After reading the attached article please discuss the Threat Assessment (2011) promulgated by the United Nations Office on Drugs

THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE A Threat Assessment

July 2011

THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE

A Threat Assessment, 2011

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna

Copyright © United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), July 2011 Sales No.: E.11.XI.11 ISBN: 978-92-1-148263-8 e-ISBN: 978-92-1-055022-2

Acknowledgements

This report was prepared by UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs (DPA), in the framework of UNODC Trends Monitoring and Analysis Pro- gramme/Afghan Opiate Trade Project, with the collaboration of the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia. UNODC field offices for East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, Pakistan, Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, Southern Africa, Nigeria, South Asia and South Eastern Europe also provided feedback and support.

UNODC is grateful to the national and international institutions which shared their knowledge and data with the report team, including, in particular, the World Customs Organization, the Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, Turkish National Police Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Customs and Trade, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, Drug Control Headquarters of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre, Narcotics Bureau of Hong Kong, China, National Narcotics Control Commission of China, and the Governments of Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herze- govina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, India, Nepal, Nigeria, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and Viet Nam.

Thanks also go to the staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan.

Report Team Research and report preparation: Hakan Demirbüken (Programme management officer, Afghan Opiate Trade Project, STAS) Hayder Mili (Afghan Opiate Trade Project, STAS) Renée Le Cussan (Consultant) Mapping support: Deniz Mermerci (STAS) Odil Kurbanov (UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia) Rakhima Mansurova (UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia) Desktop publishing and mapping support: Suzanne Kunnen (STAS) Kristina Kuttnig (STAS) Supervision: Thibault Le Pichon (Chief, STAS), Sandeep Chawla (Director, DPA)

The preparation of this report benefited from the financial contributions of the United States of America, Germany and Turkey.

Disclaimers This report has not been formally edited. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNODC or contributory organizations and neither do they imply any endorsement. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Photos: © UNODC, Alessandro Scotti

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 3 Key facts 5 Executive summary 7

1. AFGHAN OPIATE TRAFFICKING

1.1 Current state of the global opiate market 13 Developments in the global opiate market 13 Global market volume 15 Global market shape 17 Global opiate interdiction 22 1.2 Afghanistan: the origin of opiates 26 Opiate production 26 Trafficking routes 28 Value and beneficiaries 30 Law enforcement and seizures 31 Health and socio-economic impact 33 1.3 Major transnational flows of Afghan opiates 34 Pakistan 34 Islamic Republic of Iran 39 Central Asia 44 Eastern Europe 50 Northern Europe 53 South-East Europe 54 Western and Central Europe 57 South Asia 63 East and South-East Asia 66 Oceania 70 Africa 71 The Americas 73 1.4 Case study: opiate trafficking through Baluchistan and FATA 75 Baluchistan 75 Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) 82 1.5 Policy implications 89

2. ACETIC ANHYDRIDE TRAFFICKING

2.1 The current state of the illicit acetic anhydride market 91 2.2 Acetic anhydride trafficking to Afghanistan 103 The Southern route 105 The Balkan route 114 The Northern route 128 2.3 Getting to market in Afghanistan 133 Smuggling routes into and through Afghanistan 133 Laboratories, capacity and the price of processing 143

Annex 1: Methodology 156

Annex 2: Substances controlled under the 1988 convention 158

2

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA Acetic anhydride AGE Anti-government elements ANA Afghan National Army ANF Anti-Narcotics Force ARQ Annual report questionnaire ATTA Afghan Transit Trade Agreement BKA German Federal Police BLO Border liaison office CARICC Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan CIS Commonwealth of Independent States DCA Drug control agency EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction EU European Union FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FC Frontier Corp FCR Frontier Crimes Regulation FIA Federal Investigation Agency GDP Gross domestic product IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ISAF International Security Assistance Force KKH Karakoram highway OC Organized crime PA Political agent PICT Pacific island countries and territories PKK Kurdish Workers’ Party TI Triangular Initiative TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees WDR World Drug Report (UNODC) WCO World Customs Organization

3

PREFACE

Opiates originating in Afghanistan threaten the health and well-being of people in many regions of the world. Their illicit trade also adversely impacts governance, security, stability and development—in Afghanistan, in its neighbours, in the broader region and beyond.

The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment, the second such report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime research project on the topic, covers worldwide flows of Afghan opiates, as well as trafficking in precursor chemicals used to turn opium into heroin. By providing a better understanding of the global impact of Afghan opiates, this report can help the international community identify vulnerabilities and possible counter- measures.

Heroin is the most dangerous drug worldwide. This report presents data on the distribution of trafficking flows for Afghan opiates and their health impact through- out the world. Trafficking in Afghan opiates is also very lucrative, generating some US$ 61 billion in illicit funds in 2009 (out of US$68 billion for the global illicit opiate trade, including other production sources). Most of this money went into the pockets of traffickers all along the transnational heroin distribution routes, and some went to insurgents.

A worrying development that requires international attention is the increasing use of Africa as a way station for Afghan heroin shipments to Europe, North America and Oceania. This is fuelling heroin consumption in Africa, a region generally ill-equipped to provide treat- ment to drug users and to fight off the corrupting effects of drug money.

Another new trend is the growing use of sea and air transport to move Afghan heroin around the world, as well as to smuggle chemicals used in heroin production into Afghanistan. Traffickers in Afghan heroin have tra- ditionally relied on overland routes, and law enforce- ment services will need to respond to this new threat.

The response to the global threat from Afghan opiates requires increased international cooperation within the context of an integrated, comprehensive and cost-effec- tive strategy that is based on the principles of shared responsibility, a balanced approach between demand and supply reduction, and respect for national sovereignty and human rights.

The Paris Pact unites more than 50 States and interna- tional organizations in the fight against Afghan opiates. At the regional level, this translates into counternarcotics information-sharing and joint cooperation initiatives like the Triangular Initiative (involving Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan), the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) and Operation TARCET. With the support of these multi-lateral initia- tives, national authorities have intercepted and seized tons of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals.

The findings of this report identify areas that need more attention. Strengthening border controls at the most vulnerable points, such as along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, could help stem the largest flows of heroin, opium and precursor chemicals. Increasing the capacity to monitor and search shipping containers in airports, seaports and dry ports at key tran- sit points and in destination countries could improve

THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A Threat Assessment

4

interdiction rates. Building capacity and fostering intel- ligence sharing between ports and law enforcement authorities in key countries and regions would help step up interdiction of both opiates and precursor chemicals.

Addressing Afghan opium and insecurity will help the entire region, with ripple effects that spread much far- ther. Enhancing security, the rule of law and rural devel- opment are all necessary to achieve sustainable results in reducing poppy cultivation and poverty in Afghanistan. This will benefit the Afghan people, the wider region and the international community as a whole.

But addressing the supply side and trafficking is not enough. We need a balanced approach that gives equal weight to counteracting demand for opiates. This is also part of the international community’s shared responsibil- ity for the global drug problem; heroin-consuming countries need to do more to provide treatment, care and support for drug users to help them kick the habit, and also to prevent drug use.

Reports like this make an important contribution to understanding the global opiate problem and identifying where interventions are most likely to be successful. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime will con- tinue to contribute to the research effort by collecting and analyzing data, and helping to build the research capacity in national institutions and Governments, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In closing, I would like to thank our dedicated team of skilled field research staff in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia who collect data on the Afghan opiate trade in often challenging and even dangerous circumstances. Thanks to them, this report is a unique and reliable source of information about the global Afghan opiate trade.

Yury Fedotov Executive Director

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

5

KEY FACTS

• Globally, around 16.5 million people use illicit opiates annually (opium, heroin and morphine), generating a US$68 billion global opiate market in 2009.

• In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organ- ized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of this extremely profitable trade. UNODC estimates that the Afghan Taliban earned around US$155 million in 2009, Afghan drug traffickers US$2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers US$440 million.

• Heroin is the most abused opiate worldwide, with 12- 13 million users consuming an estimated 375 tons of pure heroin per year (equal to 2,800 tons of opium). Opium abuse is also significant with users consum- ing an estimated 1,300 tons of raw opium in 2009. In total, over 4,000 tons of opium production were needed to meet global heroin and opium consump- tion in 2009.

• Afghan production has largely exceeded estimated global demand for the past several years, resulting in the creation of large stocks (including 2,600 tons in 2009). Stocks, in opium or morphine form (and to a lesser extent, pure brown heroin), accumulated in Af- ghanistan and along major trafficking routes over the period 2005-2009, would amount to 10,000-12,000 (opium equivalent) tons.

• Although Afghan heroin is only directly trafficked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia, it flows from there to the rest of the world; in 2009, UNODC estimates that 150 tons of Afghan heroin reached Europe, 120 tons Asia and 45 tons Africa.

• Africa has received increasing Afghan heroin flows, re-emerging as a heroin trafficking route to Europe, and to a lesser extent, North America and Oceania in 2009. Increasing flows of heroin to Africa are also ap- parently generating some increase in heroin abuse in parts of the continent.

• In 2009, law enforcement bodies continued to stem the flow of heroin, seizing almost 76 tons of heroin worldwide. Depending on the purity of the heroin seized, the interdiction rate would amount to between 2 and 16 per cent of the global heroin flow that year.

• Traditional emphasis on land border control to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets needs to be complemented with increased attention to traf- ficking by sea and through seaports, which appears to play a growing but still insufficiently noticed role.

• Opiates have continued to cause severe health prob- lems for drug abusers in 2009. More than 60 per cent of the drug treatment demand in Asia and Europe was related to heroin.

• In Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, the level of opiate consumption has risen sharply in the last decade.

• Afghanistan, the centre of global heroin manufacture, has approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation with an output of approximately 380-400 tons of heroin per year. Heroin labs are mainly located where there is limited law enforcement capacity.

• Acetic anhydride is the main chemical precursor used for manufacturing heroin. A tiny fraction (0.02 per cent, or some 475 tons) of the legitimate global trade (2 million tons a year) needs to be diverted to satisfy the needs of Afghanistan’s heroin processors. Europe and East Asia are the main regions of origin of the acetic anhydride trafficked into Afghanistan.

• The patterns of acetic anhydride seizures that have developed around Afghanistan in recent years also strongly suggest that a focus on seaports is warranted.

• Despite a sharp decrease in opium production in Af- ghanistan in 2010, and scattered reports of shortages of good quality heroin from some European countries, there were no major heroin shortages reported from consumer markets.

• Stopping the operations of the global Afghan opi- ate market will require further efforts to eliminate production of, demand for and trafficking in Afghan opium and heroin. Increasing the effectiveness of interventions in these three interrelated areas also re- quires guidance from threat monitoring and analysis efforts.

7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the last decade, the global trade in illicit Afghan opi- ates has been one of the world’s greatest transnational drug and crime threats – with severe consequences for health, governance and security at national, regional and interna- tional levels.

UNODC has undertaken numerous surveys and studies on aspects of the trade with a view to supporting countermea- sures and initiatives at the national and international levels. These include the Paris Pact Initiative and its Rainbow Strategy. To complement these efforts and to help monitor and better understand the global impact of Afghan opiates, UNODC launched a research project dedicated to the threat of Afghan opiates in September 2008. The Project released its first report, Addiction, crime and insurgency: the transnational threat of Afghan opium in November 2009. The report mapped and measured global heroin and opium flows to main opiate markets, analysing market values and beneficiaries. The report also discussed the links security and the opium economy in Afghanistan and some of the neighbouring areas.

This report is the second from the Afghan Opiate Threat Assessment Project. In this report, the analysis is both deeper and broader in scope. Opiate market estimates and flows have been updated. The report also pays particular attention to the reverse flows of acetic anhydride trafficked into Afghanistan.

Opiate trafficking

Globally, some 16.5 million people use opiates annually, generating a US$68 billion global opiate market in 2009. Heroin is the most abused opiate, with 12-13 million users globally consuming an estimated 375 tons of pure heroin

per year. Opium abuse is also significant, with 3-4 million users consuming some 1,300 tons of raw opium. In addi- tion to global consumption, an additional 2,600 tons of opium (or an equivalent amount of heroin or morphine) are estimated to have been stocked in Afghanistan and along trafficking routes in 2009. UNODC currently esti- mates that there are between 10,000 and 12,000 tons of opium held in stockpiles – which may be sufficient for at least three years of heroin and opium abuse worldwide.

In 2009, Afghan heroin was trafficked to numerous desti- nations worldwide, with the exception of South and Cen- tral America. Europe is the largest market for Afghan heroin. In 2009, 150 tons of pure Afghan heroin were esti- mated to have been consumed in Europe. According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addic- tion, heroin is present in the majority of drug-induced deaths reported in Europe, making heroin a significant public health threat.

East and South-East Asia have also become significant des- tinations for Afghan heroin due to the decrease in opium production in Myanmar during the last decade. Almost 50 per cent of the Chinese market and most of the East Asian market may have been supplied by Afghan heroin in 2009.

Africa has also received increasing Afghan heroin flows, emerging as a cost-effective heroin trafficking route to Europe, North America and Oceania in 2009. Trafficking through this new route is likely facilitated by relatively high levels of corruption, widespread poverty and limited law enforcement capacity in many countries. Increased pres- sure on traditional heroin trafficking routes may be provid- ing an incentive to traffickers to diversify itineraries and reopen the African route to Europe that had been very

8

THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A THREAT ASSESSMENT

Map 1: Heroin trafficking flows from Asia, 2009

Source: UNODC.

active in the 1980s and early 1990s. Increasing flows of heroin to Africa are also apparently leading to increases in drug abuse in parts of the continent.

The multiple threats engendered by Afghan opiates are not limited to distant destination markets. In Afghanistan and its neighbouring countries, the level of opiate consumption has risen sharply in the last decade. Some 35,000 hectares of opium poppy cultivation (out of a total of 123,000 ha in 2009) are currently needed to produce the opiates con- sumed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Afghan opium now presents significant public health and internal security challenges for the population of Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours; however, unlike in downstream markets, treatment facilities are very limited in these coun- tries.

In Afghanistan and elsewhere, transnational organized crime groups were the main beneficiaries of the US$68 bil- lion trade in 2009, which they supplemented with other forms of crime such as arms trafficking and human smug- gling. In 2009, the Afghan Taliban was estimated to have earned around $150 million from the opiate trade, Afghan drug traffickers $2.2 billion, and Afghan farmers $440 mil- lion. While the findings suggest that most insurgent ele- ments content themselves with taxing the trade rather than attempting to become active participants, it now appears that some insurgents involve themselves directly in the

heroin supply chain, including in the procurement of acetic anhydride. Anti-government elements based in Afghanistan and Pakistan may gain access to only a fraction of the value of Afghan opiate exports, but this is nonetheless enough to support logistics, operations and recruitment.

Areas under insurgent influence, such as the border between Iraq and Turkey and the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, also provide a key competitive advantage for organized crime groups as those areas lie beyond the reach of law enforcement. If global organized crime groups man- aging the opiate trade pocketed only 10 per cent of the profit, they would have earned at least $7 billion in 2009. All these illicit profits are laundered in one way or another, a process that undermines the vulnerable economies of areas such as the Balkans and Central Asia.

In 2009, law enforcement bodies continued to stem the flow of heroin, seizing almost 76 tons of heroin worldwide. The interdiction rate was between 2 and 16 per cent, depending on the purity of the heroin seized. Dropping of trade barriers across many parts of the globe has not only facilitated the movement of illicit goods, but also closer interaction between organized criminal groups from differ- ent locations and cultures. Drug traffickers will almost certainly exploit this situation and make connections with other criminal networks to facilitate the smooth movement of heroin.

Oceania

Africa

USA, Canada

Gulf area, Middle East

South-East Europe Caucasus

West, Central, East Europe

South-East Asia

Central Asia

Russian Federation

China

South – Asia

Pakistan

Islamic Republic of Iran

Afghanistan

Turkey

Flows of heroin (in metric tons) (not actual trafficking routes)

6-10

11-35

0,5-5

38

U N

O D

C / S

C IE

N C

E S

P O

11 5

1 6

0

82

65

59

9 0

77 Myanmar

North Europe

9

Executive Summary

Traffickers tend to shift routes and change their modus operandi as law enforcement pressure increases. Traditional methods of land border control may not be sufficient to stem the flow of opiates into destination markets. With traditional emphasis on land border and airport control, the use of maritime transportation and seaports by opiate traf- fickers appears to have received too little attention. In 2009, just 6 per cent of global heroin seizures made by customs departments occurred at seaports, although there are indications that heroin traffickers are utilizing maritime transportation much more than currently estimated.

Acetic anhydride trafficking

Acetic anhydride is a precursor chemical essential to the production of heroin. Global manufacture of acetic anhy- dride reaches 2 million tons annually, but only a fraction – some 475 tons (or 0.02 per cent) – is needed to satisfy the demand of Afghanistan’s heroin processors. The European market was heavily targeted by traffickers in 2008-2009 and remains an area vulnerable to diversion. Afghan organ- ized crime groups have also penetrated several regions in Asia and cooperate with indigenous groups to traffic heroin processing chemicals into Afghanistan. In Afghanistan itself, traffickers managed a domestic acetic anhydride market estimated at $130-$ million in 2009. In the same year, some 38 tons of acetic anhydride were seized in Afghanistan, most of which was seized at heroin production sites in the south, with the help of coalition forces.

Acetic anhydride trafficking for Afghan heroin production is multi-directional, but Central and South-Eastern Europe appear to straddle a major artery, which mostly pumps diverted acetic anhydride out of the trade within the Euro- pean Union. In 2008, Slovenia and Hungary alone seized 156 tons, equivalent to nearly two thirds of global seizures and more than a third of the illicit requirements of Afghan- istan that year. On the other side of the globe, diversion from domestic trade is also important; diversions from the Republic of Korea and other South-East Asian countries appear to supply a significant proportion of the acetic anhy- dride transiting Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In diverting from domestic trade, traffickers still face a low level of risk with the potential for rich rewards.

With Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran positioned between acetic anhydride-producing regions and an acetic anhydride-consuming country (Afghanistan), the transit of acetic anhydride through their borders is inevitable. The Islamic Republic of Iran receives heroin chemicals across its border with Turkey, but also from northern Iraq and through its southern seaports. Pakistan receives smuggled acetic anhydride from multiple directions and accounted for 70 per cent of acetic anhydride seizures in countries bordering Afghanistan (excluding China). Afghanistan’s southern frontier with Pakistan appears to receive the lion’s share of acetic anhydride due to porous borders and limited

capacity for detection and enforcement.

Central Asia witnessed seizures of 260 tons of acetic anhy- dride from 1995-2000, but from 2001-2010 it seized less than half a ton. The role of the so-called ‘Northern route’ through Central Asia appears secondary. However, there remains a question as to whether trafficking routes have quickly shifted or modus operandi has changed through Central Asia to avoid detection.

Afghanistan, the centre of global heroin manufacture, has approximately 300-500 laboratories in operation with an output of approximately 380 tons of heroin per year. At the ‘centre of the centre’, southern Afghanistan was responsible for 50 per cent of national manufacture in 2009 and 2010. The patterns of acetic anhydride seizures that have devel- oped around Afghanistan in recent years strongly suggest that a focus on seaports is warranted. In the high-seizure countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, 80 per cent of the acetic anhydride seized in 2008-2010 was interdicted in seaports.

Based on arrests resulting from seizures, it appears that networks of Afghan and Pakistani nationals play an impor- tant role in diverting acetic anhydride, even in distant producing countries where respective diasporas are rela- tively small, namely the Republic of Korea and Japan. By contrast, most groups involved in trafficking acetic anhy- dride through Europe and the Balkan route seem to be loose multi-national networks usually composed of local nationalities working jointly with Turkish citizens. Heroin is often used as a barter currency to purchase acetic anhy- dride on the Balkan route, notably in Turkey.

Policy implications

Stopping the operations of the deadly and globalizing Afghan opiate market that has exploded over the last 20 years will require further efforts to gradually eliminate pro- duction of, demand for and trafficking in Afghan opium and heroin. Increasing the effectiveness of interventions in these three inter-related areas requires guidance from accu- rate information and assessments of the problem and of the ways in which the performance of counter-measures can be increased.

There is a strong link between insecurity and opium poppy cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan. Anti-govern- ment elements are partly funding their operations from the opiate trade. In most of the Afghan provinces where secu- rity is better, there is either no or very limited opium poppy cultivation. Conversely, the main poppy cultivation areas of the country are found in the insecure southern provinces. Further improving security in Afghanistan appears there- fore as a critical precondition for controlling opium poppy cultivation in the country.

Heroin trafficking occurs mainly through Afghan border

10

THE GLOBAL AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE: A THREAT ASSESSMENT

provinces with weak law enforcement and border control. Although considerable improvements have been brought to a number of border control points, there are still many areas along Afghanistan’s borders that are not well protected or monitored, such as the borders between the southern prov- inces of Afghanistan (Hilmand, Kandahar and Nimroz) and the Baluchistan province of Pakistan. Drug traffickers take advantage of this situation and heavily use these bor- ders for trafficking opium, heroin and acetic anhydride from one country to the other. The capacity to control these border crossings should be further increased.

In addition to land borders, the sea- and airports of Afghan- istan’s immediate neighbors have become increasingly used for heroin and acetic anhydride trafficking. Maritime trans- portation, in particular, appears to have gained in impor- tance for traffickers, be it for exporting heroin to the re-emerging African route, or for importing acetic anhy- dride destined to heroin processing labs in Afghanistan. Consequently, interdiction capacity at vulnerable seaports, including dry ports, should be improved, notably in Paki- stan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also in other transit and destination countries.

Only some 2 per cent of the millions of containers shipped every year across the globe can be physically searched. More generally, the further drugs move away from their source,

the more fragmented, diverse and widespread drug ship- ments become, making it extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect and intercept them in the legitimate and ever growing flows of goods and people. Particular attention needs to be paid, therefore, to stepping up interdiction efforts and capacity as close as possible to the Afghan opiate source, as well as to increasing intelli- gence sharing among concerned law enforcement agencies.

In addition to increased law enforcement capacity, social and economic conditions need to be improved in Afghani- stan and the poorest areas in the region. Although there is no direct causal link between poverty and drug production and trafficking, where security and the rule of law is weak, drug traffickers and anti-government elements find in dis- advantaged areas more fertile ground to promote illicit drug production and to recruit young males in the ranks of armed and drug trafficking groups.

The vast majority of heroin produced in Afghanistan is consumed outside of Afghanistan and its immediate region. Although heroin demand has stabilized worldwide, there are no signs of a decrease at present. Afghanistan and its neighbours cannot bear alone the burden of stopping the operation of the global opiate market. In line with the principles of shared responsibility and a balanced approach to reducing supply and demand, consuming countries, particularly in the regions that create the strongest demand

Seizures (in liters)

> 150,000

> 80,000 <= 150,000

> 30,000 <= 80,000

> 10,000 <= 30,000

> 3,000 <=

Collepals.com Plagiarism Free Papers

Are you looking for custom essay writing service or even dissertation writing services? Just request for our write my paper service, and we'll match you with the best essay writer in your subject! With an exceptional team of professional academic experts in a wide range of subjects, we can guarantee you an unrivaled quality of custom-written papers.

Get ZERO PLAGIARISM, HUMAN WRITTEN ESSAYS

Why Hire Collepals.com writers to do your paper?

Quality- We are experienced and have access to ample research materials.

We write plagiarism Free Content

Confidential- We never share or sell your personal information to third parties.

Support-Chat with us today! We are always waiting to answer all your questions.