What were some disagreements between Egypt and Israel identified by President Carter at the beginning of the Camp David negotiations?
What were some disagreements between Egypt and Israel identified by President Carter at the beginning of the Camp David negotiations?
What determined the success of Carter’s mediation at Camp David?
Requirements: 200-300
A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience Author(s): Jacob Bercovitch Source: Review of International Studies, Jan., 1986, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 43-65 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097065JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/termsCambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Review of International StudiesThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Review of International Studies (1986), 12, 43-65 Printed in Great Britain A case study of mediation as a method of international conflict resolution: the Camp David experience Jacob Bercovitch This paper purports to contribute to the development of a theory of international mediation by considering, in some detail, the experience at Camp David and more specifically the role of President Carter. The uniqueness of this event cannot of course be ignored, but even unique cases can contribute to theory development especially if they are considered as one of a class of events. Single cases can provide a powerful impetus to the development of a general explanation as long as they are historically grounded and their description is not couched in purely idiosyncratic terms. For too long students of international relations have developed theories as normative or deductivist products making minimal use of historical experience. Recognizing the limits of such approaches, I propose to focus on a single case of international mediation, study it intensively in terms of the available data and propositions, explain its outcome in these terms and formulate potentially general izable statements about international mediation. Such an approach is likely to remain imperfect in some respects, but it seems to offer a better appreciation of the phenomenon singled out for investigation and better opportunities for developing policy relevant theories than the deductive or normative approaches.1 Mediation in international conflict International conflict is a multicausal and multifaceted phenomenon, not easily accounted for in terms of single traits or approaches. Its occurrence (unless it is violent) should not be taken as an interruption of ‘normal’ interactions. It is a natural consequence of the existence of actors with different values and interests. Like other social processes, international conflict is not an autonomous, self-exacerbating process leading inevitably to violence and destruction. It is a dynamic process whose course is determined, inter alia, by the nature of the issues, the number of the parties involved, their prior relationship and the number of outsiders involved.2 Although international conflicts rarely have clear beginnings, they may have clear endings and they terminate with a specific outcome. Broadly speaking there are three possible types of outcome. In ascending order of both parties’ expectations of benefits, these are: (a) dominance and imposition, (b) withdrawal or avoidance, and (c) compromise settlement and resolution.3 These outcomes may be reached (a) uni laterally (e.g. violence, withdrawal), (b) bilaterally (e.g. bargaining and negotiation), * I wish to express my thanks to A. J. R. Groom, Roy Jones and Sue Spivey for their helpful comments and suggestions. 0260-2105/86/01/0043-23/$03.00 ? 1986 Review of International StudiesThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
44 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience or (c) multilateral^ (e.g. binding and non-binding third party intervention). The mediation of international conflicts is an aspect of the non-binding third party efforts of conflict management. Mediation, whether by individuals, organizations or other states, has always been an important method of managing international conflicts. K. Holsti examined 77 major international conflicts between 1919 and 1965 and found that in 49 of these (or 64 per cent) there was some form of mediation and that mediated conflicts showed the least evidence of destructive behaviour.4 Zacher examined 116 conflicts between 1945 and 1977 and found that international organizations were involved in mediatory activities in 40 conflicts (or 35 per cent).5 Using Butterworth’s list of 310 conflicts in the period 1945-1974, one can find that in 255 conflicts (or 82 per cent) there was some form of official mediation.6 Whichever way we look at it, international mediation can hardly be described as being in a state of disuse. It is an important technique of conflict management. It is growing in importance because of the increase in number and seriousness of international conflicts, and it deserves a serious and systematic study. Towards a model of mediation Mediation of conflicts takes place in an impressively diverse array of settings ranging from the interpersonal to the international. It is not therefore surprising to note the absence of a single model that can be used to describe what it is exactly that mediators or third parties do. An extensive review of the literature7 as well as my own research8 suggests two basic models of mediation: a model that treats mediation essentially as a sub-set of the structure and process of negotiation, and a model which treats it very much as an independent input with its own unique features and characteristics. The study of mediation, or more accurately third party intervention, as an extraneous aspect of bargaining and negotiation is associated with problem solving workshops and other supportive techniques of conflict management.9 The third party’s role in this model is that of structuring the participants’ discussions, feeding in information derived from the third party’s experience in handling conflicts at other levels, giving the participants the freedom, opportunity and motivation to move away from official positions, and analysing the conflict and exploring new ways of looking at it. Adherents of this approach contend that once these steps have been taken, the parties will be able to clear up their misperception and misunderstanding and move gradually towards a self-sustaining resolution of their conflict. The third party, in this approach, with its provision of a unique input and establishment of an appropriate framework of interaction, transforms a conflict from a ‘problem’ to an intellectual ‘puzzle’. It focuses on interpersonal relations and utilizes psychological principles to alter the process, and content, of interactions. In this way the conflicting parties increase their knowledge and understanding, they acquire new insights into each other’s goals, intentions and fears, and they recognize their interdependence on any outcome. This experience generates new ideas and proposals and increases the possibility that innovative proposals for conflict resolution will be found and transferred to the policy formation process. The weaknesses of this model have been highlighted elsewhere.10 Only a few of these can be mentioned here. One weakness is that it is not always beneficial toThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 45 increase communication between conflicting parties as this may well increase areas of disagreement. Another weakness is that the approach provides no way of relating the workshop process to the actual policy making process.11 Yet another is the failure to tailor third party strategies to fir various levels of conflict intensity.12 An even more serious weakness is the basic assumption that once a conflict is analysed it can be resolved (how do the parties actually go about resolving their conflict?). The inter actional approach to conflict management may well be an important and useful social innovation, but it is as yet too loose and undeveloped and it leaves too many unanswered questions. It is also, of necessity, interpersonal and hence of limited relevance to the study of international conflict. A more successful model of mediation as an aspect of conflict management treats it not as a distinctive input unrelated to the nature of the conflict, but as a structural aspect of bargaining and negotiation. An analysis of mediation can, I suggest, only be undertaken if it is considered as an integral part of bargaining and negotiation. Stevens has stated that an analysis of mediation is not possible except in the context of a general analysis of bargaining and negotiation. That is unless the investigator has some theories about the agreement process in negotiations, it is difficult to see how he can analyse the contribu tion of the mediator to the resolution of conflict.13 Schelling, for his part, notes that a mediator ‘is probably best viewed as an element in the communication arrangement’.14 This is the approach which I propose to take. A mediator enters a dispute and turns an initial dyad into a triadic interaction of some kind. The mediator clearly exercises some influence, but he does so as a party in the negotiations with control over the information, learning and other resources. The way a mediator exercises his influence is thus affected by the particular context of negotiation and his ideas, attributes and capabilities. If we are interested in enhancing the effectiveness of mediation, then it is essential to achieve a proper description of international negotiation, and to give attention to the factors which link mediation to negotiation. A perspective on negotiation If mediation can only be understood as an aspect of the general structure and process of negotiation, we should first of all have a clear idea of the characteristics of negotiation and the best way of conceptualizing negotiating phenomena. Negotiation represents a special form of social interaction or decision making that (1) involves two or more parties who (2) have a conflict of interest or incompatible relationships and (3) a sufficient common interest or interdependence to motivate each party to enter into a negotiating relationship. In addition (4) their relationship is reciprocal and involves attempts to modify or manipulate each other’s cost/benefit calculations and (5) this relationship is sequential rather than simultaneous.15 Scholarly concern with the practice of negotiation is well established and sub stantial work of a variety of kinds has been produced.16 Much of this work treats negotiation by utilizing deductive arguments and conceptualizations of a highlyThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
46 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience abstract character. One way or another these approaches have been concerned with discovering determinate solutions to the problems of conflict between two inter dependent parties. They eschew any responsibility for explaining the empirical reality of negotiation, providing instead logical formulae that cannot be applicable to, or tested against, real-life data. The only approach which takes an interpretive account of the dynamic nature of negotiation in the real world is the social-psychological approach. This approach grew out of the work of Sawyer and Guetzkow.17 It was then developed in the work of Druckman18 and subsequently elaborated in my own work.19 The conceptual structure of the social-psychological approach takes account of five sets of variables?personal, goal, role, interactional and situational?as well as their interactive effect at three different time periods?antecedent, concurrent and consequent (see Fig. 1). The antecedent dimension refers to all those inputs which exist prior to engaging in bargaining and negotiation. Here we find such variables as the identities of the negotiating parties, their attitudes and cognitive differences, as well as their specific disagreement and common negotiating goals. In the concurrent dimension we find situational factors (i.e. social and physical conditions under which the process of negotiation transpires), interactional factors (such as the nature of communication between the parties and the social influence strategies which each employs), and the role variables which examine cross-cutting pressures on negotiators. The consequent dimension is the dependent dimension and it comprises the possible outcomes of (f-D antecedent” PERSONAL FACTORS identity of parties Attitudes between parties Cognitive differences Personality variables Common goals Specific disagreements ROLE FACTORS Pressure towards an agreement Pressure from one’s own group Presence of audience (f) ___ “concurrent * CONSEQUENT SITUATIONAL FACTORS Location Physical arrangements: -spatial -communication channels Open v. closed (secret) Presence of third party Presence of audience Nature of issues Number of parties + size, level of representation Time element Agenda INTERACTIONAL FACTORS Communication Social influence strategies: -demands -arguments ?proposals ?commitments ?promises -threats ?concessions OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATION Criteria for evaluating: failure: ?break off negotiation -postpone negotiation success : -on one’s terms -a fair compromise -a creative solution Figure 1. A social-psychological framework for the analysis of international negotiation.This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 47 negotiations. Negotiation outcomes are thus understood as reflecting a specific cluster of personalities, setting and other contingent variables. Mediation in international negotiation Mediation involves the introduction of a third party to the negotiating relationship. This usually occurs when a conflict is long, drawn-out and complex, the parties have reached a deadlock with their own negotiating efforts, and neither of the parties wishes to exacerbate the conflict. The inclusion of a third party has important structural implications. A third party is not an impartial political eunuch. It has its own motives, perceptions and interests. Its identity and behaviour act as a catalyst in changing the interaction between the disputants. The actions it takes, the influence it exerts and the inputs it makes are, however, related to the basic framework of bargaining and negotiation. To propose third party roles, or forms of intervention, without taking this basic fact into account, amounts to engaging in wishful thinking or futile intellectual flights of fancy. In its simplest form mediation involves three parties: two disputants and a mediator or third party. The mediator interacts with each party and with both together, and they in turn communicate to and through him. The mediator becomes in effect a party in the negotiations. His intervention creates a ‘mediated negotiation system’. This has been defined by Wall as comprising ‘the mediator, the two negotiators and the relationship among them. The environment of this system includes the negotiators’ constituents, the mediator’s constituents and the third parties who affect or are affected by the process and outcomes of the mediated negotiation.’20 Figure 2 presents Wall’s model of a mediated negotiation system. Wall’s model of mediation is a particularly interesting treatment of mediation because within its triadic structure many sets of relationships can be analysed (e.g. mediator-negotiator A, mediator-negotiator B, negotiator A-negotiator B). All these relationships can be conceived as relationships of influence and exchange in which each party has expectations, exerts influence, receives rewards and incurs costs. Within this structure a mediator acts to increase the motivation to reach an agreement. This can be achieved by modifying the disputants’ social and physical environment and influencing their perception of specific outcomes and comparison levels. Wall’s model provides a suitable structure within which the relationships between a mediator and the negotiators can be analysed. It suggests the two forms of influence which are available to a mediator, namely, influence over the negotiators themselves and influence over the negotiator-constituency relationship. The first form of influence implies such mediator functions as control of communication, establishment of basic rules and norms for negotiating, and injection of information. The second form of influence implies such functions as convincing constituents that negotiators defend their interest firmly and resolutely and persuading negotiators that a proposal may be acceptable to their constituents. The model outlined above can be used to identify a wide range of third-party functions all of which may be classified under the general categories of process functions and motivational functions. Such a model, although useful, probably oversimplifies what is in fact a complex and dynamic process. It is a structural model of mediation, not a process model. Many functions can be readily coded using this model, but the model cannot explainThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
48 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience Negotiator B’s group Figure 2. A structural model of mediation. (Adapted from Wall, J., 1981. See footnote 7.) why some strategies work better than others. To obtain better descriptions of what mediators do, can do, or are allowed to do, Wall’s model should be integrated with the social-psychological model of bargaining and negotiation. The idea is to combine the components of a structural model with those of a process model. This should improve our understanding of mediation and provide guidance for its appropriate application. Figure 3 represents an attempt to capture both the structure and dynamics of the mediation process. Mediators operate in a complex arena where personal, goal, role and interactional factors affect their behaviour, choice of strategy and likelihood of success. In their endeavours to settle a conflict, mediators attempt to exercise some influence over the negotiators, their constituents and their own relationship with the negotiators. At each phase of the conflict-management effort a mediator may employ different forms of influence, but the overall objective remains the same: to change or modify personal, goal, role and interactional factors. There can be no discussion of mediatory functions that is independent of these factors. To complete this section it seems desirable to describe the tactics and actions which a mediator may actually undertake with respect to each of these factors. These have been set out in Table 1. Research and theory concerning international mediation can, I suggest, be improved upon if they are undertaken within the framework developed above. Wanton borrowing from the field of interpersonal conflict in pursuance of novel mediatory objectives or the emphasis on one aspect of mediatory activities (e.g. effective communication) may be interesting exercises, but they are unhelpfulThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 49 (f-T) ANTECEDENT CONCURRENT CONSEQUENT -i—>r / Mediated negotiation jT_ system X, * Interactional factors Figure 3. A social-psychological framework for the analysis of international mediation. because they ignore the basic relationship between mediation and the context in which it occurs, as well as the factors which link mediation to negotiation. Different levels of conflict must be taken into account in planning a programme of mediation. Mediation that proves effective at one level may prove ineffectual, or even detri mental, at other levels. Application of the Model Can this framework of international mediation be applied to a real conflict situation? Can a single case study of conflict contribute to theory development? Both these questions can be answered in the affirmative especially if the treatment of the case study is focused in accord with the type of framework that the investigator is attempting to develop. In the second part of the paper I shall address myself to this question by examining in some detail President Carter’s mediation at Camp David. The empirical section is intended to support the plausibility of the theoretical arguments. It is not offered as a confirmation of these arguments. President Carter’s mediation took place against a background of continuing impasse in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. These negotiations had started almost immediately after Sadat’s visit to Israel in November 1977. For much of the time, at least until September 1978, they were characterized by a lack of clarity concerning the issues at stake and the procedures for conducting negotiations. A new approach was needed to take the negotiators out of the glare of publicity and ensure that some momentum towards a settlement would be maintained. Carter’s mediation, incorporating a whole cluster of notions about negotiation and conflict management, provided that approach.21This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
50 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience Table 1. Third party behaviour in conflict situations 1. Personal factors Reduce cognitive differences Clarify attitudes Highlight similar attitudes Offer facts and information Make each party aware of the other’s constraints Emphasize common interests 2. Goal factors Find underlying issues Reduce area of disagreement Expand area of agreement Suggest ‘prominent’ position Initiate proposals Reward concessions 3. Role factors Undo commitments Praise negotiators Appeal directly to constituents Threaten to abandon mediation Exert pressure Strengthen moderate tendencies within each side Allow parties to ‘save face’ 4. International factors Ensure effective communication Reduce stresses and tensions Establish procedures for interaction Maintain secrecy of proceedings Control extreme demands Establish a good personal relationship Help parties to interact informally Antecedent phase Personal factors Personal factors consist of all the characteristics, experiences and attitudes that negotiators bring with them to a negotiating situation. These factors include the identity of the negotiators, their perceptions and needs, and the degree of personal compatibility. They exist prior to the negotiations, but affect both its conduct and outcome. Identity of the parties The identity of the parties in conflict is an important and essential qualifier for any statement concerning their negotiating behaviour. Those primarily involved in theThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 51 negotiations are listed in Appendix 1. Of these, there can be no doubt that Carter, Begin and Sadat stamped their individual styles on the structure of negotiation. All three were political leaders with the power to initiate or change policies.22 All had a high self-esteem, high need for achievement and recognition, and a relatively low tolerance for ambiguity. The identity of the participants undoubtedly influenced their social behaviour. Personality variables Although it is not always possible to explore the psychological properties of leaders, it is possible to discern various personality traits and to study their effect on negotia tions. All three leaders were deeply religious men. This is a variable which figures prominently in the writings of Carter and Sadat23 and is known to have been an important factor in Begin’s behaviour. Indeed the first occasion on which the three met was at a session of prayers for world peace and justice.24 Of the three leaders, all of whom saw themselves as statesmen or men of destiny, Carter was the most high-minded. He was personally committed to the idea of a negotiated peace in the Middle East and channelled his energies towards his goal. Carter was not a person to be put off course. He persisted and persevered with the task at hand despite occasional setbacks and numerous difficulties. He was also easily-offended but could, on the other hand, be brutally direct.25 Within the negotiating context itself Carter displayed, as he was known to do with other matters, an enormous concern with details and a desire to understand fully the complexities of the issues involved. Carter immersed himself in the tortuous process of drafting proposals and explored the ramifications of every idea. In a typical engineering fashion Carter drew lines on maps of Sinai, measured distances, assessed the features of the terrain and studied other technical problems. In his speech at the White House Begin went as far as calling the tripartite summit at Camp David ‘Jimmy Carter’s Conference’. He went on to note how impressed he had been by Carter’s readiness to show ‘. . . interest in every section, every paragraph, every sentence, every word and every letter of the framework agreement’.26 In contrast to Carter’s meticulous approach, Sadat possessed a flamboyant per sonality and an impulsive streak. His decision to go to Jerusalem and address the Knesset, without consulting other Arab states, served as an indication of his boldness and courage. He tended to take a long historical perspective and to display a visionary approach to politics. He was totally uninterested in details or paperwork which he would invariably delegate to his aides. Sadat preferred instead to concentrate on broad principles. He also proved more flexible and cooperative than some of his advisers. Begin’s personality was very different. He was much more earth-bound. He possessed a fine legal mind and loved scoring debating points. His concern for the small print was legendary. He was scrupulous with every word and comma and the precise meaning of every term. He was acutely aware of negotiating protocol and proved to be a very tough, yet ultimately flexible, negotiator. Carter found Begin rigid and unimaginative27 and had serious doubts about Begin’s readiness for an historic peace.This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
52 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience Attitudes between the parties On entering negotiations the parties bring with them images and attitudes, based upon previous contact, which have a marked effect on the course of interaction. Hostile attitudes and competitive intentions serve to distort the evaluation of a given behaviour, and to make a successful outcome that much more difficult to attain. A history of cooperative relationship between the parties increases favourability and trustworthiness, while a history of competitive relationship reinforces stereotypes and unfriendly behaviour. The previous relationship between Egypt and Israel did not exactly create incentives for a strong friendly orientation. There was little trust between Begin and Sadat and more or less open animosity between Begin and Carter. The summit meeting at Camp David was conducted amidst a mood of pessimism and the only expectation was for an agreement to continue negotiation.28 The pattern of hostile and distrustful attitudes was so well-entrenched that any thought of bringing Sadat and Begin together in face to face negotiations in the first week had to be abandoned.29 Indirect communication became the norm at the highest level, while direct communication became the norm at the secondary and technical level of decision making (e.g. Ministers and advisers). Cognitive differences Cognitive differences relate primarily to cultural differences between negotiators. The more cognitively different they are, the more conflict will they experience. Just how far behavioural differences between Begin and Sadat should be attributed to cultural differences, rather than to policy differences, is difficult to determine. What is clear, however, is that Begin’s concern with, and interest in, the minutiae of security could not be easily reconciled with Sadat’s more ornate and gestural style of politics. The salience of their differences was not reduced by Sadat’s somewhat informal and relaxed negotiating style30 (in contrast to Begin’s rather stiff and all too formal style), nor by their disagreements over the precise role that the United States should play (Sadat wanted the US to play the role of a full partner, Begin wanted a much more restricted role).31 Interaction and debate between two such culturally divergent personalities with contrasting negotiating styles was possible only through the key link of a mediator. Carter was that link and he assumed a critical role in reducing cognitive differences between the parties. Role factors International negotiators are not unitary actors. As representatives of their respective governments they occupy roles which prescribe options and emphasize certain types of acceptable and unacceptable outcomes. Negotiators-as-representatives have con stituents to which they are accountable. They must arbitrate among diverse positions and decide on the ‘best’ position in particular cases. The pressures which constitutes exercise on negotiators, the negotiators’ accountability to their constituents, and their need for positive evaluation, affect the posture, decision-latitude and behaviour of each party in conflict.32 As negotiators the three leaders acted as initiators of policies, not messengers for policies. Their behaviour did, however, reflect the positions of their referrent groups and their responsiveness to their own parties andThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 53 their needs intruded on, and often impeded, their negotiation. Carter was patently desirous of a foreign policy achievement, while being aware that such an achievement would have to be fair to Begin and the Israeli people if favourable public opinion in the United States were to be secured.33 In this respect Carter found himelf responsive to the demands of his constituents, those of his own administration and his role obligations to the other negotiators. Whereas Carter was concerned with eliciting the positive evaluation of his con stituents, Sadat needed much more than a favourable evaluation. He could not afford a failure.34 Although in many ways his leadership position at the time seemed unassailable and Sadat personally felt less accountable to his constituents than either of the other two leaders, he was desperate to reach an agreement. The Russians were mistrusted, the American call for a comprehensive conference in Geneva seemed like another postponement and, worst of all, the Egyptian economy was nearly wrecked by the ruinously high expenditure on defence. These domestic pressures, coupled with the need to placate a volatile constituency, prompted Sadat to visit Jerusalem and to pursue his talks with Israel. Throughout the negotiations Sadat was well aware of these pressures. Such pressures exercised a legitimate ‘hold’ or constraint on his behaviour. Unlike Sadat, Begin could afford a failure at Camp David. In some ways he might even have benefited domestically from a weakened and discredited Sadat.35 Begin was highly sensitive to domestic opinion in Israel. He had, after all, been elected to office on a platform stressing ‘Israeli sovereignty between the Mediterranean and the Jordan’.36 Throughout the election campaign of 1977 Begin had declared that Judea and Sumaria (i.e. the West Bank) would not be yielded to foreign rule. Begin was not going to change his life-long beliefs or antagonize those who had voted him into office by abandoning his commitments or making substantive concessions. Begin’s constituents and domestic commitments exerted a direct and very potent influence on his negotiating behaviour. He had to represent a group that was more intransigent than his own position. Goals Negotiation is an exercise in conflict management. For negotiation to occur the parties must agree on some common goals as the irreducible minimum objective. Only when an agreement on these has been reached can they deal with the specific issues in conflict. Common goals Common goals refer in this context to the parties’ mutual preference for a particular course of action or outcome. First and foremost it became clear that both Egypt and Israel were prepared to build on the disengagement agreements of 1973/74 and develop a common position on the desirability of establishing peace between them. ‘No one can doubt that both sides need peace badly. For Egypt it represents the chance it has to solve the alarming problem of the economy. Israel’s problems are no less serious.’37 The desire to recognize the legitimacy of the other and to end their state of hostility acted as a superordinate goal which was indeed clear to all. Beyond that overriding objective, neither Israel nor Egypt were keen to pursue theThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
54 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience idea of reconvening the Geneva conference which the Soviet Union had consistently advocated since 1973.38 Neither party was prepared, for its own reasons, to face a united and radical Arab front, nor were they prepared to place the ‘Homeland for the Palestinian’ concept, of which Carter had spoken so favourably, at the heart of their negotiation. The United States for its part shared a common percepton with the other two parties that a new conflict-management strategy was in order. There was a general feeling that the time had never been more propitious to work for a peaceful settle ment and that losing this opportunity could be quite disastrous. All the parties shared a desire for peace, they all agreed that the time was right, and they all wanted to replace the ‘step by step’ approach to conflict (e.g. Kissinger’s preferred approach) with a new approach which came to be known as the ‘comprehensive approach’. Specific disagreements President Carter devoted the first three days at Camp David to the study of each party’s position and of the specific disagreements between them. It was only then that Carter realized just how far apart the two parties were. He summarized the specific disagreements between them as centring on the following issues:39 (a) The future status of the West Bank and Gaza where Israel insisted on its right to establish settlements and Egypt demanded that they be dismantled. (b) The Sinai, where the question of settlements and airfields remained unresolved. Israel longed to keep some of these intact. Egypt was violently opposed to any such idea. (c) A Palestinian state. This was what Begin feared most and Sadat believed was inevitable. (d) Security arrangements. Israel argued that the territories it had acquired in 1967 provided it with strategic depth, while Egypt argued that the best form of security for Israel was peace with its neighbours. (e) The status of Jerusalem. Should it be divided, and if so how? How should it be administered? (0 The meaning of Resolution 242. Egypt had continually insisted on incorporat ing the ‘inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force’. Israel argued that this principle applied only to territory taken in aggressive, not defensive, wars. (g) The refugees. There were serious disagreements between the parties over how many should be allowed to return to the West Bank, who would monitor their movement and just how far they should be allowed to make decisions about the future of the West Bank or any other piece of territory. Recitation of this list of disagreements between the parties indicates how difficult it was to bring them together. These difficulties were further compounded by differences between Begin and Sadat on how to approach these issues. Sadat felt that he had given Israel everything and got nothing in return. He wanted to concentrate on the substantive issues first and reach a comprehensive agreement. Begin, on the other hand, wanted to deal with procedural matters and the small issues at first, believing that these would be easier to deal with and that agreements on small issues might well lead to some agreement on the substantive issues.40This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 55 Concurrent phase Situational factors Location The issues of site location has important implications for conflict management because it affects the psychological climate in which the exchange takes place. Negotiating on one’s own territory confers obvious psychological advantages (e.g. control over physical arrangements, proceedings, etc.) and affects the perceived power relation between the parties. Clearly it is advisable to allow negotiations to take place in a neutral setting where neither party has any potential for territorial or psychological dominance. Camp David provided the perfect setting for negotiations between Egypt and Israel. This presidential retreat, tucked away in the Catoctin mountains of Maryland, consists of a number of cabins set in a forest of chestnut and oak trees. Most of the surrounding roads have been blocked off by a security fence and the close proximity of the living quarters proved conducive to easing the tensions between the negotiators. President Roosevelt called Camp David a Shangri-La and Begin referred to it once as a ‘concentration camp de-luxe’.41 Camp David had considerable advantages in reducing the stresses and tensions that emanate from the environment of negotiation. Physical arrangements Just as important as site location are the actual physical arrangements. Seatings, arrangements of tables and chairs and other physical arrangements can accentuate power differences or engender an atmosphere of informality. At Camp David each delegation was put in a separate cabin. Begin, Sadat and Carter occupied a cabin of their own, some distance from their respective aides. Each delegation had its own secretarial staff, personal physicians and cooks trained in the preparation of American, Egyptian and Jewish food. The flexibility of these arrangements and the proximity of all negotiators encouraged an informal social interaction and created pressures against excessive distancing, posturing or competitiveness. As to the operation of communication channels at Camp David, it is interesting to note that separate paths led from Carter’s cabin to Begin’s and Sadat’s cabin, but there was no path between the latter two cabins. Most of what Begin and Sadat had to say to each other was said through Carter. When Carter actually tried to increase direct communication between the two by bringing Begin and Sadat together on Thursday, 7 September, they attacked each other so bitterly (with Sadat actually shouting and pounding the table) that Carter had to intervene to prevent the acrimony from getting out of hand.42 From then on Carter decided that the principals would have to be kept apart lest the conflict be further exacerbated. With hostile impulses as strong as those of Begin and Sadat, Carter’s decision to curtail any overt communication between them proved important in decreasing competitiveness, threat-orientations and further aggressive behaviour.43 Wrhile restricting communication opportunities between the principals, Carter ensured that Egyptian, Israeli and US officials would meet almost continuously at a lower level of decision-making. Kamel, Boutros-Ghali, Dayan, Weizman, Vance andThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
56 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience Brzezinski met for long sessions, discussing technical details, drafting proposals and generally reducing the problem of coordination at the strategic level. In structuring the channels of communication in this way (i.e. restricted communication at a high level, unrestricted communication at other levels) Carter was able to insulate the ‘hard’ negotiators and encourage positive feelings and a perception of some value congruence amongst the other negotiators. The parties: size and level of representation Bargaining and negotiation may often involve more than just two parties. Multiparty negotiations characterize most international conflicts. As the number of negotiating parties increases, so does its complexity. More issues have to be dealt with, more personal relationships have to be accommodated, more information has to be digested and more coordination problems have to be resolved. Large numbers of negotiating parties increase the complexity of the situation and limit its compre hension. Complexity and uncertainty are important factors in negotiation. Their presence increases the ambiguity of the situation and reduces the likelihood of a successful outcome. Camp David serves as an interesting example of a tripartite summit meeting where conscious efforts were made to restrict to a minimum the number of advisers and those attending (see Appendix 1). The three leaders who had staked their political reputation on a high-risk venture agreed to bring with them a few key advisers only. This format served a number of important purposes. It allowed for strategic decisions to be made at the highest level of decision-making. It cut down the number of procedural problems associated with many participants. It increased ease of communication at the technical level, and, given the relatively small number of participants and extensive contacts between them, it increased the level of informality and intimacy between the parties. By maintaining a high degree of informality, simplicity and flexibility, Carter managed to cope with the problem of complexity and avoid paralysis in decision-making. Site openness Another factor that can affect the process of negotiation is its degree of openness or protection from public visibility. Most practitioners and scholars of negotiation agree that international negotiations should be conducted in private and that a reasonable degree of secrecy can protect negotiators and make them more amenable to a settlement.44 When negotiations take place under open conditions, negotiators may be subject to a myriad of outside pressures (e.g. newspapers, constituents etc.) all of which may interfere with the actual process and have adverse consequences. By choosing Camp David as the negotiating site, Carter managed to isolate the parties from their own conflict environment, their constituents and other interested third parties. To gain a further strategic advantage Carter decided to exclude the press from Camp David. ‘It was imperative’ he notes ‘that there be a minimum of posturing by Egyptians or Israelis, and an absence of public statements, which would become frozen positions.’45 As the negotiations drew to a close, Carter became aware of another advantage which followed from the secret nature of the process. ‘The intense personal relationships during the negotiations stripped away the facade with which people in public life often surround themselves for self-protection. We had noThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 57 need, while working in the privacy of Camp David, to convince the public that we were wise, forceful, consistent, or superior in our negotiating techniques.’46 Carter not only ensured the privacy of the proceedings, he also successfully controlled the flow of information out of Camp David. In their book on Sadat, Hirst and Beeson write of the hundreds of journalists meeting daily in the Legion Hall at Thurmont (a small town about six miles from Camp David) to receive their one and only briefing.47 Carter’s press secretary, Jody Powell, would reveal nothing of substance in his briefings. The restrictions on information, and their control by Carter, did not permit public opinion to coalesce in support of a certain position, and to this extent freed the decision-makers from some important cross-pressures. Nature of the issues In addition to modifying some features of the social and physical environment, a mediator can help the parties to identify the issues in conflict, order them in terms of their importance, and make recommendations concerning the way they should be addressed. By identifying issues, and ordering them, a mediator can help the parties evaluate the scope of their conflict and the degree of incompatibility between them. There were clearly many issues in the dispute between Egypt and Israel. Some of the issues were of a tangible nature (e.g. return of Sinai), others of an intangible nature (e.g. recognition of Israel). Carter was able to move the parties towards a settlement by targeting, and clearly identifying, the issues that should be considered, and by focusing primarily on tangible issues (e.g. the Sinai desert, oil fields, airbases, settlements etc.). The much more intractable intangible issues were sidetracked for discussion at a later time when sufficient momentum towards an agreement had been achieved. Carter was very much at the centre of communications at Camp David. He was able to determine which issues should be discussed, to convert intangible issues into more tangible ones, and to determine the differential importance of issues. He encouraged the principals to negotiate first those issues on which an agreement could be found. He manipulated their perception of the reward structures associated with different issues so as to avoid the ‘winner takes all’ type of outcome. In addition to all that, he saw to it that the issues at stake would not be considered one by one, but as a set under a single umbrella concept (i.e. the withdrawal-security principle). Time limits International negotiations often drag on for months, or even years (e.g. SALT negotiations, MBFR, Law of the Sea, etc.). Given the complexity of the issues in the Middle East conflict and the high level of distrust between the parties, the negotia tions between Egypt and Israel could have taken a very long time indeed. That they did last ‘only’ thirteen days is a tribute to Carter’s astute manipulation of the dead line device. The phenomenon of negotiations which take months and are then concluded at the ‘eleventh hour’ is by no means uncommon. Time limits, imposed by a mediator, create this ‘eleventh hour’ effect and produce a rush for concessions. The imposition of time limits operates as a force in bringing the parties together. This was clearly evident at Camp David. After numerous discussions between the parties many issues remained unresolved by Saturday, 16 September 1978. Carter threatened to withdrawThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
58 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience his services as a mediator if an agreement could not be reached by the following day. He gave both parties less than forty-eight hours to make the necessary concessions. A flurry of negotiating activities and meetings followed his announcement and the ‘Framework for Peace’ was agreed upon just hours before Carter’s Sunday dead line.48 The agenda An agenda structures the content of negotiations. It represents the issues which the parties are prepared to discuss and the framework within which they will be discussed. An agenda embodies the basic rules of accommodation between the parties and prescribes tacit codes of behaviour and norms of interaction. Traditionally, parties in international negotiation have a formal, well-designed and specific agenda in front of them. They discuss each issue in turn until the requisite concessions have been made. This was not, however, the case at Camp David. Here the outcome reflected basic negotiating principles and the activities of a mediator determined not to be bound by any agenda. All the parties met at Camp David without any prepared agenda. The issues that were subsequently discussed were identified by Carter who had spent the first few days studying each party’s position. Having identified the issues and the width of the gulf separating the parties, Carter became convinced that the customary incremental search for concessions would be unfruitful. He realized the futility of moving from issue to issue when the two sides were so far apart. It was at that point that Carter decided to modify the parties’ perception of the issues by introducing a single draft that would subsequently serve as the basis for all future drafts. Egypt and Israel would then discuss the draft and concede, not to each other, but to the mediator. With no clear notion of a final goal, the single negotiating draft allowed for much greater flexibility than a formal agenda. Carter first met the Israeli team, listened to their reactions and criticisms, wrote a draft paper and then took it back to Begin. The same drafting and re-drafting occurred after Carter’s meetings with Sadat. Neither side was asked to concede or accept anything, merely to offer criticism of the draft. Based on this criticism, new drafts would be prepared and the tortuous process of meetings and drafting went on and on. New sets of changes were incorporated until finally the twenty-third draft became acceptable to both parties.49 Rather than devise a formal agenda, Carter went through cycles of drafting and redrafting. The single negotiating draft permitted negotiation to go on until the right blend of agreement and ambiguity was found. It shifted the centre of negotiation from the need to hunt for concessions to basic criticisms of a single text. Fewer decisions were needed, fewer complex issues were faced and fewer trade-offs were required. The parties were merely asked to listen, criticize and suggest improvements to a single document. The advantages of working with a single, comprehensive text were evident at Camp David. Interactional factors Interactional factors define the parameters of the actual process of bargaining and negotiation. We can think of this process as having two broad dimensions: (1) com munication and (2) social influence strategies. The former describes the way theThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 59 parties announce their positions, bids, demands, offers and concessions; the latter refers to their attempts to hold out or converge on a settlement. The presence and activities of a mediator can modify both these dimensions. Nature of communication The form, and type, of communication are undoubtedly the primary ingredients of conflict management. Generally speaking the more communication the parties exchange, the easier it is to reach an agreement. One of Carter’s initial tasks was to ensure that Egypt and Israel would resume direct communications (these had ceased in January 1978). Against a background of continuing impasse, and the need for a foreign policy success, the first requirement was to re-establish communication between the principals. Not only did Carter re-establish communications, he also controlled the availa bility and use of communication channels at Camp David. After the first face-to-face meeting between Sadat and Begin, it became quite clear that any direct communica tion between the two would deteriorate into an unproductive argument and open old wounds. A different strategy was clearly in order. The new strategy involved Carter in a series of bilateral communications during which all the difficult issues were discussed. Begin and Sadat met again only when an agreement appeared likely. The norms governing communication at Camp David were mainly informal. Carter would meet with Begin and Sadat as well as with their advisers. Typically agreements were reached in informal meetings with advisers and these would then be taken back to Begin and Sadat for comment and approval. Carter thus found himself engaged in communication at two levels: the level of principle (with Begin and Sadat) and the level of detail (with Dayan, Weizman etc). Carter’s ability to build up trust and communicate effectively at both levels contributed significantly to achieving a settlement that was acceptable to both parties.50 Carter was able to exercise considerable control not only over the communication channels, but also over the transmission of messages. Carter did not just act as a ‘go between’ transmitting messages from one party to another, he acted instead as a ‘conceptual filter’, commenting on, for instance, the characteristics, ambiguity or accuracy of transmitted messages. In this way Carter shaped the parties’ orientations and expectations. He transmitted messages and influenced the parties’ perceptions of these messages by examining the meanings attributed to them. Carter’s mediation imposed a structure on the content of communication at Camp David. A structure which increased understanding, responsiveness and willingness to initiate con cessions. Social influence The social influence dimension consists of strategies designed to alter another party’s perception of the costs and benefits that can be associated with particular outcomes. Negotiating parties find themselves in an interdependent relationship in which they seek to obtain information about each other’s intentions and to influence these inten tions. The range of influence strategies is obviously dependent upon the kind of information each party can obtain. In general, though, influence strategies can be divided into (1) positive (e.g. promises) and (2) negative (e.g. threats). At Camp David, Carter used both promises and threats with considerable frequency toThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
60 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience increase the likelihood of a specific proposal being accepted. As early as the third day (Thursday, September 7) Carter told the Israelis, quite forcefully, that he expected them to freeze their settlement activities in the West Bank.51 He offered his own interpretation on some of the major issues in dispute (e.g. the precise meaning of UN resolution 242). He invited each leader to put forth his views to the other. He asked for comments and criticisms and continually appealed to both Sadat and Begin not to sabotage the summit.52 Carter’s mediation used every avenue of persuasive com munication to establish the outer limits of the process. In a situation of social inter dependence this form of mediation can affect the intensity of motivation, the attrac tiveness of various outcomes and generally achieve a higher degree of progress. Persuasive communication was only one aspect of Carter’s social influence role. He used both threats and promises to change the parties’ preferences and dispositions concerning various courses of behaviour. When Carter felt that Begin was not prepared to make any concessions on the settlement issue, he used the threat of accusing Israel in front of Congress and public opinion.53 The threat of being denounced publicly was also used against Sadat when Sadat indicated on Tuesday, September 19, that he was ready to pack his bags and leave Camp David.54 This form of mediatory power created pressures which neither Israel nor Egypt could ignore. They were used in stalemate situations only and were ultimately effective in influencing the parties’ expectations and behaviour. Warnings and threats were accompanied by promises of rewards and incentives. Carter offered US aid to Israel to replace her Sinai airbases with two new bases in the Negev. Egypt too was given to understand that it could expect massive economic aid at the conclusion of the negotiation. The substantial amounts of economic aid promised by Carter were later calculated as being $2 billion in the case of Egypt and $3 billion for Israel.55 It may be difficult to assess precisely how the parties’ percep tions and expectations were altered as a result of mediatory threats, warnings and promises. At the very least these forms of social influence changed the motivational structure that contributed to, and sustained the conflict for so long. A proper under standing of mediation requires a definition and classification of the social influence strategies and the specific tactics which a mediator may use. Few activities are likely to be as maximally effective in changing parties’ behaviour as the social influence activities of a mediator. Consequent phase Outcome All negotiations terminate with a specific outcome. Negotiating outcomes may be explicit or implicit. They may be embodied in an agreement that yields high joint benefit, or in a compromise that benefits one party only. The nature of a negotiating outcome is determined, inter alia, by the parties’ assessment of the costs and benefits associated with their choice of (1) reaching an agreement, (2) continuing negotiation, or (3) abandoning negotiation. Of these three courses of action (1) is usually profit able, while (3) is usually costly. This is not to suggest that all negotiations can terminate with an agreement. Some disagreements are very difficult to resolve. When a negotiation does, however, terminate with an agreement, we can order it differently on the preference scale of each party, but we should look at it as a common denomThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 61 inator which can create an optimistic attitude and encourage the parties to continue their efforts to reach better agreements. The Camp David negotiations terminated with an explicit agreement. It was not an integrative agreement, nor did it remove all disagreement between the parties. The agreement was one of the possible compromises whose joint value became apparent later. Two explicit documents were produced. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel was signed, back at the White House, on Sunday, 17 September 1978. This was accompanied by a second document, The Framework for Peace in the Middle East (referring to the West Bank and Gaza) which was not contingent on the first and was couched in a deliberately ambiguous and obfuscating language. A few months later, despite a host of obstacles, Egypt and Israel signed a formal peace treaty on 26 March 1979. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel concluded Carter’s mediatory efforts. His efforts created a more promising situation which improved the prospects of achieving better, and as yet, unfulfilled goals. Between the extreme positions of warfare and a satisfactory resolution there are various positions of negotiatory progress. Carter’s achievement was to get both belligerents to consider warfare too costly and commit themselves to search for better agreements, to build up a momentum in their search for an agreement and to fit contending positions into a multilateral treaty. The treaty itself was neither a miracle nor a disaster. It left many questions unanswered and it did not, alas, bring peace to the region. It did, though, represent a logical extension of Kissinger’s principles of incrementalism (i.e. ‘step-by step’) which had begun in 1973 and the culmination of effective American mediation. The peace treaty created a new reality and shifted the priorities towards new strategies of conflict management away from violent behaviour. It provided the parties with a respite from the pressures of war. Unless all the parties in the Middle East learn to assimilate the lessons and opportunities of this new reality, the hope for a comprehensive peace will be at best a frustrating hope. Conclusion In view of the tremendous complexities of conflict management, it is no wonder that social scientists are in sharp disagreement as to how best to study it. Some think it is wise to obtain detailed information about one or two cases, others go for more cases but offer fewer details. Whichever mode of explanation is attempted, one must go beyond searching for facts only. Certain assumptions must inevitably be invoked, conclusions about human motivation and behaviour must be inferred, and lessons of broader applicability must be drawn. Thus, one utilizes historical fact in order to get beyond the single case, in order to understand, and deal effectively with, similar cases. This can only be done by stating one’s assumptions and theoretical choices, and constructing a conceptual framework which can be used in grouping or organiz ing material and illuminating the critical elements in negotiation and mediation processes. In this paper I have looked at international mediation within the broader context of bargaining and negotiation. Having identified the many conditions and variables which affect the outcomes of bargaining and negotiation, I then examined a single case of international mediation and attempted to offer a systematic explanation of the circumstances and conditions that fostered its effective use. The objective hereThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
62 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience was to demonstrate the analytical utility of the conceptual framework and to suggest a number of broad statements about the structure and process of international mediation. International mediation is a form of conflict intervention which requires the prior acceptance and cooperation of the parties. Having secured these, a mediator occupies a central role in the process of conflict management. From this position the focus of the mediator’s activity is on modifying the physical, situational and structural aspects of the process. A mediator can thus fulfil many functions. He can facilitate under standing, increase communication, propose solutions and move the parties towards a particular outcome. He can modify the issues in dispute and introduce new issues and alternative solutions. He can manipulate goal-perceptions and increase the motivation to reach an agreement. A mediator’s role in conflict situations amounts to changing, extensively or minimally, the physical, social and structural constraints that affect the process of bargaining and negotiation. The ultimate measure of mediation effectiveness is its ability to modify the situation and process of bargaining and negotiation (and not just tinker with one aspect of it, e.g. facilitate communica tion). President Carter’s mediation at Camp David was successful. Its success was not so much a function of his perceived impartiality or acceptability, but of his timing, skill and, most importantly, control over resources which both parties desired. Mediation is an aspect of bargaining and negotiation. Just as we recognize the importance of bargaining resources, we should recognize the crucial role that mediatory resources play in determining the outcome of a conflict. We should now identify these resources more specifically and evaluate their relevance to different types of conflict. There are formidable obstacles ahead, but if scholars and practitioners can draw upon their understanding of single and comparative cases of mediation and blend their perspectives, some of these obstacles may be overcome. I can think of no better way of organizing our research efforts in conflict management. Appendix 1 Personnel Present at the Camp David Negotiations, 6-17 September 1978 Representing Egypt: Anwar el-Sadat, President Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Minister of Foreign Affairs Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Osama el-Baz, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ashraf Ghorbal, Ambassador to the United States Ahmed Maher, Director of the Foreign Minister’s Cabinet Abdul Rauf el-Reedy, Director of Policy Planning, Foreign Ministry Nabil el-Araby, Legal Director of Foreign Ministry Ahmed Abou el-Gheite, Office of the Foreign MinisterThis content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 63 Representing Israel: Menachem Begin, Prime Minister Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister Ezer Weizman, Defence Minister Aharon Barak, Attorney General and Member-designate of Supreme Court Avraham Tamir, Major General, Director of Army Planning Branch Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Foreign Minister Elyakim Rubenstein, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Advisor to the Prime Minister Representing the United States: Jimmy Carter, President Walter M?ndale, Vice President Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to the President Hamilton Jordan, Staff of the President Jody Powell, Press Secretary of the President Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Alfred Atherton, Ambassador at Large Hermann Eilts, Ambassador to Egypt Samuel Lewis, Ambassador to Israel William Quandt, Staff of National Security Council Source: Carter, Jimmy: Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London, Collins, 1982). Notes and references 1. For a discussion of the logic of this approach see A. George, ‘Case studies and theory development: The method of structured focused comparison’, in P. G. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy {New York, 1979), pp. 43-68. 2. On the conditions influencing the course of conflict, see M. Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, 1973). 3. Resolution is a special form of conflict termination that is associated with supportive techniques and a change in the parties’ attitudes and perceptions. It is particularly important in the work of Burton and Doob. See J. W. Burton, Conflict and Communication (London, 1969); L. Doob (ed.), Resolving Conflict in East Africa: The Fermeda Workshop (New Haven, 1970). On conflict outcomes in general see K. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York, 1962) and L. Kriesberg, Social Conflicts (Engle wood Cliffs, NJ, 1982). 4. K. Holsti, ‘Resolving International Conflict: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and Some Figures on Procedure’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10(3), 1966, pp. 272-296. 5. M. Zacher, International Conflicts and Collective Security (New York, 1979). 6. R. L. Butterworth, Managing Interstate Conflicts, 1945-1974 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1976). 7. I refer in particular to the work of Burton, op. cit. and Deutsch, op. cit. Also to R. Fisher, ‘Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16(1), 1972, pp. 67-95; J. Z. Rubin (ed.), Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East (New York, 1981); R. Walton, Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confronta tions and Third Party Consultation (Reading, MA, 1969); O. R. Young, The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises (Princeton, NJ, 1967); J. Z. Rubin, ‘Experimental Research on Third Party Intervention in Conflict’, Psychological Bulletin, 87(3), 1980, pp. 379-391; and J. Wall, ‘Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(2), pp. 157-180.This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
64 International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience 8. J. Bercovitch, Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution (Boulder, CO, 1984). 9. See Burton, op. cit., Doob, op. cit. See also Burton, ‘Resolution of Conflict’, International Studies Quarterly, 16(1), 1972, pp. 5-30; Doob and Foltz, ‘The Belfast Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17(4), 1973, pp. 489-512; S. Cohen, et al., ‘Evolving Intergroup Techniques for Conflict Resolution’, Journal of Social Issues, 33(2), 1977, pp. 165-188 and H. Kelman, ‘The Problem Solving Workshop in Connict Resolution’, in R. L. Merritt (ed.), Communication and International Relations (Urbana, IL, 1972), pp. 168-204. 10. See J. Bercovitch, op. cit. 11. This is known as the problem of transference or re-entry (how to transfer changed attitudes and perceptions to the policy process). On this issue see Bercovitch, ‘Resolving the Middle East Conflict: A Non-Traditional Approach to International Conflict’, International Problems, 16(2), 1977, pp. 89-99. 12. A third party strategy that proves effective at a relatively low level of intensity may prove ineffective or even counterproductive in a high-density conflict. See Rubin (1980), op. cit. 13. C. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations {New York, 1963), p. 123. 14. T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA, 1960), p. 44. 15. These characteristics are discussed further in Bercovitch, ‘Problems and Approaches in the Study of Bargaining and Negotiation’, Political Science, 36(2), 1984, pp. 125-144. 16. Ibid. See also G. Shea, ‘The Study of Bargaining and Conflict Behaviour’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(4), 1980, pp. 706-741. 17. J. Sawyer and H. Guetzkow, ‘Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations’, in H. Kelman (ed.), International Behaviour: A Social Psychological Analysis (New York, 1965), pp. 466-520. 18. D. Druckman, Human Factors in International Negotiations: Social-Psychological Aspects of Inter national Conflict (Beverly Hills, CA, 1973). 19. Bercovitch, op. cit. 20. Wall, op. cit., p. 158. 21. For an account of the negotiations at Camp David see S. Zion and W. Dan, ‘The Untold Story of the Middle East Talks’, New York Times Magazine, 21 January 1979. 22. Key decision makers with a strong and secure power-base tend to negotiate more cooperatively than delegates. See M. Hermann and N. Kogan, ‘Negotiation in Leader and Delegate Groups’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12(3), 1968, pp. 332-334, and H. Lamm and N. Kogan, ‘Risk Taking in the Context of Intergroup Negotiation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6(3), 1970, pp. 351 363. 23. See J. Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London, 1982) and A. Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (London, 1978). 24. See International Herald Tribune, 8 September 1978. 25. Brzezinski recounts how distressed and agitated Carter would be after his meetings with Begin and also how adept he was at breaking protocol (e.g. talk to Weizman and Barak rather than to Begin) in a manner that would upset Begin. See Z. Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York, 1983). 26. Text of Begin’s speech at the White House, The Jerusalem Post, 22 September 1978. 27. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 255. 28. See The Times, 4 September 1978. 29. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 359-364. 30. See Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 256-258. 31. See S. Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton, NJ, 1982), p. 298. 32. For a review of the effects of these factors in international negotiation see F. Ikl?, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964). 33. See Carter, op. cit., p. 338. 34. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 253. 35. Ibid. 36. See The Jerusalem Post, 13 May 1977. 37. Financial Times, 14 August 1978. 38. For an analysis of Soviet objectives in the Middle East see R. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, 3rd Ed. (New York, 1982), and J. Steele, The Limits of Soviet Power (London, 1984). 39. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 353-355.This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Jacob Bercovitch 65 40. Begin’s belief in this respect is supported by Fisher’s notion of fractionating conflict. See R. Fisher, ‘Fractionating Conflict’, in R. Fisher (ed.), International Conflict and the Behavioral Sciences (New York, 1964), pp. 91-110. 41. The Guardian, 7 September 1978. 42. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 352-355. 43. Providing parties with the opportunities to communicate does not necessarily produce effective communication. Strong role factors and commitment to one’s group impair the ability to communicate effectively. See M. Deutsch and R. Krauss, ‘Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16(1), 1962, pp. 52-76. 44. See Ikl?, op. cit. See also H. Nicolson, Diplomacy (Oxford, 1969) and W. Harrimann, ‘Observations on Negotiating’, Journal of International Affairs, 29(1), 1975, pp. 1-6. 45. Carter, op. cit., p. 318. 46. Ibid., p. 402. 47. See D. Hirst and I. Beeson, Sadat (London, 1981), pp. 302-305. 48. See the Sunday Times, 24 September 1978. 49. For an account of these successive drafts see The Jerusalem Post, 26 September 1978. 50. It is interesting to note that Begin and his advisers were convinced that Carter’s control over communication and his understanding of details was due to the American ‘bugging’ of the cottages at Camp David. See M. Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiation (London, 1981), p. 178. This was, of course, denied by American officials. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 254. 51. Carter, op. cit., p. 349. 52. For an interesting account of Carter’s direct and active mediation see C. Vance, Hard Choices (New York, 1983). 53. Dayan, op. cit., p. 193. 54. Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 271-272. 55. See The New York Times, 16 February 1979.This content downloaded from 146.244.101.138 on Wed, 10 Mar 2021 14:15:06 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
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