beachhead while the VII Corps cut across the Contentin Peninsula before wheeling north to

capture the port city of Cherbourg. After securing the seaport, the VII Corps was to move south

toward St Lo. After holding St Lo, Bradley “would have his army on dry ground suitable for offensive

operations by mechanized forces.” Then Patton’s Third Army could advance to Brittany, seize ports

(to include Brest), and cover the southern flank while the First Army began to attack toward Paris (see

Map 5 for details of the actual Third Army breakout) (6:12-13).

Meanwhile, the Second British Army would operate between Bayeux and Caen, a region

suitable for airfields with “a relatively unimpeded route toward Paris.” The landing of airborne forces

would also precede their arrival. The British 6th Airborne Division would drop before dawn near Caen

with the objective of securing crossing sites over Orne River and protecting the northeastern flank (6:13).

At H-hour, the British 50th Division under the British 30 Corps would come ashore on Gold Beach, near Bayeux and the American zone, while 1 Corps conducted a two-pronged attack farther to the east. There, the 3d Canadian Division would cross Juno Beach near the town of Courseulles and the British 3d Division would come ashore at Sword, near Lion-sur-Mer. “In the initial stages,” Montgomery told his officers, “we should concentrate on gaining control quickly of the main centers of road communications. We should then push our armored formations between and beyond these centers and deploy them on suitable ground.” In this way it would be difficult for the enemy to bring up his reserves and get them past these armored formations (6:13).

To insure that all soldiers knew what was expected out them during the invasion, rigorous

training and meticulous rehearsals were conducted in Southern England (9:37, 42). Although the overall

mission was complex, this was recognized from the outset. An apparent conflict with the principle of

simplicity was mitigated with simply stated orders and clear objectives combined with intense training,

preparation, and rehearsal. An example of simplicity was the use of dime-store crickets by the

paratroopers as an alternate password. The challenge was one click and the response was two (2:63). By

D-Day, soldiers were well trained, knew unit objectives and understood where they fit into the mission.

Mass

Although, the principle of mass is normally thought of in the context of an offensive or

defensive action, in the case of OVERLORD, looking at the logistical and engineering efforts that

were undertaken to be able to ultimately achieve and sustain mass provides an interesting study.

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources (13:3-15/16).

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Due to limited landing craft (enough built for five divisions), numerous obstacles along the beach, and

heavy defenses of the Atlantic Wall, achieving mass under fire on the beaches of Normandy on D-Day

would be difficult. Achieving and sustaining the buildup without adequate ports or secure airfields in

enemy territory would be a paramount undertaking. To begin with, massive supplies, personnel, and

equipment would have to be pre-positioned in England in preparation for OVERLORD. These efforts

were complimented by the development of innovative engineering concepts and supporting specialized

equipment. Some of the undertakings to create a massive lodgment will be overviewed next (9:26-32).

Logisticians faced unprecedented challenges during the build-up in preparation for the cross-

channel invasion. They started production planning two years in advance of D-Day, the buildup of

supplies in England a year ahead, “and planning of detailed logistical support six months before the

Landings.” This required not only a concerted joint effort but also a vast industrial effort (19:468-468).

The major flow of combat troops to the U.K. took place during the early months of 1944. Since most organizational equipment for these troops had been preshipped, cargo shipping was available to lift other required operational supplies. A backlog of available cargo in the United States steadily developed after 1 January 1944, because of the high equipment priority now in effect and the inability of British ports to unload larger quantities. British ports at this time had to handle not only the in-flow of cargo but also the loading of troops and supplies for the cross-channel movement to Normandy. Most of the U.S. backlog was equipment and supplies needed after the invasion got underway. ASF [Army Service Forces, part of the War Department] took action to ease the pressure upon the ports … by reducing the number of scheduled sailings from about 120 to about 100 ships per month, and by “commodity” loading individual ships solidly with single items, such as rations, clothing, lumber, or ammunition. These ships served as floating warehouses and were subject to discharge as circumstances permitted. In May and June, 54 “pre-stowed” ships were “tailor-loaded” with food, ammunition, and equipment as specified by General Eisenhower’s headquarters. These ships were not intended to be unloaded in England but were dispatched overseas, held in British waters, and then moved directly to the Normandy beaches for discharge. This saved four handlings in the United Kingdom, eased the pressure on ports, railroads, and depots, and provided immediate supplies for the invasion troops (16:99).

There were only two ways the Allies could arrive at Normandy, either by air or landing craft. It

would not be feasible to deploy tanks by air. At Dieppe, tanks were unloaded from landing craft under

fire, the majority were destroyed and most of the rest were stuck in soft sand and abandoned. The

Allies knew having armor early in the fight was essential, but they did not want another armored

disaster. They knew through photos and reports that they faced different categories of obstacles on the

beaches; “artificial obstacles, with and without mines attached; mines; soft sand; concrete walls;

ditches; heavily armored pillboxes and strongpoints.” Many of these obstacles were designed to stop

tanks, so specialized armor would be needed to bridge them. Since there was not a deep-water harbor,

a man-made harbor would be needed (7:121-122). As a result, many ingenious engineering concepts were

developed to build harbors, supply fuel, and perform specialized tasks (see Figure 1) (9:26-30).

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A massive

buildup of American

troops in 1944 resulted

in 950,000 men being

“poised to strike,” their

equipment, supplies, and

thousands of vehicles

cluttered southern

Britain (4:75).

A vast and complex network of camps was established near the coast. Area A, to the north of Portsmouth, consisted of over forty-three miles of parking areas for tanks and other vehicles and seventeen barbed-wire-encircled camps. (Once inside the camps, the assault formations were briefed on their destination, and any further communication with the outside world was forbidden) (9:38).

During the buildup, British troops redeployed from Italy to form the British Second Army who would

also participate in OVERLORD. By D-Day, 3,000,000 were ready to support OVERLORD (4:75). The

invasion would include “over 4000 ships and craft of all types” (1:3) (over 5,000 according to other

sources), “176,475 men, 20,111 vehicles, 1500 tanks, and almost 12,000 planes” (20:280).

Surprise

Operation OVERLORD provides many excellent examples of deception, used to achieve surprise.

The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision-making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation (13:3-16).

The use of the principle of surprise is probably the most interesting principle to study during

OVERLORD planning and execution. Many deception plans were used to confuse the Germans as to

the date and location of an Allied invasion. A key reason these deception plans worked so well was

that the Allies “broke the Enigma code early in the war that could be used to decode secret German

messages.” This allowed the Allies to monitor German message traffic and determine whether

deceptive efforts worked or not prior to their subsequent efforts (11).

– Mulberry Harbors (made of Gooseberries, Phoenixes, and Pontoons, depicted) – Phoenixes (lines of 600-ton concrete caissons sunk to form solid lines to protection the harbor) – Gooseberries (old ships sunk to form wave breakers) – Pontoons (floating roadways) – PLUTO (pipeline under the ocean, fuel delivery)

– Menagerie (“specialized armor”, some noted below) – Bobbin Tank (unrolled canvas over soft sandy areas) – Crocodile Tank (fired huge jet of flames into bunker slits) – Flying Dustbin Tank (fired napalm containers) (9:26-30) – Flail Tank (spun free lengths of chain to set off mines) – Fascine Tank (emplaced wood bundles in tank ditches) (7:125) – Duplex Drive Tank (dual prop amphibious Sherman, depicted)

Mulberry Harbor (8:153)

Duplex Drive Tank (9:65) Figure 1

OVERLORD Engineering Examples

Lodgment Innovations

Menagerie “Specialized Armor”

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A very sophisticated deception plan named FORTITUDE was implemented by the U.S. and

Britain to convince Hitler the invasion was coming elsewhere and that the invasion force was larger

than its actual size. Operation FORTITUDE “made full use of the Double Cross System, of Ultra, of

dummy armies, fake radio traffic, and elaborate security precautions.” It included the “Bodyguard”

scenarios designed to mislead the Germans with false information, such as: the Allies believed

strategic bombing would force surrender; the invasion would begin in Norway; an invasion would take

place in the Balkans; the Russian offensive would begin in July (two months after the actual date); and

an Allied invasion would not occur until at least mid-July (11). As an example, the Norway deception

was accomplished by 24 personnel providing radio messages indicating the entire British Fourth Army

was stationed in Scotland and would “invade Norway in mid-July.” This unit was completely

fictional. The Allies also used a Double Cross System in which they captured German spies in

England and had them work for the British. These “turned German spies” sent messages to Germany

supporting the fictional unit in Scotland. At the same time the British began placing “wooden twin-

engine ‘bombers’” on the Scottish airfields. Additionally, British commandos conducted raids on the

coast of Norway to provide indications to Germany of a pre-invasion force (3:80-81).

“The payoff was spectacular.” Hitler moved 13 army divisions to Norway and in late May

Rommel requested five infantry divisions be moved from Norway to France. They were enroute when

another set of messages indicated the threat to Norway and the movement order was cancelled. To

paraphrase Churchill, “never in the history of warfare have so many been immobilized by so few.”

Additionally, Fortitude South consisted of an elaborate scheme to have the Germans believe there were

89 Allied divisions, which in reality consisted of only 47 (3:81-82).

OVERLORD is an outstanding example of employment of surprise during war. The planners

were extremely effective in making the Germans believe the operation was taking place elsewhere and

that the invasion would be preceded by a feint or diversionary attack.

Security

Adherence to the principle of security was absolutely essential during OVERLORD planning

and preparation. Known information leaks could have caused the operation to be delayed, revised, or

even cancelled. Unknown security failures could have led to another Dieppe disaster on a larger scale.

The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. It results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Although risk is inherent in military operations, application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action (13:3-16).

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Tremendous measures were taken to protect forces preparing to invade France during

OVERLORD. President Roosevelt requested all visitors be denied access to the southern coast of

England where training and staging operations were taking place. “Initially Churchill denied the

request, as he did not want to upset the lives of the British people. Eisenhower directly requested these

security measures be implemented to ensure the success of the operation and not endanger the lives of

the soldiers. Churchill eventually agreed to th

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