The United States entered this contest shortly after achieving independence. Having established national sovereignty, U.S. lea

12 The Imperial Era

The United States entered this contest shortly after achieving inde- pendence ("playing the European Game," as Mark Twain would acidly observe). Having established national sovereignty, U.S. leaders would seek to extend territorial reach over European colonies and prevent other powers from challenging this expansion. As a result, U.S. relations with Latin America during the nineteenth century represented a continuation and culmination of European incursions into and struggles over the New World that dated back to the late fifteenth century.

From the outset, in other words, the United States was an aspiring imperial power. It entered the international arena as a relatively minor, al – most insignificant actor; within a century the young nation became a for- midable contender. The United States embarked on its imperial course neither by impulse, miscalculation, or accident. Its behavior represented long-term policy and national purpose. As historian William Appleman Williams has observed, "Americans thought of themselves as an empire at the outset of their national existence. . . . Having matured in an age of empires as part of an empire, the colonists naturally saw themselves in the same light once they joined issue with the mother country." 1 In an ethical sense, U.S . conduct was neither better nor worse than that of other ambi- tious powers. All played by the same rules of the game.

Once engaged in this contest, the United States adapted its policy in accordance with conditions and circumstances particular to the New World. While European powers engaged primarily in colonization of overseas possessions, the United States tended to rely, first, on territorial acquisition and absorption, and, second, on the estaplishment and preser- vation of informal spheres of influence. The means thus varied, but the ends were much the same.

European Rivalry in the New World

European powers began to compete for control of the New World alm_ost

immediately after Christopher Columbus announced his earth-shattering "discovery" in 1492. Protesting Spanish claims to total monopoly ov~r the Americas, King Joao II of Portugal convinced the "Catholic kings" U1 1494 to modify the original ruling of Pope Alexander VI and accept the Treaty ofTordesillas, which ceded to Portugal dominion over the easte~n half of South America-much of present-day Brazil. Theoretically, Spall1 and Portugal thus possessed exclusive title to the newly found territo~ies. According to the terms of papal endorsement, it was the religious obliga- tion of Spain and Portugal to spread the Catholic gospel to the heathen. So long as they fulfilled this missionary duty, Spain and Portugal would have complete control of lands and peoples of the New World. Frorn 1580 to 1640, when Portugal fell under Spanish control, this claim be- longed to Spain alone . . d

The Iberian monopoly did not last long. Protestant:J.sm took hol_ ……… ….. H ,.,,_ h ….. .. , .. mn ,… h ….. f' p,.. .. ..,……,p, -,c, ,, rP~n1t- nf t-hP R p,.fnrm~t-lAn -:1nrl it<: ~no-

The European Game 13

Catholic adherents saw no reason to respect the Treaty of Tordesillas or any papal declaration. Seeking economic access to the riches of the New World, merchants and buccaneers from rival European countries initiated a thriving trade in contraband. According to then-prevailing mercantilist theory, mo:eover, the goal of economic activity was to enhance the power of the natl.on-state. The accumulation of power was to be measured through th~ possession of precious bullion-that is, gold or silver. Mer- cantilist policymakers thus sought to run a favorable balance of trade with exports e~ceeding imports, since this would increase the storage of coinage ?: bullion. (The emphasis on trade gave the doctrine its name .) Mercantilist theory tended to assume that nations engaged in a "zero- sum" game, with one state's gain entailing a loss for another state. Dis- c~ver! of the New _World gravely threatened prevailing power relations , smce It placed massive and unforeseen quantities of gold and silver at the disposal of Spain and its crusading Catholic monarchs Charles I and Philip II. Given the assumptions of the time, other powe;s had no choice but to react.

. By the mid-si~teenth century England emerged as Spain's principal nval. Legendary ptrateers John Hawkins and Francis Drake made raids on ports around the Car~bbean. Philip II decided to retaliate by invading En- gl~d. f_rake_ roared mto the harbor of Cadiz and destroyed a number of ships, smgemg the beard of the king of Spain," and the English fleet then crushed the Spanish armada in 1588. War extended beyond Philip's ~ath and peace finally came in 1609, when the Netherlands were divided In tw~: the north was set free from Spain and became Holland· the south remame_d under Spanish control and is now Belgium . ' Th Spam:s setbacks in Europe were soon reflected in the New World. The English settled at Virginia in 1607 and at Massachusetts in 1620. C e Du~ch reached New York in 1612. The French began moving into En~: m the 1620s. More significantly, from the standpoint of the era, llliddl ' French, and Dutch settlements appeared in the Antilles-in the th De ofwh~t had been up to then a Spanish lake. In 1630 moreover

e Utch seized co tr 1 f th B .li ' ' sugar 1 . n ° ~ .. e raz1 an northeast-with its extensive the P ~tat:J.ons-an acqmsltlon that for Holland vastly overshadowed 111~udr~ ase ~f M~nhattan Island a few years before. The Dutch re-

c m Brazil unt:1.l 1654.

tffec!:erhe late sev~nteenth century Europe was seeking to establish an famil coun_terwe1ght to France. In 1700 Louis XIV's efforts to impose

e Y rd

at:1.ve on the Spanish throne prompted a coalition of three a ~~Eng!and, Holland, and the Holy Roman Emperor-to respond

til 17~~ arat:1.on of war. The War of the Spanish Succession dragged on • Y, d · At _the war's end Austria gained control of Milan Naples . ' an Belgmm; Philip V (Louis XIV's nephew) was made' King of

, Under th ti ul · h th b e s P at:1.on t at e crowns of France and Spain would . e held by the same individual; and England, the biggest win-

ed control nFr:;h-~1 .. — 1'T – • • ..C _ __ __ JI . , ,,

14 The Imperial Era

important-the commercial contract (asiento) for the African slave trade with Spanish colonies in the New World. This lucrative privilege gave Britain a secure foothold in Spanish America.

Competition for empire intensified throughout the eighteenth cen- tury. A series of skirmishes stretched from 1739 to 1763 (with an uneasy truce from 1748 to 1756) and comprised what has come to be known as "the great war of the mid-eighteenth century." The first part of the con- test, usually known as the War of the Austrian Succession, ground to a halt in 1748 when England and France reached agreement to restore the status quo ante bellum. The second stage came with the Seven Years' War, in which Britain and Prussia joined forces against the combined strength of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons. This war had multiple fronts, stretching from Europe to Canada to India. When the dust finally cleared in 1763, the Treaty of Paris codified the results: Britain remained in India; France ceded to Britain all French territory on the North American main- land east of the Mississippi River; France retained its slave stations in Africa plus the cash-producing Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique (leading one observer to exult, in classic confirmation of mer- cantilist economic doctrine, "We may have lost Canada, but we have re- tained Martinique!"); and Spain retained its North American holdings west of the Mississippi and at the river mouth. The Seven Years' War thus achieved a new political and economic equilibrium. England replaced France as the preeminent colonial power, a position she would extend and consolidate through the pax britannica of the nineteenth century.

As England was celebrating its diplomatic triumph, Prime Minister George Grenville took a series of steps to consolidate British rule in North America and to improve imperial finances. His most notorious measure was the Stamp Act, which in 1765 imposed taxes on all legal documents, newspapers, pamphlets, and almanacs. Eventually, and in many instances reluctantly, British colonists rose up in protest against these impositions and against the monarchy. Proclaiming their indepen- dence in 1776, they finally achieved sovereignty and recognition in 1783. The emergence of their new nation would have fundamental and far- reaching impacts upon the international arena.

Imperial Order: The Rules of the Game

Imperialism entailed the policy, practice, or advocacy of the extension of control by a nation over the territory, inhabitants, and resources of areas that lay outside the nation's own boundaries. Typically, nations engaged in imperialistic behavior for two basic reasons: first, to gain access to eco- nomic benefits-such as land, labor, and minerals; and second, to increase political strength and military capability-often through the improvement of geopolitical position in relation to other contending powers. Almost al- ways, the pursuit ofimperial advantage evoked elaborate ideological justifi- r · ;m in fr th r r inns missi n f i n h-,f"nt1mr, m1in tn th

The European Game 15

civilizing mission of eighteenth-century France and the "white man's bur- den" that would be borne by nineteenth-century England.

As it evolved over time, imperialism spawned an informal but coher- ent code of international rules. The keystone of this system was the idea of a balance of power. First articulated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this principle assumed that international politics would consist of relations among nation-states. The ultimate purpose of a balance of power was to prevent domination by any single European nation. In prac- tice the principle led to a constantly shifting pattern of alliances and coali- tions, as weaker nations often sought to achieve an appropriate balance by combining their forces in opposition to the stronger ones. Alignments would be based not on religion, ideology, culture, or values. They would respond to momentary contingencies and power calculations.

Second, this international system supported the sovereignty of estab- lished European nation-states and accepted the state as the primary actor in the global arena. Indeed, the whole idea of a "balance" among nations tended to assume and assure their individual survival. By definition, equi- librium precluded the possibility of elimination or extinction. Of course this stipulation applied only to recognized powers in Europe, not to other parts of the world.

Third, and partly as a result of this understanding, European nations focused much of their competitive energy on imperial expansion. Preser- vation of a balance among metropolitan powers tended to limit the scale and scope of wars within the European theater. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, battlegrounds shifted from the European conti- nent itself toward the colonized areas. In effect, the extension of imperial possessions provided nations with an opportunity to enhance their power positions without having always to engage in direct hostilities with other European states. Colonization created a "positive-sum" game, or so it seemed at the time, a means of tilting the balance of power without up- setting the system as a whole.

Fourth, imperial holdings became integral elements in the calculation of the power balance. Especially under the mercantilist doctrines of the period, the ultimate rationale for imperial possessions was to strengthen the economic and political position of the metropolitan state. European powers consequently went to considerable lengths to maintain monopo- listic control over their dominions, from Spain's elaborate complex of le- galisms and regulations to England's maritime enforcement of its pax bri- tannica. The point was not only to maximize direct exploitation of the dominions. It was to make sure that no other rival power would seize part of the booty and in so doing revise the prevalent balance of power.

Various methods existed for the pursuit of imperialistic advantage. One was the conquest and incorporation of territory, leading to effective enlargement of the boundaries of the nation-state. After the Peace of Westphalia most European powers tended to shy away from this method, at least in reµ;ard to each other's terrain, since it threatened to violate the

16 The Imperial Era

whole idea of a balance of power. And with regard to overseas territories, the prospect of incorporation raised complex juridical and philosophical questions about the relationship of colonial inhabitants to metropolitan society. Even so, it became the policy of France to regard its imperial possessions in Africa, Asia, and the New World as integral parts of the nation-as departements d ,outre m er, in theoretical possession of the legal rights and obligations pertaining to the provinces of France.

A second technique involved subjugation and colonization. Through this method, imperial dominions attained special status as subordinate ap- pendages to the metropolitan nation and , usually, to its central govern- ment. While adding to the power of the metropole, colonization did not lead to effective enlargement of national boundaries. Nor did it raise awk- ward questions about the rights or roles of colonial subjects. For such rea- sons this approach was favored by most European competitors in the im- perial contest. The British empire and its contemporary remnants ( the so-called Commonwealth) offer perhaps the most notable and elaborate example of this option.

A third alternative entailed the creation of a "sphere of interest," or sphere of influence, over which an imperial power would exert de facto hegemony through informal means. This could stem from economic domination or, in politics, the installation of client regimes or protec- torates. One advantage of this approach was economy of effort: it did not entail the enormous expenditures of military, administrative, and financial resources that formal colonies required. (Indeed, there now exists sub- stantial doubt about the net profitability of colonial possessions for Euro- pean powers.) A central disadvantage was, of course, insecurity: precisely because they were informal , spheres of influence were subject to intrusion by rival powers. Stability could prevail only if major powers agreed to recognize each other's spheres of domination . Such was the case in nineteenth-century Africa, where European rivals agreed to a "partition- ing" of the continent, and to a lesser extent in turn-of-the-century China, where European nations attempted to carve out exclusive spheres ofinflu- ence . It also applied to locations where the ever-resourceful British con- structed what have come to be known as "informal empires. "2

Enter the United States

The newly independent United States joined the contest for imperial ex- tension soon after achieving constitutional stability in the late 1780s. Two schools of thought quickly emerged with regard to foreign policy. One, championed by George Washington, held that the United States should avoid "entangling alliances" with European powers and should separate itself as much as possible from the Old World. The other, associated with Alexander Hamilton, argued that the United States should actively take advantage of European conflicts: if the new nation were to develop a powerful navy, he wrote, "a price would be set not only upon our friend-

The European Game 17

hope ere long to become the Arbiter of Europe in America; and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate" (emphasis added). Despite these differ- ences, however, U.S. policymakers were in full agreement on one funda- mental premise: European influence in the Americas should be reduced and restricted. It was this concern that directed their attention toward Spanish America. As Rufus King said of South America in a letter to Hamilton in 1799: "I am entirely convinced ifit [South America] and its resources are not for us that they will speedily be against us."

American statesmen employed several strategies to prevent this nega- tive outcome . First was to insist, at least in the short run, that these colonies remain in possession of Spain, which had the desirable quality of being a weak and declining power. Spain presented no threat; France or England, by contrast, would represent a powerful challenge. As a result, the United States vigorously and consistently opposed the transfer of Spanish dominions in the New World to any other European power.

Second, U.S . leaders would support campaigns for independence by Spanish American colonies in the 1810s and 1820s. They reached this po- sition after a substantial amount of controversy and debate . One concern was that newly independent nations of Spanish America might forge diplomatic and commercial ties with England or France. A second preoc- cupation was that the resulting nations would be susceptible to instability, authoritarianism, and, as a result, extrahemispheric intervention. Another was that it would be politically difficult for the United States to take terri- tory away from sister republics in the hemisphere. In the end, the United States faced little practical choice-and concluded that Spanish American independence would promote long-term national goals. As Thomas Jef- ferson wrote in 1808, "We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere ."

Third, U.S. policymakers sought to establish their own hegemony within the region. Without the power to back up their statements, they brazenly asserted that the continents of the Americas comprised a U.S . sphere of interest-to the exclusion of European powers. As Secretary of State John Quincy Adams declared, the United States was willing to leave Great Britain in "indisputed enjoyment" of all her colonial possessions so long as Britain would accept "every possibility of extension to our natural dominion in North America, which she can have no solid interest to pre- vent, until all possibility of her preventing it shall have vanished." In a similar vein, Jefferson insisted that Europe comprised "a separate division of the globe," while "America," he contended, "has a hemisphere to it- self. It must have a separate system of interest which must not be subordi- nated to those of Europe. The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them."

18 The Imperial Era

proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Partly aimed at czarist Rus- . sia's territorial claims in the American northwest, the doctrine asserted that the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European power." It did not condemn colo- nization as a matter of principle; it inveighed only against colonization by European powers in the Americas. Taking note of an apparent design by the Holy Alliance to help Spain regain her colonies, President Monroe in addition warned against reinstatement of monarchical rule:

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing be- tween the United States and those powers, to declare that we should con- sider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [ the newly independent nations], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposi- tion toward the United States.

In one sense this statement declared the United States to be the guardian of independence and democracy throughout the hemisphere. But in an- other, more fundamental sense, it was an assertion of realpolitik. Not only would the United States oppose colonization by Europe in America; it would also oppose political alliances between newly independent nations of Spanish America and European powers.

U.S. Imperialism I: Territorial Expansion

The first phase of U.S. imperialistic policy involved territorial acquisition and absorption. Circumstances were propitious in the early nineteenth century. England and France were distracted by internal strife and by con- tinental wars. Spain was in a process of precipitous decline. New nations in the hemisphere, especially in Spanish America, would be unable to offer much resistance. As Thomas Jefferson prophesied as early as the 1780s, it would eventually become possible for the United States to take over remnants of Spain's once-formidable empire "peice by peice [sic]."

Pocketbook Diplomacy

The acquisition of Louisiana marked U.S. entry into the imperial contest. In 1763 France lost its possessions west of the Mississippi to Spain- fortunately for the United States, the weakest of the European powers. In 1795 the United States obtained commercial rights along the Mississippi River. In 1800 Napoleon suddenly took title to Louisiana on behalf of France. Thomas Jefferson expressed shock and dismay over this develop- ment.3 "It completely reverses all the political relations of the U.S.," he declared. Shortly afterward Jefferson emphasized the importance of "one sinp;le s ot" on earth-the port ofl'-kw o wh ·

The European Game 19

would necessarily become "our natural and habitual enemy." The United States and France were on a collision course.

England came to the rescue, at least indirectly, as British-French ten- sions threatened to erupt in war. A beleaguered Napoleon decided to sell off the Louisiana territory: better it go to the United States, he must have calculated, than to the English. By the terms of the 1803 purchase arrange- ment, the United States paid about $15 million in exchange for a massive span ofland, one that not only included the present-day state of Louisiana but that almost doubled the territorial size of the then United States.

Florida came next, through a combination of guile and force. In 1817 Secretary of State John Quincy Adams opened talks with the Span- ish minister, don Luis de Onis, after which General Andrew Jackson seized Spanish forts at St. Marks and Pensacola. Instead of reprimanding Jackson, as one might have expected, Adams demanded reparations from Spain to cover the cost of the military expedition-allegedly undertaken against Indians whom the Spaniards could not control. Unable to obtain diplomatic support from Great Britain, the king of Spain agreed in 1819 to cede "all the territories which belong to him situated to the eastward of the Mississippi and known by the name of East and West Florida." In return the U.S. government would assume the claims of its citizens against the Spanish government in the amount of $5 million. This money was to be paid to American citizens, not to the Spanish government: tech- nically speaking, the United States did not "purchase" Florida, as is often said. In addition Spain renounced her claim to territory north of the forty-second parallel from the Rockies to the Pacific, while the United States gave up its claims to Texas. America's renunciation of interest in Texas did not, of course, endure the test of time.

England's refusal to support Spanish claims in the New World re- sulted from political calculations about the European theater. In the mid- 1820s, with French troops occupying parts of a much-weakened Spain, British foreign minister George Canning began to worry about the possi- bility that France might assume control of Spain's holdings in the New World. That would upset the balance of power. To prevent this outcome he extended diplomatic recognition to the struggling republics of Spanish America, a gesture that earned accolades and gratitude throughout the continent. But Canning's motive was less than charitable, as he immod- estly declared in 1826: "Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World into existence to redress the bal- ance of the Old." Rarely had the logic of the Imperial Era found such pristine expression.

Military Conquest

In the 1820s Mexico won independence from Spain and jurisdiction over · c;c; Qf v I wil rn :'i:'i (P ,:'i1im-

18 The Imperial Era

proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Partly aimed at czarist Rus- sia's territorial claims in the American northwest, the doctrine asserted that the American continents "are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European power." It did not condemn cqlo- nization as a matter of principle; it inveighed only against colonization by European powers in the Americas. Taking note of an apparent design by the Holy Alliance to help Spain regain her colonies, President Monroe in addition warned against reinstatement of monarchical rule:

We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing be- tween the United States and those powers, to declare that we should con- sider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing [ the newly independent nations], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposi- tion toward the United States .

In one sense this statement declared the United States to be the guardian of independence and democracy throughout the hemisphere. But in an- other, more fundamental sense, it was an assertion of realpolitik. Not only would the United States oppose colonization by Europe in America; it would also oppose political alliances between newly independent nations of Spanish America and European powers.

U.S. Imperialism I: Territorial Expansion

The first phase of U .S. imperialistic policy involved territorial acquisition and absorption . Circumstances were propitious in the early nineteenth century. England and France were distracted by internal strife and by con- tinental wars. Spain was in a process of precipitous decline. New nations in the hemisphere, especially in Spanish America, would be unable to offer much resistance. As Thomas Jefferson prophesied as early as the 1780s, it would eventually become possible for the United States to take over remnants of Spain's once-formidable empire "peice by peice [sic]."

Pocketbook Diplomacy

The acquisition of Louisiana marked U.S. entry into the imperial contest. In 17 63 France lost its possessions west of the Mississippi to Spain- fortunately for the United States, the weakest of the European powers. In 1795 the United States obtained commercial rights along the Mississippi River. In 1800 Napoleon suddenly took title to Louisiana on behalf of France. Thomas Jefferson expressed shock and dismay over this develop- ment.3 "It completely reverses all the political relations of the U.S.," he declared. Shortly afterward Jefferson emphasized the importance of "one rin1TJ., rnnt-" nn f' 'lrth " .thf' nnrt nf lT,-m nrlf''lnr-thf' nnrrPrrnr nf mhirh

The European Game 19

would necessarily become "our natural and habitual enemy." The United States and France were on a collision course.

England came to the rescue, at least indirectly, as British-French ten- sions threatened to erupt in war. A beleaguered Napoleon decided to sell off the Louisiana territory: better it go to the United States, he must have calculated, than to the English. By the terms of the 1803 purchase arrange- ment, the United States paid about $15 million in exchange for a massive span ofland, one that not only included the present-day state of Louisiana but that almost doubled the territorial size of the then United States.

Florida came next, through a combination of guile and force. In 1817 Secretary of State John Quincy Adams opened talks with the Span- ish minister, don Luis de Onis, after which General Andrew Jackson seized Spanish forts at St. Marks and Pensacola. Instead of reprimanding Jackson, as one might have expected, Adams demanded reparations from Spain to cover the cost of the military expedition-allegedly undertaken against Indians whom the Spaniards could not control. Unable to obtain diplomatic support from Great Britain, the king of Spain agreed in 1819 to cede "all the territories which belong to him situated to the eastward of the Mississippi and known by the name of East and West Florida." In return the U.S. …