March 1, 2022

This is an interesting book addressing Performance Information. Usually, you? run across the term Performance Measurement,? b

Government

This is an interesting book addressing Performance Information. Usually, you

run across the term “Performance Measurement,” but this replaces

“measurement” with “information” and, I think the difference is significant. OK,

the book uses the term “Performance Management” in the title but attempting to

measure performance is at the heart of what you are reading.

How information is collected, who collects it, subsequently influences policy

decisions regarding what needs to be addressed, or what we might call “reform.”

How exactly is information used once it is collected? So, there is a relationship

between what takes place on one side (all the information collected) and the

other (using all that information in some reasonable and effective ways).

Instead of thinking of the term “Performance Measurement” which sounds

detached, objective, analytical, the term “Performance Information” raises a

whole host of questions associated with a world that is more imperfect, where

the subjective matters. As the author points out, there is information that is

gathered and used to make changes or reforms but, at the same time, there is a

selective process to what is accomplished. As a result, some aspects of

performance measurement are not achieved or even tried.

Issues such as agency leadership (at either the Federal or state level), a

culture that pervades an organization, or other issues, influence the choices made

in what is to be accomplished.

So now it’s your part. Enjoy reading this book. Address the important points

that you got out of the book—and take the time to explain what is

important and why. As part of your conclusion address a word: Cautious. This is

what you want to be, cautious, when it comes to collecting information and going

through the process of figuring out how to use it once collected.

The book that you are reading is:

Donald Moynihan, The Dynamics of Performance Management: Constructing

Information and Reform (Wash. D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2008)

1) minimum of five pages.

2) Besides covering what you need to from above, comment on what you

think about this book and why. The “and why” means that you want to get

to specifics. Think in terms of, just for example, “Here are three points I

want to raise about this book and here is the reason I want to address

them.” So avoid generalizations regarding your opinions on the book.

1 An Era of Governance by Performance Management

The beginning of the twenty-first century finds us in an era of governance by per- formance management. Frederick Mosher charted the history of government in the United States via the management characteristics of each era, portraying the twentieth century as dominated by two phases: government by the efficient (1906– 37) and government by managers (the post-1937 era).1 In recent decades, the con- cept of performance has become central to public management reform, reflecting a fusion between the key values of both management and efficiency, now more broadly redefined to include effectiveness.2

In this era, public managers are asked to justify their actions not just in terms of efficiency but also by the outcomes they produce. They meet performance- reporting mandates, are asked to do more with less, and must explain the per- formance of their programs. The public sector is expected to be able to demonstrate its value and to constantly seek new ways that foster performance. The most frequent and widely adopted reforms of the past three decades are tied to the concept of performance. Reforms that have incorporated pay-for- performance, total quality management, strategic planning, performance meas- urement, benchmarking, contracting out, increased managerial flexibility, and decentralization have consistently claimed improved performance as their ultimate goal. The assumption of these reforms is that changes in management systems could and should be made in a way that enhances performance.

The popularity of performance management is reflected in its semantic fertility. In earlier times, progressive reformers spoke simply of performance measurement. Business executives have recommended strategic planning and management-by- objective. State governments have attempted variants of performance budgeting for decades. In addition to these previous monikers, we hear about managing for re- sults, results-based reforms, and entrepreneurial budgeting. The logic common to each approach is that government agencies should produce performance informa- tion and use this information to inform decision making. There will doubtless be

Co py ri gh t © 2 00 8. G eo rg et ow n Un iv er si ty P re ss . Al l ri gh ts r es er ve d. M ay n ot b e re pr od uc ed i n an y fo rm w it ho ut p er mi ss io n fr om t he p ub li sh er , ex ce pt f ai r us es p er mi tt ed

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EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 11/14/2013 3:25 PM via LINDENWOOD UNIV AN: 228430 ; Moynihan, Donald P..; The Dynamics of Performance Management : Constructing Information and Reform Account: 092-800

additional variations that arise, adding a new luster to a core idea that has, at best, a mixed record of success.

This book is about the era of governance by performance management. It de- scribes why and how performance management systems are constructed and ex- amines the assumption that performance information is used to improve public decisions. In doing so, it argues that we need to rethink the purposes and expecta- tions of performance management.

Performance management reform has enjoyed ardent champions who have laid out a doctrine of how this reform shall save government. But it has also had critics who insist that it is, as Radin puts it, a “hydra-headed monster” that reemerges every few years despite a record of dismal failure.3 This book seeks to rethink performance management by acknowledging its weaknesses and its potential. The overarching theme of this book is that performance management has not worked as expected, but in some cases it has had positive impacts. Knowledge of the environment of agency- level actors and the nature of performance information dialogue is the key to un- derstanding when performance management can succeed. In practice, performance management reform in the United States has been a messy affair. The implementa- tion of performance management reforms has not strictly followed the recipe of re- form proponents and has not led to the benefits predicted by reformers. Despite problematic adoption, we still see benefits from performance management, largely occurring within agencies rather than among decisions made by political officials. The book introduces an interactive dialogue model to understand performance in- formation use. This model points to the ambiguity inherent in performance infor- mation. As actors with specific roles and interests communicate with one another, performance information will be used to serve those interests. The interactive dia- logue model therefore predicts that cross-institutional dialogues will see performance information used for advocacy purposes. In intra-institutional dialogues, however, interests and beliefs are more homogenous, and it is more likely that information en- genders learning and problem-solving rather than advocacy and conflict.

The current era of governance by performance management coincides with a period of antibureaucratic impulses. Proponents of performance management say that it is important not just because of improved effectiveness but also because it is necessary for the credibility of public action. Such claims are overstated because public distrust in government is fed in part by scandals and failures that are often political in nature, and controls to prevent such failures may run at odds with a per- formance approach that liberates managers. However, in a time of public distrust of government, the rhetoric of reform becomes more potent, and the language of results becomes a rare public currency that citizens view as legitimate.

How important are these performance management reforms to the actual man- agement of government? It is only a slight exaggeration to say that we are betting

4 Chapter One

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

the future of governance on the use of performance information. The current era is also characterized by a willingness to adopt new structural forms of government and controls, such as networks or outsourcing, or to simply provide greater free- dom to managers. New structural forms and modes of control raise difficult ques- tions. How do we coordinate? How do we manage? How do we control? How do we exert accountability? How do we improve? How do we engage citizens? Per- formance information is frequently cited as the answer. We are told that perfor – mance information will allow elected officials and policymakers to set goals. It will provide the basis for accountability. It will be tied to incentives. It will allow in- novations to be identified and diffused. It will improve the allocation of scarce public resources. It will allow citizens to give feedback on services. The one con- stant in visions of future government is the availability and smart use of perfor – mance information. If performance information does not prove to be the linchpin for the future of governance, we will have to return to the basic questions listed above and find some alternative answers.

Despite the importance of performance information to the future of gover- nance, we have a weak understanding of how and why it is used in practice. Gov- ernments have never been so awash in performance data, mostly because bureaucrats are required to collect and report it. The wealth of performance data contrasts with the poverty of the theoretical and empirical justifications for per- formance-reporting requirements. We have poor theories of performance infor- mation use, largely informed by a combination of common sense, some deeply felt assumptions about how government should operate, and a handful of success sto- ries. The operating theory of performance management reform appears to hold that it is an unambiguous benefit to governance, it should be adopted, and it will foster smarter decisions that lead to better governance. The current theory of per- formance information use might be characterized as “if you build it, they will come.” It assumes that the availability and quality of performance data is not just a necessary condition for use but also a sufficient one.

A Reform in Search of a Theory? Defining Performance Management and Performance Budgeting

Given the range of guises that the performance management idea has appeared in, it is helpful to start by explaining how performance management and performance budgeting are defined in this book. I define performance management as a system that generates performance information through strategic planning and perfor – mance measurement routines and that connects this information to decision venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions. Figure 1.1

An Era of Governance by Performance Management 5

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

represents a simple model of how a performance management system improves governmental decision making and performance.

In this model performance information lifts the focus of managers from inputs and processes to results. Performance management, through its production and dissemination of high-level performance information, promises governmental ac- tors common goals to pursue and an understanding of how present management structures could be adjusted to pursue these goals, improving the ability to make informed decisions about capacity. Performance information is the lifeblood of the performance management model portrayed in figure 1.1. Performance man- agement systems are designed to take information from the environment, through consultation with the public, stakeholders, public representatives, and analyses of the external environment in the strategic planning phase. Because the external en- vironment is so large, public officials need some criterion of relevance to make sense of it.4 Performance management systems provide a means by which public officials engage in coding—interpreting and refining information from the exter- nal environment and internal stakeholders into a series of information categories such as strategic goals, objectives, performance measures, and targets. After this coding takes place, performance information can then be presented to decision makers.5 Performance information also provides a language for communicating

6 Chapter One

Based on stakeholder input and previous performance, government engages in results-oriented strategic planning; goals have a clear purpose and are communicated.

Government engages in valid and accurate performance measurement that reflects progress toward results. Measures are communicated.

Performance information is communicated to employees, the public, and specific decision venues (including implementing strategic goals, resource allocation, policymaking, evaluation, performance monitoring, performance improvement efforts, benchmarking, capacity improvements).

Figure 1.1 Integrating planning, measurement, and decision venues Source: Adapted from Ingraham and Moynihan, “Beyond Measurement: Managing for Results in State Government.”

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

with the external environment, transmitting strategic goals and performance mea – sures via public documentation, speeches, websites, and other means.

Figure 1.1 also points to the linkage between strategic planning and perfor – mance measurement, suggesting that effective performance management implies the integrated use of both.6 Without the linkage, the potential for goal conflict, confusion, and inaccurate measurement arises.7 Strategic planning without per- formance measurement fails to link goals to actions or identify implementation is- sues, failures that generate a lack of credibility among stakeholders.8 Performance measurement without broader strategic guidance fosters measurement without a sense of overall purpose; a technical exercise undertaken out of habit or adminis- trative compliance, with little practical relevance for decision makers.

What is the purpose of all this activity? One justification for results-based re- form is the accountability to the external environment and elected officials.9 How- ever, public managers report that the more immediate rationale for results-based reform is improved internal decision making and improved public performance.10

High-quality information, and the ability to communicate it to the right decision- making venue in a useful and timely way, are as necessary to these interim objec- tives as to the broader accountability purposes.11 The communication of performance information is intended to act primarily as a stimulus to the decision- making process—provoking, informing, and improving the quality of decisions.12

The budget process is perhaps the most visible and important decision venue where performance information can be used. A strict definition of a performance budget is “a budget that explicitly links each increment in resources to an increment in outputs or other results.”13 This strict definition suggests an equally simple the- ory of how performance budgeting should work. Once politicians decide what level of performance they want and are willing to pay for, they fund accordingly. Pro- grams that fail to perform will lose support relative to the superior claims of higher- performing programs. The budgeting process, in effect, mimics the free market. Agencies compete for resources and chase incentives to increase performance.

This theory of performance budgeting is beguiling in its simplicity and distant from reality. Legislators are loath to link the budget decisions so tightly with any one factor, since it reduces their discretion and would ignore other relevant aspects of public programs. Paul Posner of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes this point:

Performance budgeting is not about a mechanical link between performance trends and budget decisions. If the program does poorly and it is a high prior- ity, it doesn’t necessarily mean you are going to reduce funding. In fact, you might find cause to increase funding. If the drug abuse deaths go up, you might need to increase funding. This information needs to inform the agenda, the

An Era of Governance by Performance Management 7

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

questions you ask. It doesn’t necessarily tell you the answers on a budget deci- sion because there are lots of other factors that are involved.14

If the strict definition of performance budgeting is undesirable and unrealistic, then what about another definition? In practice, performance budgeting is usually defined to suggest a loose connection between performance information and re- source allocation without detailing how decision makers should use this informa- tion. An example from Schick: “A performance budget is any budget that represents information on what agencies have done or expect to do with the money provided to them.”15 Such a definition is little different from the definition of performance management supplied above, but markedly different from the strict definition of performance budgeting.

Rethinking Performance Management

To rethink something means to challenge a dominant paradigm or set of assump- tions and to look at it in a new light. Talbot, in reviewing the study of performance management, writes: “As with many administrative arguments, for every doctrine and its justification there are often counter-arguments and it is important to record these. Perhaps surprisingly the academic critique of the ‘performance’ movement has been relatively muted.”16 The sheer ubiquity of performance management re- forms calls for a careful challenge to beliefs about performance management.

Some have started to make this challenge. An increasing literature has docu- mented the potential for performance measures to create perverse behavior, in- cluding goal displacement and gaming.17 This book is the third in a series that Georgetown University Press has published on performance management. In 2006 Radin published Challenging the Performance Movement, and David Frederickson and H. George Frederickson published Measuring the Performance of the Hollow State.18 Each book has turned a critical eye on performance management, con- tributing to what Radin calls “a new discussion about performance management that integrates the issues of complexity.”19 Each book has its own perspective. Radin draws from democratic theory to point to a basic tension between political values and the values of performance management reforms, most notably the ten- sion between the separation of powers designed into the U.S. political system and the assumption of a single central actor that characterizes performance manage- ment. Focusing on the federal level, she argues that performance management techniques fail to incorporate concerns about equity and constitute a top-down approach that excludes and demeans the professionals we rely on to implement our public programs. Frederickson and Frederickson have mapped the complexities of

8 Chapter One

un de r U. S. o r ap pl ic ab le c op yr ig ht l aw .

using performance regimes to govern the hollow state. At a time when more and more government work is being performed by third parties, federal managers are increasingly being held accountable to performance standards that are difficult to exert on third parties.

This book joins the debate on the complexities of performance management, but it does so in a number of ways that are different. I focus on understanding why performance management reforms are adopted and how the nature of adoption af- fects implementation. Radin has argued that performance management reforms can become a “one-size-fits-all” approach, failing to reflect differences between programs. Some functions are simply easier to measure and more suited to the de- mands of performance management. I also argue that performance management is more likely to succeed in some conditions than in others, focusing on other agency-level variables such as leadership and resources to explain why.

To a greater extent than other treatments of performance management, I am in- terested in how people interpret and use performance information. The main con- ceptual contribution of the book is to propose an interactive dialogue model of performance information use. The model examines how performance informa- tion is socially constructed. Talbot points out that a social constructionist per- spective has been largely absent in the literature of performance management. The social constructionist view could lead to “the conclusion that such approaches should be rejected out of hand or, more constructively, that this should lead to an approach to performance based on dialogue.”20 This book pursues the latter ap- proach, consistent with recent literature that has emphasized the role of dialogue in the policy process.21 While performance measures suggest the irreducible ob- jectivity of numbers, they are in fact ambiguous: selected, interpreted, and used by actors in different ways consistent with their institutional interests. This model suggests that a dialogue about performance across institutional interests will be more likely to be marked by conflicting interpretations and disagreement than a dialogue within an institution.

In this book I examine recent performance management reform at the federal level and the state level. While most analyses of performance management tend to focus on one level of government, the similarities between the state and federal lev- els suggest the benefit of considering both when examining how performance man- agement works. Both levels of government have the same basic political institutions. In addition, both levels of government have embraced performance management in very similar ways. Every state government has its own version of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), requiring that agency staff collect and report performance information to a central budget office, usually as part of the budget process. There is an active and ongoing interchange of reform ideas between the state and federal levels, and innovation at the federal level in the

An Era of Governance by Performance Management 9

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form of the PART program may become the next wave of reforms at the state level. The key findings of the book—the reasons performance management is adopted and used; the ambiguity and subjectivity of performance information; and the po- tential for learning—do not depend on factors unique to the state or federal level.

Given the focus of the book on U.S. federal and state governments, the appli- cation of findings to the local level or to other countries should be made carefully. The adoption of performance management routines has been enthusiastically em- braced by cities and countries around the world. Some of the basic theories pro- posed here—such as why performance management is popular and how performance information may be used—are not conditioned on any particular political institutions or tendencies. So why might performance management be different at the local level? One reason is the shorter distance between political of- ficials, managers, and the actual services delivered. While federal and even state governments deal with a broad array of services and deliver few services directly, political leaders and managers at the local level have a much easier time connect- ing performance information to the activities of frontline employees, and their services are generally more visible to the public. This context makes it more likely that performance management practices have a greater impact at the local level, and research from the local level provides some support for this view.22

When comparing to other countries, differences in political institutions and the nature of political-bureaucratic relations will create variation in the adoption and use of performance management routines. One key difference is that the decen- tralized nature of U.S. political institutions limits the ability of any single actor to establish its own blueprint for a performance management model, define the mean- ing of performance information, or determine how performance information is used. Another difference is that the deep tradition of politicization of the bureau- cracy in the form of political appointments seems to have discouraged U.S. gov- ernments from dismantling civil service systems to the same degree as other countries that have pursued performance management (see chapter 3). On the whole, compared with the benchmark adopters of New Public Management (NPM) reforms, the U.S. approach to performance management has not been es- pecially loyal to any particular prescriptive theory in adoption or as rigorous in seek- ing to link performance information to decisions in the implementation phase.

The dominant paradigm of performance management, what I refer to as per- formance management doctrine, is explored in chapter 2. Performance management doctrine is based on the logic that the creation, diffusion, and use of performance information will foster better decision making in government, leading to dividends in terms of political and public accountability, efficiency, and budget decisions. Performance management doctrine also argues that liberating managers from tra- ditional controls complements the creation of performance information.

10 Chapter One

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Performance management doctrine promises to change the nature of account- ability. For the public, performance information provides a transparent explana- tion of how well the government is doing. For elected officials, performance information provides a basis to reduce information asymmetry and exert oversight, while goal-setting routines provide an additional basis to exert policy control.23

Case findings question the extent to which performance management is really used for such accountability purposes.

In exchange for holding managers to higher standards of results-based ac- countability, performance doctrine promises to give them greater freedoms to achieve goals. In short, performance management doctrine calls for both a focus on results and greater managerial flexibility. The doctrine does not anticipate that performance information might remain unused or used in ways that run contrary to an ideal of objective decision making. As becomes apparent in later chapters, this means that many of the predicted benefits of performance management doctrine do not materialize.

In contrast to the performance management doctrine, a more critical literature points to problems with performance management and suggests it is destined to fail. This critical perspective highlights the troubled history of performance manage- ment efforts, especially efforts that sought to reorganize the budget process, such as planning programming and budget systems in the 1960s and zero-based budgeting in the 1970s. There are a number of logical reasons for these failures. One basic problem is the issue of information overload. Wildavsky pointed out that perfor – mance information systems produce mounds of information that no one particu- larly cares about and that collectively is beyond the cognitive abilities of any individual to process.24 Another criticism is that politics makes performance infor- mation irrelevant. Strong political preferences make performance information un- necessary. Relative to partisan goals, ideological biases, stakeholder pressure, and constituent needs, performance data is not especially influential. In addition, per- formance information does not help elected officials by making political decisions simpler—indeed, it is an additional layer of information to incorporate.

Performance management reforms, frequently borrowed from the private sec- tor or parliamentary systems, have been critiqued as incompatible with the sepa- rated powers of the U.S. political institutions.25 Such reforms assume that the executive branch is the critical decision …

2 Performance Management as Doctrine

What does performance management actually mean, and what does it hope to achieve? This chapter examines the basic claims made in performance manage- ment doctrine. These claims serve as a theoretical standard against which evidence on the actual implementation of performance management and alternative theo- ries can be compared. The key claim that applies to government organizations is that two mutually dependent reforms should be adopted: Managers should be given more flexibility in human resources and budgeting matters but held ac- countable by quantitative performance standards.

One of the defining tensions of the intellectual development of public adminis- tration is between the field as a social science and as a professional activity under- taken in a highly politicized environment. Frequently, decisions on running public organizations are made on the basis of what Hood and Jackson have described as “administrative arguments” or “doctrines.”1 Such doctrines are ideally suited to pol- icy choices in a political context. Doctrines are a theoretical explanation of cause and effect, often presented as factual and widely applicable. Doctrines are designed to prompt actions consistent with this explanation. Proponents of public administra- tion based on social science have exposed such doctrines as contradictory.2 Yet this style of argumentation persists, and the history of public administration is replete with examples of management doctrines, often of a very similar nature.3 As these doctrinal arguments find supporters, they become movements that seek to reform government. This persistence is due, in part, to the demand-driven nature of pub- lic sector reform. Practitioners and elected officials constantly seek suggestions on improving public organizations, and they rarely differentiate between knowledge derived from social science and plausible argument.4

Perform

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This is an interesting book addressing Performance Information. Usually, you? run across the term Performance Measurement,? b

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