What do the authors mean by semi-authoritarian regimes? Identify one country that is currently in the news that fits the d

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi-Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?

Carl Henrik Knutsen University of Oslo Håvard Mokleiv Nygård Peace Research Institute Oslo

Previous studies report that semi-democratic regimes are less durable than both democracies and autocracies. Still, mixing democratic and autocratic characteristics need not destabilize regimes, as three highly plausible alternative explanations of this correlation remain unaccounted for: (a) semi-democracies emerge under conditions of political instability and social turmoil; (b) other regime characteristics explain duration; and (c) extant democracy measures do not register all regime changes. We elaborate on and test for these explanations, but find strikingly robust evidence that semi-democracies are inherently less durable than both democracies and autocracies. “Semi-democracies are particularly unstable political regimes” should thus be considered a rare stylized fact of comparative politics. The analysis yields several other interesting results. For instance, autocracies and semi-democracies are equally likely to experience “liberalizing” regime changes more specifically, and once accounting for differences in degree of democracy, there is no robust evidence of differences in duration between military and single-party regimes.

G urr (1974) reported evidence that political regimes combining democratic and autocratic institutional characteristics are relatively short-

lived. More recent studies have confirmed that such regimes are clearly less durable than both democracies and autocracies (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006; Gates et al. 2006; Goldstone et al. 2010). Hence, there exists an indisputable correlation between having “inconsistent,” “mixed,” “partial democratic,” or “semi-democratic” characteristics and short regime durability, even when controlling for factors such as income level and time- specific effects.1 Yet, do semi-democratic institutional characteristics actually have a causal impact on regime survival? By extension, did autocrats such as Mobutu

Carl Henrik Knutsen is Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, PO Box 1097 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway ([email protected]). Håvard Mokleiv Nygård is Senior Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo, Conditions of Violence and Peace, PO Box 9229 Gronland, 0134 Oslo, Norway ([email protected]).

We thank Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Bjørn Høyland, Bethany Lacina, Håvard Strand, Tore Wig, anonymous reviewers, the current and former editors of AJPS, as well as participants at the 2013 ISA Annual Convention in San Francisco, the 2013 Annual MPSA Conference in Chicago, and the 2013 APSA Annual Meeting in Chicago for valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Jason Brownlee for making his data available. This research was partially funded by Norwegian Research Council grant 204454-V10. Replication data and code are available from the AJPS Data Archive on Dataverse (http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27371).

1Although we recognize the conceptual nuances and measurement differences between different studies, we mainly refer to regimes with a fairly balanced mix of democratic and autocratic characteristics as “semi-democracies” below. In contrast with, for instance, Przeworski et al. (2000), we consider democracy a graded phenomenon. Yet, to simplify discussion and analysis, we often subdivide the dimension according to thresholds. Hence, “democratic regimes” is shorthand for “regimes that score above a certain threshold on degree of democracy.” We denote regime changes toward more democratic forms as “liberalizing,” and toward less democratic as “deliberalizing.”

in 1990s Zaire or Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1848 Prussia grossly miscalculate when they—arguably in order to stay in power—liberalized? If introducing democratic institu- tions in otherwise authoritarian regimes harms regime survival, “why would any incumbent create or tolerate them” (Gandhi 2008, xvii)? In fact, we do not know whether the relationship between semi-democracy and short durability is causal; previous studies have failed to account for three very plausible alternative explanations of the observed correlation. Below, we elaborate on and empirically account for these three explanations.

First, semi-democratic regimes may result from pro- cesses of social unrest and political conflicts, such as op- position groups forcing dictators to partially liberalize.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, No. 3, July 2015, Pp. 656–670

C⃝2015, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12168

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INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REGIME SURVIVAL 657

Young semi-democracies may last briefly not because of any inherent regime-institutional characteristics, but rather because the turbulent, latent political and social environments they are born in are hostile to the sur- vival of any regime. Second, a large literature indicates that other regime characteristics (e.g., military involve- ment in politics, dynastic succession, or regime parties) are highly consequential for regime-survival prospects. These characteristics may, for some reason, be correlated with degree of democracy, generating a spurious rela- tionship between semi-democracy and regime durability. Third, extant democracy indices often fail to pick up fur- ther liberalization in relatively democratic regimes and deliberalization in already autocratic regimes, whereas liberalizing and deliberalizing regime changes are mea- surable for all semi-democracies. Consequently, previous studies may have overestimated the durability of autoc- racies and democracies.

Given these plausible alternative explanations, the shorter durability of semi-democracies reported in pre- vious studies may merely reflect a correlation, and semi- democratic institutional characteristics need not cause regimes to break down faster. However, the main result from our analysis below—accounting for the alternative explanations—is that semi-democratic regimes are in- herently less durable than autocracies and (particularly) democracies. Despite our strenuous efforts, we are sim- ply unable to “break” the result that regimes combin- ing democratic and autocratic characteristics have shorter life expectancies; the evidence strongly suggests the rela- tionship between regime-institutional characteristics and regime durability is causal after all. Given the general lack of robust relationships between macro-variables in polit- ical science, this is a notable result.

Below, we first review literature on regime- institutional characteristics and regime durability before discussing and empirically accounting for the three alternative explanations. To ensure consistency— between our different specifications and with the literature—our models expand, adjust, and elaborate on the duration model setup in Gates et al. (2006). Our findings do not, however, rely on this, but hold when employing alternative specifications. We find robust evidence that semi-democracies are short-lived, even when accounting for the abovementioned sources of bias. Also, when distinguishing different semi-democratic types—according to executive recruitment, participa- tion, and executive constraints—our results suggest that previously established correlations between particular regime types and durability reflect causal relationships. Nevertheless, we identify one important (general) nuance; semi-democracies are as resilient to liberalizing

regime changes as autocracies are. Our analysis yields additional results of interest to comparative politics scholars: Competitive authoritarian regimes are neither more nor less durable than other nondemocracies (see also Brownlee 2009). Furthermore, when accounting for differences in degree of democracy, we do not find robust evidence that single-party regimes are more durable than personalist or military regimes (cf. Geddes 1999).

Institutional Characteristics and Regime Stability

Gurr (1974) found that consistently democratic and autocratic polities were more durable than polities with mixed authority characteristics. He interpreted this as supporting the congruence–consonance theory in Eckstein (1973); political institutions perform better if their authority patterns are congruent with those of social institutions and, importantly, if they are internally consonant. More recently, Gates et al. (2006) reported evidence that inconsistent regimes are less durable than both full democracies and full autocracies—despite also identifying differences in durability between different kinds of semi-democracies—arguing that democracy and autocracy constitute self-enforcing equilibria whereas semi-democracy does not. Semi-democracies lack the concentration of power and authority providing stability in autocracies, but they do not provide the incentives for governments to voluntarily cede power, or for people to support the regime, that democracies do either. More- over, Epstein et al. (2006) find that partial democracies are more volatile than both democracies and autocracies; changes either to or from the former category constitute 80% of regime changes in their global (1960–2000) sample. They underscore the importance of appreciating the dynamics of semi-democratic regimes (e.g., for de- mocratization processes) and the distinctiveness of such regimes from both autocracies and democracies. Indeed, they highlight how poorly understood such regimes—in particular their short durability—actually are.

Several contributions discuss the impact of introduc- ing particular (nominally) democratic institutions, such as multiparty elections or legislatures, in otherwise auto- cratic regimes. Schedler (2002b) notes that introducing (even manipulated) multiparty elections may constitute a subversive force; elections could provide coordination signals for the opposition and windows of opportunity for organizing collective action. Elections could also pro- vide discontented parts of the winning coalition with op- portunities to split from the regime, potentially inducing

658 CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN AND HÅVARD MOKLEIV NYGÅRD

regime change (e.g., Magaloni 2006). Repeated elections, although starting out manipulated, may spread demo- cratic norms, leading to substantive democratization over time (Lindberg 2006).

Yet manipulated elections may sometimes rather in- duce further deliberalization: “The institutional ambiva- lence of flawed elections creates pressures for institutional change in both directions…. If semidemocratic elections get out of hand and start producing ‘unacceptable’ results, incumbents will strive to rescind democratic concessions made in the past” (Schedler 2002b, 109). Likewise, the mixing of autocratic with other democratic characteris- tics may reduce regime durability. Autocracies opening up the media sphere or allowing freedom of association may experience increased anti-regime collective action, since this reveals informative signals about the regime’s (un-) popularity and alleviates coordination problems (see Ku- ran 1989; Lohmann 1994). This may, in turn, lead to either successful democratization or regime crackdowns. Partial expansion of participation rights may also cre- ate viable coalitions for further such expansions, possibly extending to universal suffrage (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). Thus, regimes mixing authoritarian and democratic characteristics could be inherently unstable.

Despite the arguments and evidence discussed above, several contributions highlight the stabilizing role of mixing particular autocratic and democratic charac- teristics. The introduction of elections and legislatures, for instance, may stabilize nondemocracies because they enable co-optation of critical opposition groups (e.g., Gandhi 2008). Partial democratization (e.g., through introducing multiparty elections or institutionalized constraints on the ruler) may also credibly signal the ruler will refrain from monopolizing and abusing power, thereby reducing incentives to overthrow the regime (Boix and Svolik 2013; Magaloni 2006; Myerson 2008; Svolik 2009, 2012). In general, introducing new institutions and organizations constitutes a core survival strategy of rulers (Haber 2006), and, as discussed below, nondemocratic rulers might more often employ such costly strategies when perceiving grave threats. For example, multiparty legislatures more likely appear in nondemocracies when regimes badly need cooperation with nonregime actors and when opposition forces are strong (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Accounting for this, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) report that multiparty legislatures stabilize nondemocracies.

The potentially stabilizing effects of (authoritarian) multiparty elections have received particular attention (see Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). As noted, some stud- ies indicate that such elections destabilize nondemocra- cies. However, other studies indicate the effect is highly

context dependent (Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Howard and Roessler 2006), whereas yet others highlight their regime-stabilizing impact. Multiparty elections could stabilize nondemocracies through enabling co-optation (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006), increasing domestic and international legitimacy (Schedler 2002a, 2006), or re- vealing important information about the opposition (Brownlee 2007; Malesky 2011). Nevertheless, Brownlee (2007) does not identify any net effect of elections on regime survival in nondemocracies, and Brownlee (2009) finds no impact of being categorized either as “electoral authoritarian” (Schedler 2006) or “competitive authori- tarian” (Levitsky and Way 2002).

The discussion indicates a complex relationship be- tween regime-institutional characteristics and durability. Whereas some arguments suggest that particular com- binations of democratic and autocratic characteristics have stabilizing properties, others indicate that semi- democracies are “not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington 1991, 137). Gold- stone et al. (2010) report convincing evidence that being partially democratic is among the most important predic- tors of regime breakdown and other types of instability, such as civil war (see also Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). However, semi-democracies may generally be less durable because of several reasons, whereof a causal effect is only one. Below, we discuss and subsequently test three alternative explanations related to (a) omitted vari- able bias due to contexts of social and political instability generating regimes with semi-democratic features; (b) different types of nondemocracies (e.g., monarchies or military regimes) having different scores on democracy measures; and (c) extant democracy indices not capturing certain regime changes.

Investigating Three Alternative Explanations

Before discussing and testing the three explanations, we present how regime type is operationalized, descriptive statistics, and model specifications.

Operationalization of Regime Type and Model Specification

We employ the Scalar Index of Polities (SIP) regime mea- sure developed by Gates et al. (2006). The SIP index uses Polity’s (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) executive re- cruitment and executive constraints sub-indicators, but a

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REGIME SURVIVAL 659

FIGURE 1 Regime Durability by Regime Type 0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

A ve

ra g

e Y

e a

rs o

f S

u rv

iv a

l

1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 Year

Semi-Democracies Autocracies Democracies

Note: Average life span (y-axis) by regime type, 1800–2000. Data source: Gates et al. (2006).

participation measure from Vanhanen (2000) to ensure that SIP is not endogenous to political instability like the Polity Index (Vreeland 2008). SIP ranges from 0 to 1 (most democratic). In their analysis, however, Gates et al. (2006) employ a tripartite categorization, classifying regimes as democratic, autocratic, or inconsistent based on the three dimensions entering SIP. A polity changes results from “one or more of the following: (1) a movement from one category to another in the Executive dimension (i.e., between ascription/designation, dual ascriptive/elective, and elective), (2) a change of at least two units in the Ex- ecutive Constraints dimension, or (3) a 100% increase or 50% decrease in the Participation dimension…. Doubling the number of citizens with voting rights qualifies as a minimum change” (Gates et al. 2006, 898).

Using the Gates et al. (2006) data, inconsistent regimes (or, as we label them, semi-democracies) lasted only 9 years on average over the period 1800–2000. In contrast, the average autocracy and democracy endured 21 and 23 years, respectively.2 Figure 1 shows that whereas the average semi-democracy endured more than 15 years around 1900, the corresponding number was consider- ably below 10 from 1950 onward (see online Appendix Section A.1). This could reflect that semi-democracies in 1900 were of a different kind—encompassing European regimes with competitive elections but limited participation—than in, say, 1995, encompassing regimes with universal franchise but limited competition. Thus, accounting for more specific regime-type characteris- tics, as done below, might be important. The relative

2This pattern is robust; when using Polity and the regime-change operationalization entailed in Polity’s “regime duration” coding, regimes scoring (−6 ≤ P ol i t y ≤ 6) last 7 years on average, autoc- racies 15, and democracies 19.

durability of democracies versus autocracies has also changed, with democracies overtaking autocracies as the more durable form. Durability is high for both regime types from the 1870s to World War I. WWI brought to an end different long-lasting autocracies and introduced sev- eral relatively democratic regimes, whereof many quickly descended into autocracies. The average durability of autocracies dropped further with decolonization and the creation of new states, whereas democratic durability rose from 1950 until the late 1970s. These observations indicate that considering descriptive statistics—for any given year—is insufficient for drawing conclusions about different regimes’ duration. We run survival models to account for different problems related to estimating the impact of regime characteristics on durability.

Although our findings below generally hold for dif- ferent regime measures, duration model specifications, and controls (Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3), we present models building on the setup in Gates et al. (2006) using a duration model with a log-logistic specification of the hazard. We adjust on their core model (Model 2, 901), which controls for linear and squared gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, GDP per capita growth, regime score in neighboring countries, a first-polity-in-country dummy, and time-period dummies.

The review above indicated that mixing different particular democratic characteristics (e.g., multiparty elections or widespread participation rights) with non- democratic characteristics might have distinct effects on regime survival. Thus, Gates et al. (2006) separate semi- democracies according to placement on the three distinct dimensions of authority. For instance, they show that regimes combining open and competitive executive re- cruitment with strong constraints but limited participa- tion are particularly short-lived. Where executives are not recruited through elections, having broad-based partici- pation and unconstrained executives makes for especially short regime spells. In our analysis below, we take this in- novation one step further and simultaneously distinguish nondemocracies by additional authority characteristics— notably Geddes’s categorization of how the power of the leader is constituted.

Since the aggregated analysis (i.e., combining all semi-democracies in one category) may mask relevant dynamics, and since some of our alternative explanations actually pertain more clearly to certain types of semi- democracies than others, we also adjust Gates and col- leagues’ “disaggregated models” (2006, Models 6 and 7, 904). All results are reported in time ratios, interpretable as relative change in duration for a one-unit change on the independent variable. Hence, our democracy esti- mate in Model A1, Table 1 (3.6) implies that democracies

660 CARL HENRIK KNUTSEN AND HÅVARD MOKLEIV NYGÅRD

TABLE 1 Instability and Omitted Variable Bias: Regime Survival, 1919–2000

(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) Gates et al. Gates et al. Instability Coups Ruling Coalition Transitions Shared Frailty 1900–2000 1919–2000

Autocracy 1.850∗∗∗ 1.880∗∗∗ 1.897∗∗∗ 1.986∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗∗ 2.054∗∗∗ 1.875∗∗∗

(6.05) (5.87) (6.06) (6.18) (5.05) (6.40) (5.62) Democracy 3.613∗∗∗ 3.781∗∗∗ 3.875∗∗∗ 4.101∗∗∗ 2.251∗∗∗ 3.621∗∗∗ 3.769∗∗∗

(8.74) (8.72) (9.11) (9.04) (6.59) (8.27) (9.34) Past Instability 0.672∗∗

(−3.27) Pressure to Democratize 0.606

(−1.35) SIP Change 1.561

(1.83) Coups Last 10 Years 0.894∗∗∗

(−3.73) Ruling Coalition Duration 1.453∗∗∗

(5.39) Polity Transitions (−88) 0.0452∗∗∗

(−6.56) GDP per Capita 1.273∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 1.275∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 1.340∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗

(5.46) (5.72) (6.05) (5.38) (4.67) (5.79) (5.66) GDP per Capita Squared 1.160∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗

(5.19) (5.73) (5.63) (5.31) (4.06) (5.33) (5.68) GDP per Capita Growth 1.018∗ 1.014 1.013 1.019∗ 1.015∗∗ 1.017 1.014∗

(2.25) (1.68) (1.55) (2.11) (2.62) (1.94) (2.04) Neighboring Regimes 0.354∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗

(−4.13) (−4.05) (−3.91) (−4.58) (−4.44) (−4.28) (−4.01) First Polity 1.624∗ 1.609∗ 1.728∗∗ 1.451 1.394∗∗ 1.599∗ 1.601∗

(2.47) (2.34) (2.79) (1.94) (2.96) (2.31) (2.36) AIC 1812.6 1630.8 1620.3 1546.4 1549.9 1538.2 1632.7 ll −895.3 −804.4 −796.1 −762.2 −763.0 −757.1 −804.4 Gamma 0.645 0.645 0.633 0.646 0.448 0.628 0.644 N 7018 6341 6341 5881 6481 6341 6341 Polities 716 666 666 618 671 666 666 Failures 555 496 496 464 528 496 496

Notes: Time ratios and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported. Time dummies are omitted from the table. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.

expectedly live 3.6 times the duration of the reference category, inconsistent regimes.

Endogeneity of Semi-Democracy: Past Instability as Omitted Variable and

Elite-Led Transitions

Our first alternative explanation relates to semi- democratic institutional features being consequences of political instability, rather than causes. The codification

of certain civil liberties or introduction of multiparty leg- islatures in otherwise authoritarian regimes may actually be pursued exactly because they are expected to stabilize regimes in already precarious situations, for instance, through enabling the co-optation of elite groups (Gandhi 2008). Institutional changes may also result from calcu- lated efforts to avoid popular revolutions when perceived imminent (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006). Thus, conditions generating political and social turmoil may induce autocrats to adopt formal-democratic institu- tions to, if only temporarily, “appease” different regime

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND REGIME SURVIVAL 661

opponents (see also Przeworski 1991). An environment of social turmoil and political instability may therefore move autocracies toward semi-democracies and simultaneously reduce survival prospects for any regime controlling power. Hence, the shorter life expectancy of semi- democracies could stem from such regimes being the result of conditions generating latent regime instability. Two brief case histories illustrate the argument.

In the early 1990s, several long-established autoc- racies, from Eastern Europe to sub-Saharan Africa, saw their authority challenged. The combination of pent-up grievances and exogenous shocks contributed to government changes in numerous countries (e.g., Diamond 2008). In others, long-ruling autocrats at- tempted to defuse threats through liberalizing their regimes and sharing power. Hence, the upheavals resulted in several regimes with mixed characteristics (Carothers 2002), but some soon changed features again. Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, had been in power in Zaire since 1965, but now faced popular unrest, army mutinies, and shrinking resources for patronage (Reno 1997). In re- sponse, Mobutu ended the decades-long ban on political parties other than his Popular Movement of the Revolu- tion, promised free and fair elections, and entered into a coalition government. Yet, a couple of years later— after conditions had changed and having shored up army support—Mobutu reversed the liberalization measures: “By March 1993, Mobutu had essentially restored the an- cien régime by naming a rival government, reviving the old constitution, and reconvening the previous parlia- ment. By mid-1994, ‘Mobutu’s opponents in Kinshasa [were] too afraid of the military to march in protest down the main boulevard”’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 214).

Almost 150 years earlier, in 1848, established European monarchs also experienced popular pres- sure for liberalization following France’s “February Revolution” (e.g., Rapport 2008). However, different monarchs and their conservative supporters employed tactics similar to Mobutu’s: liberalize when faced with overwhelming opposition and popular unrest, then retract the concessions when control is regained. As a result, the “semi-democratic” arrangements resulting from Europe’s springtime uprisings were often reverted by the year’s end, and old authoritarian arrangements reinstated. This may have had less to do with charac- teristics of the new constitutions and institutions than the withering of the exogenous shock that spurred the revolutionary uprisings, and the lag time for ruling elites to shore up their winning coalitions and respond. In Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm IV faced massive protests and riots in Berlin in March 1848 and caved under pressure

to allow the popular election of the first all-Prussian leg- islative assembly. Yet, within 8 months, the king regained control with army support, dissolving the national assembly. A similar pattern played out in, for instance, Habsburg-dominated Central Europe and Northern Italy (see Palmer, Colton, and Kramer 2002, 485).

There may be something inherently unstable with the institutional arrangements of 1990s Zaire or 1848 Prussia, but the short-lived nature of these arrangements could also be functions of the underlying social and political unrest. More generally, institutional characteristics may be endogenous to past instability and political elites’ ex- pectations about future instability. To investigate this, we first establish a baseline by replicating Gates et al. (2006) in Models A1 (identical sample as their Model 2, 901) and A2 (1919–2000 time series; 1900–1919 dummy dropped) in Table 1. Model A2 is estimated to enable direct compar- isons with our adjusted models for identical samples, but A1 and A2 produce very similar results; they identify the expected time ratios (> 1) for both democracy and au- tocracy, indicating that semi-democracies (the reference category) are less durable.3

Model A3 extends A2 by adding proxies for past insta- bility and liberalization. As indicated above, autocracies forced to liberalize by popular pressures could move into the semi-democracy category, and the resulting regime may be unstable simply because of the context-specific factors that brought it about in the first place. To capture this, we include an interaction term (Pressure to Democ- ratize) multiplying Past Instability—a dummy measuring whether, in the past 5 years (up to t − 1), a country expe- rienced riots, antigovernment demonstrations, or strikes (as recorded by Banks 2011)—with SIP Change, captur- ing regime liberalization by registering increases in SIP score over the same 5 year period.4

Past Instability, SIP Change, and Pressure to Democra- tize are highly collinear—individually, only Past Instabil- ity is clearly …

Legal Manoeuvres and Violence: Law Making, Protest and Semi-Authoritarianism in Uganda

Tom Goodfellow

ABSTRACT

This article explores the interplay between violent protest and the making of laws in Uganda. It advances two main arguments. First, since multiparty- ism was restored in 2005, the Ugandan government has repeatedly drafted intentionally contentious new laws in part to provoke, divide and politically manipulate opposition. Implementing these laws has often not appeared to be a priority; rather, drafting, debating and (sometimes) passing them rep- resent tactical ‘legal manoeuvres’ geared towards political gain. Second, I argue that these manoeuvres can be linked to another trend since 2005: the rise in urban-based protests and riots, which have often become violent and resulted in aggressive crackdowns by the state. In bringing these trends to- gether, this article argues that the use of legislative processes as part of a strategic repertoire to destabilize political opposition has exacerbated unrest, especially among urban dwellers. Moreover, in response to rising protest the government has engaged in further legal manoeuvring. The analysis suggests that the semi-authoritarian nature of the regime in power, where the symbolic importance of the legislature and relatively free media contend with funda- mentally authoritarian tendencies at the centre, is propagating this cycle of legal manoeuvres and violence.

INTRODUCTION

A notable feature of contemporary Ugandan politics is the way significant numbers of laws are proposed by the government, debated in the media, brought to parliament, and then — after further heated debates &#x2

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